Chap 10 - LTD cases

8/20/2019 Chap 10 - LTD cases

1/21

G.R. No. L-34080 March 22, 1991

SALVADOR SERRA SERRA, HEIRS OF GREGORIO SERRA SERRA, representedby CARMELO IMAZ, as Special Administrator of the Estate of GREGORIOSERRA SERRA, MARGARITA SERRA SERRA, FRANCISCA TERESA SERRA

SERRA, AND FRANCISCO JOSE SERRA SERRA, petitioners,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. JUDGE CARLOS ABIERA, THEPROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, PRIMITIVO HERNAEZ,ROGACIANA HERNAEZ AND LUISA HERNAEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 34693 March 22, 1991

SALVADOR SERRA SERRA, HEIRS OF GREGORIO SERRA SERRA,respresented by CARMELO IMAZ, as Special Administrator of the Estate ofGREGORIO SERRA SERRA, MARGARITA SERRA SERRA, FRANCISCA TERESASERRA SERRA AND FRANCISCO JOSE SERRA SERRA, petitioners,vs.HON. JUDGE NESTOR B. ALAMPAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge ofBranch III of Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, FELIPE GARAYGAYAND NEGROS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (SONEDCO), respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J .:

These consolidated petitions under Rule 65 seeks the issuance of the following writs:

G.R. No. L-34080

a) Certiorari— To annul and set aside the Resolution of the respondent Courtof Appeals, promulgated on August 3, 1971, setting aside the writ of preliminaryinjunction it previously issued on June 7, 1971 in CA-G.R. No. 00139-SP,

entitled "Salvador Serra Serra, et al., Petitioners, vs. Hon. Carlos Abiera, et al.,Respondents." . . .

b) Prohibition — To enjoin private respondents, respondent Judge Carlos Abiera and respondent Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental or his deputiesor representatives from further dispossessing petitioners of Lot No. 1316 ofKabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre.

c) Mandamus — Directing private respondents to immediately restorepetitioners in possession of Lot No. 1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos.2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre. (pp. 1-2, Rollo of G.R. L-34080)

G.R. No. L-34693


2/21

a) Certiorari — To annul and set aside the Orders of the respondent JudgeNestor B. Alampay, issued on November 29, 1971 and December 29, 1971, inCivil Case No. 10040 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental entitled"Salvador Serra Serra, et al. v. Felipe Garaygay, et al." The Order of November29, 1971 dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by

Executive Judge Cesar Kintanar enjoining private respondent SONEDCO fromissuing and delivering sugar quedans to private respondent Felipe Garaygay,while the Order of December 29, 1971 directed the issuance of the writ ofpreliminary injunction enjoining petitioners from harvesting, hauling and sellingsugar canes from Lot Nos. 717 and 2685 "Ilog Cadastre" and Lot No. 1316"Kabankalan Cadastre." As hereafter shown, both Orders were issued withgrave abuse of discretion and in utter violation of the resolution of thisHonorable Court of Appeals adopted on September 24, 1971 in G.R. No. L-34080, entitled "Salvador Serra Serra, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al."

b) Prohibition — To enjoin respondents, their agents, deputies or

representatives from interfering in any manner with petitioners' right ofpossession of Lot Nos. 717 and 2685 "Ilog Cadastre" and Lot No. 1316"Kabankalan Cadastre."

c) Mandamus — To compel private respondent Felipe Garaygay to return topetitioners the value of the sugar canes covered by the sugar quedans issuedand delivered to him by respondent SONEDCO. (pp. 1-2, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34693)

The facts are as follows:

On December 27, 1967, Primitivo, Rogaciana and Luisa, all surnamed Hernaez(Hernaezes, for brevity) filed with then CFI of Bacolod City a petition for reconstitutionof allegedly lost original certificates of title in the name of their predecessor-in-interest,Eleuterio Hernaez, covering Lot No. 1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685and 717 of Ilog Cadastre, all in the Province of Negros Occidental. The petition wassupported by a certification from the Register of Deeds, Bacolod, Negros Occidental,that no certificates of titles had been issued covering the properties. The petition wasdocketed as Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Records No. 163 (Annex "J").

On April 6, 1968, the petition was granted and the Register of Deeds of Negros

Occidental issued on May 6, 1969 reconstituted original certificates of title Nos. RO-10173 [N.A.]; RO-10174 [N.A.] and RO-10175 [N.A.] for Lot Nos. 1316, 2685 and 717,respectively. On May 29, 1969, these reconstituted original certificates of title werecancelled upon presentation by the Hernaezes of a "declaration of heirship" and in lieuthereof, TCT Nos. T-51546, T-51547 and T-51548 were issued in their names.

Upon learning of the existence of the above transfer certificates of title, Salvador SerraSerra, for and in behalf of his co-heirs (Serras, for brevity), filed with the Registry ofDeeds an adverse claim against the reconstituted certificates of title in the name of theHernaezes. They also filed in Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Records No. 163, amotion for cancellation of said certificates of title (Annex "L"), claiming that they are

holders of valid existing certificates of titles and that they are in actual possession ofthe properties covered by the reconstituted certificates of titles since before the war.


3/21

The motion was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Himamaylan, NegrosOccidental, then presided by Judge Abiera, where the lots are situated. TheHernaezes sought the dismissal of the motion for cancellation (Annex "M"). On March16, 1970, Judge Abiera denied the motion for cancellation (Annex "O") withoutconducting a formal hearing. The order denying the motion was received by the Serras

only on November 4, 1970. They moved for a reconsideration of the denial. On March27, 1971, the Hernaezes filed a motion with the trial court of Himamaylan for executionof the order of the Bacolod court in the cadastral case granting the petition forreconstitution. The motion prayed that they be placed in possession of the subjectproperties. On April 29, 1971, the trial court denied Serras' motion for reconsiderationof the denial of their motion for cancellation of the reconstituted certificates of title (p.87, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080). On May 7, 1971, the Himamaylan court issued the writof possession prayed for (p. 91, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080).

On May 12, 1971, the Serras challenged the legality of the issuance of the writ ofpossession before the Court of Appeals in a petition of certiorari , docketed as CA-G.R.

No. SP-00139. They alleged that the order was issued with grave abuse of discretionand therein prayed that the order denying the motion for cancellation of thereconstituted certificates of titles as well as the writ of possession be nullified (Annex"T").

On May 21, 1971, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and requiredthe Hernaezes to answer (p. 100, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080). A writ of preliminaryinjunction was issued upon the filing of a bond by petitioners in the amount of P500.00.On June 16, 1971, the Serras filed an ex-parte motion for the dissolution of the writ ofpreliminary injunction which was granted on August 3, 1971. On August 13, 1971petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dissolving the writ. Themotion was denied on August 23, 1971. From the resolution denying reconsideration,petitioners brought this petition denying reconsideration, petitioners brought thispetition docketed as G.R. L-34080.

Petitioners alleged that respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretionwhen it set aside the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued thereby givingeffect to the writ of possession issued by the trial court. They argued that thequestioned dissolution of the writ was tantamount to an adjudication on the merits ofthe main petition which involves the issue of possession. The lifting of the writ wasallegedly premature. They also claimed that the order of the trial court for the issuance

of a writ of possession over the disputed lots in favor of private respondents is voidbecause a writ of possession in a cadastral proceeding can only be issued pursuantto a final decree of registration and not, on the basis of an order denying a motion tocancel certificates of title.

On September 24, 1971, the Court required respondents to answer the petition and toshow cause why no mandatory injunction should issue requiring them to immediatelyreturn to petitioners whatever they might have received in the implementation of thewrit of possession. On September 28, 1971, a preliminary prohibitory injunction wasissued upon the posting of a bond by petitioners in the amount of P10,000.00 orderingrespondents to desist from further dispossessing petitioners of the lots in question until

further orders (p. 145,Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080).


4/21

While G.R. L-34080 was pending in this Court, on October 11, 1971, the Serras filedwith the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Civil Case No. 10040 againstFelipe Garaygay and SONEDCO (Southern Negros Development Corp.). Thecomplaint alleged that Garaygay cut, hauled and milled with SONEDCO's sugarcentral, sugarcanes owned by the plaintiffs. The complaint also prayed for the delivery

of sugar quedans covering several truckloads of sugarcane harvested by Garaygayon Field 17, Lot. No. 4726 of the Kabankalan Cadastre that were entrusted by him tothe corporation for milling; and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction torestrain the corporation from issuing the quedans to Garaygay. The prayer for a writof preliminary injunction was granted by Judge Cesar Kintanar, Executive Judge of theCourt of First Instance of Negros Occidental, on October 12, 1971 (p. 312, Rollo G.R.No. L-34080).

The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Nestor Alampay. On October 17, 1971,Felipe Garaygay, who claimed that he obtained from the Hernaezes a contract toharvest and dispose of the sugar canes produced from the disputed lots, filed a motion

to dismiss the complaint. On October 18, 1971, Garaygay filed a motion to dissolvethe writ of preliminary injunction issued by Judge Kintanar. On November 29, 1971,the trial court dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction dated October 12, 1971 (p.331, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080). In the same case, Garaygay filed an urgent motiondated December 17, 1971 for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against theSerras who allegedly harvested and thereafter planted sugarcane on the lots disputedcontrary to the intention of this Court in its resolution of September 28, 1971 that theparties maintain the status quo. On December 29, 1971, the trial court issued the writagainst the Serras (p. 343, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080). The motion for reconsiderationfiled by them was denied on January 12, 1972 (p. 357, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080).

Petitioners challenged both orders (November 29, 1971 and December 29, 1971)before this Court thru G.R. No. L-34693. They assailed that both orders of respondentJudge Alampay were issued with grave abuse of discretion. They claimed that the writof injunction issued by respondent judge on October 12, 1971 was aimed to preservetheir rights pending determination by this Court in G.R. No. L-34080 of their prayer forthe issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The dissolution of the saidwrit disturbed the status quo and allowed private respondent Garaygay to obtainpossession of the sugar quedans from SONEDCO. Petitioners also asserted that theDecember 29, 1981 order of respondent judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunction against them and their representative blatantly defied the resolution of this

Court dated September 28, 1971 in G.R. No. L-34080 which enjoined privaterespondents Hernaezes, their representatives and/or agents from executing furtheracts of dispossessing them of the lots in questions.

On February 15, 1972, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. L-34080 andG.R. No. L-34693 and the issuance of a temporary restraining order restrainingrespondent Judge Nestor Alampay, his representative, assigns, or persons actingupon his order and the Hernaezes, their agents, representatives and successors-in-interest from interfering in any manner with petitioners right of possession of Lots Nos.717 and 2685 (Ilog Cadastre) and Lot No. 1316 (Kabankalan Cadastre) and directedprivate respondent Garaygay to return to petitioners the value of the sugarcanes

covered by the sugar quedans which were released to him by SONEDCO (p.359, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080). The petitions were heard (p. 397, Rollo of G.R. No.


5/21

L-34080) on July 25, 1972 after which they were deemed submitted for decision (p.401, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080).

The issue in this petition is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuseof discretion when it lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it previously issued. The

main petition in the writ of preliminary injunction it previously issued. The main petitionin the Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. No. SP-00139, questioning the propriety of theissuance of a writ of possession by the trial court has not been resolved to date andthe issue before Us cannot be resolved without resolving also the issue in the Courtof Appeals. Therefore, We deemed it proper to resolve also the issue on the proprietyof the issuance of the writ of possession by the trial court in this petition.

After studying the first petition carefully, We hold that the issuance of the writ ofpossession by Judge Abiera after the motion for cancellation of the reconstitutedcertificates of title filed by petitioners was dismissed and under the circumstancesobtaining in this case, was not proper. Consequently, the lifting of the previously issued

writ of preliminary injunction by the respondent appellate court, resulting in theenforcement of the writ of possession issued by the trial court and the dispossessionof the petitioners of the subject properties was a grave abuse of discretion amountingto a lack of jurisdiction.

In the case of Mabale v . Apalisok , L-46942, February 6, 1979, 88 SCRA 247, thisCourt enumerated the cases where a writ of possession may be issued:

In that connection, it should be borne in mind that the law specifies when a writof possession may be issued. That writ is available (1) in a land registrationproceeding, which is a proceeding in rem (Sec. 17, Act No. 496; Estipona v.Navarro, L-41825, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 285, 291); (2) in an extra-judicialforeclosure of a realty mortgage (Sec. 7, Act No. 3135); (3) in a judicialforeclosure of mortgage, a quasi in rem proceeding, provided that themortgagor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not aparty to the foreclosure suit, had intervened (Rivera v. Court of First Instanceof Nueva Ecija and Rupac, 61 Phil. 201; Ramos v. Mañalac and Lopez, 89 ,Phil. 270, 275) and (4) in execution sales (last par. of Sec. 35, Rule 39, Rulesof Court).

Since the instant case does not fall among the cases mentioned above, the

issuance of the writ of possession was not proper (Gatchalian v. Arlegui, L-35615 and L-41360, February 17, 1977, 75 SCRA 234, 244).

In a land registration case, a writ of possession may be issued only pursuant to adecree of registration in an original land registration proceedings "not only against theperson who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyoneadversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the proceedings up to theissuance of the decree." (Lucero v. Loot, G.R. No. L-16995, October 28, 1968, 25SCRA 687; Marcelo v. Hon. Mencias, L-15609, April 29, 1960; Demorar v. Hon. Ibañezand Paras, G.R. No. L-7595, May 21, 1955, 97 Phil. 72). It cannot however, be issuedin a petition for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Reconstitution does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over the property covered by


6/21

the reconstituted title as in original land registration proceedings where, in the latter, awrit of possession may be issued to place the applicant-owner in possession.

The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the samereproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law in the same form they

were when the loss or destruction occurred. The reconstitution of certificates of titleshould be made, as just stated, in the same form and exactly as they were at the timethey were lost or destroyed, . . . (Gov't. of the Philippine Islands v. Abada, 48 O.G., p.1872, April 1952). A person who seeks a reconstitution of a certificate of title over aproperty he does not actually possess cannot, by a mere motion of the issuance of awrit of possession, which is summary in nature, deprive the actual occupants ofpossession thereof. Possession and/or ownership of the property should be threshedout in a separate proceeding.

It should be noted also, that the motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles filedby the petitioners in the cadastral case, contained serious charge against the

reconstitution proceeding which if proven would result in the nullity of the reconstitutedtitles. The motion alleged:

That there had never been at any time decreed or any title issued in favor ofEleuterio Hernaez over said lots which were in fact decreed and titled originallyin favor of the deceased Isabelo Javellana and Salvador Serra whosesuccessors-in-interest, the herein movants, hold subsisting transfer certificatesof title and who are actually in possession and owners of all improvements andbuildings of said lands since before the war continuously up to the present; thelands are declared for tax purposes in their names and taxes paid by them;neither Eleuterio Hernaez, alleged predecessor-in-interest, nor the allegedheirs who had fraudulent titles transferred in their names, declared the landsfor tax purposes nor paid any land tax up to the present;

That the Hon. Court has been misled by the petitioners for reconstitution,Messrs. Primitivo and Rogaciana Hernaez, into ordering the reconstitution ofthe so-called lost certificates of title which were NON-EXISTENT in the firstplace by:

1. Not specifying, contrary to the requirements of Sec. 12 of Rep. ActNo. 26, the names and addresses of the actual occupants or persons in

possession of the property and, instead of the real adjoining owners,giving the names of fictitious persons who naturally could not be locatedand hence NO notice was cause to be sent to the herein movants-owners who were completely ignorant of the entire proceedings.

2. Surreptitiously hiding from the Hon. Court the fact that these sameparcels of land were formerly the subject of said petitioner's attempt toinclude them in the estate of Eleuterio Hernaez under Spec. Proc. No.2336, CFI Neg. Occ., but which lots were found out by the court to beproperties of the movants herein and said special proceedings wasdismissed; that petitioners attempted, for the second time, to claim

ownership and take possession over these same lots by trying to includethem in the alleged estate of Eleuterio Hernaez under a second Spec.


7/21

Proceedings numbered 212-5470, CFI, Neg. Occ., but which specialproceedings was also dismissed by the court after it was found out thatthe lots alleged to compose the estate of Eleuterio Hernaez were ownedby and titled in the names of other persons, more particularly Lots Nos.1316 Kabankalan Cad., 2685 and 717 Ilog Cadastre which are owned

by and titled in the names of the movants herein; (pp. 66-67, Rollo ofG.R. No. L-34080).

Moreover, petitioners were not mere possessors of the properties covered by thereconstituted titles.1âwphi1 They are possessors under claim of ownership. Actualpossession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership.The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property (Article433, New Civil Code), not summarily through a motion for the issuance of a writ ofpossession. Furthermore, petitioners were holders of existing certificates of titles tothe same properties covered by the reconstituted certificates of title of privaterespondents. It was error for Judge Abiera to issue a writ of possession against

petitioners ousting them from the premises without formal hearing.

Private respondents argue that the herein petitioners are bound by the order grantingreconstitution because the reconstitution proceedings was heard after notices weresent to alleged boundary owners and the petition was published in the Official Gazette.However, the petitioner who were in actual possession of the properties were notnotified. Notice by publication is not sufficient as regards actual possessors of theproperty. In the case of Alabang Development v . Valenzuela, No. 54094, August 30,1982, 116 SCRA 277, We held that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual ownersand possessors of the lands involved must be duly servedwith actual and personal notice of the petition.

To repeat what the writer hereof said in his concurring opinion in the BernadCase, "The first lesson to be drawn here is that courts must exercisethe greatest caution in entertaining such petitions for reconstitution of allegedlylost certificates of title, particularly where the petitions are filed, as in this case,after an inexplicable delay of 25 years after the alleged loss. Furthermore, thecourts must likewise make sure thatindispensable parties, i .e. the actualowners and possessors of the lands involved, are duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition (not by mere general publication), particularlywhere the lands involve constitute prime developed commercial land including

a part of the South Superhighway. . .

The private respondents alleged, and the trial court agreed, that the proceedings fortheir reconstituted titles can no longer be reopened because the order forreconstitution had already become final. The order for granting the reconstitution wasissued on April 6, 1968 and the motion for the cancellation of the reconstituted titlewas filed only on November 4, 1968.

We do not agree. Republic Act No. 26, pursuant to which the "titles" of privaterespondents were reconstituted provides in its Sections 18 and 19, thus:

Sec. 18. In case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed, be found orrecovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title, and,


8/21

if both titles appear in the name of the same registered owner, all memorandaof new liens or encumbrances, if any, made on the latter, after its reconstitution,except the memorandum of the reservation referred to in Section Seven of this Act, shall be transferred to the recovered certificate of title. Thereupon, theregister of deeds shall cancel the reconstituted certificate of title and spread

upon the owner's duplicate, as well as on the co-owners, mortgagee's orlessee's duplicate, if any has been issued, such annotations of subsisting liensor encumbrances as may appear on the recovered certificate of title, cancellingat the same time the memorandum of the reservation referred to in Sectionseven hereof; Provided, however, That if the reconstituted certificate of title hasbeen cancelled by virtue of any deed instrument, whether voluntary orinvoluntary, or by an order of the court, and a new certificate of title has beenissued, the recovered certificate of title shall be likewise cancelled, but allsubsisting liens or encumbrances, if any, appearing thereon shall be transferredto the new certificate of title and to its owner's duplicate, as well as to any co-owner's mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate that may have been issued, the

memorandum of the reservation referred to in section seven of this Act, if any,being thereby ipso facto cancelled.

Sec. 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and subsequentlyfound or recovered, is not in the name of the same person in whose favor thereconstituted certificate of title has been issued, the register of deeds shouldbring the matter to the attention of the proper Court of First Instance, which,after due notice and hearing, shall order the cancellation of the reconstitutedcertificates of title and render, with respect to the memoranda of new liens orencumbrances, if any, made on the reconstituted certificate of title, after itsreconstitution, such judgment as justice and equity my require; Provided,however, That if the reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtueof any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary or by an order ofthe court, and a new certificate of title has been issued, the procedureprescribed above with respect to memoranda of new liens or encumbrancesmade on the reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, shall befollowed with respect to the new certificate of title, and to such new liens orencumbrances, if any, as may have been made on the latter, after the issuancethereof.

Thus, if no such original title in fact exists, the reconstituted title is a nullity and the

order for its reconstitution does not become final because the court rendering the orderhas not acquired jurisdiction. It may be attacked at any time. The same rule applies ifin fact there is an earlier valid certificate of title in the name and in the possession ofanother person/s.

The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by the duly issuedexisting Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration ofone year from their issuance under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act)cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyedtitles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgmentthe cancellation of such existing titles. . . The courts simply have no

jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lostor destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting


9/21

titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stabilityand indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of Registrationrules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the sameland to two different holders thereof. A fortiori, such proceedings for"reconstitution" without actual notice to the duly registered owners and holders

of Torrens titles to the land are null and void." (Alabang Development v.Valenzuela, supra).

Moreover, petitioners filed a motion to cancel the reconstituted certificates of title inthe cadastral case. Said motion was in the nature of a petition for relief from judgment.The relief sought in the said motion of petitioners is the nullification of the final orderfor reconstitution. One way to set aside a final and executory judgment is by a petitionfor relief from judgment as provided for by Rule 38, as when the judgment has beenentered against a party thru fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and thepetition is filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and not morethan 6 months, after such judgment or order was entered (Rule 38, Sec. 3, Rules of

Court). When the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered by the Court of FirstInstance (now Regional Trial Court); the petition may be filed in the same case and inthe same court which rendered the judgment (Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Sheriffof Manila et al., G.R. No. 74586, October 17, 1986). The order for the reconstitution inCadastral Case No. 17 was issued on April 6, 1968. The final entry of the order wason May 6, 1968. The motion for cancellation of the reconstituted certificates of titleswas filed on November 4, 1968, upon petitioners' knowledge of the existence of thereconstituted titles. The filing of the motion was well within the period prescribed bythe Rules.

In G.R. No. L-34693, We do not believe that respondent Judge Alampay abused hisdiscretion or acted without jurisdiction when he lifted the writ of preliminary injunctionissued by then Judge Kintanar enjoining SONEDCO from issuing and delivering sugarquedans in the name of the private respondents. Private respondents, by virtue of thelifting of the writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP-00139 by the Court of Appeals,took possession over the subject properties. It was not until September 29, 1971 whenWe issued the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction against private respondentsordering them to desist from committing further acts of dispossession againstpetitioners. It did not cover already consummated acts of possession by privaterespondents such as the cutting and hauling of sugar cane and the delivery thereof toSONEDCO before September 30, 1971, the date of receipt by private respondent's

counsel of the writ of injunction in G.R. L-34080. There was also no order yet from Usin G.R. 34090 commanding the return of whatever the private respondents may havereceived by virtue of their possession of the premises. We agree with Judge Alampay'sconclusion that:

The writ issued in G.R. No. L-34080 has reference only to and enjoins furtheracts of dispossession of the subject lots, obviously to maintain the statusquo with respect to said lands between the petitioners Serra and privaterespondents, Hernaezes, pending ultimate and final determination of theirownership rights over such properties. On the other hand, the writ issued in thepresent case is restricted to the defendant SONEDCO directing it to refrain from

issuing to defendant Felipe Garaygay the sugar quedans corresponding to thesugar cane(s) delivered by and milled for the latter.


10/21

A reading of the writ issued in G.R. L-34080 (Exh. 5-Garaygay) persuades thisCourt to conclude that the same was not intended to affect or relate to the sugarcrops on the quedans that would be issued for the value thereof, for it is thereunequivocally stated.

. . . Within fifteen (15) days from notice of this order. The privaterespondents are required to show cause, within the same period, why amandatory injunction should not be issued requiring said respondents toimmediately return to petitioners whatever private respondents mighthave received in the implementation of the writ of possession issued byJudge Carlos Abiera on 31 December, 1970 in Cad. Case No. 17,G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 163, etc. (Exh. 5-A, Garaygay).

In effect the return to the plaintiffs of whatsoever the private respondentsHernaezes or for that matter their representatives (defendant herein, FelipeGaraygay) received or would receive, has yet to be resolved by the Supreme

Court in said case. Perhaps the application for the provisional remedy hereinsought directed against herein defendant and SONEDCO, should be presentedlikewise in the Supreme Court in G.R. L-34080. . . (p. 74-75, Rollo of G.R. No.L-34693).

Thus, it became necessary for Us to issue on February 15, 1972, a mandatoryinjunction ordering Garaygay to return to petitioners the value of the sugarcanes cutfrom the lots involved herein.

But respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued the writ ofpreliminary injunction dated December 29, 1971. Civil Case No. 10040 was acomplaint for recovery of personal property (sugarcane) and damages. Possessionwas never put in issue by the parties. The issuance of the writ enjoining petitionersfrom harvesting, hauling and selling sugarcane produced from the lots subject of G.R.No. L-34080 was beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court. It should be noted that theissue of possession was then pending in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-00139. The issue of possession of the disputed properties should have beenpresented in the said case and not in the Civil Case No. 10040. Moreover, in G.R. L-34080, this Court already issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction in G.R. L-34080 enjoining the private respondents from further dispossessing the petitioners ofthe subject premises. The issuance of the questioned writ by respondent Judge

enjoining petitioners from harvesting, hauling and selling sugarcane produced fromthe subject premises directly contravened the injunction of this Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are GRANTED. The questioned order of the respondentCourt of Appeals lifting the writ of preliminary injunction is SET ASIDE. The writ ofpossession issued in Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Records No. 163 is declaredNULL and VOID. The records of this case and of CA-G.R. No. 00139 are remandedto the trial court for hearing of the motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles.Private respondents are ordered to return to petitioners the possession of theproperties in question. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court onFebruary 15, 1972, enjoining private respondents from interfering in any manner, with

petitioners' right of possession of the properties in questions, shall remain effective


11/21

until the issue of ownership and/or possession of the properties is finally settled by acompetent court.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 185604, June 13, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner , v . EDWARD M.CAMACHO, Respondent .

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of theDecision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87390, whichaffirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Villasis,Pangasinan, Branch 50 in Land Registration Case No. V-0016.

The facts follow.

On March 6, 2003, respondent Edward M. Camacho filed apetition4 denominated as “Re: Petition for Reconstitution of the OriginalTitle of O.C.T. No. (not legible) and Issuance of Owner’s Duplicate Copy”before the RTC. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In support thereof, respondent alleged that the Original Certificate ofTitle5 (OCT) sought to be reconstituted and whose number is no longerlegible due to wear and tear, is covered by Decree No. 444263, Case No.

3732, Record No. 221416 issued in the name of Spouses Nicasio Lapitanand Ana Doliente (Spouses Lapitan) of Alcala, Pangasinan. Respondent alsoalleged that the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT is in his possession andthat he is the owner of the two parcels of land covered by theaforementioned OCT by virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition withAbsolute Sale7 (the Deed) executed on December 26, 2002 by the heirs ofSpouses Lapitan in his favor. Said OCT covers two parcels of land locatedin San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan, (Lot No. 1) and Namulatan,8 Bautista,Pangasinan (Lot No. 2) with the following technicaldescriptions:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

A parcel of land (Lot No. 1, plan Psu- 53673), situated in the Barrio of SanJuan, Municipality of Alcala. Bounded on the NE. by property of Benito


12/21

Ferrer; on the S. by an irrigation ditch and property of Marcelo Monegas;and on the W. by Lot No. 2. Beginning at a point marked “1” on plan, beingS. 0 deg. 53’ W., 3830.91 m. from B. L. L. M. No. 1, Alcala; thence S. 87deg. 22’ W., 44.91 m. to point “2”; thence N. 5 deg. 25’ W., 214.83 m. topoint “3”; thence S. 17 deg. 06’ E., 221.61 m. to the point of beginning;

containing an area of four thousand eight hundred and eighteen squaremeters (4,818), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on theplan and on the ground are marked by old P. L. S. concrete monuments;bearings true; declination 0 deg. 40’ E.; date of survey, April 19-21, 1926[;and]

A parcel of land (Lot No. 2, plan Psu-53673), situated in the Barrio of[Namulatan], Municipality of Bautista. Bounded on the N. by properties ofHipolito Sarmiento and Ciriaco Dauz; on the E. by Lot No.1; and on the SW.by property of Nicasio Lapitan vs. Felix Bacolor. Beginning at a point

marked “1” on plan, being S. 2 deg. 40’ W., 3625.25 m. from B. L. L. M.No. 1, Alcala; thence N. 80 deg. 47’ E., 3.50 m. to point “2”; thence N. 86deg. 53’ E., 40.64 m. to point “3”; thence S. 5 deg. 25’ E., 214.83 m. topoint “4”; thence N. 16 deg. 57’ W., 220.69 m. to the point of beginning;containing an area of four thousand seven hundred and forty-four squaremeters (4,744), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on theplan and on the ground are marked by old P. L. S. concrete monuments;bearings true; declination 0 deg. 40’ E.; date of survey April 19-21, 1926.9

Respondent attached to his petition photocopies of the Deed; the OCT; TaxDeclaration No. 485810; a Certification11 dated January 13, 2003 issued by

the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan stating that thefile copy of the OCT could not be found and is considered lost and beyondrecovery; and Decree No. 444263.12

Upon a Show-Cause Order13 of the RTC, respondent filed an AmendedPetition14 dated May 21, 2003, alleging that the subject properties bear noencumbrance; that there are no improvements therein; that there are noother occupants thereof aside from respondent; and that there are nodeeds or instruments affecting the same that had been presented forregistration. He further alleged that “the land in issue is bounded on the

North by the land covered by Plan Psu-53673; on the North by theproperties of Hipolito Sarmiento and Cipriano Dauz,15 residents of Anulid,Alcala, Pangasinan; on the West by Lot No. 3; and on the Southwest by theproperties of Nicasio Lapitan vs. Felix Bacolor [who are also] residents ofAnulid, Alcala, Pangasinan.” 16 Respondent intimated that he desires tohave the office/file copy of the OCT reconstituted based on the TechnicalDescription provided by the Chief of the General Land Registration Officeand thereafter, to be issued a second owner’s duplicate copy in lieu of theold one.

On May 30, 2003, the RTC issued an Order17

finding the respondent’spetition sufficient in form and substance and setting the same for hearing


13/21

on September 29, 2003. The said Order is herein faithfully reproduced asfollows:cralavvonlinelawlibraryO R D E R

In a verified petition, petitioner Edward Camacho, as vendee of the parcels

of land located in San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan, and [Namulatan], Bautista,Pangasinan, covered by Decree No. 444263, Case No. 3732, G.L.R.O. No.22141, formerly issued in the names of spouses Nicasio Lapitan and AnaDoliente, of Alcala, Pangasinan, under an Original Certificate of Title thenumber of which is not legible due to wear and tear, seeks an orderdirecting the proper authorities and the Registrar of Deeds, Lingayen,Pangasinan, to reconstitute the office file copy of said Original Certificate ofTitle based on the technical description thereof and to issue a secondowner’s duplicate copy of the same in lieu of the old one.

Being sufficient in form and substance, the petition is set for hearing onSeptember 29, 2003, at 8:30 in the morning, before this Court, on whichdate, time and place, all interested persons are enjoined to appear andshow cause why the same should not be granted.

Let this order be published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazetteat the expense of the petitioner.

Likewise, let copies of this Order and of the Amended Petition be posted inconspicuous places in the Provincial Capitol and the Registry of Deeds, both

in Lingayen, Pangasinan, the Municipal Halls of Alcala and Bautista,Pangasinan, and the Barangay Halls of San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan andNamulatan, Bautista, Pangasinan, and the Office of the Solicitor General,Manila.

Finally, furnish copies of this Order, by registered mail, at the expense ofthe petitioner, to the following:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

1. Hipolito Sarmiento;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2. Cipriano Dauz;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

3. Nicasio Lapitan; and

4. Felix Bacolor.

all of Brgy. Anulid, Alcala, Pangasinan.

SO ORDERED.18

Thereafter, copies of the said order were posted on seven bulletin boards:at the Pangasinan Provincial Capitol Building, at the Alcala and Bautista

Municipal Buildings, at the San Juan and Namulatan Barangay Halls, at theoffice of the Register of Deeds in Lingayen, Pangasinan and at the


14/21

RTC.19 The order was also published twice in the Official Gazette: onAugust 18, 2003 (Volume 99, Number 33, Page 5206), and on August 25,2003 (Volume 99, Number 34, Page 5376).20

However, on January 22, 2004, respondent filed his second Amended

Petition21 averring that “the land in issue is bounded on the North by theland of Ricardo Acosta, a resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; on theSouth by the property of Greg Viray,22 a resident of Laoac, Alcala,Pangasinan; on the West by the land of Roque Lanuza,23 a resident ofLaoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; and on the East by the lot of Juan Cabuan,24 aresident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan.” 25 On March 4, 2004, respondentfiled a Motion26 with Leave of Court to admit his second Amended Petition,which the RTC granted in its Order27 dated March 4, 2004, directing thereinthat the persons mentioned in the second Amended Petition be notified byregistered mail.

During the hearing, the following witnesses were presented: (1)respondent28 who, among others, presented the original owner’s duplicatecopy of the OCT before the RTC;29 (2) the tenant of the adjoining lot(Western portion) Roque Lanuza who testified that he tilled the adjoininglots, that he has personal knowledge that respondent bought said lots fromthe heirs of the Spouses Lapitan, and that he was present when the lotswere surveyed;30 (3) adjoining owners Gregorio Viray31 and RicardoAcosta32 who testified that they were notified of the proceedings andinterposed no objection to the petition; and (4) Arthur David (Mr. David),

Records Custodian of the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan whotestified that Atty. Rufino Moreno, Jr., Registrar of Deeds had issued theCertification that the OCT subject of the petition can no longer be found inthe Office of the Register of Deeds.33 In his subsequent testimony, Mr.David reported to the RTC that the name of Nicasio Lapitan cannot belocated in the Index Cards of titles as some are missing anddestroyed. Upon questioning, Mr. David testified that the number of theOCT sought to be reconstituted may be referred to in the decree issued inthe name of Nicasio Lapitan which allegedly could be found in the LandRegistration Authority (LRA).34

On May 23, 2005, the LRA rendered a Report35 addressed to the RTC whichpertinently stated, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary(1) The present amended petition seeks the reconstitution of OriginalCertificate of Title No. (not legible), allegedly lost or destroyed andsupposedly covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psu-53673, situated in theBarrio of San Juan, Municipality of Alcala and Barrio of [Namulatan],Municipality of Bautista, respectively, Province of Pangasinan, on the basisof the owner’s duplicate thereof, a reproduction of which, duly certified byAtty. Stela Marie Q. Gandia-Asuncion, Clerk of Court VI, was submitted tothis Authority;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary


15/21

(2) Our records show that Decree No. 444263 was issued on July 18,1931 covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psu-53673, in Cadastral Case No.3732, GLRO Record No. 22141 in favor of the Spouses Nicasio Lapitan andAna Doliente;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(3) The technical descriptions of Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psu-53673,appearing on the reproduction of Original Certificate of Title No. (notlegible) were found correct after examination and due computation andwhen plotted in the Municipal Index Sheet No. 451/1027, do not appear tooverlap previously plotted/decreed properties in the area.

The government prosecutor deputized by the Office of the Solicitor General(OSG)36 participated in the trial of the case but did not presentcontroverting evidence.37

On March 9, 2006, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision,38 the dispositiveportion of which reads:cralavvonlinelawlibraryWHEREFORE, the Court, finding the documentary as well as the parole (sic)evidence adduced to be adequate and sufficiently persuasive to warrant thereconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title covered by Decree No.444263, Cadastral Case No. 3732, GLRO Record No. 22141, and pursuantto Section 110, PD No. 1529 and Sections 2 (d) and 15 of RA No. 26, herebydirects the Register of Deeds at Lingayen, Pangasinan, to reconstitute saidoriginal certificate of title on the basis of the decree of registration thereof,without prejudice to the annotation of any subsisting rights or interests notduly noted in these proceedings, if any, and the right of the Administrator,

Land Registration Authority, as provided for in Sec. 16, Land RegistrationCommission (now NALTDRA) Circular No. 35, dated June 13, 1983, and toissue a new owner's duplicate copy thereof.

SO ORDERED.39

On April 4, 2006, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG,filed a Motion for Reconsideration40 which was denied by the RTC in itsResolution41 dated May 24, 2006 for lack of merit. The RTC opined thatwhile the number of the OCT is not legible, a close examination of theentries therein reveals that it is an authentic OCT per the LRA’s findings.Moreover, the RTC held that respondent complied with Section 2 of RepublicAct (R.A.) No. 2642 considering that the reconstitution in this case is basedon the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT.

Petitioner appealed to the CA.43 By Decision44 dated July 31, 2008, the CAaffirmed the RTC’s findings and ruling, holding that respondent’s petition isgoverned by Section 10 of R.A. No. 26 since the reconstitution proceedingsis based on the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT itself. The CA, invokingthis Court’s ruling in Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development,Inc.,45 concluded that notice to the owners of the adjoining lots is not

required. Moreover, the CA opined that Decree No. 444263 issued on July18, 1931 covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2 in the name of Spouses Lapitan exists


16/21

in the Record Book of the LRA as stated in the LRA’s Report. The CAratiocinated that the LRA’s Report on said Decree tallies with the subjectOCT leading to no other conclusion than that these documents cover thesame subject lots. Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration46 whichthe CA, however, denied in its Resolution47 dated November 20, 2008.

Hence, this petition based on the following grounds, towit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIALCOURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTIONEVEN IF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NUMBER IS NOTLEGIBLE[; and]

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL

COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF ASECOND OWNER’S DUPLICATE.48

Petitioner through the OSG avers that respondent does not have any basisfor reconstitution because the OCT per se is of doubtful existence, asrespondent himself does not know its number. According to the OSG, thisfact alone negates the merits of the petition for reconstitution as held bythis Court in Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, etal.49 Moreover, the OSG highlights that the Deed, the tax declaration forthe year 2003, and the Register of Deeds Certification all indicated that the

number of the OCT is not legible. The OSG also stresses that nowhere inthe records did the LRA acknowledge that it has on file the original copy ofDecree No. 444263 from which the alleged OCT was issued and that saidDecree did not at all establish the existence and previous issuance of theOCT sought to be reconstituted. The OSG notes that the RTC erred, asfound in the dispositive portion of its decision, in basing the reconstitutionof the OCT under Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 26. Finally, the OSG submitsthat respondent cannot seek the issuance of the second owner’s duplicateof the OCT because he himself alleged in his own petition that he is inpossession of the same owner’s duplicatecertificate.50 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On the other hand, respondent counters that the OSG’s reliance in Tahananand Republic of the Phils. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,51 is unavailing.He argues that in Tahanan, the petitioner therein merely relied ondocuments other than the owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of title,while in Republic, this Court ruled that reconstitution cannot be based onstatutes which do not confer title over the property. Respondent claimsthat in these aforementioned cases, petitioners therein do not have othersources to support their respective petitions for reconstitution while in thiscase the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT sought to be reconstituted truly

exists albeit its number is not legible. Respondent submits that thedocumentary as well as the parol evidence he adduced are adequate to


17/21

warrant the reconstitution of the OCT as it is covered by Decree No.444263. Respondent also submits that since there is a valid title in thiscase, there is legal basis for the issuance of the owner’s duplicate copy ofthe reconstituted title.52 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Notwithstanding the numerous contentions raised by both parties, thisCourt finds that the fundamental issue to be resolved in this case is whetherthe RTC properly acquired and was invested with jurisdiction in the firstplace to hear and decide Land Registration Case No. V-0016 in the light ofthe strict and mandatory provisions of R.A. No. 26.

We resolve the sole issue in the negative.

Section 11053 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as theProperty Registration Decree, as amended by R.A. No. 6732,54 allows the

reconstitution of lost or destroyed original Torrens title either judicially, inaccordance with the special procedure laid down in R.A. No. 26, oradministratively, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.6732.55 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

As the case set before this Court is one for judicial reconstitution, we limitthe discussion to the pertinent law, which is R.A. No. 26, and the applicable jurisprudence.

The nature of the proceeding for reconstitution of a certificate of title under

R.A. No. 26 denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is supposed tohave been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition. The purposeof such a proceeding is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced,after proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss ordestruction occurred. The same R.A. No. 26 specifies the requisites to bemet for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition forreconstitution of a certificate of title. Failure to comply with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders theproceedings null and void. Thus, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lostor destroyed one, R.A. No. 26 laid down procedures which must be strictly

followed in view of the danger that reconstitution could be the source ofanomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy substitute fororiginal registration of title proceedings.56

It bears reiterating that respondent’s quest for judicial reconstitution in thiscase is anchored on the owner’s duplicate copy of said OCT – a source forreconstitution of title provided under Section 2 (a) of R.A. No. 26, whichprovides in full as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrarySEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of thesources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the followingorder:cralavvonlinelawlibrary


18/21

a. The owner’s duplicate of the certificate oftitle;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

b. The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of thecertificate of title;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

c. A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued bythe register of deeds or by a legal custodianthereof;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

d. An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent,as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificateof title was issued;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

e. A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which theproperty, the description of which is given in said document, ismortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy ofsaid document showing that its original had been registered;and

f. Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, issufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost ordestroyed certificate of title. (Emphasis supplied .)

In this aspect, the CA was correct in invoking our ruling in Puzon v. Sta.Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.,57 that notices to owners of adjoining

lots and actual occupants of the subject property are not mandatory and jurisdictional in a petition for judicial reconstitution of destroyed certificateof title when the source for such reconstitution is the owner’s duplicate copythereof since the publication, posting and notice requirements for such apetition are governed by Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of R.A. No. 26.Section 10 provides: chanroblesvirtualawlibrarySEC. 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owneror person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section five of thisAct directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sourcesenumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act:

Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the petition,before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner statedin section nine hereof: And, provided, further, That certificates of titlereconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to theencumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act. (Emphasis supplied .)

Correlatively, the pertinent provisions of Section 9 on the publication,posting and the contents of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitutionclearly mandate:cralavvonlinelawlibrarySEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition tobe published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of

the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincialbuilding and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which


19/21

the land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and afterhearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justiceand equity may require. The notice shall specify, among other things, thenumber of the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner, thenames of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of

title, the location of the property, and the date on which all persons havingan interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they mayhave. x x x (Emphasis supplied .)

In sum, Section 10, in relation to Section 9, requires that 30 days beforethe date of hearing, (1) a notice be published in two successive issues ofthe Official Gazette at the expense of the petitioner, and that (2) suchnotice be posted at the main entrances of the provincial building and of themunicipal hall where the property is located. The notice shall state thefollowing: (1) the number of the certificate of title, (2) the name of theregistered owner, (3) the names of the interested parties appearing in thereconstituted certificate of title, (4) the location of the property, and (5)the date on which all persons having an interest in the property, mustappear and file such claims as they may have.58

Verily, while the CA invoked the appropriate provisions of R.A. No. 26, itfailed, however, to take note that Section 9 thereof mandatorily requiresthat the notice shall specify, among other things, the number of thecertificate of title and the names of the interested parties appearing in thereconstituted certificate of title. In this case, the RTC failed to indicate these jurisdictional facts in the notice.

First. The Notice of Hearing issued and published does not align with the inrem character of the reconstitution proceedings and the mandatory natureof the requirements under R.A. No. 26.59 There is a mortal insufficiency inthe publication when the missing title was merely identified as “OCT No.(not legible)” which is non-compliant with Section 9 of R.A. No. 26.

Moreover, while the LRA confirmed the issuance of Decree No. 444263 inits Report, it perplexes this Court that the LRA failed to state that an OCTwas actually issued and mention the number of the OCT sought to be

reconstituted. In Republic of the Phils. v. El Gobierno De Las IslasFilipinas,60 this Court denied the petition for reconstitution of title despitethe existence of a decree: chanroblesvirtualawlibraryWe also find insufficient the index of decree showing that Decree No.365835 was issued for Lot No. 1499, as a basis for reconstitution. Wenoticed that the name of the applicant as well as the date of the issuanceof such decree was illegible. While Decree No. 365835 existed in the RecordBook of Cadastral Lots in the Land Registration Authority as stated in theReport submitted by it, however, the same report did not state the numberof the original certificate of title, which is not sufficient evidence in support

of the petition for reconstitution. The deed of extrajudicial declaration ofheirs with sale executed by Aguinaldo and Restituto Tumulak Perez and


20/21

respondent on February 12, 1979 did not also mention the number of theoriginal certificate of title but only Tax Declaration No. 00393. As we heldin Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, the absence of anydocument, private or official, mentioning the number of the certificate oftitle and the date when the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant

the granting of such petition. (Emphasis supplied .)

Second. Respondent and the RTC overlooked that there are two parcels ofland in this case. It is glaring that respondent had to amend his petitionfor reconstitution twice in order to state therein the names of the adjoiningowners. Most importantly, the Notice of Hearing issued by the RTC failed tostate the names of interested parties appearing in the OCT sought to bereconstituted, particularly the adjoining owners to Lot No. 1, namely, BenitoFerrer and Marcelo Monegas. While it is true that notices need not be sentto the adjoining owners in this case since this is not required under Sections9 and 10 of R.A. No. 26 as enunciated in our ruling in Puzon, it is imperative,however, that the notice should specify the names of said interested partiesso named in the title sought to be reconstituted. No less than Section 9 ofR.A. No. 26 mandates it.

Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute areclear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaningand applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non estrecedendum. From the words of a statute there should be nodeparture.61 In view of these lapses, the RTC did not acquire jurisdictionto proceed with the case since the mandatory manner or mode of obtaining

jurisdiction as prescribed by R.A. No. 26 had not been strictly followed,thereby rendering the proceedings utterly null and void.62 As such, whilepetitioner overlooked these jurisdictional infirmities and failed toincorporate them as additional issues in its own petition, this Court hassufficient authority to pass upon and resolve the same since they affect jurisdiction.63

Apropos is our ruling in Castillo v. Republic64 where we heldthat:cralavvonlinelawlibraryWe cannot simply dismiss these defects as “technical.” Liberal construction

of the Rules of Court does not apply to land registration cases. Indeed, tofurther underscore the mandatory character of these jurisdictionalrequirements, the Rules of Court do not apply to land registration cases. Inall cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by astatute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed by astatute, the mode of proceeding is mandatory, and must be strictlycomplied with, or the proceeding will be utterly void. When the trial courtlacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over thewhole case and all its aspects. All the proceedings before the trial court,including its order granting the petition for reconstitution, are void for lack

of jurisdiction.65


21/21

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decisiondated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87390 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for reconstitution docketed as LRCNo. V-0016, RTC, Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50, is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ. concur.

Documents

Chap 10 - LTD cases