Changes in Military Affairs: Revolution or Evolution?

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Changes in Military Affairs: Revolution or Evolution?

By Oleg Nekrassovski

The concept, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), evolved from the ideas developed by

the Soviet military theorists in the early 1970s. The Soviet concept on the matter was more

limited than an RMA, as it was called a military-technical revolution; showing that the primary

focus of Soviet theorists was on revolutions in military technology (Galdi, 1995). Hence, while

applying their new concept to the changes in military affairs that took place before the 1970s;

Soviet theorists concluded that two military-technical revolutions have so far taken place in the

20th century. The first of these revolutions, according to Soviets, took place during, or soon

after, World War I, as it was “driven by the emergence of aircraft, motor vehicles and chemical

warfare;” while the second, was “driven by the development of nuclear weapons, missiles and

computers in World War II” (Galdi, 1995). The same Soviet military theorists even attempted to

outline the nature of the next “military-technical revolution;” which, according to them, “would

involve advances in microelectronics, sensors, precision-guidance, automated control systems,

and directed energy” (Galdi, 1995). And in retrospect, while the revolutionary nature and

significance of these changes in military technology is open to question, it is clear these Soviet

theorists have succeeded in correctly predicting which technologies will play the leading role in

future warfare. Hence, the present paper will seek to show that a revolution in military affairs

(RMA) is a theoretical concept which does not seem to be applicable to the changes in military

affairs that have been taking place since the last decades of the 20th century. However, the

characteristics attributed to the alleged, current RMA, by its various proponents, are fairly

uniform; indicating that there is a considerable amount of consensus regarding the general

changes in military affairs that are currently taking place.

According to Galdi (1995), a revolution in military affairs (RMA) takes place when one of

the participants in a conflict attains immediate victory through a new combination of new

technology, organization, and doctrine; and moreover, when anyone who wishes to overcome

that participant “must match or counter the new combination of technology, organization, and

doctrine.” Thus, “The accomplishments of the victor become the necessary foundation

for any future military activities in that area of conflict.” The reason why the specific area of

conflict must be empathized is that the elements of a new RMA (e.g. microelectronics and

sensors), may be countered, in another area of conflict, by some elements of former RMAs

(e.g., an electronics-frying electromagnetic pulse from a nuclear blast) (Galdi, 1995).

A good illustration of a proposed, specific RMA of the past, as well as the importance of

all three factors of technology, organization, and doctrine, in creating an RMA, is given by the

battle that led to the Fall of France in 1940, at the hands of German invaders. As it turns out,

the capabilities of the belligerents were a reverse of what one would normally expect in such


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cases. The allied forces of France, Britain, Belgium, and Holland, that were defending France,

clearly outnumbered the German force that attacked them. And in the opinion of General

Ludwig Beck, who was the Chief of the German General Staff at that time, the French Army was

“the strongest in Europe” (Cowan, 2007, p. 4). Moreover, “The French had the best tanks in the

world and the allies had an overall advantage in the number of divisions, tanks, aircraft, and

artillery pieces.” And yet, within six weeks, the allies were defeated by the Germans and

suffered over 2.2 million casualties, while the Germans suffered only 150,000 (Cowan, 2007, p.

4).

The explanation for such a surprising outcome to this battle is said to lie in the following

factors. The Germans synchronized “the technology of the tank, airplane, and radio” and

combined “the storm troop tactics of 1918 with the use of the Indirect Approach” (Cowan,

2007, p. 4).

This combination of technology, organization, tactics and doctrine allowed the Germans

to execute [their attack] with such speed that it made it look like the Germans belonged

“to an entirely different period of human history.” The French applied the tank and the

airplane as singular systems. They employed the tanks as infantry and artillery support

weapons. They did not consider the strategic impact of combining these technological

advances. Mired in outdated doctrine, they failed to see and understand the military

power that emerging technology could achieve when combined with changes in doctrine

and strategy. (Cowan, 2007, p. 4)

Another rigorous definition of an RMA comes from Hundley (1999). Hundley (1999, p. 9)

defines an RMA as a “paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations” which

either (1) makes irrelevant or obsolete “one or more core competencies of a dominant player,”

or (2) creates at least one new core competency in a new dimension of warfare, or (3) both.

This definition contains a number of key terms which are worth elaborating on.

The core competencies, as used in the above definition, refer to those fundamental

abilities that create the foundation for a set of military capabilities. For example, a core

competency of today’s U.S. Air Force is its ability to detect from the air and attack with

precision weapons any vehicular targets on the ground (Hundley, 1999, p. 9). A dominant player

is a military organization which has “a dominating set of capabilities in an area of military

operations.” For example, the U.S. Air Force is today’s dominant player in air-to-ground attacks

and air-to-air combat (Hundley, 1999, p. 10).

The dimension of warfare is a medium on which warfare is conducted. Until the 20th

century, the only two dimensions of warfare were the surfaces of the earth (land warfare) and

water (naval warfare) (Hundley, 1999, p. 10). In the 20th century, warfare rapidly expanded into

other mediums, especially underwater (undersea warfare) and air (air warfare), “and the

homelands of the combatants (strategic warfare and intercontinental warfare).” More recent,

potential dimensions of warfare, which have not yet been employed, include outer space

(space warfare) and cyberspace (information warfare) (Hundley, 1999, p. 10).


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A paradigm shift refers to “a profound change in the fundamental model underlying a

segment of military operations.” The blitzkrieg paradigm that was used by the Germans during

WWII (as described above for the battle leading to the Fall of France in 1940), involved

armoured forces of high mobility breaking through enemy lines and rapidly penetrating to the

rear (Hundley, 1999, p. 10-11). This was a great change in the basic model of land warfare. Up

to that point in history the core competency of ground forces consisted of dominant infantry

and artillery forces, which the blitzkrieg paradigm rendered obsolete and was therefore an RMA

(Hundley, 1999, p. 11).

However, “There are several interpretations of the exact number and constituent

elements of earlier revolutions in military affairs” (Galdi, 1995). Moreover, “Most true

revolutions in military affairs have only been recognized after they have taken place.” And,

quite possibly, when it comes to the military conflicts of the past, the victorious side, that was

the prime mover of the new RMA, could have viewed as merely evolutionary, the same changes

in military affairs that the losing side and history viewed as truly revolutionary (Galdi, 1995).

Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that if an RMA is currently taking place, it would appear

evolutionary and spanning a considerable interval of time, at least from the perspective of

military theorists that study the changes in military affairs of the most militarily advanced

nations.

It is doubtful, however, that an RMA can be said to be currently taking place at all, or

can be expected to occur in the near future. After all, since the middle of the twentieth century,

technological change has been very rapid, accelerating, and unavoidable (Galdi, 1995). Thus,

technological change, which happens to be “one of the major elements needed for a revolution

in military affairs … is now always present.” Moreover, “rapid societal change and

organizational adaptations by military forces” are also constantly taking place (Galdi, 1995).

Alternatively, it can be argued that even though there neither is occurring, nor will occur, a

single RMA, “there will be a series of almost continuous revolutions” in military affairs (Galdi,

1995).

Even Hundley (1999, p. 19), who believes that a Soviet type of a military-technical

revolution is currently underway, doubts that it is a true RMA; or at least thinks that “it is too

soon to tell.” After all, following his definition, this new military-technical revolution, neither

created at least one new core competency in a new dimension of warfare, nor made irrelevant

or obsolete “one or more core competencies of a dominant player.” However, Hundley (1999,

p. 19) provides two hypothetical examples of how a true RMA (according to his definition) could

occur in the future. One of these examples involves a sizeable (e.g., division size or greater)

armoured enemy force being completely stopped by U.S. Air Force using precision-guided, anti-

armour munitions, without any involvement of the U.S. Army’s armoured forces. If this feat

could be accomplished in a wide variety of terrains accessible to armoured vehicles and despite

the enemy employing air defenses, it would be a true RMA; because it would make “irrelevant a


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core competency (tank/antitank warfare) of a dominant player (the armored forces of the U.S.

Army)” (Hundley, 1999, p. 19). The second of Hundley’s hypothetical examples, of a true RMA

taking place, consists of one side in a future conflict utilizing cyberspace based techniques and

inflicting strategic damage on the other side, which is “sufficient to significantly alter the course

of the conflict.” Such an event would also be a true RMA, because “it would create a new core

competency (information warfare) in a new dimension of warfare (cyberspace)” (Hundley,

1999, p. 20).

According to many observers, the Persian Gulf War supposedly marked the beginning of

a new RMA. For example, Metz and Kievit (1995, p. 1) state that “American combat

effectiveness in the Gulf War amazed observers around the world. ... The Gulf War thus

suggested that a historic revolution in military affairs (RMA) is underway ...” Similarly, Sloan

(2002, p. ix) states that “The Gulf War provided the first concrete, vivid indication that a military

technological revolution was underway. This conflict can be seen as the precursor to a broader

RMA that ... could come to fruition anytime between 2015 and 2025.” Thus, Sloan even goes

one step further than Metz and Kievit, by giving an approximate date when this alleged new

RMA will finish.

Many proponents of air power, who believed that the Persian Gulf War has

demonstrated that a new RMA has begun, claimed that the new RMA consisted of “the

realization of the 50-year quest for the decisive application of air power in war.” The 50-year

quest referred to the theoretically possibilities of air operations, which were allegedly first

envisioned by the first theorists of air warfare between the two world wars, and have for the

first time became a reality (Cohen, 1996). It is highly doubtful, however, that the air operations

that were conducted during the Persian Gulf War reflected much of what was actually

envisioned by the first theorists of air warfare. After all, “No theorist in the 1920s imagined it

would be possible to take down telecommunications systems or to conduct extensive attacks in

densely populated areas without killing many civilians” (Cohen, 1996). Instead, the Gulf War

merely showed, what one would normally expect; namely that an air force sized and trained for

a global war, operating in a theatre ideal for air operations, at a time and place of its own

choosing, would achieve a spectacular victory against a much smaller and lesser equipped

opponent in a small local war (Cohen, 1996). Thus, even if US Air Force did achieve a

spectacular victory against Iraqi forces during the Gulf War, there is no evidence that it

employed a new combination of new technology, organization, and doctrine. Moreover, their

victory clearly did not create a new core competency in a new dimension of conflict; nor is

there any reason to believe that it made irrelevant any of the core competencies of a dominant

player.

Other thinkers even strongly doubt that the US Air Force scored any kind of victory in

the Gulf War, altogether. For example, Macgregor (1997, p. 10), building on the works of

several other scholars states that “Forty days of near-constant air and missile attack during


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January and February 1991 neither dislodged the Iraqi Army from Kuwait nor destroyed Iraq’s

nuclear facilities and mobile missile launchers. It was the ground offensive that compelled the

Iraqis to submit unconditionally to the American-led coalition forces.”

Another vision of an alleged, new RMA, comes from Admiral William Owens, former vice

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. Owens calls the new RMA a “system

of systems” and describes it as consisting of “a world in which the many kinds of sensors, from

satellites to shipborne radar, from unmanned aerial vehicles to remotely planted acoustic

devices, will provide information to any military user who needs it” (Cohen, 1996). Thus, in the

age of a new RMA, US armed forces will be able to collect, evaluate, and instantly employ huge

quantities of information about any given battle space (Owens suggests a 200-mile-by-200-mile

box) (Cohen, 1996).

Ground soldiers, however, remain skeptical about Owens’ “system of systems.” They

doubt that any technology can eliminate Clausewitz’s ‘fog of war,’ and “ask what will happen

when an opponent attempts to conceal its force or attacks the information systems that

observe it” (Cohen, 1996). And these are valid concerns, because the “system of systems”

originated in naval warfare, and even there, sea and storm can considerably limit the

information about what goes on inside Owens’ 200-mile-by-200-mile box. Moreover, Owens’

supposed, new RMA is clearly based on the assumption that other countries will be unable to

systematically deny the information required by USA’s latest weapons systems (Cohen, 1996).

Thus, it is unclear why Owens ignores the fact that his “system of systems” may be easily

countered by older technologies, or seems to believe that it must lead to an immediate victory

in a particular area of conflict. Perhaps more importantly, what Owens considers to be a new

RMA is, at best, a revolution in technology (Cohen, 1996); while a true RMA must involve a new

combination of new technology, organization, and doctrine. Moreover, there is no reason to

believe that Owens’ “system of systems” will make irrelevant any of the core competencies of

the dominant player. Instead, it appears more likely that it will only enhance them. Also, it is

fairly obvious that the “system of systems” will not create a new core competency in a new

dimension of warfare; though successful attacks on it, might; once the armed forces will

become heavily dependent on it.

Thus, it is highly doubtful that a new RMA is currently taking place or can be expected to

occur in the near future. However, it appears that all proponents of the alleged, current RMA

are describing essentially the same changes in military affairs which they see as currently taking

place. Even in those cases where their descriptions appear radically different, they simply seem

to be talking about different aspects of the same broad changes.

Owens’ new RMA (“system of systems”), despite almost completely neglecting

organizational and doctrinal aspects of a true RMA, consists of three ‘arenas’. The first arena of

the “system of systems” is intelligence collection, surveillance and reconnaissance (Bachler,

2001, p. 11). Not surprisingly these capabilities allow the commander to “see” what the enemy


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is doing by providing him/her with the information about the enemy and the battlefield. It is

these capabilities that in Owens’ view will provide the US military with an in-depth knowledge

of any 200-mile-by-200-mile box of the battle space. Hence, these capabilities are sometimes

called dominant battle space awareness (Bachler, 2001, p. 11).

The second arena of Owens’ new RMA is “advanced command, control,

communications, computers, and intelligence.” This allows the rapid transfer of data and

communication down the chain of command even if everyone involved is dispersed across

thousands of square miles (Bachler, 2001, p. 12). Not surprisingly, these capabilities allow

commanders to coordinate operations more effectively regardless of their proximity to the

battlefield. Thus, in Owens’ view, one of the keys, in the developing RMA, will be unrestricted

and secure communications (Bachler, 2001, p. 12).

The third arena of Owens’ “system of systems” is called precision force, as it involves

“the use of precision - guided weapons to cause the greatest damage to the enemy.” This

allows the US military to attack the weakest points of the enemy forces (Bachler, 2001, p. 12).

According to Owens, while all three arenas of his “system of systems” provide the

military with advantages, it is the overlap of these arenas that creates truly revolutionary

advances (Bachler, 2001, p. 12). The three arenas are thought to overlap in three places,

creating three conditions for combat victory. These three conditions are dominant battle space

knowledge, near-perfect mission assignment, and immediate/complete battle assessment

(Bachler, 2001, p. 11-12).

Sloan’s (2002) vision, of the allegedly currently progressing RMA, is very similar to that

of Owens’. The only serious difference is that of the organizational and doctrinal aspects of an

RMA; which is not surprising, given that Owens’ vision of a new RMA is almost exclusively

focused on technology. Hence, Sloan splits her description of what she believes is “today’s

ongoing revolution in military affairs” into sections on revolutionary technologies, doctrines,

and methods of organization.

Sloan (2002) divides her description of revolutionary technologies into sections on (1)

precision-guided munitions and precision force, (2) force projection and stealth, and (3)

battlespace awareness and control. Precision-guided munitions were first developed at the end

of the Vietnam War, but have greatly improved in accuracy “since about the mid-1980s, and

even more so since the Gulf War” (Sloan, 2002, p. 4). One example of modern precision-guided

munitions is the Tomahawk cruise missile, which is guided by the Global Positioning System and

“can reliably hit a target the size of a small room from a thousand miles away.” Another such

example is the precision bombs, most of which can “hit their targets despite darkness, smoke,

or bad weather,” even if dropped from “six miles up and 40 miles away” from their targets

(Sloan, 2002, p. 4). Precision-guided munitions allow the application of “precision force,” which

is nothing other than the application of deadly force with greater accuracy, range, and speed.

Precision-guided weapons have already increase the destructive power of an attack by a


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thousand fold, compared to the unguided munitions of the past, while at the same time

enabling a great reduction in collateral damage (Sloan, 2002, p. 4).

One of the most significant technological developments, that greatly amplifies force

projection, is stealth technology (Sloan, 2002, p. 4). Military stealth technology carries an

advantage over its nonstealthy counterpart because of its “ability to penetrate high-threat

areas and deliver precision-guided munitions.” A variety of stealthy platforms is already

possessed by the air, naval, and ground forces of the United States and a few other countries

(Sloan, 2002, p. 5).

Thus, it is clear that those technologies which Sloan sees as forming an integral part of

an alleged, current RMA, and which she discusses under the headings of (1) precision-guided

munitions and precision force, and (2) force projection and stealth, are essentially the same

thing as the third arena of Owens’ “system of systems,” called precision force.

Many new military technologies allow a significant increase in battlespace awareness,

considerably reducing the “fog of war.” Sensors in satellites, manned aircraft, or UAVs “can now

monitor virtually everything that is going on in a particular battle area” (Sloan, 2002, p. 6). This

can potentially impart commanders with “complete, real-time knowledge of the disposition of

all enemy and friendly forces” (Sloan, 2002, p. 6). Moreover, the US Army has been working on

enhancing its battlespace awareness by adding digital technology or building it into “aircraft,

tanks, artillery, and individual soldier systems” in order to help create an “instantaneous and

complete picture of the battlefield” for use by commanders (Sloan, 2002, p. 7).

However, great battlespace awareness is useless unless there is a command and control

architecture that can allow acting on all this information. “Advanced command, control,

communications, computers and intelligence processing systems are being designed to make

sense of the vast amount of data that is gathered” (Sloan, 2002, p. 8). These systems are also

designed to allow the commander to be in constant and instant contact with his/her

subordinates. Hence, advanced command and control systems can potentially reduce “the

surveillance-synthesis-assessment-command-strike loop to a matter of minutes,” allowing the

commanders to control the battle “from one moment to the next” (Sloan, 2002, p. 8).

Thus, it is clear that one of the essential parts of the technological aspect of Sloan’s

alleged, current RMA, which she discusses under the heading of battlespace awareness and

control, is virtually indistinguishable from the first and second arena of Owens’ “system of

systems;” which are (1) intelligence collection, surveillance and reconnaissance, and (2)

advanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence.

Sloan (2002) divides her description, of what she sees as revolutionary military

doctrines, into sections on (1) joint doctrine, (2) naval doctrine, (3) land doctrine, and (4) air

doctrine. Joint doctrine refers to the practice of achieving a greater effect on the battlefield by

making army, navy, and air force work together. Some experts believe that this push for joint

operations comes from new technology. A related concept is the greater utilization of


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combined operations, where armed services of one country work in coalitions with armed

services of other countries (Sloan, 2002, p. 9). In turn, joint and combined operations require

greater interoperability to be effective. Interoperability refers to “the ability of systems, units,

and forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to

use these services to enable them to operate effectively together” (Sloan, 2002, p. 9).

Given the importance of joint doctrine, the new naval doctrine (at least within the U.S.

Navy) stresses the ability of the navy to project its power from the sea to the land, in support of

marine or army units, rather than be only capable of naval combat. “A second important

doctrinal change within the U.S. Navy is a shift from platform-centric to network-centric

warfare” (Sloan, 2002, p. 9-10).This concept stresses the ability of a network of platforms (e.g.

warships, submarines, aircraft) to effectively utilize their sensor and surveillance systems and

quickly share the gathered data with other platforms in their network, so as to reduce their

combined “reaction time to an absolute minimum and deny the enemy a window to respond”

(Sloan, 2002, p. 10).

Because the nature of threats in today’s international security environment is highly

unpredictable, armed forces must become capable of responding quickly to almost any

situation. Hence, the new ground forces must be smaller, more mobile, and more flexible,

while remaining highly lethal (Sloan, 2002, p. 11). In other words, the new Army must be able

to quickly project its power across the globe. This need is already being met by the

development of rapid reaction and expeditionary ground forces (Sloan, 2002, p. 11).

An expeditionary deployment capability requires, among other things, that the army be

reorganized “into smaller, more modular, and mission-tailored units.” “Ground forces also

require lighter and more mobile (especially air deployable) equipment that remains highly

lethal and does not sacrifice force protection” (Sloan, 2002, p. 11). Also, a strategic lift,

especially airlift, is essential for the rapid reaction capability of the new army. After all, there is

no other “mode of transport that can react to global force-commitment needs within days”

(Sloan, 2002, p. 11). And finally, in order to become smaller and more mobile, a lesser

dependency of land forces on large logistics infrastructures is essential. One way to achieve this

is to eliminate large stockpiles by relying on just-in-time delivery. Another, is to switch to

equipment which requires less logistics support but provides more combat capability (Sloan,

2002, p. 12-13).

The smaller, more mobile units of the new army must still have as much firepower as

the old mass army. In other words, the combat capabilities of army units must be multiplied.

This can be accomplished by “tying enhanced reconnaissance and surveillance systems to

precision guided munitions” (Sloan, 2002, p. 12). Hence, the troops-based firepower of the old

mass armies, which engaged in mass assaults, will be replaced by the technology-based

firepower of the new smaller, more mobile army that carefully selects the time and place of

each assault (Sloan, 2002, p. 12).


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So it is quite likely that future ground operations will involve small groups of troops

moving rapidly over the battlefield. These forces “will be more widely dispersed than in the

past” and will have little in common with the frontlines of yesterday (Sloan, 2002, p. 12). The

latest weapons with greater lethality and reach, which will be carried by each soldier and

platform, will allow maintaining a strong offensive, despite increased dispersion and mobility.

New communications and coordination capabilities will enable the synchronization of the

dispersed elements, which will become critical (Sloan, 2002, p. 12).

However, ground forces no longer need to face the enemy directly until it has been

considerably “softened up” by the air power. In fact, proponents of air power, argue, that the

new main role of the ground forces is not to achieve victory, but merely to secure it after it has

been largely achieved by the air forces. This new manner of joint fighting is known as the

doctrine of “disengaged combat” (Sloan, 2002, p. 13). And according to its proponents, it has

been made possible by the advances in precision capabilities which turned the air power into a

decisive force in war. A related concept, called “rapid halt,” involves a quick and overwhelming

utilization of air power against an attacking enemy in order to “stop an assault, disrupt the

enemy’s ability to control its forces, paralyse the assailant, and pave the way for an easier

ground campaign.” Also, just like ground forces, the new “air forces are adopting expeditionary

doctrines,” in order to better be able to counter the full spectrum of conflict anywhere in the

world (Sloan, 2002, p. 13).

The shift from “mass destruction” to “precision warfare” requires an organizational

transformation of mass armed forces into smaller, better educated, and capital-intensive

professional military, “whose units are commanded by a more decentralized decision-making

structure and can be specifically tailored to the task at hand” (Sloan, 2002, p. 15). In fact, the

relative importance of numbers has been reduced by the emphasis on high-quality weapons,

placing premium on high-quality troops. At the same time, advanced surveillance and

communications technologies will, in theory, allow the frontline soldiers to know about the

battlefield as much as generals. Consequently, military organizations must become less

hierarchical, with frontline soldiers being granted greater power to take initiative, and the local

command being “empowered at the expense of theatre-level command” (Sloan, 2002, p. 15).

Not surprisingly, such changes will require new command protocols. Using modern

communications technologies it will be easy and essential that frontline soldiers are directly

linked to weapon systems and their operators; and are allowed to both receive and give orders,

instead of being required to route all requests for firepower through the chain of command.

Thus, the lower ranks will be enabled to steer the course of the battle (Sloan, 2002, p. 16).

Increased responsibility among the lower ranks will, of course, require greater skill levels.

Moreover, the altered nature of warfare will require personnel with new type of skills. U.S.

Navy, for example, is already finding that it needs more personnel skilled in maintaining and

troubleshooting computer networks (Sloan, 2002, p. 16).


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As has been already described, Cohen (1996), unlike Sloan (2002) and many others, does

not believe that the Gulf War demonstrated the beginning of a new RMA. However, Cohen

(1996) does believe that a new RMA has begun around the time of the Gulf War.

Cohen’s characterization of the revolutionary technologies involved in his alleged, new

RMA is brief, but still very similar to that provided by Sloan and Owens, as described above. In

particular, Cohen (1996) mentions the new surveillance and communication technologies, as

well as precision-guided munitions, all of which, when combined together, greatly increase the

firepower of the new armed forces.

With regards to new modes of military organization that do, or soon will, characterize

the new RMA, Cohen (1996), mirroring the views of Sloan (2002), emphasizes that “the new

military will be an increasingly joint force.” In fact, according to him, in militaries around the

world, the air forces are increasingly carrying out their combat duties in cooperation with

ground forces; while naval forces increasingly focus on delivering “fire against a wide range of

ground targets.”

Also, Cohen (1996), just like Sloan (2002), mentions the elimination of mass assaults by

mass armies, and the need for new armies to stop relying on large logistics infrastructures. He

also states that the ground forces are increasingly becoming smaller, more mobile and with

greater firepower; in particular, infantry formations being characterized by “very small units,

dispersion, and the extensive use of fire brought to bear from the air or rear areas” (Cohen,

1996).

Cohen (1996) also repeats Sloan’s (2002) assertion that the new armed forces need to

become less hierarchical with more authority being given to lower echelons; as well as the fact

that the new armed forces will require more skilled personnel with new types of skills, such as

electronic warfare experts.

Thus, we have seen that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a complicated concept,

which is frequently poorly defined. While a few a thinkers on the matter put considerable effort

into providing a rigorous definition of an RMA, most do not, and instead apparently assume

that the concept is self evident. The result is that they fail to distinguish between truly

revolutionary and merely evolutionary changes in military affairs. Thus, while many observers

believed that the exceptional performance of US Air Force in the Persian Gulf War signalled the

beginning of a new RMA, there are no reasons to believe that it is in fact so, or that an RMA is

currently taking place. However, most proponents of the idea that an RMA is currently

underway, seem to be talking about the same broad changes in military affairs that are

currently taking place. In fact, different thinkers on the matter who describe the attributes of

the alleged, current RMA, agree that it includes such things as precision-guided munitions; new

surveillance and communication technologies; joint force operations; smaller, more mobile,

more dispersed ground forces with greater, per unit, firepower; and a push towards less

hierarchical command structure and a more technically-skilled personnel.


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References

Bachler, D. R. (2001). “The Revolution in Military Affairs: Impact on the U.S. Army Personnel

System.” Master’s Thesis. University of Denver.

Cohen, E. A. (1996). “A Revolution in Warfare.” Foreign Affairs.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51841/eliot-a-cohen/a-revolution-in-warfare.

Cowan, T. (2007). “Theoretical, Legal and Ethical Impact of Robots on Warfare.”

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a469591.pdf

Galdi, T. W. (1995). “Revolution in Military Affairs? Competing Concepts, Organizational

Responses, Outstanding Issues.” http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/rma/crs95-

1170F.htm

Hundley, R. O. (1999). Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What can the history of

revolutions in military affairs tell us about transforming the U.S. military? Washington:

RAND.

Macgregor, D. A. (1997). Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st

Century. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

Metz, S., and Kievit, J. (1995) “Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to

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Documents

Changes in Military Affairs: Revolution or Evolution?