Case Digests for Mock Recit

7/30/2019 Case Digests for Mock Recit

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I. Mala Prohibita / Mala in Se

GR No. 4963

The United States vs. Go Chico

September 15, 1909

Gibbs and Gale for appellant

Moreland, J. (Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur)

FACTS:

1) Appellant Go Chico is charged in violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission that onAugust 4, 1908, in the City of Manila, the appellant displayed in one of the windows and one of the show cases

of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions in the form of a small button depicting the image of

Emilio Aguinaldo, and a flag or banner used during the Philippine insurrection against the United States.

2) Appellant is sentenced to pay a fine of P500 and subsidiary imprisonment until such time the fine should bepaid.

ISSUES:1) Whether or not the appellant is guilty of violating Sec. 1 Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission2) Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted based on two propositions he has presented

- The appellant insists his acquittal upon two propositions:

a) That before conviction must be done, a criminal intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt;

b) That the prohibition of the law is against the use of identical banners actually used during the

insurrection

RULING:

1) Yes, appellant Go Chico is guilty of violating the statute by displaying the medallions depicting the image ofEmilio Aguinaldo and the flag used during the insurrection the act itself (of displaying these prohibited items),

constitute the crime.

2) a) The Supreme Court held that it is not necessary for the appellant to have acted with intent to havecommitted a crime, as the case at bar is an example ofmalum prohibitum - the act alone (of displaying the

medallions), irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime. Since Sec. 1 of Act 1696 was a statute, establishing

criminal intent is immaterial. Statutory offenses committed against a statute prohibiting the perpetration of

certain acts, regardless of intent.

b) The statute was plainly worded, and could not have possibly included all the specific details on the

prohibited items. The statute clearly forbids the display A flag related to the insurrection (any type of flag

related to the insurrection), not just THE flag. - The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to the interpretation.

- When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some person, the law implies conclusively

the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he violates. - The

accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and the act is, by the

very nature of things, the crime itselfintent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act

are inseparable. The act is the crime.

Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.


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GR No. 109250

People of the Philippines vs Noriel Lacerna and Marlon Lacerna

September 5, 1997

Marlon Lacerna appellant

Panganiban, J. (Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.)

FACTS:

1)

Appellant Marlon Lacerna is charged in violation of Sec. 4, Article II of RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of1972, in relation to Sec. 21, Article IV as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, that on September 12, 1992

in the City of Manila, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, or give away to another or

distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and jointly sell, deliver or give away to

another 18 blocks (about 18.235 kilos) of marijuana, which is a prohibited drug.

2) Judgment by the trial court states that:I. The guilt of the accused Marlon Lacerna having been established beyond reasonable doubt for the

crime of violation of Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended, he is found guilty of the same, sentencing him to

life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. With costs.

II. The guilt for the crime charged of accused Noriel Lacerna not having been established beyondreasonable doubt he is hereby ACQUITTED. The warden of the Manila City Jail is ordered to release his

person, unless held on other charges.

3) The trial court ruled that appellant could not be convicted ofdelivering prohibited drugs because theInformation did not allege that he knowingly delivered marijuana. Neither could he be convicted of

transporting or dispatching in transit such prohibited drugs because these acts were not alleged in the

Information. The trial court mused further that appellant could not be convicted of selling marijuana because

the elements constituting this crime were not proven. However, the information charged appellant with the act

of giving away to another prohibited drugs that, constituted the act as akin to transporting prohibited

drugs, which is a malum prohibitum under the specified RA 6425.

4) Since appellant did not deny that he did give away the bag containing the prohibited drug to co-accusedNoriel Lacerna who was seated at the back of taxi from which they were located, the trial court found the

appellant guilty of violating Sec. 4 RA 6425, as charged for giving away to another the marijuana

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the trial court erred in making a sweeping statement that the act of giving away to another()is not defined under R.A. 6425 specifically requiring knowledge what intent one (sic) is passing is a dangerous

drug, as contradistinguished from the term deliver; where knowledge is required. Whether or not the lower

court erred in convicting the appellant for the act of giving away to another, since a distinction can be madebetween the act of delivery (where knowledge is required) and giving away (where the absence of criminal

intent or knowledge that said object being given away contains prohibited substances)

2) Whether or not the trial court erred in not giving credence to the assertion of accused-appellant that he had noknowledge that what were inside the plastic bag given to him by his uncle were marijuana leaves. Whether or

not the lower court erred in accepting the accuseds statement that he had no knowledge of the contents of

the plastic bag.


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3) Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant despite failure of the prosecution to provehis guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellant despite

failure to establish his intent to violate the statute, or guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

4) * Whether or not the appellants right against warrantless search and seizure was violated. Whether or notthe appellant was subjected to a warrantless search and seizure, thereby rendering the evidence derived as

inadmissible, based on the fruit of the poisonous tree reasoning.

5) * Whether or not the trial court was correct in convicting the appellant for giving away to another 18 blocksof marijuana. Whether or not the lower court was correct in convicting the appellant based on their

interpretation of giving away as stated in the RA.

6) * Whether or not the appellant can be held guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs.

RULING:

1) No, the appellants right against warrantless search and seizure was not violated, as he explicitly gave hisapproval to be subjected to a physical search when he gave his verbal consent to the policemans request to do

a physical search, knowing in his mind that he has nothing to hide (as he also stated in his statement).

Nonetheless, we hold that appellant and his baggage were validly searched, not because he was caught in

flagrante delicto, but because he freely consented to the search. It was his consent that validated the search,

serving as the waiver, which provides an exception to the rule against warrantless searches.

2) No, the trial court was incorrect in convicting the appellant for giving away to another 18 blocks of marijuana,based on their literal interpretation. According to the trial court, the appellant is guilty of giving away to

another when he literally handed over the plastic bag to Noriel, who is seated in the backseat. Further,

adopting the trial courts interpretation would lead to absurd conclusions. Following the trial courts line ofreasoning, Noriel should have been held liable for the same crime when he gave the plastic bag to PO3

Valenzuela for the latters inspection. According to the Supreme Court, giving away to another is to be

interpreted as an act short of a sale which involves no consideration, where ownership is transferred.

3) Yes, the appellant can be clearly held guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, under Section 8 of RA6425. The elements of illegal possession are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object,

which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused

freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug. The mere act of possessing the prohibited drug is a

criminal violation punishable under RA 6425, as, it is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the

prosecution of acts mala prohibita.

Hence, the Supreme Court modified the decision of the lower court. (Appellant is to be convicted of illegal

possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 or RA 6425, and is sentenced to eight (8) years minimum to twelve

(12) years maximum, and is ordered to pay a fine of Php 12,000.)


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II. Definition of a Felony

Article 3, Revised Penal Code

Article 3. Definitions. Felonies (delitos, or serious/criminal offense) are acts and omissions punishable by law. Felonies

are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo, or fraud), but also by means of fault (culpa, or blame).

There is deceitwhen the act is performed with deliberate intentand there isfaultwhen the wrongful act results fromimprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

The elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must be

punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or

fault. (People vs Gonzales, GR No. 80762)

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GR No. 80762

People of the Philippines vs Gonzales

March 19, 1990

Custodio Gonzales, Sr. appellant

Sarmiento, J. (Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.)

FACTS:

1) On October 31, 1984, appellant Custodio Gonzales Sr. and five others are found guilty beyond reasonabledoubt under Art 248 of the Revised Penal Code by the RTC of Iloilo Branch 38, for the murder of Lloyd

Peacerrada on February 21, 1981. - On February 21, 1981, in the municipality of Ajuy, Iloilo, appellant along

with co-accused Augusto Gonzales (son), Fausta Lanida-Gonzales (daughter-in-law), Custodio Gonzales Jr. (son),

Nerio Gonzales (son), and Rogelio Lanida (brother of Fausta), armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons,

with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, inflicted upon the

victim multiple wounds on different parts of the body which caused the immediate death of said victim.

2) The lower court sentenced all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida (still at-large), to suffer the penalty ofimprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion

temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of Php40,000, plus moral damages in thesum of Php14,000 and to pay the costs."

3) All accused filed a notice of appeal on the trial courts decision, but before the Court of Appeals could renderjudgment, all appellants except Custodio Gonzales Sr., withdrew their appeals and chose instead to pursue

applications for parole before the Department of Justice.

4) On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on Custodio, Sr.s appeal, modifying the formerdecision of the RTC from reclusion temporalto reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs in the amount of

Php30,000.

5) Upon certification from the Court of Appeals, the case is elevated to the Supreme Court for final reviewISSUES:

1) Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting appellant Custodio Gonzales, Sr. by basis of the testimonyof Jose Huntoria, the lone eyewitness, and in not considering his alibi as defense.

2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision to raise the punishment from reclusion temporaltoreclusion perpetua for the appellant.

RULING:

1) Yes, the lower court erred in convicting appellant Custodio Gonzales, Sr. by basis of the eyewitness account ofthe Jose Huntoria. According to the Supreme Court, with the investigation done by the police authorities were

sloppy; the ambiguity of the medical evidence presented by the examining medical officer posing the

possibility that the killing could have been done by only one, or by two or more bladed instruments; and the

admission of Fausta Gonzales to be solely responsible for the killing, if the lower courts ruling is to be

sustained, then the courts will have to heavily rely on eyewitness Huntoria, whose testimony hasfailed to

impute a definite and specific act committed or contributed by the appellant.


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2) Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in its decision to raise the punishment from reclusion temporalto reclusionperpetua. According to the Supreme Court, there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of

Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as aprincipalby direct participation

under Article 17, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the

prosecution that inculpates him (accomplice) by inducement, under Paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or

(accessory) by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3. Basing on Huntorias testimony, who cannot for

certain assert what specific act the appellant has performed to participate in the murder, the case does not

meet the elements of Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code.The victim sustained only five fatal wounds out ofthe total of sixteen inflicted, while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of

the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound, which could have or have not been the appellant.

The Supreme Court also scrutinized Huntorias credibility as witnesshe only came out to testify after 8

months when all the accused, except Fausta and Augusto Gonzales, were still not named (citing fear for his life

when he knew the identity of the killers), and is not a disinterested party (the victim was his landlord). As such,

the Supreme Court finds that the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Hence, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, and acquitted the

appellant.


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III. Power to Define and Punish Crimes

GR No. 17584

People of the Philippines vs Gregorio Santiago

March 8, 1922

L. Porter Hamilton for appellant

Romualdez, J. (Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur)

FACTS:

1) Appellant Gregorio Santiago is charged with homicide by reckless negligence for running over with theautomobile he was driving a 7-year old boy, Porfirio Parondo, who was killed at that instant. Appellant was

sentenced to suffer 1 year and 1 day ofprison correccional, and pay the costs of the trial. According to the

Supreme Court, there is no shade of doubt about these facts, that the appellant while driving his vehicle along

a narrow space between a wagon standing on one side and a heap of stones on the other side where the victim

Parondo was standing, did not proceed with vigilant care under the circumstances an ordinary prudent man

would take in order to avoid possible accidents.

2) Not agreeing with the sentence, the appellant goes to the Supreme Court and presents his appeal, citing fourerrors committed by the lower court.

2.1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the fact that the appellant was being prosecuted

in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the Act is unconstitutional and

gave no jurisdiction in this case.

2.2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint after the presentation of the evidence in the

case, if not before, for the reason that said Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional and the proceedings had in

the case under the provisions of the Act constitute a prosecution of appellant without due process of

law. 2.3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the person of the accused

and over the subject- matter of the complaint.

2.4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged and in sentencing him to

one year and one day ofprison correccionaland to the payment of costs.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint has been made, is valid and constitutional.2) Whether or not the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of

the complaint.

RULING:

1) Yes, Act No. 2886, which amended General Order 58 and under which the decision has been made, is valid andconstitutional. According to the Supreme Court, no proof is required to demonstrate that the present

Legislature had the power to enact and amend laws. It has the power to legislate on criminal matters which is

very evident from the wording of section 7 of the Jones Law.Further, the Supreme Court statesthat the

legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment to

amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may from time to

time see fit.Also, the (US) Congress has tacitly approved Act No. 2886, when it remained silent after the Act

has been submitted to amend General Order 58 (silence considered as an act of approval).


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2) No, the lower court did not lack jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of thecomplaint, as although the political status of the country is yet undetermined and is in a transitory status, it is

undeniable that the present government of the Philippines, created by the Congress of the United States, is

autonomous,and that this autonomy also includes the ability to make judicial actions, and the right to

prosecute in court in its own name whomsoever violates within its territory the penal laws in force.

Furthermore, the Legislature has the power to prescribe the form of the complaint so long that the

constitutional rights of the accused are not violatedunder the Constitution of the United States and by like

provisions in the constitutions of the various states, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature andcause of the accusation against him, which has been done in the case at bar.

Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, and the appellant is further sentenced to accessory penalties

as prescribed in Article 61 of the Penal Code (to indemnify the family of the deceased with the sum of

Php1,000, as well as pay the trial costs.) [The Supreme Court rules that the said Act upon which the complaint

does not violate any constitutional provisions, and that the lower court did not commit any of the errors

presented by the appellant.]


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IV. Bill of Attainder / Ex Post Facto Law

Article III, Section 22 (The Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder

shall be enacted.

An ex post facto law(literally, after the fact) is defined as law that operates retroactivelyto:

1) Make criminal and punishable an innocent act done before the passage of the law,2) Aggravate a criminal act, or make it greater than when it was committed,3) Change the punishment and inflict a greater punishment to a criminal act than what the law specified at the

time it was committed,

4) Alter the legal rules of evidence and allow different or less testimony than what the law required at the timethe criminal act was committed in order to convict the offender,

5) Assume to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect impose penalty or deprivation of a right whichwas previously lawful,

6) Deprive lawful protection to a person accused of a crime (such as protection of former conviction or acquittal,or proclamation of amnesty).

[The first four of the enumeration were provided in Mekin vs. Wolfe, while the last two were added in In re: KayVillegas Kami, Inc.]

In general, criminal laws cannot be given retroactive effect. But if it is favorable to the accused, it should be given

retroactive effect. (See Article 22 of Revised Penal Code)

Applying the constitutional provision under Article III Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution, Supreme Court of the

Philippines has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation that affects the substantial rights of the

accused. It also applies to criminal procedural law prejudicial to a person accused of a crime.

The prohibition against the passage of an ex post facto law, expressed in the legal maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena

sine lege(there is no crime, where there is no law punishing it),is embodied in Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code,

which states that: "No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission."

A bill of attainderis a defined as a legislative act that inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular

group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of

individuals, the imposition of a punishment (penal or otherwise), and the lack of judicial trial. This last element, the

total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the

most essential.


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GR No. L-46228

People of the Philippines vs Hon. Rolando R. Villaraza (City Judge of CDO) and Caesar Puerto

January 17, 1978

Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas, and Casiano A. Gamotin for petitioners

Aquino, J. (Fernando, Barredo, Antonio, and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur)

FACTS:

1) Respondent Caesar Puerto is charged with estafa (swindling) on December 3, 1975 under Art 315 of theRevised Penal Code, for issuing two bouncing checks for the total sum of Php4966.63 on October 16, 1974.

2) Respondent City Trial Court Judge Rolando Villaraza, noting that the accused had waived his second stage ofpreliminary investigation, issued an order dated March 31, 1976 for the elevation of the case to the Court of

First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan De Oro City Branch 8.

3) The Court of First Instance, upon petition of the prosecution, issued an order dated February 3, 1977 to returnthe case to the city court. While the case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of both courts, it was the city

court that first took cognizance of the case and should therefore try it.

4) On April 21, 1977, respondent Judge Villaraza, in disagreement with the Court of First Instances ruling, issuedanother order directing its re-elevation, arguing that the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over

the case, as it is punishable byprision mayor medium, under Presidential Decree No. 818 which took effect on

October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

5) In response to the Judge Villarazas order, the Office of the City Fiscal of Cagayan De Oro City filed a petition forcertioraridated May 27, 1977 in the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the City Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro has jurisdiction over the estafa case at bar, and shouldtherefore try it.

2) Whether or not City Trial Court Judge Villaraza erred in elevating the case to the Court of First Instance, arguingthat the estafa case at bar is punishable withprision mayor medium, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 818

(which took effect on October 22, 1975) under amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:

1) Yes, the City Trial Court of Cagayan De Oro has original jurisdiction over the case because the penultimateparagraph or Section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828, provides that

"judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an

offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed

prision correccional, or imprisonment for not more than six years, or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or

both."

2) Yes, City Trial Court Judge Villaraza erred in the elevating the case to the Court of First Instance, citingPresidential Decree No. 818 which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code thereby increasing the

penalty ofestafa toprision mayor medium from previous punishment ofprision correccional. The accused

Caesar Puerto commited the act ofestafa (swindling) on October 16, 1974, while the amended law only applies


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to similar cases committed on or after October 22, 1975. The Supreme Court explicitly stated that to apply this

amended law retroactively, making it an ex post facto law, is prohibited by Articles 21 and 22 of the Revised

Penal Code, and section 12, Article IV of the Constitution (1973). [*See NOTES below]

Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance to return the case to the City Trial

Court for trial, with the City Trial Court judges orders set aside.

NOTES:

Revised Penal Code

Title Three - PENALTIES, Chapter One - PENALTIES IN GENERAL

Article 21. Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not

prescribed by law prior to its commission.

Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they

favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of

Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has beenpronounced and the convict is serving the same.

Constitution of the Philippines (1973)

Article IV, Section 12. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.


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V. Characteristics of Criminal Law

A) Prospective

GR No. L-41423

People of the Philippines vs Crisanto Tamayo

March 19, 1935

Juan Amor and Simeon J. Tolentino for appellantHull, J. (Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur)

FACTS:

1) Appellant Crisanto Tamayo is charged in violation of Section 2 of Municipal Order 5, series of 1932 of themunicipality of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur.

2) Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, appellant was convicted and fined. From that decisionthe appeal was brought to the Supreme Court.

3) While the appeal was pending, the municipal council repealed Section 2 of Municipal Order 5, as approved bythe provincial board, which made the act complained of, instead of being a violation of municipal ordinances,

legal in the municipality.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the appellants move for the dismissal of the action against him on account of the repeal isvalid.

RULING:

1) Yes, the appellants move for dismissal of the action against him on account of the repeal of Section 2 ofMunicipal Order of the municipality is valid. As per Spanish doctrine, upon which the Supreme Court conforms,when an offense ceases to be criminal, prosecution cannot be had. As the repeal of Section 2 of the Municipal

Order was absolute, and not a reenactment and repeal by implication nor was there any saving clause, such

conduct formerly denounced is no longer deemed criminal, it would be illogical for the court to attempt to

sentence appellant for an offense that no longer exists.

Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the proceedings against the appellant.

NOTES:

Different effects of repeal of penal law:

1) If repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new law, the new law shall be applied, except when the offender is a

habitual delinquent or when the new law is made not applicable to pending action or existing causes of action.

2) If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall

be applied. (Prohibition ofex post facto law)

3) If the new law totally repeals the existing law so that the act, which was penalized under the old law, is no

longer punishable, the crime is obliterated.


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B. General

Republic Act No. 386

June 18, 1949

Civil Code of the Philippines

Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the

Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a)

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GR No. 448

The United States vs Philip K. Sweet

April 17, 1903

Theopile B. Steele for appellant

Ladd, J. (Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Willard and Mapa, JJ., concur)

FACTS:

1) Appellant Philip K. Sweet is convicted under article 558, No. 1 of the Penal Code, in accordance with GeneralOrder No. 58, section 29, for striking complainant Marcelino San Pedro several times with a whip, causing

complainant to bleed but not severely injured so as to incapacitate him from working or to necessitate medical

assistance.

2) Original complaint was for lesions menos graves under article 418 of the Code, but it was determined that itfalls within article 588, No. 1, which punishes as a misdemeanor the infliction of injuries which do not prevent

the person injured from devoting himself to his customary labors, and do not require medical attendance.

3) The lower court imposed a sentence of 15 days ofarresto and reprension on the appellant.ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the lower court was correct in imposing a sentence of 15 days ofarresto and reprension on theappellant under article 558, No. 1 of the Penal Code.

2) * Whether or not the appellant is under jurisdiction of the Philippine courts and can be convicted of theoffense based on Article 558, No. 1 of the Penal Code.

RULING:

1) Yes, the lower court was correct in imposing the sentence of 15 days ofarresto and reprension under article558, No. 1 of the Penal Code on the appellant. According to the Supreme Court, in the application of penalties

in cases of misdemeanor, the discretion of the court is not controlled by the rules of the Code as to aggravating

and extenuating circumstances. (Art. 605.) In this case, that discretion was properly exercised, the sentence

being fifteen days of arresto and reprension, the maximum of the penalty fixed by law for the offense.

2) * Yes, the appellant can be convicted of the offense based on Article 558, No 1. of the Penal Code, as he isunder jurisdiction of the Philippine courts, due to his connection with the Police Department in the City of

Manila under the Provost-Marshal-General as Chief of Secret Service Bureau.

Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts decision, and returns the case to the lower court for

execution of judgment.


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C. Territorial

Act No. 3815

December 8, 1930

Revised Penal Code

DATE OF EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE

Article 2.Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, theprovisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its

interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;

2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities

issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;

3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities

mentioned in the presiding number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or

5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of

Book Two of this Code.


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VI. Construction of Penal Laws

GR No. L-12262

The United States vs Antonio Abad Santos

February 10, 1917

Quirino Abad Santos for appellant

Moreland, J. (Arellano, C. J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur; Carson and Trent, JJ., dissent)

FACTS:

1) The appellant Antonio Abad Santos, owner of a printing establishment, is accused of violating the InternalRevenue Law, and is convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Php10.

2) Sec. 185 of Act No. 2339 (or section 2727 of the Administrative Code) states that a person who violates anyprovision of the Internal Revenue Law or any lawful regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue made in

conformity with the same, for which delinquency no specific penalty is provided by law, shall be punished by a

fine of not more than three hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.

3) The appellant, owner of a printing establishment called The Excelsior, required by law to keep a book,violated the provisions of said regulation by failure to make any entry for the 5th day of January, 1915,

indicating whether any business was done on that day or not.

4) The appellant employed a bookkeeper who had complete charge of putting entries in the book, and who failedto make the required entry on the specified date, unknown to the appellant.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the court erred in the conviction of the appellant since the omission punishable by law wascommitted by the employed bookkeeper and not by appellant, and of which the appellant had no knowledge

of the omission thereof.

RULING:

1) Yes, the lower court erred in convicting the appellant, as the Supreme Court believes that a person should notbe held criminally liable for the acts of another done without the persons knowledge or consent, unless the

law clearly so provides. Based on facts, the Supreme Court believes that no connection between the accused

and the omission of the bookkeeper is shown or claimed, they believe that the appellant had no knowledge of

the omission, and that he did not direct or connive with the bookkeeper in the omission.

Courts should not hold one person criminally responsible for the acts of another, committed without his

knowledge or consent, unless there is a statute requiring it, written in plain terms.Criminal statutes are to be

strictly construed. No person should be brought within terms that are not clearly within them, nor should any

act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute.

Hence, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered the acquittal of the accused.


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GR No. 151876

People of the Philippines vs. Fernando L. Dimagiba

June 21, 2005

Panganiban, J. (Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur)

FACTS:

1) Respondent Fernando Dimagiba is charged in violation of BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing topetitioner Susan Go 13 checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on thedue dates were dishonored for the reason of account closed.

2) Respondent is sentenced by the Baguio City Municipal Trial Court (Cities) or MTCC Branch 4 the penalty of 3months imprisonment for each count (13 counts), and indemnification the offended party with the amount of

Php1,295,000 with legal interest per annum commencing from 1996, and to pay attorneys fees of P15000, and

to pay for the costs of the trial.

3) Respondent filed an appeal, raffled to RTC Branch 4 of Baguio City, who denied the appeal sustained theMTCCs decision. Since no further appeal to the Court of Appeals was issued, on February 1, 2001, the RTC

issued a Certificate of Finality of the Decision, and on February 14, 2001, issued an Order directing the arrest ofDimagiba and a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability.

4) Respondent filed for a Motion for Reconsideration for recall of the Order for Arrest and the modification of thefinal Decision on February 27, 2001, arguing that the penalty imposed should be fine without imprisonment

only. Respondent reiterated his arguments in a subsequent Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of

Execution on February 28, 2001. On August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motions and ordered the arrest of

respondent.

5) On October 9, 2001, the Respondent, now serving time, filed with the RTC a petition for a writ of HabeasCorpus, using the same arguments he raised in the previous Motions. The Petition was raffled to RTC Branch 5of Baguio City, who had the hearing on October 10, 2001. RTC Branch 5 issued an Order for the immediate

release of Respondent from confinement, and required him to pay a fine of Php100,000 in lieu of

imprisonment.

6) On October 11, 2001, RTC Branch 5 released a subsequent order justifying their decision by invoking Vaca vs.Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court Admin. Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000. In their interpretation, RTC

Branch 5 argued that SC-AC No. 12-2000 allegedly requires only the imposition of a fine instead of

imprisonment for BP 22 violations if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent. Such rules should

be retroactively applied to respondent, since it is favorable for the accused (pro reo). RTC Branch 5 noted that

the Respondent was 1) a first time offender, and that his imprisonment would lead to the displacement of at

least 200 workers employed under his care; and 2) the civil liability of the case had already been satisfied

through the levy of his properties (sale of a Toyota Land Cruiser and two parcels of land).

7) On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Susan Go filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of RTC Branch 5s Orders,which was denied on January 18, 2002. Petitioner filed a subsequent Petition for Review to the Supreme Court,

citing Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (pure questions of law).


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ISSUES:

1) Whether or not RTC Branch 5 erred in amending the final and conclusive decision of the Municipal Trial Court,Branch 4, dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the Sentence Mittimus, dated September 28, 2001, and in ordering

the release of Respondent from confinement in jail for service of his sentence under the final and conclusive

judgment.

2) Whether or not the Petition for Habeas Corpus is of merit as Respondent was not entitled to the beneficentpolicy enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases, and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular No.

12-2000, and whether or not RTC Branch 5 validly granted the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

3) Whether or not RTC Branch 5 erred in imposing the fine of Php100,000 on Respondent, instead of one millionand two hundred ninety five thousand pesos (P1,295,000.00) or up to double the said amount (or

Php2,590,000), based on its interpretation of SC-AC No. 12-2000.

4) Whether or not RTC Branch 5 Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction in hearing and deciding Respondents Petition for Habeas Corpus.

RULING:

1) Yes, RTC Branch 5 erred in amending the final and conclusive decision of the MTCC (anchored on the Vaca caseand SC-AC No. 12-2000, incorrectly interpreted), and in ordering the release of the Respondent based on his

Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus (which the Supreme Court further argues should not have been granted

in the case at bar).

2) No, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus has no merit, and RTC Branch 5 erred in granting it, as the writ ofhabeas corpus only applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of

liberty, and if availed of as a post-conviction remedy, the following circumstances should have been met: (1)

there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no

jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as

to such excess. The Supreme Court noted that the Respondents Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was

anchored on the (incorrect interpretation) of the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly

prescribed the imposition of a fine only, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought the

retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being

excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ. The

Supreme Court also noted that the Respondent appears to have gone forum shopping, and has tried (and

misused) the habeas corpus argument as a last resort to reopen a case that had already been judged final and

executory.

3) Yes, RTC Branch 5 erred in imposing the fine of Php100,000 only in lieu of imprisonment, and not the penaltiesas originally stated in BP 22. According to the Supreme Court, SC-AC No. 12-2000 is not a penal law, therefore it

does not have a retroactive effect and cannot be cited to modify final conviction.SC-AC No. 12-2000, as

clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, merely establishes a rule of preference in imposing penalties for

violations of BP 22, and does not delete the other alternative penalties for BP 22, including the penalty of

imprisonment. The penalties that can be imposed under BP 22 are as follows: (1) imprisonment of not less than

30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine

that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.


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4) Yes, RTC Branch 5 committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in hearingand deciding Respondents Petition for Habeas Corpus, because, 1) as already explained, SC-AC No. 12-2000 is

not a penal law, thus it cannot be applied retroactivelyit merely lays down a rule of preference, or serves

only as a guideline for trial courts), in which penalties to impose; and 2) the competence to determine the

proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision against the accused(which in this case is MTCC

Branch 4). MTCCs decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority.

According to the Supreme Court, RTC Branch 5 did not have jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment for thesake of granting a writ of habeas corpus, as 1) the penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law; 2)

the conviction subsequentlysustained by RTC Branch 4 upon Respondents appeal; and3) the Decision has

already attained finality.

Hence, the Supreme Court granted the Petition, nullified the Orders of RTC Branch 5, and denied the

Respondents petition for writ of Habeas Corpus. Case is remanded to MTCC for arrest of Respondent and

completion of sentence.


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VII. History of Act No. 3815

GR No. L-9527

The United States vs Jose Tamporong, Et Al.

August 23, 1915

Appellants on their own behalf

Trent, J. (Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., Araullo, J., concur)

FACTS:

1) Defendants Tamporong et al. were caught violating Baguio City Ordinance No. 35 prohibiting the playing of agame of chance called monte

2) Justice of the Peace of Baguio (gobernadorcillo/ city court) and Court of First Instance both convicted thedefendants with the same charge

3) Case was elevated to the Supreme Court because the validity of Ordinance No. 35 was questioned4) In tackling the question, the history of penal laws in the Philippines was looked into

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Ordinance No. 35 is valid.2) Whether or not the Supreme Court required is by law to examine the evidence to determine guilt or innocence

of the defendants.

RULING:

1) Affirmative, as in the case of United States v. Joson2) No. To explain this, the history of penal laws and criminal procedure in the Philippines was looked into. In

execution of the royal order dated December 17, 1887, the Penal Code and Provisional Law of Criminal

Procedure used in Spain were applied to the Philippines

Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts decision, and returns the case to the lower court for

execution of judgment.

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