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Chapter 1: The Lenin Problem

JohnAhlquistandMargaretLevi

Left-wing longshore union members give up time and money to fight on behalf of social

justice causes from which they can expect no material return. Basque nationalists make

vulnerable their freedom and their lives for the sake of seemingly unattainable goals.

Parishioners at churches throughout the United States risk jail to shelter political asylum

seekers. Altruism is common enough, and so are volunteering, political commitment, and

unselfish service to others. Yet, we know that there are environments that evoke such

behavior and those that depress it. Why and how do some organizations produce

membership willingness to self-sacrifice on behalf of a wide range of political and social

justice issues? In some instances, the answer may be simple: self-selection. Those who

want to act on behalf of others join the church or the interest group or the activist

organization that encourages, indeed advertises, such behavior. The more interesting cases

are those in which individuals join the group for one reason but come to pursue goals they

may not have considered previously. The organization changes them.

Organizationssuccessfulatencouragingcostlyactionsthattranscendnarrowself‐

interestareworthyofnoteintheirownright.Theyalsoofferinsightintotheprocesses

thatfosteraggregatechangesinbehaviorand,possibly,beliefsandpreferences.Our

researchcontributestothepoliticaleconomists’investigationofpossibleendogenous

sourcesofpreferences,thepsychologists’ofthecausesofprosocialityandorganizational

citizenshipbehavior,andthesociologists’oftheorigin,maintenance,andreproductionof

Ahlquist & Levi, p. 2

norms.However,whilemuchofthisliteraturefocusesonthefactorsaffectingindividual

choice,the“Leninproblem”concernsagroup’sdeterminationtopursuecostlygoalsand

thefactorsthatencourageindividualstoactinwaystheymaynothaveconsidered,let

alonegonealongwith,priortotheirengagementinaparticularorganization.

Thepuzzleishoworganizationstransformthebasesforindividualactionand

thereforealteraggregatebehavior.InWhatistobeDone?Lenin(1963[1902])proposed

politicaleducationthroughtrainingandinformationasthewaytoinspireworkerstoseek

fundamentalsocietalchange.Workersareeasilypersuadedtofightforimprovementsin

wages,hours,andworkingconditions.ForLenin,suchgoalsconstitute“economism,”a

focusonthenarroweconomicinterestsboundupinthejob.Leninwantedworkersto

thinkbeyondtheirownimmediateneedsandtoimagineasocietyinwhichadifferentlife

waspossible.Hisaimwastocreateclassconsciousworkerswhounderstoodtheirfateas

boundupwitheachotheracrossoccupationsandevenborders,workerswhorealized

theirstrugglehadtobeoverfarmorethantheirworkingconditionsandpay.Leninheld

thatonlyinthiswaycouldtheproletariatbecomevictorious,significantlyimprovingtheir

materialwellbeingwhilealsoachievingamoreequitablesociety.

Mobilizingtheproletariattoengageinrevolutionisnotwhatisatissueforusinthis

book.Thatisasubjectthathasalreadyfueledarichandsufficientliterature.Thereare

strategicissuesraisedbythosewhosharedLenin’scommitmenttorevolutionarychange.

RosaLuxemburgarguedformassactionandgeneralstrikesasabettercourseofaction

(Luxemburg1971).AntonioGramscidistinguishedbetweendemocraticandnon‐

democraticregimesandthensuggestedthemostappropriatestrategiesforeach


(GramsciandButtigieg1992).Therearealsoanalyticquestionsraisedbysocialscientists.

Thebasesofcollectiveactioninrevolutionshavereceivedconsiderablescrutiny(see,e.g.,

Lichbach1995;Taylor1988;Tilly1978).Sohavethegroundsforpresumingrevolutionary

changebymeansofelectoralvictoriesincapitalistdemocracies;middleclassandwell‐off

proletariatvotersreveallittleinterestinoverturningtheeconomicsystem(Przeworski

andSprague1986).

WhilewecandismissLenin’smodelofrevolution,wecannotsoeasilydismissthe

centralquestionheraises:Whatarethemechanismsthattransformthethinkingof

individualssothattheycometobelievethatanotherwayofactingispossibleandeven

preferable?NorcanweeasilydismisssomeofLenin’sinsights,namelythecriticalroleof

leadershipandinformation.

TheemphasisbyLeninandmanysocialmovementandcollectiveactiontheoristsis

aggregatebehavior.Muchworkfocusesonthestructuralfactorsandpolitical

opportunitiesthatmakeitmoreorlesslikelyforagrouptoactandtoactinacertain

way.Themostimportantcontemporaryvariantofthisanalytictraditionistheresource

mobilizationliterature(Tarrow1994;Tilly1978;ZaldandMcCarthy1979)anditsmore

recentcontentiouspoliticsvariant,whichemphasizesmechanismsaswellasstructures

(McAdam,Tarrow,andTilly2001).

Asecondapproach,theonewearepursuinghere,istoidentifytheprocessesand

interactionsthattransformindividualdecisionsintoabehavioraloutcome.Itisahighly

contextualapproachandonethatemphasizesthewaysinwhichpeopleinteractingiven

settings.Itsharesmuchincommonwiththecontentiouspoliticsperspective,buthasa


greateremphasisonthemicro‐foundationsoftheaggregateoutcome.Gametheoryand

economicmodelsprovidethemeanstoidentifytheprocessesthatproduceaparticular

groupoutcomeandinidentifyingtestablepropositionsandalternativeexplanations.

Unlikemostoftheworkintheliteraturesfromwhichweprimarilydraw,wedonot

presumethatindividualsalreadyhaveclearpreferences.Weareopentothepossibility

thatpreferenceschangeasaconsequenceofmembership.Attheleast,preferencesare

clarifiedand,possibly,reorderedasmemberscometobelievethatcertaingoalsare

actionableandpotentiallyachievable.

Ourfirststepisthedevelopmentofaformalmodelthatspecifiestherelationships

betweenleadersandmembers.Themodelrevealstheinformationalconditionsforbelief

changeandclarifiestheroleofinstitutions.Asinallformalmodels,particularlythose

intendedaspartofananalyticnarrative(Batesetal.1998),thegamelaysoutthepaths

nottakenaswellastheonethatisfollowed.Thisallowsustoderivealternative

hypothesesandtestableimplications,whichwethendelvewithbothqualitativeand

quantitativedata.

Weseeourworkascontributorytoagrowingresearchtraditionthatintegrates

interpretativeperspectiveswithgametheory(See,e.g.,Bates,deFigueiredo,and

Weingast1998;Batesetal.1998;Brady,Ferejohn,andPope2005;Chandra2004;de

FigueiredoandWeingast1999;Ferejohn1991;Sanchez‐Cuenca2001).Wehave

immersedourselvesinthehistoryandgovernancedetailsoftheorganizationswestudy.

Thisenablesustoidentifypreciselyhowleadershipbuildsatrustworthyreputation,the

natureoftheinstitutionsandhowtheyoperatetoconstrainorenablebehavior,the


processesofsocializationandeducation,thefocalpointsforcoordination,andthe

triggersforaction.Theformalmodelsensitizesustothedynamicsofagivensituation

andallowsustoderivetestablepropositions.Thecontextualandhistoricalmaterial

providesthebasisforinterpretingthemotivationsoftheactorsandtheirbeliefs.

Statisticalanalysisofelectoralandsurveydataoffersadditionalevidenceforour

claims.Statisticscanconfirmthatthereareindeedcorrelationsamongthefactorswe

hypothesizeasbeingrelated,andtheysuggestsomerelationshipsthatcompelusto

probeourcasesfurther.However,statisticscannotprovidetheindepthunderstanding

oftheorganizationsandtheprocessesthatourquestionsdemand.Forafuller

explanation,werelyonthecombinationofourformalmodelsandcontextualdetail.The

endproduct,wehope,isanaccountthatresonateswiththeexperiencesoftheactorswe

describeaswellaswithoursocialsciencemodels.

Beyond economism

Ourinitialfascinationwiththelargerquestionofbeliefchangebeganwithobservations

ofbehavioramonglongshoreworkersintheWestCoastportsoftheUnitedStates.The

creationoftheHarryBridgesChairinLaborStudiesattheUniversityofWashingtonin

1992andMargaretLevi’sappointmenttoitin1996ledtoregularcontactwiththehistory

ofafamousleft‐winglaborleaderandtheunion’sorganizationalcultureBridgesdidso

muchtocreate.Theendowmentforthechairitselfwastheproductofmultiple

contributionsfrompensionerswhobelievedthatBridgeshadtransformedthemfrom

“wharfratstolordsofthedocks”.

Thisisaunionwhichin1937chosetopreventshipsfromtransportingscrapiron


fromtheUStoJapanforfearthattheironwouldreturnintheformofbulletsandarms

aimedatAmericans.Theunion’sactionswerenotagainsttheemployersbutrepresented

aninterventionintheforeignpolicyofthelabor‐sympatheticgovernmentofPresident

FranklinDelanoRoosevelt.TheILWUstillactivelyengagesinnationalandinternational

politicalandsocialconflicts.Someofthoseareonbehalfofotherworkers,asinthe

refusaltoloadgrapesthatdidnotbeartheUnitedFarmWorkers’sealandthe1997

worldwideboycottofthecargoship,NeptuneJade,loadedbynon‐unionlabor.

However,italsoclosedportsonMay1,1999toprotestthedeathsentenceforMumia

Abu‐JamalandonNovember30,1999duringthedemonstrationsagainsttheWTO

MinisterialinSeattle.Mostrecently,theILWUInternationalhastakenactionagainstthe

warinIraq,passingresolutionscondemningtheoccupationandcallingforimmediate

troopwithdrawal.ThousandsofILWUmembersshutdowntheportstoprotestthewarin

IraqduringaWestCoastworkstoppageonMayDayof2008.

TheILWUoffersarelativelyrarebutnotuniqueexampleofaunionwithan

organizationalculturethatseemstoevokebehaviornoteasilycharacterizedas

economistic.AnotherAmericanexampleistheInternationalTypographicalUnion(ITU),

madefamousbyLipset,TrowandColeman(1956)intheirimportantbook,Union

Democracy.TheITUpresentsacounter‐exampletowhatRobertMichels(1919[1962])

observedoftheGermanSocialDemocraticParty(SPD)intheperiodleadinguptoand

includingWorldWarI.Michelsarguedthatallsocialmovementshaveatendencyto

oligarchicgovernanceanddisplacementoftheiroriginalgoalsinordertoensure

organizationalsurvival.Thestudyoftheexceptionstotherule,beittheITUortheILWU,


arerevealingoftheconditionsinwhichMichels’modelholds—ornot.

Norarethesetheonlyunionswithlong‐survivingorganizationalculturessodifferent

thantheoneMichelspredictedwouldevolve.AnotherexampleistheWaterfront

Workers’FederationofAustralia(WWF),nowtheMaritimeUnionofAustralia(MUA).

ThisunionalsopreventedshipmentsofpigirontoJapanin1937,andtheyengagein

otheractionssimilartothoseoftheILWU.Mostrecently,theyhaverefusedtoloadships

withlivesheepdestinedforSaudiArabiaoutofobjectiontothewaythesheepare

slaughteredthere;they’llonlypermittheloadingofdeadsheep.

The Cases

Thecasesthatinterestusarethoseorganizationsthataskindividualstoengageinactions

thatrequireself‐sacrifice,sometimestothepointofdeath,andwherepersonalpayoffs

andselectiveincentivesappeartobeaninsufficientexplanationofbehavior.We

examinehoworganizationsinducememberstotakecostlypersonalactionsthatdonot

seemtohaveconnectiontothereasonspeoplejoinedtheorganizationinitially.

Weinvestigateaspecifictypeoforganization:laborunionsindemocraticcountries.

Wechoseunionsforseveralreasons.Firstthereisvariationamongthemintermsofthe

demandsonmembershipandthevaluecommitmentsofleaders.Both“business

unions,”thosewhosesolecommitmentsaretothewelfareofmembers,and“social

movementunions,”thosecommittedtothesocialwelfareofmembersandthelarger

society,havebeensuccessfulinimprovingthematerialconditionsofdues‐payers.

Almostallunions(andcertainlythoseweexamine)askmemberstocontributepersonal

timeandmoneyorapproveorganizationalresourcesforcharitablepurposes,electoral


campaigns,andlobbying.Onlyaveryfew,however,advocatepoliticalandsocialjustice

causesthatseemunrelatedtotheachievementofbetterwagesorworkingconditions.

Second,forauniontocontrolthesupplyoflabor,itmustrecruitalargenumberof

workersinafirmorindustry.Itthereforecannotrelyonthestrictrulesandsteep

demandsasatooltoscreenforonlythemostmotivated,asmayoccurinsmallergroups

(Iannaccone1992).1Third,theunionswestudyallhaveperiodicelections,thusallowing

ustoexplorewhatleadersdotoretaintheirpositionsandwithwhatsuccess.

OurcasesincludetheInternationalBrotherhoodofTeamsters(IBT),International

Longshoremen’sAssociation(ILA),InternationalLongshoreandWarehouseUnion(ILWU),

andWatersideWorkers’Federation(WWF)ofAustralia—nowknownastheMaritime

UnionofAustralia(MUA).TheIBTandILAexemplifyunionsthatasktheirmemberstoact

consistentlywitharelativelynarrowconceptofself‐interest;theothertwounionselicit

frommembersnotonlyefforttoimprovetheirownwell‐beingbutalsosacrificesoftime

andmoneyinsupportofsocialandpoliticalcauses.

Wehaveselectedunionsthatsharecertainfeaturesbutwhoseorganizational

culturesvary.Allareinthetransportsector.Theirmembership,atleastatthebeginning

ofthe60plusyearswestudy,waslargelydrawnfromalaborpoolofcasual,i.e.

temporary,lowskilledworkerschosenmorefortheirbrawnthantheirbrains.Thereis

considerableevidencethatthesameworkerssometimeswereemployedastruckers,

sometimesaswarehousemen,andsometimesasdockworkers.Yet,theworkersalso

1 We thank Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca for emphasizing these points.


comefromadiversityofreligious,ethnic,andpoliticalbackgrounds.Somehave

considerableexposuretoandexperiencewithradicalunionism,andsomehavenone.

The Argument Previewed

Voluntaryorganizationsexhibittremendousvariationintheirexpectationsofadherents,

andmembersdifferintheirwillingnesstocomplywithorganizationaldemands.Weargue

that,inappropriatecircumstances,organizationalmembershipchangesthebeliefsof

constituentsaboutthenatureoftheworldandsubsequentlyrevealsapreferencefor

actionsonbehalfofothersorforacause,actionsthatentailunrequitedcostsintime,lost

income,andpossiblebodilyharm.Thisseemstobewhatishappeningwithinasubsetof

religious,political,andlabororganizations.

Wearehardlythefirsttoobservethatsomeunionsandvoluntaryorganizations

sustainpolitical,economic,orjusticecommitmentsthatothersimilarorganizationsdo

notevenconsider.However,wearenotcompelledbythedominantextantexplanations.

ThefirstisthatitisunionsformedandinitiallyledbyCommuniststhatdisplaysuch

characteristics(Stepan‐NorrisandZeitlin2002).Itmayprovetobethecasethatradical

leadershipisthekeytothewaytheunionbeginsitslife,butafoundingideologyinandof

itselfcannotaccountforwhysomeoftheseunionsmaintainsuchcommitmentsand

othersdonot.Somescholarsarguethatcertainnationalculturalcharacteristicsand

religions,generallythosethatareProtestantandeitherAnglo‐SaxonorNordic,aremore

likelythanothers,generallyCatholicandeitherIrishorSouthernEuropean,toengender

strongallegiancetodemocraticandsocialjusticepractices(Lipset1994).Howard

KimeldorfarguesthatthedemographicdifferencesbetweenthelargelyScandinavian


protestantdockworkersoftheWestCoastandtheItalianCatholicdockworkersofthe

EastCoastcontributestothedistinctivecontrastoftheILWUwiththecorruptand

hierarchicalInternationalLongshoremen’sAssociation(ILA),fromwhichtheILWU

splinteredin1937(Kimeldorf1988).Therearemanyreasonstodoubtthisexplanation,

butoneisthefactthattheWatersideWorkers’Federation(WWF)ofAustraliasharesthe

ILWUviewpointbuthasamembershipthatisdisproportionatelyCatholicandIrish.

Kimeldorf’sprimaryexplanationisthestructureoftheindustryandthewaythe

employersareorganizedandempowered.Heandotherstructuralistsemphasize

economicandgovernmentalfactorsoutsidethecontrolofaparticularunionbuthighly

determinativeofwhattheunion’sbargainingandpoliticalpossibilitiesare.Someofthese

accountsemphasizetheinstitutionalfeaturesofgovernmentpoliciesandemployer

initiatives(EbbinghausandVisser2000;Iversen1999;Mares2003;Streeck2002;

Swenson1989;WallersteinandWestern2000;Western1997),butallemphasizefeatures

thathavelittletodowithendogenoussourcesofuniongovernanceandstyle.

Thefinalexplanationhastodowiththenatureoftheworkandthelabormarket.

Maritimeworkers,includinglongshoremen,tendtobeinternationalistinperspective.

Theycomeintocontactwithindividualsfrommanydifferentcountries,theyareexposed

toawide‐rangeofideologiesandbeliefsystems,andtheyrecognizethattheyarepartof

anetworkofportswhoseworkerscanmakeabigdifferenceduringjobactionsand

contractdisputes.Moreover,theteamnatureoftheworkonthedocks,particularly

beforecontainerization,madetheworkersinterdependentinwaysthatshouldfacilitate

solidarity.Whilethesefactorscertainlyhelpexplainwhylongshoreworkersarelikelyto


bemoremilitantandrelyoninternationalconnectionsmorethanmanyothersinthe

labormovement,theydonotprovideasufficientaccountofthebeliefsandpreferences.

TheorganizationalcultureandaggregatebehavioroftheILAisclosertothatofthe

TeamstersthantothatoftheILWUandWWF.

Ouralternativeexplanationemphasizestheprocessesbywhichleadershipearnsthe

confidenceofmembersandthensucceedsinpersuadingthemthatgoalsandactions,

previouslybelievedinaccessible,arepossible.Thoseleadersabletochangebeliefsdonot

dosothroughpersonalcharismabut,rather,throughathree‐stepprocess:1)successat

achievingtheeconomicgoalsoftheunion;2)theannouncementofprinciplestheleaders

pledgetouphold;and3)thecreationofinstitutionsthat,simultaneously,make

leadershipcommitmentscredibleandoffermemberstheopportunitytolearn,influence

eachother,andconsensuallymaintaintheprinciples.Thecombinationofprinciplesand

institutionsthatdefineaunionarewhatwemeanbyitsorganizationalculture.

Weareinterestedinboththefoundationalmomentofanorganizationalcultureand

itsreproductionovertime.Somewhatdifferentprocessesareinvolvedineach.

Establishing an organizational culture

Inaddressingtheissueofrevealedorganizationalpreferences,webuildoneconomic

theoriesofthefirm,extendingandmodifyingthemtolookathoworganizationswith

differenttypesofgoalscomeabout.Insodoing,wepresentabasicframeworkfor

examininganorganization’s“culture”.Ourfocusisontheroleofleadersinshapingand

transmittinginformationtothemembershipthroughorganizationalrulesandtheleaders’

actions.Members,fortheirpart,cometoaccepttheleaders’positionssolongasthe


organizationcontinuestodelivergoodbasicoutcomes.Wearguethatwherethereare

costlyactionsexertedinsupportofcausesthathavenodirectmaterialbenefittounion

members,wewillbeabletodemonstratethat:leadershipabidedbytheprinciples

establishedintheorganizationalculture;somemembers’beliefsabouttheworldwere

transformedbytheirparticipationintheorganization;andleaders’demandswere

rewardedwithlarge‐scalecontingentconsent(Levi1997).

Theroleofleadershipiskeytotheprocessofbothbeliefchangeandpreference

provocation.Leaderscaninfluencepreferencesandbeliefsbycrediblyconveyingthe

corporatecultureandthroughpersonalactsthatexemplifyanalternativesetofbeliefs

aboutwhatisfeasibleandright.Therewasonceakeeninterestinleadershipamong

thosestudyingtherelationshipbetweenmanagersandemployees(Barnard1938;Blau

1964;Simon1947)andamongthoseinvestigatinghowpoliticalentrepreneursencourage

collectiveaction(Frohlich,Oppenheimer,andYoung1971).Althoughthereissomenew

andinnovativeworkonleadership(DirksandSkarlicki2004;Hermalin1998;Keohane

2005;Miller2000,2004),mostoftheworkfocusesonfirms.Thereisstillconsiderable

empiricalresearchandtheoreticaldevelopmentthatneedstobedonetounderstand

morefullytherolethatleadersplayinchangingbeliefsandprovokingpreferencesin

voluntaryorganizations.Thisresearchcontributestothateffort.

Fromourperspective,theprocessthatproducesrevealedorganizationalpreferences

beginswithacredibleleadershipabletoestablishwhateconomistscallacorporate

culture(Hermalin2001;Kreps1990)andwe,inconsistencywithpoliticalscienceand

sociology,labelorganizationalculture.Anorganizationalculturecombinesmanagement


principlesandinstitutionaldesign.Theleadermovesfirstand,often,atapersonalcost.

Onceconstituentshaveconfidenceintheleader’scommitmenttoherprinciplesandin

theviabilityoftheinstitutions,theorganizationalcultureisinstantiated.

Intheresearchonfirms,thereisevidencethataleaderwhostaystruetoher

principlesisperceivedastrustworthyandthusabletoevokeeffortandcommitment

fromconstituentsbeyondwhatstandardrationalchoicemodelscanexplain(Cook,

Hardin,andLevi2005;Miller1992).Inourresearchonvoluntaryorganizations,wefind

thatsomeleaders,particularlyideologicalleaderscommittedtomajorsocietalchange,

areabletocreateaclimateofpersuasivenessthatfacilitatesbeliefchange.Theextentto

whichtheyaresuccessfuldependsasmuch,ifnotmore,oninstitutionalarrangements

theycreateandthecredibilityoftheinformationtheyprovideasontheattractivenessof

theirpersonalappealandrhetoric,however.

Alltheleadersweinvestigateareaskingmemberstoactintheirprivateinterests,but

somearealsoaskingmemberstoactonbehalfofpoliticalorethicalgoalsthathavelittle

ornothingtodowiththereasonsforjoiningthevoluntaryorganization.Whysome

leadersdoonethingandsometheotherisnottheobjectofexplanationhere.Westart

withtwodifferentleadershiptypes:theconventionalmanagerwhosegoalistoimprove

thenetpay‐offtothosetowhomheisbeholden;andthe“transformational”2manager

whoseaimistoimprovethepay‐offbutalsochangethenatureoftheorganizationitself.

2 This is the language now in use in psychological studies of leadership. See, e.g., Avolio,

Walumba and Weber 2009.


Ifsuccessful,bothwillproducematerialbenefitsfortheirconstituentsandbothwill

establishanorganizationalculturethatwouldsurvivetheirdeparturefromleadership

roles.However,thetwotypesshouldalsosystematicallyvaryintheirbehaviors,the

principlestheyespouse,andtheinstitutionsandorganizationalculturetheycreateand

sustain.Thesevariationsshouldinturnproducesystematicvariationintheaggregate

preferencesoftheirconstituents.

Ourprimaryanalyticfocusisonorganizationalleadersandhowtheyuseinformation,

values,rulesandoperatingprinciplestoalterbeliefs,evokereciprocityamongmembers,

andpromotecontingentconsent.Wespecifyseveralconditions.First,leadershave

accesstoinformationaboutthestateoftheworldthatisvaluabletoboththeleaderand

themembership.Second,leadersmustbeabletocrediblytransmitthisinformationto

members.Reputationisonesourceofcredibility.Equallyimportantareinstitutional

arrangementswithintheorganizationthatfacilitatedisseminationofinformationand

thatmaketheleaderaccountableiftheinformationispoor.Whenenoughmembers

cometobelievecertaingoalsareattainable,goalstheyhadeitherpreviouslynot

consideredorthoughtnotfeasible,achangeingroup‐levelrevealedpreferencesresults.

Thepossessionofvaluableandcredibleinformationmaybethesinequanonof

leadersinanyorganization,notjustthoseinwhichleadersaskforactionsthatgobeyond

self‐interest.Soisthedemonstratedeffectivenessofleadershipinsecuringthebasic

breadandbutterdemandsofmembers—andthensome.Onlyleaderswhohavesatisfied

thoseconditionscanaskmemberstosacrificeprivatebenefitsforlargernon‐union

collectiveends.Buttoevenconsiderasking,equallynecessaryisaleadershipcadre


whosepreferencesincludeawiderrangeofcommitmentsbeyondthosethatserve

membershipinterestsnarrowlyconceived.Theleadershaveideologiesandgoalsthat

includechangesinthelargerpoliticalandeconomicsystemandnotjustintheunion’s

relationshipwithitsemployers.

Thesecondpartoftheargumentinvolvesbeliefchangeitself.Leadershipcredibility

intermsofprinciples,information,andbargainingsuccessneedstobefollowedby

processesthatrevealandreinforcetheappropriatenormsofactionforthemembership.

Thisrequiresthedevelopmentofinstitutionsthatprovideeducationaboutthenorms

andideasaboutwhenthosenormsshouldbeactedupon.Theyaretheforumsfor

obtainingtheknowledgethattransformsperceptions.Asthebeliefsarealteredabout

whattheoptionsareandwhicharefeasibleandnormativelyappropriate,anewsetof

preferencesareprovoked.TheexperienceofoneretiredSydneydockworkerwemet

exemplifiestheprocess.Hefollowedusoutofameetingtotellushehadnevercared

aboutthat“Communiststuff”theleaderstalkedabout.However,whenheheard—

duringastopworkmeetingoverlunchoneday‐‐aboutwhattheDutchweredoingtothe

Indonesians,therewasnowayhewasgoingtoloadDutchshipswithgunstoshootthe

rebels.HisexperienceisconsistentwiththeBicchieri(2006,6‐7)argumentaboutnorms,

“thedefaultrulesthatweautomaticallyfollowareaccompaniedandsupportedbybeliefs

anddesiresthatwebecomeawareofonlywhenchallenged.Surpriseinthiscasebreeds

awarenessofourunderlyingmotives.”However,wethinkthatsurprisemustalsobe

accompaniedbyarealisticassessmentoffeasibility:Becomingconsciousofan

individual’snormativepositiononlyleadstoachangeinaggregateorganizational


preferenceswhenitisevidentthatenoughofthegroupsharethatnorm,willactuponit,

andmightevensucceedinrealizingthegoaloftheaction.Theretireddockworkermay

havediscoveredhisnormsthroughsurprise,buttheunionthenprovidedhiman

opportunityforcollectiveactionandconvincedhimandothersthatitmightmakea

difference.

Inthechaptersthatfollow,wefocusonseveralinstitutionalarrangementsprevalent

inthoseunionsabletoevokeaggregatebehaviorthattranscendseconomisticinterests

andabsentfromthosenottryingtochangebeliefs.Therearemanyweshalldiscuss.

However,themostimportantarethehiringhallandrankandfiledemocracy.Thehiring

hallprovidesalocusforsocializationbutalsoexemplifiesthepracticeoffairdistribution

ofjobsandincomeamongmembers(Larrowe1955;Wellman1995).Avibrantrankand

filedemocracyoffersaforumfordebateandinformationbutalsoputsintopracticethe

normoftherightsofalltoavoiceandanopiniononawiderangeofissueswith

significantpoliticalandeconomicimpact,bothpersonalandsocietal(Levietal.2009).

Theseinstitutionsareessentialforcreatingthebeliefs,buttheyalsoplayarolein

ensuringtheconditionsforthethirdelementinourargument,contingentconsentwith

theleadership’sdemands(Levi1997).Contingentconsentimpliesthatrationalactorswill

comply(behaviorallyconsent)withdemandsthatdonotconformwithnarrow,material

self‐interest,iftheyareassuredthatothersintheirgroupwillalsoconformandifthey

believethatthedemandsbeingmadeofthemareconsistentwiththestandardsof

fairnessthatreignintheirrelevantsocialgroup.Contingentconsentersmayinclude

thosewhosebeliefshavechanged,butitmayalsoincludethosewhoheldsuchbeliefs


priortomembershipandthosewhohaveexperiencednobeliefrevisionyetwishtobe

solidarywithothers.

Membersmaywant(orcometowant)tocomplywithleaders’requeststoputeffort

intostrikesandotherjobactionsaswellasinsupportofsocialjusticeandpoliticalcauses

leadersvalue,butmemberswilldosoonlyiftheyhaveconfidencethatotherswilldothe

sameandthatleadersarecredibleintheircommitmentstoprovidepromisedmaterial

benefits.Sometimestheassessmentoftheprobabilityofotherscomplyingresultsfrom

thecoercivepracticesofaunion,which—aswithanationalstate—enforcesonfreeriders

theobligationsmembersasawholehaveapproved.Sometimes,itismembers

themselveswhoexertsocialpressuredirectlyonthosewhoseemreluctanttogoalong.

Institutionalarrangementsarecriticalhere;theyarethesourceofrules,external

enforcementbytheunionofficialsorothermembers,and,inmanycases,internalization

ofnorms.Acombinationofcoercivepracticestowardsfreeridersandtheexistenceof

institutionsthatcreateregularinteractionsamongmembersmaycreatecommon

expectationsofbehaviorandfacilitatememberabilitytoobservethatothersdoinfact

conform.3

3Onepossibilityweshallexploreinlaterchaptersistheroleplayedby“strong

reciprocity”Gintis2000;2003.Strongreciprocityisdistinctfromsocialpressure.

Motivatedbyneitherfearofostracismnorhopeofacceptancebutfromthedesiretobe

justorfair,thereciprocityis“strong”becausethosewhoactaccordingtothenormof

fairnessarealsowillingtoexpendeffortinpunishingthosewhodonotconform.Strong


Democraticelectoralprocessesincreasemembershipcompliancebycompelling

leaderstodeliverorloseoffice.Democraticparticipatorypracticesmayhaveadditional

affectsonthewillingnessofmemberstobepersuadedbyleaders’ideologicalpositions.

Democraticprocessesincreasethecapacityofmemberstochallengeleaders’ideasand

demandreasonsforbelievingthem;theyalsoprovideevidenceofleadershiprespectfor

andaccountabilitytomembers.

Maintaining the organizational culture

Ifweunderstandtheproductionoftheorganizationalcultureastheresultofakind

ofcontractbetweenleadershipandmembers,thenatissueishowitisreproduced

throughtime.Asnewmembersjoin,theywilllikelyviewthecultureoftheunionasso

manynormsofbehavior.Theywillcomply,i.e.engageinsocialjusticeactions,solongas

therearesufficientnumbersaroundthemvisiblyengaginginthatbehavior.Initially,we

expectthatcomplianceissupportedbysomecombinationofsanctionsandexpectations

aboutothers.Overtime,however,thenewrecruitsmaycometoreconsidertheirbeliefs

andpreferences.Theymaybegintodevelopnewnormativemotivationsasthebasisfor

theircompliance.

Wesuspectthattheworkerscometothejobwithbeliefsaboutwhatitisattainable

throughaunionandwhattheunionhasarighttoexpectofthem.Someofthesebeliefs

arecrystallizedbeforejoining;othersareevokedintheprocessofbelonging.Wesuspect

reciprocatorsaretheprovidersofsocialpressure,notitsrecipients.


thatnewworkerswithearlierfamilialconnectionswiththeunionwillhavesomeprior

socializationandwillbemorewillingthanothernewrecruitstosacrificeforsocialjustice

causes—butpossiblylesssothantheolderworkers.Wesuspectthatmostnewworkers

withoutpriorunionsocializationwillinitiallybeconcernedonlywitheconomicwell‐

being.Iftheorganizationalcultureisasstrongaswebelieveitis,expectationsaboutthe

unionandpreferencesshouldconvergeovertime.

Reinforcingtheseexpectationsandthesocializationprocessaretheinstitutionsthat

helpedcreatebeliefchangeinthefirstplace.Theyprovidelocationsforlearning,norm

transmittal,andsocialpressure.However,theextenttowhichtheinstitutionsare

effectivemechanismsofculturalreproductionmaydependonhownewmembersofthe

unionarerecruited.Ifjobsareobtainedthroughfamilyandnetworkconnections,there

isahigherprobabilityofpre‐socializationintotheunion’sorganizationalculturethanif

thejobsarewidelydispersedthroughoutthepopulationatlarge.

Our data and approach

We investigate the four unions over time so that we are able to identify the extent and

nature of any belief change that takes place and the process by which it is reproduced, if it

is, despite demographic and leadership changes within the union and technological,

economic, and political changes affecting the industry. All the cases are considered at

significant moments of transformation and growth. A focus on critical organizational

shifts permits before and after documentation of members’ preferences (as revealed in

actions and debates). Focusing on historical cases enables us to: 1) trace changes in

members and their preferences; 2) document the selection of the initial leaders and the


institutions and cultures those leaders create within the organization; 3) follow the

consequences of the leadership style and institutional arrangements over time, in particular

clarifying how the organizational cultures they create mold preferences; 4) investigate

what happens to the institutions and group values when that leader leaves office; and 5)

determine how the union reproduces (or why it fails to reproduce) the organizational

culture.

Ourdatacomefromwrittenrecordsofunionmeetingsanddecisions,membership

rolls,electoralrolls,andoralhistoriesthatdatefromthe1920sthroughtheearlyyearsof

the21stcentury.Byconsideringargumentsaboutandwillingnesstoengagein

organizationalactions,weareabletoillustrateandunderstandbeliefchange.By

consideringvotesfor(andagainst)leadershippoliciesandforandagainstincumbents

remaininginoffice,wecaninvestigatethedegreeofcontingentconsentwithactions

evenamongthosewhodisapproved.Thedataalsopermitustoobservehowthe

institutionsproduceandreproducegroupnormsandchoices.

Noneoftheseunionsishomogenous.Thus,wehaveidentifiedaseriesofpaired

localsthatsharemanycharacteristicsincommonbutappeartodifferinorganizational

cultureandrevealedorganizationalpreferences.TheTacomaandSeattlelocalsofthe

ILWUhavememberswithsimilarethnic,religious,andpoliticalcharacteristics,but

TacomastayedintheILAuntilthe1950s.TheMelbournelocaloftheWWFhadfewer

memberswhoacceptedandasignificantnumberwhoopposedtheorganizationalculture

thatthenationalleadershipwastryingtobuildthandiditsSydneycounterpart.During

the1930stheMinneapolisandSeattlelocalsoftheTeamstersappearedtoattractmen


withsimilarbackgrounds,butMinneapolispracticedaradicalsocialmovementunionism

notwhollydissimilarfromthatoftheSeattlelocaloftheILWU.Ontheotherhand,the

SeattleIBTwasasconfirmedabusinessunionastheycome.

Byfocusingontheaggregatebeliefsandpreferencesofmembersatthelevelof

locals,weareabletogetaveryconcretegraspofdemographicvariables,workingclass

culture,andeventhethinkingofleadersandmembers.Wearethusabletoachievea

detailedunderstandingofindividualinteractionsanddecisions,aswellasthe

developmentoftheinstitutionalarrangementsandcollectiveidentityofthelocal.This

approachpermitsustoholdindustrialstructureandlabormarketsomewhatconstant,

whilebeingabletoattainasenseofwhetherthereissignificantvariationinthesefactors

andhowitmightaffectlocalbehavior.Wehavevariedworkingclassculture,

demographiccharacteristics,andleadershipideology.

Sometimesthereisnopuzzleastowhyorganizationalcultureandthebeliefsofits

adherentstaketheformthattheydo;thebeliefsandpreferencesthatseemtobeshared

bythegroupreflectaprocessofself‐selection.Individualsjoinpoliticalparties,labor

unions,churches,activistgroups,andevensoccerclubsinwhichtheorganizational

expectationsareconsistentwiththeirinterestsandleaveonesthatmakedemandsthat

aretooonerous.Inothercases,individualsfearostracismiftheydeviatefromthegroup

normandhopeforsocialacceptanceiftheyacquiesce.Selectiveincentivesprovide

sufficientexplanationforthecollectiveactionsproducedbyvoluntaryorganizations

relyingonself‐selectionorsocialpressure.Thisisthemostparsimoniousexplanationof

whatmaybehappeningandthereforetheonewemustdisproveinthecasesweidentify


asevidencingbeliefchange.

Forthefoundingmomentsoforganizationalculture,ourdataallowustodetermine

whethertheunion’sorganizationalculturereflectsself‐selection.Itdoesnot.Asthe

unionsdevelopovertime,manyincreasinglyrelyonself‐selection,however.The

motivationmaybenepotism,oritmaybepolitical.Thecauseisoflessimportthanthe

effect:Itbecomesrelativeeasytoreproducetheorganizationalculturewithintheunions

whoseemployerschoosejobapplicantsfromamongthefamilyandneighborsofthose

alreadyworkingthere.

Self‐selectionofmembersiscertainlypartoftheexplanationofthesurvivalofthe

organizationalcultureoftheILWU,buthistorymayprovenoguidetothefuturehere.In

thelastdecade,aseriesofcourtcasesconcerninggenderdiscriminationonthedocks

requiredconsiderationofnewhiringpractices.Employerinterestinunderminingthe

militancyoftheunionaddedtothepressureforchange.TheemployersandtheILWU

subsequentlynegotiatedanewhiringsystembasedontwoquitedistinctpoolsofjob

applicants.Thefirstwouldbeamongthosewhorespondedtoadvertisements.Aninitial

lotterywouldproduceanumberequaltothosewhohadreceived“industrycards,”given

outbyemployersbutmostlybycurrentunionmembers.Therewouldthenbeafinal

lotterytodeterminetheorderinwhichnewworkerswouldbecalleduptotakeavailable

positions.Thelotteryproducedanaturalexperimentinwhichtwoverydifferentsetsof

applicantswouldbeginworkingonthedockssimultaneouslyandinrelativelyequal

numbers.Butwhowouldhavemoreinfluenceontheunionovertime?Wouldthose

whocameviaadvertisementsbetransformedbytheunionortransformit?


Thisnaturalexperimentprovideduswithanopportunityforanexcitingsourceof

data.Wewereabletoobtainpermissiontorunapanelsurveyamonglotterywinners

andmoreseniorworkers.Wealsodidasurvey,baseduponrandomdigitdialing,among

thosewholiveintheneighborhoodsfromwhichthelotterywinnerslargelycome.The

firstphaseofthesurveywillbecompletedbytheendof2008(orearly2009),andthe

secondayearortwolater.

The Chapters

Asnotedearlier,theargumentandhypothesistesting—beitbynarrative,statistics,or

surveyevidence—isinformedbyagametheoreticmodelthathighlightskeycomponents

oftherelationshipbetweenleadersandconstituentsintheprocessofbeliefchange.

Thatisthesubjectofthenextchapter.

Chapter3providesabackgroundinlaborhistoryandsituatesourcaseswithinthe

largernationalandpoliticalcontext.Withchapters4and5,weconsiderthecases

themselves.Chapter4focusesonthedevelopmentandmaintenanceoforganizational

culturesof“meatandpotato”unions,theIBTandtheILA,andchapter5onthe

organizationalculturesofunionswithcommitmentsthatextendbeyondeconomism,the

ILWUandWWF.Chapter6addressesthereasonsforthelocalvariationswithinthe

largerunionsandwhatthosevariationsrevealaboutorganizationalculture,the

processesofbeliefchange,andaggregatebehavior.InChapter7,weturntothefindings

ofthesurvey.

Chapter8representsoureffortstopullourfindingstogetherandtogeneralizeabout

thepossibilitiesforbeliefand,possibly,preferencechange.Ourtheoreticalemphasisis


onleadership,unioninstitutions,andtheorganizationalculturethatthememberscome

toacceptandhelpreproduce.Allsuccessfulunions,indeedallsuccessfulvoluntary

organizations,mostlikelyhaveanorganizationalculture,buttheyvaryintermsofthe

aggregatebehaviorstheyencourage.Byuncoveringtheprocessesthataccountforwhy

someunionsgobeyondeconomismwhenothersdonot,ourintentionistoofferamore

generalexplanationoftheobserveddiversityamongreligious,political,andeven

nationalistgroups.Ourfirstjob,however,istounderstandunions.Itistothattaskwe

nowturn.


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