would help the barristers,law students and anyone who wishes to get legalfruition. Thanks to my boredom coz it drives me to nuts in setting this up.SABADO, MAYO 05, 2012San Beda 2000-2001 Memory Aid

SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES

I. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Art. 26, NCCThe philosophy behind Art. 26, NCC underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our Civil Law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality be exalted. Thus, under this article, the rights of a person are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Further, the violations mentioned in this codal provision are not exclusive but merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts such as the one involved in this case.(CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000)

Prejudicial QuestionA prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. More simply, for the court to appreciate the pendency of a prejudicial question, the law requires the concurrence of two essential requisites, to wit:a) The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; andb) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.(CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 110844, April 27, 2000)

Pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. (BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000)

Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage (Art. 148, FC); Support; Retroactive Application of the Family Code Actual contribution is required by Art. 148 of the Family Code, in contrast to Art. 147 . which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. The care given by one party [to] the home, children, and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration provided to the other, is not included in Art.148. Hence, if actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharesThe right to support (for shelter) of illegitimate children does not prevail over the right of the spouses to eject them. Article 203 of the Family Code expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of the judicial or extra-judicial demand.(TUMLOS vs. FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000)

Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death of a SpouseSince the marriage was contracted in 1958, the applicable provision is Art. 83, NCC which provides that a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved, except when the first spouse (1) has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or (2) if absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or (3) is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. For the exception to apply, the subsequent marriage must have been made in good faith. A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. The marriage under these exceptional cases is deemed to be valid until declared null and void by a competent court. In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur: (a) the prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where the danger of death under the circumstances in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.(ARMAS vs. CALISTERIO, G. R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000)

Validity of Marriage; Marriage License RequiredA marriage license is a formal requirement, its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. Absence any claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between the parties could not be classified among those exempt from the marriage license requirement. (SY vs. COURT OF APPEALS , G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000)

Exemption from Marriage License; Declaration of Nullity of a Void Marriage

The five-year period provided by law in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.The Family Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage can be attacked collaterally and can be questioned even after the death of either party. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible. Any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.(NIAL vs. BAYADOG, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000)

Property Relations of Unions Without Marriage

The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. If the property is acquired during the time when the other party to the cohabitation has a subsisting marriage, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.(ADRIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 124118, March 27, 2000)

II. PROPERTY

Property of Public Dominion

Like public street, public parks are beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of a lease contract.(LANSANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000)

Builder in Good Faith

Both Article 448 and Article 546, NCC which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of the alleged owners that they were going to donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at the time the improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized.(VERONAPADA-KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 134329, January 19, 2000)

Quieting of Title; Termination of Co-ownership by Prescription

An action to quiet title, under Art. 476, NCC, is a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.(ROBLES vs. COURT OF APPEALS,G.R. No. 123509, March 14, 2000)

Quieting of Title; Laches; Freedom to Enter into Contracts; Waiver of Rights

Persons having legal as well as equitable title to or interest in a real property may bring an action for quieting of title and "title" here does not necessarily denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the person filing the suit.Moreover, if the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title is in possession of the property being litigated, such action is imprescriptible. One who is in actual possession of a land, claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right because his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to ascertain the nature of the adverse claim and its effects on his title. Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, nonetheless in some instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid injustice. Laches operates not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.The act of registration of a voluntary instrument is the operative act which conveys or affects registered land insofar as third persons are concerned. Hence, even without registration, the contract (oral partition) is still valid as between the parties. Neither a Transfer Certificate of Title nor a subdivision plan is essential to the validity of an oral partition.Quitclaims are valid contracts of waiver of property rights. The freedom to enter into contracts, such as the quitclaims, is protected by law and the courts are not quick to interfere with such freedom unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order.Quitclaims, being contracts of waiver, involve the relinquishment of rights, with knowledge of their existence and intent to relinquish them. The intent to waive rights must be clearly and convincingly shown. Moreover, when the only proof of intent is the act of a party, such act should be manifestly consistent and indicative of an intent to voluntarily relinquish a particular right such that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.( MAESTRADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 133345 & 133324, March 9, 2000)

Preference of Possession; Ownership

Between the claimants, ownership shall be vested to the one who has proven acquisitive prescription. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription.It is settled thatownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless it is hostile, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession. Thetax declarations and receipts are only prima facie, not conclusive, evidence of ownership in the absence of actual public and adverse possession.(CEQUENA vs. BOLANTE, G. R. No. 137944, April 6, 2000)

Donation Inter Vivos; Repudiation Of Inheritance; Escheat

There are 3 essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (c) the intent to do an act of liberality oranimus donandi. When applied to adonation of an immovable property, the law further requires that thedonation be made in a public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document. In cases where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.The inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation of the inheritance valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as there was already an acceptance and where there is no showing that such acceptance was made thru any of the causes which vitiate consent or there is no proof of the existence of an unknown will. Art. 1056 of the Civil Code provides The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance is irrevocable and cannot be impugned except when it was made thru any of the causes that vitiate consent or when and unknown will appears.Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of land intores nulliusto be escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation, being of no effect whatsoever, the parcels of land should revert to their private owner, who although being an American citizen is qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the litigation.(REPUBLIC vs. GUZMAN,G.R. No.132964, Feb. 18,2000)

Donation Inter Vivos

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.(VELASQUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 126996, February 15,2000)

PRESCRIPTION

Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years. Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was its owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof.(SERASPI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 135602, April 28, 2000)

Prescription in Action for Reconveyance

Prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance when the claimant is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.(MILLENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 127797, January 31, 2000)

Ownership Through Acquisitive Presciption

Together with actual possession of the land, tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land occupied by a person.Uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years could only ripen into ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription which is a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property.Prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner for ten (10) years, in case the possession is in good faith and with a just title.(DBP vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 129471. April 28, 2000.)

III. SUCCESSION

Successional Rights; Transmission of; Scope

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.Under Article 776 NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.Substitutionis thedesignation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. Since theWill expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, thewishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.(RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 129471. April 28, 2000.)Partition; Preterition

Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.The deed of donation and deed of extra-judicial settlement consolidated the title solely to one of the heirs and ceased the co-ownership.The exclusion of one of the children of the decedent from the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, in the absence of proof and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on the new TCT. The relief instead rests on Art.1104, NCC to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value pertaining to her.(VIADO NON vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 137287, February 15, 2000)

Formal Requirements of a Valid Partition

The intrinsic validity of partition not executed in a public instrument is not undermined when no creditors are involved. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance.(VERONAPADA-KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 134329, January 19, 2000)

IV. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

Novation

Novation is never presumed; it must be proven as a fact either by express stipulation of the parties or by implication derived from an irreconcilable incompatibility between old and new obligations or contracts.Otherwise, the original contract remains in force. (ESPINA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 116805 June 22, 2000)

Relativity of Contracts

The general rule under Article 1311, NCC is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. A good measure for determining whether a contract terminates upon the death of one of the parties is whether it is of such character that it may be performed by the promissors personal representative. Furthermore, the subject matter of the contract is a lease, which is a property right. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.(DKC HOLDINGS CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,G. R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000)

Onerous Contract The fact that no renewal was granted removed the basis for the continued payment of the monthly royalty fee. It is the essenceof aroyalty fee that it is paid in consideration of an existing right. In its ordinary acceptation, royalties refer to payments made to the owner for permitting another to use his property. Royalties are similar to the rents payable for the use or right to use an invention and after the right to use it has terminated there is no obligation to make further royalty payments.TheMOA is an onerous contract, wherein the contracting parties are obliged to render reciprocal prestations.Entitlement to the royalty fee is wholly dependent upon the existence and subsistence of the right for which the royalty was granted. If the reason which gave rise to the contract has ceased to exist, the result is that the obligation too, has ceased to exist.(GOLDEN DIAMOND vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 131436, May 31, 2000)

Power to Rescind in Reciprocal Obligations

The power to rescindor resolve is givento the injured party. More, the rescission of the contracts requires the parties to restore to each other what they have received by reason of the contracts. The rescission has the effect of abrogating the contracts in all parts. (RELIANCE COMMODITIES INC. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. 74729, May 31, 2000)

The right to rescind a contract involving reciprocal obligations is provided for in Article 1191 of the Civil Code. The law speaks of the right of the "injured party" to choose between rescission or fulfillment of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. The parties should not be allowed to rescind the contract where they themselves did not perform their essential obligation thereunder.It should be emphasized that a contract of sale involves reciprocity between the parties.(CENTRAL BANK OF THEPHILIPPINESvs. BICHARA, G.R. No. 131074, March 27, 2000)

Contract to Sell; RescissionArticle 1191,NCC on rescission, speaks of obligations already existing. In a contract to sell, the full payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not considered a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event which prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring any obligatory force. There can be no rescission of an obligation that is non-existent, considering that the suspensive condition therefor has not yet happened.(PADILLA vs. PAREDES, G.R. No. 124874, March 17, 2000)

Interpretation of Contracts; Rescission

The various stipulations in a contract should be interpreted together. Ambiguous ones should be so construed as to conform to the sense that would result if all the provisions are comprehended jointly.The act of treating a contract as cancelled or rescinded on account of infractions by the other contracting party is always provisional; that is, contestable and subject to judicial determination. When one party resolved or rescinded the Agreement without previous court action, it proceeded at its own risk. Only the final judgment of a court will conclusively and finally settle whether such recourse was correct in law.If breach is insubstantial, rescission is not justified.(PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORP. vs. MARS CONSTRUCTION ENT., G.R. No.133909, February 15, 2000)

Badges of Fraud

Under Article 1381(3) of the Civil Code, contracts which are undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any manner collect the claims due them, are rescissible. The existence of fraud with intent to defraud creditor may either be presumed in accordance with Article 1387, NCC or duly proved in accordance with the ordinary rules of evidence. Hence, the law presumes that there is fraud of creditors when: a) There is alienation of property by gratuitous title by the debtor who has not reserved sufficient property to pay his debts contracted before such alienation; or b) There is alienation of property by onerous title made by a debtor against whom some judgment has been rendered in any instance or some writ of attachment has been issued. The decision or attachment need not refer to the property alienated and need not have been obtained by the party seeking rescission.In determining whether or not a certain conveyance is fraudulent, the question in every case is whether the conveyance was a bona fide transaction or a trick and contrivance to defeat creditors or whether it conserves to the creditor to the debtor or a special right. It is not sufficient that it is founded on good considerations or is made with bona fide intent. It must have both elements. If defective in either of these, although good between the parties, it is voidable as to creditors. The question as to whether or not the conveyance is fraudulent is: does it prejudice the rights of the creditors? The mere fact that the conveyance was founded on valuable consideration does not necessarily negate the presumption of fraud under Art. 1387, NCC. There has to be a valuable consideration and the transaction must have been made bona fide.(China Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129644, March 7, 2000)

Void and Voidable ContractsUnder Art. 1409 (2),NCC, one type of contract which can be declared void and inexistent is that which is absolutely simulated or fictitious, as when there are several badges of simulation proving that the sale between the parties was not intended to have any legal effect between them..Nonetheless, a sale of the entire property by a co-heir is unenforceable having been entered into in behalf of the co-heirs who gave no authority or legal representation. However, such a contract is susceptible of ratification. Where there is a ratification, then the sale is considered valid and binding.(SEN PO EK MARKETING CORP. vs.MARTINEZ, G.R. No. 134117, February 9, 2000)

Capacity to Enter into Contract

A person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years of AGE or by reason of physical infirmities. Only when such age or infirmities impair his mental faculties to such extent as to prevent him from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting his property rights is he considered incapacitated.(LOYOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 115734, February 23, 2000)

Unenforceable ContractArticle 1529 of the old Civil Code, which was the prevailing law in 1948 and thus governed the questioned Deed of Sale, clearly provided that a contract is unenforceable when there is an absence of authority on the part of one of the contracting parties. The mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to such a contract. The defect is such that it cannot be cured except by the subsequent ratification of the unenforceable contract by the person in whose name the contract was executed.(VILLANUEVA-MIJARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 108921, April 12, 2000)

Simulation of Contracts

Simulation is the declaration of a fictitious will deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order to produce, for the purposes of deception, the appearances of a juridical act which does not exist or is different what that which does not exist or is different what that which was really executed. Characteristic of simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the judicial situation of the parties. The requisites for simulation are: (a) an outward declaration of will different from the will of the parties; (b) the false appearance must have been intended by mutual agreement; and (c) the purpose is to deceive third persons.(LOYOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 115734, February 23, 2000)

Laches; PrescriptionWhile a review of the decree of registration is no longer available after the expiration of the one-year period from entry thereof pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, an equitable remedy is still available. Those wrongfully deprived of their property may initiate an action for reconveyance of the property.(VILLANUEVA-MIJARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 108921, April 12, 2000)

The essence of laches is the failure, or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is thenegligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.(GASTON vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 116340 June 29, 2000)

TRUST

Express TrustTrust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. Anexpress trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Animplied trust comes into being by operation of law. Under Art. 1444, NCC no particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.While no time limit is imposed for the enforcement of rights under express trusts, prescription may, however, bar a beneficiarys action for recovery, if a repudiation of the trust is proven by clear and convincing evidence and made known to the beneficiary.(SECUYA vs. VDA. DESELMA, G.R. No. 136021, February 22, 2000)

SALES AND LEASE

Elements of a Contract ofSale

Since the lot subsequently sold is said to adjoin the "previously paid lot" on three sides thereof, the subject lot is capable of being determined without the need of any new contract. The fact that the exact area of these adjoining residential lots is subject to the result of a survey does not detract from the fact that they are determinate or determinable. Concomitantly, the object of the sale is certain and determinate. Under Article 1460,NCC, a thing sold is determinate if at the time the contract is entered into, the thing is capable of being determined without necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties.There is also no reservation of ownership nor a stipulation providing for a unilateral rescission by either party. The stipulation that the "payment of the full consideration based on a survey shall be due and payable in five (5) years from the execution of a formal deed of sale" is not a condition which affects the efficacy of the contract of sale. It merely provides the manner by which the full consideration is to be computed and the time within which the same is to be paid. But it does not affect in any manner the effectivity of the contract.(SAN ANDRES vs. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. 137287, February 15, 2000)

Option Money vs. Earnest Money

An option contract is a preparatory contract in which one party grants to the other, for a fixed period and under specified conditions, the power to decide, whether or not to enter into a principal contract, it binds the party who has given the option not to enter into the principal contract with any other person during the period designated, and within that period, to enter into such contract with the one to whom the option was granted, if the latter should decide to use the option. It is a separate agreement distinct from the contract to which the parties may enter upon the consummation of the option. An option contract is therefore a contract separate from and preparatory to a contract of sale which, if perfected, does not result in the perfection or consummation of the sale.IN THIS CASE, AFTER THE PAYMENT OF THE 10% OPTION MONEY, THE OFFER TO PURCHASE PROVIDES FOR THE PAYMENT ONLY OF THE BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE, IMPLYING THAT THE "OPTION MONEY" FORMS PART OF THE PURCHASE PRICE. THIS IS PRECISELY THE RESULT OF PAYING EARNEST MONEY UNDER ART. 1482 OF THE CIVIL CODE. IT IS CLEAR THEN THAT THE PARTIES IN THIS CASE ACTUALLY ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT OF SALE, PARTIALLY CONSUMMATED AS TO THE PAYMENT OF THE PRICE.(CAVITE DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. CYRUS LIM, G.R. NO. 131679, FEBRUARY 1, 2000)

Delivery in Contract ofSale

For while a contract of sale is perfected by the meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price, the ownership of the thing sold is not transferred to the vendee until actual or constructive delivery of the property. Hence, the maximnon nudis pactis, sed traditione dominiadominicarerum transferuntur (not mere agreements but tradition transfers the ownership of things).(SERASPI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 135602, April 28, 2000)

Under Article 1497, NCC, a thing sold shall be understood as delivered when it is placed in the control or possession of the vendee. Delivery is generally evidenced by a written acknowledgment of a person that he or she has actually received the thing or the goods, as in delivery receipts. A bill of lading cannot substitute for a delivery receipt. This is because it is a written acknowledgment of the receipt of the goods by the carrier and an agreement to transport and deliver them at a specific place to a person named or upon his order. It does not evidence receipt of the goods by the consignee or the person named in the bill of lading; rather, it is evidence of receipt by the carrier of the goods from the shipper for transportation and delivery. Likewise, a factory consignment invoice is not evidence of actual delivery of the goods. An invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity and cost of the thing sold. It is not proof that the thing or goods were actually delivered to the vendee or the consignee.(LAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 47013, 60647 & 60958-59, February 17, 2000)

Salewith Right of Repurchase

The mere fact that the price is inadequate does not prove support the conclusion that the contract was a loan or that the property was not at all sold. The price fixed in the sale with a right to repurchase is not necessarily the true value of the land sold. The rationale is that the vendor has the right to fix a relatively reduced price, although not a grossly inadequate one, in order to afford the vendor a retro every facility to redeem the land. Thus, inadequacy of the price is not sufficient to set aside a sale unless it is grossly inadequate or purely shocking to the conscience.(ABAPO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. 128677, March 2, 2000)

Consolidation of Title in Pacto de RetroSale

Art. 1607, NCC requiring a judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be recorded in the Registry of Property is intended to minimize the evils which the pacto de retro sale has caused in the hands of usurers. A judicial order is necessary in order to determine the true nature of the transaction and to prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while the determination is being made. Notwithstanding Art. 1607, the recording in the Registry of Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the transfer of ownership. The essence of the pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over the property sold. As title is already vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his title under Article 1607, NCC does not impair such title or ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering the consolidated title. (CRUZ vs. LEIS, G.R. No. 125233, March 9, 2000)

DOUBLESALE

The prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544,NCC requires that such registration must be coupled with good faith.Primus tempore, potior jure(first in time, stronger in right).Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar him from availing of his rights under the law, among them, to register first his purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso,knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Art. 1544 for the second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer's rights) from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession.The second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior registration as provided by law. To merit protection under Art. 1544, thesecond buyer must act in good faith from the time of the sale until the registration of the same.(BARICUATRO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 105902, February 9, 2000)

Under Article 1544 of the Civil Codebefore the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e., in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer's rights) from the time of acquisition until title is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession.Knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.(ANGEL BAUTISTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS,G.R. No. 123655, January 19, 2000)

Legal Redemption

A letter given by the vendee notifying the co-owner of the sale of the co-owned property cannot be considered compliance with the notice requirement of Art. 1623, NCC for purposes of legal redemption. Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requiring that thewritten notification should come from the vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other person. In the second place, it makes sense to require that thenotice required in Art. 1623 be given by the vendor and by nobody else. The vendor of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners who under the law must be notified of the sale. It is the notification from the seller, not from anyone else, which can remove all doubts as to the fact of the sale, its perfection, and its validity, for in a contract of sale, the seller is in the best position to confirm whether consent to the essential obligation of selling the property and transferring ownership thereof to the vendee has been given.(FRANCISCO vs. BOISER, G.R. No. 137677, May 31, 2000)

Validity of Stipulations in a Lease Contract

Jurisprudence supports the view that when parties to a contract expressly reserve an option to terminate or rescind a contract upon the violation of a resolutory condition, notice of resolution must be given to the other party when such right is exercised. In Zulueta vs. Mariano, the SC ruled that resort to courts may be necessary when the right involves the retaking of property which is not voluntarily surrendered by the other party. The rationale for such ruling is based on the thesis that no one should take the law into his own hands. In this sense, the stipulation is legally vulnerable. Permitting the use of unqualified force to repossess the property and without condition of notice upon the lessee is fraught with dangerous possibilities. Such a broad stipulation cannot be sanctioned for the reason that it would allow the lessor/owner to take the law into his own hands, and undermine the philosophy behind the remedy of forcible entry which is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims to be his.(CAMPO ASSETS CORP. vs. CLUB X. O. COMPANY, G.R. No. 134986, March 17, 2000)

Nature of Lease of Chattels

In thelease of chattels, thelessor loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee cannot be reckless in the use thereof, otherwise, he would be responsible for the damages to the lessor. In the case ofjeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercise supervision and control over the latter. Themanagement of the business is in the owners hands. Theowner as holder of the certificate of public convenience must see to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules promulgated as regards its operations. This relationship may be applied by analogy to taxi owners/operators and taxi drivers.(JARDIN vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 119268, February 23, 2000)

Right of First Refusal of a Lessee

Art. 1622, NCC which only deals with small urban lands that are bought for speculation where only adjoining lot owners can exercise the right of pre-emption or redemption is not available to one who is not an adjoining lot owner, but a lessee trying to buy the land that it was leasing. Indeed the right of first refusal may be provided for in a lease contract. However, such grant of the right of first refusal must be clearly embodied in a written contract.(SEN PO EK MARKETING CORP. vs.MARTINEZ, G.R. No. 134117, February 9, 2000)

Renewal of Term of Lease

Pursuant to Art. 1196, NCC, the period of the lease contract is deemed to have been set for the benefit of both parties. Renewal of the contract may be had only upon their mutual agreement or at the will of both of them. It is the owner-lessors prerogative to terminate the lease at its expiration. The continuance, effectivity and fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessee between continuing the payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving the owner of any say in the matter. Mutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no equality exists between the lessor and the lessee since the life of the contract would be dictated solely by the lessee.(BUCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 136913, May 12, 2000)

Extension of Lease

The provisions of a contract should not be read in isolation from the rest of the instrument but, on the contrary, interpreted in the light of the other related provisions in order to fix the meaning of any of its parts. Furthermore, in a reciprocal contract like a lease, the period of the lease must be deemed to have been agreed upon for the benefit of both parties, absent language showing that the term was deliberately set for the benefit of the lessee or lessor alone.(UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS SERVICES, INC. vs. CA, G.R. No. 115045, January 31, 2000)

Concept of Implied New Lease

The prescriptive period for an action of reformation should be counted from the date of execution of the lease contract and not from the date of extension of the same. First, Art. 1670 speaks of an implied new lease (tacita reconduccion) where at the end of the contract, the lessee continues to enjoy the thing leased "with the acquiescence of the lessor", so that the duration of the lease is "not for the period of the original contract, but for the time established in Article 1682 and 1687." Hence, if the extended period of lease was expressly agreed upon by the parties, then the term should be exactly what the parties stipulated, not more, not less. Second, even if the supposed 4-year extended lease be considered as an implied new lease under Art. 1670, "the other terms of the original contract" contemplated in said provision are only those terms which are germane to the lessees right of continued enjoyment of the property leased. The prescriptive period of 10 years provided for in Art. 1144 for reformation of an instrument applies by operation of law, not by the will of the parties.(ROSELLO-BENTIR vs. LEANDA, G.R. No. 128991, April 12, 2000)

V. TORTS AND DAMAGES

DamagesIn seeking recovery for actual damages it is necessary that the claimant produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable such as receipts to justify an award therefor. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty. Only substantiated and proven expenses or those which appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be recognized by the court.Civil indemnity (ex delicto) requires no proof other than the fact of death of the victim and assailants responsibility therefor.Compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and as such requires due proof of the damages suffered; there must be unbiased proof of the deceaseds average income.(PEOPLE vs. EREO, G.R. 1224706, Feb. 22, 2000)

The award authorized by criminal law as civil indemnity (ex delicto) for the offended party is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundation and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.(PEOPLE vs. MENDIONA, G.R. No. 129056, Feb. 21, 2000)

As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.(CALALAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000)

Indemnity for death is presently fixed at P50,000.00. As to actual damages. Art. 2199,NCC provides that "except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved."The civil liability of accused for indemnity for death and actual and moral damages is solidaryUnder Art. 2230,NCC, "exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."(PEOPLE vs. BAUTISTA, G.R. No. 131840, April 27, 2000)

As to the matter of moral damages, the law clearly states that one may only recover moral damages if they are the proximate result of the other partys wrongful act or omission. Two elements are required. First, the act or omission must be the proximate result of the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Second, the act must be wrongful. The rule has always been that moral damages cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good faith.Where a party is not entitled to actual or moral damages, an award of exemplary damages is likewise baseless.No premium should be placed on the right to litigate and not every winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of attorneys fees. The party must show that he falls under one of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Where the award of moral and exemplary damages is eliminated, so must the award for attorneys fees be deleted.(OROSA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G. R. No. 111080, April 5, 2000)

The amount of indemnity for loss of earning capacity is based on the income at the time of death and the probable life expectancy of the victim. It should be stressed that the amount recoverable is not the entire earnings, but only that portion which the beneficiaries would have received. Thus, indemnity for lost income refers to the victim's total earnings minus the necessary living expenses.(PEOPLE vs. CABANDE, G.R. No. 132747, February 8, 2000)

Any person who seeks to be awarded actual or compensatory damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving said damages as well as the amount thereof. Actual damages cannot be allowed unless supported by evidence on the record. The court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages. To justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, the actual amount of loss.Moral damages may be recovered in cases involving acts referred to in Art. 21, NCC. As a rule, a public official may not recover damages for charges of falsehood related to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice.(BAAS, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 102967, February 10, 2000)

The Court can only grant such amount for expenses if they are supported by receipts. In the absence thereof, no award for actual damages can be granted.(PEOPLE vs. ALAGON, G.R. Nos. 126536-37, February 10, 2000)

The heirs are also entitled to receive a compensation for the loss of earning capacity of the victim. The formula for computing the same as established in decided cases is as follows:Gross NecessaryNet Earning = Life x Annual - LivingCapacity Expectancy Income Expenses.(PEOPLE vs. DANDO, G.R. No. 120646, February 14, 2000)

Attorney's fees may be awarded if one who claims it is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect one's interests by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is sought.(INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY vs. BONDAD, G.R. No. 136722, April 12, 2000)The requisites for an action for damages based on malicious prosecution are: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice.(BAYANI vs. PANAY ELECTRIC CO., G.R. No. 139680, April 12, 2000)

The adverse result of an action does not make the prosecution thereof wrongful neither does it subject the action to payment of damages. The law does not impose a penalty to the right to litigate. Resort to judicial processes, by itself, is not an evidence of ill will. As the mere act of filing criminal complaint does not make the complainant liable for malicious prosecution. There must be proof that the suit was performed by legal malice, an inexcusable intent to oppress, vex, annoy or humiliate. A contrary rule would discourage peaceful resources to the court and unjustly penalize the exercise of a citizens right to litigate. Where the action is filed in good faith, no penalty should be imposed thereon.(VILLANUEVA vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, G.R. No. 138291, March 7, 2000)Recovery of Damages in Negligent Acts

In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.(CALALAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000)

Negligence; Easement

Even if the heavy rains constituted an act of God, one may still be held liable for damages to the other. The event was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. Article 637, NCC provides that lower estates are imposed the obligation to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from higher estates. However, where the waters which flow from a higher state are those which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation.(REMMAN ENTERPRISES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G. R. No. 125018, April 6, 2000)

Rule Against Double Recovery in Negligence Cases

In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery. In other words, the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liabilityex delicto, and civil liabilityquasi delicto,either of which may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability.(RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 129029, April 3, 2000)

Liability of an Educational Institution

It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate. The negligent act of professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitted a students grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the student of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages.Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligation coupled with a conscious knowledge the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable.(UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. JADER, G.R. NO. 132344, February 17, 2000)VI. CREDIT TRANSACTIONS

Escalation Clause; InterestPursuant to P.D. No. 1684 which became effective March 1980 wherein to be valid, escalation clauses should provide: 1) that there can be an increase in interest if increased by law or by the Monetary Board; and 2) in order for such stipulation to be valid, it must include a provision for the reduction of the stipulated interest in the event that the maximum rate of interest is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board. Despite the validity of the escalation clause, the contracting party may not, however, increase the stipulated interest pursuant to the Central Bank Circular 494 from 12% to 17%. CB Circular 494, although it has the force and effect of law, is not a law and is not the law contemplated by the parties.(BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 129227, May 30, 2000)

Real Estate MortgageIn a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void. Buyers of unregistered real property, especially banks, must exert due diligence in ascertaining the titles of mortgagors and sellers, lest some innocent parties be prejudiced. Failure to observe such diligence may amount to bad faith and may result in the nullity of the mortgage, as well as of the subsequent foreclosure and/or auction sale.(ROBLES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 123509, March 14, 2000)Rights of a MortgageeA mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation. It is constituted by recording the document in which it appears with the proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties. Thus, the only right granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the recording of the document in which the mortgage is formalized. As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds therefrom given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan. Regardless of its possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold, with the prescribed formalities, in the event of the debtor's default in the payment of his loan obligation.(ISAGUIRRE vs. DE LARA, G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000)

Legal Redemption; MortgageUnderRA No. 3844, Section 12,"In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration. Provided, that the entire landholding sold must be redeemed. Provided further, that where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this section may be exercised within two (2) years from the registration of the sale and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption."(PHILBANCOR FINANCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 129572, June 26, 2000)

Concurrence and Preference of CreditArt. 2242, NCC provides that the claims of contractors engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings or other works shall be preferred with respect to the specific building or other immovable property constructed. However, this provision only finds application when there is a concurrence of credits, i.e. when the same specific property of the debtor is subjected to the claims of several creditors and the value of such property of the debtor is insufficient to pay in full all the creditors. In such a situation, the question of preference will arise, that is, there will be a need to determine which of the creditors will be paid ahead of the others. This statutory lien should only be enforced in the context of some kind of a procedure where the claims of all preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as in insolvency proceedings.(J.L. BERNARDO CONSTRUCTION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 105827, January 31, 2000)VII.LANDTITLES AND DEEDS/AGRICULTURAL TENANCY LAWSRegistration of Land Under theTorrensSystemRegistration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership over an immovable property. The purpose of the Land Registration Act is not to create or vest title but to confirm and register already created and already vested.(DBP vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 129471, April 28, 2000)

Proof required in Land Registration Proceedings

The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. On him also rests the burden to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain considering that the inclusion in a title of a part of the public domain nullifies the title.The declaration by the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-interest for a certain period, does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in land registration. Further, it should be noted that tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership in land registration cases.Rosarioshould have substantiated her claim with clear and convincing evidence specifically showing the nature of her claim. The applicant must likewise prove the identity of the land. It must be borne in mind that what defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.Considering that the writ of possession was sought byRosarioagainst persons who were in "actual possession under claim of ownership," the latter's possession raises a disputable presumption of ownership. This unrebutted presumption militates against the claim ofRosario, especially considering the evidentiary rule under Article 434 of the Civil Code that a claimant of a parcel of land, such asRosario, must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.(MARIANO TURQUESA, ET AL. vs.ROSARIOVALERA, G.R. No. 76371, January 20, 2000)

Evidence of Ownership

A Torrens Certificate of Title covers only the land described therein together with improvements existing thereon, if any, nothing more.True, tax declarations do not prove ownership. However, tax declarations can be strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.(SANTIAGOvs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 109111, June 28, 2000)

Grant of Title/Confirmation of Imperfect Title on Lands

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must also show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.(BRACEWELL vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 107427, January 25, 2000)

Remedies Available to Aggrieved Party in Registration Proceedings

In land registration proceedings, the rule is that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. This rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not to the date of filing of the application for registration of title. Hence, even though an applicant precedes another, he may not be deemed to have priority of right to register title. As such, while his application is being processed, an applicant is duty-bound to observe vigilance and to take care that his right or interest is duly protected.An applicant for registration has but a one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of another applicant, within which to question the validity of the certificate of title issued pursuant to such decree. Once the one-year period has lapsed, the title to the land becomes indefeasible. However the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is still available. If the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for damages against those who employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of thePhilippinesfor recovery against the Assurance Fund. Recognizing the futility of these actions, aggrieved applicants sought protection under the provisions of the Rules of Court by an action for revival and execution of judgment. However, the provisions of the Rules are merely suppletory to special laws governing land registration proceedings and hence, cannot prevail over the latter.(HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ vs. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 112905, February 3, 2000)

Grant/Transfer of Friar LandsIn case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his interest in the land before having complied with all the conditions thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the certificate shall be entitled to all the rights of the holder of the certificate upon presenting his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for registration. In order that a transfer of the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and registration. The law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands.(DELA TORRE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 113095, February 8, 2000)

Free PatentIn the light of their open, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the land, petitioners are deemed to have acquired by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant without a necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land was segregated from the public domain. Accordingly, the Director of Lands had no authority to issue a free patent thereto in favor of another person. Verily, jurisprudence holds that free patent covering private land is void.(ROBLES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 123509, March 14, 2000)Presumptive Conclusiveness ofTorrensTitleIf a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title.(LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 124715, January 24, 2000)TenancyThe requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) there is personal cultivation; and (5) there is sharing of harvest. Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land, and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy.(BAUTISTA vs. ARANETA, G.R. No. 135829, February 22, 2000)

A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. Briefly stated, for this relationship to exist, it is necessary that:1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;2. The subject is agricultural land;3. There is consent;4. The purpose is agricultural production;5. There is personal cultivation; and6. There is sharing of harvests.Upon proof of the existence of the tenancy relationship, a tenant could avail of the right of redemption under RA 3844. This right of redemption is validly exercised upon compliance with the following requirements: a) the redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee or share tenant; b) the land must have been sold by the owner to a third party without prior written notice of the sale given to the lessee or lessees and the DAR in accordance with Sec. 11, RA 3844, as amended; c) only the area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed; d) the right of redemption must be exercised within 180 days from notice; and e) there must be an actual tender or valid consignation of the entire amount which is the reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed.(RUPA, SR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 80129, January 25, 2000)

The right of tenancy attaches to the landholding by operation of law. The leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding.(PHILBANCOR FINANCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 129572, June 26, 2000)

RA 3844 allows only one heir to succeed to the tenancy of the deceased tenant in the order of preference prescribed by Section 9 of the said law. However, where the land is not cultivated by one tenant alone (predecessor of the present claimants) but with other tenants who are likewise qualified and who are related to him, this provision does not apply. Thus, it can be said that the entitlement of the other possessors is not by virtue of succession to the rights of a predecessor-in-interest, but in their individual capacity as tenants therein simultaneously with an ascendant.Under Section 22 of RA 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, those entitled to the award of the land are: Section 22. Qualified Beneficiaries the lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:a.)agricultural lessees and share tenantsb.)regular farm workersc.)seasonal farmworkersd.)other farmworkerse.)actual tillers or occupants of public landsf.)collective or cooperatives of the above beneficiariesg.)others directly working on the land.(GREENFIELD REALTY CORP. vs. CARDAMA, G.R. No. 129246, January 25, 2000)

Preferential Rights of Tenants under P.D. 1517

Saleto one tenant alone, among the many tenants, is sufficient compliance with P.D. 1517 where the landowner had offered his tenants the chance to buy the land which they respectively occupied.(DEEv. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.108205, February 15, 2000)

Jurisdictional Requirements for Reconstitution of Title

The requirements for reconstitution of title, under R.A. 26, Secs. 12 and 13, are the following: That the petition must state (1) the nature and description of the buildings and improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such building and improvements, (2) the names and addresses of the occupants of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property, and (3) that no deeds or other instrument affecting the property may have been presented for registration; and That there should be notice and publication of said petition. The failure to comply with the requirements of publication and posting of notices prescribed in RA 26 Sec. 12 & 13 is fatal to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, non-compliance with the jurisdictional requirements renders its decision approving the reconstitution and all proceedings therein utterly null and void. (HEIRS OF EULALIO RAGUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 88521-22 & 89366-67, January 31, 2000)

CASE DIGESTS

I. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONSART. 26, NCCCONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000

Facts:Spouses Nestor and Allem Nicolas reside in an apartment leased to them by Florence Concepcion. The spouses engage in a joint venture by supplying government agencies with office supplies and equipment. Sometime in July 1985, petitioner Rodrigo, brother of the deceased husband ofFlorenceaccosted Nestor and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship withFlorence. As a result of the incident, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame that he could no longer face his neighbors. Consequently, Nestor demanded public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo ignored the demand for which reason, the Spouses Nicolas filed a civil suit. The RTC ordered Rodrigo to pay for moral and exemplary damages. CA affirmed the award.

Issue:Is there a legal basis for the award of damages?

Held:Yes. The incident charged of Rodrigo was no less than an invasion on the right of Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind Art. 26, NCC underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our Civil Law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality be exalted. Thus, under this article, the rights of a person are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Further, the violations mentioned in this codal provision are not exclusive but merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts such as the one involved in this case.Prejudicial Question

CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 110844, April 27, 2000

Facts:On 04 February 1992, petitioner Ching was charged before the RTC of Makati with four counts of estafa punishable under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree 115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts Law". On 05 March 1992, Ching, together with Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., filed a case before the RTC of Manila for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 92-60600, entitled "Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. et. al. vs. Allied Banking Corporation."On 07 August 1992, Ching filed a petition before the RTC-Makati, for the suspension of the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question in a civil action. Said court denied the petition to suspend.

Issue:Does the pendency of a civil action for damages and declaration of nullity of documents constitute a prejudicial question as to warrant the suspension of criminal proceedings?

Held:NO. As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. More simply, for the court to appreciate the pendency of a prejudicial question, the law requires the concurrence of two essential requisites, to wit:a) The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; andb) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.Verily, under the prevailing circumstances, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages, does not juris et de jure determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Assuming arguendo that the court hearing the civil aspect of the case adjudicates that the transaction entered into between the parties was not a trust receipt agreement, nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still be established and his culpability under penal laws determined by other evidence. To put it differently, even on the assumption that the documents are declared null, it does not ipso facto follow that such declaration of nullity shall exonerate the accused from criminal prosecution and liability.Therefore, the civil action for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages does not constitute a prejudicial question to the criminal cases for estafa filed against petitioner.

BELTRAN vs. PEOPLEG.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000

Facts:Petitioner Meynardo Beltran sought a declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC of QC. His wife, Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Later on, upon complaint of Charmaine, a criminal case for concubinage was instituted before the Metropolitan TC of Mkti. City against petitioner and his paramour. Petitioner moved to defer the proceedings arguing that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case.

Issue:Does a pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage constitute a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage?

Held:NO. Pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution wouldbebased, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.In a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. Article 40 of the Family Code provides:"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."In Domingo vs. CA, this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.

Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage (Art. 148, FC); Support; Retroactive Application of the Family CodeTUMLOS vs. FERNANDEZG.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000

Facts:Respondent-spouses Mario and Lourdes Fernandez filed an action for ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumlos and her two children. In her Answer, Guillerma averred that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario. The MTC ruled for the spouses Fernandez. Upon appeal to the RTC, Guillerma alleged that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest, that they lived together in the apartment building subject of the ejectment suit with their 2 children for around 10 years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. The RTC ruled that Guillerma and Mario acquired the property during their cohabitation as husband and wife, although without the benefit of marriage, it concluded that Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the subject property and could not be ejected therefrom.

Issues:1. Did Guillerma have the right of co-ownership over the property in question? 2. Does the right to support (for shelter) of illegitimate children prevail over the right of the spouses to eject them?

Held:1. NO. There was no proof of actual contribution by Guillerma in the purchase of the subject property. Her only evidence was her being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of Mario. Since she failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the subject apartment building, there is no basis to justify her co-ownership with Mario. The said property is thus presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, it being acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and no other proof to the contrary. It is clear that actual contribution is required by Art. 148 of the Family Code, in contrast to Art. 147 . which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. The care given by one party [to] the home, children, and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration provided to the other, is not included in Art.148. Hence, if actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares

2. NO. Article 203 of the Family Code expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of the judicial or extra-judicial demand. Thus, it cannot be presumed. No demand was made by Guillerma to make the obligation to give support for dwelling demandable.

Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death of a Spouse

ARMAS vs. CALISTERIOG. R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000

Facts:On April 24, 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving parcels of land. He was survived by his wife, respondent Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was the second husband ofMariettawho had previously been married to James William Bounds on January 13, 1946. James disappeared without a trace on February 11, 1947. Eleven years after,Mariettafound a new romance in the loving arms of Teodorico when the two got married on May 8, 1958, withoutMariettahaving priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. On October 9, 1992, herein petitioner Antonia, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for the granting of letters of administration, claiming herself to be the sole surviving heir of Teodorico, the marriage between the latter and respondentMariettabeing allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. The trial court rendered a judgment declaring Antonia as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico.

Issue:Was the subsequent marriage between Teodorico andMariettainvalid due toMariettas failure to secure the judicial declaration of the presumptive death of James?

Held:NO. The subsequent marriage was valid. When the marriage between Teodorico andMariettawas solemnized on May 8, 1958, the law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on August 3, 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive application only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Hence, the applicable provision is Art. 83, NCC which provides that a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved, except when the first spouse (1) has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or (2) if absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or (3) is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391of the Civil Code. For the exception to apply, the subsequent marriage must have been made in good faith. A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. The marriage under these exceptional cases is deemed to be valid until declared null and void by a competent court. In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur: (a) the prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where the danger of death under the circumstances in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. In the case at bar,Mariettas first husband, James Bounds, has been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage with Teodorico. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bound. Moreover, there is no finding that the said second marriage was contracted in bad faith.

Validity of Marria