Chapter 1 Local Ownership in the Security Sector 1.pdfsecurity sector including intelligence, justice, security policymakers, and non-state armed groups. Some refer to SSR, or SSD

8 LOCALOWNERSHIPINSECURITY

Chapter1LocalOwnershipinthe

SecuritySector

This report is about local ownership. It illustrates how civil society groups in diversegeographicalcontextsfromSouthAfricatoGuatemala,fromthePhilippinestoIsrael/Palestine,use peacebuilding processes to build relationships between security forces and localcommunitieswith the goal of increasing human security. Even though “local ownership” hasbecomeacommonbuzzword,themeaningofthetermisoftenvague,especiallywhenappliedtothesecuritysector.

In this report, “local” is interpreted as a geographic term. It designates people affected bysecurity threats–aswellassecuritypoliciesandstrategies–becausethey live in thespecificgeographic area in which the threats occur. “Ownership” is used as a relative term thatdescribes the varying ability to include local communities in security sector policies andprogrammesandsetupeffectiveoversightmechanisms.

Local ownership is not an end in itself. It is ameans of reaching a larger common goal. Theprogrammesdescribed in this reportallwork towards thegoalof improvinghumansecurity.They aim to democratise and legitimise state-society relations, so that local people in everyhomeandcommunity feel safe.Humansecurity isapopulation-centricidea; it ismeasuredbytheperceptionsofwhetherlocalmenandwomen,boysandgirlsfeelsafe.Thisdistinguishesitfrom other enemy-centric concepts of security that focus on identifying and deflecting threatsfromcertaingroups.Duetotheemphasisonpopularperceptionsofsafety,localownershipisakeypre-requisiteandintrinsicaspectofhumansecurity.

Localownershipengageslocalcommunitiesinasetofprocesses.Thisreportdocumentstheroleofpeacebuildingprocessessuchasdialogue,negotiation,mediationand jointproblemsolvinginenabling localownershipof security.Thesepeacebuildingprocessesenable localpeople toparticipate in identifying security challenges, jointly developing and implementing securitystrategies,andmonitoringandevaluatingthesecuritysectortoensureitworkstoimprovethesafetyofeveryman,woman,girlandboy.

The term “localownership” relates to other popular concepts. The security sector tends tospeakabout“communityengagement”whentheyrefertotheireffortstohavelocalcommunitiesparticipate in theirpoliciesandprogrammes,e.g. incommunitypolicingprojects.Civilsocietyfavours the term “civilsocietyoversight” todescribe their ability tomonitorand contribute tosecurity sector policies and programmes. “Civil-military-police coordination” and “multi-stakeholdercoordination” relate to the same general concept. All of these terms refer to jointmeetings between civil society and the security sectorwhere local people have the ability toparticipateinsecuritysectorprogrammesandpolicies.

State-SocietyRelationsLocalownershipofhumansecuritybeginswithanunderstandingofsociety’sroleinlegitimate,participatoryanddemocraticstate-societyrelations.Legitimacystemsfromastatethatusesitspowersandresourcestoprotectandadvancetheinterestsofallpeopleandgroupsinsociety.

CASESTUDIESOFPEACEBUILDINGAPPROACHES 9

In democratic state-society relations, societyparticipates in making decisions that affect theirlives not only through an occasional election, butalso through a variety of forums where societyparticipates in solving public problems. State-society relations based on public legitimacyrepresent the ideal environment for ensuringconditionsofhumansecurity.

Historically,therighttoruleastatecamebyvirtueof the rulers’ “monopoly of force” and militaryforces justified theirsovereigntywith theirabilityto control a population in military terms. Today,this model continues to exist. In some states,groupsstillcompeteforthemonopolyofforceandthegroupwithmostmilitarypowerearnstherightto govern.With the widespread availability of weapons to private individuals and non-stategroups, today somegovernments actively takepart in violent competitions against their owncitizensandotherstatestoearntheirlegitimacytogovern.Armedrebellionagainstthestateismore frequent in “elite-captured” states that serve the interests of a small group of elitemembersinsocietyandactivelydiscriminateagainstothergroups.2

Excluded groups lack fair treatment or access to government services, such as protection,justice,oraccesstohealthcare,education,housing,orjobs.Botharmedinsurgenciesaswellasnonviolentsocialmovementsoftendevelopinresponsetoelite-capturedgovernmentsaslocalgroupsattempttopushforeitheraneworreformedgovernment.Elite-capturedgovernmentsmaythendirectsecurityforcestopacifyorrepresssocietyinanattempttoobstructtheirpublicdemands on government for accountability and equal access to public goods. In too manycountries, local police ormilitary forces use repressive violence against unarmedpeople andcommunities.

Analternativeapproachseesstatesearninglegitimacybyservingtheinterestsofallgroupsinsociety and throughnon-coercive public engagement via democratic processes such as publicdialogueandaccountabilityboards.Instable,peacefulstates,citizenssupporttheirgovernmentandhelpleadersmakedecisionsthatbenefitallgroupswithoutdisadvantagingorpersecutingpartsofthepopulationsuchaswomen,menorotherminoritiesofgender,ethnicity,race,ageorreligion.

“Citizen-centredstates”–whichinmostcasesaredemocracies-servetheinterestsofastate’sentirepopulationandenjoya“monopolyofpubliclegitimacy.”Thesegovernmentswinpublic

support when they work to ensure humansecurity of the whole population and not justthe security of elite groups. A government’spublic legitimacy is a reflection of publicperception of government performance inproviding public goods. In a citizen-orientedgovernment, society both is able to holdgovernment to account and to partner withgovernmenttoprovidepublicgoods.

In a citizen-oriented state, the security sectorserves the population. Peace and stability arerelative to the degree that police, nationalmilitary, internationalpeacekeepersormilitaryforces serve locally defined human securitygoalsandareaccountabletolocalcommunities.

Figure1:RepressiveState-SocietyRelations

Figure2:LegitimateState-SocietyRelations


Local ownership is not about enlisting an elitememberof civil society toparticipate in elite-centred security strategies. Building local ownership requires listening to the perceptions ofsecurity threats fromdiverse segments of society. Government security policymakers consultwithandlistentotheinterestsofalllocalcitizenswhoareaffectedbytheirsecurityoperations.

SecuritySectorReformandDevelopmentIn countries such as South Africa, Guatemala, and the Philippines, large social movementspushed for the transformation from an elite-captured government to a citizen-orientedgovernment.Civil societygroupsorganised themselves topush forgreater localownership insecurity. In most democratic countries, society continues to push for security sectordevelopment(SSD)towardahumansecuritymodel.Nowthesecountriesandmanyothersareundergoing a process of developing democratic and legitimate state-society relations. Atransformationof how society views and relates to the security sector is fundamental to thistransformation,asillustratedinFigure3.

With growing recognition of the links between development and security, donor countriesbegan to see the importance of citizen-oriented states that provide public services and areaccountabletocitizensascriticaltosecurityandstability.Theworldhasmanytragicexamplesofhowconflictcanrapidlywipeoutdecadesofhard-wondevelopmentgains.Therefore,donorsintheOrganisationofEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)developedprogrammestoassist in thedemocratisationand legitimisationof the security sector in “fragile” countriesaffected by violence. Reformed, citizen-oriented security sectors correlatedwith states beingmoreablepreventandaddressviolenceandsustainapeacesettlementtoendwar.3

Donorsbeganurgingstatesemerging fromwar to takeona formalprocessofsecuritysectorreform (SSR) or a less formal process of security sector development (SSD) to change statepoliciesandpracticesfromonesthatprotectthesecurity,economicandpoliticalinterestsofanelite group in power to one that protects the interests of all citizens – male and female –includingminoritygroups.Securitysectorreformanddevelopment(SSR/D)isseenasawaytostrengthenand transformthestate-society relationship towarda focusonhumansecurity, asillustrated in the figure here. The OECD defines SSR/D as a process of “seeking to increasepartnercountries’abilitytomeettherangeofsecurityneedswithintheirsocietiesinamannerconsistentwith democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and therule of law. SSR/D includes, but extendswell beyond, thenarrower focusofmore traditionalsecurityassistanceondefence,intelligenceandpolicing.”

SSR/D involves not only developing the military and police, but also addressing the widersecurity sector including intelligence, justice, security policymakers, and non-state armedgroups. Some refer to SSR, or SSDor JSSR,meaning justice and security sector reform.Theseeffortsincludethreegoals:

Figure3:TransformationofState-SocietyRelations


1. Improvingdemocraticgovernancewithanemphasisonciviloversightofsecuritysectorandmulti-stakeholderprocesses that include civil society, especiallywomen,minoritygroups,andyouthinshapingsecuritypolicyandstrategy

2. Recognizing the relationship between security and development policy, and orientingsecuritystrategiestowardhumansecurityforallpeople

3. Professionalizing the security sector, emphasizing an efficient and effective securitysectorthatholdsamonopolyofforceoverotherarmedgroupsinsociety

In practice, many Western donors under pressure to improve counterterrorism andcounterinsurgencyefforts investprimarily in the thirdarea.Theyprofessionalise the securitysector by training and equipping military and police in enemy-centric tactics, but put littleemphasisondemocraticgovernanceorhumansecurity.Thisismoreaccuratelycalled“securityforce assistance” and not SSR/D. Research on exclusive “train and equip” programmes inAfghanistan,Iraq,Maliandelsewhereemphasisesthattheycandomoreharmthangood.Often,theymay lead to situationswhere security forces simplyusebiggerweapons to repress localpopulations. They risk further undermining human security when they trap populationsbetweenincreasedviolenceofabusivesecurityforcesandtheterrorofnon-statearmedgroups.The risk of security assistance to escalate violence is especially prevalent in nondemocraticstates, where security forces lack public legitimacy and are thus less inhibited to engage inabuses.4

MostreviewsofSSR/Dprogrammescitethelackoflocalownershipasthemostpivotalelementinsuccessorfailure.Donorsattemptingtofosterlocalownershipandcommunityengagementinsecuritymaynotknowwheretobegin.Atthesametime,civilsocietygroupswantingtopushforreformstowardahumansecurityapproachalsodonotknowhowtobegintoreachouttothesecuritysector.Thisreportattemptstoaddressthatgap.Thecasestudiesprovideabundantexamples of collaborative processes between civil society and state security actors in police,military, justice, and other civil government institutions that are engaged in transitioningtowardsahumansecurityframework.Butfirstitisimportanttounderstandthehistoryofwhylocalownershipofsecurityissodifficult.

SecurityApproachestoSociety:FromPacificationtoPartnershipThe case studies in this volume emerge from a long history of non-existing or adversarialrelationshipsbetweensecurityforcesandlocalpopulations.It is importanttounderstandthispasttorecognisethemagnitudeofshiftrepresentedbythenewpeacebuildingprojectsbetweencivilsocietyandsecurityforcesthatthisreportdisplays.

Thereareatleastfivedistinctapproachesorstagesinsecuritysectorrelationshipswithsociety.Figure5illustratestheseapproacheswiththegoalofenablingananalysisofwhycivilsociety-military-policecoordinationandlocalownershipofsecurityispossibleinsomecontextsbutnotothers.


Figure4:SecuritySectorApproachestoSociety

Historically, states have taken an adversarial and exploitative approach to civilians. Colonialgovernmentspredominantlyviewedcivilianseitheraspotentialenemiesorcheap labourandwaged atrocious wars against them to keep them subdued. Such “pacification” campaignsinduced fear and terror in local populations as ameans of control. Some governments todaycontinue to repress civil society, executing and torturing civil society leaders and usingscorchedearthpolicies,includingmassatrocities,againstlocalpopulationstoensurethattheywill not press governing authorities for any public services, freedoms, or rights. Journalistsdocumentingsuchformsofviolencebysecurityforceshavebrought internationalpressuretoexpose and prevent violent pacification tactics – sometimes referred to as “state-basedterrorism.”5However, the legacy of this approach continues to influence the security sector’sattitudetowardscivilsociety,includingsecurityforces’distrustofNGOsandothercivilsocietyorganisations,andcivilsociety’sdistrustofsecurityforces.

Today,civilsocietywidelyviewscounterterrorismlawstorestrictcivilsocietyasacontinuationofthepacificationmind-set.6Inthisapproach,counterterrorismlegislationrestrictscivilsocietyfrom contact with non-state armed groups identified as “terrorists” even if they have alegitimatesetofpoliticalgrievancesandself-determinationaimsprotectedbyinternationallaw.Counterterrorism“lawfare”(warfarebylegalmeans)makesitimpossibleforcivilsocietytoofferhumanitarianassistance,developmentassistanceorengageinpeacebuildingprogrammesthatmighthaveamoderatingeffectonnon-statearmedgroups.7

Butover the last fifteenyears, security forceshavebeenadopting less repressiveapproachestowards civil society. Some aspects of the concept of pacification continue to be found incounterinsurgencyliterature,whichtakesacautiousapproachtowardcivilians,viewingthemas potential allies or potential enemies. Rather than intimidating civil society,counterinsurgencyaimstopacifylocalpopulationsbywinningtheheartsandmindsthroughestablishingorre-establishing localgovernmentresponsive toand involving theparticipationof thepeople.8Rather thanattacking civilians,military forcesprovide civic assistance to localvillages to gain acceptance and prevent local populations from supporting hostile non-statearmedgroups.

A fourth approach emphasises a new era prioritizing civilian safety in security sector-civilsociety relations where states, regional organisations like the Africa Union, or the UnitedNations, mandate security forces with the task of “protection of civilians.” New militarydoctrineandtrainingemphasisesmilitaryandpoliceroles inprotectionofciviliansaswellas

• GovernmentsordersecurityforcestouseviolentrepressiontopacifyciviliansViolentPacikication

• GovernmentsuselegalrestrictionsoncivilsocietythatlimittheirabilitytocontributetohumansecurityCounterterrorismLawfare

• Securityforcesusepsychologicaloperationsandcivilianassistancetomanipulatepublicopinion

Counterinsurgency“Hearts&Minds”

• SecurityforcestrainingandlinesofeffortincludepreventingharmtociviliansProtectionofCivilians

• Governmentscontractwithcivilsocietytobeserviceproviderstoperformgovernment-identikiedprogrammes“ImplementingPartners”

• Governmentsworkwithanempowered,independent,distinct,acceptedandfreecivilsocietytosupporthumansecurity

CoordinationforHumanSecurity


avoiding civilian casualties and mitigating harm against civilians during military or policeoperations.New frameworks for internationalactionsuchas theResponsibilitytoProtect9callgovernmentstorefrainfromviolentrepressionofciviliansthemselves,andtoprotectciviliansfromviolencefromnon-statearmedgroups.A fifth approachviews civil societyasservice providers, contributing topeaceand stability.States,regionalorganisationsandinternationalorganisationsviewcivilsocietyorganisationsascontractors or “implementing partners.”They fundCSOs toprovidehealthcare, food,waterandsheltertovulnerablepopulationssuchastheyoung,old,veteransanddisabledmembersofsociety,tobuildingthecapacityofcommunitiestogoverneffectivelytomaintaintheruleoflaw,communitysafety,andeconomicdevelopment,tocounteringviolentextremism.ManyCSOsarewary of government funding, noting they lose their independence; their ability to respond tolocally identifiedneeds, and the trust and legitimacy theyhavewith local communitieswhenthey are seen as for-profit contractors working on behalf of governments. Civil societyspecificallyopposestheuseoftheterm“implementingpartners”,asitimpliesthatCSOsdonothavetheirownassessmentorplanstoaddresslocalneeds.10This report illustrates a sixth approach where security forces and an empowered andindependent civil society build understanding and coordinatewith each other to address therootcausesofinsecurityandcoordinateeffortstosupporthumansecurity.Ina“coordinationfor human security” approach, conflict prevention and peacebuilding skills, values, andprocessesenablelessantagonisticrelationshipcapableofjointproblemsolving.Itisimportantto recognise how this multi-stakeholder human security approach contrasts with otherapproaches. Unlike other approaches, a human security approach does not manipulate civilsocietyassecurityassets.Insteaditemphasisestheempowermentofcivilsocietytoparticipatein identifying security challenges, designing and implementing human security programmesandoverseeingthesecuritysector’sperformance.Senior military leaders have come to advocate for this approach. In his book MilitaryEngagement: Influencing Armed Forces to Support Democratic Transitions, US Admiral DennisBlairarguesarmedforceshaveacriticalroletosupportsociety’smovetowarddemocracy.“Themilitaryheroes thathistory remembershaveactednot tooppress theirpeoplebut todefendthem.”11Suchviews represent amajordeparture frompastmilitaryattitudes that consideredciviliansasinferiororevenhostileandmarkaneweraofprioritizingcivilianlivesandaddinghumansecurityinterestsontonationalsecurityagendas.

In some contexts, different security actors may each be using a different approachsimultaneously. Some national or international military and police units may focus onprotection of civilians while others are actively using violent pacification. A government’sdevelopmentagencymaybefundingprogrammestosupportcivil-military-policecoordinationon human security while other government agencies use legal frameworks to prevent CSOsfrom talking to armed groups, or keep CSOs busy with lucrative contracts to provide publicservices.

CivilSociety:FromProtesttoProposalAssecuritysectorapproachestocivilsocietyhaveevolved,sohavethoseofcivilsocietytothesecuritysector.Broadlyspeaking,onecandistinguishthreedistinctcivilsocietyapproachestothesecuritysector:support,protest,orproposal.In some citizen-oriented states, civil societywidely supports and accepts the security sector.Theyviewmilitaryandpoliceas legitimate representativesof societyandmayalsodecide tovoluntarily sign up for service. In such countries, a growing number of civil societyorganisations are also working as implementing partners providing public services tocontribute to the security agenda of governments, regional organisations and internationalorganisations.


Thesecuritysectorsinmostelite-capturedstatesdonotenjoythiskindofsupport.Incountrieswherethereisforcedrecruitment,orrecruitmentbyracial,ethnicorreligiousgroup,theremaybewidepublicoppositiontosecurityforces.Thisisalsotrueincountrieswheresecurityforcesrepressorviolatehumanrights.Giventheprevalenceofthisprobleminthesecuritysector,inmanycountries,CSOs–especiallyhumanrightsorganisations-adoptanadversarialapproachto the security sector. Somegroupsdocumenthumanrightsviolationsandpublish reports todenounce and protest against abuses committed by security forces and seek accountability.Humanrightsorganisationsplayanimportantroleinholdinggovernmentstoaccountfortheirduties to protect civilians. The “protest” approach relies mostly on “Naming, Blaming, andShaming”statesecurityforcesandnon-statearmedgroupsforhumanrightsabuses.Figure6illustratesthatsomecivilsocietyorganisationsareshiftingfromprotestingtomakingproposals to improve human security. While sharing the same human rights concerns thatprotesters denounce, these peacebuilding CSOs use a persuasive theory of change to buildrelationshipswiththesecuritysectorthroughdirectdialogue,negotiation,andproblemsolvingtoaddresshumanrightsabuses.As illustratedbelow,peacebuildingskillsandprocesseshelpcivil society to move from a sole reliance on “protest” to also include their ability to make“proposals.” While sharing concerns about human rights violations and firmly supportinghuman security, civil society leaders in diverse corners of the world have come to theconclusion that they must go beyond protesting security policies. Civil society’s interest in“coordination for human security” developed as civil society reached out to buildrelationshipswiththesecuritysector,engagedinjointproblemsolving,andarticulatedsecuritypolicy alternatives. Peacebuilding skills and processes such as conflict analysis, negotiation,mediation,anddialogueofteninspiredthiscoordinationtosupporthumansecurity.ThisreportdocumentscasestudiesillustratinghowpeacebuildingCSOshavecoordinatedwiththemilitaryandpolicetosupporthumansecurity.

Figure5:CivilSocietyMovesfromProtesttoProposal

CivilSociety’sOperationalRequirementsIncontextsofpoliticalconflict,civilsocietymustnavigatebetweenstateandnon-statearmedgroups to maintain their legitimacy among their constituents and their safety amidst thesearmed groups. This requires the adherence to operational requirements that guarantee itsindependence. The more empowered, independent, distinct, accepted, and free civil societyorganisations are, the better they can contribute to improve human security. Disempoweredcivil society organisations that aredependent on government funding, indistinguishable fromsecurity forces, and lackingoperational freedom,will likelybe rejectedby local communities.The text box below describes the key operational requirements for civil society working incontextsofpoliticalconflict.

ProtestCivilsociety“Names,Blames,&Shames”securityforcestodenouncehumanrightsviolations,withuseof

criminaljusticepunishmenttoimproveaccountability

Proposal

Civilsocietyusesdialogue,negotiation,problem-solvingtobuildrelationsandjointlyproblemsolvetoadvance

humansecurity


CoordinationforHumanSecurity:WorkingWith,notAgainstCivilsocietyandthesecuritysectorcanworkwitheachotherwhentheyhaveacommongoaltoimprovehuman security. “Human security” is also knownas “multidimensional security” and“citizensecurity.”Humansecurityisdistinctfrom,butmayoverlapwithnationalsecurity.

“Nationalsecurity”prioritiseseconomic,geopolitical,orideologicalinterestsofthestateand,ifnecessary, the use of military force to protect them. In many countries, national security istasked solely to the military. In recent years, some states have begun investing more indevelopmentanddiplomacyasnationalsecuritystrategies.

“Human security” focuses on the individual and community perspectives on security. Humansecurity prioritises violence caused by both state and non-state armed groups, poverty,economicinequality,discrimination,environmentaldegradationandhealthandhowtheyaffectindividuals and communities. Comprehensive human security includes three components:freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. To address theseproblems,humansecurityemphasisestheneedfor“wholeofsociety”effortsincludingsecurityforcesbutalsogovernment,civilsociety,business,academic,religious,mediaandotheractors.Due to thesedifferingoutlooks, national security andhuman security responses canoftenbeverydifferent.

OperationalRequirementsforCivilSocietyOrganisations(CSOs)inContextsofPoliticalConflict

Empowerment:CSOsneedtohavethepowertoinfluencepublicdecisions.Toacquirethispower,theyneedtobeabletoorganise,mobiliseandinspirecommunitiestoworktogether;gainaccesstoinformation,educationandtraining;receivefundingorinvitations(voluntaryordonor-mandated)toparticipateinpublicdecision-makingprocesses.

Independence:WhileCSOssharecommongoalstosupporthumanrights,CSOsneedtobeviewedasindependentofexplicitpoliticalandsecurityintereststiedtopoliticalpartiesorregimes.IndependenceenablesCSOstobeacceptedbyallcommunitiesandarmedgroupsthatmightotherwisethreatenorattackthemiftheyareviewedasaproxyforstateinterests.CSOsneedtobeabletoindependentlyassesstheneedsoflocalpopulationstoidentifylocalhumansecurityprioritiesratherthangovernmentordonorintereststhatmighttargetspecificgroupstoachievespecificpoliticalgoals.

Distinction:CSOsdependonthedistinctionofunarmedciviliansandarmedgroupsencodedinInternationalHumanitarianLaw.Thisistopreventattacksonthecivilianstheyrepresentorontheirownstaff.Distinctioncanbeachievedthroughclearlyidentifiableclothing,separatetransportation,andhousingofciviliansandsecurityforcesindifferentlocations.

ConsentandAcceptance:CSOsdependontheconsentandacceptanceoflocalcitizensandallstateandnon-stateactorscontrollingtheterritoryonwhichtheywanttooperate.Inordertosecureconsenttofacilitatedialogueormediation,CSOsnegotiatewithavarietyofactorsincludinggovernmentsandnon-statearmedgroups,informaltraditionalgoverningbodiessuchastribaleldersorreligiousauthorities,localauthorities,orarmedactorsatcheckpoints,airports,portsorregions.

AccessandFreedom:CSOsneedtobeabletospeakandmovearoundfreely,unhinderedbylegalconstrictionsorsecuritythreats.Inmanycountries,counterterrorismlawsarerestrictingcivilsociety’sabilitytocontributetohumansecuritybylimitingtheiraccesstocommunitiesororganisationsinvolvedinarmedconflict.


Tocontrastnationalsecurityandhumansecurity,onecanlookatthedifferentunderstandingofsecuritychallengesand thedifferent theoriesof changeunderlyingbothapproaches.The textboxhereexplainstheconceptof“TheoriesofChange.”

An example helps to illustrate the two approaches. An armed opposition movement isthreatening to throw over a government, which is widely known to endanger civilian livesthroughviolationsofhumanrights.Anationalsecuritystrategymayunderstandtheunderlyingsecurity challenge as the state lacking a monopoly of force. As a consequence, the nationalsecurityactormayasktheinternationalcommunityformoreweaponsandtoprovidetrainingin counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to security forces. In contrast, a human securitystrategywillunderstandthechallengeasthestatelackingpubliclegitimacy.Ahumansecuritystrategymightthereforefocusonempoweringcivilsocietytoholdtheirgovernmenttoaccountforthegrievancesthatdrivesupportforinsurgents.

UnderstandingoftheChallenge TheoryofChangeandInterventionDesign

NationalSecurity

Threats to state-defined economic, political orideologicalinterests,oftenemphasizingviolencefrom non-state armed groups and other statesasassessedbynationalsecurityadvisors

• Emphasis on governmentsecurity forces as primaryactorinsecurity

HumanSecurity

Threatstoindividualsandcommunitiescomingfrom violence from state and non-state armedgroups, poverty, economic inequality,discrimination, environmental degradation andhealth concerns as assessed by conflictassessment research processes that includebroadpublicconsultationstodefinethedriversofviolenceandinsecurity

• Emphasisonwholeofsocietyor “multi-stakeholder” effortsto address the drivers ofviolence and insecurityincluding government, civilsociety, business, academic,religious, media and otheractors

Figure6:ComparingTheoriesofChange

Whatare“TheoriesofChange”?

Groups contributing to human security shape their programmes and strategies based ontheirunderstandingofsecuritychallenges.Buttheymaynotsharethesameunderstandingof the security challenge, even when acting in similar context. Organisations workaccording to their own set of ideas about the nature of the challenge they are addressing.Increasingly, civil society and governments are all using a conflict assessment researchprocesstoidentifysecuritychallenges–includingtherootcausesanddriversofviolence.Yeteven when using similar conflict assessment frameworks, groups still tend to understandsecuritychallengesdifferently.A“theoryofchange”(ToC)isastatement–astrategicnarrative-abouthowtoaddressaparticular challenge. Every organisation has an implicit or explicit theory of change thatarticulates how some type of strategy or intervention will address the challenges theyidentify.Toillustratethevarietyoftheoriesofchange,eachcasestudyinthisreportcontainsatextbox summarizing the locally identified understanding of the challenge and the theory ofchangeguidingthehumansecurityprogrammedescribedinthecasestudy.


Despite their differences, national security andhuman security goals can also overlap. A statemight come to understand that protectingcivilians and prioritizing development ordemocraticgovernance is in itsnational securityinterests.12The case studies in this report areexamples of collaboration and dialogue betweensecurity forces and civil society who shareinterests at the intersection of national securityandhumansecurity.

TheLogicofLocalOwnershipintheSecuritySectorEvery government makes decisions about how much power local civil society will have toparticipate in the security sector. Elite-captured governments usually have little incentive toexpandlocalownership,asthiswouldleadthemtolosecontrolandpossiblytheirelitestatus.Butcitizen-orientedgovernmentssee increasing localownershipandcommunityengagementasimportantaspectsoftheirnationalsecurityplans.

Although some donor governments recognise the necessity of local ownership and push forgreaterdemocraticgovernance,mostforeigndonorsandintervenershaveatendencytoignoreit. Nearly every international assistance framework - at the UN,World Bank, OECD, and therecent Busan Principles of International Assistance and the New Deal for Fragile States –mandatestheprincipleof“localownership.”Butinreality,thepoliticalandeconomicinterestsofdonorcountrieseasilyhijacktheconceptof“localownership.”

Critics of SSR/D argue that the term SSR/D itself has come to imply an unequal powerrelationship;asituationwherethose“reformed[are]reformingtheunreformed”13ratherthanlocal people reforming their own system. It is true that donor approaches to SSR/D arefragmented, lacking coordination and mechanisms for listening to local communities orcommunicatingtransparentgoalsorprocesses.ForeigngovernmentsdonatingmoneyforotherstatestoundergoanSSR/Dprocessalsohavetheirownnationalsecurityinterestsinmind.Thisleads some of them to push counterterrorism lenses onto their SSR/D programs. Localownership then serves as a fig leaf, as a nice and uncontroversial idea, but certainly not astrategicnecessity.

OftenSSR/Dprocessesinvolveafewtokenelite,malecivilsocietyleadersto“checkthebox”oflocal ownership. These elites are not actually invited to shape the analysis or design andimplement the program. Rather they are asked to “comment” on plans already made. TheInternationalNetworkonConflictandFragility’sreviewofdonorsupporttojusticeandsecurityconcluded that, “‘ownership’ isoften conflatedwith ‘buy-in’. Structuresaremeant toenhancelocalbuy-intodonor-conceivedand-ledactivities,nottoenablelocalactorstotaketheleadinprogramming decisions.”14Often this approach to community engagement just causes furtherdivisionwithincivilsociety.

Meaningful localownershipasks criticalquestions listed in the figurebelowandrequires theparticipation of civil society in decision-making, control, implementation and evaluation ofhumansecurityprogrammes.

Figure7:OverlapbetweenNationalSecurity&HumanSecurity


Local ownership of security needs a makeover. Security sector reform and development(SSR/D)needstomovefromexternallyguidedprocessestowardinternallygeneratedanalysisandsolutionscarriedoutbydiverse local stakeholders.Localpeople ineverycommunitycanand should play roles inmonitoring and oversight of security programs. The effectiveness ofSSR/Dshouldbemeasuredby localperceptionsanddefinitionsofhumansecurity.15Thecasestudiesinthisreport illustratethatdonorscancreateandsupport incentivesormandatesforlocalownershipinanSSR/Dprocess.

National governments and internationaldonorsneed to recognise the clear strategic valueoflocalownership:

TimeandSpeedImplicationsDonor governments who focus on train and equip programmes to meet the urgent securitythreatsor to support fragilepeaceagreementsoftenargue that that this is the fastestway toremedysecurity challenges.While it is true that localownership takes time to construct, it isultimatelythefasterroute.Trainandequipprogrammeswillultimatelyfailorcauseevenmoreviolence, unless they are accompanied by programmes aimed at preventing human rightsabusesbysecurityforces.Tobuildlegitimatestate-societyrelationshipswithlocalownershipinsecurity,“youhavetogoslowtogofast.”Thereisnoend-runaroundauthenticlocalownership.

SecurityImplicationsLocal ownership improves state-society relationships. A public that perceives the securitysector protects human security is more likely to view their government as legitimate.Legitimate, citizen-oriented states face fewer threats from non-state armed groups. Localperceptions of security and justice may be very different than those of national elites orforeigners’.Incountrieswherenon-stategroupsfulfilupto80%ofthesecurityandjusticerolesinsociety,tribal,traditional,religiousandothercitizen-basedgroupsmustbeengagedinorderto achieve human security for all. Local ownership puts local perceptions of security at thecentreofallSSR/Defforts.

Long-termPoliticalStabilityImplicationsIf outsiders take down a government and attempt to rebuild it themselves, local groupsmayneverhavetheincentiveorthetimetobuildcoalitionsamongthemselves.Thiscanhampertheemergenceof stableand functionalgovernance in the long run.Withoutoutside intervention,insiders have greater incentive to build broad coalitions between social groups to improvestate-society relations. This coalition building among local groups that negotiate with eachothertoidentifycommongroundproposalsandplatformsisessentialtosustainableSSR/D.

SustainabilityImplicationsWithout robust local ownership, any SSR/D efforts may simply fail. If insiders are notcommittedtochanging thesecuritysector,nationalelitesor internationaldonorsmay justbe

Whoassesses? Whoplans? Who

implements?Who

Evaluates?

Figure8:QuestionsonLocalOwnership


wasting their time and effort attempting to force such changes. For example, a reviewof theBurundian SSR/D process questioned the impact of Dutch funding for the SSR/D process inBurundi. On the one hand, the funding mandated community engagement but may haveencouraged national elites to withdraw financial support from SSR. Once the national eliteswereno longer financially invested inSSR/D, there is someconcern theyare less invested inmakingthereformssucceed.16InSomaliland,thelackofinternationalfinancialsupportforthepeaceprocessmeantthatthelocalbusinesscommunityhadtostepin.Theywerewillingtodoso and increase their influence, because they realised that reconciliation and stability wouldbenefit the pastoral economy.17More research could help to determine the conditions thatwarrantoutside funding.Donorsmightbeable toprovideneeded funding inways that fosterlocalaccountabilityanddolesstodiscouragelocalownership.

GenderImplicationsLocalownershipisespeciallyimportanttoensurethatsecuritythreatstobothwomenandmenare taken into consideration in all efforts to improve security. SSR/D needs to be gendersensitive to ensure allmen, women, girls and boys have equal access to justice and security,including their protection from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). SSR/Dneeds to begenderinclusivetoinvolveallgendersinplanningandimplementingsecuritystrategies.SSR/Dalsoneedstobegenderaccountablesothatallgendersparticipates inoverseeingthesecuritysector.

BroadeningLocalOwnershipLocal ownership should be broad, including as many stakeholders as possible. In order tobroaden local ownership, diverse stakeholders must participate in policy-making andprogramminginthesecuritysector.Involvingjustahandfuloflocalelitemeninaconsultationcannotyieldanaccuratepictureof the interestsorneedsof all social groups in society.Truelocal ownership includesmechanisms to engage every individual in society, from children toelders,malesandfemales,workingineverysectorofsociety,withdifferentlevelsofeducation,religious beliefs, economic status, and with diverse gender, ethnic, racial and linguisticidentities.Meaningfullocalownershipisnotonlyaboutwhomtoengagebutalsoabouthowtoengage, i.e. which oversight or engagement mechanism to use to create meaningful andsustainable ties with local communities. Oversight and engagement mechanisms can beinstitutions or activities that provide citizens the ability to contribute, influence and controlsecuritysectorpoliciesandprogramming.CivilianGovernmentOwnershipThe traditional mechanism to increase local ownership in the security sector is the civiliangovernment.Thegovernment‘sexecutivebranchandrepresentativebodiessuchasparliamentorcongressholdeffectiveoversightfunctions.Theyadministerandcontrolthesecuritysectorsauthorities,mandates and budget to ensure that all security sector policies and programmesrepresentandsatisfytheneedsofcitizens.However,civiliangovernmentoversightisnotalwaysabletoguaranteethehumansecurityofallcitizens.Ifaparliamentismadeupmostlyofmen, it isnotsurprisingthatviolenceagainstwomenisnotapriorityforthem.Ifacongressismadeupprimarilyofoneracialgroup,itisnotsurprising that the civiliangovernmentdoesnot takeaction toensurediversitywithinpolicedepartments or to stop police violence when the police belong to one racial group and thecommunity belongs to another. Even in states with democratic electoral systems, an elite-capturedgovernmentmaymake securitydecisionsbasedexclusivelyon its ownpolitical andeconomicinterests,suchasmakingprofitsthroughweaponsmanufacturing.Allstatesshouldprovideadditionalparticipatorymechanismsthatofferopportunitiesforcivilsociety and thewider public to have an input into security sector policies and programmes.These mechanisms enable the full participation of all sectors of society in security sectorpolicies and programmes. They enable women, who represent half of every community and


nation,tobeincludedandapplytheirdistinctskillsetsandperspectivesonhumansecurity,butalso other gender groups such as LGBTI individuals ormenwho can bemarginalised due totheir belonging to a particular ethnic,racial,religious,social,oragegroup.Figure8illustratesthetwotypesof localownershipinsecuritysectorpoliciesandprogrammes: civilian government,consisting of the executive branch of thegovernment and the parliament orcongress in an elected representativesystem of government, and civil society,whichalsoincludesthemedia.

CivilSocietyOwnershipLocalownershipmustbeexpandedhorizontallytoincludebroadersegmentsofcivilsociety,asillustrated in Figure 9. This requires moving from international NGO (INGO) and elite localparticipation toward processes that involve large numbers of diverse segments of society.INGOS must map local capacity and recognise the principle of “Local First.”18They shouldprovideentrytolocalcivilsocietyinordertowidenpublicinvolvementindialogueonsecuritypriorities and strategies.Womenandmenofdifferent ages, regions, languages, religions, andethnicities as a diverse set of representatives of distinct civil society groups should allparticipateinsecuritysectorpolicy-makingandprogramming.Sometimes, internationalNGOs(INGOs)actas intermediariesbetweenthesecuritysectorandlocalcivilsociety.Theyprovidesupportstructuressuchasforumsanddialoguesandcapacitybuilding to strengthen the ability of civil society to oversee security sector policies andprograms. In some cases, INGOs engage and hand over functions to national “modern” civilsocietyorganisations,whichinturndrawin“traditional”civilsocietyorganisationsuchastriballeaders.Butthischainofengagementdoesnotalwaysproceedwithouttensions.INGOsmaybeeffectiveinapplyingmodelsandlessonstheyhavelearnedelsewhere,asisevidentintheworkof international peacebuilding NGOs including Saferworld, International Alert, ConciliationResources,SearchforCommonGround,andPartnersforDemocraticChange.Butsomeaccuseother INGOsofholdingontoneo-colonial attitudes toward local civil society,underestimatingtheircapacitiesandtendingtospeakfor localpeople.19LocalcivilsocietysometimescritiquesINGOsfor takingovertheroleandfunding for localcivilsociety. InternationalNGOsandelitelocal civil society representatives should not be gatekeepers, but instead step back and opendoorstomorediverseindividualsandgroupsthattrulyrepresentaspectsofsociety.

Figure10:BroadeningLocalOwnershipofSecurity

NationalGovernment

InternationalNGOs

Elitelocalcivilsociety

Women&menfromdiverse

segmentsoflocalcivilsociety

Figure9:GovernmentandCivilSocietyOwnershipofSecurity


DeepeningLocalOwnershipWhile it is important tobroaden localownershipby includingmorediversesegmentsof localcivil society, it is also important to deepen local ownership, so that civil society engagementevolvesfromisolated,project-basedeffortstowardplatformsforjointimplementationandjointinstitutionaloversight.Thereareagreatvarietyof institutionsandactivities thatenable civilsociety to contribute to security sectorpoliciesandprograms.Notallof themareeffective increatingsustainablerelationshipsbetweencivilsocietyandsecurityforces.Tostrengthentheirties,civilsocietyandsecurityforcesneedtobuildlong-termrelationshipsandtrust.Theyneedtocometogether,discusstheirrespectiveinterestsandfindjointsolutionsthatoptimisetheirrespectiveoutcomes.

CoordinationWheelforHumanSecurityThis reportdocuments various activities to coordinate civil society and the security sector infiveareas,illustratedinFigure10.Joint capacity building: Joint training, coaching and support can build relationships anddevelop a common set of skills,concepts and processes forworking together to supporthumansecurity.Jointlyassesshumansecuritychallenges: Joint conflictassessment can include jointlydesigning research questionsanddatacollectionmethodsandjointlyanalysingdata.Jointly plan human securitystrategies: Jointly determiningappropriate programs andstrategies to support humansecurity,anddeterminerelevanttheoriesofchange.Jointly implement humansecurity strategies: Jointlyimplement a project together,such as increasing the gendersensitivity of police, developinga civilian harmmitigation plan,or addressing trauma in localcommunities.Jointlymonitorandevaluatesecuritysectorperformanceinoversightmechanisms:Jointinstitutional oversight mechanism to identify the baselines, benchmarks and indicators formonitoring and evaluation of the security sector and discussing the outputs, outcomes, andimpactsofsecuritystrategies.Thecoordinationwheelofactivitiesproducesavisionforwhatlocalownershiplookslikeatitsmostrobust.Butoften,asillustratedinmanyofthecasestudiesinthispublication,civilsocietyand the security sectormay only be coordinating in one set of activities, and not in all. Casestudies such as the Philippines illustrate joint work in all five activities in the coordinationwheel.Othercasestudiesindicateonlyoneortwojointactivities,suchasjointcapacitybuildinginBrazil,orjointlyimplementingaDDRprogrammeinDRC.

Figure11:CoordinationWheelforHumanSecurity


Exactmeasurementsof thevertical “degrees”of local ownership aredifficult.However, someformsofcoordinationandlocalownershipseemtobemorerobustthanothers.Levelsoflocalownershiprelatetoatleasttwofactors:thenumberofjointactivitiesthatcivilsocietyandthesecurity sector perform together, and the level of civil society empowerment within thoseactivities. Local ownership is most robust where civil society and the security sector arecoordinatingwitheachotherinallfiveelements.Second,localownershipismostrobustwherecivilsocietyisempowered,independent,distinct,accepted,andfree,asdiscussedinthesectiononcivilsociety’soperationalrequirements.For example, sharing informationwith civil society or setting up a dialogue to listen to civilsociety indicates less localownership thansettingup joint implementationofhumansecurityprogrammingwithcivilsocietyorinstitutionalizingajointoversightmechanism.Acommunitypolicing dialogue where the police just listen to citizen complaints is less robust than acommunity policing programme that involves local neighbourhood watch committees wherecitizens work with the police to manage community conflicts. And a permanent citizen-oversight committee where the community can assess threats to their human security, andreport and take action to address incidents of civilian harm illustrates even greater localownership. Institutionalised oversight forums that give civil society a seat at the table tomonitorandevaluate thesecuritysector indicate that thestate-societyrelationship isseenaslegitimate,democraticandcitizen-oriented.Inordertodeepenlocalownership,itisimportanttoincreaseandinstitutionalisethefunctionsof civil society in relation to the security sector. Figure 11 illustrates a rough framework fordeepening the levels of local ownership in the security sector.20The darkest blue colourillustrates the most robust levels of local ownership, where civil society both is involved inmultiple activities in the coordination wheel and where civil society holds institutionalisedpower tomonitor and evaluate the security sector’s performancewith government. Capacitybuilding is a necessary pre-requisite to achieve any level of local ownership,which iswhy itstandsasaseparatebutpermanentcategory.Eachoftheselevelsoflocalownershipshouldbuildonthepriorlevelsofengagement.However,Figure 11 is not necessary a linear path to local ownership. It is possible to innovate aprogrammein“jointimplementation”beforetherearedialogueprocesses.Butthecasestudiesin this volume illustrate that often there is first dialogue to assess human security threatsand/or an initial effort in capacity building. Joint implementation and institutional oversightmechanisms are more likely to grow out of these “lighter” forms of engagement. Figure 11showsanapproximateprogression fromthemostsuperficial to themoremeaningful typesofengagement.


CapacityBuildingTrainingforcivilsocietyandthesecuritysectortosupporthumansecurity

LevelofLocalOwnershipInformationSharing Governmentsidentifyhumansecurity

threatstociviliansCivilsocietyidentifieshumansecuritythreatstogovernment

DialogueandConsultation Governments,securityforces,andciviliansidentifyhumansecuritythreatsandjointlydesignpotentialhumansecuritystrategies

JointImplementation Civilsocietyandthesecuritysectorparticipateinjointproblem-solvingandprogrammingtoimplementhumansecuritystrategies

JointInstitutionalOversight Civilsocietyrepresentativeshaveinstitutionalcapacity,andlegalauthorityatthelocal,regional,andnationalleveltoparticipateinassessingthreats,designingandimplementingsecuritystrategiesandmonitoringimpact.

Figure12:LevelsofLocalOwnership

InformationSharingInformationsharingisaone-waychannelofcommunication,whereonepartysimplyreceivesinformationfromtheother.Ataminimum,“localownership”meansgovernmentsshouldsharebasicsecurityinformationwiththepublic.Italsomeanscivilsocietygroupsshareinformationwiththegovernment.

Governments may share information with the public or may encourage the public to shareinformationwith them. Some governmentsmay decide to publish their policies on a specificsecurity issue to increase transparency. Or they may encourage the public to provideinformationaboutsecuritythreats.Somegovernmentsmayrequestinformationfromciviliansthroughhotlinephonenumbers,acomplaintsdesk,orawebformthatwillallowindividualstoreport concerns related to security. These can be information sharing portalswhere citizensshare information about security problems or they can be grievance mechanisms to reportdirectly on the performance of a security officer. Some governments offer grievancemechanisms that simply register private complaints. Others are more transparent, enablingreporting to the public the pattern of complaints or grievances and how the government orsecuritysectorareattemptingtobeaccountabletothepublicbyrespondingtothecomplaints.Buttheseone-waystrategiespreventlong-termrelationshipbuildingandtrust.

Civil society also uses information sharing channels when advocating for improvements tohumansecurity,suchassubmittingreportsonsecurityorpolicyrecommendations.Civilsocietyorganisationsplaya“watchdog”roleandserveas“an indexofpubliccontentment”21withthesecuritysectortoensurethatitrespectshumanrightsandservesthepublic.


Until the last two decades, civil society relied mostly on these one-way information-sharingapproachesthatoftentakeanadversarialstancewithina“protest”paradigmdescribedearlierin this chapter.22Independent human rights commissions; indigenous people’s rights groups,women’srightsadvocates,refugeeadvocates,andanti-nuclearadvocatesaresomeexamplesofthetypesofcivilsocietygroupsandmovementsthatexistinmostcountries.Thesegroupsmaydenounce human rights abuses by security forces publicly, push for internal complaintmechanisms such as phone hotlines, or external oversight bodies such as or OmbudsmanOffices,orworktostrengthenlegislationtoprotectingvictimsofabuses.Watchdogmechanismsareimportantbecausetheyholdthesecuritysectoraccountable.Iftheyare successful, they force police or military to change their policies or to apply punitivemeasures toperpetratorsofabuses,whichcertainly contributes tohumansecurity.But thesemechanismsmayentailthesacrificeoflong-termrelationshipsandtrust.Duetotheirone-waydirectionandadversarialnature,advocacyeffortsmaymakeitmoredifficultforcivilsocietytobuild the necessary relationships with security stakeholders to reorient the security sectortowardhumansecurity.Thisreportfocusesoncivilsociety’smovefromrelyingalmostentirelyonone-wayinformationsharing and the “protest” method of security oversight toward civil society’s ability to workdirectlyinrelationshipwiththesecuritysectoronhumansecurity“proposals”thatdevelopoutof“two-waycommunication”settingswherepeoplemeettogether.Thisdoesnotmeansuggestneglecting accountability, but achieving accountability differently by creatingmeaningful andlong-term institutional relationships and trust. Permanent, institutionalised civil society-security sector coordination mechanisms on as many levels and as many security issues aspossiblemayprovidethemosteffectiveguaranteeforhumansecurity.

DialogueandConsultationThe terms dialogue and consultation refer to a process during which civil society and thesecuritysectorjointlyassessthreatstohumansecurityandjointlyplanhowtoimprovehumansecurity.Theseforumsaredifferentfromamereinformation-exchangeduringwhichonepartysimply explains their point of view. This approach by definition includes at least a two-wayexchangeofinformation.

Successful dialogue and consultation forums – like all coordination mechanisms - requireprofessional facilitation to foster effective cross-cultural communication. Stakeholders listeneachother’sinterestsandperspectives.Withoutskilfulfacilitation,coordinationmeetingsoftenbreak down as participants engage in unproductive conflict or walk out of the meeting.Communication skills and knowledge of civic responsibilities also contribute to improvedoutcomes.Inpractice,manycountry’ssecuritysectorsareopentoengagingindialogueandconsultationswithcivilsocietybecausetheyrecognisethatcivilsocietyhasinformationandinsightsneededto achieve national security priorities. For example,manymilitary forces receive training onhumanitarian civil-military coordination, given the likelihood that they will need tocommunicatewithhumanitarianorganisations, includingcivilsocietygroups,operating inthemidstofahumanitariancrisis.Civil-militarycoordinationorcooperation (CIMIC)centresandothermechanismstosupporta“comprehensiveapproach”thatincludescivilsocietywouldalsofallunderthiscategory.However,fewmilitaryforcesreceivetrainingoninteractingwithlocalcivilsocietyorothertypesofCSOsthatareinvolvedinlong-termdevelopment,humanrightsorpeacebuildingefforts.Thislimitstheirpossibilitytoengageeffectively,asmanysecurityforcesare not even aware that other civil society groups exist and are working to support humansecurity.Coordinationisnotpossiblewherethereisnotfirstamappingofthislocalcapacity.

Wherenationalsecurityoverlapswithcivilsociety’shumansecuritypriorities,thesedialogue,consultation and coordination forums may be productive. The local ownership platforms


discussed in this volume are examples of such civil-military-police coordination to supporthumansecurity.

CivilSociety-LedDialoguesontheLocalLevelCSO driven dialogues are forums that CSOs initiate and organise at the local level to fosterexchange and understanding between security forces and civil society around a certain topicrelatedtosecurity.InNepal,civilsocietyconductedcomprehensivejointsecurityassessmentson the district level including 80 focus groupswithmore than 800 individuals altogether todevelopanapproachtocommunitypolicing.InKenya,theUniversityofSanDiego’sInstituteforPeace and Justice assembled youth leaders and policemen to talk about urban violence. InTanzania,SearchforCommonGroundgatheredsecurityforces,civilsocietyandrepresentativesof private companies to discuss the security of mining operations. These dialogues usuallyhappen ad hoc, i.e. only for a particular purpose and duration and rarely include nationalleadership.ConsultationstoDefineRegionalandNationalSecurityPolicyNationalConsultationsaremechanismsthatenablecivilsocietytotakeapermanentseatatthetable to defining a country’s national security agenda. In Yemen and Guinea, for example,Partners for Democratic Change helped to facilitate a series of national dialogue forums thatenabledjointanalysisofhumansecuritychallengesandstrategies.

Dialogue and consultation has its limits unless it is institutionalised and accompanied byaccountabilitymechanisms.Governmentsmayseektounderstandandreviewthecommunity’spointofviewonanadhocbasisonlywhenthepoliticalclimatemakesitnecessary.Theymaycreditandacknowledgecivilsocietyperspectivesanytimewithouthavingtocommittoactuallyincludethemintheirstrategiesandprograms.

JointImplementationA step beyond dialogue and consultation, ‘joint implementation’ involves civil societyparticipatingwiththesecuritysectorinthedevelopmentand/ortheimplementationofhumansecurity strategies. Civil society not only provides input but may also take on certainprogrammatic functions, such as participating in neighbourhood patrols Civil society and thesecuritysectorcancarryoutjointimplementationinawiderangeofeffortsindiversesectors,including community policing, restorative justice, criminal justice reform, transitional justice,security sector reform and development, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration,demining, preventing sexual and gender-based violence, mitigating civilian harm, protectingcivilians,andmanymoresectors. It canalsomeancivil societyplaysarole inmediatingwithnon-state armedgroups.TheUK-basedpeacebuildingNGOConciliationResourcesdocumentshow civil society uses mediation to end violence between state armed forces and non-statearmedgroups.23Therecanbetwokindsofjointimplementation:JointProgrammingattheLocalLevelThisreportprovidesexamplesof jointprogrammingsuchasacommunitypolicingprojectsinPakistan, in which local populations work with the police to report threats and holdperpetrators toaccountorDDRprogrammes inMozambique,DRC,andAfghanistan, inwhichcivilsocietyinnovatednewmodelsofjointimplementationofdisarmament,demobilisationandreintegration of ex-combatants. The case study on private companies and community-basedsecurity in Tanzania also shows how, members of local communities, police and businessrepresentativesdevelopedandimplementedasecuritystrategyataminingsite.

NationalPeaceInfrastructuresNational Peace Infrastructures are permanent institutionalised mechanisms that enable civilsociety and security sector on all levels to address the occurrence of violence. The NationalPeaceCouncils inGhanaprovide thebestexample forsuchan infrastructure.Theyshowhow


localpeacecommitteesworktoprovideearlywarningandaddresslocaltensions.Inthecaseofescalation, the infrastructureprovidesrecoursemechanismsat theregional,nationalandalsomilitarylevel.TheNationalPeaceCouncilinKenyaisanotherexampleofapeaceinfrastructurethathasalsosuccessfullystoppedtheescalationofelection-relatedviolence.JointInstitutionalOversightJoint institutional oversight provides institutionalmechanisms for accountability, monitoringandevaluationof the security sector includingofficial, institutionalplatforms for civil societyinvolvement.Theyrepresentanewgenerationofoversightmechanisms thatcomplement thewatchdogandprotestfunctionsmentionedearlierbyenablingcivilsocietyandsecurityforcesto build long-term institutional relationships and trust. In Guatemala for example, the UN-brokeredpeaceplanenshrinesaccountabilitymechanismsforcivilsocietytoprovideoversightto all areas of the security sector, including intelligence,military, police, criminal justice andnationalsecuritypolicyformulation.InthePhilippines,anewpermanentcivilsocietyoversightplatformallowscivilsocietytomeetmonthlywithsecuritysectoratthenationalandregionallevel to identify security challenges, formulate joint strategies andmonitor and evaluate theperformance of the security sector. This permanent institutional engagement between civilsociety and security sectors is the ultimate guarantee of an accountable, democratic stateresponsetoviolenceanda“wholeofsociety”approachtohumansecurity.InBurundi,twocivilsociety representatives participated in the National Defence Review, serving as officialrepresentativestohelpmonitorandevaluatethereformprocess

Moststatesarestillreluctanttosetuppermanentinstitutionalstructurestoenablecivilsocietyoversight. Dialogue and coordination and joint implementation are thus second-best optionsthat enable civil society to contribute to security sector policies and programmes andcomplement civiliangovernmentoversight inorder toensure localownership in the securitysectorandthushumansecurityforallcitizens.

CapacityBuildingCapacitybuilding forboth the security sectorandcivil society isnecessary toenable them toreach each of these levels of local ownership. A lack of capacity can often represent amajorobstacle to building an effective working relationship. Traditional security sector trainingprogrammesdonot include raising awarenessof civic roles and responsibilitiesnordialogueand consensus-building skills such as communication, negotiation,mediation and facilitation.Civil society also rarely has the opportunity to increase their knowledge about traditionalnationalsecurityapproaches.This report documents the efforts of peacebuilding CSOs to provide training to civil societygroups and security forces, so that both sides have the necessary skills and knowledge toeffectively coordinate human security programs. Joint trainings are particularly effective inpreparing security forces and civil society for joint problem solving. When civil societyrepresentatives and security sectors are gathered in the same classroom, they may oftenexperience the very first institutional opportunity tomeet. Interactive training curricula thatfavour discussions and interactive exercises will enable the participants to already startbuilding common ground and increase their understanding and appreciation for each other,before their formal joint problem-solving process starts. As of now, opportunities for jointtrainingforbothcivilsocietyandthesecuritysectorarestillrare.

The“HandbookforCivil-Military-PoliceCoordinationforHumanSecurity,”whichisacompaniontothisreporttriestofillthegapincurriculumsforjointtraining.Buildingontheinsightsofthecase studies listed here as well as existing curriculums for separate trainings, it providesmodulesforjointtrainingenablingcivilsocietyandsecuritysectortolearnsharedterminologyandappreciatetheirdifferencesaswellastheircommonground.

Ideally,capacitybuildingcansupportaplanningcyclewheregovernments,securityforces,andcivilsocietylearnhowtojointlyidentifyhumansecuritythreats,designandimplementhuman


security strategies, and then monitor and evaluate the impact of these strategies together.Dialogueandconsultation,jointimplementation,andjointinstitutionaloversightallcontributetothisplanningcycle.Together,thesejointactivitiescreateopportunitiesforstrengtheningthestate-societyrelationshipandensuringhumansecurity.

APeacebuildingApproachtoLocalOwnershipPeacebuilding analytical tools, values, skills and processes help to support all the big ideasdiscussed in this chapter: legitimate state-society relations, human security, security sectorreform and development (SSR/D), local ownership and civil society oversight of the securitysector,andcivilsociety-military-policecoordination.

In a parallel way, this report illustrates how civil society uses peacebuilding processes tonavigateastate-societyrelationshipthatcansupporthumansecurity.

Peacebuilding organisations work to advocate and support more robust levels of localownership.Thecasestudies in this reportall illustrate inspiringeffortsofhowpeacebuildingCSOs are playing a mediating role to engage in governments, police, military and localcommunities in order to achieve dialogue and consultation, joint implementation or jointinstitutionaloversighttoimprovehumansecurity.

Peacebuildingincludesawiderangeofeffortsbydiverseactorsingovernmentandcivilsocietyatthecommunity,national,andinternationallevelstoaddresstheimmediateimpactsandrootcauses of conflict before, during, and after violent conflict occurs. Peacebuilding values, skillsand processes such as dialogue, negotiation, and mediation support human security.Peacebuildingincludesactivitiesdesignedtopreventconflictthroughaddressingstructuralandproximatecausesofviolence,promotingsustainablepeace,delegitimizingviolenceasadisputeresolutionstrategy,buildingcapacitywithinsocietytopeacefullymanagedisputes,andreducevulnerabilitytotriggersofviolence.24

From the various case studies in this report, some commonprinciples of peacebuilding haveemerged. They characterise the approach that pioneering CSOs have taken in order tostrengthen local ownership in the security sector and thus advance human security. Theyinclude:

PeacebuildingAnalysis:RootCausesPeacebuildingstandsapart fromotherapproachestoarmedconflictbecause it focusesonthelackof legitimate,democraticgovernanceasa root causeofviolence.Otherapproaches focusless on structures and more on individuals or groups as the cause of violence. Conflictassessmentframeworksemergingoutofthefieldofpeacebuildingcanhelptoimprovesharedunderstanding of security challenges.25Such a shared analysis of violence between diversestakeholders in the security sector as well as civil society is necessary to enable multi-stakeholdercoordinationforhumansecurity.

PeacebuildingValues:RespectandTrustSecurityforcesandcivilsocietycanjointlyadvancehumansecuritywhenbothgroupsrespecteach other as human beings, even though theymay distrust or disagree with each other onissues.Mutualrespectisafundamentalpeacebuildingvalue.Focusingonrelationshipsdoesnotmeantoacceptoraccommodateadversarialinterests.Apeacebuildingapproachdoesnotbackaway from conflicts or tensions. It is “hard on the problems, but soft on the people.”26Thismeansthatitencouragesindividualstodistinguishbetweenopinionsandthepersonswhoholdtheopinion.Itencouragesthemtocriticiseideasorrejecttypesofbehaviour,whilemaintaininganappreciationforthepersonbehindit.Suchanattitudeisthepre-requisiteforbuildingstrongandsustainablerelationshipsandtrust.


PeacebuildingSkillsandProcesses:Facilitation,Negotiation&MediationPeacebuilding skills and processes enable women and men in civil society and the securitysectortounderstandeachother’sinterests.Peacebuildingforumsfordialogueandconsultation,joint implementation and joint civil society oversight enable both groups to jointly solveproblems. A lack of contact and communication between civil society and security forcesincreasestensionsanddecreasestheirabilitytounderstandhowtosupporthumansecurity.Individuals and CSOs engaging in peacebuilding are often known for their ability to facilitatedialogueprocesses andbuild consensus. They are able to help diverse stakeholders to eithercome to an agreement or agree on a disagreement. They guide people through a dialogueprocess.Theyhelpparticipantstocommunicatewitheachothereffectivelyandensurethatallstakeholder’s interests and perspectives are heard. They ensure that the results of jointmeetings are constructive and that there are no communications break downs, for examplewhenparticipantswalkoutofthemeetingduetoarisingconflict.Theyhelpcreateasafespacebysettinggroundrulesorguidelinestokeepdialogueparticipantsfocusedonlisteningtoandworkingwitheachother.Peacebuildersare“processexperts”ratherthanexpertsonasubjectarea. They keep a dialogue focused, help participants consider a variety of views, andsummarisegroupdiscussions.Theymodelactivelisteningandrespectfulspeaking.Facilitatorsandmediatorshelpgroupsexploresimilaritiesanddifferencesofopinion.

PeacebuildingEvaluation:Measuringchangesinattitudes,behaviours,andknowledgeOnelastuniquecharacteristicofapeacebuildingapproachis itsabilitytomeasurechangesinattitudesaswellasbehavioursandknowledge.CSOsusuallymeasurehumansecurity,atleastin large part, by the perceptions of safety held by civilians, including women who mightexperiencedifferenttypesofthreatsandviolence.Domenandwomenfeelsafer?Aremenandwomenabletowork,travel,andliveintheirhomeswithoutfearofviolence?Iftheydonotfeelsafe,whichpartsofsocietydotheyseeasathreatandwhy?Acommonpeacebuildingindicatorof human security is tomeasurewhether thepublic perceives security forces as “protectors”and not “predators.” Such indicators show how that dualistic stereotypes may havetransformed, as adversarial attitudes have turned into cooperative ones and discriminatingsocialnormsintomoreegalitarianthinking.

Tomeasure changes in beliefs and values, CSOs develop context-specific indicators that theydevelopbasedontheirknowledgeofthefactorsthatcausedmistrustbetweenperpetratorsandvictims. For example, in the DRC where rape was often committed close to water sources,SearchforCommonGroundwouldaskcivilianintervieweesquestionssuchas“Wouldyoufeelconfidentgoingtowatersources if therearemilitaryvehicles inthearea?”ortheywouldasksoldiersquestionssuchas“doyoufeelthattobeastrongmanyouneedtobeatyourownwife?”or“howwouldyouinteractwithacivilianataroadblock?”

Since these perceptions evolve constantly, especially in situations where conflict is still on-going, assessment has to happen almost on a continuous basis. In DRC, Search for CommonGroundmonitoredawarenessandperceptionsthroughpre-andpost-projectsurveys,baselineandevaluationsatthe12,18,and24-monthstages.

The case studies in the following chapterswill all reflect these principles to varying degrees.Theywill showhow they can be put into practice in different areas of the security sector toenable civil society leaders and security sector to find joint solutions to problems of humansecurity.

CreatingEntryPointstoLocalOwnershipLocal ownership in security cannot be built overnight. Changing attitudes and setting upadequateoversightmechanismstakestimeandrequiresastrongcommitmentfrombothsides.Security sector reformanddevelopment requires “decade thinking” and looking beyondone-yearprogramming.Thepoliticalenvironment,historicallegacies,orshort-termorienteddonorpoliciesmayallrepresentobstaclesforachievingmeaningfulandlong-termlocalownership.


Nevertheless, the civil society organisations showcased in this report were able to set upinitiativesforjointactionevenifthesystemicconditionswerenotpromising.Theywereabletocreate entry-points to local ownership that could extend into increased engagement inwiderareas and strengthen institutionalised cooperative mechanisms. Joint activities that areparticularlyusefulasentrypointsare:CommunityPolicingProgrammesCommunitypolicingprogrammesarea low-cost entrypoint towiderefforts to improve localownershipinthesecuritysector.Onekeyadvantageofcommunity-basedpolicinginitiativesisthat they require relatively little resources. Since local staff rather than foreign experts runthem, costs related to salary are relatively low and no sophisticated equipment is required.These initiatives provide a low-cost opportunity to change local attitudes and increase trustbetweenthestateandcivilsociety.Peacebuildinggroupscanbuildonthecooperativenetworksthat theseprojectsestablish inorder toworkonother reformareassuchas issuesrelated toreducing Small Arms and Light Weapons, implementing DDR programs, creating externaloversightbodiesortransformingexistinglegalframeworks.CapacityBuildingProgrammesThecasestudiesshowedtheneedforcapacitybuildinginbothcivilsocietyandinthesecuritysector as a key prerequisite for local ownership. Learning about different stakeholder’s rolesandresponsibilitiesandacquiringskills foreffectivelyengaging incoordinationisanecessaryfirststepforcivilsocietyandthesecuritysectorwhentheywanttobeginworkingtogetheronhumansecurity.Manyofthecapacitybuildingexamplesillustratethattrainingcanpreparecivilsociety and the security sector to work together by building shared understanding andinterpersonal relationships. In the Burundi Leadership Training Program, for example,scenario-basedtrainingprovidedskillsforlisteningandnegotiatingeffectively,butalsoaforumthat enabled key leaders to interact and build trust that increased their ability to thenworktogetheronsecuritygovernance.ThiswasalsotrueinthePhilippines,whereaninitialone-timetrainingwasthegatewaytoasustainedandinstitutionalisedrelationshipbetweenthesecuritysector and civil society that included regular dialogue, joint problem solving andinstitutionalised civil society oversight of the security sector. Training can serve to createrelationshipsandtrustonasmallscale.

NationalDialoguesNational dialogues such as those held in Guinea and Senegal provide the security sector andcivil society a first opportunity tomeet and exchange views. They enable both sides to learnabout each other and jointly identify security challenges and responses. The case studies ofYemenandLibyaalsoshowhownationaldialoguescanincreaselocalownershipbyprovidingcivil society an opportunity to express their voice. They are a necessary step to achieve anationalconsensusonavisionforhowsecurity, justiceandotherkeyelementsofgovernancewillevolve.

NeedtoGoBeyondEntry-PointInitiativesAlthough entry-points are helpful in building first contact and establishing trust, the casestudies show how peacebuilding organisations work hard to go beyond the entry-level andincrease theabilityof the security sector to coordinatewithcivil societywhile increasing thecommitmentsofnationalgovernmentsanddonorstolocalownership.Thecasestudiesinthisreport show how peacebuilding organisations use training to also engage in other areas ofwork, such as operational programmes aimed at setting up consultative processes, jointinitiatives,oradvocacyatdifferentlevelsinordertocreaterealandsustainablechange.Most donors only want to fund isolated trainings at the country level without putting thestructures in place for on-going coaching and relationships that enable on-going learning.Moreover donors may fund initial training programs, but thenmove onto the next crisis. In


manycontexts, trainingonlyrepresents the“lowest-hanging fruit.”But training isnota fix-allsolutionoranendinitself.

Capacity building can serve as a veneer to cover over systemic problems such as corruptbehaviourthatenablesindividualsorcorporationstoprofitfromsecuritythreatsandprioritiesor different security strategies. If motivated by political or economic interests, the securitysector resists governance initiatives that entail civil society oversight, but theymay bemorewillingtocommittoshort-sighted“trainandequip”programmesthatenablethemtokeeptheexistingpowerstructuresinplace.

Peacebuilding organisations working on community-based policing initiatives make greatefforts to embed their programmes into wider policies and practices on local, district andnational level.Theyare advocating for institutional structures andguaranteesonall levelsofgovernmentsothattheseprogrammescanbeadoptedonawiderandmoreregularscaleandbe aligned with other security sector reforms, such as improvements of court procedures,prison reforms, DDR programs, or vetting mechanisms. The level of local ownership in thesecuritysectorwillalwaysdependontheabilitytoinstitutionaliseisolatedcommunitypolicingprojects that are isolated and limited in duration and make the accompanying structures oftheseprojectsmoreinclusiveandaccountable.Peacebuilding organisationsworking onnational dialogue alsomake a great effort in helpingcivilsocietytoplayamorepermanentandinstitutionalroleinnationalsecuritypolicy-makingand programming. They provide civil society participants with civic education, set upmechanismstodeependialogueonissuesthataredifficulttoresolveandprovideothersupportstructures mechanisms that increase the potential of the national dialogues to result ininstitutionalisedjointactionandapermanentoversightroleforcivilsociety.

Thecasestudiesinthisreportbringtolightapeacebuildingapproachtolocalownershipthatencouragessharedunderstandingofhumansecuritychallengesandstrategies,aswellasjointimplementation,monitoringandevaluationinordertoachieveaccountability.Theyshowcivilsociety working to encourage and increase direct and constructive two-way exchanges inindividualormultiplephasesofsecuritysectorpolicy-makingandprogramminginordertofindjointsolutionstohumansecuritychallenges.

Documents

Chapter 1 Local Ownership in the Security Sector 1.pdfsecurity sector including intelligence, justice, security policymakers, and non-state armed groups. Some refer to SSR, or SSD