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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160093 July 31, 2007
MALARIA EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (MEWAP), represented by its National President, DR. RAMON A. SULLA, and MEWAP DOH Central Office Chapter President, DR. GRACELA FIDELA MINA-RAMOS, and PRISCILLA CARILLO, and HERMINIO JAVIER, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, (substituting the former Executive Secretary Renato de Villa), THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL DAYRIT and THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, CJ.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65475 dated September 12, 2003 which upheld the validity of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 102,1 the law Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health. Then President Joseph E. Estrada issued E.O. No. 102 on May 24, 1999 pursuant to Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and Sections 78 and 80 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8522, also known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1998. E.O. No. 102 provided for structural changes and redirected the functions and operations of the Department of Health.
On October 19, 1999, the President issued E.O. No. 165 "Directing the Formulation of an Institutional Strengthening and Streamlining Program for the Executive Branch" which created the Presidential Committee on Executive Governance (PCEG) composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) as co-chair.
The DBM, on July 8, 2000, issued the Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action (NOSCA). On July 17, 2000, the PCEG likewise issued Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 62, entitled "Implementing Executive Order No. 102, Series of 1999 Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health."2 M.C. No. 62 directed the rationalization and streamlining of the said Department.
On July 24, 2000, the Secretary of Health issued Department Memorandum No. 136, Series of 2000, ordering the Undersecretary, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau or Service Directors and Program Managers of the Department of Health to direct all employees under their respective
offices to accomplish and submit the Personal Information Sheet due to the approval of the Department of Health – Rationalization and Streamlining Plan.
On July 28, 2000, the Secretary of Health again issued Department Circular No. 221, Series of 2000, stating that the Department will start implementing the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan by a process of selection, placement or matching of personnel to the approved organizational chart and the list of the approved plantilla items.3 The Secretary also issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 94, Series of 2000, which set the implementing guidelines for the restructuring process on personnel selection and placement, retirement and/or voluntary resignation. A.O. No. 94 outlined the general guidelines for the selection and placement of employees adopting the procedures and standards set forth in R.A. No. 66564 or the "Rules on Governmental Reorganization," Civil Service Rules and Regulations, Sections 76 to 78 of the GAA for the Year 2000, and Section 42 of E.O. No. 292.
On August 29, 2000, the Secretary of Health issued Department Memorandum No. 157, Series of 2000, viz.:
Pursuant to the Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action (NOSCA) approved by the DBM on 8 July 2000 and Memorandum Circular No. 62 issued by the Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) on 17 July 2000, Implementing E.O. 102 dated 24 May 1999, the following approved Placement List of DOH Personnel is hereby disseminated for your information and guidance.
All personnel are hereby directed to report to their new assignments on or before 2 October 2000 pending processing of new appointments, required clearances and other pertinent documents.
All Heads of Office/Unit in the Department of Health are hereby directed to facilitate the implementation of E.O. 102, to include[,] among others, the transfer or movement of personnel, properties, records and documents to appropriate office/unit and device other necessary means to minimize disruption of office functions and delivery of health services.
Appeals, oversights, issues and concerns of personnel related to this Placement List shall be made in writing using the Appeals Form (available at the Administrative Service) addressed to the Appeals Committee chaired by Dr. Gerardo Bayugo. All Appeals Forms shall be submitted to the Re-Engineering Secretariat xxx not later than 18 September 2000. 5
Petitioner Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a union of affected employees in the Malaria Control Service of the Department of Health. MEWAP filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-98793, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila seeking to nullify Department Memorandum No. 157, the NOSCA and the Placement List of Department of Health Personnel and other issuances implementing E.O. No. 102.
On May 2, 2001, while the civil case was pending at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners sought to nullify E.O. No. 102 for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as it allegedly violates certain provisions of E.O. No. 292 and R.A. No. 8522. The petition was referred to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same in its assailed Decision. Hence, this appeal where petitioners ask for a re-examination of the pertinent pronouncements of this Court that uphold the authority of the President to reorganize a department, bureau or office in the executive department. Petitioners raise the following issues, viz.:
1. Whether Sections 78 and 80 of the General Provision of Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriation[s] Act of 1998[,] empower former President Joseph E. Estrada to reorganize structurally and functionally the Department of Health.
2. Whether Section 20, Chapter I, title i, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides legal basis in reorganizing the Department of Health.
(A) Whether Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772, has been repealed.
3. Whether the President has authority under Section 17, Article VIII of the Constitution to effect a reorganization of a department under the executive branch.
4. Whether there has been abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of former President Joseph E. Estrada in issuing Executive Order No. 102, Redirecting the functions and operations of the Department of Health.
5. Whether Executive Order No. 102 is null and void.6
We deny the petition.
The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
In Canonizado v. Aguirre,7 we held that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It alters the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them.8 While the power to abolish an office is
generally lodged with the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may include such abolition, is permissible under our present laws, viz.:
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.9
The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures, viz.:
SEC. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.10
We explained the nature of the President’s residual powers under this section in the case of Larin v. Executive Secretary, 11 viz.:
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees [is] unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.12
The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772, clearly support the President’s continuing power to reorganize the executive branch, viz.:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the National Government. In exercising this authority, the President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good government and responsive national
development, including but not limited to the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and development-oriented governmental framework:
x x x
b) Abolish departments, offices, agencies or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which are necessary, for the efficient conduct of government functions, services and activities;
c) Transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, properties, records and personnel from one department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another;
d) Create, classify, combine, split, and abolish positions;
e) Standardize salaries, materials, and equipment;
f) Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, as well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers, functions, and authorities, including, with respect to government-owned or controlled corporations, their corporate life, capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters;
g) Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of this Decree.
Petitioners argue that the residual powers of the President under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 refer only to the Office of the President and not to the departments, bureaus or offices within the executive branch. They invoke Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the same law, viz.:
Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. x x x
The interpretation of petitioners is illogically restrictive and lacks legal basis. The residual powers granted to the President under Section 20, Title I, Book III are too broad to be construed as having a sole application to the Office of the President. As correctly stated by respondents, there is nothing in E.O. No. 292 which provides that the continuing authority should apply only to the Office of the President.13 If such was the intent of the law, the same should have been expressly stated. To adopt the argument of petitioners would result to two conflicting provisions in one statute. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.14
In fact, as pointed out by respondents, the President’s power to reorganize the executive department even finds further basis under Sections 78 and 80 of R.A. No. 8522, viz.:15
Section 78. Organizational Changes – Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structure and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.
Section 80. Scaling Down and Phase-out of Activities of Agencies within the Executive Branch – The heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out or abolished subject to Civil Service rules and regulations. Said activities shall be reported to the Office of the President through the Department of Budget and Management and to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Chairman, Committee on Finance of the Senate. Actual scaling down, phase-out or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.
Petitioners contend that Section 78 refers only to changes in "organizational units" or "key positions" in any department or agency, while Section 80 refers merely to scaling down and phasing out of "activities" within the executive department. They argue that neither section authorizes reorganization. Thus, the realignment of the appropriations to implement the reorganization of the Department of Health under E.O. No. 102 is illegal.
Again, petitioners’ construction of the law is unduly restrictive. This Court has consistently held in Larin16 and Buklod ng Kawanihang EIIB v. Zamora17 that the corresponding pertinent provisions in the GAA in these subject cases authorize the President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency concerned.
Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.18 R.A. No. 665619 provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the President did not commit bad faith in the questioned reorganization, viz.:
In this particular case, there is no showing that the reorganization undertaking in the [Department of Health] had violated this requirement, nor [are] there adequate allegations to that effect. It is only alleged that the petitioners were directly affected by the reorganization ordered under E.O. [No.] 102. Absent is any showing that bad faith attended the actual implementation of the said presidential issuance.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65475 dated September 12, 2003 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, Quisumbing, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Annex B; Rollo, 68-72.
2 Annex E, Petition; Id. at 145-146.
3 Annex F, Petition; Id. at 147-189.
4 An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization. Approved on June 10, 1988; 84 Official Gazette No. 24, p. S-1.
5 Annex G, Petition; Rollo, 190-248.
6 Petition, 8-9; id. at 16-17.
7 G.R. No. 133132, January 25, 2000, 323 SCRA 312.
8 See Buklod ng Kawanihang EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718, citing Martin, Philippine Political Law, p. 276.
9 Ibid. Citations omitted.
10 Emphasis supplied.
11 G.R. No. 112745, October 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 713.
12 Ibid. Emphases supplied. Citations omitted.
13 Comment, 31; Rollo, 365.
14 Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. CA, G.R. No. 114323, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 26, citing JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. v. NLRC, 228 SCRA 129, 134 (1993).
15 Sections 78 and 80 were reproduced in The General Appropriations Act of 1999 and 2000.
16 Supra Note 11.
17 Supra Note 8.
18 Department of Trade and Industry v. The Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 96739, October 13, 1993, 227 SCRA 198.
19 Supra Note 4.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
G.R. No. 166620 - ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, ET AL., Petitioners, v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, the Director General of the Philippine Information Agency and the National Treasurer, Respondents.
Promulgated:
April 20, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I concur in the result that Executive Order No. 378 (EO 378) is a valid
Presidential issuance, but not because it implements Section 31, Chapter 10, Book
II of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Section 31) or that it is sanctioned by case
law anchored on Presidential Decree No. 1416 (PD 1416), but because EO 378
merely implements Republic Act No. 9184 (RA 9184) regulating government
procurement activities.
EO 378 Exceeds the Parameters of Section 31
Section 31, an executive legislation, grants to the executive a narrow power
to reorganize ringed with limitations on two fronts: (1) the branch of the
government covered and (2) the scope of authority delegated:
Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. ─ The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions: (1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 31 limits Executive discretion to reorganize the Office of the
President and the enumerated ancillary offices along the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function
under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or
(3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa. This listing is closed and admits of no other
category of reorganization.
Tested against these three narrow categories of reorganization, EO 378 fails
to pass muster. EO 378 effects two changes to the National Printing Office (NPO):
first, it reduces the NPO’s exclusive printing function to cover election
paraphernalia only, allowing private printing establishments to bid for the right to
print government standard and accountable forms and second, it caps the NPO’s
annual appropriation to its income. Although EO 378’s narrowing of the NPO’s
functions arguably falls under Section 31(1)’s ambit authorizing abolition of units,
this power is limited to the Office of the President Proper, defined under the 1987
Administrative Code as consisting of “the Private Office, the Executive Office, the
Common Staff Support System, and the President Special Assistants/Advisers
System x x x.” The NPO is not part of the Office of the President Proper, being an
agency attached to the Office of the President, a bigger entity consisting “of the
Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it.” Thus, Section 31(1) is no
basis to declare that the President has the power to “abolish agencies under the
Office of the President.” Section 31(1) limits this power only to the Office of the
President Proper.
Further, insofar as the “Office of the President” is concerned, the President’s
reorganization powers are limited to transferring any function or any agency from
that office to any department or agency and vice versa. No amount of etymological
stretching can make reduction of function and capping of budget fit under the
narrow concept of “transferring any function or any agency.”
Case Law Cited No Authority to Validate EO 378
The cases the Decision cites furnish no bases to validate EO 378. The
leading case in this area, Larin v. Executive Secretary (reiterated in Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec. Zamora and Tondo Medical Center Employees
Association v. Court of Appeals) relied on Section 20, Chapter 7, Book II of the
Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to PD 1416:
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which states:
“Sec. 20. Residual Powers. — Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.” (italics ours) This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under
the law. What law then which gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. (Emphasis supplied)
Larin and its progeny cannot validate EO 378 because its statutory basis, PD
1416, is an undue delegation of legislative power.
It is an unquestioned attribute of the broad and undefined legislative power
of Congress to fashion Philippine bureaucracy by creating (and thus, abolishing)
public offices save for offices created by the Constitution. This power, including
its ancillary to reorganize, is exercised by the other branches only as allowed by
Congress under valid statutory delegation. Even then, the delegated power only
partakes of the original legislative power as the other branches can only implement
the legislature’s will. Thus, despite their equally broad and undefined powers,
neither the executive nor the judiciary inherently possesses the power to reorganize
its bureaucracy.
A simple scanning of the list of powers PD 1416 vests on the Executive
shows that far from being a legislative delegation to implement congressional will,
PD 1416 surrenders to the Executive the core legislative power to re-mold
Philippine bureaucracy, with the ancillary privilege to control funding, thus:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the National Government. 2. For this purpose, the President may, at his discretion, take the following actions: (a) Group, coordinate, consolidate or integrate departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, instrumentalities and functions of the government; (b) Abolish departments, offices, agencies or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which are necessary, for the efficient conduct of government functions services and activities;
(c) Transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, properties, records and personnel from one department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another; (d) Create, classify, combine, split, and abolish positions; and (e) Standardize salaries, materials and equipment. (Emphasis supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 1772 (PD 1772), amending PD 1416, enlarged the scope
of these powers by extending the President’s power to reorganize “to x x x all
agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government,
including all government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the entire
range of the powers, functions, authorities, administrative relationships, and related
aspects pertaining to these agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units.” Further,
PD 1772 clarified that the President’s power to “create, abolish, group, consolidate,
x x x or integrate” offices relates to “entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and units
of the National Government.”
The term “national government” has an established meaning in statutory
and case law. Under the statute governing Philippine bureaucracy, the
Administrative Code of 1987, “national government” refers to “the entire
machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the different forms of
local government.” Jurisprudence has interpreted this provision of the
Administrative Code to encompass “the three great departments: the executive, the
legislative, and the judicial.” By delegating to the Executive the “continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the National Government”
including the power to “create, abolish, group, consolidate, x x x or integrate” the
“entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government,” PD
1416, as amended, places under the Executive branch the vast – and undeniably
legislative – power to constitute the entire Philippine Government in the guise of
“reorganization.”
Capping the unprecedented siphoning of legislative power to the Executive,
PD 1416, as amended, authorizes the Executive to “transfer appropriations” and
“standardize salaries” in the national government. The authorization to “transfer
appropriations” is a complete repugnancy to the constitutional proscription that
“No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations. x x x.” On the
other hand, the Constitution mandates that “The Congress shall provide for the
standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, x x x.”
Indeed, Congress, with the Executive’s acquiescence, has repeatedly exercised this
exclusive power to standardize public sector employees’ compensation by enacting
a law to that effect and exempting classes of employees from its coverage.
Thus, much like the invalidated Section 68 of the previous Revised
Administrative Code delegating to the President the legislative power to create
municipalities, PD 1416, as amended, delegates to the President that undefined
legislative power to constitute the Philippine bureaucracy which the sovereign
people of this polity delegated to Congress only. This subsequent delegation of the
power to legislate offends the fundamental precept in our scheme of government
that delegated power cannot again be delegated.
The radical merger of legislative and executive powers PD 1416 sanctions
makes sense in a parliamentary system of merged executive and legislative
branches. Indeed, PD 1416, issued in 1979, three years after Amendment No. 6
vested legislative power to then President Marcos, was precisely meant to operate
within such system, as declared in PD 1416’s last “Whereas” clause: “WHEREAS,
the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate
flexibility in the organization of the national government[.]” When the Filipino
people ratified the 1987 Constitution on 2 February 1987, restoring the operation
of the original tri-branch system of government, PD 1416’s paradigm of merged
executive and legislative powers ceased to have relevance. Although then President
Aquino, by her revolutionary ascension to the Presidency, held and exercised these
two powers under the Provisional Constitution, her legislative powers ceased when
the post-EDSA Congress convened on 27 July 1987 following the 1987
Constitution’s mandate that “The incumbent President shall continue to exercise
legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.” Thus, even though the
demands of modernity and the imperatives of checks and balances may have
blurred the demarcation lines among the three branches, we remain a government
of separated powers, rooted in the conviction that division – not unity – of powers
prevents tyranny. PD 1416, as amended, with its blending of legislative and
executive powers, is a vestige of an autrocratic era, totally anachronistic to our
present-day constitutional democracy.
Making sweeping statements that the President’s power to reorganize
“pertains only to the Office of the President and departments, offices, and agencies
of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or
constitutionally created or mandated bodies” and that “the exercise by the
President of the power to reorganize x x x must be in accordance with the
Constitution, relevant laws and jurisprudence” will not erase PD 1416 and PD
1772 from our statute books. If this Court found it intolerable under our system of
government for the President to demand “obedience to all x x x decrees x x x
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction,” the same hostility should be
directed against PD 1416’s authorization for the President to “reorganize x x x the
National Government,” “transfer x x x appropriations” and “standardize salaries.”
These issuances all vest on the President unadulterated legislative power.
Hence, PD 1416, being repugnant to the 1987 Constitution in several
aspects, can no longer be given effect. At the very least, the exercise of legislative
powers by the President under PD 1416 ceased upon the convening of the First
Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Similarly, Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary
(finding valid executive issuances transferring to a department two offices under
the Office of the President) is not in point because that case involved a
reorganization falling within the ambit of Section 31(3) transferring offices from
the Office of the President to another department.
Nor is Canonizado v. Aguirre authority for the proposition that the power of
the President to reorganize under Section 31 involves the “alteration of the existing
structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control,
authority and responsibility between them” or the “reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions.” Canonizado reviewed a legislative reorganization (Republic Act No.
8851 reorganizing the Philippine National Police) thus Section 31 never figured in
its analysis. Accordingly, the vast reach of Canonizado’s definition of the power to
reorganize relates to Congress, which is, after all, the original repository of such
power, as incident to its broad and all-encompassing power to legislate.
Doctrine of Presidential Control
Over the Executive Department No Basis
to Validate EO 378
The doctrine of presidential control over the executive department likewise
furnishes no basis to uphold the validity of EO 378. As distinguished from
supervision, the doctrine of control finds application in altering acts of the
President’s subordinates. It does not sanction structural or functional changes even
within the executive department.
EO 378 Valid for Implementing RA 9184
RA 9184 mandates the conduct of competitive bidding in all the
procurement activities of the government including the acquisition of “items,
supplies, materials, and general support services x x x which may be needed in the
transaction of the public businesses or in the pursuit of any government x x x
activity” save for limited transactions. By opening government’s procurement of
standard and accountable forms to competitive bidding (except for documents
crucial to the conduct of clean elections which has to be printed solely by
government), EO 378 merely implements RA 9184’s principle of promoting
“competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable private contracting
parties who are eligible and qualified to participate in public bidding.” Indeed, EO
378 is not so much a “reorganization” move involving realignment of offices and
personnel movement as an issuance to “ensure that the government benefits from
the best services available from the market at the best price.” EO 378’s capping of
NPO’s budget to its income is a logical by-product of opening NPO’s operations to
the private sector — with the entry of market forces, there will expectedly be a
decrease in its workload, lowering its funding needs.
Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Executive Order No. 292.
The Government Procurement Reform Act.
EO 292 was enacted by then President Aquino on 25 July 1987 in the exercise of her legislative power under Section 1, Article II of the Provisional Constitution.
Section 22, Chapter 8, Title II, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
Office of the President Proper. - (1) The Office of the President Proper shall consist of the Private Office, the Executive Office, the Common Staff Support System, and the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System; (2) The Executive Office refers to the Offices of the Executive Secretary, Deputy Executive Secretaries and Assistant Executive Secretaries; (3) The Common Staff Support System embraces the offices or units under the general categories of development and management, general government administration and internal administration; and (4) The President Special Assistants/Advisers System includes such special assistants or advisers as may be needed by the President.
Section 21, Chapter 8, Title II, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides: “Organization. The Office of the President shall consist of the Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it.”
Decision, p. 11.
345 Phil. 962 (1997).
413 Phil. 281 (2001) (upholding the validity of executive issuances deactivating the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau, an agency under the Office of the President).
G.R. No. 167324, 17 July 2007, 527 SCRA 746.
Supra note 7 at 730.
See Canonizado v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, 25 January 2000, 323 SCRA 312; Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-802, 10 July 2001, 360 SCRA 718.
We described this power, as exercised by Congress, as follows: “Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.” (Canonizado v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, 25 January 2000, 323 SCRA 312, 326; internal citations omitted).
The doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power admits of only two exceptions under the Constitution, namely, the delegation to the local governments (Section 3 and Section 20, Article X) and to the President on the imposition of tariff rates, trade quotas, and shipping dues (VI, § 28(2) and adoption of measures during national emergency (Section 23(2), Article VI).
For the Executive, this authorization is found in Section 31, Chapter 10, Book II of the Administrative Code of 1987. For the judiciary, Section 43 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) required the Supreme Court to submit to the President the staffing pattern for courts constituted under that law for issuance of relevant implementing rules. For the reorganization of the Office of the Court Administrator, Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 828, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 842, delegated to the Supreme Court the power to “create such offices, services, divisions and other units in the Office of the Court Administrator, as may be necessary.”
Last paragraph, Section 1, PD 1772.
Section 2, PD 1772 (emphasis supplied).
Section 2(2), Executive Order No. 292 (emphasis supplied). More specialized statutes, such as Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6758 (Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989) substantially hews to the Administrative Code’s definition: “The term “government” refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state colleges and universities, local government units, and the armed forces. x x x” (emphasis supplied).
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, G.R. No. 120082, 11 September 1996, 261 SCRA 667, 688-689, citing the following definition of “government” in Bacani v. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468, 471-472 (1956):
[W]e state that the term “Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them” This institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. (Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied)
Article VI, Section 25(5), Constitution.
Section 5, Article IX-B, Constitution. The entire provision reads: “The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their positions.”
Republic Act No. 6758 (Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989).
E.g., Republic Act No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines; Republic Act No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System; Republic Act No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation; Republic Act No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System; Republic Act No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines; Republic Act No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation; and Republic Act No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
Struck down as unconstitutional in Pelaez v. Auditor General, No. L-23825, 24 December 1965, 15 SCRA 569.
A paradigmatic statement of the doctrine runs:
The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. x x x x (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 112 (1937); emphasis supplied).
Section 1, Article II.
Section 6, Article XVIII. See also Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343.
The rise of the administrative state since the latter half of the last century saw the blending of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in multifarious executive offices, radically redefining the classical notion of separation of powers. (see IRENE R. CORTES, PHILIPPINE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 6-11 [2nd ed., 1984])
Among the constitutionally permissible inter-branch encroachments are the President’s veto power, Congress’ power of legislative inquiry and the judiciary’s power of judicial review.
This is a core theory justifying the separation of powers, undergirded by modern political thinking, which found its way into the writings of the framers of the United States’ Constitution, the blueprint of the present Philippine constitution.
Decision, p. 20.
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 which was partially declared unconstitutional in David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
G.R. No. 166052, 29 August 2007, 531 SCRA 583.
Department of Agrarian Reform.
G.R. No. 133132, 25 January 2000, 323 SCRA 312.
Id. at 326.
Citing De Leon and De Leon, Jr., The Law On Public Officers And Election Law (1994 ed.), 365 and Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, 8 August 1989, 176 SCRA 84 (reviewing the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 127, reorganizing the then Ministry of Finance, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution).
This is apparent from the following canonical distinction of the two doctrines: “In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” (Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 147-148 [1955]) (Emphasis supplied).
Section 4 in relation to Section 5(h).
Section 10, Article IV in relation to Article XVI.
Section 3(c).
EO 378, second “Whereas” clause.
EN BANC
[G. R. No. 133132. January 25, 2000]
ALEXIS C. CANONIZADO, EDGAR DULA TORRES, and ROGELIO A. PUREZA, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER P. AGUIRRE, as Executive Secretary, HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, as Secretary of Budget and Management, JOSE PERCIVAL L. ADIONG, ROMEO L. CAIRME and VIRGINIA U. CRISTOBAL, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
The central issue posed before this Court in the present case is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8551 (RA 8551), otherwise known as the "Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998,"1 [Entitled "An Act Providing For the Reform And Reorganization Of The Philippine National Police And For Other Purposes, Amending Certain Provisions Of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-Nine Hundred And Seventy-Five Entitled, ‘An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Re-Organized Department Of The Interior And Local Government, And For Other Purposes." Took effect on March 6, 1998.] by virtue of which petitioners herein, who were all members of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), were separated from office. Petitioners claim that such law violates their constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.
The NAPOLCOM was originally created under Republic Act No. 6975 (RA 6975), entitled "An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized Department Of The Interior And Local Government, And For Other Purposes." Under RA 6975, the members of the NAPOLCOM were petitioners Edgar Dula Torres, Alexis C. Canonizado, Rogelio A. Pureza and respondent Jose Percival L. Adiong. Dula Torres was first appointed to the NAPOLCOM on January 8, 1991 for a six year term. He was re-appointed on January 23, 1997 for another six years. Canonizado was appointed on January 25, 1993 to serve the unexpired term of another Commissioner which ended on December 31, 1995. On August 23, 1995, Canonizado was re-appointed for another six years. Pureza was appointed on January 2, 1997 for a similar term of six years. Respondent Adiong’s appointment to the NAPOLCOM was issued on July 23, 1996. None of their terms had expired at the time the amendatory law was passed.2 [Rollo, 81.]
On March 6, 1998, RA 8551 took effect; it declared that the terms of the current Commissioners were deemed as expired upon its effectivity. Pursuant thereto, President Ramos appointed Romeo L. Cairme on March 11, 1998 as a member of the NAPOLCOM for a full six year term. On the same date, Adiong, was given a term extension of two years since he had served less than
two years of his previous term. Cairme and Adiong both took their oaths of office on April 6, 1998.3 [Ibid..] Completing the membership of the NAPOLCOM are Leo S. Magahum and Cleofe M. Factoran, who were appointed by President Estrada on June 30, 1998 and who took their oaths of office on July 2, 1998.4 [Ibid., 83.]
According to petitioners, sections 4 and 8 of RA 8551 are unconstitutional. Section 4, amending section 13 of Republic Act No. 6975, provides -
SEC. 13. Creation and Composition. – A National Police Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, is hereby created for the purpose of effectively discharging the functions prescribed in the Constitution and provided in this Act. The Commission shall be an agency attached to the Department for policy and program coordination. It shall be composed of a Chairperson, four (4) regular Commissioners, and the Chief of the PNP as ex-officio member. Three (3) of the regular Commissioners shall come from the civilian sector who are neither active nor former members of the police or military, one (1) of whom shall be designated as vice chairperson by the President. The fourth regular Commissioner shall come from the law enforcement sector either active or retired: Provided, That an active member of a law enforcement agency shall be considered resigned from said agency once appointed to the Commission: Provided further, That at least one (1) of the Commissioners shall be a woman. The Secretary of the Department shall be the ex-officio Chairperson of the Commission, while the Vice Chairperson shall act as the executive officer of the Commission.
Meanwhile, section 8 states that -
Upon the effectivity of this Act, the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired which shall constitute a bar to their reappointment or an extension of their terms in the Commission except for current Commissioners who have served less than two (2) years of their terms of office who may be appointed by the President for a maximum term of two (2) years.
Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates their security of tenure.
It is beyond dispute that petitioners herein are members of the civil service, which embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.5 [Constitution, art. 9 (B), sec. 2 (1).] As such, they cannot be removed or suspended from office, except for cause provided by law.6 [Id., art. 9 (B), sec. 2 (3).] The phrase "except for cause provided by law" refers to "… reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient."7 [De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil 289 (1950).]
Public respondents insist that the express declaration in section 8 of RA 8551 that the terms of petitioners’ offices are deemed expired discloses the legislative intent to impliedly abolish the
NAPOLCOM created under RA 6975 pursuant to a bona fide reorganization. In support of their theory, public respondents cite the various changes introduced by RA 8551 in the functions, composition and character of the NAPOLCOM as proof of Congress’ intention to abolish the body created under RA 6975 in order to replace it with a new NAPOLCOM which is more civilian in nature, in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Petitioners’ posit the theory that the abolition of petitioners’ offices was a result of a reorganization of the NAPOLCOM allegedly effected by RA 8551.8 [Rollo, 84-94.]
The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function.9 [Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, 243 SCRA 196 (1995).] It is acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer’s right to continue in the position held10 [Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil 903 (1954).] and that such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack of funds11 [Ginzon v. Municipality of Murcia, 158 SCRA 1 (1988); Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 184 (1984).] or in the interest of economy.12 [Abrot v. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 468 (1982).] However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees.13 [Baldoz v. Office of the President, 78 SCRA 354 (1977).]
An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently, as the word "abolished" denotes.14 [Busacay v. Buenaventura and Murao, 93 Phil 786 (1953).] Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. Thus, in U.P. Board of Regents v. Rasul15 [200 SCRA 685 (1991). See Gacho v. Osmena, Jr., 103 Phil 837 (1958); Brillo v. Enage, 94 Phil 732 (1954).] we said:
It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an office denies to the incumbent the right to security of tenure. [De la Lanna v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982)] However, in this case, the renaming and restructuring of the PGH and its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of the position of PGH Director. This is because where the abolished office and the offices created in its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good faith. [Jose L. Guerrero v. Hon. Antonio V. Arizabal, G.R. No. 81928, June 4, 1990, 186 SCRA 108 (1990)] We hereby apply the principle enunciated in Cesar Z. Dario vs. Hon. Salvador M. Mison [176 SCRA 84 (1989)] that abolition which merely changes the nomenclature of positions is invalid and does not result in the removal of the incumbent.
The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the position of the PGH Director and the creation of a UP-PGH Medical Center Director are valid, the removal of the incumbent is still not justified for the reason that the duties and functions of the two positions are basically the same…. (underscoring supplied)
This was also our ruling in Guerrero v. Arizabal,16 [186 SCRA 108 (1990).] wherein we declared that the substantial identity in the functions between the two offices was indicia of bad faith in the removal of petitioner pursuant to a reorganization.
We come now to the case at bench. The question that must first be resolved is whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their office by Congress. More specifically, whether the changes effected by RA 8551 in reference to the NAPOLCOM were so substantial as to effectively create a completely new office in contemplation of the law. In answer to this query, the case of Mayor v. Macaraig17 [194 SCRA 672 (1991).] is squarely in point.
In that case, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 671518 [Entitled "An Act To Extend Protection To Labor, Strengthen The Constitutional Rights Of Workers To Self-Organization, Collective Bargaining And Peaceful Concerted Activities, Foster Industrial Peace And Harmony, Promote The Preferential Use Of Voluntary Modes Of Settling Labor Disputes And Reorgnize The National Labor Relations Commission, Amending Presidential Decree No. 441, As Amended, Otherwise Known As The Labor Code Of The Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor And For Other Purposes."
Took effect on March 21, 1989.] insofar as it declared vacant the positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission and provided for the removal of the incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their successors.19 [Id. SEC. 35 provides –
Equity of the Incumbent. – Incumbent career officials and rank-and-file employees of the National Labor Relations Commission not otherwise affected by the Act shall continue to hold office without need of reappointment. However, consistent with the need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments, all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the present National Labor Relations Commission are hereby declared vacant. However, subject officials shall continue to temporarily discharge their duties and functions until their successors shall have been duly appointed and qualified. (underscoring supplied)] The Court held that the removal of petitioners was unconstitutional since Republic Act No. 6715 did not expressly or impliedly abolish the offices of petitioners, there being no irreconcilable inconsistency in the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners’ offices under the old law and the new law. Thus:
Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration that that office is vacant. While it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it can not be conceded the power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or holders thereof from the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on that account. It can not be justified by the professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments.
This is precisely what RA 8851 seeks to do - declare the offices of petitioners vacant, by declaring that "the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired," thereby removing petitioners herein from the civil service. Congress may only be conceded this power if it is done pursuant to a bona fide abolition of the NAPOLCOM.
RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners’ positions. In order to determine whether there has been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary to examine the changes introduced by the new law in the nature, composition and functions of the NAPOLCOM.
Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as a collegial body within the Department of the Interior and Local Government,20 [RA 6975, sec. 13.] (Department) whereas under RA 8551 it is made "an agency attached to the Department for policy and program coordination."21 [RA 8551, sec. 4.] Contrary to what public respondents would have us believe, this does not result in the creation of an entirely new office. In Mayor, the NLRC, prior to the passage of the amendatory law, was also considered an integral part of the Department of Labor and Employment. RA 6715, however, changed that by declaring that it shall instead "..be attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program coordination only…." making it a more autonomous body. The Court held that this change in the NLRC’s nature was not sufficient to justify a conclusion that the new law abolished the offices of the labor commissioners.
Another amendment pointed out by public respondents is the revision of the NAPOLCOM’s composition. RA 8551 expanded the membership of the NAPOLCOM from four to five Commissioners by adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member. In addition, the new law provided that three of the regular Commissioners shall come from the civilian sector who are neither active nor former members of the police or military, and that the fourth regular Commissioner shall come from the law enforcement sector either active or retired. Furthermore, it is required that at least one of the Commissioners shall be a woman.22 [Id.] Again, as we held in Mayor, such revisions do not constitute such essential changes in the nature of the NAPOLCOM as to result in an implied abolition of such office. It will be noted that the organizational structure of the NAPOLCOM, as provided in section 20 of RA 6975 as amended by section 10 of RA 8551,23 [Id., SEC. 10. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 20. Organizational Structure. - The Commission shall consist of the following units:
"(a) Commission Proper. – This is composed of the offices of the Chairman and four (4) Commissioners.
"(b) Staff Services. – The staff services of the Commission shall be as follows:
"(1) The Planning and Research Service, which shall provide technical services to the Commission in areas of overall policy formulation, strategic and operational planning, management systems or procedures, evaluation and monitoring of the Commission’s programs, projects and internal operations; and shall conduct thorough research and analysis on social and economic conditions affecting peace and order in the country;
"(2) The Legal Affairs Service, which shall provide the Commission with efficient service as legal counsel of the Commission; draft or study contracts affecting the Commission and submit appropriate recommendations pertaining thereto; and render legal opinions arising from the administration and operation of the Philippine National Police and the Commission;
"(3) The Crime Prevention and Coordination Service, which shall undertake criminological researches and studies; formulate a national crime prevention plan; develop a crime prevention and information program and provide editorial direction for all criminology research and crime prevention publications;
"(4) The Personnel and Administrative Service, which shall perform personnel functions for the Commission, administer the entrance and promotional examinations for policemen, provide the necessary services relating to
records, correspondence, supplies, property and equipment, security and general services, and the maintenance and utilization of facilities, and provide services relating to manpower, career planning and development, personnel transactions and employee welfare;
"(5) The Inspection, Monitoring and Investigation Service, which shall conduct continuous inspection and management audit of personnel, facilities and operations at all levels of command of the PNP, monitor the implementation of the Commission’s programs and projects relative to law enforcement; and monitor and investigate police anomalies and irregularities;
"(6) The Installations and Logistics Service, which shall review the Commission’s plans and programs and formulate policies and procedures regarding acquisition, inventory, control, distribution, maintenance and disposal of supplies and shall oversee the implementation of programs on transportation facilities and installations and the procurement and maintenance of supplies and equipment; and
"(7) The Financial Service, which shall provide the Commission with staff advice and assistance on budgetary and financial matters, including the overseeing of the processing and disbursement of funds pertaining to the scholarship program and surviving children of deceased and/or permanently incapacitated PNP personnel.
"(c) Disciplinary Appellate Boards. – The Commission shall establish a formal administrative disciplinary appellate machinery consisting of the National Appellate Board and the regional appellate boards.
"The National Appellate Board shall decide cases on appeal from decisions rendered by the PNP chief, while the regional appellate boards shall decide cases on appeal from decisions rendered by officers other than the PNP chief, the mayor, and the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) created hereunder."
(amendments are underscored)] remains essentially the same and that, except for the addition of the PNP Chief as ex-officio member, the composition of the NAPOLCOM is also substantially identical under the two laws. Also, under both laws, the Secretary of the Department shall act as the ex-officio Chairman of the Commission and the Vice-Chairman shall be one of the Commissioners designated by the President.24 [RA 6975, sec. 13; RA 8551, sec. 4.]
Finally, the powers and duties of the NAPOLCOM remain basically unchanged by the amendments. Under RA 6975, the Commission has the following powers and functions:
(a) Exercise administrative control over the Philippine National Police;
(b) Advise the President on all matters involving police functions and administration;
(c) Foster and develop policies and promulgate rules and regulations, standards and procedures to improve police services based on sound professional concepts and principles;
(d) Examine and audit, and thereafter establish the standards for such purposes on a continuing basis, the performance, activities, and facilities of all police agencies throughout the country;
(e) Prepare a police manual prescribing rules and regulations for efficient organization, administration, and operation, including recruitment, selection, promotion and retirement;
(f) Establish a system of uniform crime reporting;
(g) Conduct surveys and compile statistical data for the proper evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of all police units in the country;
(h) Render to the President and to Congress an annual report on its activities and accomplishments during the thirty (30) days after the end of the calendar year, which shall include an appraisal of the conditions obtaining in the organization and administration of police agencies in the municipalities, cities and provinces throughout the country, and recommendation for appropriate remedial legislation;
(i) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and training, logistical requirements, communications, records, information systems, crime laboratory, crime prevention and crime reporting;
(j) Affirm reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National Police;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits;
(l) Recommend to the President, through the Secretary, within sixty (60) days before the commencement of each calendar year, a crime prevention;
(m) Prescribe minimum standards for arms, equipment, and uniforms and, after consultation with the Philippine Heraldry Commission, for insignia of ranks, awards and medals of honor;
(n) Issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum in matters pertaining to the discharge of its own powers and duties, and designate who among its personnel can issue such processes and administer oaths in connection therewith; and
(o) Perform such other functions necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act and as the President may direct.
Meanwhile, the NAPOLCOM’s functions under section 5 of RA 8551 are:
a) Exercise administrative control and operational supervision over the Philippine National Police which shall mean the power to:
1) Develop policies and promulgate a police manual prescribing rules and regulations for efficient organization, administration, and operation, including criteria for manpower allocation, distribution and deployment, recruitment, selection , promotion, and retirement of personnel and the conduct of qualifying entrance and promotional examinations for uniformed members;
2) Examine and audit, and thereafter establish the standards for such purposes on a continuing basis, the performance, activities and facilities of all police agencies throughout the country;
3) Establish a system of uniform crime reporting;
4) Conduct an annual self-report survey and compile statistical date for the accurate assessment of the crime situation and the proper evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of all police units in the country;
5) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and training, logistical requirements, communications, records, information systems, crime laboratory, crime prevention and crime reporting;
6) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National Police;
7) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits;
8) Prescribe minimum standards for arms, equipment, and uniforms and after consultation with the Philippine Heraldry Commission, for insignia of ranks, awards, and medals of honor. Within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, the standards of the uniformed personnel of the PNP must be revised which should be clearly distinct from the military and reflective of the civilian character of the police;
9) Issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum in matters pertaining to the discharge of its own powers and duties, and designate who among its personnel can issue such processes and administer oaths in connection therewith;
10) Inspect and assess the compliance of the PNP on the established criteria for manpower allocation, distribution, and deployment and their impact on the community and the crime situation, and therewith formulate appropriate guidelines for maximization of resources and effective utilization of the PNP personnel;
11) Monitor the performance of the local chief executives as deputies of the Commission; and
12) Monitor and investigate police anomalies and irregularities.
b) Advise the President on all matters involving police functions and administration;
c) Render to the President and to the Congress an annual report on its activities and accomplishments during the thirty (30) days after the end of the calendar year, which shall include an appraisal of the conditions obtaining in the organization and administration of police agencies in the municipalities, cities and provinces throughout the country, and recommendations for appropriate remedial legislation;
d) Recommend to the President, through the Secretary, within sixty (60) days before the commencement of each calendar year, a crime prevention program; and
e) Perform such other functions necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act and as the President may direct."
Clearly, the NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions.
Public respondents argue that the fact that the NAPOLCOM is now vested with administrative control and operational supervision over the PNP, whereas under RA 6975 it only exercised administrative control should be construed as evidence of legislative intent to abolish such office.25 [Rollo, 88.] This contention is bereft of merit. Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the that of the latter."26 [Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366 (1998).] On the other hand, to supervise is to oversee, to have oversight of, to superintend the execution of or the performance of a thing, or the movements or work of a person, to inspect with authority; it is the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.27 [Borres v. Canonoy, G.R. No. L-31641, October 23, 1981.] Thus, the power of control necessarily encompasses the power of supervision and adding the phrase "operational supervision" under the powers of the NAPOLCOM would not bring about a substantial change in its functions so as to arrive at the conclusion that a completely new office has been created.
Public respondents would have this Court believe that RA 8551 reorganized the NAPOLCOM resulting in the abolition of petitioners’ offices. We hold that there has been absolutely no attempt by Congress to effect such a reorganization.
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them.28 [De Leon and De Leon, Jr., The Law On Public Officers And Election Law (1994 ed.), 365.] It involves
a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.29 [Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 (1989).] Naturally, it may result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith, laid down in Dario v. Mison:30 [176 SCRA 84 (1989). See Dytiapco v. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 88 (1992); Domingo v. Development Bank of the Philippines, 207 SCRA 766 (1992); Pari-an v. Civil Service Commission, 202 SCRA 772 (1991).]
...As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
It is exceedingly apparent to this Court that RA 8551 effected a reorganization of the PNP, not of the NAPOLCOM. They are two separate and distinct bodies, with one having supervision and control over the other. In fact, it is the NAPOLCOM that is given the duty of submitting a proposed reorganization plan of the PNP to Congress.31 [RA 8551, SEC. 13. Authority of the Commission to Reorganize the PNP. –
Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6975 on the organizational structure and rank classification of the PNP, the Commission shall conduct a management audit, and prepare and submit to Congress a proposed reorganization plan of the PNP not later than December 31, 1998, subject to the limitations provided under this Act and based on the following criteria: a) increased police visibility through dispersal of personnel from the headquarters to the field offices and by the appointment and assignment of non-uniformed personnel to positions which are purely administrative, technical, clerical or menial in nature and other positions which are not actually and directly related to police operation; and b) efficient and optimized delivery of police services to the communities.
The PNP reorganization program shall be approved by Congress through a joint resolution.] As mentioned earlier, the basic structure of the NAPOLCOM has been preserved by the amendatory law. There has been no revision in its lines of control, authority and responsibility, neither has there been a reduction in its membership, nor a consolidation or abolition of the offices constituting the same. Adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member of the Commission does not result in a reorganization.
No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their removal from office, removes civil service employees from office without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.
Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there are now new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never became vacant under the law and he is
considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace petitioners are not valid.32 [Floreza v. Ongpin, 182 SCRA 692 (1990); Tanala v. Legaspi, 13 SCRA 566 (1965).]
At this juncture, we note that it is alleged by public respondents that on June 30, 1998, Canonizado accepted an appointment by President Estrada as the Inspector General of Internal Affairs Services (IAS) of the PNP, pursuant to sections 40 and 41 of RA 8551 and that he took his oath of office before the President on July 7, 1998. However, this is a mere allegation on the part of public respondents of which this Court cannot take judicial notice. Furthermore, this issue has not been fully ventilated in the pleadings of the parties. Therefore, such allegation cannot be taken into consideration by this Court in passing upon the issues in the present case.
Petitioners also assail the constitutionality of section 4 of RA 8551 insofar as it limits the law enforcement sector to only one position on the Commission and categorizes the police as being part of the law enforcement sector despite section 6 of Article XVI of the Constitution which provides that the police force shall be civilian in character. Moreover, it is asserted by petitioners that the requirement in section 4 that one of the Commissioners shall be a woman has no rational basis and is therefore discriminatory. They claim that it amounts to class legislation and amounts to an undue restriction upon the appointing power of the President as provided under section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.33 [Rollo, 8-12.]
In view of our ruling upon the unconstitutionality of petitioners’ removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551, we find that there is no longer any need to pass upon these remaining constitutional questions. It is beyond doubt that the legislature has the power to provide for the composition of the NAPOLCOM since it created such body. Besides, these questions go into the very wisdom of the law, and unquestionably lie beyond the normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon.34 [Osmena v, Commission on Elections, 288 SCRA 447 (1998).]
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition, but only to the extent of declaring section 8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional for being in violation of the petitioners’ right to security of tenure. The removal from office of petitioners as a result of the application of such unconstitutional provision of law and the appointment of new Commissioners in their stead is therefore null and void. Petitioners herein are entitled to REINSTATEMENT and to the payment of full backwages to be reckoned from the date they were removed from office.35 [Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108 (1990).]
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
