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Changes in racial disparities under public reporting and pay for performance. Rachel M. Werner. Can market-based QI decrease disparities?. Disparities stem in part from location of care Opportunity to reduce disparities by improving performance among low-quality providers - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Changes in racial disparities under public reporting and pay
for performance
Rachel M. Werner
Can market-based QI decrease disparities?
• Disparities stem in part from location of care– Opportunity to reduce disparities by improving
performance among low-quality providers– Public reporting and P4P may reduce
disparities
Market-based QI may increase disparities
• Consumer-driven increases– Limited access to information– Limited access to high-quality providers
• Provider-driven increases– Limited resources to improve quality– Selection of low-risk patients
How does P4P affect resource-poor hospitals?
Werner RM, Goldman LE, Dudley RA. Comparison of change in quality of care between safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals. JAMA 2008;299:2180-2187.
Financial resources are important for QI
• Resource-poor hospitals (i.e. safety-net hospitals) may not be able to invest in quality improvement
• Low-performance at baseline reduces economic rewards
• Rich become richer while poor become poorer
Objective
• To examine changes in disparities in quality of care between safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals under public reporting
• To estimate the financial impact of P4P at safety-net hospitals
Empirical approach
• Publicly available data on hospital performance– www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov
• All acute care non-federal hospitals in U.S.– 3,665 hospitals– 2004 to 2006
• Compare changes in performance across % safety-net care at hospitals– % Medicaid
Hospital performance measures
3 condition-specific composites:–Acute myocardial infarction
Aspirin at admissionAspirin at dischargeACE-inhibitor for LV dysfunctionBeta-blocker at admissionBeta-blocker at discharge
–Heart failureAssessment of LV functionACE-inhibitor for LV dysfunction
–PneumoniaOxygenation assessmentPneumococcal vaccinationTiming of initial antibiotic therapy
Hospital performance in 2004Percent safety-net:
Adjusted changes in hospital performance
Change in performance (2004 to 2006)
Non-safety-net Safety-net
Difference
Acute myocardial infarction 3.8 2.3 1.5 *
Heart failure 8.0 6.6 1.4 *
Pneumonia 9.3 8.0 1.3 ***
*.05>p-value≥.01; ***p-value<.001
Adjusted for: hospital characteristics, baseline performance, states fixed-effects
Changes in top-ranked hospitals
Low Middle High
% Safety-net
Low Middle High
% Safety-net
Low Middle High
% Safety-net
Changes in top-ranked hospitals
Low Middle High
% Safety-net
Low Middle High
% Safety-net
Low Middle High
% Safety-net
Pay-for-performance simulation
• CMS hospital P4P demonstration project
• In 2004, hospital receive bonuses based on relative performance
• In 2006, hospitals face penalties for not achieving performance above threshold
Changes in % bonus
% Safety-net
Changes in % bonus
% Safety-net
Summary
• Safety-net hospitals had smaller improvements in performance between 2004 and 2006
• Safety-net hospitals were less likely to be identified as top-performers by 2006
• Under P4P, safety-net hospitals would have substantially smaller payments by 2006
Implications
• Hospitals serving a disproportionate share of minority and low income patients are in worse financial condition at baseline
• In setting of public reporting or P4P, widening performance gap could further worsen finances
• Declining finances may further worsen clinical quality
Does “cream-skimming” increase disparities?
Werner RM, Asch DA, Polsky D. Racial profiling: the unintended consequences of coronary artery bypass graft report cards. Circulation. 2005;111:1257-1263
Physician response to public reporting
• In 1991, New York State began publicly rating cardiac surgeons based on their mortality rates
• Composition and risk profiles of patients undergoing CABG has changed– Harder for high-risk patients to find a surgeon
– Schneider and Epstein 1996
– The number and severity of patients transferred out of NY increased
– Omoigui et al 1996
– Lower illness severity of patients receiving CABG in report cards states compared to other states
– Dranove et al 2003
Statistical discrimination
• Because of clinical uncertainty physicians use beliefs about a group to make decisions about an individual
Statistical discrimination in the setting of public reporting
• Physicians may avoid patients with high unmeasured severity
• If surgeons believe racial and ethnic minorities will have worse outcomes, surgeons will preferentially treat white patients after report cards are released
Empirical approach
• All patients admitted with AMI in New York– n = 310,412
• Compared to a national sample of patients admitted with AMI– n = 618,139
• Differences in CABG use between white vs. black and white vs. Hispanic over 2 time periods:– Before report cards (1988-1991)– After report cards (1992-1997)
Changes in racial disparities after public reporting
Summary
• There was a relative increase in disparities in CABG use after public reporting
• No relative change in complements (cardiac catheterization) or substitutes (angioplasty)
• Relative change in CABG use for both blacks and Hispanics
Implications
• Racial/ethnic minorities have lower rates of CABG use before public reporting
• Public reporting may cause increased pressure for physicians to perform well
• If race is a signal for severity, racial disparities may increase– Quality may worsen for subgroups of patients
even as overall quality increases
Reducing racial disparities with market-based incentives
• Changes in financial incentives– Reward improvements in care in addition to
relative rank– Provide direct subsidies for quality
improvement
• Changes in measures– Directly reward reduced disparities– Stratified performance measures