Can We Un-forgive? - University of Michigan

volume21,no.6 may2021

Can We Un-forgive?

Monique WonderlyUniversity of California, San Diego

© 2021 MoniqueWonderlyThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/021006/>

I n saragreenslit’s award-winningnovel As If a Bird Flew by Me, wefindthefollowingpassage:“‘Youcan’tsayIeverforgavethem,’she’llhearherselfsay,notknowinganymorewhatitmeanstofor-

give.Canyoutakebackforgiveness,nullifyit?Wasiteverforgivenessthen,orwhatwas it called instead?” (2011:83)Theunnamednarra-torneitherprovidesacontextforthepassagenormakesanyattemptto answer its queries, but simply leaves thematter to drop.1 Yet, asdroppedmatters go, this is oneworth recovering. Thequestions atitscorerepresentarichmoralpsychologicalpuzzleapuzzlethat,thoughrelativelyneglectedinthephilosophical literature,hasimpli-cationsforhowweunderstandthenatureofforgiveness.

Inthispaper,IaddressthepuzzleposedbyGreenslit’scuriouspas-sage.Iconsiderwhetherandinwhatsenseforgivenessisrescindable,retractable,orotherwisereversible.Inotherwords,Iconsiderwhatitmightmeantosay thatavictimwhoforgaveheroffender forapar-ticularactofwrongdoinglaterun-forgavethatindividualfortheverysameact.

Thepaperproceedsasfollows.In§1,Iclarifyandmotivatethepa-per’sanimatingquestion.In§2,Iemployextantliteratureonthena-tureofforgivenesstointroduceandelaboratetwobroad,overlappingconceptionsofwhatwedowhenweforgive.In§3,usingthepreced-ingconceptionsofforgiveness,Iformulatetwoparallelconceptionsofun-forgiving,andIexaminesomefactorsthatbearontheirplausibility.In§4,IofferwhatItaketobeacaseofun-forgiveness,andIconsidersome objections against this interpretation. In §5, I briefly exploresomepotentialapplicationsof thisanalysis forassessingtheoriesofforgiveness.Finally,in§6,Iofferconcludingremarks.

1. The Puzzle

The question “Can we un-forgive?” admits of multiple interpreta-tions.Thequestioner,forexample,mightmeantoaskwhetherwecan

1. Imight justaswellhavedescribed thematteras left tohang curiouslybe-tween two (seemingly)unrelatedpassages.Theauthoremploysanuncon-ventionalwritingstylethatoftenincorporateselementsthataremoreremi-niscentofpoetrythanstandardfictionprose.

moniquewonderly Can We Un-forgive?

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.21,no.6(may2021)

WhenIreporttoafriendthatIun-walkedmydog,Iamnotmerelybe-inggauche,butincoherent.Doubtless,peoplehavebeenun-friendedonsocialmediasitesforlesseroffenses.

Ontheotherhand,while“toun-forgive”issomethingofatorturedterm,wemightacknowledgethatunlike,say,“toun-swim”itisnotobviouslyameaninglessone.Thoughrelativelyrare,thislocutionisnotentirelyabsentfromourvernacular.Considerthelyricsof“Un-forgiven”,a2001singlebyAmericanrockbandTheGo-Go’s:

OnceIforgaveyou,butIdidnotforget.NowIamtakingbackeverythingIsaid.You’reunforgivensogoonliving,knowingthatI’veunforgivenyou.AndmyThanksgivingcamethedayIsawitwasokaytounforgiveyou.(TheGoGo’s2001)

The use of the term here does not strike us asmere gibberish butseemstoexpressarecognizableidea.AnditispresumablythesameideathatpsychotherapistSusanForwardmeanstoconveywhenshedescribescounselingapatientto“unforgive”herparentsinorder“togetintouchwithheranger”(1989:180).Theseobservationssuggestthatweatleasthavesomeconceptofwhatitmightmeantowithdrawortoreverseforgiveness.4

Wheredoesthis leaveus?Neithertheextantphilosophical litera-tureonforgivenessnorobservationsaboutourordinarylanguageuseaffordsusaneasyanswertothispaper’sanimatingquestion.Crucially,whetherandhowwecanmakesenseof “un-forgiving”willdependonwhetherforgivenessisthe sort of thingthatadmitsofretractionorreversalandifso,onwhatisinvolvedinenactingtherelevantchange.Tothisend,abriefexcursionintothephilosophicalliteratureonthenatureofforgivenesswillbeinstructive.

4. Notably,while“un-forgive”remainsabsentfrommostformaldictionaries,itdoeshaveitsownentryintheEnglish-languageWiktionary,whereitislistedasatransitiveverbmeaning:“Torevokeorrescindforgivenessof”(unforgive.Wiktionary).

un-forgivepermissiblyi.e.,withoutviolatingsomemoralorrationalrequirement.My target, however, is a prior question, one towhichinquiriesaboutthepermissibilityofun-forgivenesspresupposeanan-swer. Iamconcernedwithwhetherandhowwecanmakesenseofforgivenessbeingreversedorundonebytheforgiver.

Relativelyfewtheoristshaveaddressedthisquestiondirectly,andwefindlittleconsensusamongthosewhohavedoneso.Thoughhetakesnodefinitive stanceon the issue, inhisdefenseof “economicmodels”offorgiveness,BrandonWarmkesuggeststhatitmaybepos-sible,and indeed justifiable, to retract forgiveness incertaincircum-stances (2014: 584−585).Geoffrey Scarrewho, tomy knowledge,offerstheonlysustainedphilosophicaltreatmentofwithdrawingfor-givenessarguesthattypically,“forgiveness,oncetrulygranted,can-notbetakenback”(2016:933).2AccordingtoH.J.N.Horsbrugh,whiletheprocessofforgivenessissubjecttoreversal,completeforgivenessisnecessarilypermanent(1974:279).Finally,DavidOwens,whochar-acterizesforgivenessas“irrevocable”,positsthatwecannot“unforgivesomeone”forwhatthey’vedone(2012:53).3

Theredoesseemsomethingstrangeabouttheideathatwecan“un-forgive”.WefindoneoftheearliestmentionsoftheterminaworkbygrammarianEvanDaniel,whereinachapteronparsing,heidentifies“unforgive”asaverbconstructionthattheEnglishlanguagedoesnotaccommodate(1891:73).Tobesure,noteveryactofφ-ingadmitsofaplausiblenotionofun-φ-ing.Whilesomewordsshouldremainunspo-ken,wecannotunspeakthem.Icanunlockadoor,unwrapagift,oruninstallsoftwarefrommycomputer.ButIcannotun-dreamafright-eningdreamorun-attendavapidlecture.Andimportantly,thisisnotjustamatterof linguistic styleoretiquette,butoneof intelligibility.

2. Isay“typically”becausethoughScarresetsouttodefendthethesisthat“nottakingbackone’s forgiveness isanecessarycondition for forgiving” (2016:932−933),helaterstates,“…thatforgivenesscanbewithdrawnin(and,Ibe-lieve,onlyin)thespecialcasewhereithasbeengrantedinerror”(ibid:938,hisemphasis).

3. Inaforthcomingworkonforgivenessandcommitment,Iassumebutdonotargueforthepossibilityofun-forgiveness(Wonderlyforthcoming).



thevictim’sagentialrolebyemphasizingthatshemustenacttheshift“voluntarily”and/orforaparticulartypeofreason.6

Notice that insofar as forgiveness involves a shift in affective at-titude,itisnotvoluntaryinthesensethatthevictimcansimplyenacttherelevantchangeatwill.Whenconfrontedbyanapologeticvictimwhoasks formy forgiveness, I canhandhera tissuewithwhich todryherguiltytears,butIcannoteliminatemyresentmentonrequest.7 Morecontroversially,wemightimagineacaseinwhichforgiveness,whileagentialinthesenseofbeingreasons-responsive,occursdespite thevictim’seffortstopreventit.Consider,forexample,anagentwhofeels empoweredbyher angryblameandwishes to retain it but ismoved by her offender’s acts of contrition to “let go” of her resent-mentdespiteherclenchedfists.Onemightthinkthatherresistanceand subsequent regret notwithstanding, she genuinely forgave heroffender.

Justasattendingtothevictim’sagentialroleinforgivenessaddsalayerofcomplexityto(F1),so,too,doesattendingtothenatureofheraffectivechange.TheoriststendtofollowButler(1897)inidentifyingtheemotionthattheforgiverovercomesasresentment,thereactiveattitudeparadigmaticallyfeltbyanagentinresponsetohavingbeenwronged.Some,however,positthattheforgivermustalsoovercomeothernegativeattitudes,suchascontemptorgrief(Richards1988;Bell2008;Garrard&McNaughton2011;Blustein2014).Andsome theo-ristsmaintain that the negative emotionsmust not bemerely over-come, but replaced with positive attitudes such as benevolence orgoodwill(Roberts1995;Pettigrove2004;Martin2010;Garrard&Mc-Naughton2011;Blustein2014).Thisapproachconstruesforgiveness

6. For example, Horsbrugh (1974), Haber (1991), Bell (2008), Owens (2012),Nelkin(2013),andBlustein(2014)allholdthatforgivenessmustbeinsomesense voluntary. For thosewho argue that forgiveness is done, or at leastsometimescanbedone,foraparticulartypeofreason,seeMurphy&Hamp-ton(1988),Hieronymi(2001),Griswold(2007),andMilam(2019).

7. Ofcourse,Icanagreeatwillto(tryto)giveuportorepudiatemyreturnedresentment,andsomemayregardthisactassufficientforforgiveness.

2. To Forgive

Un-forgivingcanonlymakesensewherethereissomeearlieractofforgivenessto“undo”.Wecanexpressthegenericdescriptionoftheearlieractasfollows:VictimVforgaveoffenderOforwrongdoingw.Tounderstandhowforgivenesscanbeundone,wemustfirstconsiderwhatwasdone i.e.,whatoccurredbetweenvictimV,offenderO,andwrongdoingw whenthevictimfirstforgave.Thoughtheoristsoftendivergeonthisissue,wecanmakeprogressbyfocusingontwobroadformulationsoftherelevantchange(s).

(F1)Vhadashiftinaffectiveattitudesuchthatherresent-ment(and/orothernegativeemotions) toward Oforwhasbeeneliminatedorsubstantiallyreduced.

(F2)ValteredO’s relationshipstatusornormativeposi-tione.g.,byreacceptingOintoamoralrelationshiporbyreleasingOfrom(certain)obligationstoVonaccountofw.

In their current state, these formulations are vague and incomplete,butwecandevelopthembyattendingtothephilosophicalliteratureonforgiveness.

Let’s start with (F1), according towhich forgiveness centrally in-volvesashiftinaffectiveattitude.ContemporaryforgivenesstheoristsoftentakeastheirstartingpointaviewthatistypicallyattributedtoJosephButler:namely, that to forgive is toovercomeor to forswearresentment(Butler1897).5Onthisview,thevictim’saffectivechangeisnotonethatmerelyhappenstoherasinthecasesofforgettingorofone’sresentmentnaturallyabatingovertime.Thevictim“overcomes”or “forswears” resentment, thusplayingsomeactiveagential role inbringingabouttherelevantshift.Theoristssometimestrytocapture

5. AsErnestoGarcia(2011)argues,thisisamisattributionsinceButler’sactualclaimisthatforgivenessinvolvesovercomingexcessiveresentment.



relationship (Kolnai 1974; Bennett 2003, 2018;Martin 2010). In for-giving,thevictimrestorestheoffender’sstatustoapositionofequalnormativefootingwiththevictim(Murphy&Hampton1988;Bovens2008,2009).

Anotherway tounderstand the relevant alteration is in termsofthevictim’sexerciseofanormative powerwhereby shealters thede-onticspacebetweenherselfandheroffender(Warmke2016;Bennett2018).9Considerthatonsomeviews,toforgiveis(inpart)torelieveone’soffenderofcertaincompensatoryobligationse.g.,her“debt”ofapologyandamends(Twambley1976;Murphy&Hampton1988;Bennett 2003;Nelkin2013;Warmke2014). Some theorists add thatthevictimundertakesanobligation(orcommitment)ofherown,anobligationtorefrainfromblamingheroffenderforthesamewrongdo-inginthefuture(Scarre2016;Bennett2018).10

Anadequateversionof(F2)shouldcharacterizetherelevantaltera-tionsuchthatitisnotbeyondthevictim’sauthoritytoenact.Insofarastheoffender’sactiondistancesherfromthemoralcommunity,thevictimmaylackthepowertounilaterallyrestoretheoffendertoherformerpositioninthemoralrelationship.Similarly,itisnotobviouswhichoftheoffender’sobligationsthevictimhastheauthoritytocan-cel.Theoffendermayoweitnotjusttothevictim,buttothemoralcommunitymorebroadly,toapologizeandtoengageinotheramen-datoryactivities.Theseobligationsmightbebeyondthevictim’spur-viewtowaive.

9. Inasimilarvein,althoughDavidOwensdoesn’tidentifyforgivenessasanor-mativepower,hearguesthatitneverthelesschangesthenormativesituationbetweenthevictimandtheoffender(andalsobetweenothermembersofthemoralcommunityandtheoffender)by,forexample,renderingsomeformsofblamefortheforgivenwrongdoinginapt(2012:53).

10. Scarrecharacterizesforgivenessasinvolvingapromisetoleavethewrongdo-inginthepast(2016:936).OnGlenPettigrove’sview,expressedforgivenessis“related”topromising,buttheformerinvolvescommitmentsincluding,inter aliaacommitmenttoforswearandinsofaraspossibleeliminatehostilereactiveattitudes that lack thebinding forceofpromisesandbreachingthemdoesn’t(withoutexcuse)harmtheoffender(2004:385−386).

notmerelyasanabsenceofsomeemotion,butashavingamoresub-stantivecharacterofitsown.

Regardlessoftheparticularemotionsthatthevictimeliminatesoracquires via her forgiveness, theorists often emphasize that forgive-ness isnot justamatterofhowone feels.Proponentsof (F1) some-times acknowledge this point by emphasizing that forgiveness, liketheblamefulorientationthatitsupersedes,isanemotionalstance.Toforgive,ortoresent,istotakeupanaffectivemodeofseeingorhold-ingone’soffenderinathickevaluativelight(see,forexample,Allais2008:52−58).Soconstrued,forgivenessisaninterpersonallyrichen-gagementthatisnotaptlycharacterizedmerelyasashiftinfeelings.OnPamelaHieronymi’saccount,resentmentisajudgment-sensitiveemotionthatfunctionsasaformofprotestagainsttherelevantwrong-doing,andforgivenesscan“ratify”theapologeticoffender’schangeofheart insomesense,changingthesignificanceofherpastaction(2001:550).

Sometheoristsdescribetherelevantchangeasaprocess,thefirststepofwhich isadecision toenact theattitudinal shift.This frame-workallowsforthepossibilitythatavictimwhomadethedecisiontoenacttheattitudinalshiftorotherwisebegantheprocessofenactingthechangeevenwithouthavingcompleteditcanintelligiblyre-portthatsheforgave.Formypart,whetherornotforgivenessinvolvesaprocessofenactinganattitudinal shiftand/oradecision tobeginthatprocess,Ithinkweshouldreportthatavictimforgaveonlyifshehascompletedtherelevantprocess.8

Let’snowturnto(F2).Onthisapproach,forgivenessisprimarilyamatterof altering theoffender’s socio-normative status. For exam-ple,whereasthevictim’sblamemightrepresenttheoffenderas(par-tially orwholly) displaced fromamoral relationship, forgiveness issometimessaid to involvere-accepting theoffender into therelevant

8. Onemightdisagree,insisting(forexample)thatforgivenessisaprocesswithnoendpoint.Thisviewof forgivenessstrikesmeasatoddswithboth thephenomenologyofcentralcasesofforgivenessandourtypicalemploymentoftheterm‘forgave’.However,aslittlehangsonthisforpresentpurposes,Iwillnotpursuedetaileddiscussionontheissuehere.



(U1)Vhadashiftinaffectiveattitudesuchthatshehascometore-inhabit(roughly)thesameresentfulemotionstowardO forw that characterizedherblamingattitudepriortoforgivingOforw.

(U2)VreturnedO’srelationshipstatusornormativeposi-tiontoits(orasimilar)statepriortoforgivenesse.g.,byagaindisplacingOfromtherelevantrelationshipwithVonaccountofworbyreinstatingcertainof O’sobliga-tionstoVonaccountofw.

Let’sbeginwith(U1).Itisnotdifficulttoimagineavictimwhoseat-titudeshiftsfromresentmenttowardheroffenderforaparticularactofwrongdoingtoamorepositiveattitudethatis(atleastlargely)devoidofresentmentandthenbackagaintoanattitudeofresentment.Onemightnotthinkitpossibletoreturntothesameattitudethatoneprevi-ouslyheld.One’slaterresentment,forexample,mighthaveadifferentintensity,andattheveryleast, itwouldbecoloredbythoughtsandfeelingsthatdivergefromthosethatoccurredintheearliercase.This,though,shouldnotconcernthosewhothinkthatwecanun-forgive.Themoreworryingpossibilitieswouldbeif laterepisodesofresent-mentwerealwaysbestconstruedaseither(1)continuationsofone’searlierresentment(suggestingthatthevictimneverreallyforgave)or(2)directedtowardanactofwrongdoingotherthantheoneforwhichthevictimforgave.Iconsiderbothpossibilitiesinthenextsection.

For(U1)torepresentun-forgiving,itshould,likethechangerepre-sentedin(F1),implicatethevictim’sagencyinsomerobustsense.Theattitudinalshift,ifnotintentional,shouldatleastberesponsivetothevictim’sreasons.Furthermore,andagainlikethechangerepresentedin(F1),theshift,ratherthanamereshiftoffeeling,shouldinvolveanormativelythickevaluativeadjustmentinthevictim’sorientationto-wardheroffender.Thevictimdepartsoneevaluativemodeofengage-mentandreturnstoanearlierone.

Proponentsof(F2)facethechallengeofshowinghowemotionsfit,ifatall,intotheirview.Importantly,manywillfinddubiousanyviewofforgivenessthatcannotaccommodatearoleforemotions.Suppose,forexample,ItellmyfriendthatIforgiveher,absolveherofanyob-ligation tomeon accountof herwrongdoing, and treather accord-ingly.Supposefurtherthataweeklater,aninauspiciouswindblowsopenmydiarytoapagethatdetailsmyunabatedresentmenttowardhersinceherwrongdoing.MyfriendmightunderstandablyfeelthatInevertrulyforgaveher.Tothoseforwhomthisringstrue,(F2)willlikelyseemtobemissingsomethingcrucial.11Consequently,somead-vocatesof(F2)allowforhybridconstructionsonwhich,inadditiontothe(morefundamental)exerciseofanormativepower,someformsofforgivenessalsoinvolveachangeinaffectiveattitude(see,forex-ample,Warmke2016).12

Havingexaminedandelaborated(F1)and(F2),wearenowwell-positionedtoconsiderwhatitmightmeantoun-forgive.

3. To Un-forgive

Giventheprecedingformulationsofforgiveness,wecanconstructtwoparallel formulationsofun-forgiveness.On the relevantapproaches,tosaythatVun-forgaveOforwistoexpressoneormoreofthefol-lowingstatements:

11. Notallwillbalkatviewsofforgivenessthatdiscountthecentralityofemo-tions.NicolasCornellsuggeststhatforgivingneedn’tinvolveanemotionalshift(2017:263).BrandonWarmkeandMichaelMcKennawrite:“Onecan…engageinbehaviorthatcommunicatestotheforgiventhatonewillnolon-gerholdthe forgiven’sblameworthyactagainsther.Andthiscanbedonewithouttheforgiverexperiencingantecedentresentmentormoderatingoreliminatingit”(2013:203).

12. Indiscussingtherespectivechallengesthat(F1)and(F2)advocatesface,Idonottomeantourgethateithertypeofviewisuntenable.Myaim,rather,istodrawoutwhatisatstakeinthedevelopmentofsuchviewsinordertoillumi-natethechallengesfacingparallelaccountsofun-forgiveness.Onarelatednote,Idonotintendtoarguethatahybridmodelofforgivenessisneeded muchless,toargueforaparticularhybridmodel.ButIwillgoontourge(in§5) thathowweunderstandun-forgivingcan informtheconstructionandassessmentofforgivenesstheories,including(F1)and(F2)hybrids.



onlyifshedoessoinfullrecognitionofherearlierforgiveness.13Thismakesadifferencebothforthevictimwho“reverses”herforgivenessand for theoffenderwho is likely to feelnotonlyconfused (as shemightinresponsetothemerelyforgetfulvictim)butbetrayedoroth-erwiseslighted.Thepointisthatun-forgivinghasaparticularnorma-tiveshapebecauseitbearsonthesignificanceofone’searlierforgive-ness. The victimdoesn’t just blame again, but she “takesback” herforgiveness.And it is thisnotionof reversalorun-doing thatmightrenderitdifficulttomakesenseofavictimun-forgivingheroffender.

Toseethismoreclearly,considerthatsomeviewforgivenessprin-cipally as a speech act.14On this view,when the victim says to heroffender(undertherightcircumstances),“Iforgiveyou,”shedoesnot

13. Therearesomeinterestingquestionsconcerninghowbesttodistinguishthemetaphysics of un-forgiving from the epistemology of un-forgiving. If un-forgivingisprimarilyanattitudechange,onemightthinkun-forgivenesscanoccurbelowthe levelofawareness.Forexample, Imightnotrealizethat Ihaveun-forgivenrightawaybutonly“discover”later(orperhapsnever)thatIhavedoneso.Idon’twanttoruleoutthispossibility,butthephenomenathatI’dliketopickoutherearen’tthesortofthingsthatjust“happentous”insomewaythatisdisconnectedfromouragency.Onmyview,forgivenessandun-forgivenessare reasons-responsiveanddistinct fromsimply forget-ting(eitheraboutthe relevantwrongdoingorone’searlierattitudetowardit).ThankstoHannaPickardforhelpfuldiscussiononthismatter.

14. As thisapproachwouldhave it, forgiveness isaccomplishedwhen thevic-timsaystoheroffender,“Iforgiveyou”(orsomethingofthesort),andthusperformsaparticular kindof illocutionary act. Illocutionary acts representwhatwedoinsayingsomething(Austin1962:99).Forexample,whenIsay“Ipromisetocallyou,”Inotonlyuttersomewords,butIdoacertainthingi.e.,Imakeapromise.Promisesrepresentwhatarecalledcommissives,atypeofillocutionaryactthatcommitsthespeakertodoingsomething(Austin1962:150;Searle1976:11).Pettigrovesuggeststhattheillocutionaryactperformedwhenavictimtellsheroffender,“Iforgiveyou,”hascommissiveforce,com-mittingthevictimtointer alia,forswearinghostileattitudesandretaliationonaccountoftheoffender’swrongdoing(2004:385).Forgivenesstheoristshaveidentifiedtwoothercandidatesforthetypeofillocutionaryactthatoneper-formsinforgiving:declarations(Searle1976:13)andwhatJ.L.Austin(1962:83) and JohnSearle (Searle 1976: 12) identify asbehabitives and expressives, respectively.According toWarmke, forgivenesshasdeclarative force, suchthat,whensaidinthepropercontext,“Iforgiveyou,”makes it the case thatthenormsofinteractionbetweenthevictimandheroffenderarealtered(2016:698). Pettigrove, followingHaber (1991), suggests that in addition to com-missive force, communicated forgivenessmightalsohavebehabitive force,

Nowturnto(U2),accordingtowhichtoforgiveistoaltertheso-cio-normativepositionoftheoffender.Forexample,iftoforgiveistoreaccept theoffender intoamoral relationship, thenpresumably toun-forgivewouldbe tooncemorestrip theoffenderof the relevantrelationship status on account of the original wrongdoing.On thisconception,justasthevictim’sinitialblamedisrupted(orreflectedadisruptionin)heroffender’sstatusasamoralpeeronequalnormativefooting,so,too,doesherun-forgiveness.Similarly, if toforgiveistowaivecertainoftheoffender’sobligationsortoundertakeanewcom-mitmentorobligationofone’sowntorefrainfromfutureblame,thentoun-forgivewouldinvolvereinstatingthoseobligationsorabandon-ingtherelevantcommitment,respectively.

Familiarlyfromabove,whetherwefindthisnotionofun-forgivingsensiblewilldependonwhetherwethinkthevictimhastheauthor-ity toalter theoffender’ssocio-normativestatus in therelevantway.Andhere,thestoryismorecomplicated.Itisonething,forexample,towaiveanother’sobligationtoyou,andquiteanotherto(tryto)re-imposethatobligationafterhavingwaivedit.Thinkhereofthecredi-torwhocancelsyourdebtandpresumablytherebyundertakesanobligationnottodemanditsrepaymentonlytolaterinsistthatyouagainoweherthefullamount.Ifthereareconditionsunderwhichthecreditorcansuccessfullyalterthenormsinthewaythatshepurportstodointhisscenario,thenonemightarguethatwecanunderstandun-forgivinginsimilarterms.

Whetherweaccept(U1)and/or(U2)asplausibleconceptionsofun-forgiving,we should interpret them so as to avoid equating un-forgivingwithmerely “blamingagain”.Consider that a forgetful vic-timwhoceases toblameanoffenderbecauseshehas forgotten thewrongdoingmight later remember it and againblameher offenderforit.This,though,isill-characterizedasanactofun-forgiving.Justasforgivenessmustbedonewhileretainingthejudgmentthattheof-fender’sactconstitutedawrongdoing,so,too,canavictimun-forgive



4. A Candidate Case of Un-forgiveness

Considerthefollowingcase:

Jane and Mabel.JaneandMabelaresisters.Uponhisdeath,theirfatherbequeathedtoMabelatreasuredfamilyheir-loom,anantiquelocket,andJanedestroyeditinafitofjealousy.Mabel,wholovedthelocket, initiallyresentedJaneforherinfraction,butinresponsetoJane’sapologyandexpressionsofremorse,finallytoldhersister,“Ifor-giveyou.”Months later,Mabeloverhears Janegleefullytellinga friendthatsheno longerregretssmashing thelocketandplanstodestroymoreofMabel’s“undeserved”possessions.Uponhearingthis,Mabel’sresentmentoverJane’sdestructionofthelocketreturned.ShetellsJane,“IknowthatIsaidthatIforgaveyouforsmashingmylocket,butItakeitback!Youneedtosetthingsright!”

Here,itseemsthatMabel’sresentmenttowardJanefordestroyingthelocketreturnedandthatshetakesherselftobere-imposingamenda-toryburdensonJanefordestroyingit.Accordingtotheconceptionsofun-forgivingsketchedintheprevioussection,itseemsreasonabletothinkthatMabelun-forgaveJanefordestroyingtheheirloom.Butnotallwouldagree.Onemightarguethatcasesinwhichweappeartoun-forgiveothersactuallyrepresentsomethingquitedifferent.Let’stakealookathowthischallengemightgo.

First, recall from the preceding section that onU1, or the affect-centered model of un-forgiveness, the returned blameful emotionsmusttargettheoffender’sinitialtransgression.OnemightthinkthatMabel’scurrentblameisbestconstruedasdirectednottowardJane’sprevious wrongdoing, but toward her current remorselessness andshamelessplotting.SincesheblamesJaneforsomethingotherthanherinitialtransgression,itiswrongtosaythatMabelun-forgivesJanefor it.Thatmatterremainsforgivenorsothechallengemightgo.Yetitseemstomethatthischallengefails.Inthescenariothatweare

merelyuttersomewords,butsheforgives perhaps,forexample,byadoptingorexpressingtheattitudedescribed in(F1)orbyeffectingthe alterationdescribed in (F2). Since thedoingof thedeed is con-tainedintheutterance,itmightseemdifficulttoimaginehowthevic-timcanundoit.Shecannot,afterall,un-utterherforgiveness-consti-tutingwords.

Yet,evenwhenforgivenessisunderstoodasaspeechact,Ithinkwecanstillmakesenseofun-forgiving.Wecanmakeheadwayherebythinkingabouthowsomespeechactscan,inafamiliarsense,beundone.Considerthespeechact“Ido”that(saidintherightcontext)binds one to another inmarriage. This act can be undone by end-ing themarriage incertainways.One temptation is to thinkof thisintermsofannulment,which,forlegalpurposes,makesitasthoughonewasnevermarriedinthefirstplace.Isuspect,however,thatthebetternuptialanalogyforun-forgivingisdivorce.Adivorcedcouplecountsasactuallyhavingbeenmarried,andthisfactmayhavepracti-calsignificancethatsurvivesthedissolutionoftheirmarriage.Yettheyarealsonowunmarried,andatleastsomeaspectsoftheirnormativesituationhaveshiftedinlightofthis,takingonasimilarcharactertotheonethattheystoodinpriortomarriage(e.g.,theycannowseverfinancialties,marryotherpeople,etc.).Similarly,weneedn’tthinkofun-forgivingasmakingitasthoughtheoriginalforgivenessneveroc-curredbutratheras“un-doing”(perhaps,justoneof)itscentraltask(s).

While somewill find these ideas intuitive, otherswill insist thatforgivenessdoesnotadmitofbeing“undone”inthisrespect.Onsomeaccounts,forgivenessisbestconstruedaspermanent,andwhatmightinitially look likecasesofun-forgivingarebetterdescribed inotherterms. Given that a plausible account of un-forgivenessmust over-cometheseobstacles,itwillbeusefultoexamineatestcase.

insofarasoneofitsillocutionarypointsistodisclose(someaspectof)thevictim’sattitudetotheoffender(2004:373).



tomakesenseofherforgiveness,wemustpositthattheactforwhichshepreviously resentedand theact forwhichshenow forgivesareoneandthesame.Similarly, itmakessensetosaythathoweverdif-ferentlyMabelnowregardsJane’searlieract,sheholdsthatactofde-structiontheoneforwhichshepreviouslyforgaveagainstJane.

In the preceding section, I raised the worry that un-forgivenessmightbeeasilyconflatedwithincompleteforgivenessthatis,amerecontinuation,ratherthanreturn,ofone’searlierresentment.Drawingonthisconcern,onemightallowthatMabelnowblamesJaneforherearlier transgression, but still deny that her resentment representsun-forgivenessbecausehercurrentattitudeconstitutesevidencethatsheneverreallyforgaveJaneinthefirstplace.Thisapproachassumesthatinordertocountasforgivenessproper,therelevantchangemustbepermanent.Onecaneasilyfindsupportforthisviewinthephilo-sophicalliterature.Forexample,Horsbrughstatesthatitispartofthelogicoftheterm‘forgiveness’that“toforgiveistoforgivepermanently”(1974:279).Similarly,DavidNovitzsuggeststhatforgivenessrequiresthat the changes that constitute it “endure” (1998:311).Drawingonsuchviews,onemightinsistthatMabel’scurrentresentmentandde-mandforamendsrevealherinitialpurportedforgivenesstobefalse.And if therewasno initial forgiveness, there canbeno subsequentun-forgiving.

supports forgivingtheoffender.Anoffender’s remorse, forexample,mightchangethevictim’sinitialviewofthewrongdoingmakingitappearmoredetachedfromtheoffender.Andaremorsefuloffendermightwellseemlessblameworthythananunremorsefulone,butstillonmanyviews,theoffend-er’sremorseconstitutesareasonforthevictimtoforgive.Thelargerpoint,though,isthatthemerepassageoftimewilloftenaddlayersofcontexttothevictim’sperceptionoftheinitialwrongdoing,ineffectchanginghowsheseesit,butweshouldtakecarenottointerpretanyandallsuchchangesasincom-patiblewithforgiveness.Likewise,asIhaveargued,weshouldavoidinter-pretinganyrevisedviewoftheoffender’sactpost-forgivenessasincompat-iblewithblameforthesamepreviouslyforgivenact.ThankstoDanaNelkinforhelpfuldiscussiononthistopic.Forinsightfulworkonhowlateractionscanchangethesignificanceofpastevents,seeJones(2008).SeealsoHiero-nymi’sremarksonhowthemeaningofweddingvowscanchangewhenonespouseleavestheother(2001:547).

imagining,Mabel’sattentionisclearlyredirectedtowardJane’searlieract,sheobviouslyseemstoresentJaneforwhatshedidbackthen,anditisthatactforwhichshenowdemandsamends.Thisisnottosaythatshedoesn’talsoblameJaneforbeingremorselessorforhernewplan,butitseemsbaselesstoruleoutthepossibilitythatsheresentsherforherearlieractaswell.

AproponentofthisstrategymightinsteadsuggestthatwhenMa-belinhabitsthenewblamingstancewithrespecttoJane’swrongdoing,sheresentsJaneandrenewsherobligationtomakeamendsfortheactunder a different description,andtherefore,itisinfelicitoustocharacter-izeherasun-forgivingJaneforherinitialact.H.J.N.HorsbrughandGeoffreyScarreeachsuggestthatcasesinwhichoneappearstowith-drawforgivenessareoftenbetterexplainedintheseterms(Horsbrugh1974:279;Scarre2016:939).Asthisobjectionwouldhaveit,whereasMabelinitiallyblamedandlaterforgaveJaneforherdestructiveactquaone-offtransgression,shenowblamesherfortheactquapartofapatternorcomplexofwrongdoing.Sincetheobjectsdivergeinthisway, there is no un-forgiveness. Jane’s original act, qua one-offtransgression,remainsforgiven.

Thisrouteofobjectionfaresbetterthanthefirst,asitdoesnotar-bitrarilyruleoutthepossibilitythatMabelnowblamesJaneforherearlieractofdestruction.Butstill,itmissesitsmark.Tobesure,MabelmightseeJane’sactdifferentlynowthanshedidbackthen,butthisisnoindicationthatwhat she blames her forisrelevantlydifferent.Toseethis,considerthatoneoftenforgivesbecauseonehascometoseetherelevantactofwrongdoingdifferently.Forexample,inthegripsofherinitialresentment,avictimmightinitiallyseetherelevantactasapos-siblesymptomofawickedcharacter,butinresponsetotheoffender’scontrition,shemightbegintoseeitasananomalousbitofcareless-nessandforgivetheoffenderfortheactonthatbasis.15Butinorder

15. Ifwetakethevictim’snewviewtoentailthatshenowseestheoffenderaslessblameworthy,thenwemightthinkthatwhatIhavedescribedasforgive-nessisbetterconstruedas(at leastpartial)excuse.Isuspectthat itwillbedifficulttodistinguishcasesinwhichavictim’srevisedviewofheroffender’swrongdoingsupportspartiallyexcusingtheoffenderfromthoseinwhichit



wereportthatweoncetrustedanagenttoperformsomeactbutdidnotsotrustheratalatertime,oragain,thatwefellinandthen,later,outoflovewithsomeone.ItwouldbestrangetoinsistthatbecauseIdon’ttrustmyfriendtodog-sitformenowthatIneverreallytrustedhertodosobefore.Likewise,thefactthatmycousindoesn’tcurrentlyloveherex-husbandneedn’tmeanthatsheneverreallydid.Andno-ticethattrustandlove,withoutanyguaranteeof theircontinuation,canplayrestorativerolesindamagedinterpersonalrelationships.Fa-miliarly,justaswecanintelligiblyaskwhetheracompanioncontinuestotrust,ortolove,uswherethattrustorloveplayedahealingrolein the relationshipwecanaskwhether she forgivesus still.Andsuchaninquiryonlymakessenseifforgivenessisnotnecessarilyper-manent.Ideally,trust,love,andofcourse,forgiveness,wouldpersist;yetthingsarenotalwaysideal.Butevenwhentheseattitudesarere-versedorrevoked,weneverthelessdidonce inhabit them,andthatseemstomeatruthwehaveastakeinpreserving.Theremaybegoodreason,then,toallowMabeltoownherhard-wonforgiveness,evenaftersheun-forgives.

OnemightsaythatperhapsMabel’sforgivenesswasconditional on Jane’scontinued,sincereremorse.Ononeinterpretationofthisclaim,Mabel’s purported forgiveness would have counted as genuine for-givenessonlyifJanewas,andcontinuedtobe,sincerelyremorseful.Andhereagain,Mabelcannotun-forgiveifshenevertrulyforgave.Onthisapproach,itisnotMabel’scurrentblamethatinvalidatesherear-lierpurportedforgiveness;rather,itisthatoneofitsconditionsforre-alizationwasnotmet.IfindthissuggestionproblematicforthesamereasonsIadducedinansweringthe“permanence”objectionabove namely,thatthisconceptionofforgivenessbothconflictswith(many)ordinaryexperiencesofhavingforgivensomeone,andfailstocoherewithhowwetendtoanalyzesimilarattitudes.Oftentimes,evenwhereweacknowledgethatweforgavemistakenlyorwrongly,westillun-derstandourselvesashavinggenuinelyforgiven.JustasImightregret,withoutbeingabletodeny,havingtrulytrusted(orpraised,blamed,etc.) someonewho,as it turnedout,didn’t reallydeserve it, so, too,

Itisunclear,though,whyweshouldacceptthischaracterizationofthe Jane and Mabelcase.HorsbrughandNovitzsupport their respec-tiveviewsbyappealingtocasesinwhichitonlyappearsthatonehasforgiven,butresentmenthavingbeenonly“incompletely”removedor “temporarilyoccluded” remainsbelowthesurface(Horsbrugh1974:279;Novitz1998:308).Tobesure,sometimeswhatappearstobeareversionbacktoapreviousattitudeisbetterconstruedasacaseinwhichonehasreallyheld(moreorless)thesameattitudeallalong.Wedosometimesthinkweforgave,andonreflection,concludethatweneverreallydid.AndasbothHorsbrughandNovitznote,thisisunderstandable,asexperienceteachesusthatitcanbebothdifficulttoforgiveanddifficulttoknowwhenonehastrulyforgiven.Importantly,though,thisisnotalwaysthecase,andthereseemstobenocompel-lingreasontoimposesuchaninterpretationonMabel’sattitudehere.

Onemightarguethatforgivenessisbestconstruedaspermanentbecause its reversibilitywould undermine its central function of re-lationshiprepair(see,forexample,Scarre2016:936).Butjustasitisnotclearwhywhatappearstobereturnedresentmentisalwaysbet-terconstruedasacontinuationofone’searlierresentment,neitherisitclearwhywemustthinkthatonlypermanentforgivenesscanplaya reparative role in relationships.Suppose, for example, thatMabelputforthgreatefforttoovercomeherblametowardJane,doingherverybest toviewJane’ssituationwithsympathyandunderstandingandtorestoretheirrelationship.SupposefurtherthatsheeventuallysucceededinreplacingherhostilefeelingstowardJanewithpositivefeelings,andthat thischangeenduredformonths(andwouldhavecontinuedbut for recentevents), fosteringgenuinely improvedrela-tionsbetweenthesiblings.Underthesecircumstances,itisdifficulttoseewhyMabel’scurrentblamewouldrenderherpreviousforgivenessinauthenticorunsuccessful.

Toseethismoreclearly,considerwhatarearguablyforgiveness’ssisterattitudes,trustandlove.They,too,areoftendifficulttoachieve,andwearesometimesmistakenaboutwhenandwhetherwedidinfactreallycometotrustortolove.Often,though,wearecorrectwhen



Tobesure,thefactthatMabelforgaveJanedoesmakeadifferenceforhercurrentblame.Mabel’searlierforgiveness,forexample,likelyattenuatesthereason-givingforceoftheinitialwrongdoing,therebyreshapingtheboundariesofwhatwouldconstituteappropriateorjus-tifiableblame.Owens’sviewnicelycapturesthis insight.Still, Jane’scurrentlackofremorseandintenttorepeatheroffenseseemlikegoodcandidatereasonsforMabel’sreturntoherpreviousblamingstance.Thus,Mabel’sblame is anapt response to the reasons that shehas.Inthisway,wemightsaythatthecurrentcircumstanceslicenseherreversalofthenormativechangeseffectedbyherearlierforgiveness.Forgiveness,then,needn’tbeirrevocable,anditseemsreasonabletoconstrueMabelasun-forgivingJane.

I havepresented the caseof Jane and Mabel as one inwhich thevictimisplausiblyconstruedashavingun-forgivenheroffenderforanactofwrongdoing,andIhavedefendedthisinterpretationagainstavarietyofobjections.Thisisnottodenythatsomecasesthatresembleun-forgivingareinfactbetterconstruedascasesinwhichthevictimblamesheroffender foradifferentact,oragain,cases inwhich thevictimnevertrulyforgaveheroffenderinthefirstplace.Theprecedinganalysissuggests,however,thatweneedn’tinterpretallsuchcasesinthisway.Atleastsometimes,wecanun-forgiveouroffenders.

5. Theoretical Applications

I have been concerned to offer an analysis and defense of the pos-sibility of un-forgiving.16 Since few theorists address un-forgivenessdirectlyandthereisdisagreementaboutwhetherwecanun-forgiveamong thosewhodoaddress it, I take it that these tasksconstituteimportantandnecessaryfirststepstowardfurtherfruitfulinquiryon16. Noticethatmyclaimthatwecanun-forgiveisconsistentwithitbeingthe

casethatinpractice,werarelydoso,oragain,thatwheneverwedoun-for-give,wenecessarilydo so impermissibly. Similarly,my claim is consistentwiththeviewthatweshouldjettisontheterm‘un-forgive’andreplaceitwithanotherthatadequatelycapturesthesameconceptthatIdescribeabove.Ihavesoughtneithertodefendthepermissibilityofthepractice,nortoinsistonaparticular labelwithwhich to identify it.Myaim, rather,hasbeen toshowhowwemightbestmakesenseofthepracticeitself.

mightIcometorealizethatItrulyforgavesomeoneunderfalsepre-tenses.Myresponse in thiscasewouldn’tbe “Inever really forgaveyou,”butrather,“Inolongerforgiveyou.”

Thisanalysisbringstotheforeanobservationfromtheprevioussection: Un-forgiving is more like divorce than annulment. Un-for-givingneedn’t voidone’searlier forgiveness,butmight “undo it” inanothersense–onethatallowsustorecognizethevictim’sinitialfor-givenessasvalidand therebyappreciate that itmayhaveakindofnormativesignificancethatsurvivesun-forgiveness.Furthermore,justaswemightacknowledgethattherearesometimesreasonsto“undo”amarriageviadivorce,wemightunderstandforgiveness’sconditions aspickingoutproperreasonstoun-forgive.Mabel,forexample,mighthave extended forgiveness with the understanding that Jane’s laterlackofremorsewouldconstituteareasontoun-forgiveher.Thisinter-pretationofMabel’s“conditionalforgiveness”isfriendlytomyview,asItakeitthatwebothforgiveandun-forgiveforreasons.

ThislineofthoughtaffordsusaresponsetoOwens’sobjectiontoun-forgiving.Owensallowsthatavictimmightblameanoffenderforanactofwrongdoingafterhavingforgivenherfortheverysameone,but he denies that this would constitute un-forgiving. Forgiveness,on his picture, irrevocably renders the victim’s resurgent blame in-apt(2012:53).Accordingtothisview,whenMabelblamesagain,shedoesn’tun-forgiveJane,butherforgivenessassumingitwasvalidatthetimeitwasextendedcontinuestonegativelyimpactthenorma-tivestatusofhercurrentblame.ThereissomethingattractiveabouttheideathatMabellacksthepowertosimplyreversethechangeinthe“normativelandscape”effectedbyherearlier forgiveness.Recallfrom§2and§3 that theplausibilityof socio-normativestatusaltera-tionviews(F2andU2)dependsheavilyonwhetherthevictimhastheauthoritytoenacttherelevantchanges.Mabelshouldnotbeabletoarbitrarilyaltertheappropriatenessofherresentmentortoreimposepreviouslyremovedburdensonanother.Butweneedn’tconstrueherblameintheseterms.



attitudinalchangesonthepartof theoffenderarenecessarytowar-rant thevictim’sun-forgiveness.Onemight think, forexample, thatJane’s initialwrongdoingprovidessufficient reason forMabel toun-forgive,oragain,thatiffurtherjustificationisrequired,thosejustify-ingreasonsneedn’treferenceJane’sactionsorattitudes.Notallwillholdthisposition,butitisnotobviouslyanimplausibleone.

If,ontheotherhand,un-forgivinginvolvesalteringtheoffender’ssocio-normativestatus,thenitmightmakesensetorequireweightier,oratleastdifferent,considerationstojustifyun-forgiveness.Thisises-peciallytrueforaccountsonwhichforgivenessanditsreversalaltertheoffender’sobligationstothevictim.Evenifwegrantthatavictimcanjustifiablycanceltheoffender’sdebttoherwithouttheoffender’sinvolvement,thismightnotholdtrueforcasesinwhichthevictimre-instatesadebt.Thelatterismorecostlytotheoffenderandpotentiallystandstowrongherifdonefornogoodreason.HadJane,forexample,donenothing(beyondherinitialwrongdoing)towarrantit,itmightbedifficultforMabeltojustifyalteringhersister’snormativepositioninthisway.

Itisalsoworthnotingthatabsentsomenewattitudinalorbehav-ioral change in theoffender (ornew information aboutherpast at-titudesand/oractions), itmaynotevenbepossible toun-forgiveonstatusalterationaccounts.Victimsmaynothavetheauthoritytouni-laterallyimposepreviouslycancelleddebtsorobligationsontheirof-fenders. Insofar as victimshave such apower, itmaybe that somefeatureoftheoffender’sattitudeorbehaviorisnecessarytolicenseit.Ifso,thenattemptstoun-forgiveanoffenderwithoutanysubsequentinteractionwith,ornewinformationabout,hermay“misfire”orfailtosucceed.Tryasthevictimmight,shemaybeunabletoreimposethepreviouslycancelledobligations.Onstatusalterationaccounts,then,the offender’s involvementmay be necessary not just to un-forgivejustifiably,buttoun-forgiveatall.Sincethesuccessofthevictim’saf-fective attitude change doesn’t obviously depend upon any featureoftheoffender,it isn’tclearthatthesameconditionwouldapplytoaffect-centeredaccountsofforgiveness.

un-forgiveness.Beforeclosing,however,Iwanttosayabitmoreaboutwhyweshouldwanttopursuesuchinquirythatis,abitmoreaboutwhyun-forgivingmatters.

Onceweacknowledgethatwecanun-forgive,wearebetterposi-tionedtorecognizeandtoaddressinterestingpuzzlesregardingthenatureandethicsofun-forgiveness.Forexample,ifwedoun-forgive,thenwe have a stake in knowingwhether andwhenwe do so ap-propriately.Someactsofun-forgivingmayrunafoulofmoraland/orrationalnorms,andsomeattempts toun-forgivemaymisfireor failto“comeoff”. Identifyingthejustificatoryandsuccessconditionsforun-forgivenesswouldhelptoilluminatethisunder-exploredaspectofourinterpersonallives.Icannottakeupthistaskhere,butIwilloffersomebriefremarkstoshowhowexploringsuchpuzzlesmighthelpustoadjudicatebetweendifferentaccountsofforgiveness.17

Let’s start by considering the role of the offender in groundingjustificatoryconditions forun-forgiving. In thecaseof JaneandMa-bel,Jane’slackofremorseandintenttore-offendlikelyhelptojustifyMabel’sun-forgiveness.Yetwemightwonderwhether,and towhatextent,new informationabout Janewasnecessary to renderMabeljustifiedinun-forgivingher.Afterall,onmanyaccounts,onecanjusti-fiablyforgiveanoffenderwithouttheoffenderhavingdoneanythingtoprecipitateorwarrantthevictim’sforgiveness.18Ifnochangeintheoffender’s attitude or behavior is necessary to justify forgiving her,thenonemight think thatwe can also justifiably un-forgive our of-fenderswithoutanynewinteractionwith,ornewinformationabout,them.Interestingly,socio-normativestatusalterationaccountsofun-forgiving and their affect-centered counterpartsmay yield differentverdictshere.

If forgiveness and its reversal are primarilymatters of a shift inaffective attitude, then it may not be clear why any behavioral or

17. SeeWonderly(forthcoming) foramore thoroughtreatmentof the tensionbetweenun-forgivingandthecommitmentsinternaltoforgiveness.

18. For examples of views that defendunconditional forgiveness, seeGarrardandMcNaughton(2011)andHolmgren(2012:esp.ch.3).



withotheragents.Un-forgivenesscanalsopotentiallyserveasause-fultoolforadjudicatingbetweenextantaccountsofforgivenessandconstructinghybridaccountsthatyieldamoreplausibleviewofhowwedo(andoughtto)respondtothosewhowrongus.19

References

Allais,L.(2008).Wipingtheslateclean:Theheartofforgiveness. Phi-losophy & Public Affairs 36(1):33–68.

Austin,J.L.(1962). How to Do Things with Words.Oxford:OxfordUni-versityPress.

Bell,M. (2008). Forgiving someone forwho they are (and not justwhatthey’vedone). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3):625−658.

Bennett, C. (2003). Personal and redemptive forgiveness. European Journal of Philosophy 11(2):127–144.

. (2018). The alteration thesis: Forgiveness as a normative power.Philosophy & Public Affairs46(2):207−233.

Blustein,J.M.(2014). Forgiveness and Remembrance: Remembering Wrong-doing in Personal and Public Life.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Bovens, L. (2008). Apologies. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soci-ety 108(1):219−239.

.(2009).MustIbeforgiven?Analysis 69(2):227−233.Butler,J.(1897).The Works of Joseph Butler:Vol. 2, Fifteen Sermons[1726],

ed.W.E.Gladstone.Oxford:ClarendonPress.

19. EarlierversionsofthispaperwerepresentedatthePrincetonUniversityCen-terforHumanValues,theCenterforValuesandSocialPolicyattheUniversityofColoradoatBoulder,the2017AmericanPhilosophicalAssociationPacificDivisionMeeting,theZicklinCenterNormativeBusinessEthicsWorkshopattheWhartonSchoolattheUniversityofPennsylvania,UCRiverside,UC SanDiego,andUCLA.Ithanktheaudiencesattheseevents,aswellasCraigAgule,LucyAllais,DavidBeglin,MitchBerman,GunnarBjörnsson, JeffreyBlustein,RosalindChaplin, JohnDoris, JohnMartinFischer,ElizabethHar-man,PamelaHieronymi,Agnieszka Jaworska,Karen Jones,ColeenMacna-mara,VictoriaMcGeer,DanaNelkin,HannaPickard,EricSchwitzgebel,AmySepinwall,JulieTannenbaum,ManuelVargas,andtwoanonymousrefereesfromPhilosophers’ Imprintforhelpfulcommentsanddiscussion.

Ifaffect-centeredandstatusalterationaccountsdoyielddifferentverdictsregardingtheroleoftheoffenderingroundingthejustifica-toryand/orsuccessconditionsofun-forgiveness,thenthisdifferencemaybehelpfulinadjudicatingbetweentherespectiveaccounts.Forexample,thoseconvincedthatun-forgivenessisbestviewedsolelyasthevictim’sprerogativemaybelessinclinedtoacceptstatusalterationaccounts of forgiveness,which seem to require amore substantiverole for theoffender.Ontheotherhand, thosewhoholdthatsomeneworpreviouslyunrecognizedfactabouttheoffenderisnecessarytojustifyun-forgivingher(orperhapstoun-forgiveheratall)mightfavorstatusalterationviews,whichseembetterequipped toaccom-modateandtoexplainthisrequirement.Inotherwords,wemightas-sessaccountsofforgivenessbased(inpart)onhowplausiblewefindtheircorrespondingimplicationsforun-forgiveness.

Importantly,myaimhereisnottoargueforanyparticularaccountofforgiveness.Rather,inthissection,Ihaveattemptedtoshowhowonemightemploytheconceptofun-forgivenesstobeginconstructingsuchanargument.Ofcourse,theindividualmoveshereneedfurtherdevelopment and defense, but I hope they suffice to show that un-forgivenessisapotentiallyusefuladditiontotheforgivenesstheorist’stoolkit.

6. Conclusion

Ihaveattemptedtoshowhowwemightmakesenseofun-forgivingan offender for a particular act of wrongdoing. Though the extantphilosophicalliteratureoffersnoready-madesolutionstothepuzzlesposedbyun-forgiveness,Idemonstratedthatwecanusetwobroad,overlappingconceptionsof forgiveness toconstructandtocriticallyexamine parallel formulations of un-forgiving. I then animated theresultingformulationsinatestcaseinwhich,asIargued,thevictimun-forgives her offender. Finally, I urged that our understanding ofwhetherandhowweun-forgivehasimplicationsforhowweconceiveofforgiveness.Ifwedoun-forgive,thenthisfeatureofourmorallivesdoubtlessplaysanimportantroleinhowwenavigateourrelationships



Nelkin,D. (2013). Freedom and forgiveness. In IshtiyaqueHaji andJustinCaouette(eds.), Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Newcastle:CambridgeScholarsPublishing,165−188.

Novitz,D.(1998).Forgivenessandself-respect. Philosophy and Phenom-enological Research 58(2):299−315.

Owens, D. (2012). Shaping the Normative Landscape. Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress.

Pettigrove, G. (2004). The forgiveness we speak: The illocutionaryforceofforgiving. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 42(3):371−392.

Richards,N.(1988).Forgiveness. Ethics 99(1):77−97.Roberts, R. C. (1995). Forgivingness. American Philosophical Quarter-

ly 32(4):289−306.Scarre,G.(2016).Ontakingbackforgiveness.Ethical Theory and Moral

Practice19(4):931−944.Searle, J.R. (1976).A classificationof illocutionaryacts. Language in

Society 5(1):1–23.Twambley,P.(1976).Mercyandforgiveness.Analysis36(2):84−90.unforgive.(2019,March14). Wiktionary, The Free Dictionary.Retrieved

01:30,August26,2019from https://en.wiktionary.org/w/index.php?title=unforgive&oldid=51809942.

Warmke,B. (2014).Theeconomicmodelof forgiveness. Pacific Philo-sophical Quarterly 97(4):570−589.

_____.(2016).Thenormativesignificanceofforgiveness.Australasian Journal of Philosophy94(4):687−703.

Warmke,B.&McKenna,M.(2013).Moralresponsibility,forgiveness,andconversation.InIshtiyaqueHajiandJustinCaouette(eds.), Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Newcastle:CambridgeScholarsPub-lishing,189−211.

Wonderly,M.(forthcoming).Forgiving,committing,andun-forgiving.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Cornell,N.(2017).Thepossibilityofpreemptiveforgiving.The Philo-sophical Review126(2):241−272.

Daniel, E. (1891). The Grammar, History, and Derivation of the English Language, with Chapters on Parsing, Analysis of Sentences, and Prosody.London:NationalSociety’sDepository.

Forward, S. (1989).Toxic Parents: Overcoming Their Hurtful Legacy and Reclaiming Your Life.NewYork:BantamBooks.

Garcia,E.V.(2011).BishopButleronforgivenessandresentment.Phi-losophers’ Imprint11(10):1−19.

Garrard,E.&McNaughton,D.(2011).Conditionalunconditionalfor-giveness.InChristelFricke(ed.), The Ethics of Forgiveness: A Collec-tion of Essays. NewYork:Routledge,97−106.

TheGoGo’s.(2001).Unforgiven.God Bless the Go-Go’s. Beyond.Greenslit,S. (2011).As If a Bird Flew by Me: A Novel.Tuscaloosa:The

UniversityofAlabamaPress.Griswold, C. L. (2007). Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration. New

York:CambridgeUniversityPress.Haber,J.G.(1991).Forgiveness.NewYork:Rowman&Littlefield.Hieronymi, P. (2001). Articulating an uncompromising forgive-

ness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(3):529−555.Holmgren, M. R. (2012). Forgiveness and Retribution: Responding to

Wrongdoing.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Horsbrugh,H.J.N.(1974).Forgiveness.Canadian Journal of Philosophy

4(2):269−282.Jones,K.(2008).Howtochangethepast.InKimAtkinsandCatriona

Mackenzie(eds.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency.NewYork:Routledge,269–288.

Kolnai,A.(1974).Forgiveness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:91−106.

Martin,A.M.(2010).Owningupandloweringdown:Thepowerofapology. Journal of Philosophy 107(10):534−553.

Milam,P.(2019).Reasonstoforgive.Analysis79(2):242–251.Murphy,J.G.&Hampton,J.(1988). Forgiveness and Mercy.Cambridge

UniversityPress.

Documents

Can We Un-forgive? - University of Michigan