1

CASE NO: MG CIV 7/12

In the matter between:

NEDCOR BANK LIMITED Appellant

and

WYNAND JACOBUS VICTOR NO First Respondent

JOHANNES LODIWICUS DU PLESSIS NO Second Respondent

WILLEM HENDRIK JACOBUS CILLIERS NO Third Respondent

WYNAND JACOBUS VICTOR Fourth Respondent

MAGRIETHA JOHANNA VICTOR Fifth Respondent

GERRIT DERKSE LUTTIG Sixth Respondent

MARIA ELIZABETH LUTTIG Seventh Respondent

MARIA ELIZABETH LUTTIG NO Eighth Respondent

JOHANNES LODUWICUS DU PLESSIS NO Ninth Respondent

WILLEM HENDRIK JACOBUS CILLIERS NO Tenth Respondent

CIVIL APPEAL

HENDRICKS J; KGOELE J

DATE OF HEARING : 28 MARCH 2014

DATE OF JUDGMENT : 20 JUNE 2014

COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT : Adv. H J Benade

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this

document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

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COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT : Adv. W A F Strydom

JUDGMENT

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KGOELE J:

A. INTRODUCTION

[1] This is an appeal against the judgment delivered by Magistrate J.

Schmulling in the District Court, Vryburg. The appellant was the

plaintiff in the court a quo and the respondents, the defendants. The

cause of action in this matter arose from various instalment sale

agreements which the appellant and the respondents concluded with

regard to the purchase of some items.

B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[2] The first three respondents are the trustees of the Germi Trust. On 12

September 1997 Germi Trust and the appellant (Nedcor) concluded

twelve instalment sale agreements for the purchase of twelve items.

The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh respondents acted as sureties for

Germi Trust. Likewise did the eighth, ninth and tenth respondents, as

trustees of the Poppiesdale Trust, acted as sureties for Germi Trust.

Bonds were also registered as securities. The terms of these

agreements were almost similar in nature.

[3] It is alleged by the appellant that at some stage, after the conclusion of

the said agreement, Germi Trust fell in arrears with payment of the

respective instalments due to the appellant. As a result, notices (in

respect of each of the twelve agreements) were sent to the fourth and

fifth respondents by a firm of Attorneys acting for and on behalf of the

appellant. These notices were dated 22 March 1999. The contents of

these notices, save for the respective amounts pertaining to the

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different agreements, were identical. All of them are in the form of

letters of demand referring to the provisions of section 11 of The Credit

Act No. 75 of 1980. (The Act)

[4] For the sake of convenience one of the said letters is quoted and the

contents thereof read thus:-

“KENNISGEWING IN TERME VAM ARTIKEL 11 OP DIE

WET OP KREDIETOOREENKOMSTE, WET NOMMER 75

VAN 1980: NEDCOR BANK BEPERK: REK NR 2287536/0027

Ons het opdrag van ons bogenoemde kliënt ontvang om van u te eis

in terme van die bepalings van Art 11 van die Wet op

Kredietooreenkomste, Wet nommer 75 van 1980 soos gewysig, die

onmiddellike betaling van die agterstallige bedrae verskuldig op

bogenoemde rekening en wel in die bedrag van R86530.20 asook

alle verdere agterstallige rente ten opsigte daarvan en moontlike

verdere paaimente wat betaalbaar mag word, welke bedrae

betaalbaar is binne dertig dae na ontvangs hiervan by versuim

daaraan ons kliënt sal voortgaan met die uitoefening van hul regte

dienooreenkomstig die kredietooreenkoms vir hetsy die verhaal van

die volle uitstaande balans verskuldig of alternatiewelik kansellasie

van die kontrak, teruggawe van die goedere en betaling van

skadevergoeding en koste, sonder enige verdere kennisgewing van

welke aard ookal.

Die uwe.

HONEY & VENNOTE INC”

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[5] On the 29th March 1999, seven (7) days after sending out the letters of

demand, the appellant approached the Magistrate Court, Vryburg and

on an ex-parte basis obtained an order against the fourth and fifth

respondents in the form of an interim interdict for the attachment of the

twelve items which form the basis of the agreement between Germi

Trust and the appellant. Paragraph 1.1 and paragraph 2 of the said

order, which in my view are important in the consideration of this

matter, reads as follows:-

“1 X GEBRUIKTE MAN 26.372 DFTC TROK MET

REEKSNOMMER V[…], ONDERSTELNOMMER F[…] EM

REGISTRASIENOMMER EN LETTERS P[…]

1.1 Asook dat die Balju van die Landroshof bemagtig en

beveel word om die goedere onverwyld uit die besit van

die Respondent of enige ander persoon in wie se besit die

gemelde item(s) mag wees te verwyder en te oorhandig

aan die eiser of n person wat hy mag aanwys ter bewaring

en ten behoewe van die eiser om dit te bewaar wie die

goedere moet bewaar hangende die uitslag van die

aansoek alternatiewelik die uitslag van ‘n aksie ingestel te

word deur die Applikant vir die kansellasie van die

skriftelike ooreenkoms en/of ooreenkomste, alternatiewelik

bekragtiging van kansellasie van die skriftelike

ooreenkoms en/of ooreenkomste, teruglewering van die

goedere sowel as die afdwinging van enige ander regte

waarop die Applikant geregtig mag wees in terme van die

skriftelike ooreenkoms en/of ooreenkomste.

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1.2 Dat vir sover dit nodig is vir die ten uitvoering daar gestel

in paragraaf 1.1 hierbo, word die balju van die

Landdroshof gemagtig en beveel om enige deur op enige

perseel of om enige toegang tot enige perseel oop te maak,

indien geweier word om dit oop te maak of indien daar

niemand daar teenwoordig is wat die person teen wie die

ten uitvoerlegging ten uitvoer gelê moet word

verteenwoordig nie, en indien nodig, kan die balju vir die

doel geweld gebruik.

2. Dat die bevel daar gestel in paragraaf 1 hierbo sal dien as

‘n tussentydse interdik hangende die uitslag van die aksie

en dat die Respondent opgeroep word om redes, indien

enige, aan te voer om 9 00 in die voormôre op 12de dag

van Mei 1999 waarom hierdie Bevel nie bekragtig moet

word nie en waarom die Respondent nie beveel moet word

om die kostes (soos op ‘n prokureur en kliënt skaal

skriftelik ooreengekom) hiervan te betaal nie.

GETEKEN te VRYBURG hierdie 29ste dag van MAART 1999”

[6] This interim order was made final on 12 May 1999. Three months

thereafter, on 12 August 1999, these items were sold on auction.

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D. THE SUMMONS

[7] On the 29th March 2000 summons were issued by the appellant as

plaintiff against the respondents as defendants for payment of a

balance of R2 395 178 70. In the summons the appellant prayed inter

alia for cancellation of the aforementioned twelve agreements. On 05

December 2005 default judgment was granted in favour of the

appellant against the respondents after the matter had been withdrawn

against the sixth respondent. This default judgment was successfully

appealed against by the respondents. The matter was referred back

to the Magistrate Court Vryburg (the trial court) for trial de novo before

a differently constituted court.

E. THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS

[8] The following were the issues that the trial court had to grapple with

when the trial commenced:-

8.1 that the contracts were not validly cancelled;

8.2 that the defendant denies that Germi Trust failed to perform in

the terms and conditions of the contract; and

8.3 that the quantum claim is also denied.

[9] The appellant called two witnesses namely, Mr Herbert George Meyer

and Mr Abraham Albertus Moller to testify on its behalf, who testified

mainly about quantum of the amount claimed. I am of the view that the

summary of the evidence of these two witnesses is not necessary in

view of the outcome of this matter which will become clearer later in

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this judgment. The defendants closed their case without leading any

evidence.

[10] The finding and the judgment of the trial court was mainly based

on the questions as to whether the contracts were validly

cancelled and furthermore, whether the appellant is lawfully

entitled to claim the damages if the court finds that the contract

were not validly cancelled. This is clear from the judgment of the

trial court where it stated that:-

“Die uitspraak van die hof is gebasseer op die punt of die kontrak

regmatiglik gekanseller is en of die eiser geregtig is op

skadevergoeding as die hof bevind dat die kontrak nie regmatig

gekanselleer is nie.”

[11] The trial court dismissed the appellant’s (plaintiff’s) claim on the basis

that the contracts were not validly cancelled at the time the items were

sold on auction, and further that, the appellant cannot claim damages

as it made performance of the respondents in terms of the agreement

impossible by selling the items before cancellation.

F. THE APPEAL

[12] Dissatisfied about the outcome, the appellant lodged an appeal

against this judgment, hence this appeal. The appeal is premised on

the following grounds:-

“KENNISGEWING VAN APPèL: REëL 51

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“NEEM KENNIS dat die Eiser in hierdie saak hiermee kennis gee

en appèl aanteken teen die vonnis en/of uitspraak deur Landros J

Schmulling gelewer op 11 Januarie 2012, en wel op die volgende

gronde:-

1. Die Agbare Landdros het met respek fouteer deur te bevind dat

Eiser nie ‘n terugname bevel (tussentydse beslaglegging en

bewaring) kon verkry het as dertig (30) dae ingevolge Artikel 11

van die Wet op Kredietooreenkomste, 1980, nog nie verstryk het

nie.

2. Die Agbare Hof het fouteer deur te bevind dat Eiser prestasie vir

die Verweerders (Eerste tot Derde Verweerder – Germi Trust)

onmoontlik gemaak het.

3. Die Agbare Hof het fouteer deur te bevind dat Eiser hulle eie

skade veroorsaak het deur die items te verkoop voordat hulle ‘n

hofbevel verkry het wat verkoping van die items gemagtig het.

4. Die Agbare Hof het fouteer deur te beslis dat Eiser, na uitreiking

van die Artikel 11 aanmanings in Maart 1999, nie aan

Verweerders die geleentheid gegee het om aan die aanmanings

te voldoen nie.

5. Die Agbare Hof het fouteer deur te beslis dat Eiser nie geregtig

is op skadevergoeding nie aangesien Eiser prestasie deur

Verweerders onmoontlik gemaak het deur die items te verkoop,

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en/of onmoontlik gemaak het deur die items voor regmatige

kansellasie te verkoop.

6. Die Agbare Hof het fouteer deur te bevind dat Eiser prestasie vir

Verweerders onmoontlik gemaak het en Verweerders derhalwe

verskoon word van prestasie ingevolge die kontrak, en verskoon

word van enige skade wat gely word uit die Verweerders se nie-

prestasie.

7. Die Agbare Hof het fouteer deur nie te bevind dat Verweerders

reeds voordat Eiser die items verkoop het, wanpresteer het en

dat Eiser op grond van daardie vooraf wanprestasie geregtig

was om te kanselleer en/of geregtig was op ‘n bevel van

bekragtiging van kansellasie en/of geregtig was om kennis te gee

van kansellasie by wyse van dagvaarding nie.

8. Die Agbare Hof het fouteer deur te beslis dat Eiser die koste van

die geding op ‘n prokureur en kliënt skaal moet betaal.

9. Die Agbare Hof het fouteer deur ‘n prokureur en kliënt

kostebevel teen Eiser te verleen, na aanleiding van die afwysing

van die aksie.”

[13] From the judgment of the trial court, it is abundantly clear that the

learned Magistrate was of the view that the most important issue to be

decided was whether or not the contracts (agreements) were validly

cancelled by the appellants.

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[14] The letters of demand which refers to section 11 of The Act do not

serve as a notice of cancellation of the said contracts. This is evident

from the wording thereof which stated that:-

“1. Let asseblief daarop dat u die bostaande kontrak verbreuk het insovere u

versuim het om die verskuldige paaiement/huurgeld te betaal en die

rekening is gevolglik agterstallig ten bedrae R3666.74.

2. U word hiermee kennis gegee dat tensy u binne ń periode van veertien

dae vanaf versending van hierdie kennisgewing, in terme van Artikel 11 op

die Wet van Kredietkoopooreenkomste nr 75 van 1980 die bogenoemde

verbreuking onverwyld herstel deur die rekening ten volle op datum te

bring, ons die kontrak sal kanselleer sonder verdere kennisgewing en sal

voortgaan met die nodige stappe vir terruggawe van die goedere

gefinansier onder bogenoemde kontrak sowel as met ń eis vir

skadevergoeding as gevol van u bogenoemde kontrakbreuk. [My own

emphasis]

3. U word dus versoek om hierdie saak met ons te bespreek en die persoon

wat hierdie kennisgewing onderteken het onverwyld te kontak.”

[15] At best, the letter of demand served as a notice in terms of Section 11

of The Act of default of payment and furthermore, indicated the steps

that the appellant will take if the default persisted. Amongst other

things that the appellant contemplated exercising (not that it had

elected to) was to cancel the contract and take the necessary steps for

the return of the goods and lastly, a claim for damages. Section 11 of

The Act is quite clear that upon default, the plaintiff (appellant) shall

exercise his/her choices of asking for specific performance or the

return of goods and cancellation.

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[16] Clause 10 of the terms of the agreements signed by both parties is

also in line with Section 11 as it specifies the choices the plaintiff

(appellant) had to make in respect of a default or non-performance by

another party. It provides:-

a) should the Buyer ….. then and upon the happening of any of this event,

the seller shall be entitled in its election and without prejudice to any

other’s right to:-

i) claim immediate payment of all amounts payable hereof

irrespective of whether or not such amount are due at that

stage.

ii) cancel this agreement, take possession of the goods, retain all

payment already made in terms hereof by the Buyer and to

claim and liquidate damages payment of the difference between

the balance outstanding and the resale value of the goods

determined in accordance with clause10b.

[17] The trial court found, correct in my view, that the ex-parte interim court

order granted on 29 March 1999 which was made final on 12 May

1999, also does not amount to an order for cancellation. This is also

apparent from the wording of the said court order quoted supra.

[18] In my view the purpose of the interim order which was ultimately made

final was not for the permanent return of goods but, their attachment

for safe keeping in custody until the defendant pays and/or the

appellant brings and succeeds in his claim for the cancellation and

return of the same goods.

[19] Furthermore, the trial court found correctly in my view, that the general

requirement of cancellation of contracts is that cancellation can only

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take place when the creditor failed to comply with the requirements of

a written notice of default within the number of days indicated therein.

It is quite clear in casu that the ex-parte application was made seven

(7) days after sending out the letter that contained the notice.

Therefore, the purpose of the ex-parte application could not have been

intended to serve as cancellation of the contract or have that effect.

The reason is that the respondents were still within the specified time

frame of 30 days provided in the letter of demand for them to comply

with the contract at that particular time.

[20] It is trite law that a decision to cancel a contract should not be vague

but must be a clear unequivocal election to do so. No doubt must

exist in the mind of the other party. Christie in the book of “The Law

of Contract in South Africa (5th edition, 2006) on page 539 states:-

“Notice of cancellation must be clear and unequivocal, but need not

correctly identify the cause of cancellation”

See also Data Colour v Intermarket 2001 (2) SA284 (SCA) of 299 E

where the following was said:-

“The innocent party to a breach of a contract justifying cancellation

exercises his right to cancel it (a) by words or conduct manifesting a clear

election to do so (b) which is communicated to the guilty party”. [My own

emphasis]

[21] From the above it is quite clear, as the trial court has found, that the

appellant never directly and unequivocally communicated to the

defendant that it is cancelling the contracts.

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[22] Cancellation of a contract can also be effected by the issuing of a

summons. The appellant submitted before the trial court that the

contract was cancelled by the issuing of summons in this matter or by

the abovementioned confirmation by the court of the rule nisi. It is

common cause that the said items (goods) were sold almost seven (7)

months before summons was issued. With regard to this, the following

is stated in the Heads of Argument filed on behalf of the appellant:-

“4.1.1 Appellant kan nie betwis dat dagvaarding (29 Maart 2000)

sewe maande na verkoop van die items (12 Augustus 1999)

geskied het nie.

Ook nie dat op datum van die verkoop van die items (12

Augustus 1999) die kontrak nog nie gekanselleer was nie”

[My emphasis]

[23] This concession is indeed correct and well made. This is also in line

with what was said by the trial court, namely:-

“Die probleem met kansellasie deur dagvaarding is dat die aksie

eers sewe maande na die verkoop van die items ingestel is.

Die hof bevind dus dat op datum van verkoop van die items deur

die Eiser die kontrak tussen Eiser en Verweerder nog nie

gekanselleer was nie.”

This finding by the trial court cannot be faulted.

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[24] Section 11 of the Credit Act states:-

“No credit grantor shall, by reason of the failure of the credit receiver to

comply with any obligation in terms of any credit agreement, to be

entitled to claim the return of the goods to which the credit agreement

relates the credit grantor by letter, handed over to the credit receiver

and for which an acknowledgement of receipts has been obtained or

posted by prepaid registered mail to the credit receiver at his address

stated in the credit agreement in terms of section 5(1)(b) nor the

address changed in accordance with section 5(4), has notified the

credit receiver that he so failed and has required him to comply with the

obligation in question in question within such period, being not less than

30 days after the date of such handing over or such posting, as may be

stated in the letter, and the credit receiver has failed to comply with

such requirement: Provided that should the credit receiver have failed

on two or more occasions to comply with obligations in terms of any

credit agreement and the credit grantor has given notice as aforesaid,

the said period shall be reduced to 14 days.”

[25] Applying section 11 of the The Act to the facts of this case, the trial

court found:-

“Deur die verkoping van die items het die eiser dus prestasie vir

die verweerder onmoontlik gemaak. Daar kan tog nie van die

verweerder verwag word om te presteer as die items verkoop en

vervreem is nie. Die vraag is waarop moet hy presteer?

Indien prestasie geheel en al onmoontlik word kan ‘n bevel vir

daadwerklike vervulling nie verleen word nie en is die skuldenaar

vir onmoontlike making nie geregtig op skadevergoeding nie.

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Dit blyk dus uit die feite voor die hof dat eiser hulle eie skade

veroorsaak het deur die items te verkoop voor hulle ‘n hofbevel

verkry het wat verkoping van die items gemagtig het. En nog meer

voordat die kontrak tussen eiser en verweerder behoorlik en

regmatiglik gekanselleer is. Eiser het nooit aan verweerder na die

uitreiking van artikel 11 aanmanings die geleentheid gegee om aan

die bepalings en vereistes van die aanmanings te voldoen en

sodoende te presteer ingevolge die terme van die kontrak.”

[26] It was contended on behalf of the appellant that it was never made

impossible for the respondents to comply / perform in terms of the

contract. As at 19 March 1999, so it is further contended, was a court

order for attachment of the items obtained. In my view it is clear, as

was also found by the trial court, that the said order was for the safe

custody of the said items. It was not an order for cancellation of the

agreements nor was the appellants, in terms of the said court order,

empowered to the sell the said items on auction.

[27] The reasoning that the trial court erred in finding that appellants made

it impossible for the respondents to perform because they could still

have paid the instalments that were allegedly due, is flawed. The

correct procedures for cancellation and the return of items were not

followed. It can therefore not be expected of a litigant to perform

under such circumstances. Sight should not be lost of the fact that the

items sold included trucks that were probably used to earn an income.

If taken and sold unlawfully, the performance of the respondents is

rendered impossible.

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[28] The particulars of claim attached to the summons stated that the said

contract be cancelled which is indicative of the fact that it was not

previously done. This serves as an intimation of the cancellation. This

unfortunately put a final nail on the coffin of the appellant’s case.

See: Middelburg Stadsraad v Trans Natal Steenkool Koöperasie

1970 (2) SA 244 (TPA);

Also: Shrosbree v Simen 1999 (2) SA 488 (SECLD);

Also: Win Twice Property v Binos 2004 (4) SA 436 (WLD).

[29] In Santambank Bpk v Dempers 1987 (4) SA 639 (OPA) the following

appears on page 645 I – 646 F:-

“Vir die redes wat ek reeds hierbo gegee het, het ek tot die

genoemde gevolgtrekking gekom dat die woorde ‘teruggawe te eis’

in art 11 van die Wet slaan op die beëindiging van die kontrak wat

aangegaan was tussen die kredietgewer en die kredietopnemer en

dat die kredietgewer se vordering waarmee hy tussentydse

verligting met betrekking tot die behoud van die goedere (wat sy

eiendom is) aanvra, nie besig is met ‘n eis om teruggawe soos

bedoel deur art 11 van die Wet nie omdat hy daardeur nog nie sy

aksie vir kansellasie en teruggawe afdwing nie. Die kredietgewer

se bedoelde aansoek vir bedoelde tussentydse regshulp in die vorm

van ‘n tussentydse interdik staan ook nie gelyk aan verbeuring nie

want die kredietopnemer verbeur eers dán sy reg op die gekoopte

of verhuurder goed as die aksie wat die kredietgewer teen hom

gaan instel ná afloop van die 30 dae vermeld in die gesegde

kennisgewing, met ‘n uitspraak ten gunste van die kredietgewer

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afgesluit word waarin kansellasie en teruggawe beveel word.

Indien hy byvoorbeeld binne die tydperk wat in die kennisgewing

gestel word sy versuim herstel (deur byvoorbeeld te betaal), dan is

hy geregtig om die koopgoed of huurgoed terug te kry en is die

kredietgewer trouens verplig om dit aan hom terug te besorg.

Weliswaar word die kredietopnemer se reg om die koop- of

huurgeld te gebruik van hom ontneem, en wel terwyl die

kredietooreenkoms nog nie beëindig is nie en hy derhalwe ceteris

paribus op ongestoorde besit daarvan geregtig sou wees totdat die

kredietooreenkoms beëindig word. Deur die kredietooreenkoms te

verbreek het die kredietopnemer egter sy besitreg van die goed in

gevaar gestel want die kredietgewer is geregtig om vir hom

onmiddellik ‘n art 11-kennisgewing te gee om sy gebrek aan te

suiwer indien die kredietgewer hom vir kansellasie en teruggawe

wil dagvaar en sal die kredietopnemer die goed moet teruggee as

die kredietgewer met sy geding (wat hy na afloop van 30 dae kan

instel) suksesvol is. Dat hy intussen die gebruik van sy goed mag

verloor is, indien die tussentydse beslaglegging regtens geoorloof

is, regstreeks te wyte aan sy kontrakbreuk, maar sodanige verlies

van gebruik (indien dit deur tussentydse beslaglegging

teweeggebring word) is immers nie stricto sensu ‘n verbeuring van

die goed self nie want verbeuring behels ‘n eenmalige gebeurtenis

met permanente en finale ontneming van die kredietopnemer se

regte, en dit gebeur eers as die kredietgewer se eis vir kansellasie

en teruggawe geslaag het.”

[30] The crux of the matter in my view is the fact that no order for

cancellation of the contract and repossession of the items has been

granted by a court of law. To reiterate, the appellant acquired

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possession of the said items in terms of an interim court order, which

was later confirmed, for the safe custody of the said items. The

appellant then, without a due process of the law, sold the said items

on auction shortly after it had acquired possession thereof. The

actions of the appellant under these circumstances cannot be

condoned. In my view, the trial court was correct in arriving at the

conclusion already quoted in paragraph 25, supra.

[31] As far as quantum is concerned, the trial court did not in its reasons for

judgment deal with the evidence presented by the appellant as

plaintiff. The reason for this is obviously that because there was no

valid cancellation of the contract (based on the alleged breach of

contract) which is a point of law, there can be no damages flowing

therefrom.

[32] On page 629 and 630 of the book by Christie quoted above, the

relevant principles in a claim for damages were set out as follows:-

“Any investigation of damages for breach of contract must logically start with an

inquiry into whether the damages were caused by the breach. It so happens that

this inquiry has engaged the attention of the courts more frequently in the law of

delict than in the law of contract, but in both types of case the inquiry is basically

the same, and Corbett CJ’s restatement of the relevant principles in International

Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A) 700E-701A is as authoritative

in contract as in delict.

These principles call for a two stage inquiry, first into factual causation and then

into legal causation. To establish factual causation it must be shown that the

breach was the causa sine qua non of the loss. This quaint Latin phrase is best

understood by applying the but-for test: would the plaintiff have suffered the loss

but for the defendant’s breach? If it cannot be shown that the loss would not have

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occurred but for the breach, the plaintiff’s claim for damages fails and the second

stage of the inquiry does not arise.”

[33] I find the words quoted above apposite in this matter and in line with

the following finding of the trial court:-

“Grobbelaar vs Bosch 1964 (3) SA 6876

As ń kontraktant nie vir die onmoontlik wording te blameer is nie, hy

van prestasie verskoon word”

“Die verweerders wat nie te blameer is vir die onmoontlik making nie

word dus verskoon van prestasie in die kontrak en dus enige skade wat

gelei kan word uit die nie prestasies wat gelewer is nie.”

Likewise, the contention that specific performance was not claimed but

damages flowing from cancellation of the agreement based on breach

thereof, cannot be sustained. The selling of the items attached before

a valid cancellation of the contract amounts to repudiation of the

contract by the appellant.

[34] The respondents did not present any evidence during the trial in the

court a quo. Much had been said by counsel of the appellant about the

quantum. In my view, the trial court was indeed correct to conclude

that there was no need to take the evidence on quantum into account

and its finding in this regard cannot be faulted. There is therefore no

need to say anything more on quantum.

[35] Much criticism has also been levelled against the trial court’s finding

for the awarding of a punitive costs order. Flowing from the reasons of

judgment, it is apparent that the trial court demonstrated its disquiet

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about the conduct of the appellant by obtaining an order for the safe

custody of the seized items and then, without affording the

respondents the opportunity to perform and rectify their alleged

default, gave an instruction to an auctioneer to sell the said items.

Thereafter, to take it even further, instituted a claim for cancellation of

the contract and for damages. The awarding of a costs order

especially on a punitive scale is in the discretion of the trial court. A

Court of Appeal will not lightly interfere with the exercise of such

discretion, unless it is found to be totally wrong. I cannot come to such

a conclusion. In my view, there is no reason to disturb the findings of

the trial court also with regard to the costs order. In view of the fact

that the respondents are successful, there is also no plausible reason

why costs should not follow the event.

G. ORDER

[36] Consequently, the following order is made:-

36.1 The appeal is dismissed with costs.

________________ A M KGOELE JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

22

I agree

________________ R D HENDRICKS JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT ATTORNEYS:

FOR THE APPELLANT : Symington & De Kok

C/O Van Rooyen & Tlhapi Wessels

Proctorlaan 9

MAHIKENG

FOR THE RESPONDENT : Smit Stanton Inc.

Warrenstraat 29

MAFIKENG