CASE STUDY SERIES #77 august 2021 GOVERNANCE FOR THE …

CASE STUDY SERIES #77

august 2021

GOVERNANCEFOR THE FUTURE:

Incorporating Science, Technology, and Innovation in Policy Making Agenda

GOVERNANCEFOR THE FUTURE:

Author:Muhammad Hafiz Noer

Editor:Treviliana Eka Putri

Design and Layout:

Naufal A. Radityasakti

1 Governance for the Future: Incorporating Science, Technology,and Innovation in Policy Making Agenda

As the world grapples with the COVID-19 outbreak that has shaken all aspects of

human life, it becomes more important for the government to integrate science,

technology, and innovation (STI) as core elements to the policymaking process.

During the course of this endless pandemic, most of the government's

responses have been, somewhat detached to scientific evidence, which have

generated slowdown measures to curb the spread of the virus and to safeguard

the people from the economic impact.1

Seeing the turmoil that the world is encountering, the role of STI as one of the

bases in public policy is more crucial than ever. The United Nations Conference

on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) pointed out that the STI role is critical in

times of crisis.2 First, digital technology, if appropriately utilized, enables and

empowers the local community. Second, innovation is a vital motor for robust

economic performance. Third, innovative solutions could lead to sustainable

outcomes.Countries that consolidate STI in their decision-making process will

not only be resilient amidst the difficult times, but most importantly, they will be

able to tackle the grand challenges—from climate change and natural disaster to

overpopulation and another pandemic—that mankind will face in the future.3

This study examines the urgent need to refocusing post-outbreak governance

through merging STI into the policymaking process. It highlights the obstacles

that exist in generating science-based policies while also providing examples of

the role of STI in Singapore and efforts in integrating STI in Indonesia.

Introduction

Governance for the Future: Incorporating Science, Technology,and Innovation in Policy Making Agenda 2

Science, technology,and innovation:The contested realm betweenscience and the politics ofpolicymakingIn short, science—both natural and social—is ‘know-why’ and technology is

‘know-how’.4 Science creates knowledge, whereas technology is the medium to

achieve knowledge and a tool for wealth creation. Therefore, the government's

support in the development of science and technology would accelerate

economic returns.5 Ideally, the abundance of cash that a country possesses

would generate excellent public services, increase the wellbeing of the people,

and foster sustainable development. However, scientific knowledge and

technological advancement only would not create a robust economy. One of the

important factors in growth is innovation.

In economic terms, innovation is the intentional introduction of the utilization of

science and technology into production activities to create more products or

services with lower production costs, increase labor's welfare, fulfill society's

higher needs, and contribute to economic growth.6 Although it sounds

promising that innovation will eventually deliver bright prospects to a country’s

economy, on the contrary, it could not handily accommodate each stakeholder’s

interests. Thus, in order to generate innovative solutions for sustainable growth,

policymakers need to assess the underlying hurdles in adapting science and

technology in each policy cycle. One of the primary challenges is the

problematic linkage between science and policymaking and setting up ways to

design appropriate innovation systems that harness science and technology.


Science and technology play

vital roles in shaping effective

policies, targeted outcomes, and measuring unintended consequences.

However, it is uneasy to integrate science and technology into policy

deliberations. Jones pointed out that the main obstacles to the application of

science and technology are education, communications, acceptability to new

ideas, economic and social interests, administrative effectiveness, business

enterprise, and political leadership.7 This writing will be focused on the

government’s acceptance of new ideas and the contrary poles between

science-technology and policymaking. I assume that these two are the

underlying problems—which brings wider effects to the hurdles that Jones

mentioned.

The experiment carried out by Andrew Shtulman and Joshua Valcarcel

explained that mankind has their own naïve intuition which constructs their

worldview. This naïve intuition is hard to be replaced by newer information,

even though it is science-driven.8 No matter how high their educational

background is, people tend to believe and disbelieve scientific evidence based

on their emotions, social background, or embedded values rather than rational

thinking.9 People also tend to defend their arguments—whether in favour or

against scientific facts—because they do not want to lose their group or

influence in that circle. In short, people might deny scientific sources because

it contradicts their beliefs and interests. Somehow, this finding of

subconscious intuition has deterred the effort to fuse science and technology

in policy agenda. Instead, political elites, policymakers, or government officials

have shown the inclination to emphasize their worldview to leverage scientific

evidence to satisfy their beliefs or interests.10 11

4Governance for the Future: Incorporating Science, Technology,and Innovation in Policy Making Agenda

When political leadership and decision-making process are based on

‘cherry-picking’ data, it will eventually affect the effectiveness of bureaucratic

machinery—which runs the policy outputs. This is because bureaucracy works to

exercise the domination of power based on knowledge. Therefore, it should be

taken into account that one of the roles of bureaucracy is to preserve the

knowledge authority that state officials possess.12 The condition is even worse in

a state where the government is supported by business actors to run the

country, if not to say empowered by the oligarchs. Thus, the government's effort

to carry out a knowledge-based economy is even more challenging. The interest

of this group is to defend their wealth and the income they rely on it.13 Therefore,

no matter how logical the scientific evidence is, their embedded intuition to

secure their business cycle is their foremost priority.

Not only that, with the personalized data

gathering and a wealth of information,

it could also lead to the obstruction of

science communication to the

public. Science communication can

only progress in a supportive

political environment. Developing

a healthy political environment


for the growth of science can only be made by the hands of the government.14 As

a result, policymakers fail to meet the ideal policy outputs because they are

personalizing or politicizing evidence to meet their interests or to secure their

constituents’ needs.15

On another note, the effort to combine science, technology, and innovation in

public policy is even more complex because the nexus between the two areas is

often presented as two contradictory poles. Moreover, studies have shown that

the use of scientific knowledge in policymaking has complicated the idea of a

logical connection between the two domains—science and policy.16 Scientists

and policymakers possess different goals, speak distinct languages,

understanding of time, and lack of mutual trust and respect.17 In

addition to that, there are fundamental differences

in how policymakers and academia

understand ideal evidence.18

Policymakers believe that

evidence is colloquial and

relevant, where at the same

time, it should also be timely

and possess a clear message.

Conversely, evidence in the

mind of researchers should be

scientific, proven, theoretically

driven, has no time constraints,

and provide points of

qualifications.


To make it clear, during the initial virus response, Indonesia’s President Joko

‘Jokowi ‘Widodo asked the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) for rapid

vaccine clinical trials for only three months, whereas scientists argued that it

should last longer due to the plenty of samples.19

Perhaps most people think that policymaking should be made scientifically, but

in reality, scientific evidence has the tendency to remove the 'political nature' of

the policymaking process. James Ferguson named this as 'the anti-politics

machine.20 As a result, the rational and technical development policy

depoliticized every problem that exists, while there are subsist political issues

central to the problems. The complex ties between science and policy

discussions—following the Laswellian thinking—can best describe the political

dimension of the use of scientific knowledge in policy. In fact, science itself is

political.21


Although it appears insurmountable to strengthen the cooperation between

science and policy work, sets of strategies have been made to juxtapose the

vast gap between the two entities.

It is not insuperable to combine the two entities. However, it takes teamwork

effort from scientists, experts, academia, policymakers, and politicians to

integrate science, technology, and innovation in policymaking. Science experts

have identified strategies to integrate the two poles to work under policymaking

process.

Stevens illustrates three patterns of the way science works in policy

discussions.22 First is the linear model, which relies heavily on the

methodological rigor of the research to find credible output. Based on the

advanced research that

scientists provide, the output

would be most likely adapted

to policymaking. Second is the

enlightenment model, where

scientific evidence conforms

with the policymakers or

politicians' core beliefs will be

highly likely to guide policy

deliberations. The third is the

political model that

acknowledges the selective

use of evidence to fulfill

policymakers' interests.

Ways to apply science,technology, and innovationin policymaking


Similar to Stevens, Wittrock demonstrated four models of the matrix of social

knowledge and policy.23 First is the politico-bureaucratic type which does not

provide a light to the relevance and quality of social science. Second is the

utilitarian engineering concept which subordinates research to meet the

demands of policy. Wittrock regarded this model as incompatible with empirical

evidence from a pool of studies. The third is the technocratic system which

depends on the role of research and policy as the subordinate. Lastly, the

enlightenment approach that views social science as a path to defining

problems, supplying policymakers with general orientations.

While we are already informed about the big scheme to narrow the distance

between the two domains, Roger Pielke explained the practical side for

scientists involved in policy work.24 Pielke proposed the 'honest broker of policy

alternatives as a strategic role to make sense of science in policymaking. The

role of scientists is not only explaining scientific evidence, but also taking part in

providing possible choices of policies to decision-makers and allowing some

space for policymakers to utilize scientific evidence that match with reality.


Whenever science is involved in policy mechanisms, it is intertwined with the

use and development of technology. This is because technology innovates and

disrupts, whereas public policy has the ability to regulate and to take control.25

Take an example of how the development of the GeNose COVID-19 test in

Indonesia where it involves science and technology but supported with

non-transparent policy mechanisms26 or the ride-hailing companies which is

beneficial for the users but threatening their drivers at the same time.27

It is important to utilize and “match” technology with the specific problems that

need to be addressed so that it will deliver efficient and needed innovation.

Problems arose from using the Research and Development budget effectively,

the lack of human resources, connecting technological innovation with

industrial demands, to stakeholder mapping and unidentified missions. With

rapid technological developments on one side and steady policy mechanisms on

the other, conventional policymaking would not be sufficient to empower

science, technology, and innovation. There needs to be an alternative pathway

to enable collaboration between them.

Through her recent work at the Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose,

Mariana Mazzucato and George Dibb offered essential strategies to integrate

science, technology, and innovation in policy governance.28 Based on their

proposal, it is imperative for countries to establish their own national system of

innovation which is based on their socio-economic, political, cultural, and

environmental context.29 Public sector takes a crucial role as a conductor of this

system, with its well-defined missions that could generate trickle-down effects.

However, it needs to welcome a large number of agents involved so that it will

nurture knowledge exchange and a broader point of view. Under this system,

corporations with their RnD laboratory may engage in the market through

selling or buying goods and services to or from customers or merchants, while

academia or experts from universities and research organizations could interact

via knowledge and human capital.30


How does the pandemicdisentangle government distrustof scientific evidence?

It is also important to note that not all research activities are intended for

profit-taking.31 Research activity comprises two functions: First, it serves as

basic research where experimental investigation is important for long-term

outputs. This is not intended for wealth creation, but rather to create fresh ideas

based on the current phenomenon. Second, research activity that boosts

productivity and meets industrial needs—which generates income for the coun-

try. The earnings gained from this innovation cycle can be allocated to provide

equitable public services or to fund other RnD activities.

With its clear missions, the government is expected to create markets for the

actors involved and generate wellbeing for the people. Therefore, instead of

fixing the systemic failures, the government is taking the role to create a new

system.

As explained before, science and policymaking are two

different realms that involve trade-offs in the

application. The interplay between them is even

more arduous during this pandemic. As we are

all aware that this is an unprecedented

catastrophe, the need to respond rapidly and

effectively is crucial to safeguard the people.

However, with this disease's high level of

uncertainty, science could not provide certain

prescriptions to answer the

policymaker’s agenda.


From time constraints—scientists need to investigate the virus for a longer time,

whereas policymakers need certainty—to defining knowledge where academia

tends to be quiet when they know nothing. In contrast, policymakers must

prepare a set of answers to the public.32

State officials encountered unfamiliar situations which contradict their political

and economic interests.33 The trade-offs are whether policymakers protect

human lives at all costs and abandon economic performance—due to the

mobility restriction, which cause a significant decline in economic activity

(fewer jobs, more savings, less spending, and business shut down)34—or taking

the middle way through curbing the spread of the disease while at the same

time pushing economic activities.35

There are many instances that denote the government's lack of trust, if not to

say politicization, of scientific advice.36 37 Developing countries experienced

declining trust in experts or epidemiologists, but developed countries also

rejected medical evidence, which was frequently at strife with plans to

reactivate the economy. Analysis by Resnick showed that there are two contrast

policy responses to the virus.38 First, government officials in populist countries

tend to belittle scientific precautions. Secondly, there are certain cases where

the public has negative sentiment over scientific evidence due to the abuse of

power from the elites.

Arguably, some spectators observed that political polarization and the growing

populism have become some of the underlying factors that exacerbate poor

COVID-19 handling. In short, populism is the idea that perceived society is

divided into two factions, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’.39 Populist

leaders act as if they are the ‘unifying’ factor of the will of the people, aiming to

thrash the political elite.40 Indonesia, United States, and Brazil can be examples

of stereotypical virus measures. The three countries showcase similar reactions

to the catastrophe; downplaying the threat of the virus, denying scientific

recommendations, and ambiguous attitudes in order to protect their people.41

Some of their stories will be given here, while these examples are

non-exhaustive.


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sit Instead of showing empathy and set precautionary measures based on

suggestions from health experts, one of Indonesia's members of the cabinet

tried to show their competence by introducing the Anti-Corona necklace, which

can kill the virus in minutes. Meanwhile, Trump promoted the use of the

controversial drug, hydroxychloroquine, which was met with resistance from

health experts. The two leaders believe that the panacea would stop people

from panicking.

It is very worrying that the leaders portrayed an ambiguous standpoint to secure

their political agenda. For example, President Jokowi publicly declared that he

would not impose a nationwide lockdown as it will threaten his economic

legacy.42 In Brazil, President Bolsonaro condemned the self-imposed lockdown

from governors because it will worsen the country's economy.43 They believe

that economic activity can work hand in hand while the government’s

combatting the virus.

The politicization of official statements to the pandemic, which is fuelled by

misinfodemics, poor risk communication, lack of transparency, and rejections

portrayed by state officials, has resulted in public skepticism over scientific

evidence. Research in Scandinavian countries has shown that the public

exhibits low trust in science due to the government’s advisors who are often

filtered scientific facts for their political benefits.44 A study carried out by

Muhtadi and Soderborg in Indonesia displayed low public approval to their

president and health ministry.45 On average, both only received 0.50 and 0.25,

respectively—from the scale of 1.0—although the president's response is

consistently rated more agreeably than that of the governor and health ministry.

In Africa, the fact-checker website 'Africa Check' has filed many irresponsible

facts about the 'cure-all' prescriptions.46

In the end, debates among politicians or public skepticism over the pandemic

handling should not be considered as a stumbling block to virus mitigation. Not

even citizens’ criticisms must provide solutions to public officials. On the

contrary, it should be seen as part of knowledge exchange, transparency,

identify bias, and building trust between the government and the people.


Science, technology, andinnovation in public policy:The Case of Indonesiaand SingaporeIn the previous section, we are already informed of the struggle to consolidate

STI into public policy and how the COVID-19 crisis can be the proper example of

a country's inability in merging STI into actions. In this part of writing, it is

necessary to recognize how the institutionalization of STI affects the

development of a country. Hereby I provide two examples from Indonesia and

Singapore to see the contrast of institutionalization and utilization of STI.

The cabinet reshuffle that happened in April 2021 gained spotlight as Indone-

sia's President Jokowi decided to dissolve the Ministry of Research and Tech-

nology with the Education and Culture Ministry and that the research

authority will be under the National

Research Agency or BRIN—which

function as an independent state

agency responsible directly to the

Indonesia’s knowledge-power relationsand the new era of research and innovation

1

INFO NEWSCOVID-19

INFO TIME

COVID-19 NEWS

COVID-1914Governance for the Future: Incorporating Science, Technology,

and Innovation in Policy Making Agenda

president. The bold move sparked mixed views from politicians and experts.

Those who are optimistic mostly come from the Jokowi camp, and on the other

hand, experts and researchers expressed their concerns about the future of

science, technology, and innovation.

The case of Indonesia’s BRIN could not be perceived as a single

knowledge-power phenomenon. The complex relations between science,

technology and the state in Indonesia has its historical roots dated back to the

New Order era (1965-1998).

The then-president Soeharto asked each ministry to build its own research and

development bodies and established research institutes like the Indonesia

Institute of Science (LIPI) and the National Institute of Aeronautics and Space

(LAPAN) to conduct research that serves Indonesia's development program.

Thanks to the oil boom during the 1970s, Indonesia enjoyed the abundance of oil

revenue to institutionalize the high technology.

Besides being backed up by former President Soeharto and his aides,

Indonesia's success in infiltrating the technological agenda was also supported

by the bureaucratic environment favorable for advance technology as an engine

of transformation.47 The encouraging ecosystem made it possible for Indonesia

to become one of the giants of Asia at that time—although it also

comes with defects in some parts.

While exact science and technology contributed to projects like

infrastructure, extractive or manufacturing industry, social science

was asked to print qualified human resources that will fill the labor

market. Dhakidae named this problematic linkage as ‘science

crisis' and pointed out at least four categorizations that portray

the phenomenon:48



Research to support business interests

Research on sensitive issues like sexual behavior in a society

Research on sensitive issues like sexual behavior in a society

Politicized research or survey on Indonesia’s most influential figure

1

2

3

4

However, the demise of the New Order administration in 1998 does not tear

down its crony capitalism and oligarchs.49 As a consequence, today's top-down

policy mechanisms do not support the role of the knowledge sector.50 This can

be seen from the problematic establishment of BRIN and the ministry merger. At

least two principal blunders evolve in this case, the structure and vision of the

BRIN and the ministry merger which broaden the scope of the education

ministry.

According to the law of the National System on Science and Technology (Sisnas

Iptek), the BRIN was designed for conducting research and innovation, creating

research policies, and synergizing research and innovation outputs from

government bodies. Having these responsibilities at once, implementation and

policy invention might cause abuse of power.51

The situation is getting even darker with the designation of the BRIN’s steering

board which positioned Megawati, the chairman of Indonesia Democratic Party

of Struggle (PDIP), as the head of the steering board—Megawati gained her seat

automatically due to her task as the head of the steering board at the Agency for

Pancasila Ideology Education (BPIP)—raising attention to potentially politicizing

the research and innovation activities.

As said earlier, Indonesia's Education and Culture Ministry is having extra

responsibility, with research and technology being its new focus. With this

additional task, the ministry has a lot of burdens, particularly with the widening

discrepancy in accessing education due to the outbreak. The ministry’s focus

comprises the upstream (early childhood education, elementary, junior, and

senior high school, character development and culture) and downstream

(vocational and higher education, research, technology, and innovation).52

With these facts, academia and scientists believe that the BRIN will not be able

to tackle current obstacles such as lack of funding, inconsequential research

and innovation with industry needs, and lack of non-profit research activity.53 It

will only serve Indonesia’s development agenda, if not to say the oligarchs’

interests.54 Subsequently, it will take some time to coordinate the administration

procedures, funding, and projects with the newly merged ministry and the BRIN.


Singapore’s success in science and technology has become my reason to put its

triumph in a brief explanation on how the Singaporean government acts as

kapellmeister of its innovation system. Although under British colonization for a

long time, Singapore did not inherit any scientific institutions nor technical

support services,55 but today, Singapore’s achievements have become a global

science hub with local talent pool and excellent innovation system.56

The Singaporean government plays a prominent role in promoting the use of

science and technology—which was aligned with the government’s initial dream

to industrialize the economy to generate jobs. However, with limited human

resources and lack of expertise, the government decided to attract foreign

investment, which heavily relied on the use of foreign technology, knowledge,

and human resources, whereas Singapore supplied labors to the multinational

companies (MNCs).

One of the breakthroughs of the government's seriousness in constructing

science and technology policy dated back in 1991, where the government

kickstarted the blueprint of the first National Technology Plan and formed the

National Council for Science and Technology (later known as National Science

and Technology Board, then the Agency for Science, Technology and Research

or A*Star).57 The role of the then NSTB or A* star is to integrate science and tech-

nology policy framework through identifying new clusters of research,

strengthen RnD activities between universities and companies, also developing

science hubs.


Singapore’s gradual strategyto create innovation system

2

While A*Star was growing as a central orchestrator in this field, a substantial

move came in 2006 when the government established the National Research

Foundation (NRF) in the Prime Minister’s Office. The shift was based on the

Economic Development Board (EDB) advice to expand state funding for

Singapore universities.58 Furthermore, the creation of the NRF was aligned with

the government’s intention to support the Research, Innovation and Enterprise

Council (RIEC)—chaired by Singapore’s Prime Minister—and take part as a

funding body and national policy agency, also to coordinate public research

institutions like the A*Star. 59

All these successes, however, possess flaws and challenges. The urgent need to

progress has made the freedom of the scientific community under a threat due

to the powerful state intervention and the lack of knowledge from the

bureaucratic machinery. It was a top-down pragmatic knowledge creation, even

within the scientific community where seniority could act as a decisive factor.

Furthermore, the 2006 United Nations report pointed out several policy

hindrances that needed to be check out. First, local human resource remains

unnecessary—one of the examples was the higher number of foreign talents in

Singapore’s ecosystem. Second, the government still championed profitable

research rather than basic experiment. Third, breakthrough scientific

research requires long-term financing and patience.

In sum, strong government interference led to more

coordinated RnD activities, an abundance of funding,

clear stakeholder mapping, and directed missions

and plans. Even up until today, the state

intercession has been a decisive factor for

the transformation of Singapore’s system.

These have shaped Singapore’s vibrant

innovation ecosystem and have

resulted in Singapore's advantage in

strengthening its knowledge-based

public policy.


Conclusion:Incorporating Science,Technology, andPublic PolicyPolicymaking is undoubtedly political. No matter how

scientific the outputs are or how objective the process is,

when scientific evidence enters policy deliberations, it is

considered as political. The claim comes from the academic

community on their apolitical stance and knowledge-based

approach, neglecting the fact that our policy conundrum is

derived from political affairs. As Foucault said, there is no

knowledge without power and power without knowledge.60

Although the mismatch between scientists and

policymakers is tangible, we have learned that there are

means to collocate the two domains under the same roof. If

academia and policy workers are in the same workstream,

they must get to know each other better. Scientists need to

accept that policymaking does not work like the scientific

method, whereas policymakers must justify their

decisions.61


In order to achieve the boon of scientific research and technological

advancement, the government needs to consider the importance of crafting an

innovation system that would boost economic performance. An ideal innovation

system emphasizes greater government’s role in directing and matching

science, technology, and innovation, in the pursuit of public interests.

Furthermore, innovation policy is not only about directing state budget for RnD

sector but creating a system that circulates fresh ideas to interact throughout

all economic sectors.62

Science and technology are the medium, not only to achieve people's

well-being, but also on what can be cultivated with the limited number of

resources. As we encounter constant changes and complex problems,

understanding the role of science and technology is of utmost importance to

help generate well-constructed public policy.


References1 Resnick, Danielle. 2020. [Online] Available at: https://www.ifpri.org/blog/trust-science-and-government-plays-crucial-role-covid-19-response accessed 24 May 2021

2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2021. [Online] Available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/dtlstict2019d11_en.pdf accessed 24 May 2021

3 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2021). [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/e0643f52-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/e0643f52-en#snotes-d7e19964 accessed 18 July 2021

4 Jones, Graham. (1971). The role of science and technology in developing countries. London: Oxford University Press

5 Ibid

6 Ibid

7 Ibid

8 Shtulman Andrew and Joshua Valcarcel. (2012). ‘Scientific knowledge suppresses but does not supplant earlier intuitions’, Elsevier, 209-215 [Online] Available at: https://sites.oxy.edu/shtulman/documents/2012b.pdf accessed 3 June 2021

9 Firdausi, Fadrik Aziz. (2018). [Online] Available at: https://tirto.id/bagaimana-manusia-mencoba-menyangkal-sains-c8x7 accessed 3 June 2021

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13Bogaards, Matthijs. (2012). ‘Book review: Jeffrey Winters, Oligarchy’, Acta Politica, 0 (1-3) [Online] Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304584421_Book_review_Jeffrey_Winters_Oligarchy/link/5e9ecc5c92851c2f52b63c27/download accessed 13 July 2021

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CASE STUDY SERIES #77 august 2021 GOVERNANCE FOR THE …