Cases in Natural Resources

1. Tabao vs. Lilagan and Aguilar, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651, September 4, 2001

2. Dagudag vs. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, June 19, 2008

3. Factoran et al. vs. CA et al., G.R. No. 93540, December 13, 1999

4. DENR vs. Daraman et al. G.R. No. 125797, February 15, 2002

5. People vs. Bagista, G.R. No. 86218 (214 SCRA 863) September 12, 1992

6. Dy vs. CA and Lausa, G.R. No. 121587, March 9, 1999

7. Lalican vs. Vergara and People, G.R. No. 108619, July 31, 1997

8. Taopa vs. People, G.R. No. 184098, November 25, 2008

9. Mustang Lumber Inc. vs. CA et al., G.R. No. 104988, June 18, 1996

10. Paat and Layugan vs. CA et al. G.R. No. 111107, January 10, 1997

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651. September 4, 2001]

PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO, Regional Chairman, Special Task Force on

Environment and Natural Resources (STF-ENR) of Region 8, Tacloban

City,complainant, vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court, Leyte, Branch 34, and SHERIFF IV

LEONARDO V. AGUILAR, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional

Trial Court, Tacloban City, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Leo C. Tabao, Assistant City Prosecutor of

Tacloban, in his capacity as Regional Chairman of the Region 8 Special Task Force on

Environment and Natural Resources, against (1) Judge Frisco T. Lilagan, presiding judge of the

Leyte Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of judicial

authority, and willful disobedience to settled jurisprudence; and (2) Sheriff IV Leonardo V.

Aguilar of the Leyte RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court, for gross irregularity in the performance

of official duties, giving unwarranted benefits to a private individual, violation of Section 1(b)

and (c) of P.D. No. 1829, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

The records of this case reveal the following facts.

On February 24, 1998, a water craft registered under the name M/L Hadija, from Bongao,

Tawi-tawi, was docked at the port area of Tacloban City with a load of around 100 tons of

tanbark. Due to previous irregular and illegal shipments of tanbark from Bongao, agents of the

National Bureau of Investigation in Region 8 (NBI-EVRO #8) decided to verify the shipment‟s

accompanying documents as the M/L Hadija was unloading its cargo to its consignee, a certain

Robert Hernandez.

The NBI agents found the documents irregular and incomplete, and consequently they

ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. The tanbark, the boat M/L Hadija, and three cargo

trucks were seized and impounded.

On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO #8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a criminal

complaint for violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D. No. 705,[1] the Forestry Reform

Code of the Philippines (as amended), against the captain and crew of the M/L Hadija, Robert

Hernandez, Tandico Chion, Alejandro K. Bautista, and Marcial A. Dalimot. Bautista was a

forester while Dalimot was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO)

of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office in Tacloban

City. Bautista and Dalimot were, thus, also charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.

3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[2] along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V.

Mohammad of the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98-296

at the Prosecutor‟s Office of Tacloban City.

In an order dated March 6, 1998,[3] complainant directed the seizure by the DENR of the M/L

Hadija, its cargo, and the three trucks pending preliminary investigation of the case. DENR thus

took possession of the aforesaid items on March 10, 1998, with notice to the consignee Robert

Hernandez and the NBI Regional Director.

On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the Regional Trial Court of Leyte a case for replevin

to recover the items seized by the DENR. The case was raffled off to Branch 34 of said court

and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-03-42.

On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S. No. 98-296. On

March 17, 1998, confiscation proceedings were conducted by the Provincial Environment and

Natural Resources Office (PENRO)-Leyte, with both Hernandez and his counsel present.

On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and

directed respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of the items seized by the

DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the expiration of five days. [4] Respondent sheriff

served a copy of the writ to the Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45

p.m. of March 19, 1998.

Thus, the filing of this administrative complaint against respondents via a letter addressed to

the Chief Justice and dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.

Complainant avers that replevin is not available where the properties sought to be recovered

are involved in criminal proceedings for illegal logging. He points out that this is a well-settled

issue and cites several decisions[5] of this Court and the Court of Appeals on the matter. He

argues that respondent judge should have known of the existing jurisprudence on this issue,

particularly since they are subject to mandatory judicial notice per Section 1, Rule 129 of the

Revised Rules of Court.

Complainant submits that respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the law and

jurisprudence or purposely disregarded them. But he avers that it is respondent judge‟s duty to

keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence.

Complainant claims that respondent judge cannot claim ignorance of the proceedings in I.S.

No. 98-296 for the following reasons: (1) the defendants in the replevin case were all DENR

officers, which should have alerted respondent judge to the possibility that the items sought to be

recovered were being held by the defendants in their official capacities; and (2) the complaint for

replevin itself states that the items were intercepted by the NBI for verification of supporting

documents, which should have made respondent judge suspect that the same were being held by

authority of law.

As regards respondent sheriff Leonardo V. Aguilar, complainant states that it was incumbent

upon Aguilar to safeguard the M/L Hadija and prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City,

after he had served a writ of seizure therefor on the Philippine Coast Guard. However, on March

19, 1998, the vessel left the port of Tacloban City, either through respondent sheriff‟s gross

negligence or his direct connivance with interested parties, according to complainant. As of the

time of the filing of the complaint, according to complainant, the whereabouts of the vessel and

its crew were unknown.

Moreover, complainant points out that respondent sheriff released the seized tanbark to

Hernandez on March 20 and 21, 1998, or within the five-day period that he was supposed to

keep it under the terms of the writ. Complainant argues that the tanbark formed part of the

people‟s evidence in the criminal complaint against Hernandez and the others. By his act,

respondent sheriff effectively altered, suppressed, concealed, or destroyed the integrity of said

evidence. For this act, complainant contends that respondent sheriff may be held liable under

Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal

Offenders.[6] Respondent sheriff‟s acts also constitute gross irregularity in the performance of his

duty as a court employee.

Complainant notes that respondent sheriff was absent from his office from March 20 to

March 24, 1998. This period included the dates he was supposed to have released the tanbark to

Hernandez. Complainant contends that respondent sheriff not only unlawfully released the

tanbark, he also made it appear that he was not physically present when such act was done.

In separate indorsements dated September 9, 1998, then Court Administrator Alfredo L.

Benipayo referred this administrative matter to both respondents for comment.

In his comment dated October 12, 1998,[7] respondent judge calls the attention of the Office

of the Court Administrator to a pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the replevin

case that effectively prevented him from commenting on the issue. The discussions that would

have to be included in the comment, he says, would also resolve the pending motion to

dismiss. Respondent judge contends that complainant should have been prudent enough to wait

for the resolution of the motion to dismiss before filing the instant administrative case.

Respondent judge claims that he was unaware of the existence of I.S. No. 98-296. He only

learned of the criminal case from an urgent manifestation dated March 20, 1998, filed by

complainant. He argues that he issued an order dated March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to

Hernandez of possession of the subject items, pending resolution of the urgent manifestation.

Respondent judge stresses that the writ of replevin was issued in strict compliance with the

requirements laid down in Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court. He also points out that said

writ was issued provisionally and was not intended to be the final disposition of the replevin

case.

Respondent judge avers that the charge of gross ignorance of the law is premature since he

has not made a ruling yet on the motion to dismiss filed in the replevin case. He contends that it

was too much to ask from him to take note of the fact that the defendants in said case were

officials of DENR and make assumptions based on such fact. Moreover, respondent judge

submits that while the complaint alleged that the cargo of tanbark was intercepted by the NBI, it

also alleged that the consignee thereof produced documents to prove that the shipment was legal.

In conclusion, respondent judge points out that no apprehension report was issued by the

NBI regarding the shipment. Neither did the DENR issue a seizure report. Respondent judge

contends that the validity of the seizure of the subject items by the DENR is a matter that will

have to be resolved in relation to the motion to dismiss.

For his part, respondent sheriff submits[8] that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast

Guard precisely to prevent the departure of the subject vessel, since he does not have the means

to physically prevent said vessel from sailing. The Coast Guard commander should have

examined the vessel and its crew after being served the writ, to determine whether or not they

were engaged in any illegal activity.

Respondent sheriff narrates that no cargo was on board the vessel when he served the writ

on the Coast Guard. He verified the cargo‟s status with DENR, which furnished him a copy of a

fax transmission stating that the tanbark came from legitimate sources except that the shipment

documents were not in order.[9]

Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the writ of replevin,

absent any instruction to the contrary. He argues further that since the items subject of the writ

are in the custody of the court and could be disposed of only through court order, there could not

be any unwarranted benefit to a private individual as claimed by complainant.

Noting that the questioned shipment of tanbark was not covered by either an NBI

apprehension report or a DENR seizure report, respondent sheriff contends that complainant

should have taken steps to protect the integrity of the shipment instead of heaping blame upon

others for his own negligence. Respondent sheriff avers that it was not his intention to obstruct

the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, contrary to complainant‟s claim.

Respondent sheriff refutes complainant‟s claim that he was absent from his office from

March 20 to March 24, 1998, and alleges that it was complainant who was absent from court

hearings on several occasions, in violation of his duty as a prosecutor.

Respondent submitted two supplemental comments dated October 30, 1998, [10] and May 3,

1999,[11] (1) reiterating his contention that the tanbark seized by the DENR and subject of the

replevin case had been found to come from a legitimate source, per an order signed by the

Regional Director (Region 8) of the DENR,[12] and (2) informing the OCA that the main replevin

case was dismissed per an order of respondent judge dated November 27, 1998.[13]

As required by resolution of the Court dated January 24, 2001, the parties herein separately

manifested that they are willing to have the present case resolved based on the record on hand.

We note that in its report dated April 8, 1999, the OCA, after reviewing the case,

recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P15,000.00 for gross ignorance of

the law. At the same time, the OCA recommended that the charges against respondent sheriff be

dismissed for lack of merit.

The recommendation of the OCA is well taken, except for the amount of the fine to be

imposed on said respondent judge.

The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment of tanbark as well as the vessel on

which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. [14] It also

states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR “for official disposition and

appropriate action.”[15] A copy of the document evidencing the turnover to DENR was attached to

the complaint as Annex “D”.[16] To our mind, these allegations would have been sufficient to alert

respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative

proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative

agencies of special competence.[17] Note, too, that the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to

recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to

him.[18] The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit

outright.

Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his authorized

representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or

possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances used in the commission of the offense.

In this regard, we declared in Paat v. Court of Appeals:

“…the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,

development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the

very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The

assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private

respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency‟s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not

warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the

jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. xxx”[19]

Respondent judge‟s act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit clearly

demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard set forth in Canon 1, Rule

1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that a judge must be the embodiment of competence,

integrity, and independence. To measure up to this standard, judges are expected to keep abreast

of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence.[20] Judges are duty bound to have more than just a

cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands

constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.[21]

We find, however, that respondent judge had already vacated the Writ of Seizure he issued

on March 19, 1998, in a subsequent Order dated November 27, 1998, dismissing the Civil

Complaint for replevin filed by Robert Hernandez against the Regional Director of the DENR

and other officers. He also directed in said order the sheriff to return to CENRO, Tacloban City,

all the chattels confiscated by virtue of the Writ of Seizure.[22]

Further, we find that Sheriff Aguilar in his Final Return of the Writ, dated December 15,

1998, had already delivered to CENRO the 102 tons and 120 kilos of tanbark duly receipted by

CENRO representative Marcial A. Dalimot on the same date.[23]

The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P15,000.00. Under

the circumstances, considering that this is the first complaint against him, we deem a fine of

P10,000.00 to be sufficient.

Regarding the charges against respondent sheriff, we agree with the OCA that they should

be dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with his ministerial duty to serve the writ

with reasonable celerity and to execute it promptly in accordance with its mandates.[24]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan is hereby found liable for gross

ignorance of the law and is accordingly ordered to pay a FINE of P10,000.00, with a WARNING

that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The complaint

against respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] SEC. 78. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forestry Products Without License. -- Any

person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from

alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest

products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with

the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of

partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession

shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further

proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest

products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools

illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.

[2] SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized

by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be

unlawful:

xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any

unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions

through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers

and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other

concessions.

xxx

[3] Rollo, p. 58.

[4] Id. at 74-75.

[5] Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167 (1997); Dapula, et al. v. Encinas, CA-G.R. No. 37055, October 28,

1996; Sampaga, et al. v. Espina, CA-G.R. No. 28404, April 20, 1994.

[6] Sec. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or

both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the

apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following

acts:

xxx

(b) Altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object with intent to

impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official

proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases.

xxx

[7] Rollo, pp. 81-94.

[8] See Comment dated October 11, 1998, rollo, pp. 197-206.

[9] Rollo, pp. 216-228. See in particular p. 227.

[10] Id. at 244-246.

[11] Id. at 264-265.

[12] Id. at 247-253.

[13] Id. at 266-268.

[14] Id. at 96.

[15] Id. at 98.

[16] Id. at 117.

[17] Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167, 178 (1997); Machete v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 176, 182

(1995); Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, 227 SCRA 271, 276 (1993).

[18] Paat v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 184, reiterated in Dy v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 331, 337 (1999).

[19] Paat v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 177-178.

[20] Cortes v. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423, 456 (1998).

[21] De Austria v. Beltran, 313 SCRA 443, 452 (1999).

[22] Rollo, pp. 266-268.

[23] Id. at 268-269.

[24] Onquit v. Binamira-Parcia, 297 SCRA 354, 364 (1998).

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017 June 19, 2008

LT. GEN. ALFONSO P. DAGUDAG (Ret.), complainant, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM, J.:

This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge filed by retired Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan, against Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City.

On or about 30 January 2005, the Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).1

On 30 and 31 January 2005, a team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG, DENR, and the Philippine Coast Guard inspected the container vans at a port in Mandaue City, Cebu. The team discovered the undocumented forest products and the names of the shippers and consignees:

Container Van No. Shipper Consignee

NCLU – 2000492-22GI Polaris Chua Polaris Chua

IEAU – 2521845-2210 Polaris Chua Polaris Chua

NOLU – 2000682-22GI Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot

INBU – 3125757-BB2210 Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot

NCLU – 20001591-22GI Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez

GSTU – 339074-US2210 Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez

CRXU – 2167567 Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez

NCLU – 2001570-22GI Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez

The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and other pertinent transport documents covering the forest products, as required by DENR Administrative Order No. 07-94. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time, the DENR considered them as abandoned and, on 31 January 2005, the Provincial

Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Richard N. Abella, issued a seizure receipt to NMC Container Lines, Inc.2

On 1 February 2005, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) OIC Loreto A. Rivac (Rivac) sent a notice to NMC Container Lines, Inc. asking for explanation why the government should not confiscate the forest products.3 In an affidavit4 dated 9 February 2005, NMC Container Lines, Inc.’s Branch Manager Alex Conrad M. Seno stated that he did not see any reason why the government should not confiscate the forest products and that NMC Container Lines, Inc. had no knowledge of the actual content of the container vans.

On 2, 9, and 15 February 2005, DENR Forest Protection Officer Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted notices on the CENRO and PENRO bulletin boards and at the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown owner about the administrative adjudication scheduled on 18 February 2005 at the Cebu City CENRO. Nobody appeared during the adjudication.5 In a resolution6 dated 10 March 2005, Rivac, acting as adjudication officer, recommended to DENR Regional Executive Director Clarence L. Baguilat that the forest products be confiscated in favor of the government.

In a complaint7 dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. On 29 March 2005, Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin8 ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possession of the forest products.

In a motion to quash the writ of replevin,9 the defendants DENR, CENRO, and Gen. Dagudag prayed that the writ of replevin be set aside: (1) Edma’s bond was insufficient; (2) the forest products were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains; (3) Edma was not a party-in-interest; (4) the forest products were not covered by any legal document; (5) nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time; (6) the forest products were already considered abandoned; (7) the forest products were lawfully seized under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; (8) replevin was not proper; (9) courts could not take cognizance of cases pending before the DENR; (10) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (11) the DENR was the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. In a motion to dismiss ad cautelam10 dated 12 April 2005, the defendants prayed that the complaint for replevin and damages be dismissed: (1) the real defendant is the Republic of the Philippines; (2) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (3) the State cannot be sued without its consent; and (4) Edma failed to allege that he is the owner or is entitled to the possession of the forest products.

In an order11 dated 14 April 2005, Judge Paderanga denied the motion to quash the writ of replevin for lack of merit.

Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an affidavit-complaint12 dated 8 July 2005 charging Judge Paderanga with gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge. Gen. Dagudag stated that:

During the x x x hearing, [Judge Paderanga] showed manifest partiality in favor of x x x Edma. DENR’s counsel was lambasted, cajoled and intimidated by [Judge Paderanga] using words such as "SHUT UP" and "THAT’S BALONEY."

x x x x

Edma in the replevin case cannot seek to recover the wood shipment from the DENR since he had not sought administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for [Judge Paderanga] to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.

x x x x

[Judge Paderanga’s] act[s] of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit, issuing the writ of replevin and the subsequent denial of the motion to quash clearly demonstrates [sic] ignorance of the law.

In its 1st Indorsement13 dated 1 August 2005, the OCA directed Judge Paderanga to comment on the affidavit-complaint. In his comment14 dated 6 September 2005, Judge Paderanga stated that he exercised judicial discretion in issuing the writ of replevin and that he could not delve into the issues raised by Gen. Dagudag because they were related to a case pending before him.

In its Report15 dated 10 July 2006, the OCA found that Judge Paderanga (1) violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; and (3) used inappropriate language in court. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; that Judge Paderanga be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and for violation of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary;16 and that he be fined P30,000.

In its Resolution17 dated 16 August 2006, the Court re-docketed the case as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. Judge Paderanga manifested his willingness to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed.18 Since Gen. Dagudag did not file any manifestation, the Court considered him to have waived his compliance with the 16 August 2006 Resolution.19

The Court finds Judge Paderanga liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct unbecoming a judge.

The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 states that the DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s natural resources.

Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, states that possessing forest products without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned.

In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products.

Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. In Factoran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court held that:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available

administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. (Emphasis ours)

In Dy v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court held that:

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. (Emphasis ours)

In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy,23 the Court held that all actions seeking to recover forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency — not the courts. In Paat,24 the Court held that:

Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ [of replevin]. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents’ right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.

x x x x

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the

Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. (Emphasis ours)

Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that members of DENR’s Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may have been

commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright. In Tabao v. Judge Lilagan25 — a case with a similar set of facts as the instant case — the Court held that:

The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x x x [was] seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action." x x x To our mind, these allegations [should] have been sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. x x x The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright. (Emphasis ours)

In Paat,26 the Court held that:

[T]he enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Emphasis ours)

Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court held that properties lawfully seized by the DENR cannot be the subject of replevin:

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the [properties seized] were validly deemed in custodia legis. [They] could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. (Emphasis ours)

Judge Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law. In Tabao,28 the Court held that:

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative of special competence. x x x [T]he plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.

Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his authorized representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned.

x x x x

Respondent judge’s act of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. x x x [J]udges are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges are duty bound to have more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge. (Emphasis ours)

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws.29

The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies is basic. There was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule. The forest products were in the custody of the DENR and Edma had not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright. In Español v. Toledo-Mupas,30 the Court held that:

Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by the judge inevitably erodes the confidence of the public in the competence of our courts to render justice. It subjects the judiciary to embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the specter of corruption.

When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she holds, or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.

The OCA found Judge Paderanga liable for using inappropriate language in court: "We x x x find respondent’s intemperate use of "Shut up!" and "Baloney!" well nigh inappropriate in court proceedings. The utterances are uncalled for."31

Indeed, the 14 and 22 April 2005 transcripts of stenographic notes show that Judge Paderanga was impatient, discourteous, and undignified in court:

Atty. Luego: Your Honor, we want to have this motion because that is...

Judge Paderanga: I am asking you why did you not make any rejoinder[?]

x x x x

Atty. Luego: I apologize, Your Honor. We are ready to...

Judge Paderanga: Ready to what? Proceed.

Atty. Luego: Yes, Your Honor. We filed this motion to quash replevin, Your Honor, on the grounds, first and foremost, it is our contention, Your Honor, with all due respect of [sic] this Honorable Court, that the writ of replevin dated March 29, 2005 was improper, Your Honor,

for the reasons that the lumber, subject matter of this case, were apprehended in accordance with...

Judge Paderanga: Where is your proof that it was apprehended? Where is your proof? Is that apprehension proven by a seizure receipt? Where is your seizure receipt?

Atty. Luego: Under the rules...

Judge Paderanga: Where is your seizure receipt? You read your rules. What does [sic] the rules say? Where in your rules does it say that it does not need any seizure receipt? You look at your rules. You point out the rules. You take out your rules and then you point out. Do you have the rules?

x x x x

Atty. Luego: Your Honor, there was no seizure receipt, but during the apprehension, Your Honor, there was no claimant.

Judge Paderanga: Answer me. Is there a seizure receipt?

Atty. Luego: But during the apprehension, Your Honor, no owner has [sic] appeared.

x x x x

Atty. Luego: According to [the] rules, Your Honor, if there is no...

Judge Paderanga: Whom are you seizing it from? To [sic] whom are you taking it from?

Atty. Luego: From the shipping company, Your Honor.

x x x x

Atty. Luego: Your Honor please, the shipping company denied the ownership of that lumber.

x x x x

Atty. Luego: But the shipping company, Your Honor,...

Judge Paderanga: Shut up. That’s baloney. You are seizing it from nobody. Then how can

you seize it from the shipping company. Are you not? You are a lawyer. Who is in possession of the property? The shipping company. Why did you not issue [a] seizure receipt to the shipping company?

Atty. Luego: But the... May I continue, Your Honor?

x x x x

Judge Paderanga: Stop talking about the shipping company. Still you did not issue a seizure receipt here. Well, I’m telling you you should have issued [a] seizure receipt to the shipping company.

x x x x

Judge Paderanga: You are a lawyer. You should know how to write pleadings. You write the pleadings the way it should be, not the way you think it should be.

Atty. Luego: I’m sorry, Your Honor.

Judge Paderanga: You are an officer of the court. You should be careful with your language. You say that I am wrong. It’s you who are [sic] wrong because you do not read the law.

x x x x

Judge Paderanga: Then you read the law. How dare you say that the Court is wrong.

x x x x

Judge Paderanga: Are you not representing [the DENR]?

Atty. Luego: Yes, in this case, Your Honor.

Judge Paderanga: Then you are representing them. They are your clients. What kind of a lawyer are you?32

x x x x

Atty. Tiamson: Specifically it was stated in the [Factoran] versus Court of Appeals [case] that the Court should not interfere, Your Honor.

Judge Paderanga: No.

x x x x

Judge Paderanga: The problem with you people is you do not use your heads.

Atty. Tiamson: We use our heads, your Honor.

x x x x

Atty. Tiamson: Your Honor, we would like to put on record that we use our heads, your Honor.33 (Emphasis ours)

Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous in relation to lawyers. Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should be patient and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced. They should avoid the attitude that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.

Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. They must refrain from inflammatory, excessively rhetoric, or vile language.34 They should (1) be dignified in demeanor

and refined in speech; (2) exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint; and (3) be considerate, courteous, and civil to all persons who come to their court.35 In Juan de la Cruz v. Carretas,36 the Court held that:

A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers x x x who appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the people’s faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

x x x x

It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer x x x. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words x x x with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.

Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. A judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words x x x. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence in the judiciary.

Judge Paderanga’s refusal to consider the motion to quash the writ of replevin, repeated interruption of the lawyers, and utterance of "shut up," "that’s baloney," "how dare you say that the court is wrong," "what kind of a lawyer are you?," and "the problem with you people is you do not use your heads" are undignified and very unbecoming a judge. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga,37 the Court already reprimanded Judge Paderanga for repeatedly saying "shut up," being arrogant, and declaring that he had "absolute power" in court. He has not changed.

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law as a serious offense. It is punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.38 Section 10 of Rule 140 classifies conduct unbecoming a judge as a light offense. It is punishable by (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; or (4) admonition with warning.39

The Court notes that this is Judge Paderanga’s third offense. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga,40the Court held him liable for grave abuse of authority and simple misconduct for unceremoniously citing a lawyer in contempt while declaring himself as having "absolute power" and for repeatedly telling a lawyer to "shut up." InBeltran, Jr. v. Paderanga,41 the Court held him liable for undue delay in rendering an order for the delay of nine months in resolving an amended formal offer of exhibits. In both cases, the Court sternly warned Judge Paderanga that the commission of another offense shall be dealt with more severely. The instant case and the two cases decided against him demonstrate Judge Paderanga’s arrogance, incorrigibility, and unfitness to become a judge.

Judge Paderanga has two other administrative cases pending against him — one42 for gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and grave abuse of authority, and the other43 for gross misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law.

The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their accountabilities. It will not tolerate any conduct that violates the norms of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system.44

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and UNBECOMING CONDUCT. Accordingly, the CourtDISMISSES him from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 1.

2 Id. at 2.

3 Id.

4 Id. at 44-46.

5 Id. at 2-3.

6 Id. at 20-22.

7 Id. at 13-19.

8 Id. at 23-24.

9 Id. at 25-35.

10 Id. at 48-61.

11 Id. at 47.

12 Id. at 1-12.

13 Id. at 103.

14 Id. at 104-106.

15 Id. at 107-112.

16 Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides:

SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

17 Rollo, p. 113.

18 Id. at 114-115.

19 Resolution, 23 April 2007, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017.

20 378 Phil. 282, 292 (1999).

21 363 Phil. 676, 682 (1999).

22 G.R. No. 111107, 10 January 1997, 266 SCRA 167, 175.

23 Supra note 21 at 683.

24 Supra note 22 at 184-185.

25 416 Phil. 710, 719-720 (2001).

26 Supra note 22 at 177-178.

27 387 Phil. 67, 79 (2000).

28 Supra note 25 at 720-721.

29 Atty. Macalintal v. Judge Teh, 345 Phil. 871, 878 (1997).

30 A.M. No. 03-1462-MTJ, 19 April 2007, 521 SCRA 403, 415-416.

31 Rollo, p. 111.

32 Id. at 64-80.

33 Id. at 99-101.

34 Guanzon v. Rufon, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2038, 19 October 2007, 537 SCRA 38.

35 Juan de la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legaspi City) v. Carretas, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043, 5 September 2007, 532 SCRA 218, 227-228.

36 Id. at 228-229.

37 A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 21, 36.

38 Sec. 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

39 Sec. 11(C), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

40 Supra note 37 at 36.

41 455 Phil. 227, 236 (2003).

42 Senarlo v. Judge Paderanga, RTJ-06-2025.

43 Summit World CDO, Inc. v. Judge Paderanga, OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2381-RTJ.

44 Escobar Vda. de Lopez v. Luna, A.M. No. P-04-1786, 13 February 2006, 482 SCRA 265, 277-278.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 93540. December 13, 1999]

FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment

and Natural Resources, VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR

GAPUZAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division),

Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW,as, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon

City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of

Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and May 18, 1990, respectively, dismissing petitioners‟ charge

that Honorable Benigno T. Dayaw, Presiding Judge of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Quezon City, committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering them to deliver to

private respondents the six-wheeler truck and its cargo, some 4,000 board feet of narra lumber

which were confiscated by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and

forfeited in favor of the government.[1]

The antecedent facts:

On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III,

intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying 4,000 board feet of narra

lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private

respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation

Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in

Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and

discovered the following discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber:[2]

“a. What were declared in the documents (Certificate of Timber Origin, Auxiliary

Invoices and various Certifications) were narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck

consisted of narra lumber;

“b. As appearing in the documents, the Plate Numbers of the truck supposed to carry

the forest products bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-267, while the Plate Number of the truck apprehended is NVT-881;

“c. Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have been accompanied

by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin, which merely covers only transport of logs and flitches;

“d. The Log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the seller and Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not

with Lily Francisco Lumber and Hardware,”[3]

which are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. The said BFD

Circular requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the following

documents: (1) Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District

Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester; (2) Sales Invoice; (3) Delivery

Receipt; and (4) Tally Sheets.[4] Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential

Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[5] Thus, petitioner Atty.

Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-

wheeler truck.[6]

On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and

Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Secretary) issued an order for the

confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.[7]

Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed, the said order to the

Office of the President. Consequently, the confiscated narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were

forfeited in favor of the government. They were subsequently advertised to be sold at public

auction on March 20, 1989.[8]

On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of

writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery

of the confiscated lumber and six-wheeler truck, and to enjoin the planned auction sale of the

subject narra lumber, respectively.[9] Said complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2045

and raffled to Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City.

On the same day, the trial court issued an Order directing petitioners to desist from

proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of

preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989.[10]

On March 20, 1989, the scheduled date of the auction sale, private respondents filed an Ex-

Parte Motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an

Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in

the amount of P180,000.00.[11] The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same day and

directed the petitioners “to deliver the xxx [n]arra lumber, original documents and truck with

plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their representative x x x”.[12]

On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to

comply therewith.[13] David G. Brodett, Sheriff of Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City

(hereinafter referred to as the Sheriff) reported that petitioners prevented him from removing the

subject properties from the DENR Compound and transferring them to the Mobil Unit

Compound of the Quezon City Police Force. To avoid any unwarranted confrontation between

them, he just agreed to a constructive possession of the properties in question. [14] In the afternoon

of the same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their intention to file a counterbond

under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the execution of the writ of seizure and to post a cash

bond in the amount of P180,000.00. But the trial court did not oblige petitioners for they failed

to serve a copy of the Manifestation on private respondents. Petitioners then immediately made

the required service and tendered the cash counterbond in the amount of P180,000.00, but it was

refused, petitioners‟ Manifestation having already been set for hearing on March 30, 1989. [15]

On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond which was,

however, denied for the same reason. [16]

On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in contempt for

disobeying the writ of seizure.[17] The trial court gave petitioners twenty-four (24) hours to

answer the motion. Hearing thereon was scheduled on March 30, 1989.

However, on March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for

Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the Orders of the trial court dated March 20,

1989 and March 27, 1989.[18]

On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of

a temporary restraining order (TRO).

On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary

injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00.[19]

However, on March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction

and dismissed the petition. It declared that as the complaint for replevin filed by private

respondents complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule

60 of the Revised Rules of court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory.[20]

As for the contempt charges against petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed the same

were sufficiently based on a written charge by private respondents and the report submitted by

the Sheriff.[21]

On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing

decision. However, that motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May

18, 1990.[22]

Hence this petition.

On the one hand, petitioners contend, thus:

(1) “Confiscated lumber cannot be subject of replevin”.[23]

(2) “Petitioners not compelled to criminally prosecute private respondents but may opt only to

confiscate lumber".[24]

(3) “Private respondent charged criminally in court”.[25] and

(4) “Writ of Replevin issued in contravention of PD #605”.[26]

On the other hand, private respondents argue that:

(1) “The respondent Judge had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the

complaint for recovery of personal property and, therefore, had

jurisdiction to issue the necessary orders in connection therewith.”[27]

(2) “The issuance of the order for the delivery of personal property

upon application, affidavit and filing of replevin bond by the plaintiff is mandatory and

not discretionary, hence, no abuse of discretion can be committed by the trial court in the

issuance thereof.”[28]

(3) “The Order of March 20, 1989 was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 60 of the Rules of

Court and is, therefore, valid.”[29]

(4) “The private respondents have not been proven to have violated Section 68 of the Revised

Forestry Code.”[30]

(5) “The petitioners do not have the authority to keep private respondents‟ property for an

indefinite period, more so, to dispose of the same without notice and hearing or without due

process.”[31]

(6) “Contrary to the allegation of petitioners, no formal investigation was conducted by the PIC

with respect to the subject lumber in this case.”[32]

(7) “The alleged Order dated January 20, 1989 of the petitioner Secretary Fulgencio Factoran,

Jr. of the DENR is not valid and does not make the issuance of the order of replevin

illegal.”[33] and

(8) “The subject properties were not in custody of the law and may be replevied.”[34]

At the outset we observe that herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of

petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President as provided for in Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705

which reads:

“All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon

appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the

aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the President x x x. The decision

of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.”

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law,

comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies

have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity

to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.[35] As to the

application of this doctrine in cases involving violations of P.D. No. 705, our ruling in Paat v.

Court of Appeals, is apropos:

“Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall

within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well

within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit

filed by private respondents constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the

administrative agency‟s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not

warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special

competence. In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, this Court

held:

„Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A

long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters

which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of

such agencies.‟”[36]

However, petitioners did not file a motion to dismiss based on the ground of non-exhaustion

of administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.[37]

Nonetheless, the petition is impressed with merit.

First. A writ of replevin does not just issue as a matter of course upon the applicant‟s filing

of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an

affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Sec. 2, Rule 60 of the Revised

Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Said provision reads:

“Affidavit and bond. - Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must show by his

own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:

“(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or entitled to the possession thereof;

“(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention thereof to his best knowledge, information, and belief;

“(c) That it has not been taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law, or seized

under an execution, or an attachment against the property of the plaintiff, or, if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure; and

“(d) The actual value of the property.

“x x x x x x x x x .”

Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must

be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should

not be issued.

In the case at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by

petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order

(E.O.) No. 277, to wit:

“SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly

Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. - In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly

authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either

by land, water, or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in

accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.”[38]

As the petitioner Secretary‟s administrative authority to confiscate is clearly provided by law, the

taking of the subject properties is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of

replevin prayed for by private respondents.

Second. Issuance of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary was a valid exercise of his

power under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705. By virtue of said order, the narra lumber and six-

wheeler truck of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of

replevin.

Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. [39] When

a thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a

legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it.[40] Otherwise, there would be interference with the

possession before the function of law had been performed as to the process under which the

property was taken.[41] So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments

introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, Sec. 2(c), Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that:

“Affidavit and bond. - Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must show by his

own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:

“x x x x x x x x x;

“(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or fine

pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution, or preliminary attachment or

otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; x x x

“x x x x x x x x x.”[42]

Third. Petitioner Secretary‟s authority to confiscate forest products under Sec. 68-A of P.D.

No. 705 is distinct from and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal

action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, in Paat, we held that:

“„x x x precisely because of the need to make forestry laws „more responsive to

present situations and realities‟ and in view of the „urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country,‟ that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This

amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. x x x. The preamble of EO 277 that added Section 68-A to PD

705- is most revealing:

„WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through

the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the Penal provisions of the Revised

Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this [sic] difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities;‟

„It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to

confiscate, not only „conveyances‟ but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the „court‟ in a criminal action has long been

provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power of confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-

A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided

any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, x x x.‟”[43]

Sec. 68-A was added precisely to supplant the inadequacies and supplement criminal

enforcement of forestry laws.

Fourth. Sec. 80 of P. D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within

six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct

preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not

to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

Sec. 80 of P.D. No. 705 provides:

“SEC. 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - A forest officer or employee of the

Bureau shall arrest even without a warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also

seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in

committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender

in the process of committing the offense. The arresting officer or employee shall

thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender and the confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to, and file the proper

complaint with, the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in court.

“x x x x x x x x x.”

The title of Sec. 80 - “Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions” - bespeaks this intendment of the

law. The fact, too, that Secs. 68 and 80 were co-existing prior to the introduction of Sec. 68-A,

proves that Sec. 80 applies to the criminal prosecutions subject of Sec. 68 and not to the

administrative confiscation subject of Sec. 68-A. Sec. 68-A, therefore, should not be interpreted

in relation to Sec. 80 as to require that criminal charges be filed with and seized forest products

be immediately delivered to, the fiscal in case of administrative confiscation, for this renders

nugatory the purpose sought to be achieved thereby. Statutes should always be construed in the

light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be

given such interpretation as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the

benefits intended.[44]

Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents‟ allegation that their right to due

process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to the confiscation of their

properties.

On the contrary, by private respondents‟ own admission, private respondent Sy who drove

the six-wheeler truck was properly investigated by petitioner Atty. Robles at the PIC/SAID

Office of the DENR. Thereafter, private respondent Sy and his witnesses were given full

opportunity to explain the deficiencies in the documents.[45] Private respondents categorically

stated that they made a “continuous and almost daily follow-up and plea x x x with the PIC for

the return of the truck and lumber x x x.”[46] Finally in a letter dated December 30, 1989, private

respondent Lily Francisco Uy requested petitioner Secretary for “immediate resolution and

release of the impounded narra sawn lumber.”[47]

Undoubtedly, private respondents were afforded an opportunity to be heard before the order

of confiscation was issued. There was no formal or trial type hearing but the same is not, in all

instances, essential in administrative proceedings. It is settled that due process is satisfied when

the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or

an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[48]

Moreover, respondents claim that the order of confiscation was antedated and not the

product of the investigation supposedly conducted by the PIC of the DENR. However, they

proffer no proof to support that allegation. On the other hand, there is the legal presumption that

official duty has been regularly performed. The presumption of regularity in the performance of

official duties is even particularly strong with respect to administrative agencies like the DENR

which are vested with quasi-judicial powers in enforcing the laws affecting their respective fields

of activity, the proper regulation of which requires of them such technical mastery of all relevant

conditions obtaining in the nation.[49]

Finally. The writ of seizure and the writ of replevin were issued by the trial court in grave

abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court

which presupposes that the court order thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful

order having been issued, no contempt of court could be committed.[50]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17194

are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Respondent Presiding Judge Benigno T. Dayaw, of

the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing the

Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989 in Civil Case No. Q-89-2045, or if said orders

have already been enforced, the said respondent Judge is directed to render judgment of

forfeiture on the replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said respondent Judge is

PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by private

respondents against the petitioners.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

[1] Petitioners‟ Memorandum, p. 1, Rollo, p. 276.

[2] Petition , pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 9-10.

[3] Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, p. 35.

[4] See note 2, supra, p.16; Rollo, p.21.

[5] “SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any person

who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber and other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable

or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products

without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the

penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,

associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,

and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the

part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

“The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest

products cut, gathered, collected, removed or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools

illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.”

[6] Annex “1” of Comment, Rollo, p. 165.

[7] See note 3, supra.

[8] See note 1, supra, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 280-281.

[9] Annex “4” of Comment; Rollo, pp. 170-171.

[10] Annex “5” of Comment; Rollo, 179-180.

[11] Annex “M” of Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 105.

[12] Annex “7-A” of Comment; Rollo, p. 191.

[13] See note 11, supra, p. 4; Rollo, p. 106.

[14] Annex “9-B” of Comment, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 195-196.

[15] Annex “I” of the Petition, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 57-58.

[16] Annex “12” of Comment; Rollo, p. 199.

[17] Private Respondents‟ Memorandum, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 312-313.

[18] Id., p. 12, Rollo, p. 313.

[19] See note 11, supra, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 106-107.

[20] Id., pp. 5-7, Rollo, pp. 107-109.

[21] Id., pp. 7-9; Rollo, pp. 109-111.

[22] See note 2, supra, pp. 22, 25; Rollo, pp. 27, 30.

[23] See note 1, supra, p. 10; Rollo, p. 285.

[24] Id., p. 15; Rollo, p. 290.

[25] Id., p. 17; Rollo, p. 292.

[26] Id., p. 18; Rollo, p. 293.

[27] See note 17, supra, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 314-315.

[28] Id., pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 315-316.

[29] Id., p. 18; Rollo, p. 319.

[30] Id., p. 19; Rollo, p.320.

[31] Id., p. 22; Rollo, p. 323.

[32] Id., p. 24; Rollo, p.325.

[33] Id., p. 25; Rollo, p. 326.

[34] Id., p. 29; Rollo, p. 330.

[35] University of the Philippines et al. vs. Hon. Elpidio M. Catungal, Jr. etc., et al., 272 SCRA 221, 240 (1997); Hon.

Bartolome Carale vs. Hon. Pampio A. Abarintos, et al., 269 SCRA 132, 141 (1997).

[36] Paat vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167, 181 (1997); Soledad Dy vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 121587,

March 9, 1999.

[37] Soto vs. Jareno, 144 SCRA 116, 119 (1986); C.N. Hodges vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, 19 SCRA 28, 34 (1967).

[38]38 Underscoring provided.

[39] Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 85, 89 (1993); Bagalihog vs. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614; 621 (1991);

Auyong Hian vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110, 134 (1974).

[40] Chua vs. Court of Appeals, supra.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Underscoring provided.

[43] Paat vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 181-182.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Annex “I” of Petition, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 72-73.

[46] Id., p. 6; Rollo, p. 73.

[47] Annex “3” of Comment; Rollo, p. 167.

[48] Paat vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 179; Navarro vs. Damasco, 246 SCRA 260, 265 (1995); Stayfast Philippines

Corp. vs. NLRC, 218 SCRA 596, 601 (1993).

[49] Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 157 SCRA 481, 493 (1988).

[50] Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Annotated and Commented, Vol. IV-B, Part II, p. 305;

Angel Jose Realty Corporation vs. Galao, 76 Phil. 201, 204-205 (1946); Weigall vs. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340, 345

(1908); Chanco vs.Madrilejos, 9 Phil. 356, 361 (1908).

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002]

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban City, Represented by Regional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized representative may order the confiscation in favor of the government of, among others, the vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision[1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

“WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused

GREGORIO DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime

charged, with costs de [o]ficio.

“The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.

“The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is taking custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle „St. Jude‟, with Plate No.

HAJ-848, to return the said vehicle to the owner thereof.”[3]

The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last paragraph of the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein respondents.

The Facts

In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

“The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with]

violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an information which is quoted herein below:

„That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 o‟clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named

accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy

two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total volume of 72.93 board feet

valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from

the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.

„CONTRARY TO LAW.‟

“Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not guilty.

“Thereafter trial was conducted.

“The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:

“That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as

a Forest Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 o‟clock in the afternoon, while he was in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge,Samar, a vehicle named „St. Jude‟ with

Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the

said vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1” x 2” x 4”, 16 pieces of 1” x 24” x 2.3” and 1 piece

of 1” x 2” x 4.” In his estimate at the price of P10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber would be P729.30. He asked the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and

he was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also

informed him that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the vehicle and

the assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. „B‟

and series. He also took photographs of the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. „C‟ and series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a

Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for some papers for the

assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not his. Daraman further told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some

wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral

Services to be brought to his (Asan‟s) house in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City.

“The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony

considering that the case would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by

Pablo Opinion. The prosecution rested its case with the admission of Exhs. „A‟ and „B‟ and their series. Its Exhs. „C‟ and series were rejected because the photographer

who took them did not testify to identify [them].

“For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused

would merely offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts

have been established:

“That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer

Baby Lucenecio instructed him to procure some wood shavings („sinapyo‟) in San

Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His companion[s] were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went

to barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by a certain AsanAbing. They loaded 20

sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2 inches in

circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were] being used by the Holy Cross Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood

shavings were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral

Services [was] also located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted lumber into

the vehicle. The subject assorted lumber were already in the furniture shop where they got the wood shavings. On their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo

Opinion stopped him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired about the

assorted lumber and he told him that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop inBrgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his vehicle to be brought to his

(Asan‟s) house in Barangay Obrero, Calbayog City. He told Opinion also that Asan advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the

person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy.

Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead impounded the vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00

o‟clock in the afternoon, the vehicle was still not returned to him and so

Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his employer

at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about what happened.”[4]

After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle to Lucenecio.

Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan, Samarconducted administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private respondents. [5] The two failed to present documents to show the legality of their possession and transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.[6] Atty. Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, concurring with the recommendation to forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from private respondents. The Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region VIII, Tacloban City.[7]

Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the ―return of the said vehicle to the owner thereof.‖[8] He contended that the vehicle had already been administratively confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.[9] He further claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.

The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence. The unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latter’s house in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the authorization for the lumber were in the former’s shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora. Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him.

In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his disapproval of the Motion.

Substantively, the trial court ruled:

“x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found

by the Court the owner of the vehicle in question, „St. Jude,‟ which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of

P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of the motion

which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession of the subject forest

products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the subject lumber. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

“The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long become final and executory.

“Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by the OIC DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the

lumber in question [was] found to be owned by AsanAbing. But notwithstanding this

fact, for reasons not known to the Court, the said Asan Abing was never made an accused in the present case.

“Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is

himself a violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any other persons who committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of

his vehicle in violating the said law. In the present case as shown by the evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has

committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by the Court in its decision

of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the decision has not been appealed.”[10]

Hence, this Petition.[11]

Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Court’s consideration:

“(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return of property already owned by the government.

(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the

provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive

Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of

thePhilippines.

(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of

mistake, error or failure of its officers to perform their duties.”[12]

Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle administratively.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue: Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle

Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government property by virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or abandoning forest products.

We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A comparison of the provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Section 68 reads:

“Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products

Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other

forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest

products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310

of the Revised Penal Code: x x x.

“The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well

as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where

the timber or forest products are found.”[14]

Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:

“SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly

Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly

authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally

cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in

accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.”[15]

If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently. [16]

Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial arts;[17] equipment covers physical facilities available for production, including buildings, machineries and tools;[18] and implements pertains to whatever may supply a want, especially an instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These terms do not include conveyances that are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner that includes ―any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of transport used in the movement of any forest product.‖ [20]

Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of ―all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same‖ is vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations.[21]

To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-93, amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations.

Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to private respondents to ―willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, x x x.‖ The Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of illegally cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended.

Confiscation Without Due Process

Private respondents’ main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex ―C‖) is a ―false, falsified and perjurious document.‖ The Order was attached to and made part of the record only when petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only after the trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according to the private respondents, that RED Momongan had approved the Memorandum on January 26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division ofTacloban City, signed the Memorandum recommending approval only on January 31, 1994.

Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32) ordered the provincial environment and natural resources officer to transfer the confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in connection with the prosecution of Criminal Case 1958.[22] Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not deliver the vehicle because it was not in running condition.[23]

We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls outside the ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to release the vehicle was private respondents’ acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning only the RTC’s jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the confiscated vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the DENR’s Order of Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus be presumed.[24] The genuineness of the Order and its proper service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court, which is not a trier of facts.[25]

The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the main limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.[26] Under PD 705, the actions and the decisions of the DENR are reviewable by the courts only through special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.[27]

Second Issue: Construing PD 705, as Amended

Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator or was a conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.

In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law

or conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705, and their acquittals were not appealed.

We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.

Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest products without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.[28]

We also uphold petitioner’s argument that the release of the vehicle to private respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws. [29] Strong paramount public policy should not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope. [30]

Third Issue: Estoppel

In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioner’s third issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that the assistant provincial prosecutor’s failure to comment on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was an implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutor’s disapproval does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private respondents.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

[1] Penned by Judge Clemente C. Rosales; rollo, pp. 39-47.

[2] Rollo, pp. 53-54.

[3] Rollo, p. 47.

[4] RTC Decision, pp. 1-5; rollo, pp. 39-42.

[5] Rollo, pp. 33-35.

[6] Rollo, p. 35.

[7] Order of Forfeiture; rollo, p. 147.

[8] Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 1-4; rollo, pp. 48-51.

[9] Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, Annex ―C,‖ rollo, p. 38; Annex ―11,‖ rollo, p. 147; and Annex ―H,‖ rollo, p. 177.

[10] Rollo, pp. 53-54.

[11] The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon this Court’s receipt of the Memorandum for private respondents on January 30, 2001. The resolution of this case was delayed by private respondents’ failure/refusal to file their pleadings on time. The Court had to issue two separate Orders of Arrest and Commitment against private respondents on April 20, 1998, for their failure to submit their Comment on the Petition (rollo, pp. 71-72) and against Atty. Sisenando Fiel Jr. on November 20, 2000 for his failure to file the Memorandum for private respondents (rollo, pp. 258-259).

[12] Rollo, p. 228. The Memorandum for Petitioner was signed by Attys. Fiel I. Marmita and Chona S. Apostol-Octa.

[13] Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, 247 SCRA 9, 18, August 2, 1995; Department of Health v. National Labor Relations Commission, 251 SCRA 700, 707, December 29, 1995.

[14] 111 VLD 74.

[15] Ibid, p. 75.

[16] Globe-Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 701, March 3, 1992.

[17] Federico B. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictonary, 2nd ed., p. 371, citing Kolambugan Lumber & Development Co. v. Yia, 56 Phil 201, 203, October 15, 1931.

[18] Ibid, p. 211, citing Lu Do & Lu Ym Corp. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 108 Phil. 566, 572, May 31, 1960.

[19] Id., p. 290, citing Central Azucarera de la Carlota v. Coscolluela, 44 Phil. 527, 531, February 20, 1923.

[20] § 1, DENR Administrative Order 54-93.

[21] §§5 and 7 of PD 705 (25 YLD 6-7).

[22] April 6, 1995 Order; rollo, p. 151.

[23] Letter dated May 10, 1995; rollo, p. 152.

[24] §5 (m) and (n), Rule 131, Rules on Evidence.

[25] San Miguel Foods, Inc. -Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Laguesma, 263 SCRA 68, 84, October 10, 1996.

[26] De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 389, 393, August 7, 1996; Tañedo v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 80, 86, January 22, 1996.

[27] §9, PD 705.

[28] Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404, 407, July 5, 1996.

[29] 111 VLD 73.

[30] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 376, 472, January 23, 1995.

SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. 86218, September 18, 1992 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ELSIE BAGISTA Y BANGCO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

D E C I S I O N NOCON, J.:

Appeal by accused-appellant Elsie Bagista from the decision dated September 26, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio City, received information from one of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5'2" or 5'3", would be transporting marijuana from up north.[1] Acting upon this piece of information, Sgt. Oscar Parajas testified that he, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a civilian NARCOM agent proceeded to Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet. Upon arriving at said location at around 11:00 o'clock that same morning, they established a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana leaves on board.[2] After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and body number 428, which came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to the passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they were going to search their baggages. Sgt. Parajas then proceeded to the rear of the bus while Sgt. Fider began inspecting the bags in the front.[3] While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right side (as one is facing the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with black and orange stripes[4] on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was booked and investigated. The woman was then identified as accused appellant.[5] The confiscated bundles were subjected to laboratory examination, and found positive for marijuana.[6] Accused-appellant's defense rests solely on denial. She claimed that she was engaged in the buying and selling of vegetables, particularly cabbages. On the day in question, she boarded the Dangwa Tranco bus at Abatan, Benguet, bringing with her ten (10) sacks of cabbages which she intended to sell to a certain Maria Opino in Baguio City. While inside the bus, she

approached the conductor for her ticket to cover the fare for her sacks of cabbages, but was told by the latter that he would attend to her later. When the bus reached Tublay, Benguet, it was stopped by the NARCOM agents who boarded the same and began inspecting the baggages of the passengers. Accused-appellant claimed that the bag containing the marijuana was taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats. When nobody admitted owning the bag, the NARCOM agent approached her, took the shoulder bag on her lap, and asked her to come with them for investigation as she fits the description of the would-be transporter of the marijuana given by the NARCOM informer. She denied having anything to do with the marijuana found on the bus. To corroborate her story, accused-appellant presented the conductor of the Dangwa Tranco bus, Nestor Yangkin. He testified that when the NARCOM agents boarded the bus at Tublay, Benguet, one of them got a bag from the luggage carrier, opened it, and smelled the contents. The agent then asked the passengers who among them owned the bag; when nobody answered, he walked to the back of the bus, all the time looking at the faces of the passengers. When the agent approached accused-appellant, who was seated at the rear of the bus, the former talked to her, then escorted her out of the bus.[7] During Yangkin's cross-examination, it came out that the 10 sacks of vegetables that were loaded at Abatan were brought by a man who told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival at the Dangwa Station in Baguio City but that the owner of the sacks would be riding in the bus. And yet, Yangkin did not seek out the alleged owner of the sacks. The witness also testified that none of the passengers approached him and offered to pay for the fare of the sacks,[8] contrary to accused-appellant's testimony. In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court found the testimony of Sgt. Parajas credible. Said the court a quo: “. . . The testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas was direct and straightforward as he gave all the requisite details of the entrapment operation they conducted based on an information provided by a coordinating individual. His testimony reveals that the bag containing the marijuana leaves was found on the lap of the accused. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Sgt. Parajas was moved by any motive than simply the carrying out of his official mission or duty. Where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit (People vs. Francia, L-69253, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 495)."[9] The trial court brushed aside the defense's observation that there were discrepancies between the testimony of Sgt. Parajas and the evidence presented, such as the color of the bag allegedly taken from accused-appellant and the kind of marijuana taken from the bag, as immaterial. Similarly brushed aside was the defense's contention that the evidence against accused-appellant, such as the Receipt of Property Seized[10] and her signature thereon,[11] and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report[12] and her signature thereon,[13] were

inadmissible due to the absence of counsel, since these were not confessions or extrajudicial statements. Finally, the trial court did not give credence to the testimonies of accused-appellant and her witness Nestor Yangkin, in view of the testimony of Sgt. Parajas that he took the bag containing the marijuana from accused-appellant's lap. Moreover, the court a quo

observed that there was a discrepancy between the testimonies of accused-appellant and Yangkin on the matter of the 10 sacks of cabbage, which led the court to conclude that the former was in the act of transporting marijuana at the time of her arrest. Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the marijuana leaves found in the bag taken from her was inadmissible in evidence as it was the product of a warrantless search, which motion was denied by the trial court for lack of merit on November 22, 1988. Aggrieved, accused-appellant filed the instant appeal, alleging that the court a quo erred (1) in not finding the warrantless search conducted by the NARCOM agents as illegal and unconstitutional, and (2) in admitting the illegally obtained evidences and convicting her on the basis of said evidences. Accused-appellant is in error. The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest.[14] The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle,[15] and the seizure of evidence in plain view.[16] With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.[17]

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.[18] The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to search accused-appellant's belongings since she fits the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible against accused-appellant. At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-appellant in the court below on the inadmissibility of the evidence against her on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. This amounts to a waiver of the objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained therefrom.[19] Amid a waiver, the court is duty bound to admit the evidence.[20] Reviewing the evidence, We find the same sufficient to prove accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag containing the dried marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellant's possession. She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was actually taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what actually happened at the checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-appellant's apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the defense. In situations like this, the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because, unlike appellate courts, they can weigh such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial.[21] The exception is when the trial court has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result,[22] which We do not find in the instant case. Moreover, accused-appellant's defense was weakened by the fact that her witness Nestor Yangkin contradicted her on the matter of the 10 sacks of vegetables appellant claims to have brought with her at the time of her arrest. Appellant claims she loaded the sacks of vegetables on the bus and tried to pay for its fare, but that conductor Yangkin, put her off. Yangkin claims otherwise: the sacks of vegetables were loaded by a man who told him that

the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival in Baguio City, and that no one on the bus offered to pay for the same. In weighing contrary declarations and statements, greater weight must generally be given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than the denials of the accused appellant.[23]

Given the discrepancy on this point, the trial court correctly disregarded the corroborative testimony of Nestor Yangkin. The matter of the ownership of the 10 sacks of vegetables is material since appellant's reason for being on the bus was to deliver these sacks to Baguio City. If the sacks of vegetables are not hers, then the only conclusion that can be drawn is that she was on her way to Baguio City to sell the marijuana found in her possession. As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution's case, such as the color of the stripes of the bag which contained the marijuana and whether the items seized from accused appellant were marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit tops, these are minor in character and do not detract from the prosecution's case since it was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized,[24] which was signed by accused-appellant, that these were the very items taken from her at the time of her arrest.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, and Melo, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., see dissenting opinion.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 121587. March 9, 1999]

SOLEDAD DY, doing business under the name and style RONWOOD

LUMBER, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ODEL

BERNARDO LAUSA,respondent.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP 33099

setting aside two orders of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City (Branch 5) and the appellate

court‟s resolution denying petitioner‟s motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows.

On May 31, 1993, the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 93-01 creating

Task Force Kalikasan to combat “illegal logging, log smuggling or possession of and/or transport

of illegally cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and other forest products” in that city. [2] The

team was composed of personnel of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police (PNP), the

Department of Natural Resources (DENR), and the Office of the City Mayor of Butuan.

Respondent Odel Bernardo Lausa, who was the acting chief of civilian security in the mayor‟s

office, was a member of the team.

On July 1, 1993, the members of the task force received confidential information that two

truckloads of illegally cut lumber would be brought to Butuan City from the Ampayon-Taguibe-

Tiniwisan area. Accordingly, the team set up a check-point along kilometer 4 in Baan, Butuan

City.[3] What happened thereafter is summarized in the following portion of the decision of the

Court of Appeals:[4]

At around 10:00 p.m., two trucks with Plate Nos. KAK-542 and KBL-214 and loaded

with lumber approached the checkpoint. They were flagged down by the operatives

but instead of stopping, they accelerated their speed hence, the task force gave chase. They finally caught up with the two vehicles at the compound of Young

Metalcraft and Peterwood Agro-Forest Industries at Baan, Butuan City, about two kilometers from the checkpoint. When requested by the operatives, Pulcita Lucero,

caretaker/in charge of the compound could not produce any document as proof of the

legality of the origin/possession of the forest products.

Forester Resurreccion Maxilom of the DENR issued a temporary seizure order and a seizure

receipt for the two vehicles and their cargo consisting of several pieces of lumber of different

sizes and dimensions, but Lucero, the caretaker of the compound where they were seized,

refused to accept them. The seized lumber and vehicles were then taken to the City motorpool

and placed in the custody of respondent Lausa.

The next day, July 2, 1993, Maxilom submitted a memorandum-report to the Community

Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Butuan City on the seizure of the

lumber and the two vehicles.[5] On July 6, the CENRO issued a notice of confiscation which was

duly posted for three days.

For lack of claimants, DENR Regional Technical Director Raoul Geollegue recommended

to the Secretary on July 29, 1993 the forfeiture of the lumber and the two

vehicles. [6] Accordingly, on July 30, 1993, DENR Regional Director De la Rosa ordered the

CENRO of Butuan City to issue the requisite forfeiture orders,[7] which CENRO Angelita

Orcasitas issued on August 15, 1993.[8]

On October 20, 1993, more than two months after the lumber had been forfeited, petitioner,

claiming to be the owner of the lumber, filed a suit for replevin in the Regional Trial Court of

Butuan City (Branch 5) for its recovery. The next day, October 21, 1993, the trial court issued a

preliminary writ of replevin.

On October 29, 1993, respondent Lausa filed a motion for the approval of a counterbond.

Before the court could act on his motion, he moved to dismiss and/or quash the writ of replevin

on the ground that the lumber in question, having been seized and forfeited by the DENR

pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended (Revised Forestry Code), was under its custody and,

therefore, resort should first be made to the DENR.

On November 29, 1993, the trial court denied respondent Lausa‟s application for the

approval of the counterbond as well as his motion to dismiss and/or quash the suit for replevin.

For this reason, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals in which he

sought the approval of his counterbond and the nullification of the two orders, dated October 21,

1993 and November 29, 1993, granting petitioner‟s prayer for a preliminary writ of replevin and

denying his Motion to Dismiss Case and/or Quash Writ of Replevin.

On January 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of

which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and

a. The Orders dated 21 October 1993 and 29 November 1993 are SET ASIDE.

b. Respondent judge is directed to approve a duly qualified counterbond to be filed by

petitioner, even with a period of at least one year.

No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Petitioner‟s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution, dated July 26,

1995. Hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges that:

FIRST ERROR

WITH DUE RESPECT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE VERIFICATION MADE BY LORENCIO DY AND NOT BY

PETITIONER SOLEDAD Y. DY WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF THE REPLEVIN WRIT.[10]

SECOND ERROR

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT A COUNTERBOND IN REPLEVIN WHICH IS EFFECTIVE FOR ONLY ONE

YEAR IS VALID TO CAUSE THE RETURN OF THE PROPERTY TO

DEFENDANT.[11]

THIRD ERROR

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT‟S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.[12]

The appeal is without merit. The threshold question is whether the Regional Trial Court

could in fact take cognizance of the replevin suit, considering that the object was the recovery of

lumber seized and forfeited by law enforcement agents of the DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705

(Revised Forestry Code), as amended by Executive Order No. 277.

The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the

courts. In a long line of cases, we have consistently held that before a party may be allowed to

seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all

the means afforded by the administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative

machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every

opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be

exhausted first before a court‟s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of a

court‟s intervention is fatal to one‟s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver

or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.[13]

Section 8 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:

SEC. 8. Review. All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to

review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty

(30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, series of 1966. The Decision of

the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil

action for certiorari or prohibition.

In Paat v. Court of Appeals,[14] where, as in the case at bar, the trial court issued a writ of

replevin against the DENR, thus allowing the claimant to obtain possession of the conveyance

used in transporting undocumented forest products, this Court stated:

Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents‟

failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper cause of action by the

lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ

ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a

condition precedent prior to one‟s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element

of private respondents‟ right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.[15]

As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the Court of

Appeals correctly set aside the assailed orders of the trial court granting petitioner‟s application

for a replevin writ and denying private respondent‟s motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited

pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended, the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR

and all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to that agency.

The appellate court‟s directive to the trial court judge to allow the respondent agent of the

DENR to file a counterbond in order to recover custody of the lumber should be disregarded as

being contrary to its order to dismiss the replevin suit of petitioner. For, indeed, what it should

have done was to dismiss the case without prejudice to petitioner filing her claim before the

Department of Natural Resources (DENR).

In view of the conclusion reached in this case, it is unnecessary to discuss the errors

assigned by petitioner. These pertain to the questions whether petitioner‟s complaint below was

properly verified and whether private respondent‟s counterbond should be approved. Both are

based on the premise that the trial court can take cognizance over the case. As shown above,

however, such is not the case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 19, 1995, and its

Resolution, dated July 26, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP 33099 are AFFIRMED with the modification

that the complaint for recovery of personal property is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[1]

Per Associate Justice Buenaventura Guerrero, Chairman, concurred in by Justices Cesar D. Francisco and Celia

Lipana-Reyes, members.

[2] CA Rollo, p. 52; Petition, Annex J, p. 2.

[3] Id., p. 120; Private Respondent‟s Reply to Petitioner‟s Comment, Annex E, p. 1.

[4] Rollo, p. 28; Decision, p. 2.

[5] CA Rollo,, pp. 61-62; Petition, Annex P.

[6] Id., p. 63; id., Annex Q.

[7] Id., p. 64; id., Annex R.

[8] Id., pp. 49-50; id., Annex I-I-1.

[9] Rollo, p. 32; Decision, p. 6.

[10] Id., p. 19; Petition, p. 9.

[11] Id., p. 21; id., p. 11.

[12] Id., p. 24; id., p. 14.

[13] Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167, 175 (1997), citing cases.

[14] 266 SCRA 167 (1997).

[15] Id., at 184.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 108619. July 31, 1997]

EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J.:

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense or a "nonexistent crime."

On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican,[1] Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543, the information reads:

"That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan,

City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and

confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board

feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps,

with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or

boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.[2]

The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of law.[3]

On September 24, 1991, the lower court,[4] guided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an Order quashing the information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that:

"Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest lands by being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought

and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to lumber."

The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a holding that the case could be resolved on some other grounds or issues.[5]

The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.

Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of

lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one point to another.[6]

Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized under that section.[7]

Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52.

On June 10, 1992, the lower court[8] issued the herein questioned Order setting aside the quashal Order of the previous judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of forest products.

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest products."

The petition is devoid of merit.

Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, provides:

"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other

forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public

land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and

regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310

of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession

shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration

and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the

machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the

timber or forest products are found." (Underscoring supplied.)

Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.

In the recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:

"The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of 'Processing plant,' which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of

machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished

wood product.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In

the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is

defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for the market.' Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage

meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is

concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos

distinguere debemus."

Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following:

"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the

country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and

regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical

difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities; x x x"

To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law.[10] After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the lower court said:

"Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the

prohibition, still it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3

(q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code defines

forest products, viz., x x x

Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product

(supra). If we are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He could

stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal

prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. x x x.

If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in their possession were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is

produce the legal documents contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or

possession of timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber,

wood, or other forest products without lawful authority."

The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[11] Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power.[12]

On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion.[13] Where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.[14] As this Court said:

"x x x. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged

does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every

erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of

judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible

through the original civil action of certiorari."[15]

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions. [16]

The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his motion to quash the information filed against him and three others. This Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[17]

Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.[18] The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[19] An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[20] However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari would not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts.[21]

Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan[22] for his contention that a denial of a motion to quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at bar. The information herein not being "patently defective" nor that the offense charged has prescribed, [23] this case may not be considered an exception to the rule on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion to quash.

With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court consider,[24] this Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case,[25] this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law. [26]

The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country, considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Torres, Jr., J., on leave.

[1] Lalican's surname appears as "Nalican" in the information but he signed the instant petition as Lalican

(Rollo, p. 15).

[2] Rollo, pp. 27-28.

[3] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

[4] Presided by Judge Sabas R. Acosta.

[5] Rollo, pp. 32-34.

[6] Ibid., pp. 36-37.

[7] Ibid., pp. 38-39.

[8] Presided by Judge Filomeno A. Vergara.

[9] G.R. No. 104988, June 18, 1996; People of the Philippines v. Hon. Teresita Dizon-Capulong, et al., G.R. No. 106424, June 18, 1996; Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123784, June 18, 1996.

[10] AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 3rd ed. (1995), p. 202 citing Uy Ha v. City Mayor of Manila, 108 Phil. 400 (1960) and Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 19337, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617 (1969).

[11] Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72424, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 246, 254 citing Litton Mills v. Galleon Traders, Inc., L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 489.

[12] Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Confesor, G.R. No. 11480, March 10, 1994, 231 SCRA 41, 53; Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 71771-73, March 31, 1989, 171 SCRA 579, 585; Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78591, March 21, 1989, 171 SCRA 415, 425; Soriano v. Atienza, G.R. No. 68619, March 16, 1989, 171 SCRA 284, 290.

[13] San Pedro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114300, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 145, 150.

[14] New York Marine Manager, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. 111837, October 24, 1995, 249 SCRA 416, 420.

[15] Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101789, April 28, 1993, 221 SCRA 582, 588 quoting Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, supra.

[16] Municipality of Biñan, Laguna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94733, February 7, 1993, 219 SCRA 69, 70.

[17] Yap v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68464, March 22, 1993, 220 SCRA 245, 253; Reyes v. Camilon, L-46198, December 20, 1990, 192 SCRA 445, 452; Acharon v. Purisima, G.R. No. L-23731, February 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 309, 311.

[18] People v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, December 8, 1994, 239 SCRA 48, 54 citing Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83754, February 18, 1991, 194 SCRA 145.

[19] Oriental Media, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80127, December 6, 1995, 250 SCRA 647, 253.

[20] Alcasid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94927, January 22, 1993, 217 SCRA 437, 440.

[21] Atienza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85455, June 2, 1994, 232 SCRA 737, 744.

[22] L-48088, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 477; Petition, p. 10.

[23] Flordelis v. Himalaloan, supra at p. 482.

[24] Petition, pp. 7-10.

[25] These requisites are: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal or substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity, and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case (Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 & 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506).

[26] Laurel v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 92013 & 92047, July 25, 1990,187 SCRA 797, 813.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 184098 November 25, 2008

AMADO TAOPA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J.:

On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber.

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705,

1 as amended, in the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The information against them read:

That on or about the 2nd

day of April 1996 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning at Barangay Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to possess, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally possess, transport in a truck bearing Plate No. EAS 839 and have in their control forest products, particularly one hundred thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong species with an aggregate net volume of One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Four (1,684) board feet with an approximate value of Ninety-Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, without any authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, the RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt.

3

Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.

4 The

dispositive portion of the CA decision read:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with respect to accused-appellant Placido Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on reasonable doubt, and MODIFIEDwith respect to accused-appellants Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by reducing the penalty imposed on them to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.5

In this petition,6 Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He

alleges that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.

We deny the petition.

Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cuison's testimony proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.

However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed on Taopa.

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the

Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft.

8 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or

other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.

Articles 309 and 310 read:

Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor orreclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis supplied)

2. xxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied).

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.

9 Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable

penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the excess of P47,630.

The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence10

imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium period

11 of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or

16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16 years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2008 decision and July 28, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Petitioner Amado Taopa is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided for by law.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice

*DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes

* As replacement of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro who is on official leave per Special Order No. 539.

1 Revised Forestry Code.

2 Rollo, p. 27.

3 Rollo, pp. 30-31. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision read:

WHEREFORE, In view of the foregoing, this Court finds:

Accused Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and applying Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences both of them to suffer imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum.

Accused Placido Cuison GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime by transporting the lumber materials in his truck covered by bundles of abaca fiber, which is akin to concealing the body of the crime in order to prevent its discovery, and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment, the maximum period of which is two (2) degrees lower than that of the principal and the minimum period of which is one (1) degree lower, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hence, from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum.

The lumber materials are likewise confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of through public auction sale to be conducted by the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes. The truck, which was included in the Seizure Receipt is ordered released to its owner inasmuch as the evidence proved that it was hired purposely for the transport of abaca fibers and not lumber materials.

SO ORDERED.

4 Despite Ogalesco's failure to appeal, the CA held that the modification

of the penalty will benefit him pursuant to Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rollo, p. 14.

5 Decision dated January 31, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380. Penned

by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 26-40. The motion for reconsideration thereto was denied in a Resolution dated July 28, 2008. Rollo, pp. 56-58.

6 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

7 Section 68 provides: "Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting

Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. - Any person who shall xxx possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code."

8 Merida v. People, G.R. No. 158182, 12 June 2008 citing People v.

Dator, 398 Phil. 109, 124 (2000).

9 The CA did not contest the correctness of the value as stated in the

information. However, the CA clarified that the value of the lumber pegged at P99,120 was inclusive of surcharges and forest charges. The CA thus provided a breakdown of the values for a more correct computation of the penalties to be imposed on the accused. The relevant portion of the CA decision reads: "The Statement of Lumber Apprehended, which was prepared by Forest Ranger Jose San Roque, states that the market value of the 113 pieces of lumber is

only P67,630. It appears that that the amount of P99,120 was arrived at by adding regular forest charges in the amount of P7,940 and 300% surcharges in the amount of P23,820 to the market value of the lumber pegged at P67,[63]0."Rollo, p. 39.

10 Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (RA 4103) provides:

"SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. xxx"

11 The medium period is imposed following Article 64 of the RPC which

states: "When there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period." Although PD No. 705 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the RPC. Hence, the rules in the RPC for graduating by degrees or determining the period should be applied. This is pursuant to People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996]

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division, DENR, respondents.

[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996]

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.

Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo

de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.

Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.

The material operative facts are as follows:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City.[1] The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.[2]

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioners lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.[3]

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. [4]

Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further orders.[5]

On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the motion on the ground that the documents being required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products placed under seizure.[6]

On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to Secretary Factoran the following:

1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required documents;

2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event its owner fails to submit documents showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten days from date of seizure;

3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes through;

4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458 as well as the lumber

loaded therein for transport lumber using ―recycled‖ documents.[7]

On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.

On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had already secured the required documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted.[8]

On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the events which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered ―CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law‖ the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard.[9]

On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 o the said court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been suspended on 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's

customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The members of the team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt therefor. [10]

As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.

In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a resolution[11] whose dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information

be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of

almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.

It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs

covered by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa.[12]

This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III, who served as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging. [13]

On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and

supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.[14]

On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision[15] in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:

1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized from the lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and instead the respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by law;

2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action before the proper court regarding the lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;

3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and

2 of this judgment;

4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said petitioner, is withheld in this case until after the proper court has taken cognizance and determined how those lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and

5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle.[16] As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a continuation of that made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even question. [17] And, although the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of the search. [18]

The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive

Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.

As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.

The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.

On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question.[19]

The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession thereof without the required legal documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources.[20]

In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, [21] respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws and regulations is not a crime."[22]

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October 1991,[23] the People filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.

On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision[24] in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing the possession of lumber, and thatlumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:

This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product involved has always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider is that when appellant

was required to present the valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present any despite the period of extension granted to it.[25]

The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992.[26] Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992.[27]

On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.

The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.

In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted for various building purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term forest product.

The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize the forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as follows:

SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. — A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police

shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in

his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing

the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process

of committing the offense.

Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products or possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.

Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.

We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424 with which the other two were consolidated.

G.R. No. 106424

The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section.

Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense,[29]and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.

Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:

SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other

forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public

land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and

regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310

of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or

possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on

Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.

Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.

Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation of the said section?

A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent, without the required legal documents, are truckloads of

(1) almaciga and lauan; and

(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.

The ―almaciga and lauan‖ specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as lumber.‖ They cannot refer to the ―lumber‖ in no. (2) because they are separated by the words ―approximately 200,000 bd. ft.‖ with the conjunction ―and,‖ and not with the preposition ―of.‖ They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:

SEC. 3. Definitions. —

xxx xxx xxx

(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum,

wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational

and geological resources in forest lands.

It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and the private respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly charges an offense.

Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that ―only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment.‖

The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule that only the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in determining whether an information charges an offense.

Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred to,[30] cannot lead one to infer that what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:

8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4) truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (Italics supplied)

In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution[31] of the investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information

be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and

lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (Italics supplied)

The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber.

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of ―Processing plant;‖ which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine

used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood

products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as ―timber or logs after being prepared for the market.‖[32] Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.[33] And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distanguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said case.

G.R. No. 104988

We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.

It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.

Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate[34] that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search.[35]

We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period.[36]

As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in the

term forest product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.

G.R. No. 123784

The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpably fail to show prima facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to require the respondents to comment on the petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the authority to seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:

Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly

Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. — In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly

authorized representative may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .

The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also fail in view of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.

All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to cover up blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our forests.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled ―People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po‖; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge on her successor to hear and decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and

2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure of the petitioner to show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 in the SECOND CIVIL CASE.

Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, G.R. No. 10493, 37-38.

[2] Id., 40.

[3] Rollo, G.R. No. 106424, 6.

[4] Id., G.R. No. 104988, 38.

[5] Id.

[6] Id., 39.

[7] Rollo, G.R. No. 104988, 39.

[8] Id., 40.

[9] Rollo, G.R. 104988, 40-41.

[10] Rollo, G.R. No. 123784, 26-27.

[11] Id., G.R. No. 106424, 50-55 (Annex "I" of Petition).

[12] Rollo, G.R. No. 106424, 54.

[13] Id., 14.

[14] Id., 32.

[15] Id., G.R. No. 104988, 62. Per Judge Ramon P. Makasiar.

[16] Citing People vs. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991].

[17] Citing Johnson vs. state, 146 Miss. 593.

[18] Citing VARON, Searches, Seizures and Immunities, vol. I, 2nd ed., 563-565, 568-570, which gave the example that a search warrant authorizing the search for and seizure of a gun includes the

seizure of live shells found within the premises to be searched although not specifically mentioned in the warrant; in other words, a departure from the command of the search warrant describing what property may be seized thereunder is justified where there is a direct relation of the additional articles seized to the primary purpose of the search.

[19] Rollo, G.R. No. 106424, 33-35.

[20] Id., 35.

[21] Rollo, G.R. No. 106424, 32-39 (annex "A" of Petition).

[22] Id., 39.

[23] Id., 40 (Annex "B" of Petition).

[24] Id., G.R. No. 104988, 36. Per Chua, S., J., with Kapunan, S., and Victor L., JJ., concurring.

[25] Id., 43.25

[26] Rollo, G.R. No. 104988, 45.

[27] Id., 10.

[28] Id., G.R. No. 123784, 26. Per Carpio-Morales, C., J., with Garcia C., and Callejo, R., JJ., concurring.

[29] FLORENZ D. REGALADO, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. 2, Seventh Revised ed. [1995], 392, citing People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]. See also VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, The Revised Rules of Court (Criminal Procedure), 2nd, ed. [1969] 579; MANUEL V. MORAN, Comments of the Rules of Court, vol. 4. [1980], 222.

[30] Rollo, G.R. No. 106424, 41-42 (Annex "C" of Petition).

[31] Id., 50-55 (Annex "I" of Petition).

[32] Page 1345.

[33] RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 131.

[34] Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

[35] People vs. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174 [1994]. In this book on Remedial Law, vol. 4 (Criminal Procedure), 1992 ed., 669, retired Justice Oscar M. Herrera of the Court of Appeals mentions a sixth exception, viz., search based on probable cause under extraordinary circumstances, citing People vs. Posadas, 188 SCRA 288 [1990]; Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 [1989]; People vs. Maspil, 188 SCRA 751 [1990]; People vs. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 [1991]; People vs. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 [1991].

[36] FLORENZ D. REGALADO, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. 2, Seventh Revised Ed. [1995], 526, citing Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal 42 Phil. 886 [1920].

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997]

LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?

Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.

The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989,[1] Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private

respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.[2] Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents’ statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then ―this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.‖[3] Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan[4] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan,[5] which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents.[6] Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989.[7] Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court’s order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question.[8] Hence, this present petition,[9] with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993,[10] the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.

Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.[11] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.[12] This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity

and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process,[13] (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,[14] (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, [15] (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, [16] (5) when there is irreparable injury,[17] (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,[18] (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,[19] (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,[20] (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,[21] (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.[22]

In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, [23] private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:

“xxx

If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter

should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.”[24]

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court’s intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.

Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the

jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.[25] In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, [26] which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, [27] this Court held:

“Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems

caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters

which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of

such agencies.”

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.[28] One may be heard , not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. [29] In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.[30] Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration,[31] as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco,[32] we ruled that :

“The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one‟s side or an opportunity to

seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied

when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of

the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.”

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:

“SECTION 68. xxx

xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber

or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and toolsillegaly [sic] used in the area where

the timber or forest products are found.” (Underline ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents’ thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include ―conveyances‖ that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private respondents’ interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A , which is quoted herein below:

“SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other

forest laws, rules and regulations, theDepartment Head or his duly authorized

representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by

land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.” (Underline

ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase ―to dispose of the same‖ is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made ―in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.‖ In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.[33] Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.[34] In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:

“But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws „more responsive to present situations and realities‟ and in view of the „urgency to conserve the remaining

resources of the country,‟ that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from

criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the

inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal actions.

The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most

revealing:

„WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the

country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through

the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and

regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical

difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry

Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more

responsive to present situations and realities;‟

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to

confiscate, not only „conveyances,‟ but forest products as well. On the other

hand, confiscation of forest products by the „court‟ in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation

cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-

A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra.”[35]

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part , viz. :

“xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for

the crime and in no case could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under

Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx”[36]

We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section

68 of P.D.705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:

“xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by

Executive Order No.277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest products not covered by the required legal documents.

She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor

liable. xxx”[37]

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:

“SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. - Any person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest

products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands,

or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309

and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx.” (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O.277 )

“SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby

amended to read as follows:

„Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products

without license. -Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public

land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest

products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310

of the Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No. 277

amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that

provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase ― shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code ‖ and inserted the words ― shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code ‖. When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.[38]

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents’ right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.

It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. [39] ―To detain‖ is defined as to mean ―to hold or keep in custody,‖[40] and it has been held that there is tortuous taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.[41] Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceedings, that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property. [42] Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products with out the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D.705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and

that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads :

SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to

review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty

(30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The

Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a

special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo p. 235.

[2] Rollo pp. 241-242.

[3] Rollo p. 239.

[4] Baggayan died during the pendency of Civil Case 4031, he was succeeded in office by Petitioner Leonardo Paat.

[5] Presided by Judge Ricardo A. Baculi.

[6] Rollo pp. 251-252.

[7] Rollo pp. 274-275.

[8] Rollo pp. 36-46 penned by Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurred by Justices Luis A. Javellana and Jorge S. Imperial.

[9] Rollo pp. 14-35.

[10] Rollo pp. 117-119.

[11] National Development Company v. Hervilla, L-65718, June 30, 1987; Atlas Consolidated Mining Company vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. L -15809, August 30, 1961; Aboitiz v. Collector of Customs, G.R. No. L-29466, May 18, 1978; Pestenas v. Dyogi, G.R. No. L-25786, February 27, 1978.

[12] Soto v. Jareno, G.R. No. 38962, September 15, 1986; Hodges v. Mun. Board, L-18276, January 12, 1967; Abe-Abe v. Manta, L-4827, May 31, 1979; Gone v. District Engineer, L-22782, August 29, 1975.

[13] Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, G.R. No. 85156, February 5, 1991.

[14] Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, L-76633, October 18, 1988.

[15] Industrial Power Sales, Inc. V. Sinsuat, L-29171, April 15, 1988.

[16] Vda. De Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission, L-12944, March 30, 1959.

[17] De Lara v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-21653, May 31, 1965.

[18] Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 13000, September 25, 1959; Bartulata v. Peralta, G.R. No. 23155, September 9, 1974.

[19] Cipriano v. Marcelino, G.R. No. L-27793, February 28, 1972.

[20] Alzate v. Aldana, G.R. No. 14407, February 29, 1960.

[21] Soto v. Jareno, supra.

[22] Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, supra.

[23] Rollo pp. 236-240.

[24] Rollo p. 239.

[25] Vidad v. RTC, G.R. No. 98084, October 18, 1993.

[26] G.R. No. 79538, October 18, 1990.

[27] G.R. No. 109113, January 25, 1995.

[28] Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phil. V. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686, August 15, 1995.

[29] Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, supra.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, G.R. No. 79968, August 23, 1995.

[32] G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995.

[33] Lopez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104158, November 6, 1992.

[34] De Guia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992.

[35] Rollo pp. 170-171; Memorandum pp. 12-13.

[36] Rollo p. 242.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386, June 14, 1994.

[39] American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 66, p.850, footnote 57; I. Tanenbaum Son and Company vs. C. Ludwig Baumann and Company, 261 NY 85, 184 NE 503, 86 ALR 102.

[40] Ibid., footnote 59; Anderson vs. Hapler, 34 Ill 436; Wails vs. Farrington, 27 Okla 754, 116 P 428.

[41] Id., footnote 60 ; Haythorn vs. Rushforth, 19 NJL 160.

[42] Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.