CANONS 5-6JUDGE AQUINO SIMBULAN v. BARTOLOMEFACTS:A letter complaint was filed by complainant Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), alleging that respondents Judge Nicasio V. Bartolome, together with Romana Pascual, Milagros Lerey, and Amor dela Cruz, Acting Clerk of Court, retired Clerk of Court and Docket Clerk, respectively, all of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, committed grave errors and discrepancies in processing the surety bond for the accused Rosalina Mercado in Criminal Case of Peopleof the Philippines v. Rosalina Mercado, et al.

Above case was originally raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41,San Fernando, Pampanga, where complainant Judge presides. On September 18, 2003, said branch of the RTC received an Indorsement from Warrant/Subpoena Officer PO3 Edwin Villacentino stating that the accused Mercado voluntarily surrendered before the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and posted her bail bond through Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co., Inc., which was duly approved by respondent Judge Bartolome on August 21, 2003. This prompted complainant to issue an Order[2]datedOctober 29, 2003, directing respondent Lerey, then Clerk of Court of the MTC, to transmit to the RTC within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of said Order, the bond which the former court approved. When the Clerk of Court failed to comply, complainant Judge issued an Order directing the former to explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt thereof why she should not be cited in contempt for delaying the administration of justice.

Then, onFebruary 12, 2004, the RTC received a written explanation[5]from Lerey stating that she had misplaced and overlooked the subject surety bond, which resulted in the delay of its transmission to the RTC. Upon perusal of the documents, complainant Judge discovered that the subject surety bond bore some erasures, and its attachments were highly anomalous. In view of these findings, the RTC issued a subpoenato respondents Pascual and Lerey directing them to appear before it to explain the aforementioned errors.Findings during investigation: 1.That respondent Judge issued an Order of Release datedAugust 21, 2003 WITHOUT a Certificate of Detention and Warrant of Arrest attached to the documents presented to him;2. Order of Release was datedAugust 21, 2003, the Undertaking and Certification from the bonding company were datedNovember 22, 2003andOctober 29, 2003, respectively; (malicious)3. That it was Lerey who reviewed the documents before the surety bond was referred to respondent Judge for the latters approval; andAfter the hearing, Public Prosecutor Otto Macabulos stated that he found the explanation too shallow and self-serving, and that he would file an indirect contempt case under Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure against Lerey and Dela Cruz.In her manifestation/CompliancedatedOctober 25, 2004, Lerey admitted lapses and negligence in processing the subject bail bond and was remorseful for what happened. On the other hand, Dela Cruz stated that there was no wrongdoing on her part in the processing of the subject bail bond and that she merely followed instructions in mailing the said bail bond to the RTC.The RTC found Lerey guilty of indirect contempt and sentenced her to pay a fine ofP10,000.00, which she duly paid.However, it absolved Dela Cruz from any liability as it found her explanation meritorious.In the meantime, in his 1stIndorsement[12]dated February 26, 2004, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jose P. Perez referred to the Clerk of Court of the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan the Orders issued by complainant Judge relative to the surety bond for comment.However, there was nothing on record to show that said Clerk of Court complied with the directive.

Afterwhich, DCA Perez also issued a 1stIndorsement[13] to respondent Judge referring to the letter dated April 27, 2004 of complainant Judge, which discussed the errors and discrepancies regarding the approval of the bail bond of the accused in Criminal Case No. 13360, with the instruction to the former to submit his comment thereto.In compliance, respondent judge denied liability concerning his approval of the bond. It was Lerey who caused delay in transmitting the bond to RTC which the latter admitted. OCA: In approving the surety bond of the accused, respondent Judge violated Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[25]In the instant case, the accused Rosalina Mercado was not arrested. IN THE CASE AT BAR, the accused must have filed the bond w/in the province of Pampanga or City of San Fernando. Instead, accused Mercado filed her bond in the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, where respondent Judge presides, who approved the same and ordered her release from custody.Respondent judge did not require accused to submit the supporting documents pertinent to the application for a bond . It appears that there was no Certificate of Detention presented to him; hence, there was no legal justification for him to issue the Order of Release and process the bond since the accused was not detained within his jurisdiction.HELD:The Court holds that there were indeed grave errors and discrepancies committed by respondents Judge Bartolome and Lerey in processing the surety bond for the accused in Criminal Case No. 13360.Sec. 14: bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.Note: Sec. 16: Whenever bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge accepting the bail shall forward the bail, the order of release and other supporting papers to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different one to be filed.

The OCAs Report revealed that the accused Rosalina Mercado was not arrested. The OCAs Report revealed that the accused Rosalina Mercado was not arrested.

FAILURE TO REQUIRE SUBMISSION OF SUPPORTING DOC. . There was no Certificate of Detention or Warrant of Arrest attached to the bond transmitted by the MTC to the complainant Judge.Moreover, the other supporting documents were belatedly filed.For Lerey, she admitted her negligence when she misplaced and overlooked the surety bond policy, resulting in the delay in the transmission of said documents to the RTC. Notably, she also failed to give an explanation for the erasures which complainant discovered on the surety bond.By such acts, it is evident that Lerey did not measure up to the standards required.ROLE OF CLERK OF COURT. Vital in the prompt and sound administration of justice since his or her office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes, and concerns.He or she also has the dutyto ensure an orderly and efficient record management system in the court and to supervise the personnel under her office to function effectively.But, because of the negligence of the Lerey, respondent judge CANNOT BE EXCUSED FROM LIABILTY.Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[33]the acts of respondent Judge and Lerey may be classified as gross neglect of duty, which is punishable by dismissal under Rule IV, Section 52 A(2) thereof.Neglect of duty denotes the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him. Gross neglect is such neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare.NOTE: In Ulat-Marrero v. Torio, Jr. the Court has categorized as a grave offense of gross neglect of duty, the failure of a court process server to serve summons which resulted in the delayed resolution of a case.As corollarily applied to the present case, where respondents released the accused on temporary liberty despite the absence of the required supporting documents for bail, the former are likewise liable for gross neglect of duty.

SC: Were it not for the fact that both respondents, Judge Bartolome and Lerey, have retired onOctober 11, 2006andAugust 26, 2003, respectively, the Court would have dismissed them from the service.RULING: JUDGE NICASIO BARTOLOME (RETIRED)GUILTYOFGROSS NEGLECT OF DUTYFOR AND TO PAY P40,000.00)TO BE DEDUCTED FROM HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS; AND Clerk of Court Milagros Lerey (retired)GUILTYofGROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY P40,000.00 to be deducted from her retirement benefits.

RE: ORDER BY JUDGE BONIFACIO v. GENABEFACTS:This administrative matter against Loida M. Genabe (Genabe), Legal Researcher II of the RTC of Las Pias City, stemmed from a Letter dated 22 December 2006 addressed to the OCA filed by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda (Judge Maceda) of the same trial court.Judge Maceda attached his Order dated 21 December 2006 suspending Genabe for 30 days by reason of neglect of duty for attending a two-day seminar despite a pending assignment.In the letter, Judge Maceda requested that the salary of Genabe be withheld for the period 21 December 2006 to 20 January 2007 since the suspension was immediately executory.

Escabarte (Atty. Escabarte), Branch Clerk of Court of the same trial court, issued an Inter-Office Memorandum to Genabe referring to her neglect, in leaving for Baguio City on 16 to17 November 2006 to attend a seminar for legal researchers, without finishing her assigned task. The assigned task required Genabe to summarize the statement of facts in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0059 to 03-0063 entitled People of the Philippines v. Marvilla, et al.,Atty. Escabarte (Clerk of court) reminded Genabe that such act could not be tolerated and that similar acts in the future would be meted an appropriate sanction.

ANSWER: Genabe submitted her explanation regarding the unfinished assigned case.She stated that she was not able to complete the summary due to lack of transcript of stenographic notes (TSN).Genabe added that she be absolved for humane considerations.

DISRESPECT. When Judge Maceda called a staff meeting to discuss several matters in the agenda, including the inter-office memorandum allegedly, even before the staff meeting, Genabe resented the issuance of the memorandum and became disrespectful to the court staff, including the clerk of court.At the meeting, Genabe allegedly continued her combative behavior in total disregard of the presence of Judge Maceda. Judge Maceda ordered Genabe to show cause why she should not be cited in contempt by the court and why she should not be administratively sanctioned for conduct unbecoming, neglect of duty and misconduct.

REPLY: Genabe attributed the lack of stenographers, which was beyond her control, as the cause of the delay in the transcriptions of the minutes of the meeting.As a counter-charge, Genabe claimed that Judge Maceda disciplines his staff on a selective basis.

When a fact-finding investigation whose agenda is focused on the charges of contempt, conduct unbecoming, among others was conducted by Judge Maceda to all staff members, Genabe did not appear despite notice. Later, she appeared to say that she was waiving her right to be present in the investigation.THEN A SUSPENSION ORDER AGAINST HER WAS ISSUED.

SUSPENDED. In a Letter dated 22 December 2006, Judge Maceda suspended Genabe for a period of 30 days, using as authority the power given to appropriate supervisory officials in disciplining personnel of their respective courts as provided in Article II, Section A(2)(a) of Circular No. 30-91. Genabes salary be withheld for the period 21 December 2006 to 20 January 2007.

After 30 days, Genabe reported back to work w/ return of salary.

HOWEVER, Judge Maceda endorsed his Investigation Report and Recommendation to the OCA, EVEN WITHOUT ANY DIRECTIVE FROM THE LATTER.The report mainly focused on the alleged unruly conduct of Genabe during the staff meeting.

There was no action from OCA but when this was elevated to the SC, Judge Maceda reasoned: that there were other charges against Genabe, such as conduct unbecoming and grave misconduct, Thus, he endorsed the determination of such other charges to the OCA, including whether the heavier penalty of dismissal or replacement might be warranted.

OCA: Judge Mcedas explanation was UNSATISFACTORY.

The OCA added that it was clear from the Guidelines that Judge Maceda had no authority to directly penalize a court employee. As an Executive Judge, he only had the right to act upon and investigate administrative complaints involving light offenses.The power to decide and impose a penalty, even for light offenses, rests with the Supreme Court.

HELD:

After a careful review of the records of the case, we find reasonable grounds to hold both Genabe and Judge Maceda administratively liable.

SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY. The Court found Genabe guilty of simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty has been defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to a task expected of him and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. She was assigned to summarize the testimonies of three defense witnesses for a criminal case set for promulgation.The records reveal that Genabe was only able to SUMMARIZE THE TSN OF ONE WITNESS CONSISTING OF 46 PAGES AND FAILED TO FINISH THE TSN OF THE OTHER TWO WITNESSES CONSISTING OF 67 PAGES.Before leaving for Baguio, Genabe had three working days to complete the task.However, the assignment remained unfinished.When such task was assigned to another court employee, it only took the other employee two and a half hours to complete the TSN of the two witnesses.

IDEM; PENALTY. As a first offense under civil service law, we impose the penalty of suspension without pay for a period of one month and one day.[5]The suspension imposed upon Genabe under the Order dated 21 December 2006 shall be considered as the penalty imposed.

FOR THE JUDGE. The reliance of Judge Maceda on the provisions of this circular is misplaced.The decision by Judge Maceda was issued Nov. 2006, while a set of new guidelines was already in effect insofar as Disciplinary actions involving light offenses are concerned. That is, Section 1, Chapter VIII of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which states among others: In the preceding instances, the Executive Judge shall conduct the necessary inquiry and submit to the OCA the results thereof with a recommendation as to the action to be taken thereon, including the penalty to be imposed, if any, within thirty (30) days from termination of said inquiry.

NOTE: The guidelines clearly provide that the authority of judges to discipline erring court personnel, with light offenses, is limited to conducting an inquiry only. OCA will be the one to recommend on what action should be taken.

We hold that the penalty of fine in the amount ofP12,000 is commensurate to Judge Macedas violation of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC.

RULING: GUILTY OF SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE. THE REMAINING 1 DAY SHALL BE IMPOSED UPON FINALITY OF DECISION AND STERNLY WARNED; JUDGE WAS FINED P12K.

SANTIAGO III v. J. ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:

Genaro Santiago III (complainant) filed against CA Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. (respondent), for gross ignorance of the law and jurisprudence and gross incompetence in connection with his rendering of alleged unjust judgment inGenaro C. Santiago III versus Republic of the Philippines.

Complainant filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate of Title No. 56, registered in the name of Pantaleona Santiago and Blas Fajardo. Quezon City RTC granted the petition but People appealed to CA.

DISSENT. J. Gonzales Sison submitted her report which was used as basis for the Divisions consultation and deliberation. Respondent dissent from the report (NOTE: Respondent justice was the Chairperson in this div.) Justice Veloso, who originally concurred in the Report, requested Justice Gonzales-Sison, by letterto TAKE A SECOND LOOK AT RESPONDENTS DISSENTING OPINION, as the reasons [Justice Enriquez] gave are strong enough to be ignored by plain technicality.

However, Justice Veloso soon expressed his concurrence with respondents Dissenting Opinion.[12]Justice Bersamin expressed his concurrence with the Report of Justice GonzalesSison,[13]while Justice Cruz expressed his concurrence with respondents Dissenting Opinion.[14] WITH THIS, THE DISSENTING OPINION BECAME THE MAJORITY OPINION OF SUCH SPECIAL DIVISION.

Complainant then filed a Motion for Disqualification on the ground that he filed this admin complaint against respondent. CA DENIED MOTION. PRESENT COMPLAINT: respondent allegedly deliberately twisted the law and existing jurisprudence GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW/GROSS INCOMPETENCE is now being filed against respondent Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.

HELD:

The complaint is bereft of merit.PROPER REMEDY: The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction.AN ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY WHERE JUDICIAL RECOURSE IS STILL AVAILABLE, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition forcertiorari,unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonestyThe Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of the arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus,unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice, The failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render a judge administratively liable.NOTE: Assumingarguendothat respondents citation of cases in support of the Decision and his appreciation of the facts and evidence were erroneous, since there is no showing that the Decision, reconsideration of which was still pending at the time the present complaint was filed, is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty or was rendered with deliberate intent to cause injustice, the complaint must be dismissed.JUDICIAL IMMUNITY. Insulates judges, and even Justices of superior courts, from being held to account criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.[25]To hold otherwise would render judicial office untenable. No one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice could be infallible in his judgment.[26]Alzua and Arnalot v. Johnson- This concept ofjudicial immunityrests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose beingto preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary.This principle is of universal application and applies to all grades of judicial officers from the highest judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a court.NOTE: the filing of charges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate. The Decision was not rendered by respondent in his individual capacity.It was a product of the consultations and deliberations by theSpecialDivision of five.CA is acollegiate courtwhose members reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberationRULING: DISMISSED.

3D INDUSTRIES v. J. ROXASFACTS:The verified May 13, 2005 Complaint[1]with enclosures of 3-D Industries, Inc. (3-D), and Smartnet Philippines, Inc. (Smartnet) represented by Gilbert Guy (Gilbert), against CA Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas,for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act[2](R.A. 3019, as amended)relative to the admission, by the Eighth Division of the CA, of which said Justices were members.Antecedents from Guy v. Court of Appeal:Herein complainant Smartnets representative Gilbert is the son of the spouses Francisco and Simny Guy.The spouses organized Northern Islands Co., Inc. (NICI) which is engaged in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of various home appliances bearing the 3-D trademark.

The spouses also organized Lincoln Continental Development Corporation, Inc. (Lincoln Continental) as a holding company of 50% of the 20,160 shares of stock of NICI in trust for their three daughters Geraldine, Gladys and Grace-sisters of Gilbert.

Finding that their son Gilbert had been dissipating the assets of Lincoln Continental, the Sps. Guy caused the registration of 50% of the 20,160 shares of stock of NICI in the names of their three daughters, thus enabling the latter to assume an active role in the management of NICI.

Lincoln Continental filed a complaint at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against NICI and Gilberts parents-the spouses Guy and three sisters (hereafter the Guy family), forannulment of the transfer of the 50% NICI sharesof stock to Gilberts sisters.The complaint, prayed for, among other things, the restoration of the management of NICI to Gilbert, and the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to prohibit Gilberts sisters from exercising any right of ownership over the questioned shares.Lincoln Continental later filed a Motion to Inhibit the Presiding Judge of RTC Manila to which its complaint was raffled on the ground of partiality. The Motion was granted and the case was re-raffled to Branch 46 of the same court.

NICI and Guy family challenged the inhibition of the Presiding Judge of Branch 24 via CertiorariandMandamusbefore the CA in which they prayed for, among other things, the issuance of an order restraining the Presiding Judge of Branch 46 from further hearing.

RTC: In favor of Lincoln (Gilbert will be return to the mgt)

NICI filed a petition for certiorari praying for the nullification of said decision.

On the other hand, herein Smartnet, one of the occupants of the NICI premises, filed on December 16, 2004 with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City acomplaint for forcible entryagainst NICI and the Guy family,

Gilbert later filed acomplaint for replevinon behalf of 3-D, before the RTC of Pasig City.The complaint was given due course RTC Pasig which issued on January 18, 2005 a writ of replevin in favor of 3-D, prompting the NICI and the Guy family to file on January 20, 2005 before the CA-Eighth Division aSupplemental Petitionfor Certiorari with Urgent Motion for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to Include Supervening Events. The Supplemental Petition[5]impleaded as additional respondents herein complainant 3-D, Judges Celso D. Lavia, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 71,PasigCityand Sheriff Cresencio Rabello, Jr.,alleging that Gilbert, in an attempt to circumvent the TROs and injunctive writ issued by the CA-Eighth Division, allowed himself to be used by 3-D by filing, onits behalf, a complaint for replevin.The appellate courts Eighth Division issued the questioned ResolutionadmittingtheSupplemental Petition for Certiorari.

In the present administrative complaint, complainants allege that in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated January 24, 2005andApril 26, 2005 (restrained the additionally impleaded respondents including Smartnet from disturbing the December 22, 2004 writ of preliminary injunction), respondents caused undue injury to them by, among other things, giving the petitioners (NICI and the Guy Family) in the new petition forCertiorari unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of their judicial functions in violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.[9]

Finally, complainants allege that the Divisions in which respondents were sitting had mutated into a judicial vending machine, regularly dispensing TROs and injunctions at an impressive maximum of five days from the filing of the pleadings by the petitioners.[12] Complainants add that the appellate courts Eighth Division acted with undue haste in precipitately admitting the two Supplemental Petitions forCertiorarion the basis of the bare and unsubstantiated allegation that Gilbert was using herein complainants as his alter egos to wrest control and possession of the assets and properties of NICI.NOTE:.It bears noting that the complaintwas indorsed by the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court specifically for a determination of whether respondents acted within their duties, pursuant toFuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao

2 WAYS BY WHICH RA 3019 MAY VIOLATED: There are two ways by which Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 may be violated,[16]viz: 1)by giving undue injury to any party, including the Government, 2)by causing any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.These acts must be committed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.

MANIFEST PARTIALITY- a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other. BAD FAITH connotes not only bad judgment or negligence, but also a dishonest purpose, a conscious wrongdoing, or a breach of duty amounting to fraud. GROSS NEGLIGENCE is the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons are concerned.

NOTE: That the assailed Resolutions issued by respondents favored NICI and the Guy family does not necessarily render respondents guilty of violation ofSection 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, absent proven particular acts of manifest, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good faith and regularity being generally presumed in the performance of official duties by public officers.That is why administrative complaints against judges must always be examined with a discriminating eye for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that they stand to face the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment. Subject order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties MUST NOT ONLY BE CONTRARY TO EXISTING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, MUST BE ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH, FRAUD, DISHONESTY OR CORRUPTION.[23]

NOTE: Since the impleading of additional parties, on motion of any party ormotu proprioat any stage of the action and/or such times as are just is allowed,[24]the Court finds that respondents participation in the admission of the supplemental petitions impleading complainants DOES NOT RENDER THEM LIABLE. (mere allegation that a corporation is the alter ego of the individual stockholders is insufficient, NOT EVERY MISTAKE WILL RENDER JUDGE LIABLE.)

RULING: DISMISSED.

OCAMPO v. JUDGE CHUA (at the back)

ATTY. DESCALLAR v. JUDGE RAMAS

FACTS:

Atty. Norlinda R. Amante-Descallar, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 18, filed seven administrative complaints against respondent Judge Reinerio Abraham B. Ramas, of the same court, for gross ignorance of the law, gross negligence, and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.InMisc. No. 2820, she claimed that in the Order dated August 18, 2006, respondent granted the motion for execution of the prevailing party by counting the five year period provided in Section 6 of Rule 39 from the counsels receipt of the Entry of Judgment.Complainant averred that Rule 39 expressly provides that the five year period is reckoned from the date of entry of judgment; and not from the date of receipt by counsel; that jurisprudence is replete with rulings that a final judgment ceases to be enforceable after that period, but merely gives the prevailing party a right of action to have the same revived.Hence, respondent should be disciplined for gross ignorance of the law and violation of Rule 3.02[1]Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[2]Complainant averred that respondents conduct was contrary to the provisions on plea bargaining in Section 2 of Rule 116, Rules on Criminal Procedure[5]and Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 8493,[6]and Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98.[7]She argued that it was unclear whether the offended party consented and whether the prosecutor has proper authority to enter into such agreement; and that plea bargaining is limited to a plea to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.[8]InMisc. No. 2824, complainant alleged that the validity and propriety of the plea entitled People v. Dumpit and the dismissal of one case as a consequence thereof are questionable.Respondent approved the plea bargaining agreement entered into by the prosecution and the accused[9]and dismissed Crim. Case No. 5760-2K and Crim. Case No. 5762-2K as a consequence of plea bargaining.Upon arraignment,[10]accused pleaded guilty to the sale of shabu.Thereafter, respondent issued a Decision[11]finding the accused guilty of selling shabu in Crim. Case No. 5761-2K.The next day, the accused applied for probation and was released on recognizance.[12]InMisc. No. 2860, complainant allegedthat on the strength of Search Warrant No. 87-04,[18]the accused in Criminal Case No. 7235-2K4 was arrested after a search conducted in his residence.After arraignment, accused filed a Motion to Quash the Search Warrant and Suppress Evidence.However, the prayer[19]in said motion inadvertently asked for the quashal of another search warrant issued in another case. respondent exhibited gross ignorance in issuing Search Warrant 87-04 and thereafter invalidating the same for failing to comply with the requisites of a Search Warrant; and that respondent issued several search warrants beyond the territorial jurisdiction of his court which were eventually invalidated thereby putting the efforts of the arresting officers to naught.ISSUE: Whether respondent judge is administratively liable for the alleged erroneous rulings and issuances made by him in the exercise of his judicial functions?HELD:ELEMENTARY RULE: not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. InMaquiran v. Grageda,[26]the Court held that alleged error committed by judges in the exercise of their adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies.Established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. EXHAUSTION OF JUDICIAL REMEDIES IS A PRE-REQ.FOR THE TAKING OF OTHER MEASURES AGAINST JUDGES.NOTE: It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.Law and logic decree that administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof. WHY? Since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions.InMisc. No. 2820, the Court agrees with the OCA that the ruling of the respondent as to the interpretation of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court does not automatically subject him to administrative liability for gross ignorance of the law.WHY? (1) There is no showing that parties to the case have exhausted judicial remedies against the alleged erroneous ruling- the parties still have available remedies to contest said ruling.An administrative complaint is NOT AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction.[27]Second, there was no showing and neither was it alleged that the issuance of the ruling was attended with bad faith, malice, or dishonesty.As regardsMisc. No. 2825andMisc. No. 2887, the Court finds that respondent violated the basic and fundamental constitutional principle of due process when he granted the motions filed by the accused in the criminal cases subject of these administrative complaints without giving the prosecution its day in court.Worse, respondent disregarded the period he gave for the prosecution to file comment on the motions.Such action cannot be characterized as mere deficiency in prudence, or lapse of judgment but a blatant disregard of established rules.Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction. SCOPE: the same applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment.

WHEN IS GROSS IGNORANCE? Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law

With respect toMisc. No. 2821 and Misc. No. 2824. At the time the assailed rulings were issued, the prohibition on plea-bargaining provided in Section 20-A of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is not absolute.It applies only when the person is charged under R.A. No. 6425 where the imposable penalty isreclusion perpetuato death.Though Sections 15 and 16 of the said law, under which the accused was charged, provide that the sale and possession of these drugs is punishable byreclusion perpetuato death, these penalties may only be imposed if the same were of the quantities enumerated in Section 20.[32]If the quantity involved is less than that stated, the penalty shall range fromprision correccionaltoreclusion perpetuadepending on the quantity.[33]

It is to be noted that the decision to accept or reject a plea bargaining agreement is within the sound discretion of the court subject to certain requirements of statutes or rules.

Respondent was also charged w/ gross negligence inMisc. No. 2824andMisc. No. 2860.Misc. No. 2824relates to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 40-03 where the name of the accused in the caption differs from that mentioned in the body.On the other hand,Misc. No. 2860relates to the Order quashing a Search Warrant in another criminal case and reproducing the Prayer in the Motion to Quash filed as its dispositive portion.The errors committed by respondent judge in the mentioned cases could have been avoided had he exercised diligence and prudence expected of him before affixing his signature. As held by the Court inPadilla v. Judge Silerio,[37]in the discharge of the functions of his office, a judge must strive to act in a manner that puts him and his conduct above reproach and beyond suspicion. He must act with extreme care for his office indeed is laden with a heavy burden of responsibility.RULING: 1)of gross ignorance of the law in Misc. No. 2825 and Misc. No. 2887, for which he is suspended from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits;2)of negligence in Misc. No. 2860 and Misc. No. 2824, for which he is meted a FINE of P5,000.00. Respondent isSTERNLY WARNEDthat a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

TIERRA FIRMA ESTATE v J. QUINTINFACTS:This is a complaint filed against Judge Edison F. Quintin, Presiding Judge of theMTC Branch 56, Malabon, Metro Manila, for failure to decide Civil Case No. JL00-026, entitled Tierra Firma Estate & Development Corporation v. Consumer Commodities International, Inc., within 30 days after it was submitted for decision, as required under Rule 70, 9 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on Summary Procedure.It appears that on September 14, 2000, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by complainant against Consumer Commodities International, Inc. in the MTC of Malabon, Metro Manila. After the defendant had filed its answer, the case was set for preliminary conference on December 7, 2000. Despite due notice, THE DEFENDANT DID NOT APPEAR. Consequently, respondent judge considered the case submitted for decision. However, notwithstanding the motions for the early resolution of the case filed by complainant on March 2, 2001 and March 22, 2001, judgment was not rendered in the case until July 10, 2001.CONTENTION; REASON FOR DELAY: he has a heavy caseload resulting from the expanded jurisdiction of the MTC; that he also had to preside over the Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, Branch 54, as acting judge thereof since March 15, 1999; and that, as a result of a fire which destroyed the courthouse in July 2000, he had to hold proceedings in his original station in a single cramped room with no partitions and with the barest of facilitiesCOMPLAINANT: no intricate questions of fact and of law that would justify the delay of 210 days and that respondent judge tolerated dilatory tactics by the defendant by entertaining motions which are prohibited under Rule 70, 13 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

HELD:

Actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure, which was designed to ensure the speedy disposition of these cases. Indeed, these cases involve perturbation of the social order which must be restored as promptly as possible.[2]For this reason, the speedy resolution of such cases is thus deemed a matter of public policy.In this case, was submitted for decision on December 7, 2000. However, respondent judge rendered his decision only on July 10, 2001, or 215 DAYS AFTER THE CASE WAS SUBMITTED FOR DECISION, way beyond the 30-day period provided in Rule 70, 9 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Likewise, 11 of the same rule provides that the court shall render judgment within 30 days after receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same.NOTE: Contention as to heavy case load, the Court said: the designation of a judge to preside over another sala is an insufficient reason to justify delay in deciding a case.What respondent judge appears to overlook is that the delay in the disposition of the case is due in part to the fact that heentertained motions,[5]some of which are prohibited by the Rule on Summary Procedure, filed by the defendant which further protracted the resolution of the case AS TO THE COMPLAINANT: the continuing delay in the resolution of thecase has already caused grave damage to it considering that the defendant continued to occupy the leased property without paying rent and the accumulated unpaid rent has already reached more thanP350,000.00, to the detriment of complainant.JUSTICE DELAYED IS NOT JUSTICE DENIED. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on them

RULING: GUILTY OF INEFFICIENCY IN DISPOSITION OF CASES;REPRIMANDED AND WARNED.

RICON v MARQUEZ

FACTS:

CONSOLIDATED CASES: We resolve the present consolidated administrative complaints (1) A.M. No. RTJ-10-2253, filed, on August 22, 2002, by Atty. Perseveranda L. Ricon, Clerk of Court, charged Judge Placido C. Marquez, RTC, Branch 40, Manila, withGrave Abuse of Discretion/Authority, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a Judge;[1]and (2)A.M. No. P-06-2138, dated May 13, 2005[2]filed by Judge Marquez against Atty. Ricon,for Gross Mismanagement and Neglect, and Falsification

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2253, Ricon v. MarquezAtty. Ricon (Clerk of court) alleged that before Judge Sablan retired, the two of them paid a courtesy call on Judge Marquez, then the pairing judge of Branch 39.

Thereafter, or in the first week of March 2002, Judge Marquez set a meeting with the staff of Branch 39 and Judge Sablan.The first thing Judge Marquez asked at the meeting was who among the staff had already rendered five (5) years of service in the government.Most of the staff proudly raised their hands, but they felt insulted when Judge Marquez said that employees who have been in the public service for five years are corrupt, gago, tamad at makakapal ang mga mukha

The staff were shocked, but did not react to Judge Marquezs tirade out of respect for him.Judge Marquez then instructed Atty. Ricon to schedule the courts cases for hearing on Thursdays and Fridays, which she did, but Judge Marquez commenced hearing the cases only in June 2002.

Atty. Ricon further alleged that Judge Marquez laid down so many rules and regulations in the court, and one such rule required the changing of the covers of case records, which she found unreasonable. .Every time Judge Marquez discovered case records not prepared according to his specifications, he would get mad and voice out offensive remarks like tamad, hindi ginagawa ang mga trabaho (even in the presence of other people and even during hearings).

UTTERED: nilalahat ko na ang mga huwes na naupo dito, walang nagawang tama!Mali silang lahat, mga walang alam!

Atty. Ricon disagreed as the respondent judges predecessors were all honest, efficient, and considerate.

Atty. Ricon also claimed that Judge Marquez would often tell people that he is a basurero[7]in the office, picking all the mess left by his predecessors and the staff.

UNSATISFACTORY RATING. Further, Atty. Ricon claimed that she received the biggest blow in her life when Judge Marquez gave her an unsatisfactory rating, together with other members of the staff. Further: the lowest rating that she got from the previous judges was very satisfactory and, before she retired, Judge Sablan gave her a rating of outstanding.

UNREASONABLE RATING. Atty. Ricon wondered how Judge Marquez could correctly rate the staff, as he did, when he conducted hearings only two days a week and the longest time that he stayed with them was five hours, inclusive of the hearing of cases; in short, when Judge Marquez made the ratings, he had stayed with the staff for only 40 hours.

Finally, Atty. Ricon alleged that there were reports that Judge Marquez was using his chambers as living quarters, sleeping and eating within the courts premises and was, in fact, accosted by a roving policeman at the Manila City Hall at about two oclock in the morning.JUDGE: Denied allegations of uttering words like basurero alleging that Atty. Ricons allegations concerning his other unsavory remarks were a twisted and perverted version of the truth and were pure concoctions, malicious and devilish.

Also, denied using his chambers as living quarters. He explained that he had to work overnight to beat the 90-day deadline in deciding cases; during those sleepless nights, he stayed in his chambers and had oats for dinner.

RATING - In regard to the staffs performance ratings, Judge Marquez explained that he had nothing to do with the signing of the rating forms, as it was the clerk of court who took charge of the matter; he was not aware of any rule requiring confrontation between the supervisor and the ratee or between him and the whole staff regarding the unsatisfactory ratings he gave them.

HELD:

We approve and adopt Justice Carandangs recommendations.The findings and conclusions on which they were based were the result of a thorough and painstaking investigation.Use of insulting, unsavoury and intemperate language to Atty. Ricon and other litigants deviated from the proper and accepted decorum of a magistrate. Such was unprofessional and unethical.

Other charges against respondent judge should be dismissed. The judge cannot be made liable for grave abuse of discretion/authority or for grave misconduct for the unsatisfactory ratings he gave to Atty. Ricon and the other members of the staff, and for laying down many rules and regulations in Branch 39 to improve record keeping and case management.

JUDGES PREROG RE ASSESSMENT; FILING. that it was Judge Marquezs prerogative, given a pre-determined set of standards, to give his staff ratings which, in his honest assessment, are commensurate to their performance in the office, ratings which were subsequently upheld by the OCA PERC.Also, we cannot fault Judge Marquez in devising ways to straighten out the file of case records in the court, even through the mundane task of changing the colors of case folders.For his resolve to put in order the courts record keeping and case management, he should be commended, not criticized.

CONVERTED TO LIVING HEADQRTRS. J. Marquez remained in the court after office hours to do his work as a judge especially at the time when he was directed by the Court to act on cases left by Judge Sablan.Certainly, he cannot be made liable for the effort.

NO EVID FOR GROSS MISMGT. OF RECORDS. Even if records are not properly arranged attributed this to the limited space and facilities as the ones principally responsible for the situation.

RULING: FINED OF P1K. ALL OTHER CHARGES ARE DISMISSED.