Elections and Casteist PoliticsAuthor(s): Jyotirmoy ChakrabortySource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 35, No. 43/44 (Oct. 21 - Nov. 3, 2000), pp. 3805-3807Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4409883Accessed: 27/02/2009 04:48

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=epw.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with thescholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform thatpromotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toEconomic and Political Weekly.

http://www.jstor.org

SIKKIM

Elections and Casteist

Politics Elections in Sikkim continue to be largely determined by caste and ethnic loyalties. The October 1999 election results show that the electorate is significantly polarised on the backward class issue. The many regional parties and even a national party like the Congress(I) have had to suitablyfine-tune their manifestos to suit regional aspirations.

JYOTIRMOY CHAKRABORTY

fter the election results of the 6th

assembly elections in Sikkim, the . AXSikkim Democratic Front supremo P K Chamling said that "the people of Sikkim have discarded casteist politics, though the opposition fought to entire election on a casteist card" (Weekend Review, October 8-14, 1999). Many po- litical analysts dealing with elections have

opined that India is a caste-ridden society and the voters tend to vote on caste lines. A contrary opinion believes that caste is no longer a potent force in influencing the

voting choice of the people [Jena and Baral 1989:48].

More than 75 per cent population of Sikkim is of Nepalese origin. The Nepalese are a caste-ridden society and the voting behaviour of the electorate was expected to be on caste lines as is usual in other

parts of India. Indeed the elections were characterised by the electorate demonstrating loyalties towards its

specific caste representatives, and caste associations played an increasingly dominant role.

Before Sikkim's merger with the Indian Union in 1975 and immediately after the

minority Bhutia and Lepcha Community (BL) dominated the state politics and administration. The first assembly elec- tion held in October 1979 witnessed a

great political upheaval. The Sikkim Janata Parishad (SJP) was formed and emerged as a strong political force winning 17 seats in the 32 member assembly under the

leadership of NarbahadurBhandari. It was, perhaps, Bhandari's anti-merger stand in 1979 which played a role in his victory [Ghosal 1997:25]. Bhandari became the first chief minister of Sikkim.

In the 1985 elections Bhandari rode

successfully to power on a sympathy wave in his favour. He contested this time as the leader of the Sikkim Sangram Parishad (SSP) which won 30 seats. The elections also threw up several unlikely winners. The prestigious Gangtok seat was bagged by a marwari businessman. In the after- math of the elections the Sikkimese felt the necessity to reserve seats for the Sikkimese Nepalese [Ghosal 1997:26].

During the elections of 1989 all the

political parties raised this issue, along with others of ethnic sentiments and of social significance. Bhandari projected himself as pro-Nepali leader and demanded seat reservations for the Nepalese of Sikkimese origin. At the same time he was in favour of keeping the reserved seats for the BL intact. In this election, R C Poudyal, the Rising Sun Party's supremo also pro- jected himself as pro-Nepali and demanded more reserved seats for the Nepalese at par with their'numerical strength. As a result, he lost the faith of the BL community. The third political force, the Congress remained as a party of the plainsmen. Bhandari emerged as the only choice, for his non- communal image appealed to the large section of the Nepalese as well as Bhutia- Lepcha people of Sikkim. All the 32 seats werewon by the Sikkim Sangram Parishad and Bhandari became the chief minister for the third consecutive term. Bhandari, a teacher-turned politician, ruled Sikkim for more than 14 years.

During his tenure the higher caste Nepalese dominated every sphere of gover- nance. The pradhans captured the higher echelons of the administration and repre- sentatives of the bahun and the chettri communities dominated Sikkim's politi- cal scenario. These upper castes were

referred to as the NBCs (the newars, the bahuns and the chettris) or the non-back- ward classes. A large section of the

Nepalese especially the other backward classes (OBC) among them remained neg- lected. However after Bhandari's defeat in the 1994 elections, the NBCs too gradu- ally lost their foot-hold in Sikkim politics. One ofBhandari's close associates, Pawan

KumarChamling, broke away to form a new party, the Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF). Chamling projected himself as a leader of the downtrodden. The SDF emerged as the

representative of the backward classes. The SDF's victory ended Bhandari's long domination of Sikkim politics.

The SDF won 19 seats capturing 42 per cent of the total valid vote while the SSP got only 10 seats, 35.17 per cent of the valid vote. The tribals, especially the bhutias and the lepchas who were earlier loyal to Bhandari initially, deserted him believing he had ignored them. All the seven seats of the south district went to the SDF. The SSP saved its face by win- ning eight seats in the east district where the upper caste Nepalese dominated. In the west district they won two out of the seven seats.

Contemporary Scene

Bhandari and his party attempted re- establish the domination of the SSP. How- ever, the results of October 1999 of the sixth assembly election greatly disheart- ened the former chief minister, and his

party. The SDF received a massive man- date in 25 of the assembly constituencies while the SSP won only seven seats. The SSP's downfall can be related to the increasing ethnic calculations that characterised the assembly elections.

Sikkim with an electorate of 2.5 lakhs is one of the smallest states in the country. It has 32 assembly seats, of which 12 are reserved for the bhutia and the lepcha communities (BL), two for the scheduled castes, one for the sangha (monasteries) and the remaining 17 for the general castes. The voters of the sangha seat are the lamas of bhutia lepcha origin, thereby making 1-3 seats at the disposal of the BL group. Similarly, all the scheduled castes of Sikkim are of Nepalese origin, so that a total of 19 seats belong to the Nepalese. There were 105 candidates in fray for the 32 assembly seats.

In the latest electoral rolls published by the Election Commission of Sikkim, the names of the castes or sub-castes are

Economic and Political Weekly October 28, 2000 3805

mentioned against names of the electors. The National Informatics Centre (NIC) has produced a caste-wise distribution of the voters in Sikkim's different constitu- encies (see Table). The lepchas, bhutias and the sherpas of Sikkim are considered scheduled tribes..The Nepalese are actu- ally a cluster of communities who share a common language - Nepali. The Nepali community includes general castes iike newar, bahun, chettri,jogi, sanyasi, thami, etc, and scheduled castes like kami, damai, sarki and maji as well. There are also the other backward castes (OBC) like rai, limbu, tamang, mangar, gurung, bhujel and sunwar. The latter comprise the largest section of the electorate.

The Table shows that only in the east district the NBCs and other high castes

comprise 32.13 per cent of the electorate. However, in the other two districts south and west, these groups have little influence with only 25.73 per cent and 21.60 per cent of votes respectively. In the north district these groups have only 10.46 per cent of voters. The tribals are in majority in north district with 73.26 per cent of voters.

Interestingly, both in the south and west districts the OBC has the largest number of voters, i e, 47.39 per cent and 52.04 per cent respectively. Thus any party that receives the support of the OBCs and the tribals will eventually dominate Sikkim politics. In the electoral process however there are a numerous factors which play an important role in voter mobilisation. Hence, demographic composition of the electorate alone cannot help electoral

predictions. Selection of candidates, ethnic balance, different issues raised by the parties, campaign strategy and per- formances of the ruling party, etc, are all equally important in determining the election results.

Towards Ethnic Representation In a multi-ethnic situation, the credibil-

ity of the candidate and the ethnic balance

play a key role in candidate selection. Often, the nomination of a particular candidate generates initial rivalry within the party particularly, when there are a number of aspirants. This results in prompt- ing dissidence which may result in the swelling of opposition ranks. The leader has to tackle the situation with all the effort at his command. His choice has to consider the ethnic composition of the electoral area and the candidate's

acceptability. In the October elections the

SDF chief, Chamling handled the situation more efficiently, than his counterpart. Some important political personalities of different ethnic origins like the former Congress(I) general secretary R B Subba of the limbu community and P K Pradhan, former chief secretary of Sikkim, of the progressive newar community of Sikkim joined the SDP. C L Rai joint secretary of the SSP along with 400 supporters also joined the SDF (Sikkim Observer, September 1-3, 1999). This helped Chamling strengthen his political base among the other backward classes. On the other hand, the SSP in its selection, alien- ated several erstwhile loyalists. SSP leader, Gyatso Lepcha, joined the SDF, as he was

deprived of a ticket to the Ranka constitu- ency. The SSP similarly rejected the can- didature of Nima Lepcha in the Rumtek constituency. Only two lepcha candidates got the SSP ticket in the 12 BL reserved seats, which hurt the sentiments of the lepchas. The SDF fielded five lepcha candidates in all. The decision of these politicians from different ethnic back- grounds to join the SDF encouraged the general voters of the same group.

In his first list of candidates Chamling selected old veteran leaders with a clean image. He was able to control the number of defections from his party thereafter. The SDF legislators who had not been given party tickets in this election were accom- modated in the central committee or in some other position. Chamling strength- ened his position by appointing the leaders of different ethnic origins like lepcha, bhutia and the Nepalese, as general secretaries to the party's central committee (Sikkim Observer, September 1-3, 1999).

In contrast, the SSP chief Bhandari fielded mostly new faces after six of his old colleagues joined the SDF or the Congress. He also tactically erred by neglecting his own NBC group who were in majority in the east district. Unfortu- nately he chose only four NBC members out of the total 17 general seats. Bhandari

contested from two of these four seats and his wife contested one seat. This created a dilemma and frustration among the NBCs. Bhandari had alienated himself from a large sections of the OBCs as well. Further he failed to win the sympathy of the bhutia- lepcha group,when he fielded a sherpa candidate from Rakdong-Tintek in BL seat ignoring Sonam Tshring, a local candidate and former minister. This sent a wrong signal to the NBC group. The SDF also fielded a sherpa candidate to counter the SSP. The Denzong Sherpa Association expressed its thanks to both the parties, considering it 'historic' and 'bold' (Sikkim Observer, September 1-3, 1999). Perhaps, the SSP fielded sherpa candi- dates to draw the sympathy of the sherpas - 10.95 per cent of the voters that could be the deciding factor in a constituency like Temi-Tarku where Bhandari's wife contested. Here too, the SDF also fielded a sherpa candidate thus neutralising the SSP's gain.

Electoral Issues

Besides the SDF and the SSP, the other contending parties in this election were the Congress(I), CPI(M) and a few indepen- dent candidates. All the parties played on the complex communal divide by espous- ing some ethnic issues or the other. Chamling, in a bid to further strengthen his base, met the then prime minister P V Narasimha Rao, in September, 1995 and demanded proportional reservation of seats to the Nepalese in the state legisla- ture. This also served to counter the pro- Nepali upper caste impage of Bhandari (The Telegraph, September 4, 1995). Chamling also asked for the inclusion of five more sub-castes in the list of OBCs. In July 1999, Chamling requested the prime minister to restore the Nepali seats in the

assembly, which were scrapped by the centre in 1979, and subsequently the SDF

campaigned on this issue (The Telegraph, July 12,1999). The SSP and the Congress(I) too demanded a reservation of Nepali

Table: Ethnic/Caste Groupwise Distribution of Electorate in Sikkim (Per Cent)

Name of the Lepcha Bhutia Sherpa OBC NBC and SC Others District Other High

Castes

East district 6.62 1311 3.05 30.56 32.13 6.81 7.72 West district 8.17 6.48 5.58 52.04 21.60 4.72 1.41 South district 5.30 6.36 5.46 46.86 25.73 5.19 3.99 North district 41.67 28.43 3.16 12.53 10.46 1.59 2.16

73.26

Source: Calculated from data from National Informatics Centre, published by Sikkim Observer, vol XIV, No 35.

3806 Economic and Political Weekly October 28, 2000

seats. Both the parties also favoured reservation for the Tsongs (limbus), a Nepali ethnic group. The Congress(I) president Sonia Gandhi demanded reser- vation of seats for the sherpas as well during her visit to Gangtok (The Tele- graph, June 22, 1999).

In their manifesto the SDF and SSP parties had demanded the strict observa- tion of Article 371(F) of the Constitution which grants special status to Sikkim. All the parties raised different ethnic and non- ethnic issues to acquire political mileage in these elections. The SDF and SSP demanded the implementation of, the sons of the soil policy. SSP expressed that their party would fight for the reservation of seats for the limbus and tamangs while the SDF wanted the gurungs, limbus and tamangs to be included in the list of sched- uled tribes. Chamling proposed that chettris, bahuns and newars be included in the list of OBCs so as to draw the sympa- thy of the upper caste Nepalese and to weaken Bhandari's strong hold. The SSP demanded that the languages spoken by different segments of the Sikkimese people be given special concessions facilities for their development and that the Nepali language be developed so that it could be used at national level. The SDF too de- manded the constitutional recognition for the bhutia, lepacha, the limbuilanguages.

This apart Chamling threw in the secular card, when he proposed to find a consensus candidate for the Sangha seat where 260 monks voted. On the eve of Pung Lhabsol, Chamling said, "Sangha seat could be kept above the party politics" (Gangtok Times, August 1999). He followed this up with the withdrawal of the Rathang Chu Hydel project in deference to the religious senti- ments of the Buddhists. Such steps were enough to draw the faith of the bhutia- lepchas towards Chamling.

A look at the major issues in the election manifestoes of the different political par- ties reveals that the same set of issues are churned out periodically, albeit in various permutations and combinations. Parties draw on the ethnic angle to win the atten- tion of the voters. Issues like seat reser- vations, inclusion of certain excluded communities in the OBC list or in the list of tribals have been emphasised in all the manifestoes. All the parties were in favour of safeguarding existing rights underArticle 371 (F). They also mentioned issues di- rectly related to the common people like health, education, rural development, self-

reliance in every field, eradication of corruption, creation of new employment avenues, special shops for the government employees, increase in the daily wages of the labourers and promises to make Sikkim in ideal state.

SSP - End of Road?

The results of the sixth Sikkim assembly elections reveal that caste factors did not play a significant role favouring the op- position SSP. Only in constituencies like Central Pandam, Rhenok, Loosing Pancheykhani Pathing and Rakdong- Tintek, where the upper caste Nepalese (the NBCs) is dominant, the SSP was able to maintain its stronghold. But in most of the other constituencies across the state, the Sikkim Democratic Front swept the polls. The SDF which had only 19 seats in the last election bagged 25 seats including the SDF-supported independent candidate of the Sangha seat. This result confirms that the SDF had further consoli- dated its OBC and the tribal base which helped to an extent by the pro-poor, pro- rural and pro-tribal image of Chamling and his party. Bhandari was unable to maintain his hold'on the NBCs of the east district, where the SDF captured six seats, two more than 1994 election. Votes in these two constituencies exercised their choice that went beyond caste boundaries.

The biggest victory was at SDF's Soreong where R B Subba beat Nar Bahadur Bhandari. This was a serious flow for the SSP party and to Bhandari for Soreong was his home constituency. However, Bhandari won from the Rhenock seat and secured his entry to the assembly. In contrast Chamling, the SDF supremo won with the highest margin. Winning with the support of 72 per cent of the valid vote was definitely a massive success for the ruling party. The election results came as a great setback for the Congress too - the third political force in Sikkim politics. None of its candidates figured in the list of elected candidates. The party lacked a firm stand on any issue. Also it failed to find the right candidates. Congress stal- warts like former chief minister, Sanchaman Limbu, the former power secretary L P Tewari could not resist the SDF wave at all.

Electorates' apathy towards the Congerss(I) was clearly discernible in its performance at Rakdong-Tintek where its candidate secured less votes than even the

CPI(M) and the independent candidates. In Dzongu constituency, the Congress candidate got only 17 votes, a mere 0.36 per cent of the valid vote. The party had lost its support in the tribal base. Most of its candidates could not even save their security deposits.

The election of Mingma Sherpa as the SSP candidate from Rakdong-Tintek with a comfortable margin indicates that the bhutia-lepcha voters of this constituency had very little role to play in their reserved constituencies. The fielding of sherpa candidate in the BL seat had led to state- wide protests from the bhutia-lepcha people. This led to the formation of the Sikkim Bhutia Lepcha Apex Committee (SIBLAC) to check the gradual erosion of cultural identity and political rights of the minority bhutia-lepcha community of Sikkim. The SIBLAC called a hunger strike and poll boycott. However, it was not successful and did not influence the elec- tions at all. Institutions like the Organisation for Sikkimese Unity (OSU) had also pro- tested on the above matter. But for the three reserved BL seats in north Sikkim, in the rest of the nine seats, the BL were in minority numerically and dependent on the voters of other communities. Another new organisation, the Sikkimese Nepali Apex Committee (SNAC), was formed during this election to safeguard the rights of Sikkimese Nepalese.

The elections prompt the observation that the whole electorate, including the tribals and the non-backward classes has become polarised to some extent on the backward class issue. This polarisation reflected itself in the election results. However, the SDF party won as it could split the voters of the non-backward classes in a few constituencies of the west and east disticts on the one hand and also success- fully consolidated its support amongst the OBC and the tribals of the state on the other. 133

References Chakraborty, Jyotirmoy (1997): 'Election, Power

and Politics in a multi-Ethnic Situation of Gujarat' in B B Goswami and Jayanta Sarkar, Ethnicity, Politics and Political Systems in Tribal India, Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta.

Ghosal, S (1997): 'Ethnicity, Politics and Political System in Sikkim' in Ethnicity Politics and Political Systems in Tribal India.

Jena, B B and J K Baral (1989): Election Politics and Voting Behaviour in India: A Study of Orissa, Discovery Publishing House, Delhi.

Economic and Political Weekly October 28, 2000 3807