Canon 7-9 Cases

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EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR

EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

R E S O L U T I O N

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other

has been rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant

(OBC) a Petition1[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to

impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar

Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation,

and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling

allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners andother people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries

to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications,

as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.

Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and

appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on

November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution2[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.



In his Answer ,3[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by

Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his

misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the

said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,

Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same

parties as “closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts

complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really

contained the word “Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-

disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar

Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can

dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still

pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required todisclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar

Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing

them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good

reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the

public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one whichcorresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by

such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character

includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under

Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “a lawyer shall be answerable for

knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for

admission to the bar .”5[5]



As regards Meling’s use of the title “Attorney”, the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation “Attorney” in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not

acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as

“attorney” whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his

communications as “Atty. Haron S. Meling” knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by

the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation “attorney” may render a person

liable for indirect contempt of court.6[6]

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign

the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that

Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.7[7]

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the

2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the

Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions

upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a

privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to

possess good moral character.8[8] The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition

precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in

the practice of law.9[9]



The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires

the applicant to aver that he or she “has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law,

rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or

convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any

pending case or charge against him/her.” Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not

reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done

under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence

of good moral character of the applicant.10[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the

applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded

of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even

if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral

character of the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of

his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed

upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation “Attorney”, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use,

cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya ,11[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of

the use of the title “Attorney” by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the

Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th

Judicial Shari’a District in

Marawi City, used the title “Attorney” in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a

contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only

practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who

has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counselors,” in the sense that theygive counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title “attorney” is

reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken

the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members

thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.12[12]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm






The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn

task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from

the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise

live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the

public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a

public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the

Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the

respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom

until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon

Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S.

Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the

suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from

taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same

is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their information

and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

RULE 139-A

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Section 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the

"Integrated Bar of the Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter

be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

Section 2. Purposes. — The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall be to elevate the

standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge

its public responsibility more effectively.

Section 3. Regions. — The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of the Integrated Bar, to wit:



(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao,

Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya,

and Quirino.

(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga,

Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales;

(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City;

(d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque,

Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal;

(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur,

Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon;

(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern

Samar, Samar, and Southern Leyte;

(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros

Occidental, Negros Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor.

(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan Del Sur,

Bukidnon, Camiguin, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Misamis Oriental, Surigao

del Norte, and Surigao del Sur; and

(i) Western Mindanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces of

Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu,

Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.

In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors shall, with the approval of the

Supreme Court, determine the Region to which the said province shall belong.

Section 4. Chapters. — A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in every province. Except as

hereinbelow provided, every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is

geographically situated.

A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political subdivisions or areas;

(a) The sub-province of Aurora;

(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;

(c) Quezon City;

(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;

(e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;



(f) Cebu City; and

(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a

member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the

absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one

Chapter.

Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by

the Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this Rule

notwithstanding.

Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on matters and problems of

common concern.

Section 5. House of Delegates. — The Integrated Bar shall have a House of Delegates of not more than

one hundred twenty members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as may be

according to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one

Delegate. On or before December 31, 1974, and every four years thereafter, the Board of Governors

shall make an apportionment of Delegates.

The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of the

House and shall end on the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next succeeding

annual convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two terms.

The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during the

month of April of each year for the election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports including

the annual report of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such other business as may be referredto it by the Board, and the consideration of such additional matters as may be requested in writing by at

least twenty Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be called by the Board of Governors to

consider only such matters as the Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates who have registered

for a convention, whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do business.

Section 6. Board of Governors. — The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine

Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis

of one Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list of nominees submitted by

the Delegates from the Region, provided that not more than one nominee shall come from any Chapter.

The President and the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the Governors from outside of themselves

as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become members of the Board.

The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and

until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for more

than two terms.



The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and such time and place as it

shall designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business.

Special meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the Board.

Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate Canons of

Professional Responsibility for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the Canons may be

amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.

The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out

the purposes of the Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.

Section 7. Officers. — The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President who

shall be chosen by the Governors immediately after the latter's election, either from among themselves

or from other members of the Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five Governors. Each of the regional

members of the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region which he represents.

The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of

their election and until their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall

automatically become the President for the next succeeding full term. The Presidency shall rotate from

year to year among all the nine Regions in such order or rotation as the Board of Governors shall

prescribe. No person shall be President or Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar for more than

one term.

The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as may be

required by the Board of Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board,

and to hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said officers and

employees need not be members of the Integrated Bar.

Section 8. Vacancies. — In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall beperformed by the Executive Vice President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the

President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of the term

of the office thus vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or disability of both the

President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to

hold office until the next succeeding election or during the period of disability.

The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of Officers

of the Integrated Bar shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or position is

for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Section 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as theBoard of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to

ten percent (10%) of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled

members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default

in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated



Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the

delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Section 11. Voluntary termination of membership; re-instatement . — A member may terminate his

membership by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall

immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a

member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys. Reinstatement may be

made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors and

approved by the Court.

Section 12. Grievance procedures. — The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for grievance

procedures for the enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of the Integrated

Bar, but no action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from

the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the Supreme Court.

Section 13. Non-political Bar . — The Integrated Bar shall be strictly non-political, and every activity

tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer

holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any politicalsubdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election of appointment to any position in the

Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the

moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any

judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or

instrumentality thereof.

Section 14. Positions honorary . — Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme

Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall receive any

compensation, allowance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any service rendered

therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the discharge of his functions.

Section 15. Fiscal matters. — The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated Bar

and shall have the power to make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper

Books of Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that the proper

audit is made of all accounts of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof.

Section 16. Journal . — The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of the

Integrated Bar, free copies of which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.

Section 17. Voluntary Bar associations. — All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may

hereafter be formed may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes

therewith.

Section 18. Amendments. — This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the

recommendation of the Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.

Section 19. Organizational period . — The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local

Chapters and toward this end shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges

throughout the Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on Saturday, February 17,



1973. In every case, the Commission shall cause proper notice of the date, time and place of the

meeting called to organize a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose, including the election of

a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and five Directors.

The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion the same among all the

Chapters as nearly as may be in proportion to the number of their respective members, but each

Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. The President of each Chapter shall concurrently be its

Delegate to the House of Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, except where the Chapter

is entitled to have more than one Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall also be a Delegate.

The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect additional as well as alternate

Delegates.

The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the Purpose

of electing a Board of Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and forthwith meet to

elect the Officers of the Integrated Bar. The Officers so chosen shall immediately assume their

respective positions.

Section 20. Effectivity . — This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP

Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

R E S O L U T I O N

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors

unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the

Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of



the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership

dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to

the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws

of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall

promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take

whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme

Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys.

Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the

Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter

adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the

membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to

Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to

submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for

resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety

and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,

however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule)1

— in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par.2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a

delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP

By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10

of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this

Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of

membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a

ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll ofAttorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court

Rule:



SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be

known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names

now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual

dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme

Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his

constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status

as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as

a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly

personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by

the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the

IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of

Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is

rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that

inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice

of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal

profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,

entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of thePhilippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in

that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on

January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments

adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual

data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the

integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'.

...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from

bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.

Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an

opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion

of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official

national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the



rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable

annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of

professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for

investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or

disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public

interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the

restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual

lawyers.3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have

been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important

profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with

public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in

the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of

the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court.4 The practice of law being clothed

with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the commongood, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice

Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the

exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 63975 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt

rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it

did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the

standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge

its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in

ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the

President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate throughPresidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of

public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,

property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to

secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the

Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law . To this

fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing

without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then

society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State

to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the

Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of

Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:



xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and

the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may

adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions

as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the

administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more

effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397),

and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the

power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission

to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the

Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the

practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his

exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of

the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper

authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did

not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed

the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with themseriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to

become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is

unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate).

Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his

constitutional freedom to associate.6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He

became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.7 All that integration actually does

is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive groupof which every lawyer is a ready a member.

8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend

the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The

only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to

further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require



that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of

the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the

Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment

of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its

constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and

the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the

respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a

reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is

quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for

carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a

deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.

Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of alicense to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the

police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its

existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a

matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is

recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by

payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and

as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's

public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a

lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,

disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are

indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding

such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in

a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar

Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers

does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as

a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument thatthis is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise

misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an

unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the

facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the

Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud.

The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."



The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the

Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice

of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the

respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial

A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of

Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,

Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent .

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J .:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against

respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a

member of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction

the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not

indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his

pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at

least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in

various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)

Annex

A

.......-

"Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1,

1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex

B

.......-

"Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13,

1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque,

MM



Annex

C

.......-

"An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File

Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in

CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that

only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled

to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the

payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the

Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the

removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar

standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP,

especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not

indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney

may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a

Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ

En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No.

11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14,1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on

appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and

January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be

respondent’s signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."13[1] Also

attached was a copy of the order,14[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.

of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration of his

conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.



On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification15[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent’s "last payment of

his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership

fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of

notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his

comment-memorandum,16[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:17[5]

3. That with respect to the complainant’s absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and

1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a

member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar

who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainant’s basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good

standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of

dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,

concealment of encumbrances. Chief

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and

reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional

Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was

appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as aJudge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a

light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would

surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his

dues.



Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the

present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his

principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple

farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is

legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the

payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe

in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the

subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such

exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted

upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only

to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused

compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even

with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such

fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly andfrustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act

of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and

honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution18[6] adopting and approving the

report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and

recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues.

Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a

resolution,19[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this

case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent’s suspension for three

months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent’s non-indication of the proper

IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter

complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter

President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in

1991."



While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he

has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes,

income taxes as an example."

. . . .

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,

respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the

"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the

present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent’s

Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines. Esmmis

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his

standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six

years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not

discuss this issue.

First . Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his

IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court,

he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and

1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years

in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice

and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax,

under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual

dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme

Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter

shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the

compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this

Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of

membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be aground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of

Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his

dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants

senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual

taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and



Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership

or association dues.

Second . By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and

the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code

of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF

THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Esmso

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court;

nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court

indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent’s advanced age, his express

willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,20[8] we believe the

penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is

later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)

YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty.

Llamas’ personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. ULANDU

FIRST DIVISION



PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

- v e r s u s - CORONA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and

BERSAMIN, JJ.

ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,

Respondent. Promulgated:

September 4, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J .:



This is a complaint for disbarment21[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &

Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of

professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his

clients22[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance23[3] and

expeditious collection on their claims.24[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called

them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit25[5] of James Gregorio

attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and



utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached

“respondent’s” calling card:26[6]

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano

Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821

Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:



CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN

REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,

INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH

AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS

ABROAD.

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation

of the said calling card.27[7]

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.28[8]



Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and

recommendation,29[9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of

complainant, violating Rule 8.0230[10] and other canons31[11] of the Code of Professional

Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or

through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13832[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the

CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would

merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the

recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s

professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in

furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.



Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by

which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,

HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a

business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.33[13] To allow a

lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in

the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which

every member of the bar is called.34[14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNEDPRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through

paid agents or brokers.35[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.36[16]



Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,

ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE.

This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an

attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)37[17] as a measure to protect

the community from barratry and champerty.38[18]

Complainant presented substantial evidence39[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the

very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent

indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.



Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during

the mandatory hearing.

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were

enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a

more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule

1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer

should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better

service, good result or reduced fees for his services.40[20] Again the Court notes that respondent never

denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s “referrals.”

Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office.41[21] Respondent committed an

unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of

the CPR.



Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent

violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s

interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.

Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he

has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the

interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for

transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is

handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of

his judgment may not be adversely affected.42[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case

he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money

to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject

matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.43[23] Either of these circumstances may lead

the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which



may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of

undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.44[24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice45[25] which calls for the

exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious

sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.46[26]

Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian

machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on

lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on

the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best

advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his



character and conduct.47[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by

publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer’s name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.48[28]

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial assistance.” The phrase was clearly

used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to

finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby

taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism

degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence

of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was

personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.



WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and

16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of

Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately

from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in

the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,

Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the

Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SECOND DIVISION

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, A.C. No. 7269

Complainant,

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,

PEREZ,

SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.



ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Promulgated:

Respondent. November 23, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana)

against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Antecedent Facts

Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil

Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the

counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged thatUlaso’s deed of sale over

the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an

ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284,

where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where

Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty.Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente’s

collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine

times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders

and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon

verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was

not a lawyer.



Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to

continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb),Busmente’s

former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his

signature in the Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela

Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case

No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him

since 2000, there was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices

from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to Busmente’s designated

office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmente’s only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his

former secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.

The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmente’s staff, alleging

Macasieb’s failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD

noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso’s case in her affidavit and that there was no mention

that she actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD

also noted that Macasieb was still working at Busmente’s office in November 2003 as shown by theaffidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb

resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied

Busmente’s allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice law using his office address without

his knowledge and only due to Dela Rosa’s connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmente’s allegation

that his signature on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate

with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to

submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the time he reserved his right to

submit the report.

The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years.

On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and

approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of Busmente’s

suspension to six months.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/november2011/7269.html#sdfootnote1sym














Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report4 from the NBI stating that the

signature in the Answer, when compared with standard/sample signatures submitted to its office,

showed that they were not written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-

2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmente’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her

illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.

The Ruling of this Court

We agree with the IBP.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

The Court ruled that the term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to

the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services.5 The

Court further ruled that holding one’s self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that

purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or

associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.6

The Court explained:

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of

law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be

limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right















conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to

maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the

public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those

unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves

upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession

enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make

possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law

makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the

unauthorized practice of law.7

In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented

herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is whether

Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able

to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of

Busmente’s staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his

office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were

still sent to Busmente’s office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa’s practice should have

ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.

We agree. Busmente’s office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7 December

2004 Order8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty.

Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban set the

preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for

Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmente’s claim that Macasieb

already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmente’s office.

Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of the

NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimensignatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The report shows that

Busmente only submitted to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report,

however, showed that there were other documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief

dated 14 November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana

also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29 August

2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to

impugn his signatures in these other documents.











Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know

about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status. Busmente’s allegation

contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:

a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND

ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo

Manila.

b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed by

IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment

docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan,

Metro Manila.

c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the Complaint-

Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;

d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other court

records as our legal counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we believed in good

faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred her tous (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;

e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which she

filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO

BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;

f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of

the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following elements of the offense are not

present, to wit:

1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the factsnarrated;

2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd

party;

3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are

absolutely false;







4. That the offender makes in a document

untruthful statements in the narration of facts.

And furthermore the untruthful narrations of

facts must affect the integrity which is not so in

the instant case.

g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her whether

she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would have been

unethical and shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that she has legal

qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her

to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave us paralegal assistance[.]

(Emphasis supplied)

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that

he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.

Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that

Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with

the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should

be suspended from the practice of law for six months.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente’s personal record in the Office of the Bar

Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Documents

Canon 7-9 Cases