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Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

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Page 1: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Chapter 16

Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Page 2: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

The Big Questions

1. What is the role of the central bank?

2. What are central bank objectives?

3. How are successful central bank’s organized?

My presentation differs from Mishkin’s

Page 3: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Central Banks

• There are about 170 central banks in the world today. Nearly every country has one.

• Central Banking is largely a 20th-century phenomenon. In 1900, only 18 countries had central banks.

• When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, the 12 of the 15 republics had central banks within a year

Page 4: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Web Links

www.bis.org

Page 5: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Role of the Central Bank: The Government’s Bank

Manage the finances of the government.

Control the availability of money and credit.

• They create money.

• Monetary Policy – Expansionary/Tight

Page 6: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Role of the Central Bank:

The Banker’s Bank Three important day-to-day functions of

the central bank Manage the payments system (settle inter-bank

payments).

Provide loans during times of financial stress (the lender of last resort credits facilities).

Oversee commercial banks and the financial system to ensure confidence in their soundness (regulatory oversight).

Page 7: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

The Primary Objectives of all Central Banks

Low, stable inflation High, stable growth with high employment stable financial markets interest rate stability exchange rate stability

Page 8: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Should Price Stability be the Primary Goal?

• In the short run, goal of price stability can conflict with the goal of high employment. Conflicting goals implies trade-off

• By law, the goals of the Fed are price stability and high employment Known as the “dual mandate” – price stability

and high employment

• ECB has a hierarchical mandate, price stability first, then growth and employment

Page 9: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Why is Low and Stable Inflation Desirable?• Usefulness of money as a store of value and

medium of exchange reduced by inflation.

• High inflation is accompanied by unpredictable inflation makes bonds risky.

• In this environment:

• i = r + πe + risk premium.

• Long-term planning difficult• Home Mortgage

• Retirement planning.

Page 10: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Stable Inflation: US. Inflation From 1970Consumer Price Inflation

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 200 200

Page 11: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

How Low Should Low Be?

• No agreement.

• Zero inflation is probably too low.

- risk of deflation (a drop in prices) which in turn results in increased defaults on loans and a threat to the health of banks.

• Should there be an inflation target in the US?

• Some countries have explicit inflation targets - generally at 2%.

Page 12: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Why is High & Stable Growth Desirable?

• Stable countries grow faster• unstable growth creates risk

• risk increases interest rates

• higher interest rates mean lower investment

• lower investment means lower growth

Page 13: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Countries with stable growth grow faster

Page 14: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

US GDP Growth Rate from 1960

Real GDP Growth

-5

0

5

10

15

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

4-q

uar

ter

Per

cen

tag

e C

han

ge

Page 15: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Stable Financial Markets

• Financial collapse of the 1930s.

• Fed’s actions under Greenspan 1987, 1997, 2001

• Fed’s actions under Bernanke Yellen’s primary concern is growth

• Central banks want to minimize the risk of a disaster - keep the chance of maximum loss as small as possible.

• Value-at-Risk

Page 16: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Origins of the Federal Reserve System• Strong resistance to establishment of a central

bank in the US:• Fear of centralized power

• Distrust of moneyed interests

• No lender of last resort Nationwide bank panics on a regular basis Panic of 1907 so severe that the public was

convinced a central bank was needed

• Federal Reserve Act of 1913 Elaborate system of checks and balances Decentralized

Page 17: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Structure of the Federal Reserve System

• Designed to diffuse power along the following dimensions:

─ Regions of the U.S.─ Government and private sector interests─ Needs of bankers, businesses, and the public

• The system as it exists now includes:─ Twelve Federal Reserve Districts─ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System─ Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)─ Member Banks (around 2,800)

Page 18: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

The Federal Reserve System - Structure

Twelve Regional Banks

Page 19: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Twelve Regional Federal Reserve Banks

• Quasi-public institutions owned by the private commercial banks in the district that are members of the Fed system

• Member banks elect six directors for each district; three additional directors are appointed by the Board of Governors Three Class A directors are professional bankers Three Class B directors are prominent leaders from

industry, labor, agriculture, or consumer sector Three Class C directors appointed by the Board of

Governors are not allowed to be officers, employees, or stockholders of banks

Page 20: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Functions of the Regional Federal Reserve Banks

• Clear checks

• Issue new currency and withdraw damaged currency from circulation

• Administer and make discount loans to banks in their districts

• Evaluate proposed mergers and applications for banks to expand their activities

Page 21: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Regional Federal Reserve Banks and Monetary Policy

• They “establish” the discount rate

• Decide which banks can obtain discount loans

• Five of the 12 bank presidents have a vote in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)

Page 22: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Special Role of the FRB of New York

• The New York Fed houses the open market desk. All of the Feds open market operations are directed through this trading desk.

• The president of New York Fed is the only permanent member of the FOMC, serving as the vice-chairman of the committee.

Page 23: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Member Banks

• All national banks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve System

• Commercial banks chartered by states are not required but may choose to be members

• Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (affectionately referred to as MCA) subjected all banks to the same reserve requirements as member banks and gave all banks access to Federal Reserve facilities

Page 24: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

• Seven members headquartered in Washington, D.C.

• Appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate

• 14-year non-renewable term

• Chairman is chosen from the governors and serves four-year term

http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/default.htm

Page 25: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Duties of the Board of Governors

• Serve on the FOMC and vote on conduct of open market operations

• Set reserve requirements within a statutory range of 8 to 14 percent for transactions deposits and 0 to 9 percent for non-transactions deposits.

• Control the discount rate through “review and determination” process

Page 26: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Duties of the Board of Governors (cont’d)

• Set margin requirements

• Approve bank mergers and applications for new activities

• Supervise the activities of foreign banks operating in the U.S.

Page 27: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)

• Meet eight times a year

• Consists of seven members of the Board of Governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the presidents of four other Federal Reserve banks

• Chairman of the Board of Governors is also chair of FOMC

• Issues directives to the trading desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Page 28: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Principles of Central Bank Design(How do you structure a Central Bank)

• Independent

• Decision-making by committee

• Transparency

• Accountability

Page 29: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Principles of Central Bank Design: Independence

• Politicians have an incentive to create short-term prosperity at the expense of inflation in the long-term.

• Central bank policy makers must think in terms of long-term inflation.

• To keep inflation low, monetary decisions must be made free of political pressure.

Page 30: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Is the Fed Independent ?Factors making Fed independent1. Members of Board have long terms (14 years)

2. Fed is financially independent (this is most important).

Income on bond portfolio, check clearing and

loans to commercial banks.

3. Instrument independence and goal independence Fed is free to choose instruments Fed is free to set goals of monetary policy FOMC policies can not be reversed

Factors making Fed dependent1. Congress can amend the Federal Reserve Act

2. President appoints Chairmen and Board members and can influence legislation

Overall: Fed is quite independent

Page 31: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Financially Independent• In 2013,

• Earned about $90 Billion on securities

• Expenses: interest on reserves of $5.2 Billion and other expenses of $7 Billion

• Turned $78 Billion over to Treasury

• 2014 - earned $115B on securities and turned over $98B to Treasury.

Page 32: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Instrument and Goal Independence• Instrument Independence: the ability of the central bank to

set monetary policy instruments. Increase/decrease in interest rates

Increase/decrease in money supply

• Goal Independence: the ability of the central bank to set the goals of monetary policy Inflation

Growth and employment.

• The Fed has instrument and goal independence

Page 33: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Should The Fed be Independent?Case For:• Independent Fed has longer-run objectives,

politicians don't. • Data shows independence produces better policy

outcomes.• Avoids political business cycle• Less likely deficits will be inflationary

Case Against:• Fed may not be accountable• Hinders coordination of monetary and fiscal policy

Page 34: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Principles of Central Bank Design: Decision-Making Framework

• Should policy be made by an individual or by a committee?

• Pooling the knowledge of a number of people yields better decisions than decision making by an individual.

Page 35: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Principles of Central Bank Design:Transparency

Policymakers must clearly communicate their objectives, decisions, and methods to the public.

Page 36: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Principles of Central Bank Design: Accountability

• Policymakers must be held accountable to elected representatives and the public they serve.

• U.S. - Full Employment Act of 1946

• ECB - price stability

• England and Canada and 21 other countries - explicit inflation targets

Page 37: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

• European Monetary Union began January 1, 1999

• Euro began circulation January 1, 2002

• 19 of 29 countries in the European Union use the Euro

European Central Bank(ECB)

http://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/intro/html/map.en.html

Page 38: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

European Central Bank (ECB)Organizational Structure

• Six Member Executive Board similar to Fed Board or Governors (8 year term) President and Vice-President

• 19 National Central Banks (Web Links) Similar to Fed District Banks.

• Governing Council similar to the FOMC. Six Member Executive Board plus governors of 19

euro area banks

Page 39: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

The European Central Bank Policy Framework: Treaty of Maastricht

• "The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ECB shall support the general economic policies in the [European] Community, including the objective of sustainable and noninflationary growth.”

• Price stability is defined as inflation close to 2 percent.

Page 40: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Governing Council

• Monthly meetings at ECB in Frankfurt, Germany

• 18 or however many National Central Bank heads and six Executive Board members

• ECB announces the target rate and takes questions from the media

• To stay at a manageable size as new countries join, the Governing Council will be on a system of rotation

Page 41: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

ECB Independence

• Most independent in the world

• Members of the Executive Board have long terms (8 years)

• Determines own budget

• Less goal independent compared to the Fed Price stability

• Charter cannot by changed by legislation; only by revision of the Maastricht Treaty

http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/independence/html/index.en.html

Page 42: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Bank of Canada

• 1934

• Inflation target since 1991

• Target range 1- 3 percent

• Monetary Policy aimed at mid-point: 2%

• Less goal independence than Fed http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/monetary/in

flation_target.html (Follow this link and read the BOC statement)

Page 43: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Bank of England• 1694

• Least independent up to 1997. Interest rate policy determined by chancellor of the Exchequer.

• Policy now with the Bank, but can be overridden by the government.

• Inflation target – 2 percent.

• http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/Pages/home.aspx

Page 44: Chapter 16 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Central Bank Independence andMacro Performance in 17 Countries