[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON

GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION,

INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,

respondents.

[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

Facts

Petitioner filed a Motion of Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion on the Supreme Court’s decisions in

G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and G.R. No. 146738 of March 2, 2001.

Certain events had transpired, leading to the build up of irresistible pressure for the petitioner to resign.

This includes exposes and speeches, motions to impeach, demanding letters by the church, mass

resignations, impeachment proceedings, prosecutors’ walkout and resignation, postponement of

impeachment proceedings, EDSA rally, withdrawal of support from the AFP and PNP, and petitioner’s

agreement to snap elections, amongst others.

These accounts were highly manifested and publicized through the media.

In establishing intent of petitioner to resign, the Courts used the Angara Diary, as well as press releases,

final statements issued after oath taking of respondent Arroyo, and subsequent abandonment of the

Malacanang Palace. The Supreme Court contends that these are overt acts which leave no doubt as to

the petitioner’s intent to resign.

Petitioner claims that said resignation was due to duress, and that an involuntary resignation is no

resignation at all.

Petitioner further alleges that the Court’s use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the

petitioner on the issue of resignation violates the rule against admission of hearsay evidence, also

contending that its use violates the rule on res inter alios acta: “The rights of a party cannot be

prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as herein provided” in Section 28 of

Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Use of Angara Diary is also said to have violated the rules on Proof of Private Writings and Best Evidence

Rule.

Petitioner also argues that a reading of Section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution, which provides

“Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and

disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted should

nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment, according to law” will tell us that

petitioner must first be convicted before he could be criminally prosecuted. Petitioner contends that

the private and public prosecutors’ walk out during the impeachment proceedings “should be

considered failure to prosecute on the part of the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of

the case by the Senate is equivalent to acquittal,” further concluding that “Dismissal of a case for failure

to prosecute amounts to an acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double jeopardy.”

Petitioner also argues that even a sitting president is entitled to absolute immunity from suit during his

term of office.

Lastly, petitioner claims that he has been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity.

Issue(s)

1. Whether or not President Estrada is entitled to immunity from suit

2. Whether or not he was acquitted in the impeachment proceedings, and therefore cannot be

criminally prosecuted

3. Whether or not the use of Angara Diary is admissible as evidence

SC Ruling Held

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion are DENIED for lack of merit.

President Estrada, in the case at bar, is not entitled to absolute immunity from suit. We look into the

discussions of the Constitutional Committee, in particular, a discussion between Fr. Bernas and Mr.

Suarez on the deletion of the first sentence, that the President should be immune from suit during his

tenure, and then we differentiate tenure from term. A term means the time during which the officer

may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the incumbent actually holds office.

Tenure, on the other hand, represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office.

The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.

From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is

concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.

And in this case, the President had already resigned and abandoned the Malacanang Office, which

effectively terminated his tenure.

He was not merely a President-on-leave, as petitioner so vehemently claims. Looking at the Angara

Diary, and other overt acts committed by petitioner, it is clear that his intent was to resign.

As for the issue on The Angara Diary, it has been held that a man’s acts, conduct, and declaration,

wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that

they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583)

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a

party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement

that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he

would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and “Pagod na pagod na

ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired.

I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue).

I just want to clear my name, then I will go.”

The use of the Angara Diary is also not a violation of the res inter alios acta, since one of its exceptions is

provided in Section 29 of Rule 130, with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent, which Angara is

to Estrada.

As to whether or not the petitioner was acquitted during the impeachment proceedings, we look at the

records of the proceedings.

The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January 16, 2001 hearing of the

impeachment cases when by a vote of 11-10, the Senator-judges refused to open the second envelope

allegedly containing the P3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in a secret bank account under the name “

Jose Velarde”. The next day, January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to the Speaker of the

House tendering their resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with

the impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul Roco immediately moved for the indefinite suspension of the

impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the resignation of the

public prosecutors. The Roco motion was then granted by Chief Justice Davide, Jr. Before the House

could resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors or on January 20, 2001, petitioner relinquished

the presidency and respondent Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic. Thus, on February 7,

2001, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio.

Petitioner’s claim of double jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted

by the impeachment court.

G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995

COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA RIVERA,

petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS, respondents.

Facts

The case is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and

orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Neria Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief

accountant and record custodian of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to

produce “all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as

vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988” and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.

An anonymous and unsigned letter purportedly written by an employee of the EIIB, was sent to the

Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished to several government offices, including the Office of the

Ombudsman.

In the letter were allegations as to the misuse of funds from the savings of unfulfilled plantilla positions,

among other forms of corruption and abuse of power.

As a response to the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied allegations. Petitioner Perez also

denied the issue for the savings realized from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM only

allotted for the remaining 947 personnel, and that the disbursement of funds for the plantilla positions

for overt and covert personnel had been cleared by COA.

Jose F. Sano, the Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman’s office found their responses

unsatisfactory; therefore he asked for authority to conduct an investigation. Anticipating the grant of

his request, he issued a subpoena to petitioners, compelling them to submit their counter-affidavits and

the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as subpoena duces tecum to the chief of the EIIB’s Accounting

Division, ordering him to bring “all documents relating to Personal Service Funds for the year 1988 and

all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988.”

Petitioners then moved to quash the subpoena (which was granted by the Ombudsman since no

affidavit was filed against petitioners) and the subpoena duces tecum, which was denied, since it was

directed to the Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the Ombudsman ordered the

Chief of the Records a Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all

documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers

for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."

Petitioners filed for a motion of reconsideration, which was denied.

Issue(s)

1. Whether or not an unsigned and unverified letter complained is an “appropriate case” within

the concept of the Constitution

2. Whether or not the documents in question are classified, and therefore beyond the reach of

public respondent’s subpoena duces tecum.

SC Ruling Held

The petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents be made

personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in the decision.

True, the court recognizes the privilege based on state secrets. However, in the case at bar, there have

been no claims that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records

pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Nor is there a law or regulation which considers personnel

records of the EIIB as classified information. On the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293 states that “The

only item of expenditure which should be treated as strictly confidential because it falls under the

category of classified information is that relating to purchase of information and payment of rewards.”

And even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, the decision would only

justify ordering the inspection in camera, and not their nonproduction.

Further, documents in question are public documents and as petitioner claims, the disbursements by

the EIIB of funds for personal service has already been cleared by COA, then there should be no reason

why they should object to the examination of the documents by the respondent Ombudsman.

As to the issue whether or not an unsigned and unverified letter is an “appropriate case”, it is expressly

provided for in the Constitution that “the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,

shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the

Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or

controlled corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the actions taken and

the result thereof.

G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate

President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N.

PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as

Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY

EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON,

PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and

MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines,

Respondents.

Facts

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as the whole sent invitations to various

officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in

a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National

Machinery and Equipment Group (North Rail Project).

Invitations were also issued to the several AFP officials, for them to attend as resource persons in a

public hearing about the wire-tapping issue involving the President.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, “Ensuring Observance of the Principle of

Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public

Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other

Purposes,” which pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.

On the same date, Senate President Drilon also received a letter from Executive Secretary Ermita

informing him that “officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be

able to attend the same without consent of the President, pursuant to E.O. 464” and that “said officials

have not secured the required consent from the President.”

Senator Biazon, chairperson of the Committee of National Defense and Security also received a similar

letter from Gen. Senga. Despite that, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani attended the investigation,

causing them to be relieved from their military posts and to face court martial proceedings.

On October 3, 2005, three petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed, challenging the

Constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Issue(s)

1. Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

SC Ruling Held

Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005),

“Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive

Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of

Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,” are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are,

however, VALID.

E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives

Congress of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether such

withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration of the general power of Congress to

obtain information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order.

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution

which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may

conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights

of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Because the investigation was in aid of legislation, no consent is required from the President.

G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,

vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

Facts

On July 25, 1987, President Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284, the pertinent provisions of

which are as follows:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,

undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department

may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and

government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this

limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which

the President is the Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive official

of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they

(sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but

in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled

corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should

either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

Petitioner maintains that said Executive Order is unconstitutional, as it allows members of the Cabinet,

their secretaries and undersecretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their

primary positions, which is contrary to what is in the Constitution, as provided for in Section 13, Article

VII of the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants

shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment

during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other

profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any

franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or

instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their

subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

Said Executive Order was promulgated on the basis of Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez’s Opinion

No. 73, Series of 1987, rendered on July 23, 1987, which construed Section 13, Article VII in relation to

Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, declaring that Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and

assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in the boards of government

corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice

who is made an ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article

VIII; or (b) if allowed by law, or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions.

Issue

1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional

SC Ruling Held

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared Executive Order No. 284 as null and void, and

accordingly set aside.

Looking into the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is clear that Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B

was enacted in order to prevent abuses, which was prevalent during the Marcos regime. And while this

law already provides for a sufficient blanket prohibition against holding of multiple offices or

employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the

Constitutional Commission imposed even stricter limitations on the President, Vice President, members

of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during

their tenure, as provided for in Sec. 13, Article VII.

What is provided for in Section 13, Article VII, specifically the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this

Constitution” cannot refer to the broad exceptions under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.

To do so would render nugatory and meaningless the intent of the framers of the Constitution to impose

a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice President, members of the Cabinet and their deputies and

assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure.

G.R. No. 147392 : March 12, 2004

BENEDICTO ERNESTO R. BITONIO, JR., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and CELSO D. GANGAN,

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.

Facts

Pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. No. 7916, otherwise known as the Special Economic Zone Act of of 1995,

which provides:

Section 11. The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) Board. There is hereby created a body

corporate to beknown as the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)

Petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio Jr., Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the

Department of Labor and Employment, was designated to be the DOLE Representative to the Board of

Directors of PEZA.

R.A. No. 7916 provides that:

The Board shall be composed of the Director General as ex officio chairman with eight (8) members

as follows: the Secretaries or their representatives of the Department of Trade and Industry, the

Department of Finance, the Department of Labor and Employment, the Department of [the]

Interior and Local Government, the National Economic and Development Authority, and the

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, one (1) representative from the labor sector, and one (1)

representative from the investor/business sector in the ECOZONE.

Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not less than the amount equivalent to the

representation and transportation allowances of the members of the Board and/or as may be

determined by the Department of Budget and Management: Provided, however, that the per diem

collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of four (4) meetings.

As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was receiving a per diem for

every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.

After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems

to the petitioner and thus issued several Notices of Disallowances, on the basis that:

Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their primary

office and to receive compensation therefore was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court

in the Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary. Disallowance is in pursuance to COA

Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee Report No.

509.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration to COA, which was denied.

Thus, the petition was raised to the Supreme Court.

Issue(s)

1. Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his

attendance in the PEZA Board of Director meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.

SC Ruling Held

Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision of COA is AFFIRMED.

It is noted that the petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as

representative of the Secretary of Labor, with no separate or special appointment for such position.

Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or

employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of

the Secretary of Labor.

The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows

that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said

position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation

attached to his principal office.

[G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003]

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, represented herein by its Secretary,

HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES, represented by BAGUIDALI

KARIM, Acting President of COURAGE (DENR Region 12 Chapter), respondents.

Facts

On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the

DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The

Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR

Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, which reads in part:

Subject: Providing for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of Administrative Units in

the Regional and Field Offices:

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 192, dated June 10, 1987 and as an interim administrative

arrangement to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR) in delivering its services pending approval of the government-wide

reorganization by Congress, the following redefinition of functions and realignment of

administrative units in the regional and field offices are hereby promulgated:

Section 1. Realignment of Administrative Units:

The DENR hereby adopts a policy to establish at least one Community Environment and Natural

Resources Office (CENRO) or Administrative Unit per Congressional District except in the

Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the National Capital Region (NCR). The

Regional Executive Directors (REDs) are hereby authorized to realign/relocate existing CENROs and

implement this policy in accordance with the attached distribution list per region which forms part

of this Order. Likewise, the following realignment and administrative arrangements are hereby

adopted:

x x x x x x x x x

1.6. The supervision of the Provinces of South Cotabato and Sarangani shall be transferred

from Region XI to XII.

Respondents filed a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction with the Regional

Trial Court, which was GRANTED. Trial court then issued a temporary restraining order enjoining

petitioner from implementing the assailed Memorandum.

A Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss was filed by petitioner, on the grounds that (1) the

power to transfer the Regional Office of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources is

executive in nature, (2) the decision to transfer said office is based on Executive Order No. 429, which

reorganized Region XII, (3) validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of

Chiongbian vs. Orbos, and (4) the power to reorganize Administrative Regions is Executive in Nature and

thus the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain respondent’s petition.

Judgment was rendered on January 14, 2000, ordering respondents to cease and desist from enforcing

the said Memorandum for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and are further ordered to return back the seat of DENR

Regional Offices 12 to Cotabato City.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Further, a petition for certiorari filed with the

Court of Appeals was dismissed outright because of procedural flaws.

Hence, the petition with the Supreme Court.

Issue(s)

1. Whether or not DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid

2. Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR

SC Ruling Held

Petition for review is GRANTED. Previous resolutions of the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court

are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction enjoining the petitioner from enforcing the

Memorandum Order of the DENR XII Regional Executive Director, is LIFTED.

In said ruling, the court looked into the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and

administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various

executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the

Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation

demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief

Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of

such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless

disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article VII, Section

17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He

shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

However, as head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be expected to exercise his control

(and supervisory) powers personally all the time. He may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet

members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the

situation demand that he acts personally.

Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the National

Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular

executive department.

in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the

DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this

authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the

latter had not expressly repudiated the same.