3
J..--L SECAETJ/RELTO USA. ISAF. NATO r Scoping the "Insider" Threat (U) MFA : I Infiltration • Insurgents who join the ANSF with the intent to - co conduct an attack, collect Q) '- information, obtain .t: I- material , or create distrust J confusion. c .- o Screening may help co identify attempts by - C) known insurgents. - ::!! -en t:_ 4 April 11: Kandahar COO Q) C 4 Nov 10 : Sangin, Helmand (J Q) Q) > a::UJ Insurgent "Insider" Threats Co-opting • Insurgents who recruit or persuade existing ANSF members to conduct an activity by using intimidation, blackmail or connections. Review of a ll AN SF records allows for cross-cuing; may identify suspect ties 5 Dec 10 : FOB Lightning, Paktiya 10 Nov 10: Khas Uruzgan Mimicking • Insurgents who impersonate ISAF or ANSF personnel to conduct a quick attack by using uniforms or forged 10 cards. Remove ANSF and ISAF uniforms from bazaars 16 Apr 11: Laghman KLE 27 Nov 10 : FOB Rushmore, Paktika ANSF "Insider" Threats 1 , • Factors such as stress, mental instability, or drug use that cause an AN SF member to conduct a violent act against member of ISAF or ANSF. Screening or counterintelligence may indentify past history. 28 Apr 11: KAlA, Kabul 18 Apr 11 : MOD, Kabul 15 Apr 11: Kandahar peop 04 Apr 11 : Faryab KLE 18 Feb 11: Baghlan (OEU) 18 Jan 11: 8adghis (ITA) 15 Jan 11 : Helmand 29 Nov 10 : Nangarhar ASSESSMENT: The screening and monitoring of the ANSF has begun to create barriers to the insider threat posed by the insurgency and from within the ANSF. Continued shortfalls and the lack of universal application are vulnerabilities that will allow some insider attacks to continue to occur against the ANSF and the ISAF. lill.A6L U) USiA ISA.. SEGRETlIREL TO USA. ISAF. NATO 12 MAY1 1

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Page 1: Centcom Green-on-Blue Slides

J..--L--~---

SECAETJ/RELTO USA. ISAF. NATO r

Scoping the "Insider" Threat (U) MFA: I

Infiltration

• Insurgents who join the ANSF with the intent to-co conduct an attack, collect Q)

' ­ information , obtain .t: I- material , or create distrust

Jconfusion.

c .-o Screening may help co identify attempts by -C) known insurgents. -::!!

-ent:_ 4 April 11: Kandahar COO Q) C 4 Nov 10 : Sangin, Helmand (J Q) Q) >a::UJ

Insurgent "Insider" Threats

Co-opting

• Insurgents who recruit or persuade existing ANSF members to conduct an activity by using intimidation , blackmail or connections.

Review of all AN SF records allows for cross-cuing; may

identify suspect ties

5 Dec 10 : FOB Lightning, Paktiya 10 Nov 10: Khas Uruzgan

Mimicking

• Insurgents who impersonate ISAF or ANSF personnel to conduct a quick attack by using uniforms or forged 10 cards.

Remove ANSF and ISAF uniforms from bazaars

16 Apr 11: Laghman KLE 27 Nov 10: FOB Rushmore, Paktika

ANSF "Insider" Threats

1, Destabilizer~

• Factors such as stress, mental instability, or drug use that cause an AN SF member to conduct a violent act against member of ISAF or ANSF.

Screening or counterintell igence may

indentify past history.

28 Apr 11: KAlA, Kabul 18 Apr 11 : MOD, Kabul 15 Apr 11: Kandahar peop 04 Apr 11 : Faryab KLE 18 Feb 11: Baghlan (OEU) 18 Jan 11: 8adghis (ITA) 15 Jan 11 : Helmand 29 Nov 10: Nangarhar

ASSESSMENT: The screening and monitoring of the ANSF has begun to create barriers to the insider threat posed by the insurgency and from within the ANSF. Continued shortfalls and the lack of universal application are vulnerabilities that will allow some insider attacks to continue to occur against the ANSF and the ISAF. lill.A6L U) USiA ISA.. N~TO'

SEGRETlIREL TO USA. ISAF. NATO 12 MAY1 1

Page 2: Centcom Green-on-Blue Slides

SEcnCTllnEL TO USA, tSAr, NATO

NSF Screening & Monitoring Timeline o

(ut FA : 1

(b)(6)

ANSF Biometrics Program officially established

Afghan Biometric Database (A-ABIS) created

ANSF begins biometric enrollment of recruits

Some ANSF Biometric enrollment into FBI

database

NTM-A Established

2010

initial capability

Oct

Mar

NATO Intel Sharing agreement J with Afghan Government

Jan Oct

t L Mol begins lsI PAl

Initial ANSF Personnel Security l i ­(PERSEC) Program developed "1 (b)(6)

ANA and ANP PAl began

PAl enrollment status: • ANA: 2,876 • ANP : 4,150 • AAF: 4,042

10.000 ANSF uniforms removed from bazaars

Jan Mar May

2011 Dec Apr r-,-----,

~ Dec

~ CSTC-A l A~;S J

Established

ASSESSMENT: Increased INS emphasis to infiltrate the ANSF has prompted the majority of the changes to ANSF screening and monitoring. Efforts such as the recruit screening process, the ongoing Personnel Asset Inventory (PAl), biometrics capabilities and the expansion of ANA counterintelligence highlight recent work to identify those who posed a potential threat to the ANSF and ISAF. lSI/REb 1Q YSA. IS,o,f , ~I,o,lOl

U.S. / Afghan Biometric

agreement signed

Mol Personnel Security Service

(PSS) obtains 1

Afghan Air Force begins PAl of airmen

MoD adds 183 Counterintell igence (CI) bi llets

to tashkil: new CI total is 445

SECAETIIREL TO USA. tSAF, NATO

BIV initial fielding at ANAREC

ANA Goal: train & field 222 new C I agents

Page 3: Centcom Green-on-Blue Slides

d

Current ANSf Scree,ning Process (utFA 1

The ANSF subjects recruits to /I Two Letters an 8-step screening process, ~ from Elders r--'\

supported by cultural norms, Valid ID ("';'0 ~~'"' ':'~o..)I----V policies, records checks, ~ (Tazkera) I r . - .. .. . t Personal Info

(MOO Fol'lT1 PSPO·1)

information sharing and Y coalition oversight. (U/I FOUO) 'D

~

Recruit sent to basic training

ISAF Counterintelligence enters process, when required , (0 investigate a security incident.

U.S. DoD ASIS database (5.400,000 recOIds) used

¢=J Medical Screening

-6% of recruits are turned away due to drug or

medical

~ MoD and Mol

conduct different tests for drugs; THC is not a disqualifier .

Drug Screening

~ Fitness Test

(Off icers Only)

Aighan Counterintelligence

SCleens Some Recruits

Application Validated from

Recruiting Authority

{] Biometric Collection

Criminal Records Check

r? or Police Regional Training Center

ASSESSMENT: On-going improvements to the screening process, as well as increases in ANSF counterintelligence capabilities and expanded biometric enrollment, give the ANSF a better chance to identify "insider threats" before they enter the service. (UlIFOO9)

U//EOIJO12 MAY11