Canada - apps.dtic.mil · Defence Research and Development Canada Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada Canada 3-D SOVIET STYLE Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience

Defence Research andDevelopment Canada

Recherche et développementpour la défense Canada Canada

3-D SOVIET STYLELessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan

Dr. Anton Minkov, SJS-DSOA, Dr. Gregory Smolynec, CEFCOM-ORAT

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3-D Soviet Style. Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan

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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Defence Research and Development Canada,Canadian ExpeditionaryForce Command (CEFCOM-ORAT),101 Colonel By Drive ,Ottawa,Ontario, Canada K1A 0K2,

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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Counterinsurgency Leaders? Workshop, 27-29 Oct, Fort Leavenworth, KS

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State of Research

• Russian assessment inadequate

• DRA officials memoirs in Dari

• Most studies usually portray Soviet experience in negative terms or dismissed it outright as irrelevant

• Focus usually on the military campaign

• Discussion of Soviet COIN as comprehensive effort (military, economic development and state building experience) virtually non-existent


Presentation Overview

• Relevance of Soviet Experience

• Defence – military ops

• Development – social, political, economic

• Diplomacy – internal efforts

• Conclusion – Lessons (to be) learned


Chronology of Soviet Engagement

• 1979 Soviets invade & bear brunt of fighting

• 1985 Increased Afghan Army role

• 1986 Soviets limit combat operations

• 1989 Soviet withdrawal


The Costs

Soviet Union

• Killed…........ 15,000

• Wounded….. 54,000

• Illnesses…. 416,000

• Political failure

Afghanistan

• Killed …1-1.3 million

• Refugees…..5 million

• Civil war, failed state


Afghans Killed per Year

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

April1978

April1979

April1980

April1981

April1982

April1983

April1984

April1985

April1986

April1987

April1988

Brezhnev Andropov

Chernenko

Gorbachev


Is Soviet experience relevant?

• Afghan geography

• Ethnic & social divisions are persistent

• Basis for state legitimacy still very elusive

• The border with Pakistan


Is Soviet experience relevant?

• Military presence needed to provide security to the new regime

• Challenge of balancing military ops with civil affairs

• Underrated insurgency – culture of resistance & the ideology of Jihad

• “Limited Contingent”


Military Ops - General observations

• Initial strategy

• Different kind of war

– Elusive and decentralized enemy

– Terrain not conducive to mechanized operations

– Most operations - small scale

• Forces not enough to control all territory

• Overriding principle - minimal casualties


Air L

ift


Military Ops - General observations









Soviet Bases


Defence - General observations









“The War of the Roads”

• Mujahidin’s standard tactics: the road ambush & road mines/ IEDs

• Blocking roads - a strategic goal: Mobility / re-supply & Afghan economy critically affected

• Soviets devote large forces to route protection

• Mujahidin mine/IED ops sophisticated: plastic mines

• Losses due to mines: 11,289 trucks, 1,314 APCs, 147 tanks, 433 artillery pieces, 1,138 command vehicles


Mines & Ambushes

Defence Research andDevelopment Canada

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Adjustments - Strategic

• Focus on controlling the LOC

• Isolating and denying infrastructure support to the insurgency

• Deal making

• Security outposts

• Building up the strength of DRA Forces

• Withdrawal from active combat after 1986


Military activities 1980-84





• Deal making





Soviet Counter-Insurgency Approach

“I hold it a principle in Asia that the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict on your enemy.”

General M.O. Skobelev,

Conqueror of Turkestan, 1881


Effects of War - Destruction of Irrigation

0%

24%20%

12%

0%

36%

30%

13%

12%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

1978 1980 1985 1986 1987

% F

arm

ers

Reported by Farmers in Afghanistan Reported by Farmers who left Afghanistan


Effects of War - Bombing of Villages

0%

53%

38%

22%

0%

65%

49%

23%

21%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

1978 1980 1985 1986 1987

% F

arm

ers

Reported by Farmers in Afghanistan Reported by Farmers who left Afghanistan






• Deal making





Fayzabad, Village Sari, The regiment’s command in negotiations with the local elders

Defence R&D Canada • R & D pour la défense CanadaSoviet solders and “friendly” mujahidin. Ceasefire





• Deal making





Outpost 21, Rukha, Panjshir Valley


The command point

Post 21’s helicopter landing and radio-signal interceptor


Road and Convoy Security Posts





• Deal making





Growth of DRA Forces

137,000

200,000

260,000

310,000

310,000

300,000

240,000

180,000

100,000

87,000

330,000

-

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989


Desertion RatesNumber of Desertions per Year

35,05830,941

30,945

25,432

38,600

29,048

32,433

28,550

30,680

42,544

-5,000

10,000

15,00020,00025,00030,000

35,00040,00045,000

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

Percent Desertions per Year

22%

17%

21%

15%

25%

11% 11% 9%10% 12%

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989


DRA Forces breakdown (1988)

• Government Forces– Army 90,000 – Border Guards 42,000 – Gendarmerie 96,700 – KhaD 68,700 – Special Guards 11,500

• Total 308,900

• Militia on the side of government – Tribal 62,000 – GDR 35,000 – Self-defence 53,000

• Total 150,000

Grand Total 458,900


Force Level to Population Ratio Comparison

• Afghanistan (1988)

– 26:1,000 (Soviet + DRA forces)

• Iraq (May 2008)

– 22:1,000 (26:1,000 including Sons of Iraq).

• Afghanistan (2009)

– 7.6:1,000

• Required as per past COIN experience

– 425,000 – 640,000


DRA Air Force


Women in DRA Forces

DRA Air Force woman officer at Lycee graduationceremony in Baghram, Autumn, 1987.

Female village self-defence group


Soviet soldiers with the local self-defence unit, Badahshan





• Deal making





Soviet and DRA Forces Deaths

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

Red Army deaths DRA Army deaths


Border Sealing Activities

19

14

16

13

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

1983 1984 1987

Border Sealing Activities

53

3730

85

70

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1983 1984 1987

Ambushes (daily)

Caravan Interceptions (monthly)

By SovietBy DRA


Soviet – Afghan joint operation


Handing Battalion's Position to the Afghan Army


Joint operation with KhaD captures a mujahidin leader

KhaD officers with captured mujahidins


Afghan and Soviet troops in ambush position

After successful operation, Parwan, April 1987


Adjustments - Tactical

• Tactics devised to minimize losses

• Armed group concept

• Bounding overwatch

• Improvement of air assault and helicopter gunship tactics

• Enveloping detachments

• Use of special forces


Михаил БзычкинThe Soviet soldier

66 Reconnaissance company. Jalalabad


Spteznaz in action: Destroying a supply caravan, 1987


Galina Podzarev, an actor from Moscow Cascade - the favourite band of the 40th Army


Adjustment - Force Structure

• Shift to smaller, independent units

– 7 divisions 4 divisions + independent units

• Withdrawal of tank and anti-aircraft regiments

• Decentralization of fire support and assets

– shifted from army and division level to battalion level

• Air power, air mobility used as a force multiplier

– helicopters increased from 50 to 300

• Use of special forces

– 20% of all Red Army special forces


Adjustment - Equipment and Training

• New systems tested and introduced

– personnel carriers, helicopters and helicopter gunships, but not tanks

• Improvements to infantry’s personal gear and firepower

• Specialized mountain warfare training schools


The GP-25 "Koster" ("Bonfire") under-barrel grenade launcher

The RPG-18 "Mukha" ("Fly")


Social and State Development


Traditional Functions of State in Islam

• External security (against enemy forces)

• Justice

• Ensuring overall support for Muslim institutions and religion

• Policing, social justice, education, health

– responsibility of individual communities and Islamic charities (waqf)


Development: State Building Strategy

Regime stabilizing

Party State

Expanding the Social Base Defeating the ‘reactionary’ forces

Expanding government control

Red Army

Reforms Education

Police Afghan Army

Regime change


The Afghan Party StatePDPA Structure State Institutions

Politburo

Central Committee

Party Congress

PDPA Province

President

RC Presidium

Revolutionary Council

PM, Ministers

Governors

Loya Jirga

Provincial Jirga

District Jirga

Village Jirga

PDPA District

PDPA Sub-district

Commissioners

Commissioners


Growth of PDPA

PDPA and DYOA Membership Growth

205,000200,000

-

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

Year

PDPA membership DYOA membership


Activists of the Afghan Women's Democratic Organization


Secretary of the local Committee of the PDPA, Kalay-Dana, Parwan, 1986


“Delivery” of PDPA activists in Parwan, 1987



Regime stabilizing

Party State



Red Army

Reforms Education

Police Afghan Army

Regime change


Other Pushtun 49.3%Pushtun

67.6% Durani 18.3%Tajik/Sunni

23.9%

Shia 8.5%

Ethnic Politics

• Ethnic equality guaranteed in 1964

• Khalq and Parcham – ethnic composition

• Language reforms as ethnic politics


Ethnic Policies and Counterinsurgency

• Ethnic Favourism

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

45.0%

50.0%

1981/2 1983/4 1984/5 1986/7 1988/9

PushtunsTajiksOther

Ethnic Composition of PDPA


From Ethnic Rivalry to Ethnic War

Senior Officers

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1978 1987/88

Pushtun Tajik Other

Troops

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1978 1989

Pushtun Tajik Other

• Ethnic policies changed the balance of power

Ethnic Composition of the DRA Army



Regime stabilizing

Party State



Red Army

Reforms Education

Police Afghan Army

Regime change



Regime stabilizing

Party State



Red Army

Reforms Education

Police Afghan Army

Regime change


Government Control, 1988


Soviet and DRA Bases


Limits of Military “Pacification”

1,005

1,252

1,819

1,535

1,319

292292292292292

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

Freed' by military activities villages Remained under government control


Number of Villages under Government Control

11,265

5000

6,100

8,861

7,265

6,9706,6796,3886,0975,8065,515

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

Under government control Under temporary control

Beginning of National Reconciliation

Beginning of Soviet withdrawal


Diplomacy: Internal

• Unifying PDPA’s factions

• Pacification Policy

– agreements with local leaders and mujahidin

• Loya and local Jirgas (1985, 1988)

• Integrating the ulema (religious scholars) within state run religious system

• Agitprop (CIMIC)

• Promotion of national reconciliation and unity


Agitprop

• Part of force structure

• Composition

– Military staff

– Medical personnel

– Party representatives

– Entertainers

• Function

– Spread of information, distribution of fuel, food, medical help, reconnaissance, negotiations

• Initiative gradually “Afghanized”


The Agitprop detachment, 1987. Parwan Province. Durani village.

Defence R&D Canada • R & D pour la défense CanadaFuel distribution, 1986

Meeting devoted to the 68-th Anniversary of the October Revolution, 1986 Movie watching. 1986

Agitprop of the 108th MRD, 1985


Change of Strategy: National Reconciliation

• Launched in 1986

• More inclusive government

• Reversal of controversial reforms

• Socialism replaced with nationalism

• Promoting Islamic character of the state

• Accommodating and buying off resistance commanders

– ….but not challenging their authority


Results - Civilian Casualties

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9

Afghanistan

Iraq

• Civilian deaths decrease by 65-70% (1986-87)


Results - Reconciliation Process, 1986-89

• By 1990, 25% of all non-government armed units had signed “reconciliation” agreements and 40% ceasefire agreements

42,000

82,000

60,000

125,000

45,000

11,5336,9136,000

-

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

1986 1987 1988 1989

Mujahideengoing over tothegovernment

Mujahidin indiscussionswithgovernment

Beginning of Soviet withdrawal


Development: Economic

• Extensive prior Soviet economic investment

• Increasing the state share of national income

– 1975 -10%; 1988 - 20% of GDP

– in manufacturing - 80%

– in the construction sector – 90%

– in transportation – 60%

– Oil and gas exploration – 100%

• Domestic revenue, excluding sales of natural gas

– Growth of 142 % from 1977 to 1989 (13% per year)


Development: Agriculture

• 60% of GDP, source of income for 80% of population

• Land reforms counterproductive

• Overemphasis on cooperatives, state farms

• Object of contention

– cash crops vs. foodstuffs

• Target of the counterinsurgency strategy

– 20% of villages destroyed

• Ultimate result – destruction, import of foodstuffs

• Opium production



Development: Trade

• Objective – increase bilateral trade

• Gas exports, mining

– Exports at below market prices to USSR

– Soviet technicians

• Manufacturing not encouraged

• Economic integration

• Economy survives on foreign aid

• Corruption


Trade

28%

57%

68%59%

64%

37%

33%

72%

87%

71%

61%

34%

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Exports to USSR Imports from USSR

The April Revolution

Soviet invasion


Development: Trade

• Objective – increase bilateral trade

• Gas exports, mining

– Exports at below market prices to USSR

– Soviet technicians

• Manufacturing not encouraged

• Economic integration

• Economy survives on foreign aid

• Corruption


Soviet Military Aid (in Millions of Rubles)

3,972

1,629

1,063.4

579.1516.3366.3277.9231.5267.6 221.4

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

Decision to withdraw,

Building Afghan Army capacity

Beginning of withdrawal


Wheat Supply (in tons)

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

From USSR From domestic sources


Expenditures and Revenue

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

mill

ions

of a

fgha

nis

State expenditure Revenue and aid

Debt

National reconciliation


Sources of State Revenue

75%

25%

State Income, 1988

30%

70%

Customs and taxes

Natural Gas sales, financial aid

Customs and taxes

State Income, 1991

Soviet Financial Aid


Economic Aid Comparison

• Afghanistan (1980-1989)– Soviet aid (converted in 2007 dollars) - $29.7

billion, $1,980 per capita

• Afghanistan (2002-2009)

– Disbursed US and international aid - $44.4 billion, $1,346 per capita

• Iraq (2003-2008)

– Combined international aid to Iraq - $73.4 billion, $2,622 per capita


Defeat or Strategic Withdrawal?

• Decision for withdrawal made in 1985

– Based on shift of Party’s global strategy

• DRA army demonstrates increasing capacity

• National Reconciliation progressing

• Effects of Red Army withdrawal are positive

• The Regime survives

– … but depends on foreign aid

– … and is weakened by ethnic conflict


Lessons (to be) learned

• Denying sanctuary in Pakistan impossible with a “limited contingent”

• Red Army’s battlefield victories could not be translated into strategic success

• Level of political commitment is more important• Getting things done in Afghanistan requires local

engagement …. but runs the risk of perpetuating local power

centers that challenge central authority• Secular values conflict with Afghan traditional

values• Is strong, centralized, democratic Afghanistan

fesible?


Lessons (to be) learned – Exit strategy

• Red Army withdrawal removed a principal cause of war for the insurgents

• The policy of “National Reconciliation” was more successful than military operations

• Building Afghan security forces was a viable exit strategy

• Focus on long term economic sustainability is most important

• Keep supporting a friendly regime in Kabul at all costs


Questions?


References

• “Report to the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Situation in Afghanistan.” October, 1979

• CPSU CC Politburo Transcript, 13 November 1986.• M. F. Slinkin,. Afganistan. Stranici istorii (80-90-e gg. XX v.)

[Afgnanistan. Pages from History (80s—90s of the 20th century)]. Simferopol 2003.

• G.F. Krivosheev,. Rossiya i SSSR v voinakh XX veka: Poteri vooruzhennykh syl, Statisticheskoe issledovanie [Russia and USSR in the Wars of the 20th century: Losses of the Armed Forces, Statistical Review. Moscow, 2001.

• M.A. Gareev,. Afganskaya strada [The Difficult Battle for Afghanistan]. Moscow 1999.

• A.A. Lyakhovskii,. Tragedia i doblest Afghana [The Tragedy and Glory of the Afghans]. Moscow 1994

• V.I. Varennikov, Interview. February, 2007..


References

• Grant Farr, Azam Gul, 1984. “Afghan Agricultural Production, 1978-1982,”Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 8, 1: 65-79.

• Antonio Giustozzi, 2000. War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan 1978-1992.Washington

• The Russian General Staff,. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. translators & editors Lester W. Grau & Michael A. Gress, Lawrence, Kansas 2002

• Scott R. McMichael, 1991. Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London

• M.S. Noorzoy, 1985. “Long-term Economic Relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: An Interpretive Study,” IJMES, 17: 151-173

• Milan Hauner, Robert L. Canfield, ed., Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: Collision and Transformation. Boulder, San Francisco, London: 48-58

• Barnett R. Rubin, 1995. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. New Haven, London

• Marek Sliwinski, 1989. “Afghanistan: The Decimation of a People,” Orbis,Winter: 39-56

• Mark Urban, 1990. War in Afghanistan. London

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