G.R. No. 120420 April 21, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS

VITUG,J.:FACTS: Complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her own father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down on a wooden bed inside their house armed with a knife and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her. Hence, complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, filed a complaint against the accused of the crime of Rape before the RTC ofParaaque. Accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty. The accused denied the allegation hence he even performed the dual role of a father and a mother to his children since the time of hisseparation from his wife and he thinks that the complainant might have been motivated by ill-will orrevenge in view of the numerous scoldings that she has received from him on account of her frequent coming home late at night. The trial court convicted the accused guilty of the offense charged andsentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.I SSUE: WON the accused was denied his constitutional right to effective and vigilant counsel. RULING:YES, SC remanded the case to the trial court. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders himadministratively liable.In the instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, thefundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as counselde oficioto the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however guilty he might have been found to beafter trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closelyand faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional Responsibility, otherwise, commission ofany similar act in the future will be severely sanctioned. The Second Assistant Prosecutor issued acertification to the effect that the accused had waived his right to a preliminary investigation. On the dayof his arraignment, the accused was brought before the trial court without counsel. The court thereuponassigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office to be the counselde officio.Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.The prosecution placed complainantManuela Bermas at the witness stand. The counsel de oficio testified on direct examination with hardlyany participation by defense counsel who, inexplicably, later waived the cross-examination and thenasked the court to be relieved of her duty as counselde officio. Furthermore, Atty. Roberto Gomez wasappointed the new counselde officio and asked for a ten minute recessbefore he began his crossexaminationwhich is far too inadequate On the day the defense will present their evidence anotherlawyer Atty.Lonzame was appointed as counsel de oficio. Therefore,the accused has not properly andeffectively been accorded the right to counsel. So important is the right to counsel that it has beenenshrined in our fundamental law and its precursor laws.

A.C. No. 6155 March 14, 2006MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUINvs.ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGALTINGA,J.:FACTS:SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin were involved ina shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of another. As aresult, Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murdereventually they were convicted. Complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused.Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied still therespondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with theattached Second Motion for Reconsideration and filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari.Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone callsthey made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went torespondents last known address only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address.More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the statusof the petition and they were shocked that their petition was denied due to late filing and non-payment ofdocket fees and said resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest had already been issued againstthem.Complainants filed before the SC an affidavit-complaint against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal(respondent) for violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross misconduct, and gross negligence for allegedmishandling of the petition which eventually led to its denial with finality. Respondent contends that hewas not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of theSandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of attemptedhomicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and bepresent at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision and the petition was filed within thereglementary period. Respondent sent a letter the PO3 Joaquin for his formal withdrawal as counsel butthe latter did not reply. Upon the investigation of the IBP, it ruled respondent guilty of violation of theCode of Professional Responsibility and recommended the imposition of penalty ranging from reprimandto suspension of six (6) months.ISSUE: Whether respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23,which eventually led to thead cautelampetitions dismissal with finality. RULING:YES, SC ordered for the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for three (3)months. The SC agreed to the IBP that the dismissal of thead cautelampetition was primarily due to thegross negligence of respondent Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelityto such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve theclient with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care,and devotion. In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has ahigher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accused whichstands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and liberty. Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, thefiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a veryhigh degree of fidelity and good faith that is required by reason of necessity and public interest.In this case, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice toWithdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave theminstructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should havebeen respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation.He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case. The rule in thisjurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime withor without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficientcause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that anattorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not atliberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its finaladjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from a good causeFurthermore, after agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both causeand client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not abusiness; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

Ramos vs. Dajoyag - A.C. No. 5174FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Ernesto M. Ramos against Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag Jr. fornegligence in failing to appeal a ruling of the NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal by the Labor Arbiterof a complaint for legal dismissal.It appears that Ramos was terminated from work for failure of his lawyer, Atty. Dajoyag, to file on timethe petition for certiorari, when the Supreme Court dismissed it with finality.From the records, it can be gleaned that Atty. Dajoyag moved for an extension to file which was grantedbut the Resolution granting the 1st extension contained a warning that no further extension would begiven. Atty. Dajoyag, on the other hand, explained that he was not aware of this because when he filed hismotion for last extension for only 20 days, he had not yet received the copy of said resolution. He furtherexplained that he relied on good faith that his Motion for 1st Extension of 30 days would be grantedwithout the warning as this was only a first extension; and also that he requested for a second and lastextension of 20 days for which he complied with the filing of the Petition for Certiorari on the last day ofthe supposed extended period.ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ramos is guilty of negligence.RULING: Yes. Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not, afterobtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse withoutsubmitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so ". Motions for extension are notgranted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presumethat their motions for extension or postponement will be granted or that they will be granted the length oftime they pray for. Due diligence requires that they should conduct a timely inquiry with the divisionclerks of court of the action on their motions and, the lack of notice thereof will not make them any lessaccountable for their omission. REGALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [1996]ySpecial Civil Action in the SC. CertiorariyRP instituted a Complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB), through the Presidential Commissionon Good Govt (PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants,for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corps.in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."yAmong the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein private respondentRaul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regalaand Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients andin the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its clientdocuments which substantiate the client's equity holdings.yIn the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire informationrelative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As membersof the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assistedin the organization and acquisition of the companies included in CC No. 0033, and in keepingwith the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporationsinvolved in sequestration proceedings.yPCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended Complaint" w/cexcluded Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant, Roco havingpromised hell reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder inthe companies involved in PCGG Case # 33yPetitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for having plotted, devised, schemed,conspired & confederated w/each other in setting up, through the use of coconut levy funds, thefinancial & corporate framework & structures that led to establishment of UCPB, UNICOM,COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, & more than 20 other coconut levy funded corps, including theacquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares & its institutionalization through presidential directives ofthe coconut monopoly. Through insidious means & machinations, ACCRA Investments Corp.,became the holder of roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB.yIn their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged that their participationin the acts w/ w/c their co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.yPetitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answerdenying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.yPetitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion that PCGG excludethem as parties-defendants like Roco.yPCGG set the ff. precedent for the exclusion of petitioners:(a)the disclosure of the identity of its clients;(b)submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and(c)the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clientscovering their respective shareholdings.yConsequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco of the sameconditions precedent. However, during said proceedings, Roco didnt refute petitioners'contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33,

nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.yIn a Resolution, SB denied the exclusion of petitioners, for their refusal to comply w/ theconditions required by PCGG. It held, ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from theconsequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing theprivilege; the existence and identity of the client.yACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied. Hence, ACCRA lawyers filed the petition forcertiorari. Petitioner Hayudini, likewise, filed his own MFR w/c was also denied thus, he filed aseparate petition for certiorari, assailing SBs resolution on essentially same grounds averred bypetitioners, namely:oSB gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners to the strict application of thelaw of agency.oSB gravely abused its discretion in not considering petitioners & Roco similarly situated&, thus, deserving equal treatmentoSB gravely abused its discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, theattorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners from revealing the identity of their client(s)and the other information requested by the PCGG.oSB gravely abused its discretion in not requiring that dropping of party-defendants bebased on reasonable & just grounds, w/ due consideration to constitutional rights ofpetitionersyPCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of theidentity of the client is not w/in the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor arethe documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nomineestatus.WON attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners from revealing the identity of their client(s) & theother information requested by the PCGGyYES. Nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatioconductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and anotherhires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, whereinlawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract ofagency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, butgives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. But the lawyer-clientrelationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.yAn attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trustand confidence reposed on him by his client. An attorney occupies a "quasi-judicial office" sincehe is in fact an officer of the Court & exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action tobe taken favorable to his client.yThus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties thatbreathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate,exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that isrequired by reason of necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence fromseeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. yAttorney-client privilege, is worded in Rules of Court, Rule 130:Sec. 24. Disqualification byreason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned inconfidence in the following cases:xxx An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, beexamined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in thecourse of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer,or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact theknowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.yFurther, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) tomaintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of hisclient, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him orwith his knowledge and approval.yThis duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17, CPR (A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of hisclient and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.) Canon 15, CPR alsodemands a lawyer's fidelity to client.yAn effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence whichexists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamicand fruitful exchange and flow of information.yThus, the Court held that this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners'client(s) in the case at bar.yThe general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name oridentity of his client.yReasons advanced for the general rule:oCourt has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to beprotected is flesh and blood.oPrivilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established.oPrivilege generally pertains to subject matter of relationshipoDue process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule,know his adversary.yExceptions to the gen. rule:oClient identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client'sname would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer'sadvice.Ex-Parte Enzor and U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig: The subject matter of therelationship was so closely related to the issue of the client's identity that theprivilege actually attached to both.oWhere disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp.: couldnt reveal name of his client as this wouldexpose the latter to civil litigation.Matter of Shawmut Mining Company: We feel sure that under such conditionsno case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of ahostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactionsto w/c it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit againsthis client.A

oWhere the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, byrevealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form thechain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name isprivileged.Baird vs. Korner: a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clientswho employed him to pay sums of money to govt voluntarily in settlementof undetermined income taxes, unsued on, & w/ no govt audit orinvestigation into that client's income tax liability pendingyApart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify asexceptions to the general rule:oif the content of any client communication to a lawyer is relevant to the subject matter ofthe legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistanceowhere the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed & it isthe identity w/c is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held tobe privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entiretransaction.ySummarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within theambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such thatdisclosure would then reveal client confidences.yInstant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the general rule.yFirst, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection withthe very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as statedearlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship).yThe link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought wasduly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself as can be seen in the 3 specificconditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution shouldthey accede thereto.yFrom these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeedconsulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporatestructure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave theirprofessional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignmentcovering their client's shareholdings.yPetitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the veryactivity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealthin the aforementioned corporations.ySecondly, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously providethe necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.yWhile the privilege may not be invoked for illegal purposes such as in a case where a client takeson the services of an attorney, for illicit purposes, it may be invoked in a case where a clientthinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney. Whetheror not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used ordisclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which mightlead to possible action against him. yThe Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behindthe privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors byclients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. What is soughtto be avoided then is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishingexpedition by the prosecution.yIn fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if theprosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidencepainstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimonyrequiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals muchabout the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal.yThe utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilegeand lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not onlyduring the relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship.yWe have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients underpain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, as the facts of the instant case clearlyfall w/in recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information.Otherwise, it would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in viewof the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in exercise of their duties.

HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., in behalf of PENTA RESORTS CORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact ofLUMOT A. JALANDONI, Complainant,vs.ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA, Respondent.Facts: In this case, respondent ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA is a practicing lawyer and a memberof the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Lumot A. Jalandoni who is the Chairman/President of PentaResorts Corporation (PRC) and owns the biggest shares of stocks in the corporation, was sued whichinvolved the possession of land where Alhambra hotel, the only property owned by PRC, is situated. ThisisCivil Case No. 97-9865.The latter engaged the legal services of herein respondent. Respondent as a consequence of saidAttorney-Client relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings of said case.Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate and confidential mattersinvolving all the personal circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent.Later on, respondent, without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion towithdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing. A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdrawas Counsel will conclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A. Jalandoni, neitherdoes it bear her conformityThe grounds alleged by respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that heis a retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena. This is an estafa case filed by the representatives of PRCitself against spouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena It is worthy to note that from the outset, respondentalready knew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to her eldestdaughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena.Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of attorney-clientconfidentiality and deliberate withholding of records were committed by respondent. To effectivelyunravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into the cases involved.Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of attorney-clientconfidentiality was committed by respondent.Issues: 1. Whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and handled byrespondent, and2. Whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record of Jalandoni.Held: Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need forcandor,fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly provides:Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concernedgiven after a full disclosure of the facts.It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appearagainst his client; otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible. Conflict of interest may be determined in this manner:There is representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require theattorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he representshim and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client anyknowledge acquired through their connection.The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications have beenconfided but alsothose in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent anattorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invitesuspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will becalled upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquire in the previousemployment. The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clientseither in the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which theadverse party against whom the attorney appears is his former client in a matter which is related, directlyor indirectly, to the present controversy.The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former clientin any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally unrelated cases. The caseshere directly or indirectly involved the parties connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A.Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the cases mentioned.An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and receiving the confidences ofthe client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both for his client and forone whose interest is adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same general matter Theprohibition stands even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that the intention andmotive of the attorney may have been honest.The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of all partiesconcerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which subjects thelawyer to disciplinary action.Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the family memberswasimproper because the written consent of all concerned was still required. A lawyer who acts as such insettling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.The next bone of contention was the propriety of respondents withdrawal as counsel for Lumot A.Jalandoni. In his comment, respondent stated that it was he who was not notified of the hiring of Atty.Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he withdrew from the case with the knowledge ofLumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court.The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as follows:The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or by the court, or byreason of circumstances beyond the control of the client or the lawyer. The termination of the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on the part of the client and his lawyer.Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other thanfor sufficient cause is considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads:Canon 22 A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in thecircumstances.An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of thecourt after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the newlawyer is recorded in the case. A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consentof his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy of his petition upon hisclient and the adverse party at least three days before the date set for hearing, otherwise the court maytreat the application as a "mere scrap of paper."Respondent made no such move. He admitted that hewithdrew as counsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of theappearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in his place.A client may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and thereafter employ anotherlawyer who may then enter his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is free to change hiscounsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him. That manner of changinga lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require approval of thecourt.The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act as additionalcounsel. Mrs. Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer did not necessarily mean conformityto respondents desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondents speculations on the professional relationshipof Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records of this case.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby found GUILTYof violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this decision, with a STERNWARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. NICANOR GONZALES and SALUD PANTANOSAS vs. ATTY. MIGUEL SABAJACANISSUE:Whether or not it is justifiable for Atty. Sabajacan in holding the certificates oftitle and its refusal to deliver the said titles to the complainant despite a formalletter demand.FACTS:Sometime in October 1994 complainants were informed by the Register ofDeeds of Cagayan de Oro City that the complainants owners duplicate of titlecovering their lands were entrusted to the office secretary of the respondentwho in torn entrusted the same to respondent but when demanded to deliverthe said titles to the complainant in formal demand letter refused and continuesto refuse without any justification to give their titles and that in spite of repeateddemands, requests and pleas towards respondent, respondent still fail andstubbornly refused without justification to surrender the said titles to the rightfulowners, the complainants.The Court required commenting on the foregoing complaint; the respondentadmitted having met Salud Panatanosas but claims that, to his recollection,Nicanor Gonzales has never been to his office. He further denies complainantsallegation that he is arrogant, in contrast to the innocence, simplicity andignorance of said complainants. The Court finds that respondent admittedhaving taken possession of the certificate of titles and that all he did was toinform the Court that his obligation to deliver the certificates to Mr. Samto Uyexcludes the delivery of said certificates to anyone else. Respondent attachedsome certificates of title to his answer to support his contention thatcomplainants are notorious characters. However, the certifications indicate thatmost of the cases stated therein, especially those involving fraud, have beendismissed. Respondent likewise submitted Xerox copies of certain certificates oftitle in an effort to explain why he kept the certificates of title of complainantsthat is supposedly for the purpose of subdividing the property. Unfortunately, anexamination of the same does not show any connection thereof to respondentsclaim. In fact, two sets of certificates of title appear to be entirely different fromeach other.HELD:As a lawyer, respondent should know that there are lawful remedies providedby law to protect the interests of his client. The records do not show that he orhis client has availed of said remedies. Also, he cannot be unaware of theimposable sanction on a counsel who resorts to unlawful means that wouldcause injustice to the adversaries of his client.The Court accordingly finds that the respondent has not exercises the good faithand diligence required of lawyers in handling the legal affairs of their clients.Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule 15.07 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall impress upon hisclient the need for compliance with the laws and principles of fairness. Instead,he unjustly refused to give to complainants their certificates of titles supposedlyto enforce payment of their alleged financial obligations to his client presumablyto impress the latter of his power to do so.Canon 19, Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honestmeans to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,participate in presenting, or threaten to present unfounded charges to obtain animproper advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent has closely skirtedthis proscription, if he has not in fact transgressed the same.The Court desires and directs that respondent should forthwith return thecertificates of title of complainants. To ensure the same, he should be placedunder suspension until he presents to the Court that the disputed certificates oftitle have been returned to and receipt thereof duly acknowledged bycomplainants, or can present a judicial order or appropriate legal authorityjustifying the possession by him or his client of said certificates. He is furtherWARNED that a repetition of the same or similar or any other administrativemisconduct will be punished more severely. IN RE: Paas AM No. 01-12-02-SCISSUE:Whether or not allegations of Judge Paas and Almarvez to each other is meritorious.FACTS:Judge Paas administratively charges Court/Aide Utility Worker Edgar E. Almarvez thathe is discourteous to his co-employees, lawyers and party litigants; has failed to maintain thecleanliness in and around the court premises despite order to do so, habitually absent fromwork or made it appear that he reported for work by signing the log book in the morning, onlyto stay out of office the whole day; asked from detention prisoners P100-P200 before hereleased to them their Release Orders and divulged confidential information to litigants inadvance of its authorized release date for a monetary consideration, thus giving undueadvantage or favour to the paying party. There were attestations of the members of the courtwith regard to this alleged complaint same attestation with the Jail Escort Officer that hewitnessed Almarvez receive from detention prisoners P100-P200 in consideration of the releaseof their Release Orders.Almarvez filed an answer denying Judge Paas charges and alleged that the real reasonwhy the latter filed the case against him was because she suspected him of helping herhusband; Atty. Renerio G. Paas conceal his marital indiscretions; since she failed to elicit anyinformation from him, she resorted to calling him names and other forms of harassment andinsisted him to sign prepared resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to keep. Hefurther denied ever requesting for money in exchange for the release of court orders andclaimed that Judge Paas ordered him to undergo a drug test per Memorandum even if he hadno history of drug abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown by the test results of hisexamination.The administrative cases were consolidated and referred for evaluation to the OCA wherein a separate case for inhibition Judge Paas husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was usinghis wifes office as his office address in his law practice wherein they vehemently denied thecharge that the latter was using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his address, theyclaiming that Atty. Paas actually holds office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila. OnJanuary of 2002 Judge Paas admitted that her husband did use her office as his return addressfor notices and orders in a Criminal case but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of thosenotices, but after the cases were terminated, all notices were sent to his office address inEscolta.OCA laid its findings and recommendations that Almarvez be dismissed of its sharges ofexacting money and be duly penalized for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties.On charges against Judge Paas, for lack of supporting evidence recommended the dismissal ofthe charges of maltreatment, harassment and verbal abuse but instead be found guilty ofsimple misconduct in office and be penalized with reprimand and warning.HELD:A.On charges against AlmarvezThe Court finds no sufficient evidence to support the charge of violation ofconfidentiality of official communication against Almarvez while the charges ofneglect of duty is too general to support a conviction and are contrary are towhat is reflected in his performance rating that he cooperated willingly. Theirclaims remains hearsay. On the charge of inefficiency concurs with the findingsand recommendations of OCA. The fact that respondent Almarvez neverdisputed the performance ratings given him is tantamount to an impliedacceptance.B.On charges against Judge PaasRegarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against Judge Paas, Almarvez failedto substantiate the same. Judge Paas order to undergo drug test is not an unlawful order.However Judge Paas indeed allowed his husband to ride on her prestige for purpose ofadvancing his private interest, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. On his part, Atty.Paas was guilty of using fraudulent, misleading and deceptive address that had no purporseother than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his client, that hehas close ties to a member of the judiciary. Therefore, violating Canons 3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10,Rule 10.01, Canon 13, Canon 15, Rule 15.06 which states that A lawyer shall not state or implythat he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.Wherefore, Almarvez is pronounced GUILTY of inefficiency and is hereby suspende for 1month and Judge Paas GUILTY of conduct of unbecoming of a member of the judiciary andhereby REPRIMANDED, with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealtwith severely, she is further ordered to pay a FINe and that his husband Atty. Renerio PaasGUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and hereby SUSPENDED from practice of law for a period ofthree months with warning. RIZALINO FERNANDEZ v. ATTY. REYNALDO NOVERO, JR.Mendoza, J:Facts:Rizalino Fernandez and others filed a disbarment case against Atty. Reynaldo Novero, Jr. for alleged patentand gross neglect in the handling of their civil case against the Bacolod City Water District.The complainant imputed that the respondent did not attend the scheduled hearing nor seek apostponement, for which reason the trial court considered respondent to have waived further presentation of hisevidence and directed him to formally offer his exhibits. However, respondent failed to formally offer his exhibits,prompting the trial court to order the dismissal of the case. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of theorder of dismissal however he did not file his motion within the reglementary period. He even tried to shift the blameon complainant by claiming that the latter insisted on presenting his sister from Manila as their last witness. The truthwas that complainants sister had already testified.The respondent submitted his Answer and averred that the complaint filed against him was baseless, purelymalicious and speculative considering the fact that it was not made under oath. He contended that complainantengaged his legal services after the first counsel had withdrawn and he had no knowledge of what had happened inthe case before he handled it because complainant did not furnish him with the records and stenographic notes of theprevious proceedings despite his repeated requests. He alleged that he failed to formally offer the exhibits becausecomplainant tried to take over the handling of the case by insisting on presenting more witnesses who failed toappear during trial.The Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a report finding respondent guilty of violation of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility and recommending his suspension.The Integrated Bar of the Philippines also submitted a report and recommendation for the suspension ofrespondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.Issue:Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross neglect in the handling of the civil case?Held:The Supreme Court held that a counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, evenmalfeasance or nonfeasance would be binding on his client. A lawyer owes to the client the exercise of utmostprudence and capability in that representation.The respondents attempt to evade responsibility by shifting the blame on complainant due to the lattersfailure to turn over to him records and stenographic notes of the case only highlights his incompetence andinadequacy in handling the complainants case.The respondent Atty. Novero is found guilty of neglect of his clients case and is Suspended from thepractice of law for one (1) month with Warning that repetition of the same negligent act will be dealt with even moreseverely. EDGAR O. PEREA vs. ATTY. RUBEN ALMADROAustria-Martinez, J:Facts:Edgar Perea filed a complaint for disbarment against his lawyer Atty. Ruben Aladro for gross neglect of hisduties as a lawyer. The respondent was his counsel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where he is beingcharged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide. The RTC issued an order granting Atty. Almadros motion for leave tofile demurrer to evidence within ten days from February 26, 1996. Perea thought that his counsel filed the saiddemurrer and the case against him was dismissed. However, he learned sometime in 1999 that his counsel failed tofile any demurrer, thus there was a warrant issued for his arrest and he is not allowed to post bail. The respondenthas not attended any of his hearings and such neglect of his responsibilities would result to the loss of freedom andlivelihood of his client.Atty. Almadro submitted an Answer to the complaint through the law firm Sua and Alambra, whichcontended that: two days after the RTC granted the manifestation of defense to file motion for leave to file demurrerto evidence, he had finished the draft of the motion and the accompanying pleading which he stored in a magneticcomputer diskette intended for editing prior to its submission in court; a few days before the deadline, he tried toretrieve the draft from the diskette but said drafts were nowhere to be found despite efforts to retrieve them; this ledhim to believe that the drafts must have been finalized and the edited versions accordingly filed. He becamepreoccupied with the congressional elections in Biliran where he ran and subsequently lost, then he was offered aposition in the Philippine Stock Exchange as head of the Compliance and Surveillance Division which he accepted;his time and attention was spent in the performance of his demanding job which led to the neglect of his duties ascounsel.The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.The IBP, through Commissioner Renato Cunanan submitted its report and recommendation. They are convinced thatAtty. Almadros actuations reveal not only serious neglect or indifference to his duties as a lawyer but more gravelyhis open disrespect for the court and the authority it represents. The IBP strongly recommend that respondent besuspended from the practice of law for two years and that he be fined ten thousand pesos (PhP10,000.00). They alsorecommend that Atty. Sua and Alambra be ordered to explain why they should not be held in contempt fordeliberately foisting a deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation.Issue:Whether or not the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the suspension of Atty.Alambra for gross neglect of his duties as a lawyer is meritorious?Held:The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, finding the respondent Atty. Alambra guilty of serious neglect ofhis duties as a lawyer and of open disrespect for the court and the authority it represents, as embodied in Canon 18,Rules 18.03 and 18.04 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is Suspended fromthe practice of law for one (1) year and Fined in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, with a Warningthat any or similar acts of dishonesty would be dealt with more severely.

LEGAL ETHICS CASES(Case Digest)---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#1 :Cayetano vs. Monsod201 SCRA 210September 1991Facts:Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position ofchairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possesrequired qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitutionprovides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and sixCommissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, atleast thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any electiveposition in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall bemembers of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.Issue:Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice oflaw for at least ten years.Held:In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to theconduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident toactions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients beforejudges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them inmatters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplatingan appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim inbankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estateand guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court,which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practiceof law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, alawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator ofboth rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELECchairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of theforegoing, the petition is DISMISSED.*** The Supreme Court held that the appointment of Monsod is in accordance with the requirement oflaw as having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Monsods past work experiences as alawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer negotiator of contracts and alawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that hehas been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Again, in the case of Philippine LawyersAssociation vs. Agrava, the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases and litigation in court; itembraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings and othersimilar work which involves the determination by a legal mind the legal effects of facts and conditions.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#2: PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS. CELEDONIO AGRAVA,in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent OfficeFACTS:A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against CeledonioAgrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondentDirector issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination forthe purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before thePhilippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinationsand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in goodstanding, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondentDirectors holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violationof the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purelythe practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as amatter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examinationcan practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holdingtests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.ISSUE:Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and theprosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.HELD:The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before thePatent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and theprosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of theirrights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation andapplication of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established inaccordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct ofcases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any workinvolving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore,the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of thedirector. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostlytechnical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to acourt or judicial body, but rather to a board ofscientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#3: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-19450Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.Paredes,J.:On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime ofMalicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented bycounselde officiobut later on replaced by counselde parte. The complainant in the same case was representedby City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, aftersecuring the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that everytime he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that hewould not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor wasquestioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case ofAquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., L-1532, Nov.28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant ProvincialFiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice."Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is aviolation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of theappearance of City Attorney Fule.Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting asPrivate Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules ofCourt, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under thislimitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he(Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presidedby the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions ofwhich read:The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civilliability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had,therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest inthe civil liability of the accused.Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conducthis litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid ofan attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of theoffended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in aprofessional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever inthe prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution ofcriminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the CityAttornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule asAssistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, asalready pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or afriend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justiceof the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of theoffended party.WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing theapprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which weconsider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employeeof the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member ofthe bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as privateprosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of CityAttorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice ismore than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of thesame kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habituallyholding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan,4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative ofengagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for acompensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediatesuperior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in allrespects, with costs against appellant hqXv.*** The Supreme Court held that the isolate appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute privatepractice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, forit consists of frequents or customary actions, a succession of facts of the same kind or frequent habitualexercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily orhabitually holding ones self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services. Themere appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the privatepractice of law. It is alsoworth noted that, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediatesuperior to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#4: JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, ROMULO CUIG.R. NO. L-18727AUGUST 31, 1964FACTS:Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and DoaBenigna Cui, nowdeceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigentinvalids, and incapacitated and helplesspersons." It acquired corporate existence bylegislation and endowed with extensive properties by the saidspouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation.-Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gavethe initial management to the founders jointly and, incase of their incapacity or death, to "suchpersons as they may nominate or designate, inthe order prescribed to them."-Don Pedro Cui died in 1926,and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon theadministration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem who both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son ofMauricio Cui, became theadministrator.-Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui arebrothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and DoaBenigna Cui.On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned infavor ofAntonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them andembodied in a notarial document. Thenext day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took hisoath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice ofeither the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.-Dr. Teodoro Cui died on August 27,1960; on Sept 5, 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter tothe defendant demanding that the office be turnedover to him; and the demand nothaving been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. RomuloCui lateron intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui,another one of thenephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.-As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications totheposition of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equalcircumstances would bepreferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,before the test of age may be, applied thedeed gives preference to the one, among thelegitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "queposea titulo de abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague alestadomayor impuesto o contribucion."-The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo deabogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class1926)but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify himas one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and althoughdisbarred by this Court, he was reinstated by resolutionpromulgated on 10 February1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of theHospiciode Barili.-Courta quo- decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado,"taken alone, means that of afull-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donationand considering the function or purpose of theadministrator, it should not be given astrict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degreeor diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by theintervenor.ISSUE:WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. (YES)RATIO: Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not merepossession of theacademic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after dueadmission thereto, qualifying one forthe practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone,conferredby a law school upon completion of certain academicrequirements, does not entitle itsholderto exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" islawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that classof personswho are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, anduponwhom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree ofBachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examination and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelorof Laws from some law school or university. The founders ofthe Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing testadvisely, and provided in the deed ofdonation that if not a lawyer, the administrator shouldbea doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in thatorder; or failing all these, should be theonewho pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "makeregulations for thegovernment of said institution; shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalidsandincapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to it thattherules andconditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of theAct; and shall administerproperties of considerable value for all of which work, it is to bepresumed, a working knowledge of the lawand a license to practice the profession would beadistinct asset.Under this particular criterion we hold that theplaintiff is not entitled, as against thedefendant, to the office of administrator.As far as moral character isconcerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatementtothe office of attorney cannot be less exactingthan that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in thiscase. When the defendant wasrestored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from hispreviousdisbarment were wiped out.For the claim of intervener and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also alawyer, grandsonof Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them inthedeed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,who is a son ofMariano Cui, another one of the said nephews.Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma.Cui is older than he andtherefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenorcontends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successivelytothedescendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, heargues, since the lastadministrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cuiline, the next administrator must comefrom the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenorbelongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by theterms of the deed of donation.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#5:IN THE MATTER OF PREOCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINSTATTY. VINCENTE RAUL ALMACEN G.R.No. L-27654 February 18, 1970FACTS:Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed onSeptember 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his clientby this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who arecalloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commitculpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved bythis Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In thesame breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "thatjustice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know ofthe silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that werecommitted must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney andcounsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faithand confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.ISSUE:Whether Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his Lawyers Certificate of Title.RULING:ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he ishereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#6: IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMAN January 21, 1974FACTS:Vicente Floro filed his Answer to the above-mentioned Petition for relief and he alleged that the decisionof the City Court was based on an admission made in open court by petitioner Lagrimas Lapatha on the basis ofwhich the words "Confession of judgment" were written on the "expediente" of the case and underneath wereaffixed the signature of said petitioner and that of Atty. Felizardo deGuzman; that the alleged payments of Lagrimas Lapatha were made after the rendition of the decision toforestall immediate execution of the judgment; that when petitioner filed with the City Court a motion forreconsideration of the decision alleging fraud, the true circumstances attending the hearing of November 2,1967, were brought out to the satisfaction of petitioner's counsel, for which reason the City Court denied themotion for reconsideration; that during the hearing on petitioner's motion for reconsideration Atty. de Guzmanagreed not to press for the execution of the judgment on the assurance of petitioner that she would vacate thepremises by January 15, 1968, however, petitioner did not comply with her promise and instead filed thePetition for Relief.ISSUE:Whether the petition for relief against the respondent who committed any deceit or misconduct in CivilCase No. 165187 of the City Court of Manila be approved.RULING:We agree with the Solicitor General that in the instant case "the evidence is wanting" to sustaina finding that respondent committed any deceit or misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of the City Court ofManila. In Go vs. Candoy, 19 this Court said: "It is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the burdenof proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the basis for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the chargeagainst him must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case whichcompels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as ofthe motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated."WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint is dismissed and respondent, Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, isexonerated of the charge.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#7: In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao vs. Severino G. MartinezFacts:Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to the Bar.Two years later, Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying the information in his application for such BarExamination. Upon further investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his high school training, andneither did he obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing College in 1941.Diao practically admits first charge, but claims that he served the US army, and took the General ClassificationTest which, according to Diao, is equivalent to a High School Diploma, although he failed to submit certificationfor such claim from any proper school officials.The claim was doubtlful, however, the second charge was clearly meritorious, as Diao did not obtain his AAdegree from Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was erroneously certified, and asserts that he obtainedhis AA from Arellano University in 1949.This claim was still unacceptable, as records would have shown that Diao graduated from the University in April1949, but he started his Law studies in October 1948 (second semester, AY 1948-1949) and he would not havebeen permitted to take the Bar, as it is provided in the Rules, applicants under oath that Previousto the studyof law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (AA) as required bythe Department of Private EducationIssue:Whether Telesforo A Diao should be Disbarred.Ruling:Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar Exams, but did by falsifying information. Admissionunder false pretenses thus give grounds for revoking his admission in the Bar, as passing the Bar Exam is notthe only requirement to become an attorney at law.

manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served uponthe adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leavecomplainant in the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is dischargedshall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shallcooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why hetook no further action on the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of anothercounsel. Assuming that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this newcounsel.There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midstof litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legalpractice on account of what might be perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigatethe dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason todeviate from the norm in this case.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#10:Borja, Sr. vs. Sulyap, Inc. 399 SCRA 601 (2003)DOCTRINE: "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to anisolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually orcustomarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.FACTS:Basilio Borja, Sr. as lessor, and Sulyap, Inc., as lessee, entered into a contract of lease involving a one-storey office building owned by Borja located at New Manila,Quezon City. Pursuant to the lease, Sulyap, Inc.paid, among others, advance rentals,association dues and deposit for electrical and telephone expenses. Uponthe expiration of their lease contract, Sulyap demanded the return of the said advance rentals, dues anddeposit but Borja refused to do so. Thus, Sulyap filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for sum of money againstBorja. Subsequently, the parties entered into and submitted to the trial court a Compromise Agreementstating that Borja is bound to pay the amounts P30,575 and P50,000 and in case any amount due is not paidwithin the period stated in this agreement shall earn 2% interest per month until fully paid plus 25% attorneysfees of the amount collectible and that writ of execution shall be issued as a matter of right.Petitioner, however, failed to pay the amounts stated in the judicial compromise. Sulyapfiled a writ of executionagainst Borja. The Trial Court granted the writ. Borja motioned to quash the writ by stating that his failure topay the amounts within the agreed period was due to Sulyaps fault; therefore, the penalty clause should not beimposed.Borja filed another motion praying for the quashal of the writ of execution and modification of the decision. Thistime, he contended that there was fraud in the execution of the compromise agreement. He claimed that 3 setsof compromise agreement were submitted for his approval. Among them, he allegedly chose and signed thecompromise agreement which contained no stipulation as to the payment of 2% monthly interest and 25%attorneys fees in case of default in payment. He alleged that his former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz, whoassisted him in entering into the said agreement, removed the page of the genuine compromise agreementwhere he affixed his signature and fraudulently attached the same to the compromise agreement submitted tothe court in order to make it appear that he agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein.Sulyap presented Atty. Cruz as witness, who declared that the petitioner gave his consent to the inclusion ofthe penalty clause of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorneys fees in the compromise agreement. He addedthat the compromise agreement approved by the court was in fact signed by the petitioner insidethe courtroom before the same was submitted for approval. Atty. Cruz stressed that the penalty clause of 2%interest per month until full payment of the amount due, plus 25% thereof as attorneys fees, in case of defaultin payment, was actually chosen by the petitioner.The trial court ruled in favour of Sulyap because it gave credence to the testimony of Atty. Cruz and even notedthat it was more than one year from receipt of the judgment on compromise on October 25, 1995, when hequestioned the inclusion of the penalty clause in the approved compromise agreement despite severalopportunities to raise said objection.ISSUE:Whether Borja is bound by the penalty clause in the compromise agreement.HELD:YES. While a judicial compromise may be annulled or modified on the ground ofvitiated consent orforgery, we find that the testimony of the petitioner failed to establish the attendance of fraud in the instantcase. No evidence was presented by petitioner other than his bare allegation that his former counselfraudulently attached the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature tothe compromise agreement submitted to the court.Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the penalty clause in the compromise agreementapproved by the court. When he received the judgment reproducing the full text of the compromise agreement,to February 19, 1997, he never raised the issue of the fraudulent inclusion of the penalty clause in theiragreement. We note that petitioner is a doctor of medicine. He must have read and understood the contents of individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. A lawyer isan oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics,and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be afearless crusader. By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law,and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act andcomport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publicsfaith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriouslytransgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not beenagreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checkshad already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for hismaterial gain.Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful anddishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conductthat merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the offensecommitted by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from thepractice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. Hismisuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentencedsuspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#15:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#16:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#17:People vs de luna et al GR 10236-48Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez.Pedro B. Ayuda.Alawadin I. Bandon.Roque J. Briones.Abraham C. Calaguas.Balbino P. Fajardo.Claro C. Gofredo.Estela R. Gordo.Generoso H. Hubilla.Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr.Angelo T. Lopez.Eustacio de Luna.Jaime P. Marco.Santos L. Parina.Florencio P. Sugarol, andMaria Velez y Estrellas-took an oath as a lawyer even though they did not pass the bar exams. (sa notary public pa jud)RULING:It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gefredo, and Sugarol,have not passed the examinations, it was resolved:A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for investigation and appropriateaction in connection with Section 3 (e), Rule 64;B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney without authority, he is given 10days from notice thereof, within which to explain why he should not be dealt withfor contempt of the Court;C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has illegallyadministered the oath to the said persons in disregard of this Court's resolutiondenying them admission to the Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), ishereby given ten days to show cause why he should not be disbarred or suspendedfrom the pratice of law;D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court ofAppeals and to all courts of first instance, the Court of Industrial Relations, thePublic Service Commission, and the Department of Justice;E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken later in theirrespective cases. (pp. 36-37, rec., G.R. No. L-10245.)It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not intend to exercise itsconcurrent jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt committed by appelleesherein and that we preferred that the corresponding action be taken by the CityFiscal of Manila in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had nojurisdiction over the cases at the bar.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- #18:Leslie Ui vs. Atty. Iris Bonifacio AC#3319 June 8, 2000Facts:Leslie Ui and Carlos Ui were married on January 1971. On June 1988, Leslieconfronted the respondentAtty. Iris Bonifacio for the illicit affair . Respondentadmitted the relationship and said that she will cut off thesaid relationship. OnDecember 1988 Carlos and Iris had a second child. On March 1989 complainantpleaded torespondent to stop their illicit relationship.On Atty Iris side, she asserts that she had no knowledge of Carlospreviousmarriage. Carlos Ui was the one who represented himself as single during theircourtship. Shesubmitted her Certificate of marriage dated Oct. 1985 to court. Uponthe courts investigation it was found outthat the marriage was in fact on Oct 1987.In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when shemet Carlos Ui, she knew andbelieved him to be single. Respondent fell in love withhim and they got married and as a result of suchmarriage, she gave birth to two (2)children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she lefthimISSUE:Whether or not Atty Iris Bonifacio is guilty of gross immoral conduct as aground for disbarmentRULING:RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,the Reportand Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part ofthisResolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supportedby the evidenceon record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint forGross Immorality against Respondent isDISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. IrisBonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfullyattaching to herAnswer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning thata repetition of the same will merit a moresevere penalty.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#19: Elmer Canoy, complainant v. Atty. Jose Max Ortiz,respondentA.C. No. 5485 March 16,2005Facts:This is a case wherein complainant Elmer Canoy accused his former counsel, Atty. Jose Max Ortiz ofmisconduct and malpractice. In 1998, Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his f