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Cascading Minority Students in Higher Education:Assessing the Impact of Statewide Admissions Standards

Michael N. BastedoAssistant Professor of Education

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Paper prepared for the Public Policy Forum, annual meeting of the Association for theStudy of Higher Education, Portland OR, November 11-16, 2003. The data collection forthis research was supported by the Spencer Foundation, whose generosity is greatlyappreciated. Thanks to Kelli Armstrong, William Blackwell, Nate Bryant, Judith Gill,and Daphne Layton for their efforts on my behalf to help collect this data.

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“Cascading” is a new term in the literature that refers to “the pattern of choicesmade by students who are refused entry to very highly selective institutions who are thenadmitted to somewhat less selective institutions” (Trow, 1999: 66). For conservativesand functional analysts of higher education systems, cascading is a process that ensuresthat students are admitted to the college that best matches their academic achievementand ability (Trow, 1987). Apparently coined by conservative commentator AbigailThernstrom, cascading has been used to rebut the premise of affirmative actionscholarship showing the benefits of elite education for minority students, by arguing thatthose students would have been admitted to less prestigious colleges providing equivalentbenefits (Heriot, 2000; Kirsanow, 2003; Thernstrom, 1998; Thernstrom and Thernstrom,1999). More recently, however, cascading has been identified as an equity problem thatincreases the stratification of public colleges, thus creating significant negative impactson minority students (Gandara, 2000; Loury, et al., 2003; Tienda, 2000).

This research takes advantage of a natural experiment in policy change to assessthe impact of statewide admissions standards on the cascading of minority students.Although empirical research on statewide admissions standards is also lacking, it isbecoming increasingly common for states to assume a more activist role in setting,implementing, and auditing admissions standards at public universities (Rodriguez, 1995;Russell, 1998). In 1995, Massachusetts became the most recent state to establish strictadmissions standards for incoming students, in a concerted effort to increase public andlegislative esteem in the state’s colleges. Analysis of enrollment trends in the publichigher education system, however, makes it clear that the effect of this policy has been todisproportionately channel minority students to the community college system and theprivate sector. This has yielded a remarkable increase in the degree of stratification in thesystem’s public colleges over a very short period of time. After discussing the findings, Iconsider the implications of cascading for college access and consider future researchaddressing the “fit hypothesis” (Bowen and Bok, 1998) and the stratification of publicuniversities.

Background and Method

The implementation of admissions standards is only one means being used by thestate of Massachusetts to fundamentally alter its system design, in a way explicitlyintended to move “underprepared” students to the community college level (Bastedo,2003; Bastedo and Gumport, 2003). To understand the underlying rationales forstructural modifications, we need to review some dynamics of system evolution. From afunctionalist perspective of system design, the fundamental public policy issue for everyacademic system is to differentiate tasks among institutions (Clark, 1983; Smelser, 1974;Trow, 1987). Functionalist theorists commonly propose that functional differentiation isa necessary accompaniment to growth and yields greater structural heterogeneity amongcampuses in a system. When applied to public higher education, it is also clear how suchdifferentiation may also be seen as a structural solution to wider value conflicts. In thisway, differentiated missions can institutionalize and seek to mediate normative tensionsbetween egalitarianism and competitive excellence.

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Although the functionalist model is simple and transparent, it often obscures thesubstantial dysfunction in the system (Collins, 1971; 1979). Indeed, research has foundthat attending highly selective universities adds little if any value to the income of mostgraduating students after controlling for student characteristics (Brewer, Eide, andEhrenberg, 1999; Dale and Krueger, 1999). The impact of elite education on minoritystudents, however, has been substantial in both the impact on their community andincreased rates of retention and graduation (Bowen and Bok, 1998). Assigning studentswho can complete the bachelor’s degree to begin their coursework at community collegesalso has a consistent and demonstrably negative effect on baccalaureate attainment(Dougherty, 1992; Whitaker and Pascarella, 1994), an effect that is enhanced for minoritystudents (Lavin and Hyllegard, 1996). Thus, the effects of “cascading” on students whoare forced lower on the prestige ladder can be substantial.

Cascading emerged as a consequence of the debate over ending affirmative actionin the late 1990s. As SP-1 and Proposition 209 in California, as well as the Hopwoodcase in Texas, served to end affirmative action in college and law school admissions,there was a general concern about minority students who would “cascade” down theprestige hierarchy of higher education. Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom turned the issueon its head, arguing that white students with higher qualifications were cascaded downthe system due to affirmative action. In addition, they argue, there is no evidence thatattending an elite institution is necessary for success in life, as Bowen and Bok (1998)have suggested. According to Trow (1999: 65), concern over cascading betrays “anelitist conception of American life.” “Nowhere can they demonstrate, in their piles ofsurvey data, that a black student who is admitted on his/her own merits to UC Riverside,or indeed to CSU San Diego, is significantly disadvantaged in relation to an affirmativeaction admit to Princeton or Harvard.” One author has even suggested that cascading canlead to white students’ susceptibility to enter white nationalist groups on campus. “Theserejected students,” she says, “can end up at less prestigious institutions where they canbecome vulnerable to nationalistic appeals that attribute their rejection letters to racialpreferences rather than to intense competition from better-prepared applicants” (Swain,2002: 303).

In the current affirmative action climate, Thernstrom and Thernstrom (1999)argue, the result is a broad distance in intellectual achievement between minority studentsand their white counterparts at institutions of all types, which leads to lower graduationrates for minority students who are overmatched by the intellectual demands of thecolleges they attend. They call this “minority mismatch theory.” As evidence, theThernstroms point to lower graduation rates by minority students compared to theirmatched counterparts, as well as persistent academic underperformance than would bepredicted by their prior achievement. There is some support for this theory in theeconomic literature (Light and Strayer, 2000).

Bowen and Bok (1998) call minority mismatch theory the “fit hypothesis.” Theyargue that there is nothing in the data on elite colleges that suggests that black studentsare being hurt by their enrollment in top universities. As evidence, they point to highergraduation rates by minority students as selectivity goes up, as well as higher earningsand higher student satisfaction. In response, Thernstrom and Thernstrom (1999) andTrow (1999) emphasize that the College & Beyond dataset utilized by Bowen and Bok

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only contains data from 16 elite, East Coast, and mostly private colleges, and contains nocontrol group of students enrolled in slightly less prestigious institutions.

Although cascading has previously been used to discuss the impact of affirmativeaction, statewide admissions standards are a more routine and prosaic means by whichthe distribution of students may be altered in public higher education systems. Toanalyze the impact of admissions standards on students, Massachusetts was selected as anatural experiment in policy formation that could have an impact on the cascading ofminority students. Enrollment data were gathered from multiple sources and trends wereexamined over time. Survey data from Massachusetts high school seniors, gathered bythe Department of Education, was examined to show the changes in student aspirationsand intentions over time. Enrollment data generated from each of the public campuseswas collected by the Board of Higher Education, broken down by minority group andanalyzed over the six-year period just prior and subsequent to the new policy onadmissions standards. Enrollment data on first-year students was gathered from theUniversity of Massachusetts to assess the impact of the policy on the incoming studentpopulation. Finally, interviews with over 20 respondents in the higher education systemwere conducted to help interpret the data and to understand its political andorganizational context. Thus, this paper utilizes a mixed-method approach tounderstanding the reasons behind and the implications of a complex phenomenon.

Findings

Historically, admissions standards in Massachusetts public higher education havebeen spotty at best. In the normal schools, even a high school education was not requireduntil the end of the 19th century, and students were often found wanting in botharithmetic and basic writing skills (Brown, 1989). The Massachusetts AgriculturalCollege, the state’s only four-year campus, accepted virtually any student with a highschool diploma (Cary, 1962). Combined with the paucity of student enrollment and thepredominance of the private sector, there is little reason for nostalgia whereMassachusetts public higher education is concerned.

Standards gradually increased in the 20th century, as a majority of studentsgraduated from secondary school and higher education increased in importance to themiddle and upper classes. Enrollments, which reached their absolute nadir in the 1890s,rebounded as well. The establishment of the University of Massachusetts in 1947,combined with the influx of returning war veterans armed with the G.I. Bill, led tosurging demand despite limited state support. The outcome of enormous demand andlimited spaces was inevitably rising admissions standards. At their height in 1957,UMass president Mather claimed that the University had the highest admissionsstandards of any state university in the country.

The public’s demand for a place in higher education had to be sated, and the stateacceded during the flush years of the 1950s and 1960s. As enrollments surged, triplingduring the 1960s alone, standards necessarily declined as well. The Board of Regentsfirst set admissions standards in 1983, after a long and protracted debate. In December1982, Regents Chancellor John Duff circulated a proposal to establish minimum SATscore and class rank requirements for admission to the state’s four-year colleges.Students admitted to the public universities would be required to have a minimum

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combined SAT score of 800 and rank in the top half of their high school class. Studentsat the state colleges would be required to have a minimum combined score of 750 andrank in the top sixty percent. In January 1983, the Regents further proposed requiring 16Carnegie units for every admitted student, consisting of four years of English, three yearsof mathematics and electives, and two years each of natural science, history, and foreignlanguage. In addition, a set percentage of students who did not meet the minimumrequirements could be admitted through various categories of exceptions, including thosewith special talents or who came from educationally disadvantaged backgrounds.

The debate that resulted pitted the Regents and nearly all of the campus presidentsagainst UMass president David Knapp and the state’s Black Legislative Caucus. Thenew standards emerged at a time when educators and black leaders were seriouslyquestioning whether the SAT was biased against racial and ethnic minorities. Knapp andthe black legislators highlighted a number of problems with the new admissionsstandards. Using standardized test scores as the sole basis of rejecting students foradmission was criticized as psychometrically inappropriate and an affirmation ofinstitutional racism. Using class rank, they added, might eliminate highly qualifiedmiddle class students from academically competitive high schools. It was also feared thatstudents from the Boston area, who had particularly low average SAT scores, could bealmost completely excluded from access to a university education. The admissionsstandards debate was thus embedded in a highly contentious division between blacks andwhites in Boston, which in education was heightened after the conflict over busing.Noting that the Board of Regents was composed almost entirely of white men, BlackLegislative Caucus spokeswoman Saundra Graham remarked, “I don’t want to put mytrust in anybody who doesn’t look like me” (Kindleberger, 1983: 15).

The Regents ultimately prevailed due to overwhelming support from thecampuses, the Legislature, and Governor Dukakis. Particularly after the surge of nationalconcern for education caused by A Nation at Risk, the need for some level of standardshad become obvious. “The reason for having minimal admission standards,” accordingto Regents vice chancellor Roger Schinness in a rare moment of candor, “is to enhancethe perception of the quality of our institutions” [emphasis added] (Kindleberger, 1982:42). Responding to the criticisms of Knapp and the Black Legislative Caucus,Chancellor Duff established a sliding scale of SAT score and class rank to eliminate thepossibility that highly qualified students would not meet the minimum standards. Thescale, called the “eligibility index,” also allowed students with low SAT scores to offsetthem with a high class rank, and vice versa. As a result, Knapp dropped his opposition tothe proposal and it passed the Board of Regents unanimously in May 1983. The planultimately passed by the Regents was strongly supported in two separate editorials in TheBoston Globe as a way to raise standards in the state’s high schools.

Despite the intense and often acrimonious debate over the new admissionsstandards during 1982-83, the policy contained so many exceptions that it was virtuallyuseless in meeting its stated goals. There was no limit to the number of students whocould be excluded from the eligibility index, as long as they fit into one of the establishedexception categories: adults who were more than three years past their high schoolgraduation, students with special talents, special needs students, community collegetransfer students, and the educationally disadvantaged. In addition, the Regents staff toldadmissions officers in 1987 that they could exempt 10% of their admissions pool from

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the requirement for 16 Carnegie units. As a result, the admissions standards existed inname only.

To compound the problem, although data on admissions were collected on ayearly basis, no effort was made to ensure institutional compliance with the newstandards. According to an internal memo from HECC vice chancellor Joseph Joyce, a“quick and dirty review” was conducted during 1988-99, and “the scope of non-compliance was alarming.” Campuses were simply ignoring the new requirementsdespite the exemptions policy, and the Regents staff did not have the will or desire toforce them to comply. A review of the admissions standards, mandated to occur in 1988,was, according to Joyce, “quietly shelved.” Nevertheless, the profile of the Universitycampuses rose well into the 1980s. The Amherst campus was elevated to a four-starrating by the Fiske Guide to Colleges, and Time magazine named the Boston campus oneof its nine “hot colleges” of 1986. Combined with the advocacy of people like MITchairman David Saxon, UMass was poised to reach the next level nationally amongpublic university systems.

The fiscal crisis at the turn of the decade stopped UMass momentum in its tracks.State budget cuts disproportionately impacted public higher education, cutting stateappropriations dramatically and state scholarship aid in particular. The campuses turnedfirst to tuition and fee increases, which more than doubled in just six years. At the sametime, scholarships were cut in half, severely impacting access for poor students.Applications for admission to UMass dropped by over 10,000, and out-of-stateapplications fell by half, combining to raise the admissions rate from 50% to 83% in justthree years (Clayton, 1992). Similarly, applications to the state colleges dropped 17%from 1989 to 1994 (HECC, 1995a). After years of working towards raising its nationalprofile, by 1993 UMass was on the verge of becoming an open admissions institution.

After his appointment in September 1993, Chancellor Stanley Koplik began a tourof the system’s 29 public campuses. He was most shocked by the decline in academicstandards on the four-year campuses. If A Nation at Risk warned of a “rising tide ofmediocrity,” Koplik remarked wryly, “We are heading toward the establishment of a seaof mediocrity” (Cohen, 1993: B1). Based only on his talks with campus presidents andfaculty, Koplik believed that there were far too many exemptions being made to thepublished admissions standards. Admitted students, he said, were often simplyunprepared for college-level work (Dembner, 1993: 1).

We’re admitting students who are far more at risk than they should be. Theywould do far better to get their feet planted at a community college and gain somematurity, and get used to the college experience... To take ill-prepared studentsdirectly from high school into the state colleges or university is not to run anefficient system.

To Koplik, admitting underprepared students was not simply an educational problem, itwas a problem of how to appropriately run and govern a system of higher education.When students who were “more appropriate” for community colleges were entering thefour-year campuses in high numbers, the system was simply not operating efficiently andneeded to be mended. Although he didn’t have them at the time, the admissions statisticswere consistent with the anecdotal information he received during his campus tours. In

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fall 1994, UMass Amherst and Lowell admitted 85% of their applicants. The percentageof students at UMass who ranked in the top tenth of their high school class had fallenfrom 21% in 1989 to 12% in 1994 (Hooker, 1994). Surprisingly, newly inauguratedUMass president Michael Hooker largely agreed with Koplik’s assessment. “I think weshould have downsized in ways that we didn’t,” he said, adding, “It’s misusing the state’sresources for us to be educating students who would fare just as well at a state college”(Dembner, 1995a: 1). Hooker later became famous around the state for giving his ownsystem a grade of “C+” after its first “report card” (Hooker, 1994).

Together with HECC Chairman Richard Wiley, Koplik made raising admissionsstandards the board’s top priority. Koplik’s plan to “build a system” of public highereducation in Massachusetts was released in September 1994. A key action item was toestablish a task force to address the admissions standards problem, and its first report wasissued in June 1995 (HECC, 1995a). The task force’s report was shocking: from 1990-94, 29% of students at the state colleges and 20% of students at UMass had beenexempted from the admissions standards established in 1984. Overall, exactly one-quarter of all students had been exempted from the admissions standards in fall 1994. AtSalem State College the rate was nearly half, and at UMass Boston it was two-thirds.

It also became clear that there was no common definition of what qualified as anexemption, so the categories were defined very broadly. The “educationallydisadvantaged” included underrepresented minorities, but it could also include those whocame from small high schools or who were simply poor. Indeed, the percentage ofminority students at Salem State in 1994 was only 18%; at UMass Boston it was half.Although the board had a monitoring system in place to ensure compliance, the data itproduced had been ignored. The task force recommended that the system office establishbaseline standards and order the campuses to revise their own policies in line with thenew standards. They also recommended that campuses be “held harmless” on theirbudgets for three years if enrollment dipped in their effort to maintain standards. Further,they said that no more than 15% of all students should be exempted from the baselinestandards. Koplik agreed, once again reinforcing the notion of system. “The system isbroken and needs fixing,” he said. “This isn’t the best use of resources for the system orthe students” (Dembner, 1995b: 1).

Over the summer, Koplik and the HECC staff developed the baseline standardsrecommended by the Task Force. Koplik recommended changing the basis of theadmissions standards from class rank to weighted high school grade point average,setting a systemwide minimum 2.5 GPA for students admitted to the four-year colleges(Koplik, 1995b). After examining the Carnegie units, Koplik recommended that studentscomplete an additional year of science and a year of computer science to qualify foradmission. The percentage of students admitted by exemption would be reduced to 15%in fall 1997 and further to 10% in fall 2002. Students who did not meet the GPArequirement could still qualify by having above-average SAT scores. In addition, all ofthe four-year colleges would have to keep their overall SAT mean above the nationalaverage. A key element of the new policy – and one that was applauded by FairTest, anational group opposed to standardized testing – was to move the basis of the policyaway from SAT scores, which have a perceived bias against women and minorities, tohigh school GPA. Thus it was hoped that standards could be raised, while addressing the

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concerns of the education community that they not be imposed on the backs of minoritystudents.

After allowing a month for the campuses to evaluate the new policy, the standardswere brought up for a vote at the October council meeting. In a surprising turn of events,the standards were defeated on a 4-3 vote, with five abstentions. The council’s onlyblack member, Jane Edmonds, believed that the standards would have a disproportionateimpact on urban youth. She saw the admissions standards issue through the lens of herown personal experience, which differed greatly from the rest of the council.

I, like other people, am shaped largely by the differentiators that make me unique,and a large part of who I am is influenced by being a black woman and growingup here in Boston, a racist city. You know, I’ve lived through differentexperiences which have influenced the lens through which I look. So when I lookback on the admissions standards issue, what was most clear to me was how someof those decisions would affect people of color and possibly for the worse. Thatwas most clear. And also I came with a very strong bias that continues today thattest scores and standards do not always determine the potential of an individual...I just don’t buy it, haven’t, and never will. Period. The end.

The other dissenting council members, however, believed that the standardsrecommended by the task force were not strong enough. The result was a divided councilwith no consensus on an issue that everyone recognized as vital to the future of thesystem. Koplik was very disappointed with the entire process, according to current BHEchancellor Judith Gill.

The Admissions Standards Committee met for over half a year and I happened toserve as one of the staff members to this committee. The staff had worked withthe institutions and with the task force and it was a disappointing adventure.Because basically what we wound up with in the task force report was somethingthat was not significantly different from the way we had been operating. Thatwas disappointing to all of us.

To help address the concerns of some council members, Koplik moved to create anadditional 5% exemption for students in “alternative admission programs” that providespecial support for educationally or economically disadvantaged students (Koplik,1995c). The key to passing the new admissions standards was Carlin, who according tothe Boston Globe was “electrifying the state Higher Education Coordinating Council inhis first appearance as chairman” (Dembner, 1995c: 33). At the council’s Novemberboard meeting, Carlin announced his plan to cut tuition and raise admissions standards.He also announced that he was giving each council member a paperweight with hispersonal motto, “Don’t confuse effort with results.” His performance immediatelyearned him a favorable editorial in The Boston Herald.

Carlin also made it clear that he wanted even tougher admissions standards thanthose that had been rejected by the council two months before. According to ChancellorGill,

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Stan [Koplik] was prepared to go with the task force recommendations and in factwe had the admissions standards motion on the board agenda for Jim’s firstmeeting. Jim took one look at them and said that it wasn’t going to happen thatway. So it was a very unusual evening for those of us who had spent our career inhigher education. Jim took the task force report, went through everyrecommendation and changed them and told us, without any consultation withanyone, what the new standards were going to be.

At the December council meeting, only two weeks after his first council meeting, his newadmissions standards were passed by a vote of 6-1. Instead of relying upon Koplik totake the lead, Carlin quickly obtained the support of the majority of board members byhammering out their issues behind closed doors.

The new standards required a minimum GPA of 2.6 at the state colleges and 2.75at UMass in fall 1997. In fall 1998, those standards would be ratcheted up to 2.7 at thestate colleges and 3.0 at UMass (Koplik, 1995d). A sliding scale allowed students withGPAs above 2.0 to qualify with above average SAT scores. In addition, the exemptionrate would be cut far more rapidly, reaching 10% by 1999 instead of by 2002. Carlin alsostated his hope that the council would revisit these standards in 18 months and considertoughening them further.

Council member Jane Edmonds continued to oppose the new standards. “My fearis that people within the state of Massachusetts may be denied a dream... this will lead topublic education for a select few” (Dembner, 1995e: 21). Ann Coles, the executivedirector of the Higher Education Information Center in Boston, agreed with herassessment. “[W]e may end up in the short term with a two-tiered system, where peoplefrom suburban high schools and middle-income families are enrolling at state collegesand UMass, where those from the cities, with less solid academic preparation, arerestricted to community colleges.” Nevertheless, within days the new policy earnedCarlin favorable editorials in both the Globe and the Herald.

The potential impact of the new policy was very unclear, and it left campusesnervous about the possible effects on student access, enrollment, and campus budgets.When a Boston Globe reporter asked Koplik what he though the impact would be, he said(Dembner, 1995d: 1):

There will be a redistribution of students throughout the system. The communitycolleges, which will retain their open admissions policies, will have to gear up fora large increase in students initially. But I believe that after a few years, thenumber of applications and enrollments will increase at institutions with higherstandards.

State college presidents got the message. Bridgewater State College president AdrianTinsley: “The approach the board took was get them out of the state colleges, get themout of the four-year colleges, get them into community colleges. Frankly, the educationis cheaper in the community colleges, so let’s do it there.” In a private memorandum toCouncil member Jane Edmonds, however, Koplik admitted that the impact was uncertain.“The new standards,” he wrote, “would have the greatest impact on students of color onthe UMass/Amherst campus. The 2.75 minimum GPA would probably be workable for

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Amherst; the 3.0 minimum is uncertain at this point. Qualitative judgments also need tobe made in combination with quantitative measures. There needs to be room for this inthe ‘exceptions window.’” He also acknowledged that data on campus admissions was“spotty at best,” and that the staff was at that point unable to break down the admissionsdata by geographic origin, age, race or ethnicity.

In the beginning, it was also unclear whether the campuses would agree to meetthe new admissions standards. Fitchburg State College quickly announced that it wouldexceed the council’s new standards, and established a 2.5 minimum GPA for the nextacademic year. UMass, however, after being a supporter of the policy, indicated that itmight reject it. Some UMass trustees, upset at Carlin’s usurpation of their authority,wanted to reject the standards at their February 1996 meeting. In the interim, UMassstaff had calculated that they would have to cut the first-year class by 10% by 1999 as thestandards were ratcheted higher. UMass president Bulger, however, ultimately supportedthe Carlin plan, and it was approved by a 10-3 vote by the trustees. According to UMassassociate academic vice president Daphne Layton,

There were a number of dynamics going on. One was that the area of admissionsstandards is one of those ambiguities in the law as far as what is the university’srole vis a vis the BHE’s role... So there was a lot of discussion about, well, doesthat mean the BHE can just impose its admissions standards on us? And therewere some people who wanted to fight a battle about that. I think the president’sview, which certainly prevailed, was that that is a dicey, political kind of decisionand it’s better to try and work with the BHE if we don’t like what it’s doing.

By February 1997, the Amherst campus had begun to embrace the plan, announcing thatit would willingly limit the following year’s enrollment to increase academic standards.According to Arlene Cash, the Amherst director of admissions, “Our rankings will bebetter in college guides and our public perception will go up. The state legislature maysee it and justify giving us more money” (Carroll, 1997: 1). The Worcester Telegram &Gazette was enthusiastic about the decision. “After years of drift, waste, duplication andempire-building on the far-flung campuses, the Board of Education [sic] has moved tomake the state’s three-tiered system... meaningful and accountable, with clearly definedacademic tasks assigned to each tier” (Editorial Board, 1997).

-- Insert Table 1 about here --

During 1996, council staff worked with the campuses to interpret the admissionsstandards policy. Although the policy seemed straight forward, in practice there were anumber of technical issues that needed to be worked out. An Admissions AdvisoryCommittee, led by vice chancellor Jack Warner and comprised of campus and councilstaff, was designed to help weigh and resolve these issues. Along with resolvinginterpretive issues regarding the new standards, the committee also considered practicalissues such as communicating the standards, connecting the standards with changes in theK-12 sector associated with the Education Reform Act of 1993, and developing a formulato compute the weighted grade point average. In September 1996, the Board of Higher

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Education issued an implementation guide for high school guidance counselors in thestate (BHE, 1996).

-- Insert Table 2 about here --

Even before the standards were implemented, the academic profile of admittedstudents began to improve. Applications rose slightly after 1994, increasing by about onethousand at UMass and remaining stable at the state colleges (BHE, 1998). Thepercentage of admitted students dropped to 73% at UMass and 68% at the state colleges,a slight but noticeable improvement. Yield rates also rose slightly to the mid-thirties.High school GPA at UMass Amherst also rose substantially, from 2.69 in fall 1994 to2.85 in fall 1996.

Academic profiles improved further after the implementation of standards, as canbe seen in Tables 1 and 2. In fall 1997, the first year of the new admissions standards, theaverage GPA for first-time freshmen jumped to 3.09 at Amherst. Over the next fouryears, the average GPA of incoming freshmen rose a solid 6.8%. Average SAT scoresfor the UMass system rose a modest 1.2%, only slightly above the increase for allMassachusetts students. Nearly all of the other indicators were positive: applications andyield were up, acceptance rates were down. The state colleges benefited even more.

Although applications fluctuated, increases in SAT scores and GPA were moredramatic. Overall, it just four years, the average SAT score rose from 972 to 1007, andthe average high school GPA of incoming students rose from 2.77 to 2.90. As will beanalyzed in depth later, campus presidents and board members were extremely pleasedwith the results.

Gradually, the ratio of community college students to the rest of the systemincreased, as can be seen in Table 3. Over the five years from fall 1996 to fall 2001,community college enrollment increased 18.6%, when UMass enrollment increased acomparatively paltry 3.3%, and state college enrollment actually declined by 6.8%. As aresult, the ratio of community college students to the rest of the system had increased aswell, from .450 in fall 1996 to .495 in fall 2001, a rise in proportion of 10% in just fiveyears.

-- Insert Table 3 about here --

Emboldened by the success of the first standards, the Board moved in September1998 to increase standards even further. Koplik developed the idea to require eachcampus to meet an average SAT score goal rather than setting a minimum score forindividual students, which was criticized as an inappropriate use of the SAT exam. Theaverage SAT score at each state college would be 1017 in fall 1999 and 1025 in fall 2000.High school GPA for individual students at state colleges would increase from 2.7 in1998 to 2.9 in 1999 and 3.0 in 2000. The minimum GPA at UMass would remain 3.0,but the average SAT score would be 1125 overall and 1160 at UMass Amherst. The SATscores on the sliding scale for students with GPAs below the minimum were increasedslightly as well. William O’Neil, the executive director of the state colleges, was upsetby the new standards (Zernike, 1998: A1).

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We’re in public higher education because it allows us to bring people along whoare in poverty, bring people out of the working class into the professional class.That has happened for generation to generation at our colleges. If these standardskeep ratcheting up, will they go to private colleges at greater cost? Can theyafford it?

A request to delay the proposed action from Worcester State College president KalyanGhosh, on behalf of the state college presidents, was denied by Chancellor Koplik.Indeed, the new standards had been sprung on the campuses so quickly, there had beenno time for any feedback from the campuses, according to vice chancellor Jack Warner.“It was sprung on them at a September meeting during an election year, which nobody onthe campuses liked, so there was no comment period, there was no heads-up and, in fact,we were told not to give any heads-up about it.” As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, thesestandards have never been met.

As with the admissions standards passed in 1983, campus compliance soonbecame an issue as well. The State Auditor conducted an audit of admissions practicesduring fall 1998, and its results were surprising. In a report issued in November, theauditor cited four campuses as out of compliance with board policy, for allowing toomany special admits: the Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts (MCLA – 16%),Westfield State College (20%), Fitchburg State College (24%), and UMass Lowell(18%). An earlier audit, conducted privately after concerns were made by board staff,revealed that Salem State College had admitted a whopping 29% of its students as specialadmits. Chancellor Koplik, outraged at the figures, announced that he would cut aproportionate part of the state appropriation from each campus budget for each studentadmitted outside of the standards. Additionally, those campuses would be deemedineligible for performance improvement funds distributed by the board office. Thecumulative impact of these decisions could top half a million dollars for each affectedcampus. Koplik also supported doubling the financial penalty for campuses thatremained out of compliance for two years.

The auditor’s findings and methodology, however, ultimately proved to be faulty.The auditors had mistakenly assigned some students to the special admits category, andsampled only about 10% of the existing files. After a review, only Salem State wasfound to be out of compliance. Nevertheless, the board’s will and ability to penalizecampuses for noncompliance had a beneficial effect in ensuring implementation of thenew policy, according to Chancellor Gill:

They were angry about the change [in policy]. In fact, some of them weredevious about the change and this was discovered when we [audited] institutions.In doing so, we discovered that one institution had actually changed studenttranscripts so that the students who were admitted would fall within thestandards... If you looked closely at the transcripts, and you didn’t have to looktoo closely, you discovered they had been whited-out in areas in order to give thestudent a higher GPA. And once this was telegraphed to the world and theinstitution lost some funding as a result, institutions throughout theCommonwealth started to take the higher admissions standards more seriously.

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Board staff began quietly making accommodations for campuses that werestruggling to implement the new policy without decimating campus enrollment. InOctober 1999, Koplik recommended that the board allow campuses to apply for anexemption from the 10% limit on special admits if they perceived there were a largenumber of students being rejected with solid qualifications. This was interpreted asstudents with high school GPAs above 2.7, a rigorous selection of college preparatorycourses, or substantially improved grades in the junior or senior years. Although theexemption would not be automatic, it would be a way to provide some flexibility tocampuses in meeting the raised admissions standards. The Admissions AdvisoryCommittee, which was developed to interpret the standards, approved a number of newcategories of students who did not fall under the 10% cap. These included ESL students,learning disabled students, students who enrolled in a pre-college summer program, andstudents from non-US high schools. Although the policy seemed rigid, according toboard academic policy director Aundrea Kelley, “accommodations can be made so that itbecomes more workable and acceptable to all the parties involved.”

The new policy also addressed the concern of campuses that they were havingdifficulty competing for quality students with the area’s private colleges. They believedthat most students who applied to four-year state colleges would rather enroll at a moreexpensive private college than settle for a community college education. A report writtenby Nate Bryant, the director of admissions at Salem State College, helps confirm thisperception. Admissions officers at Salem State called students who were rejected foradmission in fall 1998 to determine where they had ultimately enrolled. Despite theastoundingly high percentage of special admits – 29% in fall 1998 – students rejectedfrom Salem State enrolled at a wide variety of selective public and private institutions(Bryant, 1999). Eleven rejected students enrolled at Boston University, three at BostonCollege, and 33 at Boston’s Suffolk University. Perhaps most shockingly, a number ofrejected students enrolled at the University of Massachusetts, including 30 at the Amherstcampus and 29 at the Lowell campus, one of whom had a high school GPA below 2.0.Overall, 90 students rejected by Salem State enrolled at a UMass campus, including fivewith GPAs below 2.0. Fifty-eight had enrolled at another state college campus, six withGPAs below 2.0. Overall, only about one-third (32.4%) of the students rejected by SalemState enrolled in one of the state’s 15 community colleges. Surprisingly, even forstudents with GPAs below 2.0, for over half of them (52.9%) private colleges were theultimate choice. The Salem State data is partially confirmed by statewide data from theMassachusetts Department of Education, reported in Table 4. From 1995 to 2000, whilethe proportion of Massachusetts high school graduates who planned to attend publiccolleges remained stable, those attending four-year private colleges rose 13.7%. At thesame time, those planning to attend one of the state’s community colleges rose a dramatic41.6% in just those five years.

-- Insert Table 4 about here --

There is now compelling evidence to support a finding that there has been aredistribution of students in the Massachusetts system in just the five years since theimposition of admissions standards. Since fall 1997, when the admissions standardspolicy was first implemented, there has been a steady rise in unduplicated enrollment at

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the community colleges, from 66,779 in 1996-97 to 79,169 in 1999-00 (Table 3; BHE,2002c). We must also consider that this was during a period when the state’s economywas booming, a condition when community college enrollment has historically declined.More telling is the rise in the percentage of students in the system who chose communitycolleges compared to the other segments. In 1996-97, 45.0% of undergraduate studentsin the public higher education system attended community colleges; by 1999-00, this hadrisen to 49.5%. The number of students intending to enroll in a two-year college rose adramatic 42% over the period (Table 4). In the rate of students moving from four-year totwo-year colleges, Massachusetts ranked 11th of the 50 states for data collected from1992-98 (Coelen et al., 2002). Transfer students also began to increase in 1999-00, asstudents who had been denied admission under the new standards finished their firstdegrees. “Students that we denied two years ago when the standards started to go up arenow applying to the college again,” according to MCLA enrollment dean DeniseRichardello (Caywood, 2000). Indeed, transfers in the state college system increased7.2% in one year, from fall 2000 to fall 2001 (BHE, 2001b).

Enrollment increased in the UMass segment as well, despite the new admissionsstandards. Undergraduate enrollment at UMass dipped slightly in the mid 1990s, fallingless than half of one percent, but had risen 3.3% by fall 2001 (BHE, 2002c). Statecollege enrollment, on the other hand, dropped 6.8% over the period. Overall, the systemgained about 13,000 undergraduate students from fall 1996 to fall 2001, led by theincrease in community college enrollment. Other admissions indicators were largelystable, including the acceptance and yield rates, which stabilized at approximately 70%and 40% at UMass, and 66% and 42% at the state colleges, respectively. Campuspresidents were surprised. “I think we were very fearful at first,” according toFramingham State College president Helen Heineman. “We thought that we would losestudents and that our enrollment would suffer. What is amazing to me is that it hasn’tand, as a matter of fact, it’s gone up... So my sense is that it hasn’t been as harmful as Ithought it was going to be.”

The data also demonstrate a clear pattern of disproportionate impact onenrollment by the system’s minority student population. Analysis of BHE and IPEDSdata reveal that while the percentage of minority students compared to students with aknown ethnicity has increased since the implementation of admissions standards,minority enrollment has declined in sheer numbers across the board (BHE, 2002c). Forexample, at the state colleges, while the total number of minority students fell 3.1%, theoverall reported percentage of minority students rose from 9.0% to 9.9% over the four-year period. At UMass, the reported percentage of minority students rose steadily, from18.4% in fall 1996 to 20.8% in fall 2000. The flagship Amherst campus showed a similarincrease, from 16.1% to 17.2% over the same period.

-- Insert Table 5 about here ---- Insert Table 6 about here --

When you break down the numbers, however, a disturbing pattern emerges: asharp and rapid decline in the number of black and Latino students at nearly everycampus. While overall minority enrollment at UMass increased by 6.3% in real numbersfrom fall 1996 to fall 2001, the numbers for underrepresented minorities are not nearly as

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favorable. Black enrollment at UMass has fallen 11.8% in just the four years from fall1997 to fall 2001, and Latino enrollment fell by 3.4% over the same period (Tables 6 and7). The trends are also reflected in Table 8, which examines trends in incoming freshmanadmissions at UMass Amherst and Boston, the system’s flagship and urban campuses. Injust four years from fall 1996 to fall 2000, new black freshman fell by 37.8% at UMassAmherst and 22.8% at UMass Boston (UMass President’s Office, 2001). Overall,minority admissions are off by nearly one-quarter at UMass Amherst and one-eighth atUMass Boston. The declines at the state colleges are even more pronounced. Overallminority enrollment has declined by 3.1% in five years. During the four years from fall1997 to fall 2001, black enrollment fell by 19.8% and Latino enrollment by 4.1%.

These trends are confirmed and reflected in data on the college plans of recentMassachusetts high school graduates collected by the Department of Education (Table 4).Because the overall number of high school graduates has increased so dramatically inrecent years (11% in just five years), and increases in the proportion of students intendingto attend college generally, the number of students planning to attend public colleges hasincreased in virtually every racial and ethnic group. The increases in those planning toattend public four-year colleges, however, is meager when compared to the overallincreases in graduates from those groups. For example, the percentage of Latino highschool graduates increased a whopping 29.2% from 1995 to 2000, but those planning toattend a four-year public college increased only 6.3%. Latinos planning to attend aprivate four-year college increased 27.3% over the same period, nearly consonant withthe increase in high school graduates overall. The statistics for black students are evenmore revealing. Overall, the number of black high school graduates increased 22% overthe five-year period, but the number who planned to attend a four-year public collegeactually declined by 1.1%. At the same time, the proportion of students who planned toattend a private college rose by the same percentage as black high school graduatesoverall: 22%.

Examination of corresponding trends in community college enrollment reveals theextent of the impact on the redistribution of minority students in the system. A goodnumber of these students enrolled in private colleges. Far more, however, entered thestate’s community college system. In just five years, minority enrollment at communitycolleges increased a formidable 42%. Black enrollment increased 17.0% between fall1997 and fall 2001, and 42.3% for Latinos (Tables 6 and 7). This was not just a minorityphenomenon, however. White students planning to attend a two-year college increasedby a third in just five years, at a time when overall white graduates increased only 8%.Nevertheless, the ratio of minority students in the community college population hasincreased dramatically. In fall 1996, 54.6% of the system’s minority students were in thecommunity colleges; by fall 2001, this had increased to 63% (Table 5). A slightly higherratio exists for black students. In fall 2001, 73.6% of Latino students were in communitycolleges, compared to 49.5% of the general student population. These ratios haveincreased every year since the imposition of admissions standards, and the ratios for allminority categories are rising faster than the average.

The exact reasons for these drops in minority enrollment can be contested,because there are a number of confounding factors. In 1999, the UMass system itselfdecided to move away from racial preferences in light of the federal lawsuits againstaffirmative action, particularly Hopwood v. Texas. During a review of its internal

15

admissions procedures during 1998-99, it was revealed that a number of UMasscampuses were engaging in preferences to a degree that they constituted quotas, whichwere clearly illegal under the Bakke decision. In April 1999, the system announced thatit was revising its policy on affirmative action, which was perceived by the staff aslegally necessary, and the new policy was in full effect by fall 2000.

At the same time, it seems clear that admissions standards played a larger role inthese changes in the student population. The sharpest declines in Black and Latinoenrollment at Amherst and Boston occurred between fall 1997 and fall 1998, over twoyears before the new affirmative action policy at UMass could be implemented (Table 8).It seems more likely that the admissions standards, which were ratcheted up to aminimum 3.0 GPA in fall 1998, were more responsible for the decline in minorityenrollment than the change in affirmative action policy. We must also consider thepossible impact of financial incentives that encouraged students to enroll in communitycolleges, which will be analyzed in Chapter 5.

-- Insert Table 7 about here ---- Insert Table 8 about here --

The unmistakable trend in these data has been unintentionally obscured, however,by the way minority data are reported by both the BHE and the UMass system. In systemreports, there has been a tendency to report minority data in the aggregate rather than byspecific racial or ethnic group, which allows increases in some minority groupenrollments, particularly among Asians, to compensate for sharp declines in otherminority groups. According to UMass institutional research director Kelli Armstrong, “Ithink [we have a] political, system-office bias toward reporting total minority percentagesvs. the subcategories of racial/ethnic groups” (Armstrong, personal communication).Reporting the data of the UMass system as a whole also allows the Dartmouth andLowell campuses, which have had more stable minority enrollments, to compensate forthe declines at Amherst and Boston. The data are also often reported as a proportion oftotal enrollment, which makes declines seem smaller in comparison. There is less of aperception of real decline when you report that the proportion of black students at UMasshas fallen from 3.8% in Fall 1996 to 3.5% in Fall 2000, rather than if you say that blackfreshman admissions at UMass Amherst has fallen 37.8% over the same period.

Finally, at the system office, minority enrollment has been reported and analyzedas a percentage of the total enrollment with a known racial or ethnic category. Thisseems like a reasonable decision, because otherwise you assume that those who fail toreport a racial or ethnic category are white. Unfortunately this decision has led to aunanticipated distortion in the data, because the proportion of students who are willing toselect a racial or ethnic category has declined dramatically over the past ten years. Theproportion of students selecting any racial or ethnic category fell by nearly 10% at UMassand 4.3% at the state colleges from fall 1996 to fall 2000. This has sometimes created theimpression that the proportion of minority students is rising at the four-year colleges,when in fact it has declined, particularly at the state colleges and the more selectiveUMass campuses.

Thus, despite these data, the standards are widely perceived to be an unmitigatedsuccess, from campus presidents to board members and staff. Most importantly – as

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Regents vice chancellor Roger Schinness suggested in 1983 – the perception is thatacademic quality in the public system has increased dramatically. According to PresidentAdrian Tinsley,

The good part has been that it’s increased the reputation of the state colleges;applications are up, yields are up... From a policy perspective that sends a clearmessage that, if you want to go to a four-year college in this state, you better bringa decent academic record with you. I think that’s hard to object to and I think thatpeople were not bringing a decent record. I mean, a 2.5 [GPA] in high school is apretty lousy student, so if your desire is to get the college-bound population to bea little more serious in high school, I think that’s a good policy.

She quickly added, “But when you look at the makeup of the region and who’s in thehigh schools and what their average SAT score are, it was the wrong policy.” AlthoughTinsley was pleased with the increasing academic profile of her students, she was alsoconflicted about its impact on access in her particular region of the state.

Board staff were much less conflicted. Although she acknowledged that a fullanalysis of the impact of the policy on students of color had not been conducted,Chancellor Gill was a strong supporter of the policy.

The interesting thing is, I have had presidents sit in this office and say, “Never didI think I would ever admit that one of the best things that ever happened in theCommonwealth of Massachusetts was the increase of admissions standards.Notwithstanding the fact that every president of a four-year institution fought theadmissions standards that the board adopted, it has proven to be one of the mostsuccessful board policies... the policy has really promoted a change in quality anda change in the perception of quality. It was incredibly important and verybeneficial and there really is no one who would argue that point right now.

Gill added, offhandedly, “there was also... a great deal of support from almost everynewspaper throughout the Commonwealth.” Indeed, there was not a single newspapereditorial opposing admissions standards during the entire period of study, and at least tenthat expressed enthusiastic support. Other board staffers, including Aundrea Kelley, weresupportive as well.

Talking with representatives of campuses, we got comments afterwards aboutdelight and surprise and amazement, almost, that the academic profiles of thestudents were so much higher than in the past. And then the institutions beingseen as more desirable on the part of the public. That kind of discussion issomething you never heard before... there’s a sense of pride that I see developingamong the state colleges that wasn’t there before.

Daphne Layton, a top UMass administrator, agreed. “I think it helped the university’spublic image that the word was out that it was tougher to get in... Guidance counselorswere realizing, and putting word out to students, that students who three years earlier

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would easily have gotten into UMass Amherst – and that’s the one that really matters sofar as image – were not going to get in.”

Yet there was also wide dissatisfaction with the process by which the admissionsstandards had been developed and implemented. Among campuses, faculty, and evensome board staff, there was a perception that the purpose of developing standards wasmore to punish campuses and make them look inferior than substantive improvement.Kelli Armstrong, who had previously worked for the BHE, took this view.

Good for you, for raising standards. We need to do that. But do we really need topunish people? I remember one incident when I was working there late oneevening and I had found some negative things in the UMass data and peoplecongratulated me for this and I felt really badly. I mean, what is our role? Are wethere to punish the campuses or are we there to work with them and get themgoing?

The state college faculty union president, Patricia Markunas, agreed with the principle ofincreasing standards but bristled at the top-down approach of Carlin and the board.

We weren’t consulted, we weren’t informed, we were just told that this was theway that it was going to be because our students were terrible and somethingneeded to be done about it, and that turned a lot of people off... Had it beenhandled in a different way, according to the contract and in a more positive way,as opposed to being told that your students are stupid, we’re going to fix this foryou, the faculty might have been more onboard with that particular policyinitiative.

Campus presidents, on the other hand, believed that the policies would have been moreeffective, and caused less disruption, if they had been implemented over a longer periodof time. Salem State president Nancy Harrington: “[The changes were sudden] andmany of the policies were changed midstream so that for the people affected by thepolicies... there was no lead time. The juniors and seniors in high school were caughtquick as a wink in an admissions change that was really fairly dramatic.” Yet she alsotook pride in the improved quality of the students admitted under the new standards.“There’s no doubt that the quality of the students studying here has risen and that there’smore of a seriousness of purpose with the students. There’s more of a sense that they feellucky to be here and are more conscientious about what they’re doing.” She concluded,

I think that, by raising the admissions standards and by looking at some of theacademic programs, it drew attention to the fact that we could do better and thatwe are doing better. And I think people think we are better. So overall, it was avery, very difficult period to live through, but I think it’s had a fairly positiveeffect.

William O’Neil, an early opponent of the standards, also became a convert even thoughhe simultaneously saw their implementation as a failure of leadership.

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When the process began, what was the biggest concern among the colleges? Theywere going to lose students if it got too high. That was, frankly, just a self-serving answer. There’s another answer: we don’t want to deprive students whocould do college work. What that line of thought failed to take into considerationadequately, including yours truly, was the grade inflation at the secondary level...We simply have adjusted for that. Now in a study, that would have come out.That factor would have been fed in if the consultative process had developed.What this top-down approach caused was a two-or three-year upset, which wastotally unnecessary, with the campuses trying to get around the regulations.

Aundrea Kelley disputes this contention. “The interesting thing is, with the admissionsstandards, they tried to do it that way [with a consultative process]. They had a task forcethat looked at the issue and then came up with the same standards as before. WithoutCarlin, the standards never would have happened.”

Conclusion: Understanding Cascading and Fit

Although cascading has been an obvious consequence of the admissions standardspolicy, we can see from the qualitative data that this was rarely a consideration during thepolicy formulation process. After the fact, far more of the focus has been on theincreasing legitimacy of the state system with legislators than on the impact of the policyon students. In states with destabilized systems of public higher education, increasinglegitimacy is often an unstated but primary reason for policy formation (Bastedo andGumport, 2003; Gumport and Bastedo, 2000).

We have a great deal to learn about the impact of the stratification of publicsystems of higher education on students of all kinds, but especially on minority and low-income students. This stratification has been so institutionalized in our sharedconceptions of higher education that it is largely taken-for-granted (Bastedo, 2003). Wemust also recognize that the impact of admissions standards cannot be treatedmonolithically. Thus, the impact of admissions standards at Harvard and Tufts is almosta different world from the impact of admissions standards at UMass Boston andFitchburg State College. In turn, cascading from Harvard to Tufts is hardly equivalentwith cascading from UMass Boston to Fitchburg State, or from Fitchburg State toQuinsigamond Community College.

This fact seriously undermines the usefulness of prior analyses of cascading andaffirmative action from both liberals and conservatives. Due to the influence of TheShape of the River, the debate over cascading has focused almost exclusively on the eliteprivate colleges. Conservatives have called this focus “embarrassing,” yet they seek onlyto extend the debate to the impact of Proposition 209 at the University of California orthe Hopwood decision in Texas. By attending only to these high profile states,conservatives have focused their analysis on students cascading from Berkeley andUCLA to Riverside and Irvine, which are hardly low-status universities (Heriot, 2000;Trow, 1999). Journalists, too, have mirrored this form of cascading in their work,highlighting the numerous stories of minority students at lower-status UC institutionswho are thriving in those environments (Cohen, 1999; Traub, 1999). As a result, theimpact of cascading to CSU or the community colleges has been ignored.

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Proponents of minority access to elite institutions have been similarly negligent inproviding useful information about less rarefied contexts. The College & Beyonddatabase does not have a control group, thus making it impossible to know if the studentswho attend elite universities would do just at well as lower-status institutions (Bowen andBok, 1998). Research on public universities has focused on the impact of the Hopwooddecision on public universities in Texas, but highlighted the impact on the flagshipcampuses at Austin and Texas A&M (Kain and O’Brien, 2003; see also Hurtado andCade, 2001). The vast majority of minority students do not attend either the elite privatecolleges or the public flagship universities, yet the impact of admissions standards at thecolleges where most minority students seek to attend has yet to be analyzed in anyserious way.

Our best indicator of the impact of admissions standards is the role of communitycolleges in social stratification. Our best data indicates that students at communitycolleges are, certeris paribus, about 13% less likely to ultimately earn the bachelor’sdegree than native students (Whitaker and Pascarella, 1994), which can range as high as20% at urban institutions, and even higher for minority students (Lavin and Hyllegard,1996). And if California and Texas are any indication, fewer and fewer students, butespecially minority students are eligible for admission to any selective public four-yearcampus (Bucks, 2003a; Bucks, 2003b; Pusser, 2001). Thus, the impact of changingadmission standards on overall graduation rates will be substantial, with consequences forboth students and society on educational attainment, earnings, and state revenues. Yetadmissions standards often ensure that the major growth sector in public higher education– indeed, the only growth sector – will be the community college segment.

This argument can be overstated – enrolling at a community college is hardly adeath sentence. Community college students who ultimately transfer to a four-yearcollege are just as likely to graduate and earn high grades as native students (Dougherty,1992). Nonetheless, it seems clear that the impact of students cascading down publichigher education will have substantial implications for society, diversity in our publicuniversities, and ultimately equal opportunity and access for students of all races andincome levels. For those truly interested in college access, cascading and institutionalstratification are emerging and salient areas for future policy research.

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Trow, Martin. 1987. “The Analysis of Status.” Pp. 132-164 in Burton R. Clark (Ed.),Perspectives on Higher Education: Eight Disciplinary and Comparative Views.Berkeley: University of California Press.

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University of Massachusetts President’s Office. 2001. “Race/Ethnicity of First-TimeFreshmen, Full-Time and Part-Time, Fall 1990 to Fall 2000.” Boston: UMPO.

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25

Table 1. First-Time Freshman Admissions at the University of Massachusetts, Fall1997 to Fall 2001

Fall1997

Fall1998

Fall1999

Fall2000

Fall2001

Four-Year% Change

Amherst Applications 18,006 17,691 19,915 19,499 18,625 3.4% Acceptance Rate .73 .74 .69 .67 .73 Yield .28 .29 .30 .28 .31 Avg. SAT math 557 565 570 569 565 Avg. SAT verbal 551 558 564 558 552 Avg. SAT comb. 1108 1124 1134 1127 1117 0.8% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 3.09 3.16 3.26 3.31 3.33 6.8%Boston Applications 2,305 2,466 2,724 2,667 2,652 15.1% Acceptance Rate .63 .59 .62 .59 .58 Yield .44 .46 .47 .45 .46 Avg. SAT math 505 514 516 532 535 Avg. SAT verbal 508 505 518 514 522 Avg. SAT comb. 1013 1019 1034 1046 1057 4.3% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.81 2.82 2.83 2.84 2.84 1.1%Dartmouth Applications 3,311 3,626 4,509 4,915 5,070 53.1% Acceptance Rate .68 .72 .69 .73 .67 Yield .40 .44 .38 .38 .35 Avg. SAT math 509 510 518 525 528 Avg. SAT verbal 512 511 512 518 521 Avg. SAT comb. 1021 1021 1029 1042 1050 2.8% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.83 2.87 2.89 2.98 3.04 7.4%Lowell Applications 3,316 3,445 3,237 3,309 3,286 -1.0% Acceptance Rate .81 .74 .71 .67 .70 Yield .38 .40 .42 .45 .43 Avg. SAT math 520 534 529 538 538 Avg. SAT verbal 519 519 514 523 520 Avg. SAT comb. 1039 1054 1044 1061 1058 1.8% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.84 2.96 2.99 2.97 2.98 5.3%

26

Table 1 (continued)Fall1997

Fall1998

Fall1999

Fall2000

Fall2001

Four-Year% Change

UMass Total Applications 26,938 27,228 30,385 30,390 29,633 10.0% Acceptance Rate .72 .73 .69 .67 .70 Yield .32 .34 .34 .33 .34 Avg. SAT math 541 548 551 553 553 Avg. SAT verbal 538 540 544 542 540 Avg. SAT comb. 1080 1088 1096 1094 1093 1.2% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.99 3.05 3.12 3.15 3.19 6.7%Massachusetts Avg. SAT math 508 508 511 513 515 Avg. SAT verbal 508 508 511 511 511 Avg. SAT comb. 1016 1016 1022 1024 1026 1.0%Source: Board of Higher Education, Enrollment and Admissions Summary Report, Fall[1997-2000]; BHE, 2001; RPEDS and HEIRS data provided by the BHE; MassachusettsDepartment of Education; author’s calculations.

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Table 2. First-Time Freshman Admissions at Massachusetts State Colleges, Fall1997 to Fall 2001

Fall1997

Fall1998

Fall1999

Fall2000

Fall2001

Four-Year% Change

Bridgewater Applications 4,987 5,237 4,680 4,469 4,681 -6.1% Acceptance Rate .69 .66 .76 .81 .74 Yield .34 .33 .32 .36 .34 Avg. SAT math 487 493 491 493 501 Avg. SAT verbal 494 502 501 501 508 Avg. SAT comb. 982 995 992 993 1009 2.7% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.73 2.78 2.81 2.86 2.92 7.0%Fitchburg Applications 2,010 2,223 1,653 2,195 2,094 4.2% Acceptance Rate .72 .66 .74 .66 .61 Yield .36 .37 .33 .31 .34 Avg. SAT math 480 484 478 502 501 Avg. SAT verbal 493 496 487 505 508 Avg. SAT comb. 974 980 964 1008 1009 3.6% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.87 2.71 2.78 2.90 2.92 1.7%Framingham Applications 2,911 3,309 3,195 3,445 3,730 28.1% Acceptance Rate .70 .64 .60 .62 .60 Yield .30 .30 .30 .29 .29 Avg. SAT math 483 492 494 492 498 Avg. SAT verbal 495 505 501 505 510 Avg. SAT comb. 979 997 995 998 1008 3.0% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.76 2.81 2.86 2.86 2.88 4.3%Mass Art Applications 935 950 1,049 1,012 1,137 21.6% Acceptance Rate .47 .48 .47 .46 .46 Yield .48 .47 .51 .49 .45 Avg. SAT math 515 520 536 529 532 Avg. SAT verbal 553 556 567 565 565 Avg. SAT comb. 1068 1076 1103 1094 1097 2.7% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 3.12 3.10 3.14 3.22 3.23 3.5%

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Table 2 (continued)Fall1997

Fall1998

Fall1999

Fall2000

Fall2001

Four-Year% Change

MCLA Applications 1,573 1,099 1,021 991 1,147 -27.1% Acceptance Rate .63 .65 .70 .70 .71 Yield .30 .31 .32 .35 .34 Avg. SAT math 484 473 497 489 498 Avg. SAT verbal 493 476 518 515 524 Avg. SAT comb. 977 949 1015 1004 1022 4.6% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.83 2.72 2.81 2.83 2.94 3.9%Mass Maritime Applications 378 434 364 514 503 33.1% Acceptance Rate .81 .82 .83 .75 .70 Yield .61 .57 .60 .55 .61 Avg. SAT math 504 521 517 524 527 Avg. SAT verbal 494 504 512 501 520 Avg. SAT comb. 998 1025 1029 1025 1046 4.8% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.73 2.82 2.72 2.79 2.76 1.1%Salem Applications 4,415 4,465 4,174 4,259 3,974 -10.8% Acceptance Rate .73 .69 .55 .59 .68 Yield .32 .31 .29 .31 .31 Avg. SAT math 453 454 477 471 474 Avg. SAT verbal 462 464 488 488 483 Avg. SAT comb. 915 918 965 959 957 4.6% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.70 2.71 2.87 2.88 2.81 4.1%Westfield Applications 3,432 3,425 3,430 3,570 3,525 2.7% Acceptance Rate .61 .62 .67 .64 .67 Yield .43 .39 .39 .38 .41 Avg. SAT math 489 497 496 501 509 Avg. SAT verbal 503 503 499 510 511 Avg. SAT comb. 992 1000 995 1012 1020 2.8% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.71 2.77 2.80 2.88 2.91 7.4%Worcester Applications 2,197 2,450 2,460 2,644 2,983 35.8% Acceptance Rate .56 .60 .52 .57 .54 Yield .39 .37 .39 .34 .37 Avg. SAT math 475 485 483 490 493 Avg. SAT verbal 483 491 487 489 499 Avg. SAT comb. 958 976 970 979 991 3.4% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.89 2.85 2.86 2.89 2.87 -0.7%

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Table 2 (continued)Fall1997

Fall1998

Fall1999

Fall2000

Fall2001

Four-Year% Change

State College Total Applications 22,838 23,592 22,026 23,033 23,774 4.1% Acceptance Rate .66 .65 .64 .65 .65 Yield .36 .35 .34 .35 .35 Avg. SAT math 481 487 493 495 499 Avg. SAT verbal 491 496 501 504 508 Avg. SAT comb. 972 982 994 998 1007 3.6% Avg. H.S. G.P.A. 2.77 2.78 2.84 2.88 2.90 4.7%Massachusetts Avg. SAT math 508 508 511 513 515 Avg. SAT verbal 508 508 511 511 511 Avg. SAT comb. 1016 1016 1022 1024 1026 1.0%Source: Board of Higher Education, Enrollment and Admissions Summary Report, Fall[1997-2000]; BHE, 2001; RPEDS and HEIRS data provided by the BHE; MassachusettsDepartment of Education; author’s calculations.

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Table 3. Proportion of Community College Enrollment to Total UndergraduateEnrollment, Massachusetts Public Higher Education, Fall 1996 to Fall 2001

UMass State Colleges CommunityColleges

CC Ratio

Fall 1996 44,727 37,032 66,779 .450Fall 1997 43,874 36,956 67,520 .455Fall 1998 44,066 35,950 71,804 .473Fall 1999 45,467 34,845 75,107 .483Fall 2000 45,469 33,922 76,716 .491Fall 2001 46,221 34,521 79,169 .495

5-YearChange

3.3% -6.8% 18.6% 10.0%

Source: BHE, 2002c; author’s calculations.

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Table 4. Public Higher Education Plans of Massachusetts High School Graduatesby Race and Ethnicity, 1995 to 2000

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 5-YearChange*

Black 3,278 3,420 3,517 3,824 3,823 3,999 22.0%2-Year Public 15.2% 13.9% 17.6% 13.5% 20.5% 22.1% 77.5%4-Year Public 17.4% 17.2% 18.1% 16.7% 15.5% 14.4% -1.1%2-Year Private 8.0% 8.7% 6.7% 4.3% 7.5% 6.1% -6.9%4-Year Private 22.4% 23.3% 19.9% 21.2% 21.2% 22.4% 22.0%Work/Military 16.7% 15.7% 17.8% 15.0% 15.2% 13.8% 0.9%% of Total Grads 6.8% 7.1% 7.2% 7.6% 7.4% 7.6%

Asian 1,804 1,841 1,938 2,088 2,267 2,320 28.6%2-Year Public 9.7% 11.0% 10.1% 10.8% 14.4% 16.0% 112.0%4-Year Public 24.2% 24.3% 26.2% 24.8% 24.8% 23.3% 23.8%2-Year Private 4.3% 3.4% 3.8% 2.6% 4.2% 4.4% 30.8%4-Year Private 43.3% 43.5% 43.9% 41.4% 38.8% 37.9% 12.5%Work/Military 8.4% 7.9% 7.8% 8.8% 8.5% 9.1% 38.8%% of Total Grads 3.8% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 4.4% 4.4%

Hispanic 2.699 2,927 3,053 3,306 3,325 3,486 29.2%2-Year Public 23.7% 24.8% 25.4% 24.4% 27.9% 29.0% 38.0%4-Year Public 14.7% 13.6% 13.4% 11.8% 11.2% 12.1% 6.3%2-Year Private 6.5% 6.3% 4.5% 4.5% 4.8% 5.9% 17.7%4-Year Private 12.5% 13.2% 12.5% 12.7% 12.1% 12.3% 27.3%Work/Military 25.6% 25.1% 30.4% 25.5% 28.2% 24.7% 24.6%% of Total Grads 5.7% 6.1% 6.2% 6.6% 6.5% 6.6%

White 39,844 39,733 40,434 41,159 41,984 43,034 8.0%2-Year Public 13.2% 13.5% 14.5% 15.2% 16.3% 16.3% 33.4%4-Year Public 23.9% 24.6% 23.7% 23.7% 23.8% 24.6% 11.2%2-Year Private 4.0% 3.4% 2.9% 2.7% 2.6% 2.7% -27.1%4-Year Private 31.1% 32.1% 32.3% 32.6% 32.4% 32.5% 12.9%Work/Military 20.7% 19.5% 19.5% 19.1% 18.4% 17.7% -7.7%% of Total Grads 83.6% 82.8% 82.5% 81.6% 81.6% 81.3%

Total 47,679 47,994 49,008 50,452 51,465 52,950 11.1%2-Year Public 13.8% 14.1% 15.2% 15.5% 17.3% 17.6% 41.6%4-Year Public 23.0% 23.4% 22.8% 22.5% 22.4% 23.0% 11.1%2-Year Private 4.5% 3.9% 3.3% 3.0% 3.2% 3.2% -21.1%4-Year Private 29.9% 30.8% 30.6% 30.7% 30.5% 30.6% 13.7%Work/Military 20.2% 19.0% 19.6% 18.8% 18.4% 17.5% -3.8%Source: Massachusetts Department of Education, Plans of Massachusetts High SchoolGraduates, 1995-2000. *Percentage increases are by total students.

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Table 5. Ratio of Community College Minority Enrollment to Total UndergraduateMinority Enrollment, Fall 1996 to Fall 2001

Fall1996

Fall1997

Fall1998

Fall1999

Fall2000

Fall2001

5-YearChange

UMass 6,812 6,935 7,124 7,268 7,108 7,268 6.3%State Colleges 2,922 3,040 2,957 2,803 2,828 2,833 -3.1%Community Colleges 11,693 12,751 13,768 15,023 15,477 17,188 47.0%Total 21,427 22,726 23,849 25,094 25,413 27,289 27.4%

Overall CC Ratio .450 .455 .473 .483 .491 .495 10.0%Minority CC Ratio .546 .561 .577 .599 .609 .630 15.4%Source: BHE, 2001d; 2002c; author’s calculations.

Table 6. Ratio of Community College Black Enrollment to Total UndergraduateBlack Enrollment, Fall 1997 to Fall 2001

Fall1997

Fall1998

Fall1999

Fall2000

Fall2001

4-YearChange

UMass 2,601 2,661 2,687 2,566 2,294 -11.8%State Colleges 1,305 1,275 1,223 1,232 1,047 -19.8%Community Colleges 5,410 5,913 6,370 6,418 6,331 17.0%Total 9,319 9,849 10,280 10,216 9,672 3.8%

Overall CC Ratio .455 .473 .483 .491 .495 8.8%Minority CC Ratio .561 .577 .599 .609 .630 12.3%Black CC Ratio .581 .600 .620 .628 .655 12.7%Source: BHE, 2002c; author’s calculations. Fall 1996 data not available.

33

Table 7. Ratio of Community College Latino Enrollment to Total UndergraduateLatino Enrollment, Fall 1997 to Fall 2001

Fall1997

Fall1998

Fall1999

Fall2000

Fall2001

4-YearChange

UMass 1,610 1,611 1,645 1,514 1,555 -3.4%State Colleges 929 927 871 870 891 -4.1%Community Colleges 4,795 5,235 5,780 6,032 6,821 42.3%Total 7,334 7,773 8,296 8,416 9,267 26.4%

Overall CC Ratio .455 .473 .483 .491 .495 8.8%Minority CC Ratio .561 .577 .599 .609 .630 12.3%Latino CC Ratio .654 .673 .700 .717 .736 12.5%Source: BHE, 2002c; author’s calculations. Fall 1996 data not available.

Table 8. Race/Ethnicity of First-Time Freshmen at University of MassachusettsAmherst and Boston, Full and Part-Time, Fall 1996 to Fall 2000

UMass Amherst UMass BostonBlack Latino ALANA Black Latino ALANA

Fall 1996 193 218 753 101 67 286Fall 1997 213 165 696 101 52 259Fall 1998 161 155 655 83 50 245Fall 1999 124 144 605 85 64 288Fall 2000 120 131 571 78 54 251

% Change -37.8% -39.9% -24.1% -22.8% -19.4% -12.2%Source: UMass President’s Office, 2001. ALANA = African American, Latino, Asian,and Native American.