Chapter 1 SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES · instrumentation, thermal hydraulics, structural analysis, reactor physics, seismology etc., relevant to nuclear and radiation

1AERB Annual Report - 2018

1.1 SAFETY REVIEW MECHANISM OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Nuclear facilities in India are sited, designed, constructed, commissioned and operated in accordance with strict quality and safety standards. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) oversees the safety of the nuclear and radiation facilities and has been mandated to frame safety policies, lay down safety standards and requirements. AERB has established a regulatory framework, which involves stipulating the safety requirements, issuance of regulatory consents after safety review, verification of compliance through safety reviews and inspections during various stages viz. siting, construction, commissioning, operation etc.

All nuclear facilities undergo an elaborate and in-depth safety review during various stages. The objective of safety review and assessment at various consenting stages is illustrated below:

Safety reviews related to the consenting decisions and safety monitoring during various stages are carried out through multi-tier safety committees. The committees include experts in relevant fields, including process design, control and instrumentation, thermal hydraulics, structural analysis, reactor physics, seismology etc., relevant to nuclear and radiation safety. The higher level Committees include experts from academia, national R&D institutes, and government bodies. The multi-tiered system of safety review follows the principle of “management by exception”, following graded approach and is based on principles, requirements and criteria specified by AERB in its regulatory documents.

In this approach, the issues of greater significance are given consideration at higher level committees for their satisfactory resolution. Recommendations of these committees concerning

Siting to ensure that the chosen site meets Site Evaluation Criteria and is suitable for the proposed type and capacity of plant from environmental considerations

Construction to ensure that the proposed plant design meet regulatory requirements, and the proposed construction meets quality requirements

Commissioning to ensure that the commissioning programme and procedures meet regulatory requirements; performance of the plant is as per design intent; results of commissioing tests confirm adequacy of the plant design for operation; and safety analysis for as-built facility has been carried out

Operation to ensure that plant operational limits & conditions meet regulatory requirements; adequate level of safety is maintained by proper operational & maintenance procedures & administrative control; organisational structures, training & qualification of operating personnel meet the requirements and conditions for renewal of consent as prescribed by AERB

Chapter 1SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF

NUCLEAR FACILITIES


the various safety issues and consents are further considered by AERB for arriving at regulatory decisions. This arrangement ensures comprehensiveness of the reviews and effective compliance with the specified requirements. Additionally, AERB carries out periodic regulatory inspections to check conformance with regulatory requirements and consenting conditions.

The licence for operation of the facilities is given after ensuring its satisfactory construction and commissioning as per the approved design, complying with the quality requirements and the specified safety/regulatory requirements. The licence for operation is given with a specified validity period. Renewal of license for operation is considered based on separate application along with a comprehensive safety review as per the laid down requirements and process.

AERB has also been entrusted with the responsibility of review and assessment of nuclear security aspects (having impact on safety) for different types of nuclear facilities in India. AERB has issued various regulatory documents specifying nuclear security requirements for nuclear facilities. Depending on the project stage, security aspects are reviewed against relevant regulatory requirements. Multi-tier approach is adopted for review of security aspects also.

Preliminary review of RI responses and security proposals from NPPs are reviewed in (CRSA-WG) Working Group under the Committee for Reviewing Security Aspects (CRSA). Important issues are referred to CRSA for detailed review in the presence of all the stake holders. Based on satisfactory review carried out on security aspects of new projects at consenting stages, AERB has issued excavation clearances for GHAVP-1&2

and KKNPP-5&6 projects in January 2018 and November 2018 respectively.

Further activities related to Nuclear Security Review are being coordinated by In-house Review Group (IHRG-NS).

Regulatory documents related to Nuclear Security (Security of Nuclear & Radiation Facilities and Radioactive Sources) are categorized as Nuclear Security Requirements (NSR), Nuclear Security Guides (NSG) and Nuclear Security Manuals (NSM). Process is in progress to align/ modify the existing nuclear security documents in above categories. Development of computer security requirements for nuclear facilities is in advanced stage.

The safety status of the nuclear facilities, significant events and enforcement actions during the year 2018 are covered in following sections.

1.2 NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION

AERB has established an elaborate system for in-depth safety review of nuclear power projects and fuel cycle facilities that are under construction. For this purpose, different stages of ‘regulatory consent’ have been identified as following:

• Siting

• Construction

• Commissioning

Important outcome of the safety reviews and assessments related to nuclear power projects and fuel cycle facilities are given in subsequent paragraphs.

The number of meetings of the important safety review committees of the facility undergoing reviews are given in following table.


(A) NUCLEAR POWER PROJECTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION: REVIEW STATUS

A1. Light Water Reactor Based NPPs

(i) Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project- 3 &4 (KKNPP- 3&4)

KKNPP Unit-3&4 plant design is a repeat design of Unit-1&2, which was extensively reviewed in AERB, hence review process for Unit-3&4 is optimized to detailed review of design differences impacting safety and compliance to AERB safety code on ‘Design of Light Water Reactors based Nuclear Power Plants’. AERB had granted clearance for FPC on June 23, 2017 with certain stipulations.

Based on satisfactory safety review of the respective stipulations, AERB granted clearance for commencement of construction of following for units-3 &4:

(a) Containment slab at +5.40m level, internal slab above it and Accident localisation area (ALA) walls up to +11.0m, OC wall till EL +24.0m and IC wall till Elevation level (EL) +20.5m

(b) Reactor building internal structures up to +10.0m

(c) Slabs and walls up to +19.40m for reactor auxiliary building

(d) Slabs, walls and columns up to +6.40m for fresh fuel storage building

(e) Shielded control building

(f) Emergency and Normal Power supply cable tunnels

(g) Transport portal structures of the Reactor building upto EL+28.50m

Review of design adequacy checks was carried out for critical locations in civil engineering structures following AERB safety standards and concrete mix designs for normal and heavy concrete. AERB Site Observer Teams (SOT) were deputed regularly to KKNPP Site for physical verification of compliances and to witness various activities. The reports sent by SOT were reviewed for necessary follow up.

Review of QA Manual for Design and Construction

QA aspects are covered in Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) Chapter-17 and in overall QA manual. These have been reviewed and found to be satisfactory. For KKNPP-3&4, QA manual on design specifically covering the

Table 1.1: Safety Review Committee Meetings of the Nuclear Power Projects

Project Safety Committee Number of Meetings

ACPSR-LWR 1

ACPSR-NPPs (for PHWR, PFBR & LWR) 1

ACPSR-FCF 1

PDSC-PFBR 1

PDSC-LWRs & PDSC-KKNPP-3&4 4

PDSC (KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8, GHAVP-1&2)

2

PDSC (DFRP, FRFCF and DFMF) 2

CESC (KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8, GHAVP-1&2)

16

Total 28

Construction Activities at KKNPP #3 (Reactor Building and Reactor Auxiliary Building)


Multi-Purpose Flask Assembly Testing

Structures, Systems and Components (SSC) which are under Indian scope has been reviewed. Revised QA manual for Construction was reviewed and found to be satisfactory.

(ii) Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project -5&6 (KKNPP- 5&6)

The application for excavation and associated documents submitted by NPCIL as per the requirement to grant excavation clearance were reviewed. Based on satisfactory review, clearance for Excavation of KKNPP-5&6 was granted on November 14, 2018.

Prior to this, NPCIL request for an early clearance to excavate for KKNPP-5&6 pump house along with KKNPP-3&4 pump house excavation citing the construction constraint was considered by AERB and after satisfactory review of the application for this along with the supporting documents, clearance was granted for excavation

of pump house area of KKNPP-5&6, approx. 4 months before issuing the clearance for excavation of KKNPP-5&6 i.e. on July 23, 2018.

A.2 Fast Breeder Reactor Based NPPs

(i) Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR)

AERB had accorded permission for commissioning of Secondary Sodium Pumps in both the loops in SGB-1&2 during December 2017. Based on above, BHAVINI had undertaken the commissioning of Secondary Sodium Main Circuits (SSMC in SGB # 1 & 2). During commissioning of secondary sodium loops, it got revealed that the existing electro magnetic (EM) pumps and the main sodium pump in loop-2 are not performing as intended in the design. Presently, the EM pumps have been replaced with modified design EM pumps and few design modifications have been made in the Secondary sodium pump of loop-2. The commissioning related issues and the

View of Reactor Building and Reactor Auxiliary Building of KKNPP #4


root cause analysis of the EM pump failure were reviewed in the AERB safety committees.

Activities related to integrated preheating of Main Vessel (MV), Safety Vessel (SV), secondary sodium circuit and SGDHR circuit are in progress with heat input from hot nitrogen circulation through MV and MV-SV annular space for MV and SV preheating and heat from electrical heaters for preheating the secondary sodium circuit and SGDHR circuit.

AERB Site Observer Teams (SOT) were deputed to PFBR Kalpakkam Site since July 2017, for independent monitoring of regulatory safety aspects related to the ongoing activities.

A.3 Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) Based NPPs

(i) KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8

Safety review of various submissions for the twin units of 700 MWe PHWRs at Kakrapar, Gujarat (KAPP-3&4) and Rawatbhata, Rajasthan (RAPP-7&8) is in progress. Civil construction activities are in advanced stage at KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8.

Construction of major structures like Reactor Building Containment and Internal Structures is nearing completion. Major equipment like End-shield, Calandria, Steam Generators, Diesel Generators and core components like Calandria Tubes (CT), Pressure Tubes (PT), Reactivity Devices etc. are installed in KAPP-3 and functional tests and pre-commissioning activities of few systems are in progress.

Main Plant Construction area of RAPP-7&8

(ii) GHAVP-1&2

Design of GHAVP-1 to 4 is similar to KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8, except for site specific changes. After satisfactory review of design basis for SSCs, aspects related to layout and finalization of the approach for ground improvement, clearance for commencement of excavation was granted for two 700 MWe PHWR based NPP units at Gorakhpur, Haryana site (GHAVP-1&2) in January 2018. Subsequent to this, excavation at site started in March, 2018 after ascertaining the maximum depth of ground improvement considering liquefaction potential aspects and satisfactory review of excavation procedure and related drawings/ reports.

NPCIL submitted application seeking clearance for FPC for GHAVP-1&2, associated submissions were being progressively made. Safety review is under progress with a focus on design differences w.r.t. the earlier projects. Seismic analysis reports, soil structure interaction aspects and configuration of foundation system for safety related buildings are under review.

Highlights of safety review of PHWRs under Construction (KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8 and GHAVP-1&2) are given below:

Main aspects of KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8 safety review included revised Preliminary Safety Analysis Reports (PSAR), Proposed Technical Specifications for Operation, Environmental Qualification Reports, Basis of Acceptance of identified equipment, revised PSI Manual, Commissioning Procedures, Containment Proof and Leakage rate test procedure etc.

PFBR BHAVINI


(a) Damage to Steam Generator (SG) nozzles and scratches on SG body during transport

During transportation of SG from manufacturer’s complex to RAPP-7&8 site by road, a carrier during overtaking, rubbed the SG outer surface near Rishabhdev, Rajasthan. Manufacturer did an inspection, where rubbing marks were observed on a nozzle and the shell surface. An instrumentation nozzle was also found slightly bent. A report on this event was submitted by NPCIL, which was reviewed and certain recommendations were made regarding the further corrective actions.

(b) Erection of Inner Containment Dome liner along with the Containment Spray System (CSS) ring header assembly of RAPP-7

Based on the detailed review, permission for erection of Inner Containment dome liner along with the CSS ring header assembly of RAPP-7 was granted on January 25, 2018 with certain stipulations. Subsequently, NPCIL has successfully completed the erection of dome liner of RAPP-7 on February 25, 2018.

(c) Review status of Industrial Accident event in KAPP-3&4

On May 10, 2018, an accident involving injury to a contract worker took place at KAPP-3 & 4 construction site. The worker fell down from a height of approximately 2-3 m while descending down through the scaffolding. The root cause of the accident was unsafe act and undeclared health issues. Review conclusion indicated the need for improvement in system of medical examination and overall safety supervision of potentially hazardous areas by department and contractor safety staffs. NPCIL and contractor were recommended to improve upon the areas related to design, engineering and construction planning,

safe working condition to work at height, effective supervision for safety and medical management.

(d) In GHAVP-1&2, to eliminate the potential for soil liquefaction, scheme of ground improvement is being implemented. Pile-raft foundation will be adopted for GHAVP-1, 2 NB and tests on validation of piles are being followed up.

(iii) Kaiga-5&6

AERB received application for Siting Consent for two units of 700 MWe PHWRs at Kaiga (Kaiga Units-5&6) from NPCIL along with Site Evaluation Report and reports on other related topical studies in December 2018. The application and associated submissions were reviewed by AERB to ascertain its adequacy, considering the requirements of AERB/NPP&RR/SG/G-1 and AERB/NF/SC/S, (R1). Based on the adequacy review, need for certain additional information was identified. Meanwhile, detailed review of the submitted reports was in progress.

(B) FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION: REVIEW STATUS

Safety review activities related to fuel cycle facilities continued during the year.

B.1 Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant

Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (DFRP) is being set up at Kalpakkam for reprocessing of the spent fuel from Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) on regular basis and demonstration of reprocessing process of the PFBR spent fuel. In the main process plant, pre-commissioning checks were completed. Civil construction activities in the Head End Facility (HEF) facility of the plant, which houses the cells required for receiving and initial processing of spent fuel subassemblies, was nearing completion.


The revised application for commencing Acid-TBP run along with requisite supporting documents (as part of commissioning of DFRP facility) submitted by IGCAR is being reviewed.

Service Piping Area of DFRP

Control Room of DFRP

B.2 Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility

Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF) is an integrated facility being set up at Kalpakkam, which will be used for recycling the spent fuel from PFBR, including fuel fabrication and assembly, reprocessing and waste management. AERB had issued consent for construction of this facility in the year 2013 and subsequently had granted extension of Consent for Construction during December 2016. Civil construction activities of Waste Management Plant (WMP), Core Subassembly Plant (CSP), Fuel Fabrication Plant (FFP) and Reprocessed Uranium Plant (RUP) were in progress. AERB has been following up the safety aspects related to construction.

In this year, consequent to a fatal accident that had occurred at construction site AERB had to suspend the construction activities involving earthmoving at the project site once. After corrective actions taken by the site to strengthen the safety management system at site based on the review and assessment of the accident, AERB issued permission for resumption of construction activities. Details of the incident is given in section 1.8.

B.3 Nuclear Fuel Complex, Kota (NFC-K)

500 Tons Per Annum (TPA) PHWR Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF) and 165 TPA Zircaloy Fabrication Facility (ZFF) are being setup at Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Kota to meet additional demand of nuclear fuel supply for the upcoming 4 nos. of 700 MWe PHWRs (KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8). In first phase, two modules each of 250 TPA PFFF and 65 TPA ZFF will be set up and 100 TPA ZFF will be added in second phase.

AERB had issued siting consent for NFC-Kota on May 28, 2014. NFC-Kota submitted application for plant construction consent, which was satisfactorily reviewed and Construction Consent to NFC-Kota was granted this year. Compliance to the stipulations made while issuing the consent is being verified through regulatory inspections.

B.4 Away From Reactor Spent Fuel Storage Facility of KKNPP-1&2

NPCIL had earlier submitted siting application for Away From Reactor (AFR) of KKNPP-1&2 along with supporting documents. The review of the application and supporting documents is in progress as per the review plan.

1.3 OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND RESEARCH REACTORS

1.3.1 Operational Safety Review

AERB carries out safety review and monitoring of operating NPPs and research reactors


following multi-tier review process. Exhaustive review takes place during review of application for renewal of licence for operation and resolution of other safety issues that would emanate during plant operation. Currently there are 22 operating NPPs in the country. The details of these NPPs indicating

their capacity, commencement of operation and validity of current operating licence is given in Table 1.2.

Safety review pertaining to ageing management and healthiness of plant buildings of various NPPs and other nuclear facilities were

Table 1.2: List of Operating NPPs

NPP Site/District/State

Unit Type Gross cap. (MWe)

Commencement of operation

Validity of Licence

Tarapur Atomic Power Station

Tarapur /Palghar /

Maharashtra

TAPS-1 BWR 160 Oct.-1969 Mar 2021

TAPS-2 160

TAPS-3 PHWR 540 Aug.- 2006 Aug 2021

TAPS-4 540 Sept.-2005

Rajasthan Atomic Power Station

Rawatbhata / Chithaurgarh /

Rajasthan

RAPS-1# PHWR 100 Dec.-1973 Aug 2019

RAPS-2 200 Apr.-1981

RAPS-3 220 Jun.-2000 Oct 2022

RAPS-4 220 Dec.-2000

RAPS-5 220 Feb.-2010 Mar 2020

RAPS-6 220 Mar.-2010

Kakrapar Atomic Power Station

Kakrapar / Tapi / Gujarat

KAPS-1 PHWR 220 May-1993 Jul 2019

KAPS-2 220 Sept.-1995

Madras Atomic Power Station

Kalpakkam / Kancheepuram /

Tamil Nadu

MAPS-1 PHWR 220 Jan.-1984 Dec 2020

MAPS-2 220 Mar.-1986

Narora Atomic Power Station

Narora / Bulandshahar / Uttar Pradesh

NAPS-1 PHWR 220 Jan.-1991 Jun 2023

NAPS-2 220 Jul.-1992

Kaiga Generating Station

Kaiga / North Uttar Kannada /

Karnataka

KGS-1 PHWR 220 Nov.-2000 May 2022

KGS-2 220 Mar.-2000

KGS-3 220 May-2007 Apr 2023

KGS-4 220 Jan.-2011

Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant

Kudankulam / Tirunelveli / Tamil Nadu

KKNPP-1 PWR 1000 Dec.-2014 Jul 2020

KKNPP-2 1000 Dec.-2017

# Unit under shutdown since 2004 and the reactor core is defueled.


taken up by AERB. In general, the condition of buildings and associated structures were found to be satisfactory. Buildings which required repair and rehabilitation were identified and appropriate assessment/repair approaches and retrofit schemes were proposed by the utilities. This year condition assessment of identified plant buildings and safety related structures of TAPS-1&2, RAPS-1&2, RAPS-5&6, HWP-Manuguru and NFC-Hyderabad were reviewed as a part of the periodic safety review for licence renewal. AERB also reviewed the seismic analysis and structural design for proposed Onsite Emergency Support Centre (OESC) buildings at Kalpakkam, Tarapur and Kakrapar sites.

1.3.2 Consents / Clearances / Permissions Issued

During the year, number of applications from the utilities were reviewed and licences for operations /clearances / permissions were issued.

• Renewal of licence for operation of KGS-3&4 under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and

the Factories Act, 1948 up to April 30, 2023.

• Renewal of licence for operation of NAPS-1&2 under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act, 1948 up to June 30, 2023.

• Renewal of licence for operation of KKNPP-1&2 under the Factories Act, 1948 up to July 2020.

• Renewal of licence for operation of KAPS-1&2 under the Factories Act, 1948 up to July 31, 2019.

• Renewal of licence for operation of FBTR & IFSB under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 up to June 30, 2023.

1.3.3 Safety Review of Operating Nuclear Facilities and Research Reactors

Number of meetings were conducted by various safety committees/standing committees /expert groups during the year is given in Table 1.3

Table 1.3: Meetings of Safety CommitteesName of the Committee / Expert Group No. of Meetings

SARCOP 21

LWR Safety Committee (TAPS-1&2 & KK-1&2) 18

PHWR Safety Committee-1 (RAPS-1&2, MAPS-1&2, NAPS & KAPS-1&2) 16

PHWR Safety Committee-2 (KGS-1&2, KGS-3&4, RAPS-3&4 & RAPS-5&6) 09

PHWR Safety Committee-3 (TAPS-3&4) 06

IGCAR Safety Committee (RR, CORAL, FRTG, RML &RCL) 06

Standing Committee on Reactor Physics (SC-RP) 12

Standing Committee on Control, Instrumentation& Computer based Systems (SCCI & CS) 05

Expert Group on Equipment Qualification (EG-EQ) 01

Expert Group on Coolant Channels (EG-CC) 17

Civil Engineering Safety Committee for Operating Plants (CESCOP) 02

Total 113


The safety status of operating NPPs and research reactors is described below:

(i) Kaiga Generating Station (KGS-3&4)

Licence for operation of KGS-3&4 under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 was valid till April 30, 2018. As per the regulatory requirements, station had carried out Periodic Safety Review (PSR) and submitted a report to AERB along with application for renewal of the licence for operation. Review assessment indicated that the performance of KGS-3&4 with respect to nuclear and radiological safety was satisfactory. The units were operated in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specifications for Operation. In-Service Inspection (ISI) of safety related SSCs were carried out as per the approved ISI programme and had not revealed any significant degradation and plant was capable for safe operation for at least next five years. Radioactive effluent discharges remained well below the limits specified in technical specification. Effective dose to the members of public residing at exclusion zone was well within the limit prescribed by AERB. Station has a well-established programme for utilisation of operating experience and had implemented a number of safety modifications based on operating experience. Station had implemented all short &

medium term safety upgrades identified based on review of Fukushima NPP accident. For pending long term modifications/ upgrades, a roadmap has been submitted and it is being followed. Equipment qualification programme was instituted and qualification of the equipment was in progress. In view of the above, AERB renewed the licence for operation of KGS-3&4 under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 up to April 30, 2023.

Licence for operation of KGS-3&4 under the Factories Act, 1948 was valid up to January 05, 2019. Station application for renewal of this licence was also reviewed in AERB following multi-tier review process. Review indicated that station had complied with all the statutory and regulatory requirements under the Factories Act, 1948. Based on the review, AERB renewed the licence for operation of KGS-3&4 under the Factories Act,

SARCOP Members’ Visit to Kaiga-3&4

SARCOP Meeting in Progress at Kaiga-3&4


1948 up to April 30, 2023 in order to align both the licences (issued under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Factories Act, 1948) and issue a single licence.

(ii) Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS-1&2)

Licences for operation of NAPS-1&2 under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Factories Act, 1948 were valid till June 30, 2018 and July 12, 2018 respectively. The applications for renewal of these licence were reviewed. Review assessment indicated that the performance of NAPS-1&2 with respect to nuclear, radiological and industrial safety had been satisfactory. NAPS units had operated in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specifications for Operation. ISI of safety related SSCs had revealed that there is no any significant degradation of the plant SSCs and plant is capable for safe operation for next five years. Radioactive effluent discharges remained well below the limits specified in technical specifications. Effective dose to the members of public residing at exclusion zone was well within the limit prescribed by AERB. A number of modifications/safety upgrades had been carried out at NAPS based on the operating experience and to address obsolescence related issues. Station had implemented all short & medium term safety upgrades identified based on review of Fukushima NPP accident. Long term post Fukushima upgrades such as installation of PCRDs, establishment of OESC, implementation of DSS etc. were expected to be completed by December 2019. In view of above, AERB renewed the licences for operation of NAPS-1&2 under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Factories Act, 1948 up to June 30, 2023.

(iii) Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP-1&2)

Licence for operation of KKNPP-1&2 under the Factories Act, 1948 was valid till October 10, 2018. AERB reviewed application for renewal of

licence. Review indicated that general performance of KKNPP-1&2 with respect to industrial safety, health and environment was satisfactory. Station had complied with all the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements under the Factories Act, 1948. However, pending completion of the review of the recent fatal accident on October 29, 2018 licence for operation of KKNPP-1&2 was renewed for limited period of 3 months, i.e. up to March 10, 2019. Subsequently based on the review the licence has been extended upto July 2020.

(iv) Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS-1&2)

Licence for operation of KAPS-1&2 under the Factories Act, 1948 was valid till November 30, 2018. Station had submitted the application for renewal of licence. Review indicated that the general performance of KAPS with respect to industrial safety, health and environment was satisfactory. Station had also complied with all the regulatory recommendations related to industrial & fire safety requirements. Even though sufficient firefighting provisions were available near the 3MVA & 5MVA oil filled auxiliary transformers, based on the review, it was decided to install water sprinkler systems also for these transformers for which actions were in progress. However, it was also noted that the existing licence for operation of KAPS-1&2 under The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 is valid up to July 31, 2019. In order to align both the licences (the licence under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Factories Act, 1948) AERB renewed the licence for operation of KAPS-1&2 under the Factories Act, 1948 up to July 31, 2019.

(v) Status of KAPS-1&2 units following Incidents of Leakage from Coolant Channels

KAPS-1&2 units had experienced the events of failure/leak from the coolant channel on March 11, 2016 and July 01, 2015 respectively. Following the incident, En-Masse Coolant Channel Replacement (EMCCR) campaign had been taken up in both


the units. After completion of all the EMCCR activities, station submitted an application for fuel reloading and re-start of KAPS-2. This application was reviewed in AERB following multi-tier review process. Based on satisfactory review, AERB granted the permission for fuel reloading and re-start of KAPS-2. Subsequently, KAPS-2 was made critical on September 17, 2018 and synchronized to grid on September 22, 2018.

EMCCR activities in KAPS-1 were in advance stage. After satisfactory completion of first phase EMCCR activities, which involve cutting, removal & disposal of coolant channels, second phase EMCCR activities were in progress. As a part of second phase, station had completed the cleaning & inspection of retained core components and installation of new coolant channel assemblies after review & approval from AERB. AERB had also granted permission for carrying out Pre-Service Inspection (PSI) of new coolant channels and installation of feeders. PSI of coolant channel was in progress.

Board members visited KAPS site to see the status of restoration and preparatory activities for resuming operation of KAPS-1 as well as the newly created Simulator for 700 MWe PHWR.

(vi) Update on Investigations on Incidents of Leakage from the Coolant Channels in KAPS-1&2 Units

Subsequent to the events of failure/leak from the coolant channels, detailed investigations were

undertaken for establishment of the root cause(s). The investigations had confirmed that hydrocarbon impurity (ethylene) in CO2 gas of AGMS had caused nodular corrosion on pressure tubes OD surface after 2012. The inspections performed in all other operating PHWRs had confirmed that the localised corrosion phenomenon was limited to KAPS-1&2 reactors alone. Based on the outcome of investigations, specifications for CO2 gas and its quality assurance checks were made more stringent for all operating PHWRs. The capability of coolant channel leak detection system was also analysed and found to meet the design requirements in all PHWRs.

Further studies in this regard indicated that the failure/leak of PTs are not attributed to the material of Pressure Tubes (PTs) and manufacturing process. The affected PT (Q-15) of KAPS-1 and one more PT (P-18) of KAPS-1 made from the same ingot were examined at PIED, BARC. Detailed investigations brought out that the radiolysis of ethylene in AGMS gas led to formation of reactive chemical species which damaged the protective layer on OD surface of PT. The availability of bare alloy surface led to its oxidation and formation of nodules. This lead to gradual absorption of hydrogen by the PT material which resulted into degradation of the material properties. The deteriorated material properties caused the event of leak/failure of coolant channel.

The investigation findings were reviewed and based on the review outcome, corrective

Site Visit of AERB Board Members’ to KAPS site


measures were implemented at operating PHWRs which include strengthening of annulus gas specifications and quality checks, increase in scope of ISI of coolant channels, enhanced surveillance and monitoring of annulus gas system, etc. These corrective actions will avoid the nodular corrosion of PTs and hence will prevent any such failure in future.

Based on the outcome of the investigations findings, INES rating of the KAPS-1 event has been uprated to Level-2 from earlier provisional rating of Level-1 and INES rating of KAPS-2 to Level-1 from earlier provisional rating of Level-0 considering the potential for common cause failure.

The outcome of the investigations findings and the corrective measures implemented at operating PHWRs were also briefed to AERB board. This meeting was also attended by the experts in the field from DAE.

(vii) Update on Coolant Channel Inspections in TAPS-3&4

During BSD in 2017, a number of volumetric indications were observed on the ID surface of coolant channels of TAPS-3&4. The channel L-08 of TAPS-4, in addition to volumetric indications, was observed to have four circumferential planar flaws. This channel was defueled and isolated from main PHT system. The inspection results and assessment carried out based on the same were

reviewed by AERB and permissions were granted for restart of TAPS-3&4.

As recommended by AERB during restart, station had carried out inspection of few coolant channels in both units of TAPS-3&4 in the year 2018, to see the growth of indications observed in previous inspection campaign. During inspection, no growth was observed in the significant indications as observed earlier. Structural integrity assessment indicated sufficient margins as per the codal requirements. Based on the satisfactory review, permission for restart was granted by AERB. The channel L-08 of TAPS-4 was cut and removed from the core for post irradiation examination at PIED, BARC.

(viii) Fast Breeder Test Reactor and Interim Fuel Storage Building

Licence for operation of Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) and Interim Fuel Storage Building (IFSB) were valid up to June 30, 2018. FBTR and IFSB submitted applications for renewal of licences. AERB review indicated that the performance of FBTR & IFSB with respect to nuclear and radiological safety was satisfactory. There was no major operational safety issue with any of the plant systems. Radioactive effluent discharges were well within the technical specification limits. ISI of safety related SSCs had not indicated any significant degradation in safety related SSCs.

AERB Board and Experts reviewing report on Investigation of KAPS Incident


Kaiga Generating Station

A number of safety modifications and upgrades were carried out at FBTR based on operating experience and to address the obsolescence related issues. FBTR had implemented majority of the safety upgrades identified based on review of Fukushima NPP accident and gave commitment for implementation of pending modifications and upgrades in time bound manner. Performance of IFSB was also found satisfactory. In view of above, AERB renewed the licence for operation of FBTR & IFSB up to June 2023.

(ix) Continuous Operation of Kaiga Generating Station (KGS) Unit-1

KGS-1 had been synchronised to grid since May 13, 2016 after completion of Biennial Shutdown (BSD) activities. Since then, the reactor operated continuously without any safety or operational issues. Considering the continuous safe operation of the unit as an opportunity for generating data on performance of various reactor systems and condition of SSCs during prolonged operation, station had proposed for continuous operation of KGS-1 till December 31, 2018.

The station’s submissions were extensively reviewed in AERB as per the established multi-tier mechanism. AERB also performed independent assessment of various aspects related to continuous long term operation. During review, it was ascertained that the previous surveillance results had been satisfactory and the various parameters during calibration of the

safety components were within limits. Based on the assessment of reactor safety systems through relevant parameters and surveillances it was concluded that the fundamental safety functions were not getting compromised in any way due to prolonged operation of KGS-1.

Station had instituted additional measures such as close monitoring and trending of important parameters, monitoring of alternate/backup parameters, issuance of relevant operator instructions and increased panel walk down by control room staff to detect any abnormality. Trends of important parameters were submitted to AERB on weekly basis and were found satisfactory. AERB also carried out frequent regulatory inspections, both announced and unannounced, to gather first-hand information on the safety status of the plant, verify/check compliance and effectiveness of instituted compensatory measures, performance of various SSCs, conduct of operating staff and safety management of KGS-1&2. The AERB team interacted with operating staff, examined the test procedures and records, made direct observations of various parameters from the recording systems, verified the healthiness of systems from the field etc. Observations made by AERB during these inspections did not indicate any safety significant deviation. Based on the extensive reviews and enhanced regulatory oversight, continued operation of KGS-1 was permitted in phases up to December 31, 2018.

KGS-1 was manually shut down on December 31, 2018 for BSD activities after 962 days of safe continuous operation. The stable & safe operation of KGS-1 for long duration demonstrated the maturity of nuclear reactor technology and effectiveness of regulatory oversight mechanism in India. The continuous long term operation of KGS-1 provided first-of-a-kind opportunity for generating the data on performance of plant systems, structures and


components during continuous run. The data would be useful to the utilities with respect to operation management as well as to AERB in future safety reviews.

(x) Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS)

MAPS-1 was shut down on January 30, 2018 to investigate the reason for high D2O collection and high tritium DAC in calandria vault. Subsequently, based on the BARCIS inspections, two coolant channels O-09 & Q-09 were identified as leaky channels. These channels were cut, removed from core and sent to Post Irradiation Examination Division (PIED), BARC for further examination, which was in progress. Preliminary investigations indicated leak from end shield might be responsible for creating through wall crack in these channels. Rectification of leak from end shield in between lattice locations of O-09 and Q-09 was in progress.

1.3.4 Safety Assessment of Operating NPPs in the wake of Fukushima Accident

Safety assessment carried out post Fukushima accident, indicated that Indian NPPs have inherent strength in dealing with external hazards. However, certain safety enhancements were identified for strengthening the defences against rare external events exceeding the design bases and enhancing severe accident mitigation capabilities. These actions were classified as short, medium and long term measures/safety upgrades. Implementations of short and medium term safety measures/upgrades have been already completed. Long term safety measures include provision of Containment Filtered Venting System (CFVS), implementation of hydrogen management provisions, establishing On-site Emergency Support Centre (OESC) etc. AERB is closely monitoring the status of implementation of the identified safety upgrades. The present status of long term safety upgrades/measures is as below:

• The generic Technical Basis Document (TBD) on ‘Accident Management Guidelines (AMGs)’ for Indian PHWRs and BWRs has been reviewed and accepted by AERB. Station specific accident management guidelines are in place at all operating stations.

• Installation of CFVS for TAPS-1&2 has been completed and system is available on requirement. Generic Design Basis report (DBR) for CFVS for PHWRs has been reviewed and accepted by AERB. Actions for procurement for major equipment are in progress.

• Nitrogen Inerting System for Primary Containment volumes (drywell, suppression pool & common chamber) of TAPS-1&2 has been commissioned successfully after approval from AERB. System performance was observed to be satisfactory.

• With respect to hydrogen management in the containment during severe accident, a generic & station specific DBR on Passive Catalytic Recombiner Device (PCRD) has been reviewed and accepted by AERB. Supporting structures for installation of PCRDs are being erected at NPPs during Biennial Shutdown (BSD) of the units. Installation of PCRDs has also been started. Provision for mixing the containment volumes are being made at all NPPs.

• Decision Support System (DSS) has been made available at all NPPs with existing Environmental Radiation Monitors (ERMs) except KKNPP-1&2.

• The design basis for OESC at all NPP sites has been finalised. OESCs are being constructed in phased manner at all the sites.


1.3.5 Licensing of Operating Staff

Operating personnel of NPPs responsible for control room operation namely Shift Charge Engineer (SCE), Assistant Shift Charge Engineer (ASCE) and Control Engineer (CE) are required to go through a rigours licensing/relicensing process. This includes clearing checklists, written exams and walkthrough. A candidate after successfully completing the pre-requisites of licensing procedure, appears before the licensing committee constituted by AERB for qualification interview, which includes AERB representatives. On satisfactory performance, the candidate is licensed/re-licensed for the given position.

During the year, 24 meetings were held for licensing/re-licensing of operating personnel responsible for control room operations at various operating plants. Total of 211 candidates were licensed / relicensed. In addition to above, four personnel for operation of FBTR (Two Senior Shift Engineers, one Senior Fuel Handling Engineer and one Control Room Assistant/Field Supervisors) were licensed. Details are given in Table 1.4.

1.3.6 Authorisation for Safe Disposal / Transfer of Radioactive Wastes for DAE Facilities under GSR-125

A major change in the procedure for issuing Authorisation for Safe Disposal / Transfer of Radioactive Wastes for DAE Facilities was effected during the year. Till now the waste authorisation was given for a fixed term irrespective of the validity period of operating licence. Now the authorisation is linked with validity of operating licence and all the fresh authorisation / renewal are done only till the date of validity of their operating licence.

The existing authorisation of all facilities are now valid till date of validity of their operating licence. Tummalapalle Mill (UCIL) submitted the application for the first time for seeking authorisation for waste disposal which was issued in line with the validity period of operating licence.

A list of DAE facilities authorised for safe disposal/transfer of radioactive waste is indicated in Table 1.5.

Table 1.4: Licensing of Operating Staff

Plants No. of Persons Licensed Licensing Committee MeetingsSCE ASCE ASCE (F) CE CE (F)

TAPS-1&2 4 3 - 6 - 2

TAPS-3&4 4 1 3 10 2 2

RAPS-1&2 4 2 1 6 2 2

RAPS-3&4 5 3 6 6 - 2

RAPS-5&6 5 9 2 7 2 2

MAPS-1&2 3 4 0 8 0 2

NAPS-1&2 4 3 - 6 3 2

KAPS-1&2 - 2 3 8 5 2

KGS-1&2 2 3 1 7 4 2

KGS-3&4 4 3 2 6 1 3

KKNPP-1&2 12 6 - 18 - 3

Total 47 39 18 88 19 24


1.4 NUCLERA FUEL CYCLE AND OTHER RELATED INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

1.4.1 Operational Safety Review

The nuclear fuel cycle facilities and other related industrial facilities under the regulatory control of AERB are mines and ore processing plants of Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. (UCIL), mineral separation plants and chemical processing plants of Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL), Nuclear Fuel

Complex (NFC), Zirconium Complex (ZC), Heavy Water Plants (HWP) and some of the facilities of Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR). In addition to this, Beach Sand Minerals (BSM) and other facilities handling Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) are also regulated by AERB with respect to radiological safety aspects. The list of fuel cycle facilities is presented in Table 1.6.

Table 1.5: List of Facilities Authorised for Safe Disposal / Transfer of Radioactive WasteS. No. Name of DAE Organisation No. of Facilities

1 Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) 122 Indian Rare Earth Limited (IREL) 033 Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) 064 Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) 145 IGCAR + SRI(AERB) 04+016 Board of Radiation & Isotope Technology (BRIT) 04*7 Technology Demonstration Plant (HWB) 1

Total Number of Authorisations 45

*LBL, JONAKI, BRIT is exempted from waste authorisation

Facilities Operated by UCIL

Mines Narwapahar In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand

Underground uranium mine

March 31, 2023

Turamdih In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand


December 31, 2023

Bagjata In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand


June 30, 2020

Mohuldih In operation Singhbhum (E) / Jharkhand


October 31, 2019

Jaduguda Shutdown Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand


January 31, 2023

Bhatin Shutdown Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand


April 30, 2023

Tummalapalle In operation Y.S.R. Kadapa/ Andhra Pradesh


February 28, 2023

Banduhurang In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand

Opencast uranium mine

June 30, 2021

Table 1.6: Status of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and Other Facilities

Type of Facility

Name Functional Status

District /State

Scope of the Facility Validity of Current Licence


Type of Facility


District /State


Ore Processing Facilities

Jaduguda In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand

Uranium Ore Processing

December 31, 2020

Turamdih In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand


February 28, 2021

Tummalapalle Under Trial operation

Y.S.R. Kadapa/ Andhra Pradesh


December 31, 2019

Facilities Operated by IREL

Mines Chavara In operation Kollam/Kerala

Mineral Separation August 19, 2019

Manavalakurichi In operation Kanyakumari/Tamil Nadu

Mineral Separation August 19, 2019

Ore Processing Facilities

OSCOM Chatrapur In operation Ganjam/ Odisha Mineral Separation August 19, 2019

OSCOM Chatrapur In operation Ganjam/ Odisha Monazite Processing April 30, 2020

Udyogamandal In operation Ernakulum/ Kerala

Rare earths compounds and Uranium production

November 11, 2023

Facilities Operated by NFC

Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facilities

NFC, Hyderabad In operation Hyderabad/ Telangana

Fuel Fabrication August 31, 2022

Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal

In operation Tuticorin/Tamil Nadu

Reactor Grade Zirconium sponge production

June 30, 2021

Facilities Operated by HWB

Heavy Water Plants

HWP-Kota, Rawatbhata

In operation Rawatbhata/ Rajasthan

Heavy Water production

December 31, 2020

HWP-Manuguru In operation Khammam/Telangana


June 30, 2020

HWP-Baroda

Heavy water production suspended

In operation (Solvent and

K & Na metal plant)

Baroda/Gujarat

Tributyl Phosphate (TBP) and Potassium metal production.

May 31, 2021

HWP-Hazira In operation Hazira, Surat/ Gujarat


January 31, 2019

HWP-Thal In operation Raigad/ Maharashtra


December 31, 2019


Type of Facility


District /State


Heavy Water Plants

HWP-Tuticorin Heavy water production suspended

In operation(Diversified

activities like solvent production

plant)

Tuticorin/Tamil Nadu

Production of solventsTiAP, DHOA, D2EHPA-II

Licence for operation of VSSP, Tuticorin is valid till July 31, 2023

HWP-Talcher Heavy water production suspended

In operation(Diversified

activities like solvent production

plant)

Angul/Odisha

Production of solventsTBP, 10B enriched Boron, D2EHPA, TOPO, TAPO, DNPPA

August 31, 2020

TDP-Chembur

Main Plant operation is Shut down

(Some systems are being

operated in closed loop for developmental

activities)

Mumbai/Maharashtra

Crude Sodium Di-Uranate

October 31, 2021

1.4.2 Consents/Clearances/Permission Issued

AERB continued its regulatory supervision of fuel cycle facilities. During the year, applications from various DAE units were reviewed and licences were renewed under the Factories Act, 1948 / Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004 as mentioned below. The licences are valid for a period of maximum five years.

l Licence for operation of HWP-Hazira was renewed up to January 31, 2019

l Licence for operation of VSSP at HWP-Tuticorin was renewed up to July 31, 2023

l Licence for operation of Narwapahar Mine was renewed up to March 31, 2023

l Licence for operation of Tummalapalle mine was renewed up to February 28, 2023

l Licence for operation of Banduhurang mine was renewed up to June 30, 2021

l Licence for operation of Bhatin mine was renewed up to April 30, 2023

l Licence for Operation of Turamdih mine was renewed up to December 31, 2023

l Licence for operation of Turamdih mill was renewed up to February 28, 2021

l Licence for operation of facilities at IREL, Udyogamandal was renewed up to November 11, 2023

l Licence for operation of CORAL, IGCAR was renewed up to August 30, 2023.

1.4.3 Safety Review of Fuel Cycle Facilities

Number of meetings conducted by various safety committees for fuel cycle facilities and other


industrial facilities during this period is given in Table 1.7

The highlights of safety review of the operating fuel cycle and other industrial facilities are given below:

(i) Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL)

The uranium mines at Narwapahar, Turamdih, Bagjata, Mohuldih, Banduhurang and Tummalapalle were under normal operation. Jaduguda and Bhatin mine are under shutdown. The mills at Jaduguda and Turamdih were under normal operation while Tummalapalle mill is in trial operation during the span.

During the year, applications for renewal of licence for operation of Narwapahar Mine, Tummalapalle mine, Banduhurang mine, Bhatin mine, Turamdih mine and Turamdih mill were reviewed and the licences for operation were renewed.

UCIL mines at Jaduguda and Bhatin are presently under shut down for ore production due to non-availability of clearances by State Government and Ministry of Environment & Forests (MoEF). AERB has issued licenses for handling (processing) radioactive material at Jaduguda and Bhatin mines which are valid till January 31, 2023 and April 30, 2023 respectively. UCIL had submitted applications to AERB for restarting the ore production from these two mines on receipt of necessary clearance from MoEF and State Government. Review of these applications are under progress.

(ii) Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL)

Rare Earth Division (RED) at IREL Udyogamandal and Mineral Separation Plants (MSP) at Chavara, Manavalakurichi and Chatrapur operated safely during the year. Monazite up-gradation plants at IREL Orissa Sand Complex (OSCOM), Manavalakurichi and Chavara were operational. Monazite Processing Plant (MoPP) at IREL, Orissa Sand Complex (OSCOM), Chatrapur were in operation.

AERB RI Team Visit to UCIL AERB RI Team Visit to IREL

Table 1.7: Meetings of Safety Review Committee of Fuel Cycle FacilitiesName of the Committee No. of Meetings

NFSC-1 (erstwhile, UCIL-AMD Safety Committee and BSM-NORM Safety Committee) 3

NFSC-2 (erstwhile, NFC Safety Committee) 1

NFSC-3 (erstwhile, HWP Safety Committee and ECIL Safety Committee) 4

Total 8


During the year, AERB reviewed the application for renewal of licence for operation of various facilities at IREL, Udyogamandal. Based on the satisfactory review, AERB renewed the licence for operation of IREL, Udyogamandal up to November 11, 2023. However, in view of limited space for storage of radioactive waste, AERB decided to carry out midterm review by December 2019 for continued operation for remaining licence period.

(iii) Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) & Zirconium Complex (ZC)

All the plants of NFC, Hyderabad and ZC, Pazhayakayal operated safely during the year.

(iv) Heavy Water Plants (HWP)

The Heavy Water Plants operated safely during the year. Heavy water plants at Kota, Manuguru, Thal and Hazira were operational. Heavy water plants at Baroda, Talcher and Tuticorin were non-operational due to unavailability of feed synthesis gas from fertilizer plant. Presently, HWP, Baroda is engaged in production of potassium metal, sodium metal and Tri-butyl Phosphate (TBP) solvent. Diversified projects namely, Versatile Solvent Production Plant (VSPP) at HWP, Talcher and Versatile Solvent Synthesis Plant (VSSP) at HWP, Tuticorin are operational. Technology Demonstration Plant (TDP), Chembur is under trial operation.

During the year, following proposals were reviewed:

• RenewaloflicenceforoperationofVSSPat HWP-Tuticorin

HWP-Tuticorin submitted application for renewal of licence for operation of VSSP, HWB-Tuticorin. The application was reviewed and based on review, AERB renewed licence up to July 31, 2023.

• LicenceforOperationofHWP-Hazira

Licence for operation of HWP-Hazira to produce 110 MT/year of reactor grade heavy

water was valid up to July 31, 2018. HWP-Hazira submitted application for renewal of licence. During review, it was noted that though the operating performance of the plant during the licence period has been satisfactory, the important aspects such as testing of the two tubes of a main cracker removed for mechanical testing, detailed study on consequence analysis of the cracker tube failure, revision of ISI Code of Practice, scheme for improvement in safety management system and retrofitting of control room at HWP-Hazira need to be addressed in a time bound manner. Based on the review, the licence for operation of HWP-Hazira was extended for limited duration of 6 months i.e. up to January 31, 2019. AERB decided that the renewal of licence for the remaining period (4.5 years) would be considered based on the review of effectiveness of the actions taken by HWB/HWP-Hazira for improvement in safety management system, availability of the revised code of practice for ISI and measures taken for strengthening of mechanism for head office level review of submissions to AERB.

(v) Renewal of License for Operation of Compact Reprocessing of Advanced Fuel in Lead mini Cell (CORAL), IGCAR

The reprocessing of FBTR spent fuel is being carried out at CORAL facility of IGCAR. AERB had extended the licence for Operation of CORAL under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 up to March 2018 subject to keeping the facility in safe shutdown condition and not carrying out reprocessing operation during this period for completion of activities related to ageing management, residual life assessment of major component & dose reduction.

After completion of pending activities, CORAL had submitted an application for relicensing of facility for reprocessing of FBTR fuel. During review, it was noted that CORAL had submitted all the documents as per the requirement for a regular facility and also complied with the


AERB recommendations with respect to nuclear and radiological safety aspects and the requirements specified for ‘Regular Plant’ as in AERB/NF/SG/G-2. Based on review, AERB renewed licence for operation of CORAL under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 for reprocessing of FBTR fuel for next 5 years with effect from September 1, 2018 and up-to August 30, 2023.

(vi) Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD)

Exploration work at various sites of AMD in northern, southern, eastern, western, central and south-central regions was in progress. Considering the low hazard potential these sites are inspected once in two years.

(vii) Beach Sand Minerals (BSM) & Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) Facilities

Periodic radiological reports submitted by the facilities were reviewed by AERB. No abnormality was observed during review.

1.5 OVERALL SAFETY PERFORMANCE OF THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION

1.5.1 Safety Performance of Nuclear Facilities in Construction

(a) KKNPP–3&4

There was one accident of serious nature that occurred at KKNPP- 3 & 4. On July 09, 2018 an accident resulting in crushing of right hand fingers of a contract person occurred during fixing of excavator bucket near the New Jetty Construction area. AERB reviewed this accident and measures to prevent recurrences of such incidents in future were recommended and conveyed to the site for compliance.

(b) KKNPP-5&6

Excavation activities are being performed safely at Site and Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) for the same was reviewed and found to be acceptable.

(c) PFBR P re -commiss ion ing /commiss ion ing activities at PFBR are in progress. There were no major reportable incidents at PFBR.

(d) KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8 and GHAVP-1&2 On May 10, 2018, a worker fell down from a height of approximately 2-3 m while descending down through the scaffolding resulting in an injury to the contract worker at KAPP-3 & 4 construction site. Details of the incident are given in section 1.8.

There were no major reportable incidents calling for enforcement actions at RAPP-7&8 during major equipment erection and GHAVP-1&2 during excavation activities.

(e) DFRP and FRFCF There were no major reportable incidents calling for enforcement actions during equipment erection at DFRP.

One fatal accident took place at FRFCF project site on August 29, 2018. Details of the incident are given under section 1.8.

(f) NFC-Kota Construction of the plant buildings is under progress at NFC-Kota Site. There were no major reportable incidents at NFC-Kota.

1.5.2 Safety Performance of Nuclear Facilities in Operation

The operational performance and significant events are reviewed and the required modifications are implemented. The operational performance of all the NPPs has remained satisfactory during last year. One significant event at MAPS-1. Details of the incident are given under section 1.8.

All the 33 significant events occurred at operating NPPs were reviewed in detail in AERB to see the adequacy of investigations, corrective actions, lessons learned and the need for any further regulatory actions.

All fuel cycle facilities operated safely during the period. However, there were few fatal


accidents that took place at HWPs, the details of incidents are given under section 1.8.

1.6 R&D UNITS AND OTHER FACILITIES IN CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION

Safety review of Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC), Raja Ramanna Centre for

Advanced Technology (RRCAT), Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) and Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) was done by AERB apart from the Fuel Cycle Facilities. The status of R&D units and other facilities are presented in Table 1.8.

Type of Facility

Name Functional Status Scope of the Facility Validity of Current Licence

Facilities operated by VECC, Kolkata, West BengalParticle Accelerator Research Facility (PARF)

Room Temperature Cyclotron (K-130)

In operation Heavy ion acceleration August 31, 2022

Super Conducting Cyclotron (K-500)

Commissioning Heavy ion acceleration No time limit

Medical Cyclotron Project

Pre-Commissioning trials Cyclotron machine along with 3 beam lines for production of radio-pharmaceuticals

No time limit

Facilities operated by RRCAT, Indore, Madhya PradeshLASER 150 TW Ti: Sapphire

Laser SystemIn operation 90 TW – for regular and 150

TW-trial (25 femto-second)June 30, 2021

PARF TWINDUS LINAC-1Agricultural Radiation Processing Facility (ARPF)

Operation Technology Demonstration for Food Irradiation

January 25, 2021

TWINDUSLINAC-2

Shifted from RRCAT to ARPF, Choithram Mandi. In Commissioning stage

Electron Acceleration 10 MeV, 5 kW

June 30, 2019

INDUS-1 In operation 450 MeV, 100 mA electron Storage ring

September 30, 2023

INDUS-2 In operation 2.5 GeV, 200 mA SRS March 31, 2021Accelerator Electron LINAC In operation 10 MeV, 10 kW June 30, 2021LASER 1 PW Laser System Construction 1 PW (femto second) ----

Facilities operated by IGCAR, Kalpakkam, Tamil NaduAccelerator 1.7 MV Tandetron

AcceleratorIn operation 1.7 MV August 31, 2021

150 kV Accelerator In operation 150 kV August 31, 2021Facilities operated by ECIL

Electronic component development

ECIL Hyderabad In operation Production of Instrumentation, Control & Communication systems and other Electronic components.

June 30, 2020

ECIL, Tirupati In operation Production of Nuclear Industrial Instrumentation systems, EVM & VVPAT power packs etc.

October 31, 2021

Table 1.8: Status of R&D and Other Facilities


1.6.1 Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC)

The Room Temperature Cyclotron (K-130) was under operation delivering alpha and proton beams of various energies and intensities. Commissioning of Super-conducting cyclotron and Radioactive Ion Beam facility are in progress. The equipment erection of medical cyclotron, which will be used, for commercial production of isotopes for Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT) isotopes as well as high end technological research is completed. AERB had issued permission for trial run of the Medical Cyclotron. The following proposal was reviewed by AERB.

Permission for Pre-commissioning Trials of Medical Cyclotron, VECC, Kolkata

Equipment erection of Medical Cyclotron was completed by VECC and applied for the permission for pre-commissioning trials which was granted to do the pre-commissioning trials at 18 MeV energy.

1.6.2 Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology (RRCAT)

INDUS-1 Synchrotron Radiation Source was under operation with beam energy of 450 MeV and beam current of 125 mA delivering synchrotron radiation through seven beam lines. INDUS-2, which is a synchrotron cum electron storage ring, was under operation at 2.5 GeV (max) beam energy and beam current of 200 mA (max). Twelve beam lines of INDUS-2 have already been authorised by AERB for carrying out experiments. In addition to these major accelerators, other accelerators and Laser Facilities/Projects at RRCAT are being periodically reviewed. The following proposals/issues related to RRCAT were reviewed.

• Amendment of Commissioning Consent for TWINDUS LINAC-1 at ARPF

RRCAT has commissioning consent for Agricultural and Radiation Processing Facility (ARPF) with 9 MeV beam energy, 270 mA beam current and 5 kW beam power. Based on application of RRCAT, the commissioning consent was amended with 10 MeV energy, 300 mA beam current and 5 kW beam power after review.

1.6.3 Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL)

Safety review of Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. was done by AERB apart from the Fuel Cycle Facilities. Following proposals were reviewed by AERB and granted the consents:

• Consent for construction of Reactor Projects (RPD) Building at ECIL, Hyderabad was granted on January 15, 2018 subject to compliance with safety precautions during construction given in the Atomic Energy (Factories ) Rules, 1996

• Consent for construction of Antenna Test Facility at ECIL, Hyderabad was granted on July 9, 2018 subject to compliance with statutory requirements during construction and other stipulations.

1.7 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Industrial Safety Awards and Fire safety Awards are given by AERB to promote Industrial safety and Fire safety in DAE Units. The winners are decided based on the review by the Award finalization committee. Industrial safety awards and Fire safety awards for the year 2017 were presented to the winner during the 35th DAE Safety & Occupational Health Professionals Meet held at VECC Kolkata this year.


Category Name of the Winner Unit(s)Production Units - I (NPPs & HWPs) Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) - 3&4Production Units - II (Others) Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL), UdyogmandalR&D and other Low Risk Units No winnerConstruction Units Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP) - 7&8

Shri S.A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB, presenting In-dustrial Safety Awards to Winners of DAE Units (i) RAPS-3&4, (ii) IREL and (iii) RAPS -7&8)

1.7.1 Industrial Safety Award

AERB presents Industrial Safety Award every year to the DAE units which achieves highest performance in Industrial Safety. These awards are given based on the relevant inputs/data received from each unit and its assessment with the set parameters that include longest accident free period, implementation of safety management system, injury statistics, dangerous occurrence, type of plant and operation, safety training imparted

to personnel and efforts made by the plant towards improving safety. For Industrial Safety award DAE units are categorized based on nature of plant operation as Production Units-I, Production Units-II, R&D & Other Low Risk Units and Construction Units category.

Following units were the winners of the AERB Industrial Safety Awards -2017 in various categories.


1.7.3 Occupational Injury Statistics of DAE Units

The compilation of Occupational Injury Statistics for the year 2018 for DAE units (other than BARC facilities and mines of IREL & UCIL) provides the data on accidents and analysis of number of injuries and loss of man-days. Details are presented in Table 1. 9.

• During the calendar year 2018, there were 18 reportable injuries including 5 fatalities with a loss of 32,122 man-days compared to 24 reportable injuries including 3 fatalities with a loss of 19,372 man-days in 2017. During the calendar year 2018, one fatality each has occurred at NAPS, KKNPP-1&2, HWP-Manuguru, UCIL Turamdih mill and at IGCAR (FRFCF).

• The year 2018 recorded a Frequency Rate (FR) of 0.11 as compared to 0.16 in the year 2017 and a Severity Rate (SR) of 204.61 as compared to 136.76 in 2017. Similarly, the year 2018 recorded an Injury Index of 0.023 as compared to 0.023 in the year 2017 and an Incidence Rate of 0.288 as compared to 0.43 in 2017.

• There was no notifiable disease reported during the period from any of the operating units of DAE under the purview of AERB.

Distribution of reportable injuries in DAE units in 2018 are presented in terms of percentage in Figure 1.1.

Year-wise Frequency Rate (F.R.), Severity Rate (S.R.), Injury Index (I.I.), Incidence Rate (I.R.) and Fatal Injuries in DAE Units is shown in Figure 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 respectively.

Shri S.A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB, presenting Fire Safety Awards to Winners of DAE Units (i) RAPS-3&4 and KAPP-3&4)

1.7.2 Fire Safety Award

This award was instituted by AERB to ensure that maximum efforts are made by the DAE units to prevent occurrence of fire incidents and ensure that appropriate management system is in place to prevent fire in these Units. The award is based on

the marks computed based on management system, efforts for improvement, training and fire incident statistics. DAE units are catagorised as Category-I and Category-II units based on fire potential. Following units were the winners of the AERB Fire Safety Awards-2017 in these categories.

Category Name of the Winner Unit(s)Category-I (High Fire Risk Units) Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) - 3&4Category-II (Low Fire Risk Units) Kakrapar Atomic Power Project (KAPP) - 3&4


Table 1.9 : Unit-wise Comparison of Reportable Occupational Injuries in DAE Units for 2018

Unit C1No. of

Lost Time (Reportable)

Injury

C2No. of Man-

days Lost

C3No. of Fatal

Injury

C4No. of

Employees

C5Number of Man-hours

Worked

C6Frequency

Rate(C1x106)

C5

C7Severity

Rate(C2x106)

C5

C8Injury Index

(C6xC7)1000

C9Incidence

Rate(C1x103)

C4

NP Plants 4 12047 2 15586 39085193 0.10 308.22 0.032 0.257

NP Projects 5 1554 0 18282 56776594 0.09 27.37 0.002 0.273

HWPs 1 6365* 1 4808 11772806 0.08 540.65 0.046 0.208

IRELs 1 2 0 548 187345 5.34 10.68 0.057 1.825

NFCs 0 0 0 4002 9645872 0 0 0 0

UCIL Mills 1 6000 1 2325 5195920 0.19 1154.75 0.222 0.430

ECIL 1 38 0 2604 6649520 0.15 5.71 0.001 0.384

IGCAR & FRFCF

4 6083 1 6614 17988905 0.22 338.15 0.075 0.605

AMD 0 0 0 3422 5209050 0 0 0 0

BRIT 1 33 0 1040 2038136 0.49 16.19 0.008 0.962

VECC 0 0 0 988 1935000 0 0 0 0

RRCAT 0 0 0 2375 505772 0 0 0 0

Total 18 32122 5 62594 156990113 0.11 204.61 0.023 0.288

* 365 man-days were lost due to reportable injury occurred at HWP-Kota in year 2017 and the victim did not join to duty in the year 2018.

Fig. 1.1 :Distribution of Reportable Injuries in DAE Units in 2018


Fig. 1.2 : Year-wise Frequency Rate in DAE Units

Fig. 1.3 : Year-wise Severity Rate in DAE Units

Fig. 1.4 : Year-wise trend of Injury Index in DAE Units


Fig. 1.5 : Year-wise trend of Incidence Rate in DAE Units

Fig. 1.6 : Year wise Fatal Injuries in DAE Units

1.8 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACTION

AERB requires NPPs to report certain events that occur in the plant which have or may have impact on operational safety. Under the reporting system established by AERB, the events reportable to the regulatory body are divided into two categories, termed as,

(a) Events

(b) Significant Events

This categorization of events is done based on their safety significance and importance to

operational safety experience feedback. Based on the established reporting criteria, Event Reports (ER) and Significant Event Reports (SER) are submitted to AERB. The SERs received from the operating NPPs are rated on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The INES rates events at seven levels (1 to 7) depending on their safety significance as shown in figure 1.7 below.

Events rated at level 4 and above are termed as ‘Accidents’. The accidents at Chernobyl NPP in former USSR (now in Ukraine) in April 1986


and Fukushima NPPs in Japan in March 2011 were rated at level 7 on INES. Events rated at levels 1, 2 and 3 are called ‘Incidents’. The level 0 or below scale means events that have no nuclear and radiological safety significance. All the significant events reported were reviewed in detail by AERB and measures to prevent recurrence of such events were recommended.

(i) Significant Events in NPP underConstruction

During the year no significant event reported in NPP under construction.

(ii) SignificantEventsinOperatingNPP

In year 2018, a total of 33 significant events were reported from operating NPPs. Out of these 31 significant events were rated at level-0 on INES (one event at MAPS-1 is provisionally rated at level-0 as the event investigations are in progress). One significant event each at NAPS-1&2 and KKNPP-1&2 were not rated on INES as these are related to industrial safety and had no relevance to nuclear & radiological safety. The number of SERs in each NPP and their ratings on INES are given in Table-1.10.

There were events of pressure tube leaks in KAPS-2 and KAPS-1 on July 1, 2015 and March 11, 2016 respectively. These events were assigned

Fig. 1.7: INES Scale

Table1.10:INESRatingofSignificantEventsinNPPsReportedduring Calendar Year 2018

NPP Number of Event ofINES-0

Number of Event ofINES-1

Number of Event ofINES-2 & above

TotalEvents

TAPS-1 & 2 3 0 0 3

TAPS-3 & 4 5 0 0 5

RAPS-1 & 2 3 0 0 3

RAPS-3 & 4 4 0 0 4

RAPS-5 & 6 0 0 0 0

KAPS-1 & 2 0 0 0 0

NAPS-1 & 2 6 0 0 7*

KGS- 1 & 2 0 0 0 0

KGS- 3 & 4 2 0 0 2

MAPS-1 & 2 4$ 0 0 4

KKNPP-1&2 4 0 0 5*

Total 31 0 0 33

* For industrial safety related event, INES is not applicable.$ One event at MAPS-1 is provisionally rated at level 0 as its investigations are in progress.


provisional INES rating of level-0 (for KAPS-2) and level-1 (for KAPS-1) respectively in view of the pending root cause analysis. The root cause has now been established and it has revealed that an unlisted impurity (hydrocarbons) in the carbon dioxide gas used in the annulus gas system of these reactors resulted in shallow localized corrosion spots on the outer surface of pressure tubes and corresponding generation of hydrogen which affected the material properties of pressure tubes. The deteriorated material properties caused the events of leak from the pressure tubes in KAPS units. Since all the pressure tubes in both units of KAPS-1&2 were

affected due to localized corrosion, these events of pressure tube leaks in KAPS-2 and KAPS-1 were uprated to level-1 and level-2 on INES respectively from earlier provisional rating of Level-0 and Level-1 respectively.

For the purpose of analysis, the events reported during year 2018 were categorized as per the IAEA-IRS coding system. The classification of systems failed / affected in the significant events is given in Figure-1.8. The classification of direct causes and root causes of the significant events are given in Figure-1.9 & 1.10 respectively.

Fig. 1.8: Classification of Failed/Affected System of SERs

Fig. 1.9: Classification of Direct Causes of SERs


• Onesignificanteventprovisionallyratedat level-0 on INES is briefed below:

During the month of January 2018, high heavy water collection was observed from calandria vault of MAPS-1. Chemical analysis of the collected heavy water revealed that the leak is from primary coolant system. On January 30, 2018, the unit was shut down for investigations and leak was identified from two coolant channels (O-09 & Q-09). These channels were cut, removed from reactor and sent to Post Irradiation Examination Division (PIED), BARC for further examination. Examinations of removed channels are in progress to understand their failure mechanism. Preliminary investigations indicated that leak/s from end shield may be responsible for through wall crack in channels O-09 & Q-09. In view of the pending root cause analysis, the event is provisionally rated at level 0 on INES.

(iii) SignificantEventsinIndustrialPlants

Significant event reported to AERB was reviewed in detail and measures to prevent the recurrence of such incidence was recommended. The analysis and recommendations of the accident were forwarded to all units of DAE for information and lessons to be learnt from this incident.

A brief description of events along with review and recommendations/directives of AERB is given below.

(a) Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF)

On August 29, 2018, a fatal accident occurred at Fuel Reprocessing Plant-Block-1&2 at FRFCF site. The victim, a Site Supervisor with M/s L&T contractor for backfilling activities, succumbed to injury as a result of getting trapped under the earth material spillage from a tipper lorry. The victim was shifted to nearby hospital where he was declared as “brought dead”.

On receipt of information about the incident, AERB carried out preliminary assessment followed by special regulatory inspection at FRFCF on August 31, 2018. Inspection findings indicated deficiencies with respect to industrial safety management related to earthmoving activities. In view of this, AERB suspended the construction activities involving earthmoving at FRFCF project site. FRFCF was asked to undertake a detailed audit of its safety management and control of contractor’s work at site for considering resumption of the backfilling related construction activities.

Subsequently, FRFCF completed the safety audits and submitted the reports with a request for

Fig. 1.10: Classification of Root Causes of SERs


resumption of backfilling activities. Based on the review and assessment of the audit reports and satisfactory implementation of the audit findings at the site, AERB granted permission for resumption of construction activities involving earthmoving at FRFCF project site on November 8, 2018, with certain stipulations. AERB is monitoring the construction safety at FRFCF site through periodic inspections by the AERB site observer team (SOT) at Kalpakkam site and review of periodic safety reports submitted by the site.

(b) Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS)

An incident occurred at NAPS on July 11, 2018 which resulted in fatality of one contract person. During the event, victim was standing on the bund wall of 1.2 m high and spraying pesticide through gun machine on beehives. After completing the activity, while getting down, the victim fell from the bund wall. He was declared dead at NAPS hospital. Station submitted that the root cause of the accident as ‘Inadequacy in hazard identification prior to execution of job’. Review of the event at AERB was in progress.

(c) Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP)

At KKNPP-1&2, solid radioactive waste storage building is meant for processing and storage of solid radioactive waste. The building consists of trenches and tile holes for storage of solid radioactive waste. On October 29, 2018, a contract worker fell inside a 13 m deep tile hole in solid radioactive waste storage building while removing the fan which was kept for removing the stale air from tile hole. The victim was rescued from the tile hole with the help of a prefabricated rescue rig and crane. After initial treatment at KKNPP hospital, he was shifted to a district hospital. During the course of treatment in the hospital, he expired on November 4, 2018.

Immediately after the accident, AERB had asked station to suspend the ongoing activity and also asked NPCIL to review the accident for its applicability to other stations. AERB further directed NPCIL that similar activities, if any, being performed at other stations, should be suspended till satisfactory implementation of the corrective measures emanating from review of the accident. The review carried out so far in AERB has indicated the deficiencies such as non-performance of Job Hazard Analysis (JHA), absence of practice of taking industrial safety permit for the activity, inadequate engineering provisions for carrying out the job, etc.

(d) Turamdih Mill of UCIL

A fatal accident occurred at Turamdih Mill of UCIL on November 06, 2018 during cleaning of tail pulley area of belt conveyor. Victim was engaged in cleaning of tail pulley area of belt conveyor which was in running condition. During this work, he got trapped in between tail pulley and belt conveyor. AERB review highlighted several deficiencies such as poor illumination at accident spot; uneven floor due to accumulation of spilled ore material over a period of time; difficult working conditions; deployment of unskilled labour for work; absence of work permit system; inadequate engineering safety measures and lapses of safety surveillance which had contributed to this accident. Based on the review outcome, AERB recommended UCIL to review/look into the viable technical solutions to control the spillage of ore material, minimize the need of human intervention in cleaning operation, strengthen the safety surveillance program, implement effective work permit system and impart job specific training to unskilled labours before deploying them in hazardous areas.


(e) HWP-Manuguru

On January 13, 2018, a fatal accident occurred at H2S Generation Plant of Heavy Water Plant, Manuguru (HWP-M) due to exposure to H2S gas released following failure of drain nozzle of H2S knockout drum. AERB reviewed the fatal accident in detail. The event revealed deficiencies in existing multi-tier review mechanism of HWP-M for implementation of safety related modifications and deviation from safe work practices w.r.t use of

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in hazardous area. Based on the review, AERB recommended HWP-M to carry out comprehensive review of the safety management system (including human & organizational aspects, leadership for safety etc.) to identify latent weaknesses and address them appropriately. Subsequent to the event, HWB had taken various actions to improve the safety management system which were found to be satisfactory.

Documents

Chapter 1 SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES · instrumentation, thermal hydraulics, structural analysis, reactor physics, seismology etc., relevant to nuclear and radiation