Sanchez v COA Gr No 127545

Facts:

In 1991, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7180 (R.A. 7180) otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1992. This law provided an appropriation for the DILG under Title XIII and set aside the amount of P75,000,000.00 for the DILG's Capability Building Program. On 11 November 1991, Atty. Hiram C. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Project Director of the Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy, informed then Deputy Executive Secretary Dionisio de la Serna of the proposal to constitute and implement a "shamrock" type task force to implement local autonomy institutionalized under the Local Government Code of 199. The proposal was accepted by the Deputy Executive Secretary and attested by then DILG Secretary Cesar N. Sarino, one of the petitioners herein, who consequently issued a memorandum for the transfer and remittance to the Office of the President of the sum of P300,000.00 for the operational expenses of the task force. An additional cash advance of P300,000.00 was requested. Upon post-audit conducted by Department auditor Iluminada M.V. Fabroa, however, the amounts were disallowed.

Issue: What are two essential requisites in order that a transfer of appropriation may be allowed? Are those present in this case?

Ruling: Contrary to another submission in this case, the President, Chief Justice, Senate President, and the heads of constitutional commissions need not first prove and declare the existence of savings before transferring funds, the Court in Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra, categorically declared that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall approve the realignment (of savings). However, "[B]efore giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see to it that: (1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and (2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made. The absence of any item to be augmented starkly projects the illegality of the diversion of the funds and the profligate spending thereof. With the foregoing considerations, it is clear that no valid transfer of the Fund to the Office of the President could have occurred in this case as there was neither allegation nor proof that the amount transferred was savings or that the transfer was for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer was made. Further, we find that the use of the transferred funds was not in accordance with the purposes laid down by the Special Provisions of R.A. 7180_____________________________________________________________________

Alvarez v Guingona GR No 118303

Facts:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.

Issue:

Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senates own version of HB No. 8817, into Republic Act No. 7720 be said to have originated in the House of Representatives as required?

Held:

Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

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Garcia vs. Mata Gr No. 33713 1975

Facts:

Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments. Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service. On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).

Issue:

Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held:

The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP. Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA. It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect. SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

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Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:

Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

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Lidasan v Comelec GR No L-28473 1968 Facts: Republic Act 4790, being disputed, reorganized the barrios in different municipalities of Province of Lanao del Sur. It came to light later that 2 barrios in the statute are within the boundaries of other municipalities and that other 10 barrios are parts and parcel of another municipality, all in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. As the statute stood, 12 barrios are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation. Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. This triggered the petition for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. Petitioner requested that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelecs resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement that [n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.Issue:

Whether or not Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

Decision:

Republic Act 4790 is null and void. Constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill. Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. Since the petitioner is a qualified voter from the affected barrio, he has every right to become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.

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Tolentino v Sec of Finance 235scra630 1994

Facts:

The constitutionality of RA 7716 which expanded the scope of the value added tax was questioned on the ground that the second and third readings were read on the same date. It was also claimed that the certification by the President the urgency of its enactment was invalid as there was no emergency and the certification only dispensed with the requirement that the bill be presented in its final form before its approval on the third reading.

Issue:

Whether or not three readings on different dates is mandatory?

Decision:

There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement of these readings on separate readings. It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a growing budget deficit not being an unusual condition in this country.

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Bengzon case GR NO 89914

Facts:

A petition for prohibition was filed to enjoin Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group in several corporations. Earlier, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile had delivered a speech asking the Senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because of the said purchase.

Issue:

Whether or not Senate has authority to conduct inquiry?

Decision:

Petition granted. The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, the investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.