CENTRAL ASIA STATE BUILDING IN THE FACE OF … countries were quick to demonstrate their support for the U.S.-led ... The largest ethno-linguistic groups are the Turkic-speaking peoples,

Central Asia • 199

Gregory Gleason is a Professor of Political Science and Public Administration atthe University of New Mexico and Faculty Associate at the Center for MiddleEastern Studies at the University of Chicago.

CENTRAL ASIA

STATE BUILDING IN THEFACE OF INSURGENT ISLAM

Gregory Gleason

ABSTRACTThe moderate Muslim states of Central Asia have a critical role to play inthe war on terrorism. Notwithstanding their importance, the establishmentof U.S. bases, expanded U.S. aid programs, and the conduct of OperationEnduring Freedom has not been sensitive to these countries’ politicalagendas. Lingering instability in Afghanistan poses crucial problems foreliminating terrorist networks in Central Asia, as well as confronting thenorthward flow of drugs. Following several years of close ties with theUnited States, Central Asian states have indicated a willingness to workamong themselves to solve regional problems, while at the same time re-orienting their strategic relationships toward Russia. U.S. policy shouldcontinue to support Central Asian states in their struggle against terror-ism, and increase emphasis on the vital importance of normalization of Af-ghanistan for Central Asian stability.

200 • Strategic Asia 2004–05

IntroductionThe five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—became independent following the collapseof the Soviet Union in 1991. The United States was among the first to rec-ognize the sovereignty of these new states, and began providing foreignaid, mainly humanitarian and economic assistance. Gradually it expandedprograms of military and security cooperation as well. Much of the moti-vation for U.S. security assistance centered on the problems of Afghani-stan and threats to international security in the South Asian region.

With the September 11 terrorist attacks, U.S. assistance to the CentralAsia region accelerated rapidly, and was warmly welcomed. The CentralAsian countries were quick to demonstrate their support for the U.S.-ledcoalition that launched Operation Enduring Freedom to liberate Afghani-stan from the Taliban. Pledging to set high standards for themselves andto work against extremism in governance while promoting civil rights andeconomic openness, the Central Asian states entered into a coalition ofthe committed in the war on terrorism.

Nearly three years after the start of the war on terrorism, this coalitionhas begun to show signs of stress. In many respects the Central Asianstates have fulfilled their commitments in the struggle against political ex-tremism and terrorism. They have been stalwart allies in opposing terroristmovements, made their airspace available for Afghanistan-related militaryoperations, and two Central Asian countries—Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan—have made their territory available for military bases for these operations.The Central Asian countries have collaborated in key international secu-rity initiatives such as NATO’s Partners for Peace program, they have beenwilling to share information, and they have generally worked cooperativelyagainst the common threat of terrorism. But the Central Asian countrieshave also interpreted many of their commitments in ways that differ fromWashington. The Central Asian countries, particularly Uzbekistan andTurkmenistan, have adopted expansive definitions of terrorism that oftencover other political opponents as well. Uzbekistan’s energetic anti-terror-ism campaign prompted international criticism and pressure. The EuropeanBank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) concluded in April 2004that Uzbekistan had failed to make sufficient progress toward democraticideals, and discontinued certain forms of lending. The U.S. State Depart-ment announced in July 2004 that it could not certify Uzbekistan’s compli-ance with human rights standards and also discontinued certain forms ofassistance.1 The Central Asian governments have reacted diffidently to U.S.criticism of their poor record in human rights and political liberalization,often to the point of accusing Western countries of excessive zeal in de-


fending human rights.2 More recently, the Central Asian states have be-gun to reappraise their international relationships in ways that suggest theirwillingness to seek new solutions to their regional security problems.

The participation of the moderate Muslim countries of Central Asia inthe anti-terrorism alliance is important. To defeat terrorism, the United Statesmust succeed in its military operations. But victory on the battlefield isnot enough. The political doctrines that stand behind the terrorists mustbe overcome if the war on terrorism is to succeed. As moderate Muslimsocieties, these Central Asian countries offer the Muslim world a moderatealternative to Muslim extremism.

This chapter analyzes the role of the Central Asian states in the waron terrorism, both in terms of how the countries are influencing the warand the effects of the war on the countries themselves. Beginning with asurvey of Central Asia prior to the events of September 2001, it asks whatthe U.S. interest in the region was prior to the beginning of OperationEnduring Freedom. The next section assesses the status of the war onterrorism within Central Asia. It describes the insurgency in Central Asia,the counter-insurgency efforts mounted by the Central Asian states, andthe political agendas of the terrorists. The chapter concludes with a con-sideration of the future challenges in the struggle against terrorism, em-phasizing three key challenges facing policymakers: normalization in Af-ghanistan, maintaining the momentum of the moderate Muslim countriesin their struggle to combat terrorism, and devising more innovative attemptsto promote regional security cooperation in Asia.

On balance, U.S. policy generally has been insensitive to the complex-ity of the countries’ agendas in cooperation in the war on terrorism. Thishas led to misperceptions and unrealistic expectations on the part of allparties. U.S. policymakers should not assume that other countries accu-rately interpret U.S. actions. The discussion of Georgia’s “Rose Revolu-tion” that took place in Russian-language publications within Central Asiaportrayed the United States as responsible for engineering the succession.3

This interpretation of Georgian events, as a leading U.S. policymaker ac-knowledged, had “huge reverberations” throughout Central Asia and isone example of how U.S. actions can be misconstrued.4

U.S. policy has also underestimated the role of Russia in the region.Russia has a positive role to play, and a well-designed policy should takethis into account. More important, Russia has resources that enable it toplay a spoiler in a way inimical to U.S. interests.

Finally, U.S. policy in Central Asia continues to underestimate howcritically important normalization in Afghanistan is for economic and po-litical development in the Central Asian states. Access to world markets is


the path to development in Central Asia. It is more than a decade since theIron Curtain has been drawn open for the Central Asian states, but theyare still hemmed into the old Soviet space by lack of infrastructure and bydisorder in Afghanistan. Pacification in Afghanistan will do far more to helpthe Central Asian states that any other form of assistance.

Central Asia Before the War on TerrorismKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan wereconceived during the Soviet period. None of these “republics” existed asindependent states prior to that time. These “socialist republics” were re-gions managed by Moscow’s political authorities. Little republic-to-repub-lic interaction took place, and the region was physically separated fromthe rest of the world by nearly impassible southern and eastern Soviet fron-tiers and by decades of northward-oriented infrastructure development.

Central Asia is linguistically and culturally diverse. The largest ethno-linguistic groups are the Turkic-speaking peoples, the Karakalpak, Kazakh,Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Uighur, and Turkmen. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan also havea large population of Farsi-speaking Tajik. Russian-speaking Slavs alsocomprise a significant population in the region. There are politically chargedseparatist and irredentist demands in the region, particularly the Uighurpopulation centered in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China.There is determined effort at national consolidation in each of the coun-tries, but there is still little correspondence between ethnographic andpolitical boundaries. There are many other ethno-linguistic groups in Cen-tral Asia, including Iranians, Kurds, Chinese, and Koreans. Often the na-tional or ethnic identity appears to be less important than clan, tribal, re-gional, or even village association.

When the Soviet Union came apart in December 1991, the collapsewas celebrated less in the Central Asian countries than in Moscow. A popu-lar referendum conducted in all the republics in March 1991 had expressedstrong support for maintaining the Soviet Union. While there were nation-alist stirrings in Central Asia during the latter years of the Soviet Union,these were hardly political independence movements or anything that re-sembled the determined nationalism of the Baltic countries. Initially, politi-cal development was oriented toward liberalization and modernization. Eachof the republics’ communist party leaders—quickly donning robes of na-tionalist protectors of the interests of the newly independent states—spokeout in favor of the establishment of secular, democratic, independent gov-ernments, market economic relations, and foreign relations recognizing in-ternational standards. Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbaev was the mostforthright of the leaders in this regard, explaining to his colleagues and


fellow citizens that the rejection of communism and the adoption of inter-national standards was “merely common sense.”5

The countries became members of major multilateral international or-ganizations, joining the United Nations, World Bank, and InternationalMonetary Fund in 1992. All five nations joined the European Bank for Re-construction and Development in 1992, and all but Turkmenistan joinedthe Asian Development Bank. The countries engaged in the process ofaccession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).6 Kazakhstan andKyrgyzstan made progress toward adopting international standards of goodgovernance, including tax laws and civil codes that were considered to beamong the best of the post-communist world. Uzbekistan, despite a con-tinuing inability to liberalize prices and adjust its currency to internationalpractice, strove energetically to develop a commercially-oriented welfarestate. Tajikistan, torn by war and internal divisions, moved in the directionof national reconciliation following a series of ceasefire agreements withthe opposition and then, in June 1997, the signing of a peace accord anda pact for national reconciliation. Even Turkmenistan, the least successfulin making the transition to an open, modern society, made some headwayin attempting to harmonize its laws with international practice.

While important elements of economic and structural reform were putin place, true democratic reform proved elusive for the countries. Today“presidents” govern all the states of Central Asia,7 and each country holdsregularly scheduled elections. However, none of the governments have sat-isfied international standards for free and fair elections, nor do any havean independent judiciary or a functioning legislature with true powers ofthe purse. Even in the most open and liberal of the countries—Kazakhstanand Kyrgyzstan—the parliaments have been routed by presidential decree.

Central Asian states were not similar in their paths of political andeconomic backsliding. The Uzbekistan government, under the leadershipof former party chief Islam Karimov, adopted a populist authoritarianism.Announcing the goal of establishing a market economy and democraticform of government, the Karimov regime went on to adopt paternalist so-cial policies, protectionist economic policies, and rigid, authoritarian politi-cal policies. The government pursued foreign economic policies thatstressed a gradual, step-by-step approach to the adoption of macroeco-nomic reform and market-oriented structural reforms. A political oppositiondid emerge, but the leading faction of beneficiaries of the old Soviet sys-tem used their established influence to quickly brush the opposition aside.The constitution adopted in December 1992 merely institutionalized theexisting power structures and political system. A decade after indepen-dence, politics is far from pluralistic or competitive in Uzbekistan.


Kazakhstan at independence set out on a reform-oriented course, with-drawing from the ruble zone, eliminating subsidies, liberalizing prices, andprivatizing most of the economy. It adopted a modern civil code, settingthe framework for commercial transactions and property rights, and estab-lishing a modern banking system, a securities exchange system, bankruptcylegislation, and a system of public utilities management.

The Russian default in 1998 had immediate consequences forKazakhstan, but despite pressure, the Nazarbaev government maintainedsupport for post-communist reform. At the critical juncture following theRussian financial collapse, when some Central Asian politicians were argu-ing for the adoption of a neo-mercantilist “Asian path,” Nazarbaev heldfirm to the reform programs, pledging “to continue the promising advancestoward an independent, open and free market economy.”8 Nevertheless,Nazarbaev came under criticism for monopolizing political power, not curb-ing corruption, and giving in to clanism and “Suhartoism.”9

Kyrgyzstan also adopted a liberalizing, pro-democratic posture at in-dependence. The country’s pro-reform leader, Askar Akaev, quickly estab-lished an impressive record of encouraging political and economic liberal-ization. In foreign trade liberalization, Kyrgyzstan’s early record of achieve-ment was unmatched. Kyrgyzstan was the first ex-Soviet republic to followthe advice of the international donor community and withdraw from theruble zone. It was also the first to adopt a Western-style civil code and amodern legal and regulatory framework, to liberalize prices, overhaul itsfinancial and banking system, privatize large industrial facilities, and adopta relatively open, competitive political system.10 In 1998 a constitutionalchange made Kyrgyzstan one of the first post-Soviet republics to sanc-tion private ownership of land. It was also the first post-Soviet country tojoin the WTO. Largely thanks to the efforts of Akaev, Kyrgyzstan’s pro-reform posture quickly made the country a favorite of the international do-nor community. But even with large levels of foreign aid, the promised ben-efits of rising prosperity remained elusive for the majority of the country’scitizens.11 Were it not for foreign aid, Kyrgyzstan’s domestic reform effortsmight not have been politically sustainable.

Tajikistan is the smallest and most constrained of the Central Asianstates, and after independence the country entered a downward spiral ofconflict and economic travail that has made it one of world’s poorest coun-tries.12 The country divided along regional lines in 1992, and Russia andUzbekistan intervened to support a coalition from the north and south ledby Imomali Rakhmonov. With Russian support Rakhmonov managed to re-tain power in the capital throughout a period of tense standoff with theopposition that controlled outlying regions of the country. The standoff


was resolved in a UN-engineered peace settlement in June 1997. In thatagreement, the government reached an accommodation with key opposi-tion leaders, signed a peace accord, and established a process of nationalreconciliation. The civil war compressed an already collapsing economy,which is today based primarily on subsistence agriculture, foreign assis-tance from donor organizations, barter relations with neighbors, and thecommercial export of a few commodities. As much as 80 percent ofTajikistan’s foreign exchange earnings result from sales of three commodi-ties: aluminum, cotton, and illegal drugs.

Russian troops have remained in Tajikistan since helping Rakhmonovgain power. Under a 1993 agreement, a Russian-controlled force (the Rus-sian 201st Motorized Division) polices Tajikistan’s 1,350 km border withAfghanistan. While the 201st was originally made up primarily of Russians,over the years the number of Russians has declined to the point where thebulk of the soldiers, probably 80 percent, are Tajik citizens. The Tajikistangovernment has been pressuring for a re-negotiation of the arrangement.The current plan is for control of the border to be handed over fully to theTajikistan government by May 2005.

Turkmenistan was one of the most underdeveloped regions of theSoviet Union. But with an estimated 71 trillion cubic feet in natural gasreserves, Turkmenistan is the second largest natural gas producer in theformer Soviet Union and the tenth largest in the world.13 The country’sgas revenue provided the basis not for broad-based prosperity but ratherfor an intense, highly personalistic nationalism revolving around thecountry’s Soviet-era communist boss, Sapuramat Niyazov. Niyazov adoptedan assertive posture of national self-reliance based on its gas and oil wealth,which he termed Turkmenistan’s “positive neutrality.” Despite this, muchof Turkmenistan’s population (48 percent by World Bank estimates) is liv-ing below the poverty level.14 The international development communityhas not been satisfied with Turkmenistan’s progress toward the adoptionof democratic norms of policy and practice. In April 2000 the EBRD took

Table 1. Population and Labor Force Distribution (m), 2001 Kazak. Kyrgyz. Tajik. Turk. Uzbek.Total Population 14.854 4.950 6.310 5.504 25.060Labor Force 7.400 1.926 1.872 2.179 12.718Employed 6.710 1.774 1.829 1.947 9.136Agriculture/Forestry 2.380 0.944 1.218 0.943 3.062Industry 0.820 0.182 0.162 0.262 1.160Other sectors 3.510 0.648 0.500 0.742 4.914Source: Compiled from Key Indicators 2003: Education for Global Participation, Manila: AsianDevelopment Bank, 2003.


the unprecedented step of suspending its public-sector lending programsto Turkmenistan on the basis of the government’s unwillingness to imple-ment agreed upon structural reforms.15

Changing U.S. Interests in Central AsiaSoviet Central Asia had long been of interest to U.S. foreign policy plan-ners because of the geo-political relations between the Soviet Union andits southern neighbors. From a strategic point of view, America’s interestin the region grew less significant after the Cold War. The United Statesopened embassies in each of the new capitals, but their roles were limited,primarily oriented toward routine consular affairs and overseeing humani-tarian assistance and other aid. The purpose of foreign aid “freedom sup-port” was to help in the post-communist transition and provide a mecha-nism for Washington to remain “engaged” in some minimal way.16 Soonafter independence, Kazakhstan returned its stockpile of Soviet-era strate-gic nuclear weapons to Russia and destroyed many of its military facili-ties. In the other Central Asian states many military facilities fell out of useand into disrepair. U.S. economic ties with Central Asia did not play a majorrole, nor, with the exception of the energy sectors in Kazakhstan andTurkmenistan, were they expected to play an important role in the future.

U.S. assistance policy was Russo-centric in the early post-communistperiod, guided by two apprehensions. First, there was a fear of communistrecidivism in the early period of transition. The Russian transition was centerstage; what happened in Central Asia was less significant. If the Russiantransition failed, the fate of democracy in the Central Asian countries wouldprobably be sealed anyway. The fear of Russian recidivism soon provedunfounded. Second, there was an apprehension that Russia would reas-sert control over the “near-abroad” former republics. U.S. policymakersroutinely underscored their support for independence and sovereignty,meaning the right of the newly independent states to live without fear ofRussian domination. As the years passed and neither communist recidi-vism nor Russian domination led to confrontations in Central Asia,Washington’s focus on the region waned.17

The September 11 attacks transformed U.S. policy toward Central Asiavirtually overnight. The United States requested and received offers to usea logistical base in southern Uzbekistan (dubbed “K2”) near the Afghani-stan border at a former Soviet-era air base near Karshi, at Khanabad. TheUnited States was also offered a base located at the Manas InternationalAirport near Bishkek.18 According to official figures, Ganci Air Base has“about 1,500” soldiers, but the figure is much higher than that as troopstransit in and out of Afghanistan.


The United States invited Kazakhstan’s Nazarbaev, Uzbekistan’sKarimov, and Tajikistan’s Rakhmonov to the White House. Kazakhstan con-cluded a “new” strategic partnership with the United States, having previ-ously concluded one in 1997.19 While the Central Asian countries facedvery different development and foreign policy challenges, they were unitedin supporting U.S. resolve to fight terrorism and address what they viewedas the legacy of Afghanistan.

Legacies of AfghanistanFrom the point of view of the Central Asian states, the war on terrorism isa guerrilla struggle against insurgents. This struggle has its origins inAfghanistan. Following the overthrow of King Zahir Shah of Afghanistanin 1973 and six years of political instability, the Soviet government forciblyintervened in 1979 to create an Afghan government loyal to Moscow. Fac-ing mounting costs, however, and unable to cultivate a stable, pro-Mos-cow government, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops in 1989. Afghani-stan quickly collapsed into civil war and regained only partial unity whenthe Taliban rose to power in the mid-1990s.

Opposition to the Taliban remained active, however, particularly in thenorthern and eastern part of the country. Commander Abdul RashidDostam’s “National Islamic Movement,” consisting heavily of ethnicUzbeks, controlled several north-central provinces. After the September 11attacks, these Northern Alliance leaders were able for the first time to se-cure U.S. military assistance—in addition to previous Russian, Iranian, andIndian support—aid that in conjunction with Operation Enduring Free-dom would lead to the final demise of the Taliban leadership in Kabul.

The years of Taliban rule have had a major impact on Central Asianaffairs. Fear of Taliban’s extremist doctrines was one of the key factors inresolving the Tajikistan civil war in 1997. The Taliban’s provision of sanc-tuary for Uzbek insurgents helped to forge a consensus for regional coop-eration among the Central Asian powers. And the Taliban made partnersof Russia and the United States—the joint sponsors of UN Resolutions1267 and 1333, which demanded the elimination of opium production andthe extradition of Osama bin Laden.

Armed with the support of their Taliban patrons, the Uzbek insurgentswho had been training in Afghanistan began returning to Central Asia withthe intention of overthrowing the Uzbekistan government. The return ofthe Uzbek insurgents followed a period of extreme tension betweenTajikistan and Uzbekistan. In the fall of 1998 a former commander in theTajikistan civil war attempted to take control of the city of Hujand in north-ern Tajikistan. The coup was crushed but gave rise to acrimonious claims


that Uzbekistan officials had supplied the Hujand mutiny. In the context ofthis animosity between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, rebels returning fromAfghanistan gathered in Tajikistan and planned a take-over of the Uzbekgovernment. Calling themselves the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU),insurgents exploded a series of bombs in downtown Tashkent in February1999, killing sixteen. If the government’s account of the events is accurate,a bomb narrowly missed claiming the life of President Karimov.

In the summer of 1999 IMU chief Juma Namangani led a brigade ofinsurgents from Tajikistan into staging areas in Kyrgyzstan in preparationfor a major assault on Uzbekistan’s Fergana Valley.20 As they moved downthrough the Altaisky mountain range into the ill-defined border areas ofKyrgyzstan, the rebels captured a number of Kyrgyz villages, taking vil-lagers hostage and, inadvertently, a group of four Japanese traveling ge-ologists who were in the area at the time. The seizure of foreign hostagesquickly escalated into an international incident, focusing the attention ofmajor world governments on the potential for instability in the region.Following a tensely negotiated bargain, the hostages were released, therebels reportedly received a ransom, and Tajikistan government troopsreportedly gave the insurgents safe passage through Tajikistan to Afghani-stan. The following summer, in August 2000, IMU insurgents again returnedthrough Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, advancing to within 100 km of Tashkentwhere they were repulsed. Months later reports circulated that the insur-gents had established a staging area in a remote region of centralTajikistan.21 The Tajikistan government denied the reports, but the tone ofthe denials gave credence to the idea that members of the former UnitedTajikistan Opposition who remained sympathetic to the rebels’ goals weresecretly aiding the rebels. Throughout the spring of 2001 Central Asiangovernments were anxiously developing plans for a coordinated interstateprogram to repulse new terrorist attacks. Many of these terrorists wereoriginally from Central Asia and returned after receiving training in Afghani-stan. They had common cause with other opposition members and formedcoalitions against the secular governments of Central Asia.

The War on Terrorism and Battles with the OppositionThe travail in Afghanistan produced the seeds and provided fertile groundfor the development of terrorist and extremist opponents. In Central Asia,the IMU insurgents and other extremist groups, however, have had onlylimited effect. They have not formed coalitions with any legitimate politicalopposition, but the likelihood of such coalitions grows as the political op-position finds that other avenues beside extremism are not available, andthat any legitimate political opposition is likely to be labeled extremism.


The essence of the political confrontation between the state and itsopponents in Central Asia is that the institutions of government in thefirst decade of independence were manipulated to eliminate competitionwithin the political system. Consequently, although institutions of democ-racy and market capitalism economics were adopted in all the Central Asiancountries, they were undercut by easily monopolized informal arrangements.If there was a missed opportunity in the early post-communist stage oftransition, it was that no pluralism of interests emerged to insist upon fairrules of competition over the management of public processes.

Because no real pluralism of interests emerged in any of the CentralAsian countries during the early period of transition, the government andthe state have become almost indistinguishable. There is little politicalspace in which a loyal opposition can function. Any challenge to the gov-ernment is interpreted as a challenge to the state. All proponents of change,from reformists urging incremental reorientation of administrative practicesto violent extremists urging destruction of the society, are grouped togetherin the category of opposition.

Major political opposition in all of the Central Asian countries may beplaced in two categories: the reformist opposition and the insurgent oppo-sition. The distinguishing feature of the reformist opposition is that it ad-vocates the removal of the present leadership but maintains, in broad mea-sure, the framework of secular government in the region. The reformist op-position seeks to reassign functions and establish new beneficiaries of thepolitical process, but to undertake this in the context of a reformed CentralAsia within the framework of the existing state structures.22

The reformist opposition lacks a competing doctrine of governmentand a unified ideational or informational base. Such movements are notunited along religious or ethnic lines. Sporadic efforts of individual reformistopposition leaders have not succeeded nor have they garnered wide-spreadpublic support or sympathy. The reformist opposition is basically self-in-terested and opportunistic. The reformist opposition is the more resource-ful form of opposition, and is the most likely to spearhead a change in

Table 2. U.S. Budgeted Assistance, 2003 ($m) Kazak. Kyrgyz. Tajik. Turk. Uzbek.

Democracy Programs 13.9 13.5 7.3 4.7 14.7Economic/Social Reform 23.4 19.9 14.3 2.4 18.2Security/Law Enforcement 49.2 10.3 1.1 1.4 30.2Humanitarian Assistance 0.5 9.1 21.8 0.5 18.5Cross Sectoral Initiatives 5.0 3.8 4.5 2.1 4.5Total Assistance 92 56.6 49 11.1 86.1Source: Compiled from State Department Country Background Notes, 2004.


government leadership in Central Asia. Moreover, should a traumatic do-mestic event (such as the death of a leader) or an external event (such asa national security crisis) precipitate a struggle over political succession,the reformist opposition stands a good chance of capturing power in anyone of the Central Asian countries.

On the other hand, the insurgent opposition favors a transformationof Central Asian society and perhaps even the abandonment of nationalsovereignty in favor of some supranational movement. The reformist op-position consists of a wide variety of groups and movements united bythe desire to replace the present government structures of Central Asiaand fueled by a drive to displace the particular political leadership. TheCentral Asian insurgent opposition advocates rebellion and revolution.

Tajikistan’s political opposition was shaped by its recent civil war.Tajikistan was the conduit for an insurgency during the early period ofindependence and, given Tajikistan’s geographic, linguistic, cultural, andcommercial linkages with northern Afghanistan, is destined to remain onthe frontline of the war on terrorism. Long before independence, Tajikistanwas fragmented along regional lines. During the Soviet period, remote re-gions of the country were united in presenting a single face to Moscowand the outside world, but inwardly the country had many conflicting per-sonalities. Independence simply made it possible for these conflicts toemerge. In August 1991 a pro-Russian former communist party chief,Rakhmon Nabiev, took over power in the capital before he lost control tocrowds in the street and resigned at gunpoint in September 1992. Escalat-ing tensions culminated in clashes between armed groups in the streets,and the Islamic Revival Party (IRP) seized control of the government.

With help from Moscow and Tashkent, a coalition of northern andsouthern politicians sponsored an uprising to retake the capital in October1992. The IRP forces retreated into the hills. The intense fight over thecapital was followed by sporadic gunfights in the rural areas that by early1993 resulted in a tense standoff. The former communist party official andpro-Russian leader, Imomali Rakhmonov, was established as provisionalhead of the government. Military commanders divided the regions amongthemselves. The opposition groups eventually gained the name “UTO,”the United Tajikistan Opposition. They were scattered in the mountainareas to the north and north-east of the capital. The government was wellensconced in the capital but had little control over the outlying areas ex-cept by virtue of compromises with the military commanders.23 The June1997 peace agreement brought the Tajikistan government and the UTO tothe bargaining table. They signed a peace accord, and the opposition isnow an active part of the political process in Tajikistan.24


Uzbekistan’s political opposition has been gradually harassed, neu-tralized, or eliminated. No real competition of power exists, and there areno genuine competing political parties or alternative agenda. The IMU’srevolutionaries claimed from the beginning that their goal was to sweepaway the Karimov government which they regard as an illegitimate rem-nant of the Soviet-era, and establish in its place an Islamic caliphate unit-ing the Muslim faithful throughout Central Asia. The bulk of the IMU fight-ing force probably was drawn into the defense of the Taliban after Sep-tember 2001. Many are said to have perished there in late 2001.

While the more violent opposition seems to have been neutralized byimprisonment or by death in Afghanistan, a broader, more popularly sup-ported insurgent political opposition, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), continues to gaininfluence in Central Asia. HT does not openly counsel armed insurrectionbut does favor revolutionary political change. As such, it was identified in1995 by the Uzbekistan government as a threat to the stability of the state.Beginning in 1996 the Uzbekistan government began carrying out exten-sive campaigns against the movement’s “wahhabis” or political extremists.The Uzbekistan government argued that Hizb-ut-Tahrir had links to the Pal-estinian Hamas, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, and other Islamist extrem-ists. The Uzbekistan government began a series of campaigns to isolateand neutralize all ideological opponents, branding them as criminals andpolitical fanatics. In the view of many human rights organizations, thegovernment’s counter-insurgency campaign cast a wide net, ensnaring le-gitimate and illegitimate opponents alike. International human rights orga-nizations have reported numerous cases of violations of human rights andcivil law at the hands of Uzbekistan law enforcement authorities.

There is a very real threat of political extremism in Uzbekistan, andPresident Karimov has long been an advocate of counter-terrorist action,warning of the contagion effect of disorder in Afghanistan. Counter-ter-rorist activities began in the Fergana Valley as early as 1994. In November1999 Uzbekistan had already begun placing land mines along its bordersin the valley to prevent incursions from Tajikistan through Kyrgyz terri-tory. In the summer of 2000 Uzbekistan reportedly extended the mine fieldsto include the border with Tajikistan. Uzbekistan established a cordonsanitaire with Afghanistan, to the point that the entire 130-mile stretch ofborder was reinforced with barbed wire and electric fences.25

Turkmenistan President Niyazov often claims publicly that there is nopolitical opposition in Turkmenistan. He may mean to suggest his regimeenjoys broad popular appeal, but he may also mean that the oppositionleaders have been eliminated. If the past is any indication of the future,political opposition will most likely arise from within the government it-


self. In March 2002 Niyazov fired the head of the Turkmenistan secret policeon charges of corruption. Subsequently more than 100 senior members ofthe country’s security agency were imprisoned. In September 2002 anotherwave of scandals swept through the country as President Niyazov an-nounced that the new security head too would be removed.

Then, in November 2002, events in Turkmenistan took a truly bizarreturn. The state media announced that an assassination attempt on thepresident on November 25 had been foiled and that former Minister ofForeign Affairs Boris Shikhmuradov had confessed to masterminding thecoup attempt. Although official accounts are contradictory, theTurkmenistan government has claimed that four former government minis-ters organized an armed attack on the president. A government spokesper-son later claimed that Shikhmuradov directed the assassination attempt withthe help of the Uzbek ambassador to Turkmenistan, Abdurashid Kadyrov.On December 25 President Niyazov announced that Shikhmuradov had beencaptured. Four days later national television aired footage of Shikhmuradovconfessing to the assassination attempt.26 In the aftermath of these events,Turkmenistan authorities detained hundreds of relatives of those implicatedin the plot, some of whom were physically abused and denied access tomedical treatment. They also lost their jobs, were dismissed from universi-ties, and were evicted from their homes.27

Kyrgyzstan has a lively political debate, but each time the politicalopposition appears to be entering into competition, the situation suddenlychanges and the opposition is disgraced, discredited, jailed, or otherwiseeliminated. The practice of neutralizing the opposition began with the dis-banding of parliament by the Kyrgyzstan President in October 1994 to avoida vote of no-confidence and the initiation of judicial proceedings againsta leading political opposition figure, Felix Kulov. The U.S. Department ofState observed on January 24, 2001, that the seven-year sentence handedKulov by the closed military court “contravenes international standardsof human rights” and has the appearance of being politically motivated.28

Kazakhstan’s political opposition is dominated by palace intrigue andinsider contests for power rather than insurgency movements. One exampleof an opposition figure is Akezhan Kazhegeldin, who served as prime min-ister from October 1994 until October 1997 and was removed from officeamid charges of corruption. Kazhegeldin then tried to run against Nazarbaevin the 1999 presidential elections, but political maneuvering excluded himfrom the ticket. He then went into exile, taking up an active campaign againstthe Kazakhstan government. Shortly afterward, the Kazakhstan prosecu-tor-general reopened a tax evasion and money laundering investigationagainst him. But the trail of malfeasance opened up by this investigation


indirectly led back to Kazakhstan officials and, eventually, to a U.S. Jus-tice Department case being filed against a U.S. businessman, James Giffen.Giffen was charged with violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Actinvolving kickbacks to high Kazakhstan government officials.

Another example is that of Rakhat Aliev, husband to PresidentNazarbaev’s daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva. Aliev served for a period as headof the Almaty tax police, establishing himself as an anti-corruption cam-paigner by combating sugar and vodka scalpers. His efforts at getting tothe bottom of these activities were so successful that he ended up per-sonally controlling the trade in these commodities. Aliev then gained areputation for managing to take control of the Pavlodar Oil Refinery afterforcing out foreign investors. Aliev eventually came into competition withanother powerful Kazakhstan businessman, Timur Kulibaev, also son-in-law to the president. Kazakhstan internal politics is dominated by thesekinds of family intrigues, which are certain to have implications for suc-cession when the president steps down as he has announced he will do in2013. But there is no significant insurgent activity in Kazakhstan.

Does the relationship between domestic opposition and insurgencyin the various countries of Central Asia have implications for the durabil-ity of these countries’ war on terrorism? The relationship between legiti-mate political opposition and insurgency is at best a marriage of conve-nience. The groups are disparate and have radically different agendas inthe different countries. They are united rhetorically by the goals of raisingdomestic standards of living, reducing what is seen as foreign exploita-tion, and developing more accountable and natural forms of government.But beyond this, the agendas of the insurgents and the reformists are verydifferent. The Central Asian states are engaged in their own strugglesagainst political opposition and terrorism, which sometimes overlap withU.S. objectives and goals but are not always conjoined. U.S. policy hasgenerally been insensitive to the complexity of these countries’ agendasin their cooperation with the war on terrorism.

Russia, the United States, and the Logic of CoalitionReflecting over the past decade of independence, the most salient aspectof the relations among the former Soviet republics is their inability to co-operate with one another.29 Since independence, the Central Asian stateshave pursued policies that were uncoordinated and frequently conflicting.The countries promoted, signed, and adopted many regional cooperationagreements that were designed to lead to forms of “equitable and mutuallybeneficial cooperation.”30 But because the countries moved toward a mar-ket economy at different rates and relied upon different measures, market


competition and political animosity developed.31 The list of failed Eurasiancooperation attempts speaks volumes: the CIS itself, the CIS Collective Se-curity Treaty, the Central Asian Union, the Black Sea Forum, the Belarus-Russian Union, the Minsk Group, the Caucasus Four, the Caspian Five,the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, and the Shanghai Five.32

These failures are understandable; such cooperation agreements arerarely self-implementing and self-enforcing. They depend upon some glueto keep the parties cooperating. That glue usually comes in the form ofsome single power with the will to enforce cooperation, the goal to do itfairly, and the legitimacy to induce compliance without having to compelit. Russia was the natural candidate for this role. Although able to supplythe will, and perhaps able to do it fairly, Russia finally could not manage togather the legitimacy for this undertaking. Its efforts at promoting coop-eration in the region led to intimidation to gain control over oil and gasdevelopment; coercion and surreptitious support for coups and armedconflicts in Azerbaijan and Georgia; the invasion of Chechnya in 1994;wresting basing rights in Armenia, Georgia, and Turkmenistan; intransi-gence on the division of rights to Caspian littoral resources; blocking thetransport of Kazakhstan oil and gas exports; and retaliation against inde-pendent-minded Uzbekistan through establishing a permanent Russian mili-tary outpost in neighboring Tajikistan. These heavy-handed Russian at-tempts to regain control were usually unproductive and often counterpro-ductive, inclining Moscow’s south Eurasian partners to seek stratagemsof self-help and greater independence. Russia’s grand policy toward Cen-tral Asia and the Caucasus in the first years of independence graduallydevolved into numerous parallel but not always complementary bilateralforeign policies.33 Sometimes this enabled Russia to keep its neighborsdivided to its benefit; more often it simply meant that none of the coun-tries succeeded in even the most basic forms of infrastructure and com-mercial cooperation. Eventually dwindling intra-regional trade, the failureof international policy harmonization, and a growing concern with threatsof insurgency and lawlessness persuaded Moscow to acknowledge thatits approach to Central Asia was fragmented, ad hoc, and unsuccessful.34

By the time Boris Yeltsin stepped down as president of Russia, a con-sensus had already formed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that somenew approach toward Central Asia was necessary. President Vladimir Putin’spublic statement in late 1999 that Russia was, after all, a “Eurasian power”set the stage for a reexamination of Russia’s strategy toward Central Asia.The Russian National Security Strategy of January 2000 and the RussianForeign Policy Strategy of July 2000 formalized Russia’s reassessment.35

By the summer of 2000, Russian officials abruptly shifted their position on


proposals for greater cooperation with the Central Asian states. In Octo-ber 2000 presidents of five states gathered in Astana to sign the founda-tion documents creating a Eurasian Economic Community. The organiza-tion was formally brought into being in May 2001. The reassessment ofrelations with the United States following September 11 simply providedadditional momentum to efforts to improve relations with the Central Asiancountries. Putin saw the challenge of an increased U.S. presence in theregion as an invitation to use Russia’s comparative advantages rather thanto seek to contain U.S. influence. Putin raised no objections to U.S. over-flights in the Central Asian countries or the basing of troops at Khanabadand Ganci. He softened his position with respect to NATO enlargementand U.S. national missile defense systems. He also announced his inten-tion to close Russian facilities in Cuba and Vietnam. But Washington maybe confusing acquiescence with consent. At the same time Putin set outto develop more “proactive, hard-headed and effective Russian policy” inthe Central Asian region.36 In the past year in particular Russia has soughtout expansion of trade and energy and investment ties with the CentralAsian countries, signing major contracts for new deals in hydroelectric gen-eration, gas and oil exploration, and agricultural production. Russia is alsoCentral Asia’s top destination and source for both exports and imports.

Purpose and PrincipleThe Central Asian states share common interests with the United States,but they do not always share common interpretations of how to pursuethese interests. This raises the question of how much dissonance U.S.policymakers are prepared to accept. How can Washington accept actionsby partners that contravene fundamental principles of human rights? Willa cynicism take root that justifies the advocacy of larger strategic objec-tives via questionable means in the pursuit of unquestionable ends? Insupporting the Central Asian countries, is Washington facing “the choiceof defending non-democratic leaders for other policy purposes?”37

U.S. diplomats argue that the basic rationale of engagement with theCentral Asian governments, even when they fail to conform to the stan-dards expected of them, is to demonstrate how the observance of humanrights standards is in their interest.38 But critics argue that there is a moralhazard in helping countries that cannot demonstrate clear progress towardhigher standards of governance. As Charles William Maynes expressed it:“The governments of the [Central Asian] region are all authoritarian andincreasingly estranged from their own populations. Washington thus runsthe risk that it will be perceived as favoring these governments and anunsatisfactory status quo.”39


All of the countries of Central Asia have received low marks fromhuman rights monitoring organizations, but the greatest concern focuseson Uzbekistan. International human rights groups and others reportednumerous violations of human rights and Uzbek law at the hands of lawenforcement authorities. In November 2000 the U.S. House of Representa-tives expressed concern over human rights violations and the use of ter-rorism as a pretext for political repression. A UN report released in April2003 claimed the use of torture in Uzbekistan’s prisons was “institutional-ized, systematic, and rampant.” The Uzbekistan government initially reactedhostilely to the allegations, but eventually agreed to develop a plan foraddressing abuse in its prisons. The Uzbekistan government also beganallowing the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit prisons andother detention facilities.

Human rights groups, dissatisfied with the Uzbekistan government re-sponse, appealed to international organizations to demand improvementin the Uzbekistan government’s human rights practices as a condition ofinternational development assistance. The European Bank for Reconstruc-tion and Development, one of the major international financial institutionsproviding assistance to the former communist countries, responded by ini-tiating a review of Uzbekistan’s progress toward democracy. The EBRDconcluded that there had been very limited progress and that it was nolonger possible for the EBRD to conduct business as usual.40

The U.S. Department of State investigated Uzbekistan’s compliancewith commitments articulated in the 2002 Strategic Partnership agreementbetween Uzbekistan and the United States. According to the legislationfor various U.S. assistance programs, the Secretary of State is required tocertify compliance before certain assistance funds can be made available.41

A State Department finding on the progress of the Uzbekistan governmentwas expected in the early spring of 2004, but was postponed as the Secre-tary of State “studied the situation.”42 In July 2004 the State Departmentannounced that based on Uzbekistan’s overall record of reform, the coun-try cannot be certified as making “substantial and continuing progress inmeeting its commitments under the 2002 Strategic Partnership Framework,including respect for human rights, establishing a genuine multiparty sys-tem, and ensuring free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and theindependence of the media.” The State Department reiterated, however, that“This decision does not mean that either our interests in the region or ourdesire for continued cooperation with Uzbekistan [have] changed.”43

Critics of Uzbekistan’s counter-insurgency measures viewed some ofthese as counterproductive, adding to the potential for greater militancyand instability.44 Excessive government measures against terrorism, critics


argue, are likely to increase the “potential for civil unrest as driven by thetwin prongs of severe political repression and economic despair.”45 Othercritics assert that Uzbekistan’s campaigns against extremists may be a self-fulfilling prophecy as the Uzbekistan government makes “its own night-mares come true by identifying Islam with political dissidence, thereby chan-neling anti-government feeling into politicized Islam.”46

Concert of AsiaSome analysts argue that the key to security throughout the entire Asianregion would be a regional concert of powers along the lines of the classi-cal balance of power of 19th century Europe.47 Such a concert, as CharlesFairbanks and his collaborators have argued, would amount to a “systemof mutual tradeoffs emphasizing the common objective of a stable and openenvironment in which sovereignty and independence are respected by allpowers.”48 Such a regional concert would reflect the recognition amongthe states that “they all have more to lose by inter-state rivalry or compe-tition than they have to gain by any short-term political or economicachievements at the expense of their neighbors.”49

The Central Asian states have sought formulas that would draw themtogether in cooperative relationships with their neighbors, but these for-mulas have been less than successful. The post-September 11 situationmay be changing that. Confronted by the common threats of extremismand terrorism, the Central Asian countries have renewed their efforts tofind common solutions to region-wide problems. The avoidance of dangeris typically more unifying that the pursuit of common objectives. The com-mon dangers facing the Central Asian countries in recent years have givennew life to the urgency of regional cooperation. This has been reflected inthe gradual expansion of the mandates of the key regional security organi-zations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference onInteraction and Confidence Building Measures, and the CIS CollectiveSecurity Treaty Organization (CSTO).

At the same time, the Central Asian states have begun to rethink theirapproach to common security and economic cooperation. In the first in-stance this is reflected in a significant departure in their diplomacy towardRussia. Kazakhstan has remained closely allied with Russia throughout thepost-communist period. But the other Central Asian countries had distancedthemselves. After 2001 that trend reversed. Uzbekistan’s President Karimov,so long wary of inroads on Uzbekistan’s sovereignty by Russia, assumedan almost apologetic posture in favor of greater interaction with Russiaduring his state visit to Moscow in April 2004. Tajikistan PresidentRakhmonov’s policy statements also illustrate a tilt toward Moscow and,


by implication, away from Washington. At a meeting of the Central AsianCooperation Organization (CACO) in Astana in May 2004, Rakhmonov wel-comed the success of Operation Enduring Freedom in ousting the Talibanand demolishing Afghanistan’s terrorist training camps. But Rakhmonovcomplained that the job of normalization in the region was far from com-plete. Rakhmonov noted that the coalition had failed to capture Osama binLaden, failed to reverse the flow of opium from Afghanistan, and failed toensure against the spread of terrorism within the Central Asian region.50

During that meeting in a surprise announcement, the CACO heads of statewelcomed Russia as a permanent member of CACO. The significance ofRussia’s new seat at the Central Asian negotiating table is underscored bythe fact that CACO was originally created as an organization specificallyfor the purpose of reducing Russia’s role in the Central Asian region.

Russia’s renewed role in Central Asia is a bellwether event for U.S.diplomacy. It signals a new stage in the region’s strategic relationships. Itshould initiate a re-appraisal in policy circles of U.S. purposes and mecha-nisms in the region. In the new strategic situation, three challenges forU.S. policy stand out as significant: carrying out more effective coalition-building, demonstrating more flexibility with respect to alliance partners,and placing even greater emphasis on clearly articulating the principlesand purposes of U.S. foreign policy in the region.

The impetus for collective action against terrorism that emerged outof the events of September 11 has definitely been attenuated, but it hasnot been exhausted. The Central Asian states took a position that they feltwas potentially risky by putting themselves in close association with theUnited States. An initial surge in financial support from the Western worldnow shows signs of subsiding. In these circumstances, the first challengefacing U.S. policymakers is to renew America’s efforts toward promoting acoordinated policy throughout Eurasia against terrorism and extremism. U.S.policymakers should seek to encourage regionwide cooperation and shouldflatly reject any inclination to play the Central Asian countries off eachother for U.S. advantage.51 While there are policy differences among theCentral Asian countries that are significant, the Central Asian countrieshave endured previous divide-and-conquer tactics. There are deep rootsof cultural community that will come immediately to the fore under thesecircumstances. Any U.S. attempt to exploit these differences will provokeresentment and be counter-productive.

Another critical element in strengthening the anti-terrorist coalition inthe region is the role of Russia. An increased Russian profile in the regiondoes not necessarily represent a setback for U.S. policy. It should not beinterpreted in zero-sum terms. Russia’s unique historical role in the region


suggests that, while Russian policies may not be able to provide a stablefoundation for regional international security, they could easily inhibit ordiscourage other constructive initiatives. In other words, Russia’s poten-tial role as a “dealmaker” in the region is not definitive, but Russia’s po-tential role as a “spoiler” in the region is significant. U.S. policy should beoriented toward encouraging a constructive role for Russia in the region.Containment policies are likely to be counter-productive and should beavoided. It is important that the United States and Russia maintain com-mon purpose with the countries of Central Asia.

Another crucial element in developing effective coalitions in the Cen-tral Asian region is the normalization in Afghanistan. The U.S. emphasison the Iraqi front in the war on terrorism has diffused concentration fromthe crucial task of rebuilding Afghanistan. From the perspective of CentralAsian countries, continuing disorder in Afghanistan implies two closelyrelated threats: the spread of insurgency and the continued influence ofdrug-traffickers. News on both of these fronts is pessimistic. U.S. Con-gressman Doug Bereuter told the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in May2004 that the security situation in Afghanistan required urgent measuresor the NATO countries might confront the “real danger” of the failure ofNATO’s mission in Afghanistan.52 UN Counter-Narcotics Czar AntonioMaria Costa, during a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan in May 2004,reported that the Central Asian region must brace itself for a bumper cropof opium. In contrast to the past in which large quantities of raw, unproc-essed opium were being exported, in the current season roughly ninety-percent of the crop will be processed within Afghanistan into finished heroin.The heroin trade is likely to be more difficult for Central Asian countries tointerdict than the opium trade. In addition, the heroin trade is likely to bemuch more damaging in its social impact.

Moreover, the normalization of Afghanistan for Central Asia also hasbroader, long-term economic and political implications. No Concert of Asiawill be complete until the Central Asian countries can truly integrate withthe markets of South Asia. This is not only an economic goal, but a politi-cal necessity for the region. For Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to escape theconstraints of their conflicts over trade and transport routes, to rise abovethe disputes with one another over energy and water, and to develop themeans for integrating into world markets, an alternative route to foreignmarkets is not only economically important but politically crucial.

The only available access routes to world markets run to the south,primarily through Afghanistan. If Afghanistan reconstruction is success-ful, it will result in opening alternate southern paths to greater Asian mar-kets. It will reduce the leverage that Russia has throughout the region.


Russia, with its energy supplies and its goal for expending into East andSouth Asian markets, will benefit from greater trade and transport possi-bilities in the Central Asian region. Thus, the reconstruction of Central Asiadepends to a large extent upon the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

The second major challenge for U.S. policy in the region is to exercisemore flexibility with the alliance partners. This requires greater insight intothe dynamics of the region and the complex pressures of the struggleagainst extremism. Flexibility is called for because all of the Central Asianstates are on the verge of generational changes of power from the Soviet-era technical elite to the post-communist “nationalist” generation. No post-Soviet Central Asian state has witnessed a smooth transfer of politicalpower. Indeed, no post-Soviet Central Asian state except Tajikistan hasyet seen a transfer of political power at all, and even then it was hardly atrue post-communist transition. Rather, all of the Central Asian states havemerely conducted a reorganization. The Turkmenistan case illustrates anextreme instance of the reliance upon political repression to maintain whatappears to be an increasingly brittle authoritarian rule.

Repression can secure a leader or group of leaders in power for a periodof time, but it is never an enduring solution to the most fundamental prob-lems of political development. The failure of the Central Asian regimes toinstitutionalize meaningful electoral processes implies that the impendingpolitical change in the region could be systemic in character rather thansimply ideological or generational. Helping to encourage a benign and lessrepressive leadership change is a great challenge for U.S. policy.

Exercising more flexibility may help to avoid U.S. policies based onmisperception and will involve a deeper understanding of the political dy-namics of partner countries. The political leaders in the Central Asian statescomprehend the war on terrorism in much different terms than many of theirU.S. counterparts. While the Central Asian leaders may at times use thesame terms, pay tribute to the same values, agree to the same goals, andsign the same documents, they often see these acts as implying very dif-ferent things. These competing understandings give rise to expectationsthat, when not realized, could lead to disenchantment and erode some ofthe common will for mutual cooperation.

The flip side is that Central Asian leaders tend to misperceive U.S.intentions. Georgia’s Rose Revolution produced immediate, negative po-litical reverberations throughout Central Asia. The Central Asian leader-ship immediately drew the lesson that political succession could come fromwithin as well as from without. There is little doubt that the decision of theUzbekistan Ministry of Justice in early 2004 to deny registration to theSoros Foundation’s Open Society Institute was a product of fears that a


Georgian scenario might be played out in Tashkent. Central Asian leaderssimply do not have the luxury of assuming that the true U.S. objectivesare those expressed in the rhetorical statements of bilateral partnership.

The third major challenge facing U.S. strategic policy toward the Cen-tral Asian region is primarily diplomatic. U.S. policy must place greateremphasis upon clearly articulating the principles and purposes of U.S.foreign policy in the region. Can the United States ally itself for strategicpurposes with a country that acts in ways that are inconsistent with fun-damental U.S. values of human dignity, civil rights, and fair play? If so,how long can such an alliance exist before such values are called into ques-tion before international public opinion?53

U.S. expectations of the tempo of democratic reform in these countriesshould be realistic, and foreign assistance—across the entire spectrum ofactivities from human rights to security issues—should not be mechani-cally linked to quotas or “result-oriented metrics.” The application of thestandards of behavior for the developing countries of Central Asia needsto be flexible and adjusted to the demands of the situation. U.S. nationalinterest in the long run will not be served by policies that “win battles butlose wars,” that is to say, sacrifice fundamental values for short-term expe-diency. Communicating to U.S. partners that a commitment to justice, ruleof law, human rights, and fair play are enduring and important parts of thefabric of U.S. national interest will take energy, commitment, and creativity.The Central Asian countries stand side by side with the other leading coun-tries in the international community in condemning terrorism and politicalextremism as great evils that confront one and all alike, and these statesare crucial allies in a protracted struggle.

Endnotes1 Richard Boucher, “Secretary of State Decision not to Certify Uzbekistan,”

Press Statement, Washington, DC, July 13, 2004.2 Representatives from the member states of the Commonwealth of Indepen-

dent States (CIS) adopted a unanimous declaration on July 8, 2004, assertingthat OSCE human rights monitoring missions were in violation of the Helskinkiprinciples of non-interference in domestic political affairs. See “ZaklyuchitelnyiAkt [“The Final Act”], Vremya Novostei, no. 119, July 9, 2004, p. 1.

3 See David Holley, “Soros Invests in His Democratic Passion: The billionaire’sOpen Society Institute network is focusing on Central Asia now,” Los Ange-les Times, July 5, 2004, p. 1.

4 Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, notedthat “the ‘Revolution of Roses’ ... had huge reverberations in the former So-viet Union ... U.S. assistance did not play a role in the choice exercised by theGeorgian people for a change in leadership ... but was key in building the ca-pabilities of Georgians and Georgian organizations so that they could make


choices for themselves about their future.” Testimony before the Senate For-eign Relations Committee, Oversight of Foreign Assistance Programs, Wash-ington, DC, March 2, 2004.

5 See Nazarbaev’s speech to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, December 10,1991, “Vybor—Tsvilizovannoe Demokratichskoe Obshchestvo,” Pyat’ letnezavisimosti, Almaty, 1996, pp. 19–24.

6 Kyrgyzstan in December 1998 became the first post-Soviet country to enterthe World Trade Organization.

7 Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev is a former first secretary of theKazakhstan Republic Communist Party Organization; Uzbekistan’s IslamKarimov is a former first secretary of the Uzbekistan Republic CommunistParty Organization; Turkmenistan’s Sapuramat Niyazov is a former first sec-retary of the Turkmenistan Republic Communist Party Organization; andTajikistan’s Imomali Rakhmonov is a former Kuliab region communist partyofficial. Only Kyrgyzstan’s Askar Akaev does not belong to the former partynomenklatura, although in some respects even Akaev, a physicist who trainedin Leningrad and who served briefly as the president of the Kyrgyzstan Acad-emy of Sciences, can also be considered a member of the Soviet elite.

8 Nursultan Nazarbaev, “Address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstanto the People of Kazakhstan: On the Situation in the Country and Major Di-rections of Domestic and Foreign Policy: Democratization, Economic and Po-litical Reform for the New Century,” Panorama, no. 38, October 2, 1998, p.1.

9 Akezhan Kazhegeldin, “Shattered Image: Misconceptions of Democracy andCapitalism in Kazakhstan,” Harvard International Review, vol. 22 (Winter/Spring 2000).

1 0 For an analysis of the challenges of independence and democratization inKyrgyzstan, see Jeremy Bransten, “Kyrgyzstan: A Democracy Only For TheRich,” RFE/RL Newsday, October 14, 1997; John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Cen-tral Asia’s Island of Democracy? London: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

1 1 Kyrgyzstan ranks 102 out of 175 countries ranked by the UNDP Human De-velopment Index. Income distribution and social indicators for Kyrgyzstan fallconsiderably behind other countries at comparable stages of development. SeeUNDP Development Index, 2003.

1 2 International Monetary Fund, “Republic of Tajikistan: Recent Economic De-velopments,” International Monetary Fund, Staff Country Report No. 00/27,March 2000.

1 3 International Energy Outlook 2004, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy In-formation Administration, p. 50, Table 12.

1 4 “Turkmenistan: Recent Economic Developments,” International MonetaryFund, Staff Country Report No. 99/140, December 10, 1999.

1 5 “EBRD Cuts Turkmen Loans, Slams Political System,” Reuters, April 18, 2000.1 6 The United States’ engagement policy has been based upon the provision of

foreign aid, and the emphasis has been on capacity transfer and capacity build-ing rather than on capital projects. Most tied assistance, accordingly, is tech-nical assistance or military assistance. Political assistance tended to supportnon-governmental organizations promoting human rights, public service ac-


countability, individual initiative, and public participation.1 7 Charles William Maynes, “Long Time, No See,” Foreign Affairs, March/April

2003, pp. 120–32.1 8 The base was named in honor of Peter J. Ganci, Jr., the New York City Fire

Chief who perished in the attack on the World Trade Center.1 9 The Clinton Administration concluded a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan

in November 1997. Following September 11, the Bush administration announceda number of bilateral negotiations with the Central Asian states. A “NewKazakhstan-American Partnership” was announced on December 21, 2001. The“Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework” between the U.S. andUzbekistan took effect in July 2002, a partnership with Kyrgyzstan followedin September, and Tajikistan announced a partnership in December. PresidentBush did not meet with Turkmenistan President Sapuramat Niyazov.

2 0 See Orozbek Moldaliev, “An Incongruous War in the Valley of Poison. TheReligious Conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan,” George C. Marshall EuropeanCenter for Security Studies, 2003.

2 1 The Moscow based newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta reported on January 10,2001, that IMU troops, under the direction of Juma Namangani, had returnedto Tajikistan and were ensconced in the Tavildara valley east of Dushanbe. OnJanuary 17, then Tajik Defense Minister Sherali Khairullaev denied foreignnews reports that Juma Namangani and his rebels had returned to Tajikistan.On January 30, the Moscow newspaper Kommersant-Daily reported that theTajik Ministry for Emergency Situations, had flown some 250 members ofthe IMU and Juma Namangani out of the country; see RFE/RL Newsline,January 11, 17, and 31, 2001.

2 2 Tomohiko Uyama has argued that in Central Asia, “The legitimacy of the na-tion-states is strongly supported both internally and internationally, and al-though protest movements may destabilize the existing political order in someor other way, they are unlikely to change the nation-state system fundamen-tally.” Tomohiko Uyama, “Why are Social Protest Movements Weak in Cen-tral Asia?” in Keiko Sakai, ed., Social Protests and Nation-Building in the MiddleEast and Central Asia, Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, Ja-pan External Trade Organization, 2003, p. 54.

2 3 In the Tajik civil war thousands of civilians and soldiers were killed and 100,000persons fled to neighboring countries while as many as 600,000 Tajikistancitizens fled their homes as internal refugees. See “UNHCR report on Tajikistan,January 1993-March 1996,” UN High Commissioner on Refugees, May 1996,p. 4; also see “Return to Tajikistan, Continued Regional and Ethnic Tensions,”Human Rights Watch (Helsinki), vol. 7, no. 9 (1997), pp. 4, 7.

2 4 This argument is made in Kathleen Collins, “Tajikistan: Bad Peace Agreementsand Prolonged Civil Conflict,” in Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester,eds., From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Preven-tion of Violent Conflict, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003, p. 295.

2 5 Reported by Damien McElroy, “Tashkent urged to allow UN aid across bridge,”Daily Telegraph, November 12, 2001, p. 1.

2 6 A chilling account of these events is available in Emmanuel Decaux, “OSCERapporteur’s Report on Turkmenistan,” OSCE Office for Democratic Institu-


tions and Human Rights, March 12, 2003.2 7 See “Turkmenistan,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2002, Bu-

reau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State,March 31, 2003.

2 8 Richard Boucher, “Conviction of Kyrgyz Opposition Figure Feliks Kulov,”Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, January 24, 2001.

2 9 For an analysis of Central Asian regional economic cooperation, see Martin C.Spechler, “Regional Cooperation in Central Asia,” Problems of Post-Commu-nism, vol. 49, no. 6 (2002), pp. 42–47.

3 0 Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, “The Commonwealth of Independent States,1991–1998: Stagnation and Survival,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 51, no. 3(1999), p. 379.

3 1 See Emine Gürgen, Harry Snoek, Jon Craig, Jimmy McHugh, Ivailo Izvorski,and Ron van Rooden, “Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan,” International Monetary Fund,Occasional Paper No. 183, August 31, 1999.

3 2 Sakwa and Webber, “The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991–1998…, pp. 379–415.

3 3 See Rajan Menon, “In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in Post Soviet CentralAsia,” International Security, vol. 20 (1997), pp. 149–81.

3 4 Gregory Gleason, “Inter-state Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS tothe Shanghai Forum,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 53, no. 7 (2001), pp. 1077–95; Gregory Gleason and Roza Zhalimbetova, “Bridges and Fences: the Eur-asian Economic Community and Policy Harmonization in Eurasia,” CentralAsian Monitor, no. 5–6 (2001), pp. 18–24.

3 5 The Russian National Security Strategy and the Russian Foreign Policy Strat-egy are guidance documents for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and otherforeign affairs agencies, and articulate the goals and objectives of Russian for-eign policy. The previous doctrinal statement (often referred to as the “Kozyrevdoctrine”) was adopted in April 1993 during Andrei Kozyrev’s tenure asMinister of Foreign Affairs.

3 6 Roy Allison, “Strategic Reassertion in Russia’s Central Asia Policy,” Interna-tional Affairs, vol. 80, no. 2 (2004), p. 277.

3 7 Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia,” in Richard Ellings and Aaron Friedberg,eds., Strategic Asia 2002–03: Asian Aftershocks, p. 255.

3 8 See “Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs ElizabethJones and Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, andLabor Lorne Craner Visit Uzbekistan,” November 10, 2003.

3 9 Charles William Maynes, “America Discovers Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs,vol. 82, no. 2 (March/April 2003), pp. 120–32.

4 0 “EBRD updates strategy for Uzbekistan,” EBRD Press Release, April 6, 2004.4 1 B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Af-

fairs, “Uzbekistan: The Key to Success in Central Asia?” Testimony beforethe Subcommittee on Central Asia, House International Relations Committee,Washington, DC, June 15, 2004.

4 2 Pascoe, “Uzbekistan: The Key to Success in Central Asia?”4 3 Richard Boucher, “Secretary of State’s Decision not to Certify Uzbekistan,”


Press Statement, Washington, DC, July 13, 2004. On the day that this an-nouncement was made in Washington, DC, the local press in Central Asiaannounced that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State A. Elizabeth Jones had ar-rived in Tashkent. See “V Tashkent pribyvaet pomoshchnik gossekretarya SShApo delam evropy i evrazii (U.S. Assistant Secretary of State arrives inTashkent),” RIA, July 13, 2004.

4 4 “Central Asia: Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security,” International Cri-sis Group, Central Asia Report No. 14, March 1, 2001, p. iii.

4 5 “Central Asia: Uzbekistan at 10—Repression and Instability,” InternationalCrisis Group, Central Asia Report No 21, August 21, 2001, p. ii.

4 6 Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., “Disillusionment in the Caucasus and Central Asia,”Journal of Democracy, vol. 12, no. 4 (2001), p. 53.

4 7 Douglas T. Stuart, “Toward Concert in Asia,” Asian Survey, vol. 37, no. 3(1997), pp. 229–44. Others argue that such an alliance is as likely to trap theparticipants in commitments that generate conflict than it is to regulate andmitigate conflict. See Richard Betts, “Systems for Peace of Causes of War:Collective Security, Arms, Control, and the New Europe,” International Secu-rity, vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5–43.

4 8 Charles Fairbanks, C. Richard Nelson, S. Frederick Starr, and KennethWeisbrode, The Strategic Assessment of Central Asia, Washington, DC: Cen-tral Asia and Caucasus Institute, January 2001, p. 2.

4 9 Fairbanks, Nelson, Starr, and Weisbrode, The Strategic Assessment of CentralAsia …

5 0 Vladimir Socor, “Questions on Western Policies Overshadow Central AsianSummit,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 1, no. 22, June 2, 2004.

5 1 One recent public policy analysis urges “diversification” of U.S. diplomaticand military initiatives in the region. The analysis proposes that “since theautumn of 2001, U.S. policy towards this potentially volatile region of theworld has been more ad hoc than well-reasoned in terms of future implica-tions for U.S. strategic interests.” The report argues that the U.S. emphasison Uzbekistan confines policy options, and concludes in favor of “diversify-ing” U.S. policy by shifting away from Uzbekistan and viewing Kazakhstanas “an interesting option as an alternate partner, as its economic and politicalassets make it the Central Asian country with the best prospect for establish-ing something close to a rule-of-law state in the mid term.” Jacquelyn K. Davisand Michael J. Sweeney, Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Plan-ning: Where do we go from here? Washington, DC: The Institute for ForeignPolicy Analysis, February 2004, p. iv.

5 2 Bereuter told the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Unless the NATO alliesquickly remedy the grave shortfalls in military personnel and equipment, theNATO mission in Afghanistan faces a real danger of failure.”

5 3 See Jeffrey Record’s criticism that that ill-focused U.S. policy runs the risk ofsetting the “United States on a course of open-ended and gratuitous conflictwith states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat to the UnitedStates.” Record, “Bounding the Global War on Terrorism,” U.S. Army WarCollege, Strategic Studies Institute Monographs, December 2003, p. v.

Bishkek

Ashgabat

Tashkent

Astana

hanbeDushhhhh

Kyrgyzstan

Tajikistan

Kazakhstan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan:Terrorist IMU and non-violent Hizb ut-Tahrir promote radical Islamist agenda; secular opposition ERK operates in exile

Turkmenistan: Opposition partiesbanned; Erkin and Gundar operate in exile with loose coalition of Turkmen opposition movements

Tajikistan: President Rahmonov neutralizing IRP, the only Islamist party in the region; UTO entrenched in the political process following 1997 accord

Kyrgyzstan: Worried about intolerance,opposition parties formed movement to ensure fair elections in 2005

Kazakhstan: Opposition parties fear increasing consolidation of power by President Nazarbaev; leader of largest opposition party in jail

The Status of Political Opposition in Central Asia

Documents

CENTRAL ASIA STATE BUILDING IN THE FACE OF … countries were quick to demonstrate their support for the U.S.-led ... The largest ethno-linguistic groups are the Turkic-speaking peoples,