Case Digest in Labor Law

8/10/2019 Case Digest in Labor Law

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Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation vs Acibo

PETITIONER Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. (URSUMCO) is engaged in the sugarcanemilling business. Respondents Ferdinand Acibo and 21 others were hired by the petitioner onvarious dates, in different capacities. At the start of their engagements, they signed contracts of

employment for a period of one month or for a given season. URSUMCO repeatedly hired themto perform the same duties and for every engagement required them to sign new employment

contracts for the same duration.

Last Oct. 23, 2002, the respondents filed before the labor arbiter complaints for regularization,entitlement to the benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and attorneys

fees. The labor arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LAs ruling and declared

respondents as regular URSUMCO employees and granted their monetary claims under the

CBA. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the NLRCs ruling finding respondents to be regular

employees of URSUMCO but deleted the grant of monetary benefits under the CBA. Did the CAerr?

The Supreme Court (Second Division) ruling: Yes.

Under the system, the plantation workers or the mill employees do not work continuously for onewhole year but only for the duration of the growing of the sugarcane or the milling season. Their

seasonal work, however, does not detract from considering them in regular employment since in

a litany of cases, this Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from

time to time and are temporarily laid off during the offseason are not separated from the servicein said period, but are merely considered on leave until reemployment. Be this as it may,

regular seasonal employees, like the respondents in this case, should not be confused with theregular employees of the sugar mill such as the administrative or office personnel who performtheir tasks for the entire year regardless of the season. The NLRC, therefore, gravely erred when

it declared the respondents regular employees of URSUMCO without qualification and that they

were entitled to the benefits granted, under the CBA, to URSUMCOS regular employees.

x x x

We find that the CA grossly misread the NLRC ruling and missed the implications of the

respondents regularization. To reiterate, the respondents are regular seasonal employees, as the

CA itself opined when it declared that private respondents who are regular workers with respect

to their seasonal tasks or activities and while such activities exist, cannot automatically begoverned by the CBA between petitioner URSUMCO and the authorized bargaining

representative of the regular and permanent employees. Citing jurisprudential standards,it then

proceeded to explain that the respondents cannot be lumped with the regular employees due tothe differences in the nature of their duties and the duration of their work visavis the

operations of the company. The NLRC was well aware of these distinctions as it acknowledged

that the respondents worked only during the milling season, yet it ignored the distinctions anddeclared them regular employees, a marked departure from existing jurisprudence.


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This, to us, is grave abuse of discretion, as it gave no reason for disturbing the system of regular

seasonal employment already in place in the sugar industry and other industries with similar

seasonal operations. For upholding the NLRCs flawed decision on the respondents employmentstatus, the CA committed a reversible error of judgment (Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp.

and Rene Cabati vs. Ferdinand Acibo, et. al., G.R. No. 186439, Jan. 15, 2014).

MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., and ANGEL T. DAZO, petitioners, vs.HON. VICENTE

LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Ministry of Labor and Employment judgment,

and JOAQUIN A. DEQUILA, respondents.

Facts:Joaquin A. Dequila was hired on probation by petitioner Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. as a general utilityworker. Upon the expiration of the probationary period of six months, Dequila was informed by hisemployer that his work had proved unsatisfactory and had failed to meet the required standards.To give him a chance to improve his performance and qualify for regular employment, instead of

dispensing with his service then and there, with his written consent Mariwasa extended his probationperiod for another three months. His performance, however, did not improve and on that accountMariwasa terminated his employment at the end of the extended period. Dequila filed a complaint for

illegal dismissal and contending that he becomes a regular employee.

Issue:Whether or not, Article 282 of the Labor Code notwithstanding, probationary employment may validly beextended beyond the prescribed six-month period by agreement of the employer and the employee.

Held:Yes. For aught that appears of record, the extension of Dequila's probation was ex gratia, an act ofliberality on the part of his employer affording him a second chance to make good after having initially

failed to prove his worth as an employee. Such an act cannot now unjustly be turned against saidemployer's account to compel it to keep on its payroll one who could not perform according to its workstandards. The law, surely, was never meant to produce such an inequitable result. By voluntarilyagreeing to an extension of the probationary period, Dequila in effect waived any benefit attaching to thecompletion of said period if he still failed to make the grade during the period of extension. The Courtfinds nothing in the law that by any fair interpretation prohibits such a waiver. And no public policy

protecting the employee and the security of his tenure is served by prescribing voluntary agreements that,by reasonably extending the period of probation, actually improve and further a probationary employee'sprospects of demonstrating his fitness for regular employment.

CALS Poultry vs Roco

CALS Poultry Supply Corporation is engaged in the business of selling dressedchicken and other related products and managed by Danilo Yap.i

On March 15, 1984, CALS hired Alfredo Roco as its driver. On the same date,CALS hired Edna Roco, Alfredos sister, as a helper in the dressing room of CALS. iiOnMay 16, 1995, it hired Candelaria Roco, another sister, as helper, iiialso at its chicken


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dressing plant on a probationary basis.

On March 5, 1996, Alfredo Roco and Candelaria Roco filed a complaint for illegaldismissal against CALS and Danilo Yap alleging that Alfredo and Candelaria wereillegally dismissed on January 20, 1996 and November 5, 1996, respectively. ivBoth alsoclaimed that they were underpaid of their wages. v Edna Roco, likewise, filed a

complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging that on June 26, 1996, she was reassigned tothe task of washing dirty sacks and for this reason, in addition to her being transferredfrom night shift to day time duties, which she considered as management act ofharassment, she did not report for work.vi

According to Alfredo Roco, he was dismissed on January 20, 1996 when he refusedto accept P30,000.00 being offered to him by CALS lawyer, Atty. Myra Cristela A.Yngcong, in exchange for his executing a letter of voluntary resignation. On the part ofCandelaria Roco, she averred that she was terminated without cause from her job ashelper after serving more than six (6) months as probationary employee.

In their position papers, the complainants claimed that they were not given their

overtime pay, premium pay for holidays, premium pay for rest days, 13 th month pay,allowances. They were also not given their separation pay after their dismissal. TheLabor Arbiter, however, denied their claims, stating that they had not substantiated thesame; on the other hand, CALS presented evidence showing that complainantsreceived the correct salaries and related benefits.

Issue: Whether or not the complainants are regular employees

Held:

From the facts established, we are of the view that Alfredo Roco has notestablished convincingly that he was dismissed. No notice of termination was given tohim by CALS. There is no proof at all, except his self-serving assertion, that he wasprevented from working after the end of his leave of absence on January 18, 1996. Infact, CALS notified him in a letter dated March 12, 1996 to resume his work. Both theLabor Arbiter and the NLRC found that Alfredo, as well as Candelaria Roco, was notdismissed. Their findings of fact are entitled to great weight.

In Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC, et al.,viiwe held:

After a careful examination of the events that gave rise to the present controversyas shown by the records, the Court is convinced that private respondent was neverdismissed by the petitioner. Even if it were true that Mariano Lim ordered privaterespondent to go and that at that time he intended to dismiss private respondent, therecord is bereft of evidence to show that he carried out this intention. Privaterespondent was not even notified that he had been dismissed. Nor was he preventedfrom returning to his work after the October 28 incident. The only thing that isestablished from the record, and which is not disputed by the parties, is that privaterespondent Chua did not return to his work after his heated argument with the Limbrothers.


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xxx

In this case, private respondents failure to work was due to the misunderstandingbetween the petitioners management and private respondent. As correctly observedby the Labor Arbiter, private respondent must have construed the October 28 incidentas his dismissal so that he opted not to work for many days thereafter and instead filed

a complaint for illegal dismissal. On the other hand, petitioner interpreted privaterespondents failure to report for work as an intentional abandonment. However, therewas no intent to dismiss private respondent since the petitioner is willing to reinstatehim. Nor was there an intent to abandon on the part of private respondent since heimmediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal soon after the October 28 incident. Itwould be illogical for private respondent to abandon his work and then immediately filean action seeking his reinstatement xxx. Under these circumstances, it is but fair thateach party must bear his own loss, thus placing the parties on equal footing.

xxx.

With respect to Candelaria Roco, there is no dispute that she was employed onprobationary basis. She was hired on May 16, 1995 and her services were terminated

on November 15, 1995 due to poor work performance. She did not measure up to thework standards on the dressing of chicken. The Labor Arbiter sustained CALS interminating her employment. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters ruling.

The Court of Appeals did not disagree with the NLRCs finding that Candelaria wasdismissed because she did not qualify as a regular employee in accordance with thereasonable standards made known by the company to her at the time of heremployment.

We agree with CALS contention as upheld by both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRCthat Candelarias services was terminated within and not beyond the 6 -monthprobationary period. In Cebu Royal v. Deputy Minister of Labor,viii our computation of

the 6-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to thesame calendar date of the 6 thmonth following.

Alcira vs NLRC

Facts:The petitioner, Radin Alcira, was hired by the respondent Middleby Philippines

Corporation as engineering support services supervisor under probationary status for 6 months.

Afterwards, the service of the petitioner was terminated by the respondent on the ground thatthe latter was not satisfied on the performance of the former. As a result, the petitioner filed a

complaint foe illegal dismissal in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against the

respondent.

Petitioner contended that his termination in the service tantamount to illegal dismissal since he

attained the status of a regular employee as of the time of dismissal. He presented the

appointment paper showing that he was hired on May 20, 1996, consequently, his dismissal on


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November 20, 1996 was illegal because at that time, he was already a regular employee since

the 6-month probationary period ended on November 16, 1996.

The respondent, on the other hand, asserted that during the petitioners probationary period, he

showed poor performance on his assigned tasks, was late couple of times and violated thecompanys rule. Thus, the petitioner was terminated and his application to become a regular

employment was disapproved. The respondent also insisted that the removal of the petitioner

from office was within the probationary period.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the dismissal of the petitioner was

done before his regularization because the 6- month probationary period, counting from May 20,

1996 shall end on November 20, 1996. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of NLRC. Hence, the present recourse.

Issue: Whether the petitioner was already a regular employee in respondents company at the

time of his dismissal from the service

Held:The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The status of the petitioner at the time of his

termination was still probationary. His dismissal on November 20, 1996 was within the 6- month

probationary period. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of years,

months, and days and nights, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days, months of 30

days, days of 24 hours and nights are from sunset to sunrise. Since, one month is composed of

30 days, then, 6 months shall be understood to be composed of 180 days. And the computation

of the 6- month period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date

of the 6th month following. Since, the number of days of a particular month is irrelevant,

petitioner was still a probationary employee at the time of his dismissal. Wherefore, the petitionis dismissed.

Mitsubishi Motors vs Chrysler Philippines

FACTS:Private respondent Nelson Paras first worked with Mitsubishi Philippines as a shuttlebus driver on March 19, 1976. He resigned on June 16, 1982 because he went to Saudi Arabia


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and worked there as a diesel mechanic and heavy machine operator from 1982 to 1993. Uponhis return, Mitsubishi Philippines re-hired him as a welder-fabricator at a tooling shop fromNovember 1, 1994 to March 3, 1995.

On May 1996, Paras was re-hired again, this time as a probationary manufacturing trainee at

the Plant Engineering Maintenance Department. He had an orientation on May 15, 1996 andafterwhich, with respect to the companys rules and guidelines, started reporting for work onMay 27, 1996.

Paras was evaluated by his immediate supervisors after six months of working. The supervisorsrating Paras performance were Lito R. Lacambacal and Wilfredo J. Lopez, as part of theMMPCs company policies. Upon this evaluation, Paras garnered an average rating.

Later, respondent Paras was informed by his supervisor, Lacambacal, that he received anaverage performance rating but it is a rate which would still qualify him to be regularized. But aspart of the company protocols, the Division Managers namely A.C. Velando, H.T. Victoria andDante Ong reviewed the performance evaluation made on Paras. Despite the recommendations

of the supervisors, they unanimously agreed that the performance was unsatisfactory. As aconsequence, Paras was not considered for regularization.

Paras received a Notice of Termination on November 26, 1996 which was dated November 25,1996. This letters intent is to formally relieve him off of his services and position effective thedate since he failed to meet the companys standards.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Paras termination was legal or not.

HELD: The Court holds that a company employer may indeed hire an employee on aprobationary basis in order to determine his fitness to perform work. The Court stresses theexistence of the statements under Article 281 of the Labor Code which specifies that the

employer must inform the employee of the standards they were to meet in order to be grantedregularization and that such probationary period shall not exceed six (6) months from the datethe employee started working, unless specified in the apprenticeship agreement.

Respondent Paras was employed on a probationary basis and was apprised of the standardsupon which his regularization would be based during the orientation. His first day to report forwork was on May 27, 1996. As per the company's policy, the probationary period was fromthree (3) months to a maximum of six (6) months. Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, theprobationary period of six (6) months consists of one hundred eighty (180) days. The Courtconforms with paragraph one, Article 13 of the Civil Code providing that the months which arenot designated by their names shall be understood as consisting of thirty (30) days each. Thiscase, the Labor Code pertains to 180 days. Also, as clearly provided for in the last paragraph of

Article 13, it is said that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last dayincluded. Thus, the one hundred eighty (180) days commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended onNovember 23, 1996. The termination letter dated November 25, 1996 was served onrespondent Paras only at 3:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996. The Court held that by that time, hewas actually already a regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281 of the Labor Code.His position as a regularized employee is thus secured until further notice.


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Brent School Inc. vs Zamora

In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora (G.R. No. L-48494, February 5, 1990), the Court, for the

first time, recognized and resolved the anomaly created by a narrow and literal

interpretation of Article 280 of the Labor Code that appears to restrict the employees

right to freely stipulate with his employer on the duration of his engagement. In this

case, the Court upheld the validity of the fixed-term employment agreed upon by the

employer, Brent School, Inc., and the employee, Dorotio Alegre, declaring that the

restrictive clause in Article 280 should be construed to refer to the substantive evil

that the Code itself x x x singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumventsecurity of tenure. It should have no application to instances where [the] fixed period of

employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties x x x absent any

x x x circumstances vitiating [the employees] consent, or where [the facts satisfactorily

show] that the employer and [the] employee dealt with each other on more or less

equal terms[.] The indispensability or desirability of the activity performed by the

employee will not preclude the parties from entering into an otherwise valid fixed term

employment agreement; a definite period of employment does not essentially contradict

the nature of the employees duties as necessary and desirable to the usual business or

trade of the employer.

BRENT SCHOOL vs. ZAMORA

BRENT SCHOOL, INC.DIMACHE vs. RONALDO ZAMORA and DOROTEO R.

ALEGRE

G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990 en banc

FACTS:

Private respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by petitioner

Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific

term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the

agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973,

August 28, 1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions,


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including the expiry date, as those contained in the original contract of July 18, 1971.

On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the

Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16,

1976. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of

the definite period of employment." Although protesting the announced termination

stating that his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his

employer, and his employment lasted for 5 years - therefore he had acquired the status

of regular employee - Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt

therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July

17, 1976 as full payment of contract."

The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance

to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the

recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead

required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position

without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized

"fixed period employment" or employment for a term.

RULING:

Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully

terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he

is declared not entitled to reinstatement.

The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18,

1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been

promulgated. At that time, the validity of term employment was impliedly recognized by

the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787. Prior, thereto, it was

the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which governed employment without a fixed

period, and also implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed

period. The Civil Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and

became effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period. No

prohibition against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any of its articles or

is otherwise deducible therefrom.


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It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School

and Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the

duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court.

The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts

under the Labor Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code

contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or

definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term

employment began to take place at about this time.

Article 320 originally stated that the "termination of employment of probationary

employees and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such

regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe." Article 321 prescribed the just

causes for which an employer could terminate "an employment without a definite

period." And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed period" in the

following manner: where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which

are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer,

except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the

completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement

of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and

the employment is for the duration of the season.

Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with "a definite period" and

"regular" employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effectiveDecember 16, 1975.

Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment," was altered by

eliminating the reference to persons "employed with a fixed period," and was

renumbered (becoming Article 271).

As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal

interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the

lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without

reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the

duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be

eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude

absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and

subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's

using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like

cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping


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off the head.

Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed

period of employment as still good rulea rule reaffirmed in the recent case of

Escudero vs. Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly

analogous case of a teacher being served by her school a notice of termination

following the expiration of the last of three successive fixed-term employment contracts,

the Court held:

Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her

employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period. At

the expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed

terminated and the letter informing her of the non-renewal of her contract is not a

condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the employ of

petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of employment was

due to expire and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of

termination.

Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the

expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity

of any notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to

said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a

letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the

approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective. In

any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.

Cielo vs NLRC

Facts:

The petitioner is a truck driver who claims he was illegally dismissed by theprivate respondent, the Henry Lei Trucking Company. The Labor Arbiter foundfor him and ordered his reinstatement with back wages. 1On appeal, the decision wasreversed by the National Labor Relations Commission, which held that the petitioner's employment had

expired under a valid contract. 2The petitioner then came to us on certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules ofCourt.

Under these arrangements, the private respondent hoped to be able to terminatethe services of the drivers without the inhibitions of the Labor Code. All it had todo was refuse to renew the agreements, which, significantly, were uniformlylimited to a six-month period. No cause had to be established because suchrenewal was subject to the discretion of the parties. In fact, the private


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respondent did not even have to wait for the expiration of the contract as it wasthere provided that it could be "earlier terminated at the option of either party."

By this clever scheme, the private respondent could also prevent the drivers from

becoming regular employees and thus be entitled to security of tenure and otherbenefits, such as a minimum wage, cost-of-living allowances, vacation and sickleaves, holiday pay, and other statutory requirements. The private respondentargues that there was nothing wrong with the affidavit because all the affiantacknowledged therein was full payment of the amount due him under theagreement. Viewed in this light, such acknowledgment was indeed not necessaryat all because this was already embodied in the vouchers signed by the payee-driver. But the affidavit, for all its seeming innocuousness, imported more thanthat. What was insidious about the document was the waiver the affiant wasunwarily making of the statutory rights due him as an employee of the trucking

company.

And employee he was despite the innocent protestations of the privaterespondent. We accept the factual finding of the Labor Arbiter that the petitionerwas a regular employee of the private respondent. The private respondent isengaged in the trucking business as a hauler of cattle, crops and other cargo forthe Philippine Packing Corporation. This business requires the services ofdrivers, and continuously because the work is not seasonal, nor is it limited to asingle undertaking or operation. Even if ostensibly hired for a fixed period, thepetitioner should be considered a regular employee of the private respondent,conformably to Article 280 of the Labor Code providing as follows:

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisionsof written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding andregardless of the oral agreement of the parties, anemployment shall be deemed to be regular where theemployee has been engaged to perform activities which areusually necessarily or desirable in the usual business or tradeof the employer, except where the employment has been fixedfor a specific project or undertaking the completion ortermination of which has been determined at the time of the

engagement of the employee or where the work or services tobe performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is forthe duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is notcovered by the preceding paragraph; Provided, that, anyemployee who has rendered at least one year of service,


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whether such service is continuous or broken, shall beconsidered a regular employee with respect to the activity inwhich he is employed and his employment shall continuewhile such actually exists. (Emphasis supplied)

In Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora,the Court affirmed the general principle that"where from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed topreclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struckdown or disregarded as contrary to public policy, morals, etc." Suchcircumstances have been sufficiently established in the case at bar and justifyapplication of the following conclusions:

Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind thedevelopment of legislation culminating in the present Article

280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, asalready observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee'sright to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said articleindiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oralagreements conflicting with the concept of regularemployment as defined therein should be construed to refer tothe substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out:agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security oftenure.

The agreement in question had such a purpose and so was null and void abinitio.

The private respondent's argument that the petitioner could at least beconsidered on probation basis only and therefore separable at will is self-defeating. The Labor Code clearly provides as follows:

Art. 281. Probationary employment. Probationaryemployment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date theemployee started working, unless it is covered by anapprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The

services of an employee who has been engaged on aprobationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or whenhe fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance withreasonable standards made known by the employer to theemployee at the time of his engagement. An employee who isallowed to work after a probationary period shall beconsidered a regular employee.


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There is no question that the petitioner was not engaged as an apprentice, beingalready an experienced truck driver when he began working for the privaterespondent. Neither has it been shown that he was informed at the time of hisemployment of the reasonable standards under which he could qualify as a

regular employee. It is plain that the petitioner was hired at the outset as aregular employee. At any rate, even assuming that the original employment wasprobationary, the Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner had completed more thansix month's service with the trucking company and so had acquired the status ofa regular employee at the time of his dismissal.

Even if it be assumed that the six-month period had not yet been completed, it issettled that the probationary employee cannot be removed except also for causeas provided by law. It is not alleged that the petitioner was separated for poorperformance; in fact, it is suggested by the private respondent that he was

dismissed for disrespect and insubordination, more specifically his refusal to signthe affidavit as required by company policy. Hence, even as a probationer, ormore so as a regular employee, the petitioner could not be validly removed under

Article 282 of the Labor Code, providing as follows:

Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer mayterminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by theemployee of the lawful orders of his employer orrepresentative in connection with his work

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trustreposed in him by his employer or duly authorizedrepresentative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee againstthe person of his employer or any immediate member of hisfamily or his duly authorized representative; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

In refusing to sign the affidavit as required by the private respondent, thepetitioner was merely protecting his interests against an unguarded waiver of thebenefits due him under the Labor Code. Such willful disobedience should


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commend rather than prejudice him for standing up to his rights, at great risk tohis material security, against the very source of his livelihood.

The Court looks with stern disapproval at the contract entered into by the private

respondent with the petitioner (and who knows with how many other drivers). Theagreement was a clear attempt to exploit the unwitting employee and deprive himof the protection of the Labor Code by making it appear that the stipulations ofthe parties were governed by the Civil Code as in ordinary private transactions.They were not, to be sure. The agreement was in reality a contract ofemployment into which were read the provisions of the Labor Code and thesocial justice policy mandated by the Constitution. It was a deceitful agreementcloaked in the habiliments of legality to conceal the selfish desire of the employerto reap undeserved profits at the expense of its employees. The fact that thedrivers are on the whole practically unlettered only makes the imposition more

censurable and the avarice more execrable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the National LaborRelations Commission is SET ASIDE and that of the Labor ArbiterREINSTATED, with costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

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Case Digest in Labor Law