Carantes v. CACarantes v. CACarantes v. CACarantes v. CA 76 SCRA 51476 SCRA 51476 SCRA 51476 SCRA 514 FACTS: Mateo Carantes died in 1913 leaving behind Lot No. 44 situated at Loakan, Baguio City to his wife and children. Petitioner Maximino Carantes, one of the sons of the late Mateo was appointed and qualified as judicial administrator of the estate. In 1930, the Government subdivided the Lot 44 into five (5) lots and expropriated lot 44-A for construction of the Loakan Airport. In June, 1939 petitioner listed in the project of partition lots 44-D and 44-E. On October 23, 1939 a deed of "Assignment of Right to Inheritance" was executed by the other heirs of Mateo assigning their right to the petitioner for a monetary consideration of P1.00. On the same date the deed was signed, petitioner sold to the Government the 2nd and 3rd lots and divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves. The deed was registered a year after and a new title was issued in favor of petitioner and on the same date the sale to the government has been formalized. On February 21,1947 a new title was issued in the name of the Government for the expropriated and sold to them, while TCT for the 2 remaining lots was issued in the name of the petitioner. On September 4, 1958 a complaint was filed by other heirs of Mateo, alleging that they executed the deed because they were made to believe by the petitioner that the said instrument merely authorized him to convey portions of the lot to the Government in their behalf to minimize expenses and facilitate the transaction; and that it was only on February 18, 1958, when the respondents secured a copy of the deed, that they came to know of the issue. They prayed that the deed be declared null and void and for the two (2) questioned Lots be partitioned into six (6) equal shares and the defendant be accordingly ordered to execute the necessary deeds of conveyance in favor of the other distributes and for petitioner to pay for the attorney's fees and costs of suit. Defendant on the other hand contend that respondent’s cause of action is barred by the statute of limitation and that plaintiffs' right to file the complaint had already prescribed on September 4, 1958; and (2) that the complaint states no cause of action because ownership over the property became vested in the defendant by acquisitive prescription ten years from its registration in his name on February 21, 1947. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents, however the Court of appeals reversed the lower court’s judgment, hence the present recourse. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not an express trust was created in favor of the private respondents. 2. Whether or not an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust is imprescriptible. 3. Whether or not an a continuing and subsisting trust exist. HELD :

1. No. The court held that definitely, no express trust was created in favor of the private respondents. If trust there was, it could only be — as held by respondent court — a constructive trust, which is imposed by law. In constructive trusts there is neither promise nor fiduciary relations; the so-called trustee does not recognize any trust and has no intent to hold the property for the beneficiary. 2. No. The court held that it is now settled that an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is prescriptible it prescribes in ten years. In this case the ten-year prescriptive period began on March 16, 1940, when the petitioner registered the deed of "Assignment of Right to Inheritance" and secured the cancellation of the certificate of title in the joint names of the heirs of Mateo Carantes, and, in lieu thereof, the issuance of a new title exclusively in his name. Since the present action was commenced only on September 4, 1958, it is clear that the same is barred by extinctive prescription. 3. No. The court held that there was no continuing and subsisting trust. From March 16, 1940, when the petitioner registered the deed of assignment and had the Certificate of title in the names of the heirs cancelled and a new certificate of title issued in his own name, he began to hold the property in open and clear repudiation of any trust. It will be noted that on the same date, the petitioner also executed a formal deed of sale over portions in favor of the Government. In 1948 he mortgaged Lot No. 44-D with the PNB his exclusive property. The petitioner's exercise of such rights of dominion is anathema to the concept of a continuing and subsisting trust. The circumstances, found by the respondent court, that the name of Mateo Carantes still appeared in the tax declaration as owner of the land and the name of the petitioner as administrator, that the real estate taxes, were shared by the other heirs with the petitioner, and that some of the heirs are living in houses erected by them on the land, wane in legal significance in the face of the petitioner's aforesaid uncontroverted acts of strict dominion. In connection with the payment of real estate taxes, it is to be noted that the respondent court also found that all the receipts were issued in the name of the petitioner. The circumstances mentioned above do not make out a case of a continuing and subsisting trust.