Case Matrix for Crimproc1

8/8/2019 Case Matrix for Crimproc1

1/43

Criminal Procedure Case Matrix SY 2010-2011

CASE TITLE FACTS/ISSUES/(KEYWORDS) DECISIONS/DOCTRINES

ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (Section 5, Rule 113; Section 12, Rule 126)

1. Posadasvs. CA188SCRA288

(Buri Bag; Unlicensed firearms; accused actingsuspiciously; there is probable cause)

Members of the Integrated National Police (INP of theDavao Metrodiscom were conducting surveillance alongMallanes St., Davao City. While in the vicinity of RizalMemorial Colleges they spotted Posadas carrying a buribag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. Theyapproached the petitioner and identified themselves asmembers of the INP. However, the petitioner attempted toflee, but his attempt was unsuccessful. The policeofficers then checked the buri bag of the petitioner and

they found one caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver; 2rounds of live ammunitions for a .38 caliber gun; and 2 liveammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. The petitioner was laterbrought to the police station for further investigation.During such investigation, Mr. Posadas was asked to showthe necessary license or authority to possess firearms andammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so.Because of his failure to produce the necessary license, hewas charged and prosecuted for illegal possession offirearms and ammunition in the Regional Trial Court

Issue:Whether or not the warrantless search is valid.

The arrest and the incidental seizure of the firearms were held as valid by theSC.

Ratio decidendi:In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by thepetitioner, the Solicitior General argued when the two policemen approachedMr. Posadas, he was actually committing or had just committed the offense ofillegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the policeofficers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband wasincidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12 Rule 126 of theRules of Court. In the case at bar, there is no question that the arrest madewas reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis of probable cause.

The fact that Mr. Posadas acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with theburi bag, the police officers have a probable cause to believe that he wasconcealing something illegal inside the bag and it was the right duty of thepolice officers to inspect the same. It would be too much indeed to require thepolice officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only afterthey shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercisemay prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptionsprovided in Section 12 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, and hence theconstitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has notbeen violated.

2. Peoplevs. CFI ofRizal101SCRA 86

(Shipment of highly dutiable goods; Blue Dodgecar; warrantless search of smuggled goods-valid;warrantless search of moving vehicle-valid)

The Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) wasinformed by an undisclosed Informer that a shipment ofhighly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila fromAngeles City on a blue Dodge car. RASAC Agents stationedthemselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of the NorthDiversion Road at Balintawak, Quezon City. At about 6:45a.m. of the same day, a light blue Dodge car, driven by

The warrantless search made by the law-enforcement authorities was upheld.

Ratio decidendi:In this case the majority of the Court held that there was a probable cause tojustify the absence of a warrant. Under the law, the authority of persons dulycommissioned to enforce tariff and customs laws is quite exceptional when itpertains to the domain of searches and seizures of goods suspected to havebeen introduced in the country in violation of the customs laws. The Court hadoccasion to recognize this power granted to persons having police authorityunder Section 2203 of the Code, in order to discharge their official duties moreeffectively.

Eppie D. Severino PSU School of Law Page 1


2/43


3/43



Issue:Whether the warrantless search and seizure conducted bythe ASAC agents is lawful or not.

3. Peoplevs. KaguiMalasugui63 Phil211

(Chinese man Tan Why; homicide with robbery;accused holding a club in his hand; accusedvoluntarily and w/o protest produce the stoleneffects of the victim; search and seizure was valid)

In the morning of March 5 1935, Tan Why, a Chinesemerchant was found lying on the ground, with severalwounds in the head. He died as a result of this woundshortly after he was brought to the hospital. When

Almada, the governments witness, found Tan Why thatmorning, the latter was still alive and was able to answerlaconically Kagui when asked who attacked him. Almadaalso testified that on the morning in question, he saw theappellant with a club in his hand, passed by the housewhere he and the deceased lived. The club was found nearthe place where Tan Why was wounded.

Kagui was immediately apprehended by the Constabulary.He was brought to the police station and when asked toproduce two bracelets in his possession, he voluntarily andwithout protest put said items on top of the lieutenantstable. He was later searched, without opposition or protest

on his part, and it was discovered that he had also thepocketbook owned by Tan Why; the latters identificationcard; and memorandum of amounts with some Chinesecharacters. Also, there were some change found in one ofthe pockets of his pants. Consequently, Kagui was chargedand convicted with the crime of robbery with homicide. Hewas sentenced with a penalty of reclusion perpetua.However, he appealed the decision of the lower court onthe ground that the articles seized from him should not beadmitted as evidence because they were seized without acorresponding judicial warrant.

The SC in this case held in the affirmative. The appealed judgment of thelower court was affirmed.Ratio decidendi:The police officer who ordered the arrest of the accused has a directknowledge of the aggression committed on the person of Tan Why.Circumstances showed that undoubtedly warranted his arrest without aprevious judicial warrant. First, based on the testimony of Almada, he saw theaccused holding a club with blood stains was found near the place where Tan

Why was wound. Second, before the victim died, he was able to say that theaccused was the one who attacked him. Third, when he was searched by thepolice officers, he did not show any opposition and he voluntarily placed theseized items on top of the table of Lieutenant Jacaria. And lastly, in theabsence of an explanation of how he came into possession of stolen effectsbelonging to Mr. Why who was wounded and treacherously killed, mustnecessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of saidperson and of the robbery committed on him. These circumstances showedthat the police officers had direct knowledge of the crime committed andwarranted the accuseds arrest without obtaining a warrant of arrest. Underthe law, member of the Insular Police or Constabulary may make arrestswithout judicial warrant, not only when a crime is committed or about to becommitted in their presence but also when there is a reason to believe or

sufficient ground to suspect that one has been committed and that it wascommitted by the person hey arrested. An arrest made under saidcircumstances is not unlawful but perfectly justified; and the agent of authoritywho makes the arrest does not violate the provisions of Section 269 of the RPCnor infringe the constitutional precept relative to the inviolability of ones rightagainst unreasonable searches and seizures. Relative thereto, when thesearch of the person detained or arrested and the seizure of the effects foundin his possession are incidental to an arrest made in conformity with the law,they cannot be considered unreasonable, much less unlawful.



4/43



Issue:Whether the arrest, search and seizure without thecorresponding warrant was constitutional.

4. Peoplevs. Musa217SCRA597

(Buy-bust operation; marijuana in a cellophanebag; plain-view doctrine; search and seizure ofmarijuana was illegal)

An information was received from a civilian informer thatMari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville,Zamboanga City. Based on such information on 13December 1989, Belagra, leader of NARCOM team,instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct surveillance and to test-buy

on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas houseand gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy onenewspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.Thefollowing day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise hisright hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. AsAni proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positionedthemselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From hisposition, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa cameout of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani saidhe wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00marked money. Musa went into the house and came back,giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing driedmarijuana . Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right

hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and thelatter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house.Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find themarked money (he gave it to his wife who slipped away).T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and founda cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at thecorner of the kitchen. They asked Musa about its contentsbut failed to get a response. So they opened it and founddried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed underarrest. He charged and convicted by the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding himguilty of selling marijuana in violation Dangerous Drugs Act

SC held that the marijuana seized by the NARCOM officers were inadmissible,because the search and seizure made by said officers does not fall within theambit of plain-view doctrine. However, the exclusion of this particularevidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of theother pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that theappellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the DangerousDrugs Act of 1972. Thus, the appeal is dismissed and the judgment of theRegional Trial Court affirmed.

Ratio decidendi:There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrestauthorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the personarrested. It is well-settled that "an officer making an arrest may take from theperson arrested any money or property found upon his person which was usedin the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which mightfurnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, orwhich may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . " Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agentsmay seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediatelyafter the arrest even without arrest and search warrants.

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant

after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then searched theentire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in acorner.

The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest,may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises orsurroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of anofficer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject toseizure and may be presented as evidence.

It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view,"the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the



5/43



of 1972. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:Whether the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuanainside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.

incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of theobject. Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police thatthe items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, orotherwise subject to seizure.

In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in theliving room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, theNARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in thekitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when theyarrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had tomove from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plasticbag. The NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with theobvious intention of fishing for more evidence.

Therefore, it was held that under the circumstances of the case, the "plainview" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bagwas seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III,Section 3(2) of the Constitution.

5. Papa vs.Mago22 SCRA857

(Shipment of personal effects; duty of deputizedagent by BOC; search and seizure for purposes ofthe enforcement of customs and tariff laws-lawfuleven if without a warrant)

A reliable information was received by the Manila PoliceDepartment (MPD) that certain shipment of personaleffects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would bereleased from the custom zone of the port of Manila andloaded on two trucks. Upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chiefof the MPD and duly deputized agent of Bureau of Customs(BOC), ordered Martin Alagao to conduct surveillance atgate 1 of the customs zone. The trucks were interceptedby the agents when they left the customs zone. Thecontents thereof, consisting of nine bales of goods,including the trucks were seized on instructions of Papa.

It was held that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department ofthe goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure theBureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose ofthe enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of

First Instance of Manila, therefore the order issued by the respondent judgereleasing the seized goods was null and void.

Ratio decidendi:The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having beendeputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposesof the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures,and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo,articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeitureor liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He could lawfullyopen and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever foundwhen he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable



6/43



Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of thegoods and showed to the policemen a "Statement andReceipts of Duties issued by the Bureau of Customs in thename of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to havebeen prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the twotrucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B.Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila apetition "for mandamus with restraining order orpreliminary injunction, among others, that Remedios Magowas the owner of the goods seized, having purchased themfrom the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga;that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa totransport, the goods from said place to her residence; that

the goods were seized by members of the Manila PoliceDepartment without search warrant issued by a competentcourt; and that unless restrained their constitutional rightswould be violated and they would truly suffer irreparableinjury. Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods,alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized didnot show any article of prohibited importation, the sameshould be released as per agreement of the parties uponher posting of the appropriate bond that may bedetermined by the court. The respondent judge issued anorder releasing the goods to Mago upon her fil ing of abond. Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion forreconsideration of the order of the court releasing the

goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila PoliceDepartment had been directed by the Collector of Customsof the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending terminationof the seizure proceedings. Without waiting for the courtsaction on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging thatthey had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in theordinary course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action forprohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction beforethe Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether or not the goods and the two trucks were legally

articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop,search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected ofholding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore,that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizureof the goods in question. The policemen had authority to effect the seizurewithout any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff andCustoms Code does not require said warrant herein. The Code authorizespersons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and CustomsCode to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store orbuilding, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examineany vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any personon board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or personsuspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced

into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a searchwarrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code providesthat said dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrantissued by a judge or justice of the peace. Except in the case of the search of adwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law mayeffect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement ofcustoms laws. The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches andseizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a searchof a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant mayreadily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobilefor contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, becausethe vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which thewarrant must be sought. Hence, the SC declared that the seizure by the

members of the MPD of the goods in question was in accordance with law andby that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goodsfor the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to theexclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures isconstrued as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of adwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant mayreadily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobilefor contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, becausethe vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which thewarrant must be sought. Having declared that the seizure by the members ofthe Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with



7/43



seized by the customs agent despite the absence of searchand seizure warrant.Whether or not the respondent Judge had acted withjurisdiction in issuing the order releasing the goods inquestion.

law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction overthe goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws,to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

6. Peoplevs.Montilla285SCRA703

(Rule 113, Section 5 of RRC; Sufficiency ofknowledge of probable cause; 28 kilos of marijuana)

Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy," was apprehended ataround 4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shedlocated at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite, bymembers of the Cavite PNP. According to the two officers,

the Montilla was caught transporting 28 marijuana brickscontained in a traveling bag and a carton box, whichmarijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos. The policeofficers likewise testified that they were aided by aninformer in the arrest of the accused. They had beeninformed the day before, June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M.,that a drug courier, whom said informer could recognize,would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran,Dasmarias from Baguio City with an undeterminedamount of marijuana. It was the same informer whopinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when thelatter alighted from a passenger jeepney on theaforestated day, hour, and place carrying a seemingly

innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Theaccused was then approached by the policemen andintroduced themselves. They requested him to open andshow the contents of the bags which he voluntarily andreadily did. Upon cursory inspection, the bag yielded theprohibited drugs, and so without bothering to searchfurther, the accused and his luggage were brought to thepolice headquarters for questioning. However, the Montilladisavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimedthat he only came to Cavite to look for his cousin and tofind some job. But not convinced with his alibi, aninformation was filed against him charging him with

The SC was not persuaded with the arguments of the accused-appellant. Itdiscerns no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court. Hence,except for the imposition of death penalty, which the SC imposed the penaltyof reclusion perpetua, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.Ratio decidendi:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that he legally caught inflagrante in transporting the prohibited drugs.

There were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that,at the point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probablecause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds ofthe officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was inthe act of violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of thatprobable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actuallycommitting a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. Withthese attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught inflagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongingswithout the requisite warrant were both justified.

2. Whether or not the prohibited drugs (marijuana) were confiscated inthe course of an unlawful arrest, and therefore invalid as evidence.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that asearch and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of ajudicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable search andseizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruitof a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall beinadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Thisexclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid



8/43



violation of Dangerous Drugs Act before the RTC. Trial washeld and thereafter the lower court found him guilty ascharged and imposed the extreme penalty of death. Thus,this appeal.

Issues:1. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that

he legally caught in flagrante in transporting theprohibited drugs.

2. Whether or not the prohibited drugs (marijuana)were confiscated in the course of an unlawfularrest, and therefore invalid as evidence.

proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches; (2) searches of movingvehicles, (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consented searches;(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) "stop and frisk"measures have been invariably recognized as the traditionalexceptions.

In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed bythe civilian informant to the law enforcers was that there would bedelivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming fromBaguio City in the "early morning" of June 20, 1994. Even assumingthat the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the

point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was toosketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the correspondingarrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informantknew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.

While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact nameof the subject of the warrant applied for, there is the additional problemthat the informant did not know to whom the drugs would be deliveredand at which particular part of the barangay there would be suchdelivery. Neither did this asset know the precise time of the suspect'sarrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivancewherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arrivingtogether with, or were being brought by someone separately from, the

courier.

On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properlyapplied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to ajudge or a court that was still open by the time they could makepreparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidencepresented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtainingwarrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all thecoincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especiallyin rural areas.



9/43



The search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of theillegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to alawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Underthat provision, a peace officer or a private person may, without awarrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to bearrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting tocommit an offense.

7. Burgosvs.Chief ofStaff133

SCRA815

(Illegal search of newspaper offices; MetropolitanMail; We Forum)

Assailed in this petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory

injunction is the validity of two search warrants issued onDecember 7, 1982 by Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano of the thenCFI of Rizal, under which the premises of the "MetropolitanMail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, weresearched, and office and printing machines, equipment,paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used inthe printing, publication and distribution of the saidnewspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents,books and other written literature alleged to be in thepossession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, wereseized.

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminarymandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for thereturn of the seized articles, and that respondents beenjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidenceagainst petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused inCriminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court ofQuezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al.

Issue:Whether mere allegations of possession and printing ofsubversive materials may be the basis of the issuance ofsearch warrant.

The Supreme Court declared the search warrants issued on 7 December 1982null and void, and granted the writ of mandatory injunction for the return of theseized articles, such articles seized ordered released to the petitioners.

Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue

except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such otherresponsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oathor affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, andparticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to beseized. In the present case, a statement in the effect that the petitioner "is inpossession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,news publications and other documents which were used and are allcontinuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversionpunishable under PD 885, as amended" is a mere conclusion of law and doesnot satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars aswould justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegationcannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Probable cause fora search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a

reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has beencommitted and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are inthe place sought to be searched. When the search warrant applied for isdirected against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with thepublication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supportingaffidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the allegedsubversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Meregeneralization will not suffice. Another factor that makes the search warrantsconstitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.In Stanford v. State of Texas, the US SC declared this type of warrant void.



10/43



8. Peoplevs.AndreMarti193SCRA 57

(Package to be sent to Zurich; odor; packagecontains dried marijuana leaves; warrantless searchand seizure by private person; proscription againstunlawful searches and seizures applies only to govtand its agencies)

On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife,went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Exportforwarders in Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages be sent to Mr. Marts friend in Zurich.The forwarder company is owned by a couple, Job andAnita Reyes. The latter attended to Mr. Marti. The

package was not inspected by Anita upon refusal of Mr.Marti, who assured her that it simply contained somebooks and cigars as a gift to his friend. Accordingly, the 4gift-wrapped packages were placed in a box and waszealed.

Before delivery of accused box to the Bureau of Customsand/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes, following standardoperating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection.When he opened the box, a peculiar order emittedtherefrom. His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of thebundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leavesinside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a

cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one ofthe gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophanewrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof.Mr. Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and requested alaboratory examination of the samples he extracted fromthe cellophane wrapper. It turned out that the driedleaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by theforensic chemist of the Narcotics Section of the NBI.Thereafter, an information was filed against appellant forviolation of the Dangerous Drug Act. Mr. Marti contendsthat the evidence subject of the imputed offense had beenobtained in violation of his constitutional rights against

The Court ruled in a negative. In the absence of governmental interference,the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against theState.

The judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt ofthe crime charged is AFFIRMED.

Ratio decidendi:The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of theGovernment without the latter transgressing appellant's rights againstunreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why thesame should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense

charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonablesearch effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed bythe Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight isnot a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has beencommitted in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles areidentified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not thesearch that is prohibited by the constitution.

The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invokedagainst acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of theConstitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamentallaw of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection againstwhom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship

between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation betweenindividuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill ofRights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphereinaccessible to any power holder.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizurestherefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and itsagencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only beinvoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary andunreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon therequest of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is topass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest



11/43



unreasonable searches and seizures and privacy ofcommunication and therefore argues that the same shouldbe held inadmissible in evidence. The case at barassumes a peculiar character since the evidencesought to be excluded was primarily discovered andobtained by a private person, acting in a privatecapacity and without the intervention and

participation of state authorities.

Issue:Can the accused validly claim that his constitutional rightagainst unreasonable searches and seizure has beenviolated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private

individual, allegedly in violation of appellant'sconstitutional rights, be invoked against the State?

or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and privatepurposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of policeauthorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot beinvoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizurescannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as tobring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by thegovernment.

9. Peoplevs.Malmstedt198SCRA401

(Hashish; Swedish national; principle of knowledgeand probable cause to justify warrantless arrest)

In the evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt, a Swedishnational, left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in themorning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada andstayed in that place for two (2) days.

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of

NARCOM, ordered his men to set up a temporarycheckpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, MountainProvince, for the purpose of checking all vehicles comingfrom the Cordillera Region. The order to establish acheckpoint in the said area was prompted by persistentreports that vehicles coming from Sagada weretransporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs.Moreover, there was an information received by Capt.Vasco, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in hispossession prohibited drugs. At the set up checkpoint atthe designated area, NARCOM officers inspected allvehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. In the bus

The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is affirmed.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in theirpersons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches andseizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, thereis no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may bemade by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.Section 5 provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without awarrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrestedhas committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personalknowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from apenal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarilyconfined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred fromone confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered tothe nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against inaccordance with Rule 112, Section 7. In the instant case, Malmstedt wascaught in flagrante delicto, when he was transporting prohibited drugs. Thus,the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1)of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to



12/43



where Malmstedt was boarded, NARCOM officers startedtheir inspection from the front going towards the rear ofthe bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the buswas seated at the rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge onaccused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waistto be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport andother identification papers. When accused failed to comply,the officer required him to bring out whatever it was thatwas bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out tobe a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag,as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking

objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting theofficer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrappedobjects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative ofmarijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus forquestioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accusedstopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggagecarrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got thebags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in eachbag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that therewere bulges inside the same which did not feel like foamstuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags

that accused finally presented his passport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of theNARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for furtherinvestigation. At the investigation room, the officersopened the teddy bears and they were found to alsocontain hashish. Representative samples were taken fromthe hashish found among the personal effects of accusedand the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory forchemical analysis. In the chemistry report, it wasestablished that the objects examined were hashish. aprohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an

a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed witha search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects ofaccused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficientprobable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and therecommitting a crime.



13/43



information was filed against accused for violation of theDangerous Drugs Act.As a defense, the accused raised the issue of illegal searchof his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashishwas planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag andthat the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him,but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couplewhom he met in Sagada. The trial court did not find hisdefense tenable, and thus found Malmstedt to be theguilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of theDangerous Drug Act.

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court

finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused arguesthat the search of his personal effects was illegal becauseit was made without a search warrant and, therefore, theprohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegalsearch are not admissible as evidence against him.

Issue:Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, andtherefore the RTC ruling be reversed.

10.

Peoplevs.Amminu

dinA63SCRA402

(M/V Wilcon 9; 3 kilos of marijuana; police haveenough time to obtain a warrant; accused illegallyarrested; search and seizure unlawful; marijuana

inadmissible; accused acquitted)

Idel Amminudin, accused-appellant, was arrested in 25June 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. Based on thetestimony of the police, they received a reliable tip twodays before a drug operation allegedly headed by theaccused. He was already identified by name and the policeknew exactly the date of his arrival. When Amminudindescended from the gangplank after the informer pointedto him, the PC officers where in fact waiting for him simplyaccosted him, inspected is bag and found inside it three

The SC reversed the decision of the lower and acquitted the accused.

No. The arrest and the search and seizure made by the police officers were

illegal. The accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crimeabout to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantlessarrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency couldnot be invoked to dispensed with the obtention of the warrant.

The present case presented no such urgency. It is clear that the police officershad at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant toarrest and search Amminudin who was coming to Iloilo on board the M/VWilcon 9. His name was known and the date of his aRival was certain. And from the information they had received they couldhave persuaded a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuanceof a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law.



14/43



kilos of what later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBIforensic examiner. On the basis of this finding, acorresponding charge was filed against Amminudin forviolation of the Dangerous Drug Act. In his defense, theaccused-appellant disclaimed the marijuana, averring thatall he had in his bag was his pieces of clothing. He allegedthat he was arbitrarily arrested and immediatelyhandcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a searchwarrant. He insisted he did not even know marijuanalooked like and that his business was selling watches andsometimes cigarettes. However, the RTC rejected hisallegations. Saying the he only has two watches during hisarrest and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries

allegedly sustained. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:Whether or not the arrest made by the police and thesearch and seizure of the accuseds bag was valid.

Furthermore, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he hadjust done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the vesseland there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.

Insofar as the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused-appellant, it cannotbe admitted as evidence and should never have been considered by the trialcourt for the simple fact the it was seized illegally. It is the fruit of a poisonoustree. The search was not an incident of lawful arrest because there was nowarrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptionsallowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegaland the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

11.

In Re:Umil,Umil vs.Ramos187SCRA311

(NPA Sparrow unit member in hospital; 2 CAPCOMsoldiers were shot; Javelon in fact is Dural; Petitionfor Habeas Corpus)

This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpusassails the validity of the arrests and searches made by themilitary on the petitioners. On 1 February 1988, the

Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the CapitalCommand (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidentialinformation about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unitbeing treated for a gunshot wound at the St. AgnesHospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Uponverification, it was found that the wounded person, whowas listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, isactually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit,responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the daybefore, or on 31 January 1988, Bagong Barrio, CaloocanCity. In view of this verification, Dural was transferred tothe Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security

SC held that it is clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made incompliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule113.

Ratio decidendi:Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), anoutlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the

arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he wascommitting an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offensescommitted in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute directassaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. Thearrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armedelements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion,is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell therebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for astatutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure inthe prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of theexistence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest



15/43



reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988,Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as thegunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOMmobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiersseated inside the car. As a consequence of this positiveidentification, Dural was referred to the Caloocan CityFiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed withthe Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an informationcharging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crimeof Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons inAuthority. On 15 February 1988, the information wasamended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who,at the filing of the original information, was still

unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition forhabeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalfof Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva.The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig.Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirrefiled a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter,the parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bailbefore the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where chargesfor violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filedagainst them, and they were accordingly released.

Issue:Whether or not Dural can be validly arrested without anywarrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion.

and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of ajudicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing personscommitting overt acts of violence against government forces, or any othermilder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest orcapture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves thevery survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.

12.

Peoplevs. AnitaClaudio160SCRA648

(Inserted fingers in plastic bag, smelled marijuana;1.1 kilos of dried marijuana leaves; no need forwarrant of arrest; accused caught in flagrantedelicto.)

Pat. Obina, a member of the Narcotics Unit, was on boardthe Victory Liner, seated on the second seat at the back.While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded

The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Ratio decidendi:Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obiadid not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrantedelicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itselflawful. Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos ofmarijuana.



16/43



the same bus and took the seat in front of him after puttinga bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat ofObia. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was awooven buri bag made of plastic containing somevegetables. The act of the accused putting her bag behindPat. Obia's seat aroused his suspicion and he felt nervous.With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had theurge to search the woven plastic bag. But it was only atSan Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to go to thebag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag locatedat the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. Theplastic woven bag appearing to contain camote tops on thetop has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom.

He could recognize the smell of marijuana because he wasassigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He didnot, however, do anything after he discovered that therewas marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused untilthey reached Olongapo City and the accused alighted fromthe bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta. Rita.Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policemanObina intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifyinghimself as a policeman and told her he will search her bagbecause of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuanainside said bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go withme, let us settle this at home." However, the witness didnot heed her plea and instead handcuffed her r ight handand with her, boarded a tricycle right away and broughtthe suspect to the police headquarters with her bagappearing to contain vegetables. At the policeheadquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searchedand inside it was found a big bundle of plastic containingmarijuana weighing about one kilo. She was accordinglycharged of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. However,she contended that the warrantless arrest, search andseizure made by Pat. Obina is unlawful. The lower courtdid not find that the arrest was illegal, thus she was foundguilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged. Hence, thisappeal.

The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the Rules on CriminalProcedure.Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:

.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest aperson:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, isactually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.xxx xxx xxx

Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrestedmay be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used asproof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (12a)



17/43



Issue:Whether or not the warrantless search, seizure andapprehension is unlawful.

13.

Peoplevs.RubenBurgos144SCRA 1

(NPA; possession of illegal firearm and subversivedocuments; Plowing field when arrested; unlawfularrest; unlawful seizure of firearm and subversivedocuments) Meaning of personal knowledge; Strictinterpretation

Ceasar Masamlok surrendered to the PC on 12 May 1982stating that he was forcibly recruited by Ruben Burgos, a

member of the NPA, threatening him with the use offirearm against his life if he refused. A joint team ofmembers of the PC-INP was dispatched the following day toarrest Ruben Burgos and they were able to locate andarrest him while he was plowing his field. Interrogationwas made in the house of the accused. He first deniedpossession of the firearm but later, upon furtherquestioning, the team with the wife of the accused, wentbelow their house and pointed to the place where the gunwas hidden. After recovery of the firearm, the accusedlikewise pointed to the subversive documents which the PCfound kept in a stock pile of cogon grass, at a distance ofthree meters apart from the Burgoss house. When Ruben

Burgos was confronted with the possession of the firearm,he readily admitted that the same was issued to him bythe team leader of the sparrow unit. He was then arrestedand was convicted by the lower court with a crime of illegalpossession of firearm in furtherance of subversion. Thetrial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelantwithout any warrant as falling under one of the instanceswhen arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule113, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. Hence, this appeal.Issue:Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of

The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous. The judgment ofconviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Theaccused-appellant is ACQUITTED,

Ratio decidendi:Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has justcommitted, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must havepersonal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his

presence or within his view. There is no such personal knowledge in this case.Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in itsentirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of thefirearm was given by the appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of anyfirearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act whichcould be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the timeof the arrest.In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough thatthere is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested hascommitted a crime. A crime must in fact or actuallyhave been committed first.That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not

enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of thecommission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable groundapplies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbalreport. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused hadcommitted a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yetascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis ofinformation from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, Ifan arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generallynothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruitof a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.



18/43



his house and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm anddocuments allegedly found therein conducted in a lawfuland valid manner?

More important, the Court finds no compelling reason for the haste with whichthe arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why theyfailed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeedthey had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed acrime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that theaccused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showingthat the whereabouts of the accused were unknown,

Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documentswere obtained in violation of the accused's constitutional rights againstunreasonable searches and seizures, it follows that they are inadmissible asevidence.

14.

Peoplevs.Merabueno239SCRA197

(Buy-bust operation; marijuana leaves; warrantlessarrest; warrantless search and seizure)

On July 18, 1987, the Unit of the Eastern Police District,received an information by telephone regarding therampant peddling of marijuana Barangay Parang, Marikina.Thus, a team was organized to conduct a surveillance ofthe place. The surveillance yielded positive results as thepolice team was able to pinpoint Merabueno, Trinidad andBasilio, herein accused-appellants, as the suspectedpushers. Pat. Romeo Cavizo was designated to act as theposeur-buyer. He was given a marked P20 bill to be used inpurchasing marijuana from the suspects. The othermembers of the team, who were deployed in inconspicuousplaces, employed pre-arranged hand signals as theirmeans of communication.

Shortly thereafter, Pat. Cavizo spotted Merabueno, andapproached the latter and inquired if he could "iskor ngdamo" worth P20.00. When Merabueno asked for themoney, Pat. Cavizo handed him the marked twenty-pesobill. After telling him to wait, Merabueno went to an alley,unknowing other members of the team were following him.Merabueno headed towards Trinidad to whom he gave the

The SC upheld the warrantless arrest, search and seizure made on Merabueno,Trinidad, and Basilio. However, as far as Cruz is concerned the warrantlessarrest, search and seizure made was unlawful but he did not timely questionthe validity of his arrest. Hence, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed,with modification as the penalty imposed.

Ratio decidendi:Appellant's contention that a blatant violation of their constitutional rights wascommitted when they were arrested and searched without a warrant, is bereftof merit. Suffice it to say the law allows warrantless searches in certain casesas provided in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Theyare as follows:

Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or private person may,without warrant, arrest a person:(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallycommitting, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personalknowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

Appellants Merabueno, Trinidad and Basilio were caught in flagrante delicto, inthe act of committing drug trafficking. As a consequence of the arrest, thethree were searched and were found to be in possession of marijuana. Since



19/43



marked twenty-peso bill. Trinidad handed him a packet,the size of a tea bag. After Merabueno left, members of theNarcotics team accosted Trinidad.

The policemen, together with Trinidad, followed Merabuenoto town. They saw Merabueno talking with Basilio. Theysurrounded the two and ordered the three suspects toempty their pockets. Two tea bags of marijuana wererecovered from Merabueno; one tea bag of marijuana fromBasilio and the marked twenty-peso bill from Trinidad. Thetrio were brought to the Marikina Police Headquarters,where Basilio revealed the name of Ernesto "Erning" Cruz,a resident of Antipolo, Rizal, as his source of marijuana.

That same morning, the team, together with Merabuenoand Basilio, went to Antipolo but they were not able toapprehend Cruz. However, at about 7:00 P.M. of the sameday, the team went back to Antipolo with Basilio. On theirway, they met Cruz, who was carrying a dark-blue bag.After placing Cruz under arrest, the policemen searchedthe bag of Cruz and found more than a kilo of driedmarijuana leaves. Cruz was questioned several times as tothe identity of the source of the marijuana and he keptuttering the name of a certain "Carding." The policemenwere unable to ascertain the whereabouts of said Carding.Based on the evidence gathered, an information was filedwith the RTC and eventually rendered a judgmentconvicting them of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:Whether or not the arrest, search and seizure made onMerabueno, Trinidad, Basilio, and Cruz was valid.

the arrests were lawfully made, it follows that the searches made incidentalthereto were also valid.

The procedure followed by the police with respect to the seizure of themarijuana from Cruz after a warrantless search is another matter. Thewarrantless arrest and search of Cruz, whose identity was only made knownduring the investigation of persons earlier lawfully arrested are not valid. Thearrest was not made in the course of a hot-pursuit because he was not inMarikina during the buy-bust operation. There was no reasonable basis toplace Cruz under arrest without warrant and then search him without awarrant. In such a case, the police should have secured an arrest warrant.However, Cruz did not timely question the legality of his arrest, the search onhis person and the seizure of the marijuana. As a matter of fact, he made an

extrajudicial confession with the assistance of counsel. There is no legal basisto set aside said confession.

15.

Peoplevs.Cuachon

(Involves a continuing buy-bust operation whereafter the sale, the shabu was handed to a policemana block away who after determining it was shabu

In holding in the affirmative, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of theaccused-appellant.



20/43



238SCRA540

which only took a few minutes immediatelyproceeded to the house of the appellant andarrested him)

This case involves the accused-appellants (RomeoCuachon) pleading for the reversal of his conviction by theRTC of Makati finding him guilty of violating RA 6425 or theDangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The antecedents: On 20 November 1988, a confidentialinformant reported to the police that was rampant sellingof shabu in the residence of Romeo Cuachon. Forthwith, ateam of police officers was formed to conduct a buy-bust

operation against the accused. As planned, Pat. Uggadanand the informant proceeded to the residence of theirquarry while Pat. Reyes and other members of the teamposted themselves in strategic places. After a fewminutes, Uggadan together with the informant, reportedto Reyes that he had succeeded in buying shabbu from theaccused at the same time presenting the merchandise tothe latter. After determining it was shabu, Reyes and hismen immediately proceeded to the residence of Cuachonand found in one of the rooms several men seated arounda table, engaged in pot session and several paraphernalia.Uggadan pointed Cuachon to Reyes as the person whoearlier sold shabu to him. Thereupon, Reyes friskedCuachon and found in his person the two P100 bill that hegave Uggadan as a buy-bust money. He also found aquantity of shabu contained in the plastic bag. In hisappeal he contended that the warrantless arrest, searchand seizure should be declared null and void.

Issue:Is the warrantless arrest, search and seizure justified?

Ratio decidendi:The Court justified the warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of theRules of Court on warrantless arrest and the obligation of the police toapprehend even without a warrant. Pat. Uggandan witnessed the illegal act ofselling shabu on the occasion of the buy-bust operation in front of the room ofthe accused. He did not make the arrest right then and there because therewere only himself and the informant as against the different male and femalevoices he heard from both rooms of Cuachons house.

Considering that the operation took place inside the house of the appellant,understandably Pat. Uggadan and his informant had to get of the house andinform their backup that the sale had been consummated. Furthermore,weighty consideration is the fact that, as previously stated, Uggadan

immediately gave the shabu to Reyes who was only a block away and after thelatter had determined that it was shabu, which only took a few minutes, theyall immediately proceeded to the house of Cuachon and arrested him. It was acontinuing buy-bust operation which, as the phrase connotes, commenced withbuying shabu and culminates in Cuachons arrest. Since his arrest was lawful,it follows that the incidental search was also valid.

16.

Peoplevs.Medel

(One kilo of marijuana; accused carrying redtravelling bag; acting suspiciously; arrest was basedon suspicion; where there is urgency; compared to

The answer of the Court is in the affirmative. The contention of the accused isdevoid of merit. The judgment of conviction by the trial court is AFFIRMED butMODIFIED as to the penalty imposed in the light that what was proven beyond



21/43



Tangliben184SCRA220

Amminudin Case)

In the late evening of 2 March 1982, Pat. Quevedo andPunzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together witha barangay tanod, were conducting surveillance mission atthe Victory Liner Terminal compound located at BarangaySan Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga. The surveillancemission was aimed not only against persons who maycommit misdemeanors at said place but also on personswho may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugsbased on information supplied by informers. Around 9:30p.m., said patrolmen noticed a person carrying a redtraveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they

confronted him. The person was requested by the policeofficers to open the red traveling bag but the personrefused, only to accede later on when the patrolmenidentified themselves. Found inside the bag weremarijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper andweighing one kilo, more or less. The person was asked ofhis name and the reason why he was at said place and hegave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that hewas waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver themarijuana leaves. The accused was taken to the policeheadquarters for further investigation; and later Quevedosubmitted to his Station Commander his InvestigatorsReport. The RTC found Tangliben guilty beyond reasonabledoubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencedhim to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and topay the costs. Tangliben appealed. In his appeal, it iscontended that the marijuana allegedly seized from himwas a product of an unlawful search without a warrant andis therefore inadmissible in evidence.

Issue:Whether the warrantless search was incident to a lawfularrest valid.

reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport the marijuana leaves but hisactual possession of the same.

Ratio decidendi:One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a searchincident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on CriminalProcedure provides that A person lawfully arrested may be searched fordangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of thecommission of an offense, without a search warrant. Meanwhile, Rule113, Sec. 5(a) provides that A peace officer or a private person may,without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, theperson to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or isattempting to commit an offense. Tangliben was caught in flagrante,

since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case thereforefalls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to alawful arrest and is consequently valid. The Court is not unmindful of itsdecision in People v. Aminnudin (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In that case the PCofficers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant wason board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting onthis tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as he descendedfrom the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Saidbag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could notbe admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally, as there was lack ofurgency, and thus a search warrant can still be procured. However, in the caseat bar, there presented urgency. Although the trial courts decision did notmention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was aninformer who pointed to Tangliben as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was notenough time to secure a search warrant. The Court cannot therefore apply theruling in Aminnudin in the present case. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, juetengcollectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make itextremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which thesepersons are associated.



22/43



17.

Rolito Govs. CourtofAppeals206SCRA138

(Shot Eldon Maguan; Go voluntary surrendered after6 days; no preliminary investigation was conducted;unlawful arrest)

As a rule, in cases of lawful warrantless arrest,preliminary investigation may not be conducted, butbefore the complaint or information is filed, if theaccused request for a preliminary investigation, hemust sign a waiver of the provisions of Art 125 ofRPC, [Section 6, Rule 112]

Rolito Gos car nearly collided with the car of Eldon Maguanwhen the latter entered a one-way street in San Juan,Metro Manila. Go alighted from his car, walked over and

shot Maguan inside his car. Go then boarded his car andleft the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant wasable to take down Gos car plate number. The policearrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting andthere retrieved an empty shell and one round of liveammunition for a 9mm caliber pistol. Verification at theLTO showed that the car was registered to one Elsa AngGo. The following day, the police returned to the scene ofthe shooting to find out where the suspect had come from;they were informed that Go had dined at a nearbybakeshop shortly before the shooting. The police obtaineda facsimile or impression of the credit card used by Gofrom the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard ofthe bake shop was shown a picture of Go and he positivelyidentified him as the same person who had shot Maguan.Having established that the assailant was probably Go, thepolice launched a manhunt for Go. Six days later, Gopresented himself before the San Juan Police Station toverify news reports that he was being hunted by the police;he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The policeforthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, whowas at the police station at that time, positively identifiedGo as the gunman. That same day, the police promptlyfiled a complaint for frustrated homicide against Go withthe Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. Assistant

The Supreme Court granted the petition and the ruling of the appellate courtwas set aside and nullified.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the"arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded aseffected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within themeaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman whohad shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had beenderived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting onestated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the

alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered inpetitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute"personal knowledge." 18

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest ofpetitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too thatSection 7 of Rule 112 is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrestedat all.

Upon the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminaryinvestigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminaryinvestigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or atthe time of entering a plea at arraignment. The facts of the case show thatpetitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before hisarraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions beforethe court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation.For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellatecourt was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary topetitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminaryinvestigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter ofthe crime of murder.



23/43



Provincial Pros. Dennis Villa Ignacio informed Go, in thepresence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of hisright to preliminary investigation but that he must first signa waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC. Gorefused to execute any such waiver. The following day,while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, andbefore an information could be filed in court, the victim,Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s). Accordingly,the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information forfrustrated homicide, filed an information for murder beforethe Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At thebottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that nopreliminary investigation had been conducted because the

accused did not execute and sign a waiver of theprovisions of Article 125 of the RPC. In the afternoon of thesame day, Gos counsel filed with the prosecutor anomnibus motion for immediate release and properpreliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantlessarrest of Go was unlawful and that no preliminaryinvestigation had been conducted before the informationwas filed. On 12 July 1991, Go filed an urgent ex-partemotion for special raffle in order to expedite action on theProsecutors bail recommendation. The case was raffled tothe sala of Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo, who, on the samedate, approved the cash bond posted by Go and orderedhis release. Go was in fact released that same day. On 16July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Courta motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation andprayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the courtbe suspended. On the said date, the trial court issued anorder granting leave to conduct preliminary investigationand cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991until after the prosecution shall have concluded itspreliminary investigation. However, the Judge motu proprioissued an Order, (1) recalling the Order which granted bail;(2) recalling and cancelling granted leave to the Prosecutorto conduct preliminary investigation; (3) treating Gosomnibus motion as a petition for bail; and thereafter, set



24/43



aside the case for arraignment. Go filed a petition forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the SupremeCourt assailing the Order. Go also moved for suspension ofall proceedings in the case pending resolution by theSupreme Court of his petition: this motion was, however,denied by Judge Pelayo. Eventually, Go surrendered to thepolice. Judge Pelayo issued a Commitment Order directingthe Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit Go into his custodyat the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, Go wasarraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea,the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The trialcourt then set the criminal case for continuous hearings onseveral dates of the months of September to November

1991. On 27 August 1991, Go filed a petition for habeascorpus in the Court of Appeals which was granted by saidCourt. On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal casecommenced. His pending petition was decided by theCourt of Appeals and a rendered decision dismissing the 2petitions on the grounds that Gos warrantless arrest wasvalid and Gos act of posting bail constituted waiver of anyirregularity attending his arrest, including the deferment ofhis arraignment. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue:Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid; and thatthe petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminaryinvestigation.

ENVIRONMENTAL CASES (Intergenerational Responsibility and Justice; Writ of Continuing Mandamus)

18.

Oposavs.Factoran224SCRA792

(Minors including generations yet unborn=locusstandi to file a taxpayers suit; Intergenerationalresponsibility and justice; Protection by the State ofthe right to a balance and healthful ecology inaccord with the rhythm and harmony of nature)

This petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balancedand healthful ecology which the petitioners dramaticallyassociate with the twin concepts of "intergenerational

The SC decided in the affirmative. Petition was granted.

Ratio decidendi:Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The stateshall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthfulecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well asgeneration yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for



25/43



responsibility" and "intergenerational justice."Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the saidpetitioners have a cause of action to "prevent themisappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforestsand "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country`svital lifesupport systems and continued rape of MotherEarth."

This civil case originated from the RTC of Makati. Theprincipal petitioners in this case are all minors dulyrepresented and joined by their respective parents. Thecomplaint was instituted as a taxpayers class suit andalleges that the plaintiffs are all citizens of the Republic of

the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that isthe countrys virgin tropical rainforests. The same wasfiled for themselves and others who are equally concernedabout the preservation of said resource but are sonumerous that it is impracticable to bring them all beforethe Court. The minors further asseverate that theyrepresent their generation as well as generation yetunborn. As original defendant, Sec. Factoran of the DENRwas impleaded as such. The plaintiffs anchored their claimon their right to the full benefit and enjoyment of thecountrys natural resources, particularly of the virginforest. Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment berendered: ordering the defendant, his agents,representatives, and other persons acting in his behalf toa.) cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLA) inthe country; and b.) cease and desist from receiving,accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timberlicense agreements. They alleged that the massivecommercial logging in the country is causing vast abuseson rainforest. They likewise asserted that the right of theirgeneration and the right of the generations yet unborn to abalanced and healthful ecology be protected.

Issue:

themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations,file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generationscan only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar asthe right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, ashereinafter expounded considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Naturemeans the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmonyindispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land,waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural resources to theend that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessibleto the present as well as future generations.Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preservethat rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful

ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a soundenvironment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligationto ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.



26/43



Whether the petitioners have the right cause of action or alegal standing to file a taxpayers suit.

19.

MMDAvs.ConcernedResidents of Mla.Bay574SCRA693

(Application of Continuing mandamus; The remedyof the writ of mandamus, which allows for theenforcement of the conduct of the tasks to whichthe writ pertains: the performance of a legal duty)

This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondentsConcerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaintbefore the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Caviteagainst several government agencies, among them thepetitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection

of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the waterquality of the Manila Bay had fallen way blow the allowablestandard set by law, specifically the PhilippineEnvironmental Code. The complaint state: The reckless,wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission orcommission of the defendants resulting in the clear andpresent danger to public health and in the depletion andcontamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, for whichreason all defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarilyliable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bayand to restore its water quality to class B waters fit forswimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contactrecreation. After the conduct of the trial, the RTC

rendered a decision in favor of the respondents andordered the government agencies concerned, including thepetitioners, to jointly and solidarily, clean up andrehabilitate the Manila Bay. The petitioners, before the CA,asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not aministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.However, CA denied the petitioners appeal and affirmedthe decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.

Issue:Can the petitioners be compelled by mandamus to cleanup and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

The SC decided in the affirmative. The cleaning and rehabilitation of Manila Baycan be compelled by mandamus.

Ratio decidendi:Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerialduty. A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise

Documents

Case Matrix for Crimproc1