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Background
On 15 November 2008 the G20, previously an informal forum of finance ministers and central
bank governors from economically significant countries, met for the first time at the level of
heads of state and government in Washington in the midst of the worst financial crisis since
the Great Depression of the 1930s. At their subsequent summits in London (April 2009) and
Pittsburgh (September 2009) the G20 were able to agree on jointly initiating measures to calm
down international financial markets that helped to contain the financial crisis, implementing
large domestic fiscal stimulus packages and setting in place a process for mutual assessment
of member countries’ economic policies.
Ten years on, and 12 summits later, the G20 will meet at the end of 2018 for their annual
summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In contrast to its early years, the G20 today is not dealing
with another financial crisis which threatens a global recession, but with underlying economic
problems and a set of political crises on various levels. These crises range from the threat of
dangerous climate change, civil wars in a number of developing countries that contribute to
high refugee flows, to European disintegration in the wake of Brexit, and threats of trade
protectionism. Furthermore, a fundamental unease with economic globalisation and
international cooperation can be observed in some major G20 countries which is fueled by
increasing socio‐economic inequalities. As a result, the G20 has been facing two threats to its
core mandate of preserving financial stability and macroeconomic coordination: First, in the
absence of a global crisis, it has become ever more difficult to reach consensus on fundamental
issues such as preventing trade protectionism or while outside the negotiation room the G20
is facing a popular backlash that is questioning its reason for existence, making it harder for
governments to support international cooperation.
At the same time, the G20 has evolved in terms of the depth of the underlying process, the
breadth of topics that are on the agenda and the number of stakeholders that are involved in
the process since 2008. The G20’s agenda has been growing over the years beyond core
economic issues such as financial stability and economic growth to incorporate issues such as
sustainable development, climate change, digitalization, women’s empowerment and
migration. This broadening of the agenda has led to the establishment of new working groups,
study groups and task forces. Ministerial meetings have become a constant feature on the
annual G20 calendar. As a result, expectations towards the club have shifted from economic
crisis management to the role of a facilitator for structural change on the global and domestic
level. The number of G20 stakeholders has been growing. Also, rather than emphasizing
exclusivity of the club, inclusivity (or outreach) is deemed relevant for legitimacy and it has
become a tradition for the annual presidencies to invite additional countries as guests. Various
international organisations, that are asked to produce analytical input for the G20 and to
implement G20 decisions, also demand a seat at the negotiation table. Outside the
negotiation room, a number of so called engagement groups have formed representing
business, labour, non‐governmental organisations, women and think tanks.
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As the G20 has evolved into an increasingly wide‐ranging club governance structure, critics
have raised numerous concerns. One concern relates to the effectiveness of the G20. In the
early years it was been praised by many for its adoption of timely and effective
measures in the years 2008 and 2009 that helped to cope with the global financial crisis. Since
then, critics argue, the G20 has not been able to deliver outcomes that help to tackle other
global challenges. Initial hopes that the G20 would help to overcome gridlock in the United
Nations by catalyzing consensus‐finding in a smaller, supposedly more efficient, setting proved
wrong. Others argue that the G20, as a self‐selected club of economically powerful countries,
lacks the legitimacy and broad‐based support among non‐G20 governments and civil‐societies
to act as the “premier forum for international economic cooperation”. Some fear that the G20
would undermine existing multilateral organisations such as the UN, International Monetary
Fund and World Bank. Both the peaceful and violent protests against the G20 Hamburg
Summit in July 2017 can be interpreted as a proof for the lack of legitimacy.
Against this background, we invite the submission of abstracts for papers that could, for
example, address topics and questions such as:
- What are the features of effective inter‐ or transnational club governance and how
does the G20 (or its sub‐groupings) score with regard to these factors of success?
- Have the G20’s attempts at outreach to a broader set of countries, groups and
interests increased its legitimacy as a forum for economic cooperation?
- Has the G20’s increasing agenda made it more or less effective? Does the experience
of the G20 suggest certain areas of international policy that are more or less receptive
to a ‘club’ format?
- How has the increased prominence of the G20 and other ‘clubs’ such as G7, BRICS or
MIKTA affect more formal international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, UN,
OECD and others, and what impact has it had on multilateral initiatives such as the
Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, the Paris Climate Agreement, or the OECD
BEPS project?
- How do engagement groups such as B20, L20, C20, W20 or T20 – including the
T20Africa Standing Group – interact with the G20? What is their impact on the G20
process?
- What is the role for other club governance formats such as G7, BRICS and MIKTA? How do
they interact with the G20? Do they suffer from the same obstacles facing the G20,
despite their smaller membership?
- Has the G20 and its increasingly wide‐ranging network of formal and informal meetings of
government officials led to the emergence of a culture of cooperation among
advanced and emerging countries? How does this vary across sectors and engagement
groups? Are there lessons for some sectors from others?
Against a challenging global context this conference will draw on novel empirical research to
inform policy discussions about the future agendas, policies and institutional structures of club
governance formats such as the G20, G7, BRICS or MIKTA. The conference aims at bringing
together researchers representing different regions of the world, disciplines and
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methodological approaches. The conference will combine academically focused panels with
keynotes and roundtable discussions involving high‐ranking policymakers and representatives
from business and civil society. The aim is to publish the results of the conference as an edited
volume or/and a special issue.
Application and Deadline for Submissions
Please submit your abstract (max. 400 words) to christa.ottersbach@die‐gdi.de no
later than 30 June 2018 . We expect full draft papers (max. 10.000 words) on 28
September 2018.
Contact
If you have any questions, please contact Axel Berger, Senior Researcher and Head of G20
Policy Research Group, DIE (axel.berger@die‐gdi.de), Sven Grimm, Co‐Chair of Programme on
Inter‐ and Transnational Cooperation, DIE (sven.grimm@die‐gdi.de). For logistical information,
please contact sabine.middecke@die‐gdi.de.
Bonn, London, Shanghai, 17 May 2018 Axel Berger, DIE
Sven Grimm, DIE
Matthew Oxenford, Chatham House
Zhang Haibing, SIIS