PALE – Atty. Reyes, Jr

January 21, 2015

Bonita’s Notes

Canon 10

78.Hueysuwan-Florido vs. Atty. Florido, AC#5624, 1/20/2004

56 HUEYSUWAN FLORIDO v FLORIDO

Facts:

Natasha Hueysuwan-Florido (H-F) filed this administrative complaint against her husband James Florido for violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and usng a spurious and bogus CA resolution/order.

H-F admits that she and her husband live separately. They have two children. Sometime in Dec. 2001, Florido went to H-F’s house and showed her a photocopy of a resolution issued by the CA apparently giving to Florido the legal custody of their children. H-F doubted the authenticity of the CA resolution so she did not give her children to Florido.

Then in 2002, while H-F and her children were in the ABC Learning Center, Florido arrived accompanied by armed men. Florido demanded that H-F surrender custody of their children to him. H-F, fearing for her children’s safety, called the police. In the police station, H-F agreed to let the children sleep with Florido just for one night at a hotel. But when H-F heard of news that Florido was planning to take the children to Bacolod, she immediately took them away.

Florido then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of the CA resolution he presented to H-F earlier. This petition was dismissed because Florido did not appear and H-F presented a certification from the CA that there was no resolution granting Florido with legal custody of their children.

Thus, this present action. The IBP has recommended that Florido be suspended from the practice of law for 6 years.

Issue:

W/n Florido should be held liable for his actions.

Held:

SC says that Florido should be held liable. He violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01 and 10.02, by his act of making up a spurious CA resolution and using such false resolution to his aadvantage.

The SC thinks that suspension of 6 years is too much so they lowered the penalty to just a 2-year suspension.

79.De Zuzuarregui vs. Atty. Soguilon, AC#4495, 10/8/2008

R E S O L U T I O N

Tinga, J.:

Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr. against respondent Atty. Apolonia A.C. Soguilon. Complainant accuses respondent of misconduct, concealment of the truth and misleading the court. 

Respondent acted as counsel for the petitioner in LRC No. Q-7195 (95) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 93.In his letter[1] dated 15 September 1995,complainant narrated that in the course of the presentation of evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution,respondent introduced as evidence the certified copy of the

technical description and the sketch plan of the land both issued by the Land Management Services. The documents were subsequently marked as Exhibits “F” and “G,” respectively.

 

A closer study of the documents however revealed that they contained the following notations:

a) In re Exhibit “F”

Note: This is not an updated survey data. This might have been already superseded by subsequent subd./cons. surveys, Amendment, correction or [c]ancellation by the order of [the] court or by the Regional Executive/Technical Director, DENR. This is not valid for land titling/Registration and for preparation of deed of sale and/or transfer of right.

b) In re Exhibit “G”

Note: This plan is used for reference purposes only.[2]

The above-quoted notations notwithstanding, the trial court allowed reconstitution of the title. As such,complainant submitted that respondent was remiss in not calling the attention of the trial court to the notations indicated in the documents, emphasizing her duty to avoid concealment of the truth from the court.

In his Supplemental Letter[3] dated 25 October 1995, complainant additionally charged respondent of committing fraud. For one, complainant alleged that the requirements of Section 12 in relation to Section 3(f) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 were not observed as the petition failed to state the “names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property or the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property.” Secondly, respondent allegedly manifested untruthfully to the trial court that her client had complied with the requirements of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) when in fact there had been no compliance. And finally, complainant contended that per the certification issued by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Rizal Province, TCT No. 17730, the title sought to be reconstituted, was missing as of the inventory conducted in September 1981. As such, complainant asserted, there was no basis for the claim that the said title belonged to one 

Gregorio Agabao.

In answer to these allegations, respondent submitted to this Court her Comment[4] dated 6 April 1996 wherein she refuted all the charges against her. Anent the annotations on the documents,respondent stated that she could not be charged of concealing facts from the court as she had submitted the documents without alteration for the evaluation of the trial court.With regard to the alleged non-observance of the requirements of R.A. No. 26, respondent countered that she had to merely rely, as she did,on the documents and information supplied to her by her client. As to the charge of having fraudulently claimed compliance with the LRA requirements, respondent averred that she submitted the documentary requirements to the LRA through certified copies thereof which were all received by the records clerk of said office. Lastly, concerning the contention that the certification issued by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Rizal Province did not contain the name of the real owner,the location and the metes and bounds of

the property referred in the certification, as well as the name and purpose of the person who requested for it,respondent asserted that she had nothing to do with the preparation of said certification and therefore cannot be blamed for any of the lapses committed by the one who issued it.

The Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Both parties presented their respective evidence before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. After investigation, the Commissioner made the following findings and recommendation:

As to the charge of misleading the court by not pointing out the notations in the technical description and sketch plan, there appears to be no malice or intentional machination to mislead the court. Indeed, the said notations were not hidden or manipulated by Respondent. x x x It is clear that Respondent and the trial court committed error that should be characterized as “reversible error” in the absence of proof of intentional machination or collusion.

The same findings are true for the charge of deliberate omission of persons entitled to notice under R.A. No. 26. The said omission should have been fatal omissions that should have jeopardized the petition for reconstitution of title. Nevertheless,it was allowed by the trial court to prosper. Furthermore, there appears to be no reason for Respondent to disbelieve or not to rely on the representation made to her by her client.

 

As to the alleged fraudulent claim of compliance with LRA requirements,it is noted that the trial judge of RTC, Quezon City, Branch 93 x x x did not cite Respondent in contempt of court 

x x x  

Clearly, what should have been fatal omissions on the part of Respondent, as counsel of the petitioner in the Petition for Reconstitution (LRC Case No. Q-7195 [95]) were allowed to pass without challenge. A simple perusal of the Decision dated June 5, 1995 (In Re: Petition for Reconstitution of TCT No. 17730, LRC Case No. Q-7195 [95]) x x x shows that there was reversible error on the part of the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 93 of Quezon City. 

 x x x x

x x x However, the disciplinary process does not punish errors, mistakes or incompetence. Errors and mistakes are corrected by legal remedies such as motions for reconsideration, appeals, and petitions for relief. The reversal of the June 5, 1995 Decision of the trial court has remedied the error committed.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that respondent did not commit any act for which she should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned.

It is therefore recommended that this CASE BE DISMISSED for lack of merit. [5]

On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution[6] dismissing the complaint based on the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Funa. The parties were furnished with copies of the IBP Resolution. On 6 September 2005, the Court received a Petition[7] from complainant praying that his administrative complaint be reinstated on the basis of the appellate court’s pronouncements in its: (1) Decision dated 30 January 1997[8] in C.A. G.R. SP No. 40897 entitled Edith R. Agabao v. Hon. Demetrio B. Macapagal as RTC Judge, Br. 93, Quezon City, ADEZ REALTY, INC.., AGUEDO EUGENIO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and (2) Decision dated 29 March 2004[9] in C.A. G.R. CV No. 59363 entitled In the Matter of the Petition for the Reconstitution of TCT No. 17730 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal under R.A. No. 26 Edith R. Agabao v. Adez Realty, Inc. and the Republic of the Philippines, affirming the Order dated 22 February 2006[10] of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93 which set aside the 

reconstitution  previously ordered.

The crux of the controversy is whether respondent maliciously misled the court by failing to point out material notations in the documents she had submitted; whether she deliberately omitted mention of certain persons entitled to notice under the law; and whether she fraudulently claimed that she had complied with the LRA requirements or whether all these omissions could be considered honest mistakes or errors.

The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the Commissioner.

The Court agrees with the Commissioner’s evaluation that respondent did not employ deceit or misrepresentation in acting as counsel for the petitioner in the petition for reconstitution of title. Anent respondent’s failure to point out the notations in the documents she had submitted, in the Court’s opinion, the Commissioner correctly observed that there was absence of proof that respondent had intended to mislead or deceive the trial court. In fact, the said notations were laid bare for the trial court’s evaluation. There were no attempts on respondent’s part to manipulate or hide them.

As regards respondent’s failure to state in the petition certain persons entitled to notice under the law, specifically the parties allegedly in possession of the properties, respondent unflinchingly countered that she had duly asked of her client the names of the persons having interest in the property subject of the title sought to be reconstituted.[11] In fact, the petition for reconstitution filed before the court contained the names and addresses of the adjoining land owners.[12] And even in retrospect, it appears that there was no reason for respondent to disbelieve the representations made by her client on the matter.

Regarding respondent’s claim that she had complied with the LRA requirements when in truth she had not, the Court concurs with the Commissioner’s finding that respondent was not sufficiently informed that compliance was insufficient and improper.

In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.[13]  In the present case, the Court finds that complainant, who notably owns one of the properties subject of the title sought to be reconstituted,[14] and is consequently an adverse party, failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show respondent’s guilt of the charges he had leveled against her. In any event, it is worth mentioning that the prejudice, if any, caused by respondent’s oversight against complainant and other interested parties had been rectified later on by a different judge who set aside the order of reconstitution.[15]

All told, the lapses of respondent were committed without malice and devoid of any desire to dupe or defraud the opposing party. They are innocuous blunders that were made without intent to harm. As plain acts of inadvertence, they do not reach the level of professional incompetence. While professional incompetence is not among the grounds of disbarment enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court yet there are instances where a lawyer may be disciplined for inexcusable ignorance as the list is not exclusive. Indeed, the Court is convinced that respondent should not be sanctioned 

Pertinently, the Court expressed in Mendoza v. Mercado,[16] to wit:

An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or error, an attorney is not liable. Chief Justice Abbott said that, “no attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law.” (Montorious v. Jefferys, 2 Car. & P. 113, cited in In Re Filart, 40 Phil. 205, 208).[17 

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated 25 June 2005 in Adm. Case No. 4495 is AFFIRMED.  The administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent Atty. Apolonia A.C. Soguilon is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA                                                            

Associate Justice

80.Mariveles vs. Atty. Mallari 219 SCRA 44

FACTS: Mariveles (petitioner) engaged the services of Atty. Mallari(respondent) to handle his defense in the RTC where he was

charged forviolating B.P. Blg. 22. After an adverse decision was rendered therein,Mariveles instructed Atty. Mallari to appeal said the decision to the CA,which the latter did.However, in the CA, despite numerous extensions of time, totaling 245days, Atty. Mallari failed to file the appellant‘s brief, resulting in thedismissal of the appeal. Mariveles discovered his lawyer‘s desertion onlywhen he was subpoenaed by the trial court to appear before it for theexecution of the decision which had become final.Through new counsel, Mariveles filed a petition to reinstate his appeal,cancel the entry of judgment and accept his brief, but it was denied. Hesought relief in the SC which granted his petition, ruling that: ―the failure ofpetitioner‘s former counsel to file the brief xxx amounted to deliberateabandonment of his client‘s interest‖ which justified the reinstatement ofMariveles‘ appeal through a new counsel.

ISSUE/S: WON what Atty. Mallari committed (or what he failed to do) is aviolation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Yes. He is guilty of abandonment and dereliction of duty toward hisclient and is hereby DISBARRED.

RATIO: Atty. Mallari demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lackof responsibility to the courts and his client but also a shameless disregardto his duties as a lawyer.A lawyer has no business practicing his profession if in the course of thatpractice, he will eventually wreck and destroy the future and reputationof his client and thus disgrace the law profession.

81.Macias vs. Atty. Selda, AC#6442, 10/21/2004

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6442.  October 21, 2004]

HON. MARIANO S. MACIAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALANIXON A. SELDA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J.:

For violation of the lawyer’s oath, Judge Mariano S. Macias, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Petition for Administrative Discipline against Atty. Alanixon A. Selda.[1]

The facts are undisputed.  On January 24, 2000, respondent Selda withdrew as counsel for one Norma T. Lim, private protestee in Election Case No. SE-01 entitled Ruth Maraon v. The Municipal Board of Canvassers, Salud, Zamboanga del Norte, and Norma T. Lim for Annulment of Election, etc.[2] He basically submitted as ground for his withdrawal that he could not cope up with the pace of the proceedings in view of his workload.  He claimed that the hearings of the election protest case would run from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. and he still had to attend to his other cases including classes at Philippine Advent College, which start at 5:30 p.m. on Mondays and Wednesdays.

In light of these representations, complainant granted the Motion and ordered respondent relieved of all his responsibilities as counsel for private protestee.  However, on May 22, 2000, respondent executed an affidavit disavowing his grounds for withdrawing as counsel for private protestee.  He swore that he only filed the Motion on account of the pre-judgment of the case by complainant, who, on several occasions insinuated to him that his client would lose in the protest.  He stated that he was convinced that chaos would result if his client were unseated, and withdrawal from the case was his best recourse.

On the basis of respondent’s affidavit, his former client and private protestee in subject election protest case, moved for the inhibition of complainant.  On June 2, 2000, complainant granted the motion for his inhibition if only to disabuse any doubt on his impartiality.  But on August 23, 2000, this Court set aside complainant’s inhibition after finding no strong

and valid reason therefor, and directed him to continue hearing the case and to resolve it with reasonable dispatch.

Deploring the act of respondent as “serious deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct as a lawyer and in utter violation of the lawyer’s oath,” complainant requested the IBP to investigate the matter and recommend to the Court an appropriate penalty against respondent.  On January 30, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline[3] required respondent to answer.  He failed.

On November 21, 2003, after several postponements filed by the parties, their failure to personally appear before the IBP investigating commission, and the request of complainant to resolve the case on the basis of the pleadings, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, submitted her report and recommended to the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. 

The Board, in its Resolution No. XVI-2004-122 dated February 27, 2004, adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Maala.  It reduced the suspension of respondent to six (6) months; hence, the transmittal of the case and its records to this Court for final resolution[4] pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court, viz:

Review and Decision by the Board of Governors. – x x x x (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

We affirm the findings of the IBP on the culpability of respondent. 

All members of the legal profession made a solemn oath to, inter alia, “do no falsehood” and “conduct [themselves] as [lawyers] according to the best of [their] knowledge and discretionwith all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients.”  These particular fundamental principles are reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically:

Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice.

When respondent executed his affidavit of May 22, 2000 retracting his reason for withdrawing as counsel for Norma T. Lim, he acknowledged, under oath, his misrepresentation.  He misled the court in clear violation of his oath as lawyer and failed to abide by the Code of Professional Responsibility. 

Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer.[5] In fact, this obligation to the bench for candor and honesty takes precedence.[6] Thus, saying one thing in hisMotion to Withdraw as Counsel for Private Protestee and another in his subsequent affidavit is a transgression of this imperative which necessitates appropriate punishment. 

The appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case.  Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides, viz:

Sec. 27.  Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.  The practice of soliciting cases for the

purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The circumstances in this case demand that respondent be imposed suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.  This serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the court, the legal profession and the public.  For indeed, “if respect for the courts and for judicial process is gone or steadily weakened, no law can save us as a society.”[7]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the February 27, 2004 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 02-921 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Alanixon A. Selda is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, to commence upon receipt of this Decision.  He is further sternly warned that a repetition of a similar offense will call for a more severe consequence.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal record of respondent with the Office of the Bar Confidant.  Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all its chapters, and to all the courts in the land.

Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

82.Atty. Alonso vs. Atty. Relamida, AC#8481, 8/3/2010

Jennifer Ebanen filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier Philippines in the NLRC. The labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier, stating that Ebanen voluntarily resigned. Ebanen appealed to the NLRC which only affirmed the appealed decision. Ebanen then filed for reconsideration but was denied. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court. The Court’s Resolution has already become final and executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment has been issued dismissing the petition and holding that there was no illegal dismissal

However, despite the judgment, Ebanen through Atty. Relamida, Jr. filed a second complaint for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of action of constructive dismissal against Servier. Thus, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint addressed to the then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum shopping and res judicata. Respondents admitted the filing of the second complaint against Servier. However, they opined that the dismissal did not amount to res judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of due process since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of vital documents filed by the complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum shopping and res judicata thus violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.

During the IBP hearing, it was manifested that Ebanen is not a lawyer but the daughter of Atty. Aurelio the senior partner in a law firm where Atty. Relamida is employed as associate lawyer. The latter then reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no choice but to represent the latter.

Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to due process due to the denial of her motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He then argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void; thus, there was no res judicata. He maintained that he did not violate the lawyer’s oath by serving the interest of his client. The IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Relamida, Jr. be suspended for 6 months for violating the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.

The Supreme Court agrees to this finding. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court’s processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court.

Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."

83. Maligaya vs. Atty. Doronilla, AC#6198, 9/15/2006

RENATO M. MALIGAY vs. ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., A.C. No. 6198, September 15, 2006

Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla which charged him with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice". Complainant swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits. Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and explain his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement. Later he explained in his memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial" and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath. He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.

By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."

The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision (Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court) means only suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate General's Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of law.

At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a

mitigating circumstance. And finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance.

Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.

Wherefore, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby suspended from the practice of law for two monthes. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

84.Molina vs. Atty. Magat, AC#1900, 6/13/2012

The Facts:

Complainant filed cases of Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority and Breach of the Peace and Resisting Arrest against one Pascual de Leon . The counsel of record for accused de Leon in both cases was Atty. Magat; that a case for slight physical injuries was filed against him (Molina) by de Leon as a counter-charge and Atty. Magat was also the private prosecutor; that Atty. Magat subsequently filed a motion to quash the information on Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority on the sole ground of double jeopardy claiming that a similar case for slight physical injuries was filed in court by a certain Pat. Molina . Based on the record, no case of slight physical injuries was filed by Molina against de Leon and Atty. Magat was very much aware of such fact as he was the counsel and private prosecutor on record of de Leon from the very start of the case. Complainant averred that Atty. Magat’s  act of filing the Motion to Quash was a malicious act done in bad faith to mislead the court, thus, a betrayal of the confidence of the court of which he is an officer and likewise committed willful disobedience of the court order when he appeared as counsel for de Leon on two (2) occasions despite the fact that he was suspended from the practice of law.

In his Answer, Atty. Magat averred that in so far as the filing of the motion to quash was concerned, he was really under the impression that a criminal case in lieu of the two (2) charges was indeed filed and that the said motion was opposed by the other party and was denied by the court. He admitted his appearances in court while under suspension.  He explained that his appearance in the hearing was to inform the court that the accused was sick and to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused. In the January 9, 1978 hearing, he appeared because the accused had no money and pleaded that his testimony be finished. Atty. Magat begged for the indulgence of the court and conveyed his repentance and apology and promised that the same would not happen again.

The complaint was endorsed to the OSG for investigation, report and recommendation. The latter transmitted the records of the case to the IBP for proper disposition. In it’s Report and Recommendation, found merit in the complaint and recommended that Atty. Magat be reprimanded and fined P50,000.00. The IBP Board of Governors passed its Resolution] adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. It, however, deleted the imposition of fine.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of malicious acts and betrayal of the confidence of the court

Ruling:The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but not with respect to the penalty.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Magat’s act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01, which provide that “ A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice”.In this case, the Court agrees with the observation of the IBP that there was a deliberate intent on the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any false and untruthful statements in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do was to secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case was filed.

Furthermore, Atty. Magat expressly admitted appearing in court on two occasions despite having been suspended from the practice of law by the Court. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court and/or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ceferino R. Magat is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.

85.Afurong vs. Atty. Aquino, AC#1571, 9/23/1999

FACTS: Victorino Flores sought the assistance of the Citizens LegalAssistance Office regarding a complaint for ejectment filed by ParalumanB. Afurong which has already reached finality. His case was assigned toAtty. Angel G. Aquino, an employee of said office at the time. Atty.Aquino filed with the City Court of Manila a Petition for Relief fromJudgment with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order. However,after due hearing, the petition was dismissed for having been filed out oftime. Atty. Aquino subsequently filed with the CFI of Manila a Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition. Notwithstanding the fact that he was separatedfrom the Citizens Legal Assistance Office on October 1, 1975, Atty. AngelG. Aquino filed on December 11, 1975, an Urgent Motion forPostponement, signing his name as counsel for Victorino Flores andindicating the address of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office in Sampaloc,Manila, as his office address. Atty. Aquino stated therein that he would beunable to attend the pre-trial conference on December 12, 1975 becausehe needed to attend the hearing of a Habeas Corpus Case before theJuvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the same day and hour.However, a certification from the Clerk of Court of the Juvenile andDomestic Relations Court stated that a decision had been rendered onthe aforementioned special proceedings case, and that there was nohearing in connection with the case on December 12, 1975, for there wasnothing more to be done in the proceedings and the same was declaredclosed and terminated. Thus, on December 22, 1975, Afurong filed acomplaint with the Court for disbarment against Atty. Angel G. Aquino forfiling frivolous harassment cases to delay the execution of a final decision,committing falsehood in an Urgent Motion for Postponement, andmisrepresenting himself as an attorney for the Citizens Legal AssistanceOffice. Respondent Aquino denied the allegations contending that suchacts had been done without malice. However, he admitted that at thetime of the pre-trial on December 12, 1975, he was no longer connectedwith the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, for he was included as one ofthe employees purged. He reasoned, not wanting to remove the casefrom the Citizens Legal Assistance Office by appearing as private counselfor the petitioner and still unable to wait for his reinstatement which hewas informed was forthcoming, he decided to file a motion to postponethe pre-trial conference of the case. He also conceded that, in order togive more ‗force‘ to the motion for postponement, he indicated thereinthat he had to attend the hearing of another case before the Juvenileand Domestic Relations Court. He further admitted that the filing of themotion with the facts so stated ―might have caused some delay‖, but justifies such act by stating that ―such filing was prompted by somecircumstances which we can consider as inevitable and unavoidable atthe moment.‖ He adds, ―If I shall be given another chance to continuehandling the case, I promise that this mistake shall never be

repeated.‖The court declared respondent guilty for making false allegations in hisUrgent Motion for Postponement. The Court referred the case to theSolicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. It wastransferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and dispositionas provided in the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Aquino should be punished/sanctioned for his actionsin the said case.

HELD: Yes, Atty. Aquino failed to perform duties expected of an attorneyas provided under the existing Canons of Professional Ethics and Section20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court in force at the time said acts werecommitted.

RATIO: The Revised Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of anattorney to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only asappear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to behonestly debatable under the law. The decision in the complaint forejectment had reached finality and execution of such decision was beingeffected. Respondent Atty. Aquino should not have filed a petition forcertiorari considering that there was no apparent purpose for it than todelay the execution of a valid judgment. Furthermore, Atty. Aquinocommitted falsehood when he stated in his Urgent Motion forPostponement that he had to attend the hearing of a special

proceedings case the same day as the pre-trial on December 12, 1975.Respondent Aquino admitted that he only included such statement ―inorder to give more ‗force to the Urgent Motion for Postponement. Such act violates the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges an attorney toavoid the concealment of the truth from the court. A lawyer is mandatednot to mislead the court in any manner.

In case at bar, Atty. Aquino stated false allegations in his motion forpostponement which delayed the execution of a valid decision. It isworthy to note that the lower court correctly declared respondent incontempt of court for conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, in violation of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Aquino purposely allowedthe court to believe that he was still employed with the Citizens LegalAssistance Office when in fact he had been purged from said office. Thathe was awaiting reinstatement to the same position at the time does notremove the fact that he was misrepresenting himself to the court. Bydoing so, he has violated his duty to employ, for the purpose ofmaintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as areconsistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge orany judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. Hecould have delegated the case to another lawyer in the same office. Thecourt found Atty. Aquino guilty of malpractice and suspendedhim fromthe practice of law for six (6) months.

86.Judge Cervantes vs. Atty. Sabio, AC#7828, 8/11/2008

Facts: Respondent filed motions for inhibition on complainant judge on the ground that EDC (a party to the case handled by Atty. Sabio) gave complainant a house and lot putting into serious doubt his impartiality, independence and integrity. The motions were denied. Later on in his affidavit of complaint, Atty. Sabio submitted an affidavit stating certain instances pointing out irregularities with the handling of his case under Judge Cervantes. The complaint was dismissed. 

A complaint for disbarment was later filed by Judge Cervantes against Sabio alleging that (1) the complaint for bribery filed by the latter against the former were unsubstantiated and motivated by plain unfounded suspicion, and, (2) such complaints were filed after the effectivity of his optional retirement. 

The complaint by Judge Cervantes was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty under the Code of Professional Responsibility for filing a malicious, false and untruthful complaint. 

Held: YES. The IBP established that by filing the groundless bribery charge against complainant, respondent violated the proscription of the Code of Professional Responsibility against "wittingly or willingly promoting or suing any groundless suit" including baseless administrative complaints against judges and other court officers and employees. 

The Court found the action taken by the IBP Board of Governors well taken. 

Respondent ought to be aware that if a court official or employee, or a lawyer, is to be disciplined, the evidence against him should be substantial, competent and derived from direct knowledge, not on mere allegations, conjectures, suppositions, or on the basis of hearsay. 

No doubt, it is the Court's duty to investigate the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers. But it is also its duty to shield them from unfounded suits which are intended to, among other things, harass them.

Canon 11

87. Judge Madrid vs. Atty. Dealca, AC#7474, 9/9/2014

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7474, September 09, 2014

PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON CITY,Complainant, v. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Antecedents

On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S. Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795, entitled “People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault” then pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid. 1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC “[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned,” where “he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned.”2cralawred

Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on February 14, 2007,3viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x x

This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal sentiments of counsel who was not even the original counsel of the litigant.

Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Courts in this province as he would like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.

This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack of merit. This is why he should not have accepted this particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case from the Court. This is unethical practice in the first order.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED.

Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby DENIED for being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William Arsenault is likewise DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’s unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them.

On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint, and required Atty. Dealca to submit his comment.5cralawred

In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s  issuance of the February 14, 2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant of arrest issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.

On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation, report and recommendation.7 Several months thereafter, the Court also indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled “Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer Merlyn D. Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City” (Yap v. Judge Madrid). 8cralawred

On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madrid dismissed for its lack of merit the administrative complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines  (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to him and his clients.9cralawred

In compliance with the referral, the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the following findings and recommendation:10cralawred

x x x x

The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed by himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E; (4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ. These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the complainants against court officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in cases that respondent

had handled as counsel for the parties in the said cases.

It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic) out of the unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the position of the respondent. The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a favorable action from the court.

Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala of Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled “Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.,” for: Accion Publiciana and Damages, that was handled by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez.

OMB-L-C-0478-E was an offshoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled “Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III” for: Support pending before the sala of complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph H. Yap III, entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order, this ombudsman case arose.

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled “Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady’s Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled “Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III” for Support pending before the sala of complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).

All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the judges and personnel of the court.

The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003 in Civil Service Case entitled “EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINAS-CARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled “SOFIA JAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA” passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 provides: “RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida) – The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled “Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida” for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records” which provides for the dismissal of the cases against all the accused, do not show participation on the part of the respondent that he signed the pleadings, although the verified complaint is one executed by the wife of the respondent.  Moreover, these cases are pertaining to persons other than judges and personnel of the court that are not squarely covered by the present investigation against respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the rest of the complainants in the Civil Service Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case resulted in the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent’s sister member of the Bar.  All these documentary evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in determining the “PROPENSITY” of the respondent as a member of the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures provided for by the Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of the court.

x x x x

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a penalty of SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from finality of the decision be ordered against respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBPIBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and Recommendation11finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminal complaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation and dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.

Judge Madrid filed a petition,13 which the IBP Board of Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-545.14cralawred

Issues

(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?

(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?

Ruling of the Court

We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.

IAtty. Dealca must guard againsthis own impulse of initiating unfounded suits

Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel.15cralawred

We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self-interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruism in the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out,16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor

harassment could be a substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.17cralawred

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.18 The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to “wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit.” These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.19cralawred

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thuswise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate,20 so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things.21cralawred

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith.22 Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the  numerous administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his part, considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious consideration.

Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to confront even the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed against erring judges and court personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the facts and the law of the case.23

Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have promulgated in frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance his cause now. He thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court. The minute resolutions have been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court.24Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit through a minute resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld,25 and the minute resolution then constitutes the actual adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or its denial of due course indicates the Court’s agreement with and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.26cralawred

The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute resolutions that the Court issues in disposing of a case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: 27cralawred

The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where

the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.

x x x x

The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that the minute resolutions violated Section 14,29Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court, through Justice Regalado, declared that resolutions were not decisions within the constitutional contemplation, for the former “merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s decision.” It pointed out that the constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was being refused due course, with the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the petition and the subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition and stated that the questions raised were factual, or there was no reversible error in the lower court’s decision, there was a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.30cralawred

IIAtty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have “in good grace inhibited himself” upon his motion to inhibit in order to preserve “confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.”31 However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being purely based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases.32cralawred

The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.33cralawred

In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently state:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

x x x x

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting

on a very shaky foundation.34cralawred

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned x x x.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)

Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel.36 The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice,37 because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.

On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative complaint to be ever brought against Atty. Dealca. In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,39 we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03,40 and Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective from notice of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Dealca’s personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio,** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.Sereno, C.J., on Wellness Leave.Mendoza, J., on leave.

88.Uy vs. Attys. Depasucat & De las Alas, AC#5332, 7/29/2003

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5332.  July 29, 2003]

JOHNNY K.H. UY, complainant, vs. ATTYS. REYNALDO C. DEPASUCAT, WILLIAM O. SU, and CELSO DE LAS ALAS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a verified complaint filed by Johnny K.H. Uy against respondents lawyers, Reynaldo C. Depasucat, William O. Su and Celso delas Alas, for gross misconduct.

Complainant Uy together with UBS Marketing Corporation (UBS) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (Branch 43) an action for reconveyance of real property, cancellation of titles and recovery of ownership and possession, with damages against SK Realty, Inc. and Uy’s sisters, Ban Hua U. Flores and Ban Ha U. Chua, together with their children, namely: Leonardo U. Flores, Gloria U. Chan, Lily Uy, Lilian Uy, Lilen Uy, Stephanie Chua, Melody Chua, Wee Kiat Y. Tan, Theresa Regalado and Yolanda Kilayko, all clients of herein respondents.  Upon filing of the said case, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-9051, complainant Uy and UBS caused the annotation of the notice of lis pendens at the back of the certificates of title of defendant SK Realty with the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City.  Subsequently, in a resolution dated November 9, 1995, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping.  Defendants moved for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens which the trial court granted in a resolution dated December 8, 1995.[1]

Complainants Uy and UBS filed their appeal before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57171.  After the parties had filed their respective briefs with the Court of Appeals and before the latter’s resolution submitting the case for decision was released on March 10, 1999,  respondents filed  a pleading dated March 1, 1999, entitled, “Manifestation of Usurpation of Authority of the Hon. Court of Appeals from a Self-Confessed Briber of Judges” which contains the following statement:

10.  That, Plaintiff-Appellant Johnny KH Uy had, in fact, confessed to “Bribery and Telling On” of judges, after the judges allegedly refused to give in to their “demands”, by using illegally taped conversations – both actual and by telephone, copies of the decision of the court -

a.          in case no. A.M. No. RTJ-92-863, against the Hon. Judge Renato Abastillas, hereto attached as Annex “C”, and also

b.          in case no. A.M. RTJ-92-880, against the Hon. Judge Bethel K. Moscardon, hereto attached as Annex “D”.[2]

In the instant administrative complaint, Uy alleges: Respondents, as members of the Bar are sworn not to do falsehood or consent to the doing of any in court, nor should they mislead the appellate court by their false, malicious and libelous imputations against him.  Respondents’ filing of the subject Manifestation was for the purpose of putting him in a bad light so as to obtain a favorable judgment for their clients.  Respondents without any provocation, reason and justification and completely unmindful of his honor and feelings submitted such Manifestation and furnished copies of the same to persons not even parties to the case.  The subject Manifestation contains groundless and false imputations which are totally immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent to the appealed case.

In their joint supplemental verified comment with counter motion to cite petitioner for contempt of court, respondents Su and Depasucat contend: Uy’s admission that he negotiated for a favorable outcome of a criminal case formed part of the decision in Lee vs. Abastillas, docketed as Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 which led to the dismissal of Judge Abastillas from the service. The bribery imputation is true.  The “bribe and tell scenario” covered by the said Manifestation was already of public knowledge as it already formed part of the said administrative decision. There was no indiscriminate distribution of such Manifestation to strangers just to malign the complainant.  Assuming that the allegations in the Manifestation had painted complainant in a bad light, the same is considered as an absolute privileged communication.  The Manifestation is relevant as it was filed primarily in response to the extra-judicial, illegal and improper attempt of Uy to reinstate a lis pendens.  Uy had tried so many times to annotate a lis

pendens on the subject properties and filed so many cases involving the same properties and therefore, all his mischiefs are relevant and material to the appealed case.

In his Comment, respondent delas Alas contends: He appeared as counsel of Uy’s siblings in other cases.  He signed the Manifestation as a collaborating counsel after he had read the transcript of the proceeding where Uy admitted having bribed Judge Abastillas.  He is convinced that Uy does not hesitate to corrupt or destroy the character of persons to suit his needs, thus he must be exposed.  Uy has predilections to file cases against opposing lawyers and to seek inhibition of judges and justices whenever adverse rulings were rendered against him, thus, his active participation in bribing a judge is not totally immaterial and irrelevant to the appealed case.

Acting on the pleadings of the parties, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[3]

On April 6, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline through Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, submitted its report, to wit:

Accordingly, the issue may be simply stated as follows:  Should the respondents be disciplined for having authored and filed the said manifestation.

. . . .

The undersigned commissioner fully agrees with the respondents that the allegations in their manifestation with respect to the fact that the complainant is a briber of judges are true and correct.  In fact, records show that complainant’s former counsel has been disbarred by the Supreme Court because of the bribing incident referred to in the said manifestation.  It cannot therefore be said that the respondents did falsehood or misled the Court of Appeals when they filed their manifestation.

Does the privilege of filing of a pleading with correct and truthful allegations carries with it the license to use abusive, offensive, menacing or otherwise improper language?

In this jurisdiction, it cannot be doubted that communications either written or oral made in the course of judicial proceeding are classified as absolutely privilege communications.  However, this doctrine applies only in such cases where the statement is relevant or pertinent or material to the case.  In this respect, respondents failed to convincingly demonstrate the materiality or relevance of such statement like “… Johnny Kh Uy has a track record of making a mockery of our judicial system …had, in fact confessed to “Bribery and Telling On” of judges, after the judges allegedly refused to give in to their “demands”, by using illegally taped conversation both actual and/or by telephone…” in the appealed case involving recovery of property and cancellation of title.  Furthermore, if such fact is relevant, why did the respondents make such fact known to the Court of Appeals only when the appealed case has already been submitted for decision.  Respondents’ timing makes their claim of good intention a doubtful claim.  It seems that the real intention is to influence the Court of Appeals in an improper way.

It cannot be doubted that as an advocate, a lawyer has the right to be zealous in the prosecution or defense of his client’s cause.  In fact, it is incumbent upon him to point out errors, arbitrariness or injustices.  He is allowed sufficient latitude of remark in furtherance of the causes he advocates for his client.  But in the exercise of this right, it is incumbent upon him to act with justice and to give everyone his due.

It is settled that a lawyer who uses abusive or abrasive language shows disrespect to the court and disgraces the Bar.  He then invites the exercise by the court of its disciplinary power as respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the respondents, for having used offensive and abusive language in their “MANIFESTATION OF USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS FROM A SELF-CONFESSED BRIBER OF JUDGES” which has no

relevance in the factual and legal issues then pending resolution before the Court of Appeals be warned that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.[4]

On June 29, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[5]

We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondents have used offensive and abusive language but instead of mere admonition respondents should be reprimanded.

The statement made by respondents that complainant Uy had bribed a judge in A.M. No. RTJ 92-863 was duly proven.  Uy who appeared as witness in the said administrative case filed against Judge Renato Abastillas of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (Branch 50),[6] testified that he gave money to the Judge in consideration of the dismissal of a case in which he had an interest.  This admission was lifted from the transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings therein submitted by the respondents and quoted in the Abastillas decision which was promulgated in 1994.

However, we find nothing on record that supports the statement of the respondents that Uy had also bribed a judge in Centrum Agri-Business Realty Corporation vs. Katalbas-Moscardon, docketed as AM RTJ 92-880 which we have decided in 1995.[7] Notably, in their joint affidavit filed before the Commission, respondents Depasucat and Su stated that “the pattern of corruption and illegal wire tapping was repeated by the complainant’s disbarred lawyer Enrique S. Chua, in A.M. RTJ-92-880, in re Hon. Judge Bethel K. Moscardon, thus institutionalizing the malevolent practice”.  However, there was nothing that showed Uy’s participation therein.  In fact, a reading of the court’s decision in the Moscardon case revealed that it was Atty. Enrique Chua, the lawyer of Uy, who was involved in the said case as a witness in the corruption of Judge Moscardon and the name of Uy was never mentioned at all.  Moreover, during the hearing, the investigating commissioner took note that there was no copy of the transcript of the stenographic notes of A.M. RTJ 92-880 presented.  Respondents were not able to substantiate their statement that Uy was involved in two bribing incidents to be branded as “briber of judges”.  Respondents have partly made a false imputation against Uy.  Half-truths are equally if not more pernicious than outright lies.

Uy claims that assuming arguendo that he had bribed a judge, the same is irrelevant and impertinent to the appealed case where the subject Manifestation was filed.  On the other hand, respondents contend that the filing of the subject Manifestation was not attended by malice; that it falls under the protective mantle of an absolute privileged communication.

The doctrine of privileged communication that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged has been enunciated in a long line of cases.[8] Said doctrine rests upon public policy which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.[9] The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages.[10]Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold,[11] and for the felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some infelicities of phrase.[12]  However, such remarks or comments should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety.[13]

We have stated the test of relevancy, thus:

xxx. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule.  The matter to which the privileged does not extend must be so palpably wanting in

relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and impropriety.  In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings.  It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial xxx[14]

Applying the above rule to the subject Manifestation, we find that the statement that Uy is a briber of judges is not relevant to the issues presented before the appellate court.  Although Uy was shown to have admitted bribing a judge, the incident did not happen in the case appealed to the Court of Appeals where the assailed Manifestation was filed.  It was not at all pertinent to Uy’s action for reconveyance of real property, cancellation of titles and recovery of ownership and possession, with damages.  Moreover, if respondents truly believe in the relevancy of the bribing incident to the appealed case, they could have stated the same in their pleading filed in the trial court in 1995 or in their appellees’ brief filed before the appellate court considering that the Abastillas case had already been decided in 1994.

Respondents claim that the subject Manifestation was filed primarily in response to the extra-judicial, illegal and improper attempt of the complainant to reinstate a cancelled lis pendens which is subject of the appealed case.  While the notice to annotate a cancelled lis pendens was filed by Uy’s counsel with the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on October 26, 1998, the same was denied by the Register of Deeds on January 25, 1999 for the reason that the cancelled notice of lis pendens can only be re-annotated by a court order.  Undoubtedly, the action taken by Uy was improper since the propriety of the cancellation of the notice was one of the issues raised by Uy before the appellate court.  Thus, respondents who had knowledge of the same have the duty to inform the appellate court, which respondents have done by filing the subject Manifestation.  However, respondents went overboard by further stating in the Manifestation that complainant “had in fact confessed to Bribery and Telling On of judges, after the judges allegedly refused to give in to their demands, by using illegally taped conversations-both actual and/or by telephone”.  It belied their good intention and exceeded the bounds of propriety, hence not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made.[15]  A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.[16]  It must be remembered that the language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.[17]  It has been said that a lawyer’s language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.[18]

It is the duty of the respondents as members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.[19]

The IBP aptly observed that the Manifestation was filed only after the appealed case had already been submitted for decision which made respondents’ claim of good intention in filing the same a doubtful claim.  While the records show that the subject Manifestation was filed with the Court of Appeals on March 1, 1999 and the appellate court’s resolution submitting the case for decision was dated March 10, 1999, we agree with the IBP’s conclusion that the filing of the Manifestation was a clear attempt on the part of the respondents to influence the mind of the court against complainant Uy and to decide the appeal in favor of their clients.

We find respondents to be at fault and therefore they should be reprimanded for having done so.  A higher penalty is not called for considering that it is clear that respondents were merely over-zealous in ensuring the victory of their clients and, that they honestly thought, although erroneously, that by branding complainant as a “briber of judges”, they were justifying their allegation in the Manifestation that complainant “has a track record of making a mockery of our judicial system”.

In their Comment, respondents Su and Depasucat pray that complainant be cited for contempt of court for denying under oath that he is a confessed

briber of judges and of accusing respondents of indiscriminately furnishing copies of the subject Manifestation to strangers in the appealed case.

We find nothing contemptuous on Uy’s desire to protect his honor from what he perceived to be defamatory imputation against him since it is within his right to do so.  While he may have denied the established fact that he bribed Judge Abastillas, however, his denial as to the other bribing incident was proven to be true since respondents failed to substantiate the same. Furthermore, although Uy failed to prove his allegation that respondents indiscriminately furnished copies of the subject Manifestation to strangers to the appealed case, the same is not grave enough so as to warrant the exercise of contempt powers of the Court.  There was no sufficient showing of bad faith in Uy’s filing of the present administrative complaint against respondents.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the respondents are hereby REPRIMANDED for MISCONDUCT in using offensive and abusive language in their Manifestation and WARNED that a repetition of the same in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The motion of respondents to cite complainant in contempt is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), J., no part.

Quisumbing, J., on leave.

89.Racines vs. Judge Morallos, AM-MTJ-08-1698, 3/3/2008

R E S O L U T I O N

 

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

 

          Complainant Jaime Racines (Racines) was required by the Court in its Resolution dated November 22, 2007 to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for filing a baseless and unfounded administrative case.

 

          Racines filed on December 17, 2003, a Complaint against Judge Jose P. Morallos (Judge Morallos) and Sheriff Benjamin Cabusao, Jr. (Sheriff Cabusao) of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 68 of Pasig City, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,[1] other deceits,[2] violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[3] violation of Article 32 of the New Civil Code, Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.[4]  The Court, finding the evaluation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to be in accord with law and the facts on record, affirmed its recommendation and dismissed Racines’s complaint in the Resolution dated November 22, 2004.  The Court held that there was nothing in the records to show that Judge Morallos was moved by improper motive when he rendered the decision in Civil Case No. 9681;[5] neither was there anything to show that Sheriff Cabusao used his position to influence the outcome of the decision; and in any event, the proper recourse was to elevate the case to a higher court for review, and not through an administrative case.  The Court, in the said resolution also directed Racines to show cause within 10 days from receipt thereof, why he should not be held in contempt of court for filing an utterly baseless and unfounded administrative case.[6]

          Racines through counsel, Atty. Onofre D. Manalad, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[7] which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution dated March 2, 2005 for lack of substantial argument.  The Resolution likewise admonished Racines and his counsel to desist from initiating baseless complaints.[8]

          On March 29, 2005, the OCA received an Earnest Motion for Clarification[9] filed by Racines through Atty. Manalad which the Court treated as a second motion for reconsideration in the Resolution dated May 25, 2005.  The Court denied the motion for being a prohibited pleading and directed that no further pleadings or motions shall be entertaned in the case.[10]

          On June 19, 2007, Racines by himself, filed a Pagpapaliwanag claiming:  He received the Court’s Resolution dated November 22, 2004 only on March 30, 2007 and he was able to file his explanation only at this time since he had to look for a lawyer who would explain it to him.  The complaint and the other documents which Atty. Manaladprepared were all written in English and because he fully trusted Atty. Manalad, he immediately signed the same even though Atty. Manalad did not explain it to him. Had Atty.Manalad fully explained the documents to him, he would not have signed the same, as he had no intention of filing a baseless administrative case against respondents.  If there was anyone who should be punished, it was Atty. Manalad because he deceived him into filing a baseless administrative case.[11]

 

          The Court required Atty. Manalad to comment on Racines’s Pagpapaliwanag.[12]

          In his Comment, Atty. Manalad avers that Racines is being used by Gerry Chua, lessor of the Viajeros Market and Chua’s lawyer Atty. Edgardo Galvez against him (Atty.Manalad), since he is assisting the officers of the Pasig Fruits & Vegetables Vendors Association (PFVVA) in their cases against Chua.  Racines, who was for several years a sergeant-at-arms of the PFVVA, was pirated by Chua to lead a group of goons to harass his co-vendors into giving up their stalls.  Atty. Manalad claims that he would not have initiated an action against an incumbent trial court judge had no grievous correctible error been committed in bad faith at the expense of truth and justice.  He also asserts that the allegations in the complaint against Judge Morallos are substantiated by the admission of the parties in their pleadings, and that he filed the charges against respondents at the instance of Racines who was even crying when he was pleading before Atty. Manalad for legal assistance.[13]

          The Court finds both Racines and Atty. Manalad guilty of indirect contempt.

          Persons guilty of any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.[14]  The Court, in the exercise of its inherent power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, may motu proprio initiate proceedings therefor.[15]

          The Court has held that unsubstantiated charges serve no purpose other than to harass judges and cast doubt on the integrity of the entire judiciary.[16]      The filing of clearly unfounded or malicious complaints seriously affects the efficiency of the members of the judiciary in administering fair, speedy and impartial justice.[17]  The Court, mindful of the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases filed by losing litigants and disgruntled lawyers against members of the judiciary, therefore issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC[18] which took effect on November 4, 2003 with the aim of preventing or at least discouraging the filing of such cases to protect the orderly administration of justice.[19]  It provides in paragraph 1 thereof that if upon informal preliminary inquiry it is found that the complaint is unfounded, baseless and merely intended to harass respondent, complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.  And if the complainant is a lawyer, he may be further required to show cause why he or she should not be

administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the court.

          In the present case, Racines, through his lawyer Atty. Manalad filed a case against Judge Morallos and Sheriff Cabusao, imputing to them corrupt and criminal acts on the mere basis of Judge Morallos’s decision.  The complaint stated that Judge Morallos “distorted the facts” in his “anomalous decision” and committed the crimes of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, causing undue injury to Racines, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and estafa by means of other deceits.[20]  The complaint also questioned Judge Morallos’s integrity, impartiality and professional competence, all on the basis of his decision on the ejectment favoring the plaintiff therein, JellicomManpower and Transport Services owned by Sheriff Cabusao, with Racines as defendant.  The complaint also claims that   Sheriff Cabusao, Judge Morallos and Gerry Chua,lessor of the property, conspired with one another in commiting the wrongful acts for which they are liable to pay damages.[21]

          Unfazed by the order of the Court directing Racines to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for filing a baseless complaint, Racines, through Atty. Manaladeven filed two motions for reconsideration, reiterating their baseless claims.

          Racines tries to escape liability by saying that Atty. Manald did not explain the contents of the pleadings to him, because if Atty. Manalad did, he would not have signed the same.

          The Court is not convinced.  It is presumed that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act[22] and unless the requirements for proper substitution were made, a lawyer enjoys the presumption of authority given him by his client.[23]  Racines does not deny that the signatures in the pleadings were his.  He also does not claim that he was prevented by Atty. Manalad from reading the contents thereof.  He only said that since he fully trusted Atty. Manalad he immediately signed the documents.  From the foregoing, it is clear that Racines acquiesced and gave his stamp of approval to the pleadings filed in court.  Considering however that he is not learned in the intricacies of law, the Court finds the penalty of reprimand with warning to be sufficient in his case.[24]

          As to Atty. Manalad, the Court finds that a greater penalty is in order.  As a member of the bar, he should know better than to file an unfounded administrative complaint.[25]  He is bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 11.04 thereof states that a lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the records. Canon 11 also enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.[26]  His claim that he filed the charges against respondent at the instance of Racines cannot free him from liability.  As the Court has pronounced, a client’s cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license.  Lawyers must always keep in perspective that since they are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice.[27]  As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the duty to uphold its dignity and authority and not promote distrust in the administration of justice.  For violating Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds that a fine of five thousand pesos is proper in his case.[28]

 

          WHEREFORE, the Court finds Jaime Racines and Atty. Onofre D. Manalad guilty of Indirect Contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Atty. Onofre D. Manalad is ordered to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS within ten (10) days from finality of herein Resolution, while Jaime Racines isREPRIMANDED.  Both are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act may warrant a more severe action by this Court.

          SO ORDERED.

 

90.Baculi vs. Atty. Battung, AC#8920, 9/28/2011

FACTS: On July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the Motion forReconsideration of a civil case in the MTC of Tuguegarao City, Atty.Melchor Battung was shouting while arguing his motion. The presidingJudge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the Atty.Battung shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would becited for direct contempt, Battung shouted, "Then cite me!" Judge Baculicited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. Atty.Battung then left.While other cases were being heard, Atty. Battung re-entered thecourtroom and shouted, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! Iam not afraid of you!" Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort Battung out of the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for thesecond time.

After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw Battung at the hall ofthe courthouse, apparently waiting for him. Atty. Battung again shouted ina threatening tone, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am notafraid of you!" He kept on shouting, "I am not afraid of you!" andchallenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted himout of thebuilding. Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left thecourtroom, he continued shouting and punched a table at the Office ofthe Clerk of Court.Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment with the Commission onDiscipline of the IBP against the respondent, alleging that the latterviolated Canons 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility andrecommended that he be reprimanded.Respondent Atty. Battung filed his Answer, essentially saying that it wasJudge Baculi who disrespected him. He stated that ―I only told JudgeRene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law against him once insidethe court room when he was lambasting me.‖ According to Battung ―itwas Judge Baculi who disrespected me. Judge Baculi did not like that Ijust submit the Motion for Reconsideration without oral argument becausehe wanted to have an occasion to just humiliate me and to make appearto the public that I am a negligent lawyer, when he said: you justify yournegligence before this court, making it an impression to the litigants andthe public that as if I am a negligent, incompetent, mumbling, andirresponsible lawyer.‖ Respondent Battung claims that he was provokedby the presiding judge that is why he shouted back at him. Atty. Battungasked that the case against him be dismissed.

The IBP conducted its investigation based on the tape of the incident atthe courtroom and the transcript of stenographic notes of the matterstating that both parties merely reiterated what they alleged in theirsubmitted pleadings.

ISSUE/S: WON the respondent Atty. Melchor Battung should bereprimanded for his actions in the said case.

HELD: Yes, Atty. Melchor Battung violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility: ―A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before theCourts.‖RATIO: According to the IBP, Canon 11 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due thecourts and judicial officers. He likewise violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive ormenacing language or behavior before the courts. Respondent Battung‘sargument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be givendue consideration since the he should not have shouted at the presidingjudge; by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of a judgecould be tolerated. What the he should have done was to file an actionbefore the Office of the Court Administrator if he believed that JudgeBaculi did not act according to the norms of judicial conduct. The IBPrecommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice oflaw for six (6) months.The Court agrees with the IBP‘s finding with exception only to thesuspension. Atty. Battung violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility. Respondent Battung disrespected Judge Baculiby shouting at him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in thepresence of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. He evencame back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in

front of manywitnesses, cannot be allowed. The Court notes that the Battung continuedto threaten Judge Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly showeddisrespect for his position even after the latter had cited him for contempt.In fact, after initially leaving the court, he returned to the courtroom anddisrupted the ongoing proceedings. These actions were not only againstthe person, the position and the stature of Judge Baculi, but against thecourt as well whose proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted,and brought to disrepute by Atty. Battung.Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position andavowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule,demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. TheCourt cited Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr., ―it is the duty of a lawyer, as anofficer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts.Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution;without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shakyfoundations.

A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards thelatter‘s role, stature and position in our justice system. When therespondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi thathe would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, therespondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the publicconfidence in Judge Baculi‘s competence and in his ability to decidecases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled withsensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objectingor complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in abad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.In the case at bar, Atty. Battung‘s violations were no less serious as theywere committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial proceedingswhere the respondent was acting as an officer of the court, and beforethe litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculiand to the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to theintegrity of the judicial system itself. Thus, Atty. Melchor A. Battung wasfound guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, for whichhe was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. He is sternlywarned that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with moreseverely.

91.Judge Lacurom vs. Attys. Lacoba, AC#5921, 3/10/2006

D E C I S I O N 

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

            This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom (“Judge Lacurom”), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court ofCabanatuan City, Branch 30, against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (“respondents”). Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03,[1] 11.04,[2] and 19.01[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion (“Veneracion”) in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant FedericoBarrientos (“Barrientos”).[4] The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.

On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution (“Resolution”) reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.[5] The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated December 22, 2000, as well as REVERSES the Decision of the court a quo dated July 22, 1997.

Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and DESIST from ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos from the 1,000 square meter homelotcovered by TCT No. T-75274, and the smaller area of one hundred forty-seven square meters, within the 1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the house thereon standing covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and Barrientos is ordered to pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137.

SO ORDERED.[6] 

 Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition)[7] dated 30 July 2001 (“30 July 2001 motion”), pertinent portions of which read:

II. PREFATORY STATEMENT

This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very  patent and glaring! x x x

            x x x x

III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION

1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing the Findings of the Lower Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:

x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very questionable SHORT period of time, came this STUNNING and SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon. Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not suspicious, hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

 

            x x x x

[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and presumes FACTS not part of the records of the case, all “loaded” in favor of the alleged “TENANT.” Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process. Need we say more?

            x x x x

4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the Defendant is Entitled to a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:

THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion? x x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!

            xx x x

6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in Holding and Declaring that The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the Subject-Matter:

Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that JURISDICTION is determined by the averments of the COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This is backed up by a Litany of Cases!

            x x x x

7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the Defendant To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiff’s HOUSE:

THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold GLARING ERRORS committed by the Hon. Pairing Court Judge.

            x x x x

This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the defendant for the ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight![8]

The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself “in order to give plaintiff a fighting chance” and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside.[9]Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (“Velasco-Jacoba”) signed the motion on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.

On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the “very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating” contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.[10] In her Explanation, Comments and Answer,[11] Velasco-Jacoba claimed that “His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case.”[12] Velasco-Jacobadisavowed any “conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice.”[13] She rationalized as follows:

x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident and hard-striking adjectives. And, if we are to pick such stringent words at random and bunch them together, side-by-side xx x then collectively and certainly they present a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. x x x

x x x x

We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of incisive and hard-hitting remarks, machine-gun style as to be called contumacious and contemptuous. They were just articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good fortune, not driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge. They must believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more no less. x x x The matters involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call a spade a spade. x x x [14]

 

 

Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize “for whatever mistake [they] may have committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when [they] may have ‘stepped on the line and gone out of bounds’.” She also agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous phrases stricken off the record.[15]

          On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.[16]

         Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon

hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba(“Jacoba”) stopped her and said “O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli.” (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in “trusting blind faith” on her husband of 35 years with whom she “entrusted her whole life and future.”[17] This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then suspension from the practice of law.[18]

Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without conducting any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring “a personal vendetta,” ordering her imprisonment despite her status as “senior lady lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother many times over.”[19]At any rate, she argued, Judge Lacurom should have inhibited himself from the case out of delicadeza because “[Veneracion] had already filed against him criminal cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and before the Ombudsman.”[20]

The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly rendering unjust judgment   through   inexcusable   negligence  and ignorance[21]  and violating

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (“RA 3019”).[22] The first charge became the subject of a preliminary investigation[23] by the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City.  On the second charge, Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit[24] filed on 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

Jude Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in contempt.[25] Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements implicating him, Jacobainvoked the marital privilege rule in evidence.[26] Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision[27] finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine ofP500

On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

          Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro (“IBP Commissioner Navarro”) despite sufficient notice.[28]

          IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002, recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months.[29]  IBP Commissioner Navarro found that “respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for authority.”[30] Although the remarks were not directed at Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at “his position as a judge, which is a smack on the judiciary system as a whole.”[31]

          The IBP Board of Governors (“IBP Board”) adopted IBP Commissioner Navarro’s Report and Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three months.[32] On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its recommendation to this Court, together with the documents pertaining to the case.

          Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision, thus:[33] 

 

 

                        x x x x

3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present complaint of Judge Lacurom is sub judice; the same issues involved in this case are raised before the Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-G.R. SP No. 66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary Injunction x x x;

4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court involving the same issues we raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court for being premature, in view of the pending Certiorari case before the Court of Appeals;

5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the present complaint should likewise be dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the certiorari case by the Court of Appeals.[34] (Emphasis supplied

The Court’s Ruling

          On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacoba’s contention that the present complaint should be considered sub judice in view of the petition for certiorari and mandatory inhibition with preliminary injunction (“petition for certiorari”)[35] filed before the Court of Appeals.

          The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October 2001, seeks to nullify the following orders issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the Orders dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying respondents’ respective motions for inhibition; and (2) the 13 September 2001 Order which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. The petitioners allege that Judge Lacurom acted “with grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in violation of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.”[36]

          Plainly, the issue before us is respondents’ liability under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The outcome of this case has no bearing on the resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there is neither identity of issues nor causes of action.

          Neither should the Court’s dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Lacurom for being premature impel us to dismiss this complaint. Judge Lacurom’sorders in Civil Case No. 2836 could not be the subject of an administrative complaint against him while a petition for certiorari assailing the same orders is pending with an appellate  court. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final declaration that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether the judge is administratively liable.[37]

          The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The corresponding implications of their actions also give rise to different liabilities. We first examine the charge against Velasco-Jacoba.

There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001 motion. Velasco-Jacoba’s responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:

          SEC. 3. Signature and address.—Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him x x x.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay.

x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)

          By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the

purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court document.  

 

          Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her husband’s request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each other’s pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, “[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other.”[38]  By Velasco-Jacoba’s own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7.  This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is  a  ground

for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.[39]

          We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of  Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to him as the author of the motion.

          The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacobaimpliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he “trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental.”[40]

Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba’sdefense which was raised only after                 a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy;       and  (2) Jacoba  had  been counsel  of  record  for Veneracion  in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s assertion that she had not “actually participate[d]” in the prosecution of the case.

          Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836,  praying that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him.[41]  This petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacoba’s handiwork.[42]

          The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent.[43]   This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.

          The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

          Rule 11.03.—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

            Rule 11.04.—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his client’s cause. We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created “a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect.”[44]

          Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the 30 July 2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.

          Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.[45] However, even the

most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom’s Resolution.  On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.[46] The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.[47]

          In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified language but also to pursue the client’s cause  through fair and honest means, thus:

 

          Rule 19.01.—A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his client in instituting two administrative cases against Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case No. 2836 was then pending before Judge Lacurom’s sala. The Court’s attention is drawn to the fact that the timing of the filing of these administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that the cases were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.

Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before this Court.  In Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended  Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six months because of “his failure to file an action for the recovery of possession of property despite the lapse of two and a half years from receipt by him ofP550 which his client gave him as filing and sheriff’s fees.”[48]  In Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his duties when he failed to file the appellant’s brief, resulting in the dismissal of his client’s appeal. We imposed the penalty of one year suspension.[49]

As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in barangay conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well the prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local Government Code.[50]

In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced with the question of whether respondents have conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them as members of the bar and officers of the court. We find respondents to have fallen short of the mark.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision.  We  also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondents that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents’ personal records as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. 

SO ORDERED.

92.Provincial Prosecutor Visbal vs. Judge Buban, AM-MTJ-02-1432,

9/3/200

PROSECUTOR ROBERT M. VISBAL, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Once again, we find occasion to reiterate this Court’s mandate that every judge should dispose of his court’s business promptly.  Delay in resolving motions is inexcusable and should not be condoned.[1]

In a sworn letter-complaint dated April 15, 2000 addressed to then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, Provincial Prosecutor Robert M. Visbal of Tacloban City charged Judge Marino S. Buban, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Tacloban City, with gross inefficiency and misconduct in Office.[2]

In his complaint, complainant alleged that on July 29, 1999, he filed with the MTCC a "Motion to Correct and Re-mark Exhibits of the Prosecution" in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-07-CR-19 and 98-07-CR-20.   Presiding Judge Marino S. Buban, respondent, resolved the motion only on March 20, 2000, or almost eight (8) months from the date it was filed.    He deliberately failed to resolve the motion within the prescribed period of ninety (90) days because he begrudged complainant's filing of an administrative charge and several motions for his inhibition.  Respondent’s delay in resolving the motion violated the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Furthermore, respondent committed falsification by stating in his Certificates of Service from October 1999 to February 2000 that he has no pending motions submitted for resolution.

In his comment,[3] respondent judge admitted he incurred delay in resolving the "Motion to Correct and Re-mark Exhibits of the Prosecution."  He attributed such delay to the frequent resetting of the hearing of the cases.  He also alleged that his clerk of court “failed or forgot” to submit the records of the pertinent case to him and to call his attention to the unresolved motion attached to the voluminous records.  He blamed the complainant for failing to remind him earlier of the motion. It was only during the hearing of March 20, 2000 that complainant called his attention to the pending incident. Immediately, he granted the motion and ordered the remarking of exhibits.  He stressed that the delay in resolving the motion did not impede the flow of the proceedings.  He surmised that complainant filed the instant administrative case in order to force him (respondent) to inhibit himself from hearing Criminal Case No. 98-11-18 for direct assault upon a person in authority.  The accused therein is complainant’s wife.

In her Report, Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño recommended that respondent be held administratively liable for gross inefficiency for his delay in resolving a motion.

This Court has consistently held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate.[4]  Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.[5]  Further, such delay constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge should dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.[6]

It is undisputed that respondent failed to resolve complainant’s motion within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days.  He cannot escape liability by claiming that his clerk “failed or forgot” to inform him of the unresolved motion.  Though blame may conveniently be placed on court personnel’s mismanagement of the records of cases, it must be kept in mind that they are not the guardians of a judge’s responsibilities.[7] Proper and efficient court management is as much the judge’s responsibility for he is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.[8]

As a trial judge, respondent is a frontline official of the judiciary and should at all times act with efficiency and with probity.[9]  Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.[10]

Furthermore, Rule 3.09, Canon 3 of the same Code requires every judge to organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.  Respondent fell short of this mandate. He also failed to comply with this Court’s Circular No. 13 dated July 31, 1987 which directs all judges to closely supervise court personnel.[11]

Noteworthy is the fact that respondent did not refute complainant's imputation of falsification of his Certificates of Service.  In fact, the Office of the Court Administrator secured copies of respondent's Certificates of Service for the months of August, September, October, and November 1999 and found that he continued to certify that all proceedings, applications, petitions, motions and all civil and criminal cases for submission or determination within ninety (90) days or more have been determined and decided.[12]

However, Deputy Court Administrator Elepaño stated that respondent’s false entries in his Certificates of Service were based on his belief, though erroneous, that he had then no pending matter to resolve. She concluded that there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.[13]

We find respondent judge administratively liable for undue delay in rendering an order, a less serious charge under Section 9, Rule 140, as amended, of the Revised Rules of Court. Pursuant to Section 11(b) of the same Rule, such offense is punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

WHEREFORE, for incurring undue delay in rendering an order, respondent Judge Marino S. Buban of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Tacloban City, is ordered to pay a FINE of Eleven Thousand (P11,000.00) Pesos, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

93.Hon. Rodriguez-Manahan vs. Atty. Flores, AC#8954, 11/13/2013

Facts:

A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal. Respondent Atty. Flores appeared as counsel for the defendant. He filed his Pre-Trial Brief without proof of MCLE compliance hence; it was expunged from the records without prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. The preliminary conference was reset several times for failure of respondent to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo gave respondent last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on his part. Respondent later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. During the preliminary conference, respondent manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of his MCLE on the following day. The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one year. 

Issue:

Whether respondent should be suspended from practice of law for using intemperate language in his pleadings

Held:

NO. There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court's order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. 

However, the court found the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent. Also, the court is not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a century. Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, the court deem it proper to fine respondent and to remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect court processes.

Canon 12

94. Atty. Fabroa vs. Atty. Paguinto, AC#6273, 3/15/2010

Facts: Complainant, Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), was removed as a member of the Board of Directors (the Board) and thereafter, respondent, Oscar Paguinto and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations. Complainant thus filed a complaint for annulment of the proceedings of her removal as well as other members of the Board and a complaint against respondent for disbarment alleging that respondent had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly, among others, Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court, when having ordered to submit position papers and despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time, did not file any position paper and further ignored the Court’s subsequent show cause order. Moreover, respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant. 

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s acts constitute a violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly, Canon 10. 

Held: Yes, lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes. The Court further noted that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. Hence, a more severe penalty is thus called for, respondent was subjected to suspension for two years. 

95.Foronda vs. Atty. Guerrero, AC#5469, 8/10/2004

RICARDO A. FORONDA vs. ATTY. ARNOLD V. GUERRERO, A.C. No. 5469, 8/10/2004 – Lawyer suspended for trifling with judicial process by resort to forum shopping in filing multifarious petitions, motions and actions concerning a property despite the fact that SC had upheld the judgment of the trial court and appellate court. While a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. In filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same subject matter, Respondent violated Canon 12 (“a lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice’) and Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate “to delay no man for money or malice.” While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

96.Que vs. Atty. Revilla, AC#7054, 12/4/2009

Conrado Que filed a disbarment case for Atty. Anastacio Revilla Jr. before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) of committing various violations on the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court as stated in the following

ISSUEMonday, February 28, 2014Vol XCIII, No. 311The respondent’s abuse courts remedies and processes by filing petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment in the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases)to assail and overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and RTC in the unlawful detainer case rendered against the respondent clients.FactsThe respondent also committed forum – shopping by filing the subject cases in order to obstruct, impede, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case.RULINGThe respondent’s willful and revolting falsehood is also alleged by the complainant that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico) who is the previous counsel of the respondent’s clients.

Atty. Revilla fabricated an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case where the respondent asserted the falsehood.The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation. Thus, the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.Under the circumstances of abuse of court and processes, the respondent’s repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. The respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to “observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.” The respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.The respondent continually argued and challenged the court for lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC even knowing – fully well that the competent courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case.Yes. The respondent committed violations in the code of Professional Responsility and the Rules of CourtThe respondent’s also deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appeared in court in the petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceasedConrado Que vs Atty. Anastacio Revilla JrLikewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer “never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law”.In defending his clients’ interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:

CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW

Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x

Furthermore, the respondent also repeatedly attacked the complainant’s and his siblings’ titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer case.The respondent willfully and fraudulently appeared in the second petition for annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.Atty. Revilla was accused of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him. The respondent answered the complaint and mostly denied all the allegations.

Whether or not the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry.The respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latter’s representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court.Due to Atty. Revilla's multiple violations on the Conduct of Professional Responsibility, and is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should beDISBARRED from the practice of law.

Canon 13

97.Jimenez vs. Atty. Verano, AC#8198, 7/15/2014

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 8108, July 15, 2014

DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, Complainants, v. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent. 

[Adm. Case No. 10299]

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

SERENO, C.J.:

Before this Court is the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano liable for improper and inappropriate conduct tending to influence and/or giving the appearance of influence upon a public official. The Joint Report and Recommendation submitted by Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III recommended that respondent be issued a warning not to repeat the same nor any similar action, otherwise the Commission will impose a more severe penalty. The Commission adopted the said ruling on 16 April 2013.2

The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro G. Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the time of the filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was representing his clients Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the “Alabang Boys”) were the accused in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs.3 In a Joint Inquest Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges were dropped for lack of probable cause.4

Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during the evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery and “cover-up” allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade. This prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing that respondent had prepared the release order for his three clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.5

Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent had admitted to drafting the

release order, and had thereby committed a highly irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the bar.6

For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for legal processes.7 Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter was not a government prosecutor.8 Atty. Lozano’s verified Complaint-Affidavit was filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP and docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2356.9

Officers of the IBP, Cebu City Chapter, issued a Resolution condemning the unethical conduct of respondent and showing unqualified support for the VACC’s filing of disbarment proceedings.10 On 27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground that a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez.11 On 2 June 2009, the Court referred both cases to the IBP for consolidation, as well as for investigation, report and recommendation.

RESPONDENT’S VERSION

In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the charges against his clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that the resolution also ordered the immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high hopes of the accused, together with their families, came crashing down when the PDEA still refused to release his clients.12 Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to prepare and draft the release order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, “if the Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything may be expedited.”13 In any case, respondent continues, the drafted release order was not signed by the Secretary and therefore remained “a mere scrap of paper with no effect at all.”14

FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER

The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the charges.

However, by his own admissions in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment, respondent drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of “feeding” the draft order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the same or any similar action.15

RULING OF THE COURT

We emphasize at the outset that the Court may conduct its own investigation into charges against members of the bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints brought before it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.16 By now, it is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar.17

As to Atty. Lozano’s withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of

interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.18 (Emphasis supplied)

After a careful review of the records, we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable grounds to hold respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating Commissioner, states that “a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.” We believe that other provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.

During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent stated that the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it received a direct order from the DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take more serious action, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see the Secretary himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a person who opens his [sic] kasi he is very political also so he opens his office. If I’m not mistaken that day because of the timing we will afraid [sic] that Christmas time is coming and that baka nga sila maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I did was thinking as a lawyer now…I prepared the staff to make it easy, to make it convenient for signing authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and send it over to PDEA. So hinanda ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to the Office of the other Secretary si Blancaflor.

x x x x

So I think it’s a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first with the parents of Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00 o’clock or 1:30 in the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor. Andon ho ang Secretary tinanggap naman kami, so we sat down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho namin in-explain x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on this, they will think that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong Fifty Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang maki-usap…sabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will study the matter, those particular words, I will study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a matter of fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were not pushing us away, he was entertaining us, and we were discussing the case.19

Respondent likewise stated that his “experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is very open;” and that “because of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a political family, my father was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and he knows my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they were together in Congress. In other words, I am not a complete stranger to him.”20 Upon questioning by Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent admitted that he was personally acquainted with the Secretary; however, they were not that close.21

These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondent’s admission that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in

view of “expediting the case.”

The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people’s faith in the judicial process is diluted.

The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To that end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.22

Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.” The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer “to impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.”

Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always be within the bounds of the law.23 A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense.

In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-month suspension against a judge who likewise committed acts of influence peddling when she solicited P100,000.00 from complainant Santos when the latter asked for her help in the case of her friend Emerita Muñoz, who had a pending case with the Supreme Court, because respondent judge was a former court attorney of the high court.24 We find that the same penalty is appropriate in the present case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately. This also serves as an emphatic WARNING that repetition of any similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be appended to the respondent’s bar records. The Court Administrator is hereby directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.Brion, J., on leave.Velasco, Jr., and Peralta, JJ., on official leave.

98.FoodSphere, Inc. vs. Atty. Mauricio, Jr., AC#7199, 7/22/2009

FACTS:

[A] certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread.  As Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can. This was complained before the BFAD. After conciliation meetings between Cordero and the petitioner, the Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD.  The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. Respondent, Atty. Mauricio, Jr.,  who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness,

later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.

Complainant filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City.  The complaints were pending at the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint. Despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Respondent suspended for three (3) years from the practice of law.

RATIO:

The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: “A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.”

The language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 and the fundamental Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to “uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.”  Respondent defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal profession to “obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.”

Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, and by failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to “at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.”