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HEARING DAY TWO1

Cameco Corporation: Application by Cameco2

Corporation for the renewal of the McArthur River3

Licence4

THE CHAIRPERSON: The first item5

on the agenda today is Hearing Day Two on the6

matter of the application by Cameco Corporation7

for the renewal of the McArthur River mining8

operating licence.9

MR. LEBLANC: The first day of the10

public hearing on this application was held on11

July 7, 2004. The public was invited to12

participate either by oral presentation or written13

submission on Hearing Day 2.14

August 16, 2004 was the deadline15

set for filing by intervenors. The Commission16

received four requests for intervention.17

The Notice of Public Hearing18

2004-H-10 was published on May 4, 2004.19

Presentations were made on Day 1 by the applicant,20

Cameco Corporation, under Commission Member21

Document 04-H17.1, 04-H17.1A and by Commission22

staff on CMD 04-H17. September 8th was the23

deadline for filing of supplementary information.24

I note that supplementary information has been25

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filed by the applicant, CNSC staff and1

intervenors.2

3

04-H17.1B4

Oral presentation by Cameco Corporation5

THE CHAIRPERSON: With that6

preamble by the Secretary, I would like to start7

the hearing by calling on the presentation by8

Cameco Corporation outlined in CMD document9

04-H-17.1B and I would like to welcome again10

Mr. Terry Rogers, Senior Vice President and Chief11

Operating Officer. Mr. Rogers, you have the12

floor.13

MR. ROGERS: Thank you and good14

morning, Madam Chair, Commission Members,15

Commission Staff, ladies and gentlemen.16

For the record, I am Terry Rogers,17

Chief Operating Officer for Cameco Corporation.18

We are pleased to be here today for the Day 219

hearings on our application for renewal of our20

operating licence for the McArthur River mine.21

First let me introduce team22

Cameco, the people who will be presenting to you23

and fielding your questions here today: John24

Jarrell on my right, Vice President of Safety25

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Health and Environment Department; Wyatt Buck on1

my left, who is the General Manager of Key Lake2

and McArthur River; David Bronkhorst, who is3

McArthur River's Mine Manager; Scott Grant,4

McArthur River/Key Lake, Manager of Quality5

Management System, Environmental Management System6

and Regulatory Compliance; Merlin Seier, Senior7

Coordinator, Radiation Safety at both Key Lake and8

McArthur River operations; Dr. Pat Landine,9

Manager of Hydrology, Civil Engineering in10

Cameco's Safety, Health and Environment11

Department; and Scott Donald, Senior12

Hydrogeologist with Golder Associates, one of our13

long-standing consultants who has assisted us over14

the years.15

Obviously this is a large group of16

people we have assembled here today. We have17

asked them to join us in Ottawa in recognition of18

the importance of this project under consideration19

and in respect of the fairly wide-ranging20

technical nature of some of the information21

requests that came out of the Day 1 hearing.22

In July, shortly after the Day 123

hearing, we did turn off the last groundwater24

pressure relief tap at McArthur River mine. So25

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the physical event is over, but the lessons we1

learned from it remain.2

Firstly, we have grouted and3

sealed the area of the inflow and put in a freeze4

wall to further protect the immediate affected5

area of the mine.6

We have beefed up and are7

continuing to strengthen our technical expertise8

to our staff in areas such as rock mechanics and9

hydrogeology, and we will continue our long-term10

practice of supplementing this in-house technical11

expertise with well-qualified consultants.12

As you would expect, we have made13

changes in the way we operate, the way we plan and14

the way we evaluate our development plans. We see15

these changes to the management system as16

complementing our quality management system and we17

believe they will make our organization stronger.18

One of the most recent lessons19

learned from the event which took place now20

17 months ago, was the need to find ways to21

improve the general level of radiation education22

within our workforce, not just in procedural23

radiation training, but also in terms of the24

general knowledge base amongst our employees for25

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this very important aspect of our business.1

The areas of training and2

education clearly go hand in hand with3

communications within the workforce, another area4

where improvements will continue to be sought.5

We had submitted to the CNSC our6

analysis of the root cause of the event which we7

believe essentially was an over confidence in the8

technology and our mining methods, as stated9

during the Day 1 hearing. In carrying out this10

analysis, we sought a balance between the11

application of formal root cause analytical12

techniques and a desire to involve those people13

most affected by the incident directly in the14

analysis.15

The CNSC staff have recommended16

that we take a second independent analysis of the17

event to ensure that nothing has been overlooked18

in our own analysis. We have agreed to this19

recommendation and have hired an expert in the20

field to perform a follow-up root cause analysis21

beginning next month.22

Further, we decided to carry out23

additional root cause analysis training for our24

workforce to be able to use these corrective25

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action tools more effectively in the future.1

The presentation that was prepared2

for today we hope will address the outstanding3

issues to your satisfaction, and we will attempt4

to answer any other questions that may arise as5

this hearing proceeds.6

I will now turn the microphone7

over to Mr. John Jarrell and the conclusion of his8

presentation will be the end of Cameco's formal9

presentation.10

Thank you.11

MR. JARRELL: Thank you, Terry.12

For the transcript record, my name13

is John Jarrell and I am Cameco's Vice President,14

Safety, Health and Environment.15

This presentation is meant to16

provide supplemental information on the McArthur17

River operation in response to questions raised by18

the Commission during the Day 1 hearing.19

The outstanding issues to be20

addressed in this presentation are:21

additional information on the22

hydrology of the underground McArthur River mine;23

details of the additional water24

pumping capacity installed underground, including25

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an overview of the existing and new water handling1

facilities;2

as well as additional information3

on waste rock pack groundwater monitoring.4

The other outstanding information5

requests arising from Day 1 are:6

the effects of the mine water7

inflow and the concentration of selenium and the8

treated effluent;9

supplemental information on the10

root cause of the mine water inflow; and11

finally, information on corporate12

oversight and coordination of environmental13

management systems at McArthur River.14

The pre-inflow understanding of15

the hydrology at McArthur River was based on16

several studies, as listed on this slide. These17

investigations included numerous bore holes and18

monitoring wells, or piezometers, with hundreds of19

permeability tests for the purpose of20

characterizing the hydraulic behaviour of the21

local environment.22

Data was also collected during the23

sinking of over a kilometre of access shafts24

through the sandstone and during the test mining25

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phase. No large scale, long-term pump test was1

done prior to the start of production mining.2

This decision was based on another early decision,3

namely the decision to rely on the use of passive4

methods to control groundwater in the form of5

grouting and freezing, rather than by active6

control through depressurization.7

The initial developed conceptual8

hydrogeological model has since been updated by9

Golder based on the extensive datasets collected10

since the April 6, 2003 start of the inflow event,11

including water levels, water pressures and inflow12

rates. This data is generated from a number of13

piezometers established at a variety of depths.14

Data from historical studies, as well as15

operational behaviour, have also been taken into16

account.17

The photograph provides a18

perspective of the relative location of the three19

access shafts, shown in red; the main P2 fault20

structure shown as the black line; the approximate21

location of the Drill Bay 12 collapse and the22

surrounding groundwater monitoring network.23

This slide provides a summary of24

groundwater monitoring well or piezometer25

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locations partitioned to show the distribution1

between shallow, intermediate and deep horizons.2

Our written submission provides more detail on3

piezometer locations relative to the point of4

inflow into the mind section view.5

This slide shows the revised6

hydrogeological model for the site, starting with7

the upper Athabasca sandstone aquifer unit8

extending from surface to a depth of about9

330 metres. The permeability of this unit in the10

model is high, at 2x10-6 metres per second.11

There is a previously undefined12

aquitard unit from 330 metres to 350 metres depth13

with a permeability estimate of 1x10-8 cubic14

metres per second.15

The presence of this sandstone16

unit was inferred from piezometric data during and17

after the inflow event, which showed only a minor18

drop in the water levels above 330 metres in19

comparison with a major drop in water levels below20

350 metres.21

The lower aquifer unit extends22

from 350 metres depth to the top of the basement23

rock. The permeability of this unit is also high,24

estimated at 2x10-6 metres per second.25

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The basement rock, which hosts the1

majority of the mine workings, is at the base of2

this model. It is hard competent rock with a low3

permeability estimated at 8x10-8 metres per4

second.5

The model includes an enhanced6

permeability zone representing the intersection of7

the P2 fault in the toe of the unconformity. The8

P2 fault is the main structural geologic feature9

of the mine hosting the main ore zones and10

extending several kilometres north and south of11

the mine.12

This hydrogeological model was13

further refined to take into account the effects14

of the washout associated with the April inflow15

event, thereby reflecting the effects of the16

removal of sand and silt materials immediately17

following the collapse.18

The model was calibrated to the19

observed response data for the first couple of20

months following the inflow event. The calibrated21

model has continued to provide a good fit against22

the response data following the partial shut-in of23

the pressures at the collapsed area beginning in24

July of 2003.25

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A risk assessment of the McArthur1

10-year mine was conducted using this refined2

model beginning in December of 2003. A number of3

the identified hazard scenarios involved inflow of4

water from drill holes, development faces and5

production raised bore holes and an estimate of6

the maximum likely inflow was made for each of7

these scenarios. A value of 100,000 cubic metres8

per hour was chosen for most scenarios, with9

smaller values selected in some cases.10

The sensitivity analysis included11

extending inflow zones from the April 2003 event12

northwards by 50 metres, creating a new inflow13

zone in Zone 4, allowing it to connect to the14

washout zone and assuming higher hydraulic15

conductivity values in the overlying sandstone.16

The reasonable case scenario17

resulted in inflows below 1,200 cubic metres per18

hour that drop below 1,000 cubic metres per hour19

either immediately or within one week.20

An extreme case scenario in which21

the hydraulic conductivity of the Athabasca22

sandstone was increased by a factor of two23

resulted in an inflow of 1,600 cubic metres an24

hour, dropping to 1,200 after one week.25

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This last scenario does not match1

the available extensive aquifer pressure2

monitoring data, but does illustrate that even3

unrealistically large changes in the input4

assumptions result in inflows that are only5

moderately greater than the more probable values.6

We believe our pumping and treatment capacity is7

sufficient based on this field tested and proved8

understanding of the hydrogeological regime.9

The pre-inflow combined10

underground mine water pumping capacity was11

650 cubic metres an hour, which was accomplished12

using four multi-staged high-head Weir pumps and13

two positive displacement Wirth pumps which are14

installed in the lower 640 levels to pump ore15

slurry to surface in their normal mode.16

The mine water pumping capacity17

had to be more than doubled or temporarily18

increased to a total of about 1,500 cubic metres19

an hour. This was accomplished by installing one20

more Weir pump, two Mather & Platt pumps, five21

National pumps and a series of Flyght pumps.22

This slide shows the quantity and23

type of permanently installed pumps underground at24

McArthur River. When complete, these pumping25

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installations will consist of four pumps installed1

in Shaft 3; five pumps installed in the Pollock2

shaft; and five pumps installed in the 640 level3

dewatering station. This combined increase in4

pumping capacity of more than 750 cubic metres per5

hour brings the total to 1,500 cubic metres. In6

other words, we are permanent installing the same7

capacity as exists in the current temporary mode.8

The existing Wirth slurry pumps,9

although not included in the permanent pumping10

inventory, would also be available under11

unforeseen circumstances to provide additional12

emergency pumping capacity of about 175 cubic13

metres an hour.14

This slide shows the existing15

surface water collection and settling ponds. They16

are four contaminated water ponds "A", "B", "C"17

and "D" for treated effluent ponds 1, 2, 3 and 4,18

a south surface run-off collection pond and a19

north surface run-off collection pond. The20

storage capacity for each of the existing21

collection and settling ponds will be presented22

momentarily, but first a photo to show the23

location of the new additions to the surface water24

handling system.25

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In this slide we are showing the1

planned expansion changes to the surface water2

treatment facilities. The existing treated water3

settling pond "C" will be modified with its4

storage capacity increased. Three new monitoring5

ponds used to batch release treated effluent ponds6

numbers 5, 6 and 7 will be constructed next to the7

existing monitoring ponds 1, 2, 3 and 4.8

The most significant element of9

the capacity increase is a new large 50,000 cubic10

metre settling pond "E" and related pump house.11

This slide summarizes the existing12

and expanded capacity of the water treatment plant13

at McArthur River. The overall water management14

capacity at McArthur River will increase from15

about 100,000 cubic metres to 175,000 cubic metres16

once the new ponds are constructed. With larger17

capacity comes additional flexibility to handle18

the process upsets and short-term issues which19

inevitably crop up in operating a large scale20

water treatment facility.21

Overall, this initiative22

represents an increase in water handling capacity23

of over 75 per cent.24

This slide highlights the location25

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of the earth filled contingency dam. The dam was1

constructed as a temporary structure in 2003 to2

provide additional water storage capacity during3

the early weeks of the inflow event. For4

instance, for any excess mine water which could5

not be treated in the existing surface water6

ponds, or to provide additional solid settling7

time or residence time to permit chemical8

reactions to complete. The dam was never used and9

remains a contingency structure.10

The dam contains about11

10,000 cubic metres of earth fill, is about12

6 metres high, has a top width of 4 metres, with13

four to one side slopes and a 0.9 metre diameter14

culvert.15

The maximum water tension capacity16

of the dam structure is 66,000 cubic metres based17

on an area of 5.3 hectares of flooded muskeg.18

The contingency dam was not19

subject to a formal EA process. As such, it is20

not licensed for use. Cameco will decide in the21

near future whether to seek formal approval to22

retain the contingency dam for its intended23

emergency purposes or deconstruct the structure.24

It should also be borne in mind25

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that while it is a temporary structure it was1

built to permanent structure standards.2

This slide shows the location of3

mineralized and potentially acid generating waste4

storage pads.5

Pad 1 is the mineralized waste6

storage pad with a surface area of about7

5,800 cubed square metres.8

Pad 2 is one of three storage9

pads for potentially acid generating or PAG waste10

rock which occupies a surface area of about11

9,500 square metres.12

Pad 3 is also a storage pad for13

PAG rock with a surface area of about 7,200 square14

metres.15

Pad 4 is the most recently16

installed PAG pad, spanning the 2002 to 200317

construction season, with a surface area of about18

10,500 square metres.19

The mineralized waste material is20

temporarily stockpiled on pad No. 1 for eventual21

transport to Key Lake for processing. The PAG22

material is crushed, segregated into aggregate23

piles and used as backfill underground. Material24

unsuitable for backfill will be transported to Key25

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Lake as well.1

This aerial photograph shows the2

location of the 2004 installed waste rock pad3

monitoring piezometers, which are shown in red,4

and some of the older piezometers shown in green.5

In total, about 50 shallow6

monitoring wells have been established, in 1993,7

2000 to 2001, and 2004 campaigns.8

The primary objective of the9

shallow piezometers is to provide leak detection10

monitoring for seepage from surface facilities.11

In the Day 1 hearing we were asked12

why some of these monitoring wells had failed.13

Golder Associates carried out an assessment of14

this groundwater monitoring system in 2002,15

largely to provide advice on where to put16

replacement and supplementary piezometers. They17

looked at 49 wells across the site, 18 of which18

had been destroyed, with 26 functional and five19

dry. The dominant flow path is downward, likely20

induced by mine shaft column inflow leakage.21

Roughly estimated groundwater22

transit times to the closest shaft are 10 to23

100 years. Water quality is good, with periodic24

minor showings of uranium and nickel. The new25

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wells are meant to examine vertical patterns and1

expand the network outside of the footprint of the2

mine surface facilities.3

In the Day 1 hearing we were asked4

to provided up to date information on selenium5

effluent concentrations shown here as the 20046

data. There is no clear trend in this data.7

For reference points, all selenium8

concentrations remain well below the effluent9

quality limit in our provincial permit of10

0.6 milligrams per litre, monthly maximum11

arithmetic mean, and 1.2 milligrams per litre12

grab. These concentrations are also well below13

the Saskatchewan surface water quality objective14

of 0.01 milligrams per litre, but are in the range15

of the Canada-wide equivalent ambient water16

quality objective of 0.001 milligrams per litre.17

However, as stated during the18

Day 1 hearing, the issue is more one of dietary19

uptake rather than water concentration toxicity.20

The next three slides build a larger scale view of21

the selenium effluent performance.22

First, effluent discharge volumes.23

They have increased as the mine has developed,24

more than doubling from 1999 to 2002. Mining25

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started in late 1999. In 2003, due to the mine1

water inflow event, treated effluent discharge2

volumes were just over 5 million cubic metres.3

As points of reference, the total4

effluent flow in Key Lake in 2003 was about5

1.7 million cubic metres and about 4 million cubic6

metres at Rabbit Lake. Key Lake numbers in the7

1990s were typically 12 million cubic metres a8

year when active pump dewatering without9

reflooding was under way.10

The extrapolated effluent11

discharge volumes in 2004 are based on actual flow12

volumes to the end of July and an estimated rate13

of 225 cubic metres an hour for the remaining five14

months.15

Looking at annual selenium16

concentrations, the start up of production mining17

in 2000 generated an increase from about one to18

three or four parts per billion. Concentrations19

dropped in 2003, due at least in part to the20

increased volume of water.21

A surprising development is the22

lack of rebound in 2004 as the volume of inflow23

water has decreased. This will require ongoing24

analysis.25

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The selenium detection levels1

changed from 0.001, or one part per billion prior2

to the inflow, to 0.1 part per billion shortly3

after the inflow event. However, this should not4

have had a major influence given the averages5

involved.6

Other possible explanations7

include changes to McArthur River's water8

treatment process completed in 2003, including9

sand filter upgrades and the use of magnesium10

sulphate reagent in lieu of sole reliance on11

ferric sulphate, or changes in data density over12

time. With the preponderance of data collected in13

conjunction with the McArthur River inflow onward14

with sparser data collected prior to the incident.15

The green line in this plot tracks16

selenium loading rather than concentration.17

Annual loadings to the environment increased from18

about 1 kilogram in 1999 to about 11 kilograms in19

2003. It is too early to tell where loadings will20

end up post-inflow, but the current short-term21

trend is positive.22

As required by Environment23

Canada's Metal Mining Effluent Regulations and our24

licensed programs, Cameco is required to do25

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ongoing environmental effects monitoring at its1

mine sites.2

The McArthur River mine was3

modified in 2003 to include selenium where4

appropriate.5

The research work has been6

completed by the University of Saskatchewan in Key7

Lake to provide some regional insight on8

biological effects associated with uranium9

exposure. The current study is on northern pike.10

Aquatic mammal surveys at McArthur11

River were completed last month and include12

selenium. Additional studies above and beyond the13

regulated program requirements included the14

sampling of metals and sediment water and aquatic15

vegetation to help us understand better the16

transfer path of this metal and other metals in17

the environment.18

At the Day 1 hearing we were asked19

to provide more information on root cause analysis20

of the 2003 inflow event. Subsequently, CNSC21

staff requested an independent root cause22

analysis. This work is scheduled to take place23

this fall and will hopefully bring closure to this24

phase of the incident.25

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CNSC staff, in reviewing our work1

to date, have made the observation that further2

analysis may show causes more closely linked to3

generic management practice rather than over4

confidence in technology.5

If we can briefly summarized key6

findings as follows. As this slide shows, there7

were changes in the management structure which8

have occurred since the inflow event last year,9

the first two creating a more structured design10

authority element and an additional rock mechanic11

technical resource for direct outcomes of the12

internal inflow investigation.13

Changes in the way in which14

corporate oversight is practised in safety, health15

and environment matters is a more recent change16

and is outlined in the next slide.17

The changes which have taken place18

in the corporate oversight of safety, health and19

environment activities at various Cameco operating20

sites are summarized in this slide.21

In essence, we are seeking to22

better distinguish two aspects of corporate23

oversight, namely the aspects of policy setting,24

performance monitoring and program review from the25

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aspects of operational support and program1

delivery.2

The objectives are twofold:3

first, to create a better alignment between4

operations who are responsible for compliance and5

performance; and the corporate Safety, Health and6

Environment Department which provides licensing7

and technical support.8

The second objective is to create9

a separate department independent of operations10

and its associated regulatory requirements which11

can focus on the oversight function.12

These changes should help us13

better address the oversight process issues14

identified by CNSC staff in their March 2004 audit15

of the McArthur River Environmental Protection16

Program.17

This slide summarizes the18

management system changes which have taken place19

since the inflow event. These changes are20

strongly influenced by the developing quality21

management system. There were no strong links to22

QA prior to the incident given the formative23

nature of the QA management system.24

Such management systems can reduce25

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the potential for developing and maintaining over1

confidence in technology, both by using more2

formal review process, involving more people in3

the decision-making process.4

One of the other major lessons5

learned from the inflow event was the need to6

re-look at radiation training and education for7

our employees. This need has been pointed out on8

a number of fronts. Looking forward, a three9

phase program is contemplated.10

The first phase includes a11

consultant supported assessment of our current12

radiation training program. Other aspects include13

an assessment of radiation related knowledge and14

skill requirements for various jobs, and15

assessment of confidence related informational16

needs. This should culminate in recommendations17

to modify the existing program.18

The second phase is to implement19

an enhanced radiation training program which is,20

where appropriate, tailored to target three21

groups, employees, radiation safety personnel and22

supervisors. It is expected that this new23

training initiative will also include training24

delivery coaching, as well as improved program25

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administrative and reporting requirements.1

The third phase is an evaluation2

of training effectiveness against established3

objectives.4

There have been no recorded lost5

time injuries at McArthur River so far this year.6

Similarly, there have been no reportable7

environmental incidents.8

As noted at the beginning of the9

presentation, the last of the Drill Bay 12 inflow10

pressure relief water was such off in mid July.11

While this took considerable time to accomplish,12

the work proved to be very effective.13

Work on two major inflow14

event-related changes, namely installation of the15

additional permanent mine dewatering capacity and16

surface water treatment capacity is well under17

way.18

In conclusion, it is our opinion19

that the McArthur River operation continues to20

demonstrate strong commitment to protecting its21

workers, the public and the environment.22

The McArthur River operation has23

also demonstrated a strong commitment to change,24

particularly in it's management, oversight and25

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processes. As has been pointed out before from1

many viewpoints, continual improvement is a key2

tenet here and meeting the challenges of mining3

this unique, complex ore deposit.4

Thank you for your attention.5

This ends our presentation.6

7

04-H17.A8

Oral presentation by CNSC staff9

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very10

much. I would like to turn to CNSC staff for11

their presentation before I open the floor for12

questions. I will turn to Mr. Barclay Howden, who13

is the DG, for the presentation by the CNSC staff14

which is outlined in CMD Document 04-H17.A.15

Mr. Howden, the floor is yours.16

MR. HOWDEN: Thank you. Good17

morning, Madam Chair and Members of the18

Commission.19

For the record, my name is Barclay20

Howden. I am the Director General of the21

Directorate of Nuclear Cycle and Facilities22

Regulation.23

With me today are Mr. Kevin24

Scissons, Director of the Uranium Mines and Lands25

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Evaluation Division; Mr. Fred Ashley, Project1

Officer within the same division; and the rest of2

the CNSC licensing team for this project.3

Cameco has applied for a renewal4

of the McArthur River uranium mine operating5

licence. For this public hearing Day 2, CNSC6

staff has submitted supplementary CMD 04-H17.A7

which updated information from the public hearing8

Day 1 for the following six items.9

They are: emergency preparedness10

and response program; quality assurance,11

environmental protection and training audit12

follow-up; packaging and transport audit13

follow-up; benthic invertebrate and sediment14

investigations; selenium releases to the15

environment; and the mine water inflow root cause16

analysis.17

The information contained within18

the CMD 04-H17.A does not affect the conclusions19

or recommendations in CMD 04-H17.20

In addition to the information21

supplied in our supplementary CMD, CNSC staff22

wishes to highlight some key points of our23

regulatory program planned for this facility24

should the proposed licence be issued.25

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CNSC staff will continue with our1

comprehensive compliance program, including2

inspections and program evaluations. When3

necessary, progressive enforcement will be used to4

ensure that compliance is fulfilled, including5

orders and requests under section 12 of the6

Nuclear Safety and Control Act. This will include7

routine management meetings between CNSC staff and8

Cameco on priority issues, commitments and9

schedules.10

CNSC staff will continue11

assessment of emerging issues, including12

identifying level of risk and bounding any13

unacceptable risks through the implementation of14

mitigative measures, administrative and15

engineering controls and/or contingency measures.16

Examples of this include: feedback on the root17

cause analysis for the mine water inflow incident;18

further assessment on the molybdenum and selenium19

in the effluent discharges; and results on the20

quality assurance program improvements.21

CNSC staff will continue22

assessment of new projects and modifications that23

are within the scope of the licence, including24

review and approval of engineering designs and25

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controls.1

Finally, reporting to the2

Commission, CNSC staff will continue to report3

significant events via significant development4

reports; a mid-term program review in the latter5

part of 2006 will be provided if this licence is6

issued; and any updates during upcoming7

appearances expected before the Commission in the8

next two years, for example production increase9

proposals will be made as required.10

That concludes our presentation11

and we are available to respond to questions.12

Thank you.13

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very14

much.15

I just would like to clarify16

before we start the rounds of questions that --17

this will be first for the licensee and then for18

the staff -- the difference in requested licence19

length still remains? It is still five years and20

three years and eight months.21

Am I correct? Is it still five22

years, from Cameco?23

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for24

the record.25

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30

Yes, we had requested five years1

but I think we are obviously more than prepared to2

accept the shorter period recommended by staff.3

THE CHAIRPERSON: Staff?4

MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons,5

Director of Uranium Mines and Lands Evaluation6

Division.7

We are staying with our proposed8

3.8 years for the facility.9

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.10

Dr. Barnes, would you like to11

start the questioning?12

MEMBER BARNES: Sure. I would13

like to thank Cameco for providing the information14

requested at last days' events. I would like to15

follow-up, though, on some of the information16

provided because I am still trying to understand,17

as I'm sure Cameco is, and hopefully staff, how18

this flooding took place, why there were such19

large flows, and large sustained flows over a long20

period of time, and to understand how that flow21

regime operated within the mine and, to some22

extent, reasonably as to what extent it could have23

been predicted.24

If it is not predictable,25

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31

could there be other events for this mine or1

other mines? Is it possible to predict it by2

understanding the regional groundwater flow or is3

it going to be simply a highly specific sort of4

one-off situation very much tied to the local5

geology?6

So what you have provided is more7

information on the piezometer distribution which8

is one way of giving you an understanding of the9

groundwater flow; you have given us information on10

the hydrogeologic model which is used essentially11

to try to test and provide a sort of theoretical12

basis for it; and you have given us information,13

together with the new information by the Golder14

letter, on maximum water inflows anticipated in15

further events.16

I would like to follow up17

on basically these aspects, at least in the18

first round.19

What you have shown on page 2 is20

that the Athabasca sandstone is 500 metres in21

depth on average. We know from information before22

that the breakout, the water inflow took place at23

the 530 level in the mine. That is very close to24

the sandstone basement interface or the25

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32

unconformity.1

Yet most of your piezometer depths2

are much shallower than that. You break these3

down into shallow, intermediate and deep. Shallow4

less than 50; intermediate 50 to 350; and deep5

greater than 350. In Figure 3 you show the6

various piezometers which give you the packer7

tests from which you base the groundwater flow8

information. Relatively few of these seem to me9

to extend down close to the 530 level which is, in10

a sense, the offending level and likely to be the11

offending level.12

So I would like to ask my initial13

question: Do you really think that the regime of14

piezometer data that you have here can really15

address what seems to be the key issue here, that16

if there are to be large inflows they are likely17

to come from roughly the 530 level? Why would I18

believe that you have enough information around19

the 500-530 level to give you continuing guidance20

of groundwater flow regimes?21

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell.22

I guess my short answer to that23

would be on the basis of the fact that we saw24

fairly strong responses on the piezometers that we25

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33

put in and then were able to correlate those1

responses pretty well with the model we had.2

But I will certainly ask my3

colleagues behind me if they could perhaps give4

you a more complete answer to that.5

MR. DONALD: For the record, Scott6

Donald from Golder Associates.7

I would agree with John, there is8

a clear response through the piezometer network.9

There are six or seven piezometers at more or less10

the same depth interval as the inflows that we saw11

post-April 2003 and the distribution of those12

piezometers is over the footprint of the future13

mining area.14

So the response we did see is not15

just local to zone 2, some of those are installed16

in the zone 4 area as well as further north. So17

we feel we have pretty good coverage at depth at18

roughly the 500 level as well as through the mid19

section of the sandstone.20

MEMBER BARNES: Basically 607 down21

at the 500-530 level?22

MR. DONALD: Yes.23

MEMBER BARNES: On Figure 3 you24

show the P2 fault, which is the one that is25

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34

creating most of the large cavity areas associated1

near the unconformity.2

Could you give me information on3

why you limit the extent of the P2 fault as you do4

on Figure 3?5

Mr. Jarrell, you indicated that I6

think the fault zone, or at least the zone of7

mineralization, extends for many miles outside of8

the particular mine site. Do you really have9

evidence to show that the false stops and starts10

basically where you have shown it?11

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell.12

I think we were just trying to13

show locations at the P2 fault relative to the14

current mining zone. This obviously isn't the15

geological map for exploration.16

You are quite correct, we do not17

have piezometers farther out from this area, it is18

focused on the mine site.19

I don't know whether my colleagues20

behind me have anything to offer as well.21

DR. LANDINE: Pat Landine, for the22

record.23

Certainly I agree with John, the24

Figure is really just to illustrate the fault25

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35

within the mine site. It does extend north and1

south from there.2

MEMBER BARNES: On Figure 8, which3

is the updated conceptual hydrogeologic model.4

Maybe you could click that on, Figure 8.5

What controls the aquitard? That6

is the shaded zone in the middle of the sandstone?7

MR. DONALD: Scott Donald.8

In a geologic sense or in a9

hydrogeologic sense?10

MEMBER BARNES: Both.11

MR. DONALD: I will start with the12

hydrogeology end of it.13

The reason for its location there,14

it is obviously a simplified view of what might be15

the mechanism that is limiting groundwater flow16

from the upper part of the sandstone to the deeper17

part of the sandstone.18

The piezometer distribution that19

we show in a separate figure, the piezometers in20

the sandstone above that aquitard, as shown on21

this slide, show no response to the inflows22

post-April 2003.23

So from a hydrogeologic point of24

view, that is how we have arrived at that aquitard25

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36

at that location.1

In looking at it from a geologic2

point of view, there is no strong correlation or3

obvious correlation with that layer and a specific4

difference in the sandstone structure, whether it5

is clay infills and fractures or solicification.6

So it is more driven from the response we saw7

post-April 3 and the groundwater data than it is8

driven from the geology side.9

MEMBER BARNES: So in the geology10

you show the fault but you show no, in a sense,11

offset of the aquitard, which you might if it was12

a geologic control on the aquitard. That fault is13

post-sandstone deposition.14

DR. LANDINE: Pat Landine, for the15

record.16

Could you perhaps rephrase? I'm17

not really sure what you mean.18

MEMBER BARNES: Well, you have a19

fault in the basement that is affecting the20

sandstone. Correct? That is the P2 fault that21

you have shown in the offset of the blue. Yet the22

aquitard goes straight across without any offset.23

If there was a stratigraphic level in the24

sandstone that was controlling the aquitard you25

StenoTran

37

would expect an offset in that just as you do in1

the basement sandstone content.2

DR. LANDINE: Okay. I understand3

now. Pat Landine, for the record.4

There are two parts to that.5

Certainly the conceptual model shows a nice flat6

layer. It may not in fact be that flat.7

Certainly some of the sandstone -- there is the8

post-depositional element to this so that there is9

some horizontality above that fault.10

MEMBER BARNES: Just as a small11

detail, on Figures 5 and 6 on which you are12

showing the well distributions, why do the lines13

representing the shafts -- don't they actually14

penetrate deeper than what you show on there? The15

shafts go well below the 530 level.16

MR. BRONKHORST: David Bronkhorst,17

for the record.18

We have three shafts at the19

property, two of them only go to the 530 level and20

the main travelway, the Pollock shaft, goes to the21

bottom of the mine at 660.22

MEMBER BARNES: In section 3.0 on23

page 4 referring to the MODFLOW, that is, as you24

say:25

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38

"A 3-dimensional groundwater1

flow model that was2

constructed to represent the3

above conceptual framework."4

To quote, this:5

"...assumes groundwater flow6

is laminar and can be7

approximated using equivalent8

porous media (i.e., as9

opposed to discrete fracture)10

assumptions."11

Coming to what seems to be the12

more critical aspect of the mine inflow here, why13

do you think that this model of laminar flow --14

and dealing with this strictly in a porous media15

sense -- is that appropriate model when you are16

dealing with this sort of cavity? On the top of17

the page you refer to this as being a void or a18

series of voids.19

Do you really think that this20

model would be applicable for this kind of21

situation or event?22

MR. DONALD: Scott Donald, for the23

record.24

Certainly at the local scale25

StenoTran

39

around the voids is the collapse, groundwater flow1

will be occurring through fractures near the2

collapse as well as in the sandstone.3

It is certainly the question when4

you begin to try to simulate the response data at5

that time whether you are going to be able to6

reproduce the observed data in the regional7

piezometers with a model such as MODFLOW.8

However, going through that9

process we have provided a good match with six or10

seven of those deep piezometers which are 400 to11

500 metres distant from the collapse and they have12

all provided a good match with the MODFLOW model.13

So that has given us the confidence at that scale14

to continue using MODFLOW as a representative15

model for inflows to the mine.16

MEMBER BARNES: If I may turn to17

the aspect of the maximum water inflows. We have18

the new letter from Golder. In the charts that19

you provide -- and we had similar information last20

time -- we have flows of roughly 1,000 cubic21

metres an hour, maximum going on and gradually22

lowering but flowing over for a year at high23

rates.24

I was intrigued by the fact that25

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40

the Golder letter in reviewing the data and1

essentially providing some new estimates here made2

no comment on the duration of the flow. In a3

sense, they accepted that in their new models they4

might use 1,000 cubic metres an hour, but made no5

comment about the duration of this flow.6

Could you give us some indication7

as to the anticipated duration?8

MR. DONALD: Scott Donald.9

For the risk assessment, when we10

use the model for that purpose, it is essentially11

looking at a similar timeframe as the collapse12

that occurred on April 2003. So the model is not13

designed to run out for years and years, it is14

looking at a timeframe say on the order of a few15

months.16

MEMBER BARNES: Maybe Cameco could17

address, in terms of a response to that type of18

flow, how quickly it could get back on top of the19

issue of returning the flows back to a low level.20

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for21

the record.22

I guess the guidance we would23

seek, the sense I always had in looking at this24

data was that we had reached some equilibrium,25

StenoTran

41

which I think is what we saw with the existing1

inflow from 2003. As has been pointed out, it2

took quite a period of time to shut the water3

inflow from the event in 2003.4

I always looked at the model5

as really what is the sort of peak flow and what6

is sort of the steady state flow. That is the way7

I have always interpreted this, not really as8

sort of an estimate of how long it would take9

to rectify the next inflow if there happened to10

be one.11

MEMBER BARNES: To Cameco, you12

have indicated in the section on final effluent13

that you have increased the capacity, but my back14

of the envelope calculations indicate that it15

still remains at about -- if I use the new Golder16

figures which are slightly higher -- that you17

still basically just have about five to seven days18

holding capacity at the maximum flow rates.19

Is that correct?20

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for21

the record.22

Yes, the assumption is obviously23

that the water treatment plant would continue to24

operate. Really what we have is a series of water25

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42

treatment plants. We have the existing primary1

and secondary water treatment plants which use the2

existing treatment plant. There is also a second3

treatment system that is focused on this new pond.4

I think my expectation would be not so much5

storage of water but treatment of water.6

Obviously we need sufficient surge7

capacity to handle any upset, but I think at the8

end of the day the issue will be getting the water9

out of the mine. That has certainly been our10

experience in 2003. We were able to effectively11

treat the water when we got it to the surface.12

So what we are trying to create13

with this additional capacity is sort of a second14

treatment system in this pond "E", if you will.15

MEMBER BARNES: If you had a16

similar flood and you were requiring to get this17

water basically out on the surface as opposed to18

holding most of it within the mine itself, you19

would have essentially a five day reservoir in20

order to treat it. So you could treat that volume21

of water on a continuing basis?22

MR. JARRELL: Yes, that is23

correct.24

Maybe I could ask one of my25

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43

colleagues if they would care to sort of maybe1

give a brief summary of how this new water2

treatment system would work. I think it is3

essentially sort of a variation on the one we4

created for the inflow.5

MR. BRONKHORST: Dave Bronkhorst,6

for the record.7

The primary and secondary water8

treatment plans are our mainstay. Our normal9

operating plant has about 750 cubic metres per10

hour. The new pond will have at least that as11

well. The main plant is 750.12

During the initial inflow what we13

found to be most difficult was the managing of the14

water, getting it to the pumps and getting it to15

the surface. We are armed with that knowledge now16

and we see the storage on surface being more than17

adequate.18

MEMBER BARNES: So if I could try19

to summarize and then just ask staff for a20

comment. Again, I appreciate the new information.21

I was not persuaded that the information -- let me22

try to pose it from my concerns.23

We are looking at essentially24

health and safety in this situation. You had a25

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44

rather sort of catastrophic event here, certainly1

unpredicted and difficult to cope with at the2

time. It is not something that one would like to3

see again. However, recognizing why this occurred4

was probably due to the local geological effects5

and the sort of cavernous nature close to the6

unconformity as the contact of the sandstone and7

the basement rock. So there certainly is a8

potential for that sort of geologic situation to9

occur elsewhere within the mine site as you10

develop it.11

So although I have information I12

am still concerned that there is not sufficient13

information on that particular fault zone, as I14

read the new information, that I wondered whether,15

as indicated more specifically in the16

discussions -- half a dozen, six or seven I think17

the number was given -- of the piezometers at18

roughly the 530 level was sufficient to give you19

adequate control on this.20

I question whether the MODFLOW is21

really appropriate to model this sort of event22

situation as opposed to the regional groundwater23

flow within the sandstone.24

I was surprised, I guess given my25

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45

concern whether you have adequate water handling1

capabilities, that you were going to potentially2

deconstruct the contingency dam. It seemed to me3

you were pretty close to sort of capacity of4

handling the volume of water in this situation.5

That was the lines of concern I6

still have in this and I wondered if staff have7

any comments on what they have heard from Cameco8

in reply to my questions.9

MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.10

When we look at all the11

information, including the new information12

provided by Cameco in their supplementary CMD, all13

this information would come back to us basically14

to address the proposed new licence condition 2.315

in regards to new mine development.16

In this perspective, the current17

mine operation, the facility and the development18

work that currently stands, the ground control,19

the water handling measures, the treatment20

capacity is all there and is more than sufficient21

to handle the current mine operations.22

The potential risk would be23

incurred when they begin to expand the mine24

workings to access the remainder of the ore body.25

StenoTran

46

The new development is of a critical nature and1

that is where the new information, the information2

that was summarized today by Cameco, would have to3

be coming into us in a report and the information4

required to satisfy Condition 2.3. Under that5

assessment, we would review the ground control6

measures, the new models, the remodelling that is7

being done, the maximum inflow predictions, the8

water-handling treatment capacities.9

We have already seen some improved10

changes to the organization of management, their11

staffing, rock mechanics and other new staff.12

So all those things would have to13

be assessed by staffing in respect to the new14

Licence Condition 2.3. So I really don't have too15

many other comments to provide on the new16

information provided to us other than assurances17

that we would be looking at this in great detail18

and review by our technical experts in reviewing19

it in relation to any new mine development.20

THE CHAIRPERSON: I guess I just21

have a supplementary to that. I think Dr. Barnes22

started out and finished with the issues of the23

broader implications of this situation for mines24

in this area and whatever.25

StenoTran

47

I guess my first question to staff1

is you have talked about going forward in terms of2

analysing this under the condition. I think the3

position that the Commission is in today though is4

that we have this evidence before us.5

Can the staff assure the6

Commission that they have analyzed this7

information in terms of the issues of giving this8

licence and that you can assure us that from your9

point of view, probably with further elaboration10

of your comments, that you have analyzed this in11

terms of assuring the Commission of the health and12

safety of this mine now, not further conditions,13

now, and in the issues of possible implications14

for other mines in this area?15

We have talked about this in terms16

of a very micro level, so first the staff on those17

two things and then back to Cameco on the issue of18

the broader implications for other mines in this19

area.20

MR. HOWDEN: Barclay Howden21

speaking, for the record.22

In terms of today, it is our23

opinion that the past operation, and that includes24

the mine water inflow incident, posed a reasonable25

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48

risk to health, safety and the environment. That1

being said, however, the mine water inflow2

incident and results of other CNSC compliance3

activities has revealed weaknesses in some of4

Cameco's programs.5

In our opinion, since these6

programs are needed to provide confidence for7

operations into the future, these weaknesses must8

be fixed. At the present time, we are satisfied9

that Cameco is in the process of revising these10

programs such that we can make our licensing11

recommendation today.12

In terms of going into the future13

and the details of further mine development, that14

comes back to this Licence Condition 2.3. I just15

want to reiterate what Mr. Scissons said there, is16

that as mine development goes forward, there will17

be information for development presented to us and18

that we have a licence condition, we have a19

process, Cameco has a process that we will walk20

through and make judgments based on health, safety21

and the environment.22

In some cases, the answer may be23

no, unless mitigating measures can be put in24

place, but today, in terms of what is being done25

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49

at this particular mine, we are satisfied that it1

is being operated safely.2

THE CHAIRPERSON: Do you feel that3

you have, over the last 18 months and in4

preparation for this licence, had the oversight5

and, I suppose, the technical expertise that you6

need to assess this in terms of the -- you know,7

obviously, Cameco has put together a pretty8

exhaustive team, both in terms of their own staff9

and hiring Golder and that. I think the10

Commission would just like to be assured that the11

analysis that has been done of this is adequate.12

MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.13

Looking at our mandate in relation14

to protection of health, safety, environments and15

security, we can assess the information provided16

by the licensee. We have enough in-house17

expertise to assess their current and proposed18

information that is upcoming to make that19

determination to stay within our mandate of the20

CNSC.21

We recognize the abilities and22

capabilities of the licensee and their consultants23

they are bringing to the table, and basically the24

big bench-scale test, the dewatering test that25

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50

occurred from this incident and what can be1

learned here for both McArthur and other2

underground operations in relation to the health,3

safety and environment.4

We believe we have the staff and5

the expertise to review that and assess it and6

assess the new information we are recommending7

come forward under Licence Condition 2.3 in8

regards to future development.9

THE CHAIRPERSON: To Cameco with10

regards to my -- I suppose my paraphrasing of Dr.11

Barnes' first question, which is to do with not12

just looking at this as an isolated issue but a13

broader question.14

MR. ROGERS: My name is Terry15

Rogers, for the record.16

I think Mr. Scissons said in a17

different manner what Mr. Jarrell just said, this18

was the mother of all pump tests that we just went19

through. So we had this regime, basically a deep20

well that pumped 1,000 cubic metres basically from21

our mine for an extended period of time. The22

flows that we experienced did not exceed what was23

anticipated or at least calculated now as what the24

maximum inflows might be.25

StenoTran

51

We are in the process of1

installing -- what is a lot different today than2

what was in April of last year is we have3

sufficient, and will soon have, sufficient water4

treatment capacity to deal with the maximum flow.5

We did not have that in April of 2003.6

So as Mr. Bonkhost said, the water7

treatment plant itself, the physical building with8

its normal processes of two stages, will be 7509

cubic metres an hour, and now we are building10

these dedicated ponds solely for the purpose of11

contingency water treatment, which doubles that12

capacity to 1,500 cubic metres.13

We did not have that in April. We14

had to -- well, what we did is retrofit a surface15

collection, a runoff pond for this treatment16

regime, and it was successful in the sense that no17

water left the site untreated. But now we have18

that in place and those ponds are dedicated for19

that purpose. There will be no other purpose for20

those ponds to exist.21

So as far as the five-day storage22

capacity, it won't be the same issue it was in23

April because now it is solely set up for the24

purpose of the treating.25

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52

In regards to -- the second thing1

is that we are not mining right now in a high-risk2

area. Until all these facilities are in place,3

dewatering is in place in the mine, we won't go4

into these areas of higher potential risk.5

The mine development schemes,6

technologies and methods we will be using will be7

scrutinized certainly by us and by the staff with8

a proper risk assessment before we proceed with9

those.10

As far as other mines in the area,11

if you are referring, Madam Chair, to Cigar Lake,12

you know the technology is entirely different.13

There would be a frozen ore body above where we14

are mining and we have discrete sort of15

compartmentalization with these water doors and16

things like that. Well, this would not pose the17

same kind of risk, say, that we experienced in18

April of 2003.19

Secondly, Cigar is also in its --20

its update of its latest design has increased the21

water treatment and water pumping capacity as22

well.23

THE CHAIRPERSON: I think I was24

referring more specifically to the science that25

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53

has been developed, the knowledge that has been1

developed from the hydrogeology, and that you and2

the staff would both be taking this and not3

saying, you know, let's -- not tunnel-visioning4

this and saying, okay, we are going to solve a5

McArthur issue and we are going to solve it now,6

but using it in the broader sense of lookit, you7

know, what does this mean for other mines or for8

other approaches that are taken in the mining9

industry in general.10

Mr. Howden.11

MR. HOWDEN: Barclay Howden12

speaking.13

Yes, I would like to echo what you14

just said in terms of anything we learned from15

this particular facility is applied by our staff16

to other facilities and anything generic health17

and safety is applied to a broader range of18

nuclear facilities.19

I would like to make a general20

comment on risk and it is basically, a major event21

has occurred and could occur again. In our view,22

the assessments plan should reduce the risk but23

the risk will never go to zero.24

Therefore, I think what you are25

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54

going to see from CNSC staff and have seen is we1

still put a heavy amount of emphasis on2

contingency planning in case, you know, something3

like this occurs and that is why we are putting a4

lot of the emphasis on the root causes of this5

event, because this event, is it going to become6

the bounding event for future events, and that7

allows you to do good contingency planning.8

But I think the bottom line is9

that what we are seeing is it all comes down to10

how the mine is being managed and what the culture11

is within the organization.12

I wanted to point out that Cameco13

has been an active industry participant in the14

developmental area of assessing safety culture15

through self-assessment and other means. Over the16

next licensing period, we are going to be looking17

closely at this because what we find is the18

follow-up to the mine water inflow incident has19

been very difficult and, in our opinion, it20

shouldn't have been as difficult as it was.21

This is a concern for us, as well22

as some of the communication issues that we are23

aware of between the licensee and its employees.24

We know there are lots of lessons learned from25

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55

this event and we expect them to be applied to1

their future operations. In addition, we have our2

own lessons learned that we are going to apply on3

the communications side with employees as well.4

Thank you.5

THE CHAIRPERSON: We will move on6

to Dr. McDill.7

MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.8

I am going to pick up on the9

numerical model a little bit. I have several10

questions.11

You refer to the model in section12

3 as transient and I am just wondering if you can13

clarify for me whether you can actually -- is it14

actually a transient model or is it more of a15

stepwise quasi-steady state model? Can you16

actually analyze in the transient?17

MR. DONALD: Scott Donald, for the18

record.19

Yes, it is run as a transient20

model.21

MEMBER McDILL: I guess that is22

fairly succinct. All right. That...23

MR. DONALD: I'm sorry, maybe I24

didn't answer -- maybe it is clearer in my mind25

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56

maybe than others.1

In terms of transient, it is run2

in a sense where at time zero or at the given3

event, which occurs at a point in time, it is4

analysing the response in the system from that5

point forward. So it will forecast changes in6

inflows with time and changes in pressure in the7

sandstone and basement formations with time. It8

is not run as a static steady-state simulation.9

MEMBER McDILL: Maybe I should ask10

then: What is the largest or smallest transient11

that you can pick up? What is the biggest sudden12

change -- how is that? Transient models, I mean13

we are talking -- I realize you are talking with14

time. Are you talking time hours, time days, time15

seconds? What is the nature of the transient that16

you can detect?17

MR. DONALD: The simulation is run18

for several months, and after several months, you19

start to see a near steady-state condition.20

Within those months, we look at the results at21

time intervals, probably on the order of minutes22

to hours.23

MEMBER McDILL: Thank you, that is24

helpful.25

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57

My next question is: If you were1

to now take this model -- and I know you have done2

a sensitivity analysis, I read that with3

interest -- can you now re-predict and model the4

event that occurred accurately? Have you tried5

that? I'm not sure -- that wasn't clear.6

MR. DONALD: Yes, we can. I7

believe there is -- if we could put a figure up on8

the screen, Figure 9, I believe, of the9

submission.10

MEMBER McDILL: That is...11

MR. DONALD: Yes, that one there.12

MEMBER McDILL: Yes.13

MR. DONALD: Let's maybe look at14

the lower set of two lines here. There is a green15

line -- let me just step back and set the stage16

here a bit.17

The bottom axis is a date. So it18

starts on the left side with April 6, 2003 --19

MEMBER McDILL: Mm-hmm.20

MR. DONALD: -- and runs through21

on the right side to middle of August this year.22

On the Y scale, we have the23

hydraulic head or pressure, the water pressure in24

metres, head on the Y scale.25

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58

The green line, which starts1

mid-July 2003, shows the pressure in the collapse2

area or in the cavity above the collapse,3

effectively the same. So until July 2003, you are4

at effectively atmospheric pressure. There has5

been no ceiling up of the collapse since the6

inflow occurred.7

Then over the past year, you can8

see the -- you need a longer desk -- there, it is9

slowly repressurizing through different stages10

over the past year.11

The yellow line which follows it12

closely is how the model is representing that13

condition. So in effect, it is an input condition14

to the model. It is approximating what was15

observed at the cavity.16

The upper two pairs of lines --17

there we go. The blue line represents the18

measured -- and this is just one example of the19

six or seven deep piezometers we have to monitor.20

The blue line shows the pressure in the21

piezometer -- this one is about 200-300 metres22

away, south of the collapse area. That is23

measured data in the field.24

The red line which follows it is25

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59

what is being predicted by the actual model.1

It is worth noting -- if I can2

find my cursor again -- by mid-July we had3

essentially come up with the revised conceptual4

model, had fitted the data to that initial5

two-month period. That model has remained the6

same and it has continued to forecast the recovery7

of the system during the different pressure-up8

data.9

So that kind of walks you through10

how we have used it to...11

MEMBER McDILL: So all of the12

recalibration and the match to empirical data is13

in the first flat, sort of horizontal, portion14

between August and a little after October and then15

it is predicted. So you have not changed the16

model since then?17

MR. DONALD: It has matched since18

April 6 to about mid-July 2003. So it has matched19

the early inflows on the order of 800 cubic metres20

per hour to its steady-state condition or near21

steady state of around 600.22

MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.23

My other questions are related to24

the pump. What was not clear to me was in terms25

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60

of the new pumps, how are they being fit into1

inspection schedules, maintenance schedules? They2

are there but it is not -- maybe you could expand3

on that and then staff could perhaps comment4

after.5

MR. BONKHOST: Dave Bonkhost, for6

the record.7

Even prior to the inflow, we did8

regular PM checks on our pump pressures and their9

ability for flow. So I think it was just a week10

before the inflow we had tested and that is where11

the 650 cubic metres per hour came from in the12

presentation that Mr. Jarrell did.13

We are in the process of adding14

pumps but there is some development and it has15

been engineered such that these pumps will be16

above any water inflow on the mine. They will be17

the last thing to see water. So they have a very,18

very good design from a protection of them from19

shorting out or things like that.20

I am not clear on your question21

though.22

MEMBER McDILL: How frequently23

will they be tested? Perhaps an example.24

MR. BONKHOST: Okay. The25

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61

contingency pumps at shaft 3, which would be the1

new Mather and Platz(ph), we haven't worked out a2

schedule yet for them but they would be tested.3

Two of the four that will be installed will be in4

operation.5

There is a fair amount of clean6

water that comes down shaft 3 and one of those7

pumps will be used to pump it to surface, as we do8

now, and the other, 1, 2 and 3, which are for9

dirty water pumping, they could be cycled and so10

they could more or less be continuously checked on11

the basis of use.12

MEMBER McDILL: Okay. Staff?13

MR. BONKHOST: I will just add14

quickly to that -- Dave Bonkhost, for the record.15

The PMs are done throughout the16

mine though. These pumps do require maintenance.17

The screens need to be checked to make sure that18

they don't clog and so on and that is actually19

done several times a week.20

MR. ASHLEY: Fred Ashley, for the21

record.22

As far as the staff verification23

of compliance, the first element would be to24

identify that there is a process in place for the25

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62

maintenance scheduled, which will be done as part1

of the review of the insulation, and then2

following that will be tabletop or basically3

record-check to make sure that those checks are4

being done. That is part of our normal compliance5

process.6

MEMBER McDILL: With respect to7

the dam, the contingency dam, is it currently part8

of a regular inspection routine even though it is9

not expected to be used in any kind of contingency10

at this time?11

MR. BONKHOST: Yes. There are12

regular checks done on it and there is a log kept13

of those checks.14

MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.15

THE CHAIRPERSON: Would staff just16

like to comment further on that in terms of17

inspection? Do you do any work at all with the18

contingency dam?19

MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.20

It is viewed during a normal21

inspection but as it does not retain any water, it22

is a flowthrough culvert system, the dam itself is23

under no risk at all. So it is just a simple24

inspection during the normal site inspection.25

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63

THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Dosman.1

MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you, Madam2

Chair.3

I have a question relating to4

water and I would like to refer to page 10 of the5

visual presentation that we had this morning, if I6

might. It shows the final effluent discharge7

volumes. It is the last one on the right lower8

corner, that is, my right, and I would just like9

to -- it is the bar graph on page 10 of the10

presentation. It is down in the -- yes.11

It seems to me that if you look at12

the trend -- and I am sure Cameco has looked at13

these often -- even accounting for the fact that14

1998 might have been a start-up year with less15

activity, there seems to be a fairly consistent16

increase in final effluent discharge volumes and17

it seems to be quite linear, and indeed, to me, if18

you look at the projected 2004 volume, it starts19

to be more than linear.20

So based on these trends, it would21

seem reasonable to predict that in five or six22

years that the final discharge volumes might be at23

the level of 5 million cubic metres per year,24

which would really have you pumping at your25

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64

maximum levels.1

I guess my questions are: Would2

you have the treatment capacity to, on a3

continuous basis, handle those kinds of volumes4

and then what do you do for the emergency after5

that? So is it likely, based on these trends,6

that you could have that kind of issue in four or7

five years?8

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for9

the record. I would offer three comments.10

First, the results we show for11

2004 include -- are projected, I should say, on12

the basis that the flood continued until July. So13

the numbers are surcharged obviously by the fact14

that the shut-in didn't occur until a couple of15

months ago. So the actual water inflow at present16

is actually -- if I recall correctly, is actually17

less than what it was prior to the inflow. That18

is the first observation I would make.19

Second, I would say that the sort20

of stepwise increase you see, one of the most21

dominating forces has been the number of shafts22

that we sink into the ore body. For example,23

shaft 3 introduced a fair amount of water in24

itself. So there tends to be these very discrete25

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65

events, like creating a new shaft, which tend to1

strongly influence the amount of water that2

inflows into the mine.3

The third thing is obviously as4

the mine develops and we go into new areas, you5

are quite correct, it is something we will have to6

look at in the forecast additional water as we7

continue to mine the asset. So there is an8

expectation, as you correctly point out, that as9

the mine develops there will be additional inflow10

but I think the dominating forces to date have11

been the shafts themselves, not the development12

underground per se.13

MEMBER DOSMAN: Could the14

treatment capability handle on a continuous basis15

the kinds of volumes that you have experienced at16

the level of 1,500 cubic metres per day?17

MR. JARRELL: Yes. As I pointed18

out, the actual inflow at present is actually less19

than it was in 2003.20

I will ask probably Dave Bonkhost.21

Maybe he can give a little insight into how --22

what our thinking is, at least in the near term,23

about additional water inflows to the mine.24

MR. BONKHOST: Dave Bonkhost, for25

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66

the record.1

I agree with what Mr. Jarrell has2

said. We are aware that we will likely have to3

increase our treatment and pumping capacity with4

time. We don't see that necessarily in this5

licence period, but as we move into other zones,6

we will see more water just from natural7

background. So we will have to maintain the8

difference between what our background is and what9

the maximum inflow would be throughout our10

history.11

MEMBER DOSMAN: So I take it that12

the company is confident that it can maintain on a13

continuous basis a treatment capability that is14

equal to the maximum expected event?15

MR. ROGERS: Terry Rogers, for the16

record.17

Yes, Dr. Dosman, that is correct.18

What John Jarrell was talking about, the19

current -- Dave Bonkhost may correct me but it is20

less than 200 cubic metres per hour, the current21

inflow, I think 175 or thereabouts. The capacity22

we will have installed is 1,500 cubic metres. We23

are currently at 175. So that is basically our24

excess at the moment.25

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67

MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you.1

Madam Chair, I have several other2

questions.3

Mr. Jarrell, in your opening4

comments, you referred to what would seem to be a5

changing management system for water. You6

referred to going more from passive to active7

control of water, which, I take it, is freezing8

versus depressurization. I wonder if you might9

explain the difference in approaches to me.10

MR. JARRELL: Yes. John Jarrell,11

for the record.12

I may be accused of using slightly13

wrong terminology. What I had in mind when I said14

"active means" was active dewatering -- for15

instance, the open pit at Key Lake would be an16

example of that -- as opposed to passive controls,17

either freeze walls or grow curtains in order to18

prevent the water from getting into the mine, as19

opposed to just pumping it out at a sufficient20

rate. That is what I was referring to. It is21

maybe a bad analogy because I was really thinking22

in my mind of sort of a Key Lake open pit as an23

example of an active dewatering.24

MEMBER DOSMAN: So do I take it25

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68

that in the future plans for McArthur River that1

there will be greater emphasis on freezing versus2

pumping?3

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for4

the record.5

I think as we venture forth, we6

have to come up with new mining methods. As Kevin7

Scissons has pointed out, we need to -- there are8

licence conditions now to make sure that those9

things are thoroughly technically assessed and10

approved.11

At this stage, I don't think we12

can necessarily conclude that we have developed13

all the mining methods that we will use at14

McArthur River, but I think the process is such15

that there will be a pretty strong review as we go16

forward on new mining methods.17

MEMBER DOSMAN: I see, but I take18

it that this event isn't resulting in any19

immediate enhancement of freezing techniques at20

the mine.21

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for22

the record.23

The only point I would make is it24

is actually part of the remediation for drill bay25

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69

12 West to put in additional freeze curtaining as1

an example, I think, of an adaptive approach.2

Maybe Mr. Bronkhorst has some3

additional insights into this.4

MR. BRONKHORST: Dave Bronkhorst,5

for the record.6

We are preparing a submission for7

mining of lower zone 4, and some of that8

submission will have additional freezing in it.9

So, yes.10

MEMBER DOSMAN: If I may, there11

has been considerable discussion of increased12

pumping capability and, along with the increased13

pumping capability to account for potential14

enhanced water flows, is there enhanced ability to15

control radon gas? We are just thinking of the16

protection and health of the workers.17

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for18

the record.19

Yes, obviously, one of the key20

features to control radon gas is to control water21

inflow to the mine. That will continue obviously.22

We also have in place obviously23

some pretty strong procedural controls on radon24

through a code of practice.25

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70

So, going forward, certainly it is1

not our expectation to modify that code of2

practice.3

We certainly have very clear4

procedures as we go forth to control radon in the5

mine, and you are quite correct, controlling6

groundwater inflow to the mine is certainly one of7

the key components to controlling radon.8

MR. ROGERS: This is Terry Rogers.9

If I may, Dr. Dosman, I am not10

sure that the question you are asking is exactly11

what we are answering.12

The in-place pumping capacity is13

only for the emergency. We never intended to14

dewater the mine above it. So the pumping15

capacity is not for that. It is for unexpected16

in-rush of water.17

We are at less than 200 cubic18

metres an hour. As more drifts get -- as the mine19

develops out into these other zones, there will be20

more openings. There will be some more water.21

But we are not anticipating, I22

believe, ever to get to a steady state of, you23

know, these ranges as we are talking about.24

MEMBER DOSMAN: Madam Chair, if I25

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71

might be allowed an additional question, you1

explained some changes in the corporate management2

structure and reporting systems in the final part3

of your presentation.4

I was just wondering if you might5

then explain a little further how these changes in6

reporting system will enhance the ability of the7

company to deal with health and safety issues.8

MR. ROGERS: This is Terry Rogers.9

One of the aspects of the10

management structure that we saw as part of a11

result of the discussion centering around the12

safety culture is -- and based also on the CNSC's13

assessment of our structure -- that we wanted a14

closer link between the management of health and15

safety and corporate operations level.16

So the Safety, Health and17

Environment department would have previously18

reported through the Compliance Regulatory19

Vice-President has been brought into the20

Operations.21

So now that we have a closer link22

directing the -- the policies are set by the23

Corporate Regulatory bunch under Mr. Chad, but the24

execution of policy for Safety, Health and25

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72

Environment is through the Operations1

organization.2

So that is just a closer link than3

what we had in the past.4

MEMBER DOSMAN: If I might, Madam5

Chair, to CNSC staff.6

Does CNSC staff have a view as to7

the potential effectiveness of this change in8

reporting and management at Cameco?9

MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.10

Yes. It is to confirm that11

Cameco -- the changes in the organization and12

management structure has come about for a number13

of reasons, one of them is, as well of that our14

own internal review of the McArthur incident, our15

investigation and review of that incident, plus16

our evaluations and audit on site in the last year17

at the facility which identified some improvements18

in that area.19

So Cameco basically is moving in20

the direction we believe this is the correct way21

to go. It is in support of our findings and they22

are addressing our concerns as we put forward in23

our findings of the investigations and audits on24

site.25

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73

So we will continue to work with1

them on the outcome of that. So the bottom line2

is, yes, these are positive improvements seen by3

staff, and we will stay in communication with them4

as this unfolds.5

MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you.6

THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Graham.7

MEMBER GRAHAM: Thank you.8

Many of my questions were answered9

through Dr. Barnes' and Dr. McDill's questioning,10

but just a couple of questions I have with regard11

to pumping.12

Your pumps are not submersible.13

You said that they were going to be established to14

the higher elevation so that they be the last to15

get water.16

They are not a submersible pump.17

Is that correct?18

MR. BRONKHORST: Dave Bronkhorst,19

for the record.20

We do have the submersible pumps.21

Their main function is to move it to the main pump22

stations. So the answer is, no, they are not23

submersible, the ones you are referring to.24

MEMBER GRAHAM: What is the25

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74

schedule for inspection of pumps? Is it weekly,1

monthly and so on? You were not really specific2

at giving Dr. McDill the answer.3

MR. BUCK: Wyatt Buck, for the4

record.5

Any pumps, historically, at6

Cameco, such as fire pumps, that are not used on a7

continuous basis are subject to a weekly run test,8

and that has been the case for 15 years.9

MEMBER GRAHAM: A general question10

that concerns me.11

You have a licence now. CNSC12

granted a licence to you based on the information13

we had the last time around, and that didn't take14

in the scenario of the comment of the mother of15

all floods or whatever it might be referred to.16

And that was perhaps jeopardy towards the safety,17

health and environment of workers.18

My question, and I guess you had19

everything based upon a flow of 640 cubic metres20

per hour -- I think that is what we had as a21

scenario last time if I am correct. This22

certainly changed.23

My question to both staff and to24

Cameco is, you have got a worst-case scenario of25

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75

1,000, 1,200, up to 1,500 metres an hour, there is1

a fault line -- I don't know whether there has2

never been any mention of an earthquake, if there3

has ever been an earthquake scenario built into4

the risk, all of this -- is everyone satisfied5

that, as the mine expands and go out into other6

areas and so on, that -- and this would happen7

within a 3.8, three years, eight months duration8

of this licence, there might be expansion -- that9

we now have sufficient pumping capacity and we10

have got the root cause down and everything else11

down path that we can ensure that the safety of12

workers and the protection of the environment is13

addressed?14

And this is what, as a lay person,15

I am still not really comfortable because we16

seemed comfortable last time when we gave a17

licence and then all of a sudden along came18

something that was not predicted.19

Are our predictions or are your20

predictions sufficient to meet the worst-case21

scenario in the next three years, eight months?22

And that first would be to Cameco23

and then to staff.24

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for25

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76

the record.1

I would draw your attention -- I2

think there is two key things we have done to give3

you some assurance.4

First of all, as we indicated this5

morning, we have done a fair amount a modelling on6

this inflow event, which really is a fairly large7

pump test, as you pointed out.8

So we have done quite a bit of9

modelling, sensitivity analysis, to take a look at10

various inflow scenarios.11

Second thing I would point out, as12

I mentioned in my discussion, was that Golder had13

assisted us in a risk assessment of the mine plan14

going forward where we look at a variety of15

scenarios and take a look at the risks.16

I would like to ask perhaps Dave17

Bronkhorst just to give sort of a little insight18

into that risk assessment process that we have19

undertaken, which I think will give you some of20

the assurance you are looking for.21

MR. BRONKHORST: As Mr. Jarrell22

pointed out, we can never say there is zero risk,23

but we have gone a long ways to reduce that risk.24

Our risk assessment starts with25

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77

our ten-year plan and an overview of the entire1

development planned during that period. That is2

categorized, and then we do detailed risk3

assessments with it.4

We look at a particular zone. We5

have the geotechnical information on that zone.6

We look at the potential for inflow or for other7

types of problems8

We then put in a mitigating9

requirement, ground control, freezing, bulkheads,10

even waterdoors as a possibility, if we find that11

that is necessary.12

Then, we would have a third-party13

review by a consultant on what we are proposing,14

and only at that point would that be passed on to15

CNSC staff for their evaluation.16

So it is a fairly rigorous process17

where many, many people will have a chance to18

comment, criticized and add value to their19

submission.20

MEMBER GRAHAM: Before CNSC staff21

answers that, just a follow-up question.22

Was this done in the same rigorous23

way when you came and gave us the confidence last24

time around on licensing?25

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78

What happened? You are a really1

large company. You are very large. You are the2

experts in mining uranium in the world. What fell3

through the cracks last time?4

MR. BRONKHORST: Dave Bronkhorst,5

for the record.6

I think that was very well covered7

in some of the inflow reports. What it was, was8

some of our programs were not as formal as they9

should have been or could have been.10

That is probably a large11

contributing factor why some things were not12

analyzed to the full extent of risk assessment13

that might have been.14

So that is where I see the major15

difference.16

MEMBER GRAHAM: Perhaps CNSC staff17

might like to comment on this time around compared18

to last time around.19

MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.20

The concern with a high water21

inflow incident is always there at all the mines.22

It was even identified at this facility, even in23

the early stages in the 1990s, during the24

environmental assessment process, about high25

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79

inflows.1

The licensee had proposed and2

taken measures to minimize those inflows, and it3

was clear though, as they began to develop towards4

this P2 Fault, they were making decisions and5

choices on their mining methods and conventional6

mining methods and ground control, ground support,7

to minimize the inflow or any structural failures8

there that allowed for a large inflow event. We9

now found that that was inadequate.10

The issue though on health and11

safety and environmental protection, even in spite12

of the incident, the environment -- though we are13

going to still do some further assessments on the14

potential impacts downstream for the large15

discharges in volumes -- the environmental impacts16

were not significant.17

In relation to health and safety18

and radiation protection for the worker, yes,19

there were some increased risks to it. But,20

again, they did fall below our requirements, our21

regulatory requirements and limits on that as22

well.23

So this is a very big learning24

experience for everyone. In spite of that though,25

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80

they did fall within our compliance per se, and we1

have a tremendous amount of information to move2

forward to any new development work that will be3

undertaken, and we put in more stringent measures4

in review on our part and clearly on the licensee5

before any new development occurs at the mine.6

So, with the knowledge we have at7

the table now and with the expertise we see being8

brought forward before any new development takes9

place there, we believe that the potential impacts10

and risks to this facility are better understood11

and better bounded, and there is sufficient12

mitigation and planning, and engineering controls13

will be put forward for this to occur safely.14

In relation to one other comment15

you made regarding that we have earthquake, sir,16

this is identified in Saskatchewan as a zero area.17

There has been no historical evidence of18

earthquakes or anything to exasperate the19

situation, sir.20

MEMBER GRAHAM: Thank you.21

A couple of other questions. In22

CNSC staff's comments today or in the23

presentation, 2.4.1 Selenium Release to the24

Environment, it is mentioned there that, regarding25

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81

selenium in the fish tissue analyses and the EEM1

Program to be completed by the autumn of 2004 at2

McArthur River site.3

Would you like to comment on that,4

that if there is any various changes and so on5

from what your previous modelling was done, what6

actions would be taken or what would be put in7

licensing conditions or how would that be8

addressed?9

MR. HOWDEN: I am going to request10

Malcolm McKee, Environmental Protection11

Specialist, to respond to your question.12

MR. McKEE: For the record, my13

name is Malcolm McKee.14

Selenium is being added15

essentially as a standard monitoring component16

within fish, within tissues, for all of the17

operating mines now.18

It is being used as a monitoring19

or sentry component to see if selenium is20

developing into an issue at various facilities.21

Prior to this, selenium has22

historically been assessed as a water toxicity23

issue.24

Extensive studies with respect to25

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82

selenium and its toxicity and its behaviour in the1

environment have now led many regulatory agencies2

to shift away from using water quality monitoring3

as a means of monitoring selenium implications and4

are going directly to tissue and tissue5

benchmarks. That is what we are shifting towards.6

MEMBER GRAHAM: Thank you.7

In the presentation, also in 2.3,8

indications are the packaging and transportation9

audit was a follow up in that it more or less10

indicated that -- I think from Day One we heard11

that -- that there needed to be more training with12

regard to the transportation of dangerous goods13

and so on with regard to quality assurance in the14

maintenance program.15

Can Cameco now advise us what16

follow-ups have been done and what type of17

training has been done to your various employees18

or subcontractors that may be transporting to Key19

Lake?20

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for21

the record.22

Yes, one of the issues that came23

out of the audit, I think, was the way in which we24

carried out what they called the transport index.25

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83

Training our employees to do it in a consistent1

fashion.2

I will probably ask Scott Grant.3

Maybe he could just give you a brief summary of4

some of the changes we made over the last few5

months to respond to that audit.6

MR. GRANT: Scott Grant, for the7

record.8

Yes, as Mr. Jarrell pointed out,9

the first thing we did was to revise our10

procedures for how we calculate the transport11

index, and then secondly to train the workers and12

the method to do that.13

A few more things that we have14

done in response to that audit have been to look15

at our maintenance program for the slurry16

containers, and we are revising the documentation17

and the methods that we carry out that maintenance18

work.19

Another thing we have been doing20

is, we are providing training on class 7 of21

transportation of dangerous goods, which is the22

nuclear materials. Providing that for our23

radiation protection people at the site to become24

more of the site experts in the requirements of25

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those regulations.1

There might be others, but off the2

top of my head, that is what I can think of.3

MEMBER GRAHAM: How many4

transports loads per day, per week or whatever5

scenario -- how many transports are used to6

transport the ore and what is the frequency?7

MR. GRANT: Scott Grant, for the8

record.9

Normally, we are about 12 slurry10

transports a day from McArthur to Key Lake11

operation.12

MEMBER GRAHAM: And training of13

new employees, if there is a turnover, you have a14

major -- a formulated -- training plan for15

handling hazardous goods, especially uranium16

products and so on, for new drivers?17

MR. GRANT: Yes. That is correct.18

MEMBER GRAHAM: One question I did19

not get an answer for back, when I was questioning20

with regard to water flows and the models that21

were built, is there anything built into the22

possibility of an earthquake or have earthquakes23

ever been considered in that area?24

Maybe that is not a frequent area25

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85

for earthquakes in the country, but perhaps you1

could give me a better vision of how that has been2

built into a model?3

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for4

the record.5

As Kevin Scissons said, this is a6

low-risk area site. I do not believe the models7

incorporated that.8

MEMBER GRAHAM: Just one other9

thing, Madam Chair, on Cameco's submission, page 410

or 5, it is 4.0, maximum inflow predictions.11

I think you have a typo there.12

You have the flow volume of 1,000 metres per day.13

I think that should be 1,000 metres per hour or14

so.15

MR. GRANT: Correct.16

MEMBER GRAHAM: I just noticed17

that.18

Anyway, that is all for now.19

Thanks.20

THE CHAIRPERSON: I have two areas21

of questioning.22

One is, I noted Mr. Rogers at the23

beginning talked about -- and correct me if I am24

wrong here -- that the staff had requested that25

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86

Cameco have a second independent analysis or a1

second independent root cause analysis.2

Is that correct, and what was the3

thinking behind the staff's request in that area?4

Am I incorrect? The looks on5

everybody's face is just -- I am correct.6

MR. HOWDEN: Barclay Howden7

speaking.8

What we have requested was, up to9

this point, as much of this work had been done10

internal to Cameco, is that we requested that they11

bring in an outside specialist to do this.12

They have done this, and this is13

planned for October. Part of this was our review14

of their methods that indicated that they could15

do -- they were probably not applying the16

methodology as well as they could.17

Our anticipation is that our18

specialists would actually be monitoring the19

exercise by the independent consultant to confirm20

that it was being done independently and that the21

methodology was satisfactory.22

And I believe they are going to be23

using a standard industry method called Tap Root24

to do that, which is accepted by us. Yes.25

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87

THE CHAIRPERSON: The timing on1

that, I gather that they are going to be in the2

field now or shortly in terms of that independent3

root cause.4

How long would that analysis take,5

to the report stage?6

MR. JARRELL: John Durell, for the7

record.8

The expectation is from document9

review, essentially one week at site, and then the10

corporate office and then probably four weeks to11

prepare a report.12

So it is basically a five-week, or13

sorry, a five-day effort.14

THE CHAIRPERSON: Because, of15

course, that will be very, very interesting, I16

think, for the company as well.17

My second area of questioning --18

and I am just going to open this a little bit, but19

just to give a sense for the union representatives20

and for the EQC that I will to come back to this21

for their comments -- is with regards to radiation22

training.23

Reading through the information,24

there was certainly questions that we saw on the25

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88

part of workers in terms of what to do in a1

specific event. So I guess I am not surprised that2

there is a process to improve training.3

First of all, my first question is4

to CNSC staff. Is there guidelines for radiation5

training at all? Is there some either CNSC or6

international approaches to this that are7

acceptable for a framework or --8

DR. THOMPSON: Patsy Thompson, for9

the record. I am Director of the Environmental10

Protection and Audit Division.11

My understanding of the process is12

that the CNSC has radiation protection program13

requirements that include the requirement to train14

the workers.15

Having said that, the CNSC staff16

does audits and evaluations of licensee programs17

to look at whether this training component is18

present, and in doing so, we look at the19

effectiveness of that component.20

The information that has come out21

of the work done on behalf of the workers is that22

this information is not being understood.23

The expectation is that the24

program is effective. So staff will be enhancing25

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89

its compliance activities in that area.1

There are, to my knowledge, no2

guidelines or standards for communication and3

training in these areas.4

The training methods have to be5

adapted to the audience, and this is the6

expectation, is that the training material will be7

suitable for the people it is intended to serve.8

This is the area we will be looking into.9

My understanding is that, over the10

years, the training programs that Cameco is11

delivering have improved. But there is obviously12

still some deficiencies.13

MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons, if14

I can add to that.15

The approach we use on general16

training, not specific just to radiation training,17

but we direct our licensees to what is called a18

systematic approach to training, the SAD approach,19

and it is applied to radiation protection20

training, as in other areas in general.21

But we normally get in there to22

analyze or assess the licensee in how they perform23

and assess the success of their training programs.24

A lessons learned in this incident25

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as well for us is in our follow-up and on1

communication and confirmation on the adequacy of2

the training and "has the message been received to3

workers?".4

So there is a lessons learned for5

the CNSC staff on this, and it will be a follow-up6

for us, not only at this facility, but other7

facilities.8

THE CHAIRPERSON: One of the9

reasons I asked this question is, I note on Day10

One we had a report, a rating, of the program11

areas, and we had radiation protection as B, B,12

and going across.13

Does that mean that that program14

area is not evaluated for training as well as for15

compliance, or -- I just don't see why that was16

not picked up.17

MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons18

again.19

I think a very key finding and a20

recent finding, as one of the other CMD is being21

presented later on this morning, is the other22

evaluation performed and confirmation with the23

workers that the message really had not been24

received.25

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91

So this is in essence a new1

finding, a new lessons learned from us, on the2

communication and understanding, in which we need3

comprehension in the training that was put forward4

to the workers at the facility.5

Our findings, our evaluations, did6

not pick this up. Even our own site audit in7

regards to this incident was performed and8

presented to the Occupational Health and Safety9

Committee -- that was in January of 2004,10

presented by Mr. Sandles with a staff member from11

Saskatoon.12

Again, it was not picked up at13

that point that there was some problems with14

comprehension on the radiation protection,15

radiation training.16

So this is new information to us17

now. It is making us, in our lessons learned, to18

reassess and re-evaluate this program.19

As well as, of course, the20

licensee has already picked up on that and is21

moving forward on it as well.22

DR. THOMPSON: Patsy Thompson, for23

the record.24

CNSC staff conducted a25

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multi-program audit at McArthur River in March.1

It included an assessment or audit of Cameco's2

training program against the expectation of a3

systematic approach to training.4

This audit did cover radiation5

protection training. The findings were that a SAD6

approach was not being applied consistently. The7

audit findings did pick this up, and Cameco has8

been asked to correct this.9

THE CHAIRPERSON: I guess, if come10

back to it -- perhaps I did not clearly pose my11

question -- if one looks at the program areas12

meeting requirements, does that mean that the13

radiation protection program area in terms of14

evaluation of program implementation does not15

include training, or is training, as a broader16

subject, covered in another program area?17

DR. THOMPSON: Training for the18

radiation protection program is covered in the19

assessment of the training program.20

THE CHAIRPERSON: May I suggest21

that that is another lesson learned on that?22

DR. THOMPSON: If you could repeat23

the question, we have --24

THE CHAIRPERSON: I just think25

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93

then it is not a very holistic approach then,1

because, I mean, in essence -- and correct me if I2

am wrong because I am not a specialist in3

radiation protection, but -- the program of4

radiation protection would have to, in my view, in5

order to be rated, particularly in terms of6

implementation, have to have a component that said7

that it was understood and it was being practised.8

Is that an incorrect assumption9

or --10

DR. THOMPSON: Patsy Thompson, for11

the record.12

One of the reasons for including13

radiation protection, environmental protection and14

other aspects, other program training elements,15

are being covered by training specialists is16

because the radiation protection and environmental17

protection specialists, for example, who conduct18

audits of the radiation protection, environmental19

protection program are not specialists in training20

programs and auditing the effectiveness of21

training programs.22

That was the reason why we brought23

in a training program specialist: to audit and24

verify those programs. But, obviously, it is an25

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important element to the radiation protection1

program.2

THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay, I will3

leave it there. I think we are going to come back4

to this, I think, with the unions and with EQC, so5

we'll come back again.6

I would like to take a break for7

15 --8

MR. ROGERS: Madam Chair.9

THE CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr.10

Rogers.11

MR. ROGERS: I'm sorry to12

interrupt the break, but --13

--- Laughter14

MR. ROGERS: -- I just wanted to15

kind of make a clarification about radiation16

protection and training, from our perspective,17

notwithstanding what the CNCS evaluates our18

program.19

But based on the numbers we see20

coming out of the recent event, you know, we do21

feel that the radiation training and protection22

that we use at our mine sites is adequate --23

generally adequate. I'm not saying it can't be24

improved.25

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95

We are talking more specifically1

about education, and that is because of the number2

of questions our employees had it's clear that,3

although they understand procedurally how to4

protect themselves exposure, what proper equipment5

to us and time/distance shielding and all that6

business, I don't think they internalize it. They7

understand what its effects are or the whys of it.8

So what we are trying to do is9

formulate a new education program, not just for10

workers in the mine, but for all of our Cameco11

employees, as well, so that they understand what12

radiation -- not what it is but what it means and13

have a broader approach to, an understanding of14

not the specifics of the training, how to drive15

the car, but what it means to be able to do that16

and what the exposures could ultimately mean.17

The training and protection,18

generally adequate. What we are trying to do is19

further the understanding of the employees who go20

through the training and take the tests, but may21

not fully comprehend all of those ramifications.22

THE CHAIRPERSON: I just would23

remind, Mr. Rogers, that the reason I used the24

word "training" was because that was the heading25

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96

that was used on your slides. So I think that if1

there's needs to have a lexicon, we may need to do2

that. But that's why I used that word.3

Okay, were going to take a break,4

and if we could be back at 10:45. Thank you very5

much. Roughly 15.6

--- Upon recessing at 10:32 a.m.7

--- Upon resuming at 10:45 a.m.8

THE CHAIRPERSON: We will have one9

further question from the Commission members to10

staff. Would the staff like to comment before11

further questions?12

MR. SCISSONS: Yes. Kevin13

Scissons.14

I have to correct an error I have15

made and clarify the question raised by President16

Keen on the issue on training.17

The original CMD for this18

facility, CMD 04-H17 -- and we did the rating19

evaluations, under "Quality Assurance" -- is where20

we actually addressed the licensees' radiation21

training program or training programs for the22

workers.23

There is another area where we24

talk about radiation protection of the radiation25

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97

staff, but in specific question to the radiation1

training for the workers, we actually cover that2

under our quality assurance component.3

Now, because there was a number of4

deficiencies under that -- and that would be page5

21, 20 and 21 of the CMD -- we didn't specifically6

bullet and itemize the training component that Dr.7

Thompson confirmed was identified in the March8

audit and that there was this lack of training,9

understandability and improvements needed.10

So we didn't itemize that as one11

of the areas, but it is confirmed and I was12

incorrect in saying this was new information.13

Maybe it's new information to me, in that sense,14

but the staff clearly understood it. We have15

itemized it, we have identified it with Cameco and16

Cameco recognizes it. There's improvements on17

radiation and training to Cameco staff and workers18

is well along. I was in error in stating that,19

the new information.20

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.21

Dr. Barnes.22

MEMBER BARNES: I just wanted to23

maybe make a statement as to my concerns.24

We are here to renew the uranium25

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98

mine operating licence for a period of some years,1

whether it be three years and eight months or five2

years, yet to be determined. We have, of course,3

seen the major event.4

So the kind of questions that I5

was asking was really to try and get some comfort6

in my own mind that the applicant, Cameco, a) had7

developed or put systems in place to really try to8

understand the event, understand the geologic9

conditions under which that event occurred and, in10

a sense, in its future development, part of which11

will occur in the next licence period, that was12

reducing, therefore, the risk of this occurring13

again. So that's the logic of my questions.14

But although some of the issues15

that we have talked about are looking at what you16

do if you get this response, in terms of trying to17

improve the holding capacity and the treatment and18

so on, I guess I'm still an advocate of trying to19

prevent the situation in the first place and,20

therefore, having as much information to try to21

help in the development of the mine so that it22

doesn't occur again.23

So if I could ask maybe staff,24

rather than Cameco, and if there was a hydro25

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geologist available to comment on my, if you like,1

understanding of the situation, therefore, how --2

whether it's adequate assistance in place to look3

at trying to prevent it again.4

It seems to me that the rate of5

flow that occurred in that event in April '03 of6

the order, you know, around numbers of a thousand7

cubic metres an hour were totally unpredictable --8

unpredicted and this is not normal flow for the9

Athabaska sandstone aquifer, if you like.10

The rate of flow was sustained for11

a long period of time. That would suggest to me12

that this was a more fracture flow than porous13

media flow. And we know that probably the14

factoring was associated, I assume, with the P215

fault and the cavernousness development16

periodically along that fault.17

No one has, I think, commented in18

any the material I have read where that volume of19

water came from, since it sort of was an20

unexpected high level of flow. I interpret that21

the reduced rate of flow was partly because of the22

grouting; in other words, the prevention, rather23

than the actual reduction of flow and that it24

wasn't sort of a reservoir of water in some of the25

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100

void spaces essentially got used up and went back1

to normal porous media flow, that it would have2

continued for a long period of time.3

Therefore, if there is potential4

in the future development of the mine of working5

around the P2 fault, and so on, I would have6

thought that -- and so I would welcome a comment7

from staff, either geologists, if those8

assumptions I just made on the groundwater flow9

were incorrect or not, at least in general, not10

necessary in any detail.11

I, therefore, come back to my12

concern whether, in order for Cameco to try and13

understand, and therefore predict, the likelihood14

of intersecting such things again, whether15

half-a-dozen -- six, seven, I think, was the16

number mentioned -- of piezometers at the depth at17

which this situation is likely to occur, that is18

close to the unconformity, is really adequate,19

right, if you are trying to understand the20

situation here.21

Although I understand there's lots22

of piezometers, that gives you the overall23

groundwater flow within the sandstone body, as a24

whole, but the issue is, the real threat is25

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intersecting these voids and intersecting what1

seemed to be unpredicted and very large2

groundwater flows associated with the3

unconformity.4

This is a level which, I think, as5

I read it from day one, is likely to be6

intersected at some point in mine development. I7

don't know precisely where this is going to be in8

the term of this licence.9

So my question is: is the general10

comments I'm making correct? Secondly, do you11

really think that the level of information gained12

by those limited number of piezometers, in13

relation to the likely fracturing along the P214

fault, which may be a zone rather than a single15

plane, is sufficient for the company to monitor16

and predict the threat of future major inflows?17

MR. HOWDEN: Barclay Howden18

speaking.19

I'm going to pass this back to one20

of our geoscientists, Peter Flavelle, but I want21

to make introductory comments.22

One, I'm going to request them to23

make -- to respond to your comments on -- the24

general comments on hydrology -- hydrogeology of25

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the area, about the number of piezometers, but I'm1

not sure we will be able to give you a definitive2

response to that.3

I wanted to indicate that the flow4

model developed by Cameco is one of the tools used5

in the overall risk assessment of whether they go6

into other areas, but certainly it's an important7

piece.8

Having said that, much of the data9

that has been -- the specific data that has been10

put forward today on the model and the results of11

the model have not been presented to CNSC staff to12

be able to give you a definitive comment on it.13

We are in a position to comment on14

how such a model can be used as part of the risk15

assessment and if we have this information16

submitted we are able to assess the information. 17

So with that, I'm just going to18

pass it back to Peter Flavelle for a comment on19

the hydrology -- hydrogeology of the area.20

DR. FLAVELLE: Thank you.21

For the record, my name is Peter22

Flavelle. I'm a senior specialist in the Waste23

and Geoscience Division.24

As Mr. Howden said, we have not25

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had an opportunity to review the recent modelling1

work that Cameco has presented today. In general,2

models such as MODFLOW and other groundwater flow3

models and contaminant transport models give an4

indication of what the consequences are of an5

incident. It will not necessary predict whether6

or not an incident will occur.7

In this particular case, Cameco8

has used this model to determine the extent of the9

contingency that they need to put in place to10

handle such an inflow in the future, but, in11

itself, it would not predict whether or not such12

an inflow will occur. That will have to come from13

the risk assessment on the future development.14

In terms of the number of15

piezometers being able to indicate whether or not16

this would occur, six or seven piezometers in the17

area of the fault intersection gives a reasonably18

good measurement of the response in that fault to19

the inflow, but it's quite limited in its spacial20

extent. It just covers the area of the21

development.22

Further piezometers -- piezometers23

further afield would characterize the far-field24

response to that, but that's not going to help25

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really predict whether or not such an inflow will1

occur in the future.2

I'm hesitant to speculate on the3

overall hydrogeologic response of the system at4

the moment, having seen what Cameco has presented5

today. It certainly looks reasonable. The6

farther-range response in the sandstone to the7

inflow event appears to respond as a porous medium8

equivalent. It's happening at a scale where the9

fracturing tends to smear the results of the10

hydraulic response and it turns out that the11

sandstone appears to be quite porous and have a12

large storativity, which supplies the continued13

flow of the water into the mine.14

Whether or not that was recognized15

previously, it's unclear whether or not that would16

have actually made a difference in the modelling.17

I hope I have addressed everything18

you are concerned with, Dr. Barnes.19

MEMBER BARNES: Okay. I assume if20

they had recognized it, it certainly would have21

affected the capabilities of the pumping system,22

for example, and the holding system on the23

surface, as examples.24

THE CHAIRPERSON: Kevin Scissons,25

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105

and then back to licensee.1

MR. SCISSONS: Yes, Kevin2

Scissons.3

I would like to -- there was4

another question you had raised about: was this5

ever predicted of potential high inflows in that?6

Mr. Flavelle was addressing some of that, but in7

your original environmental assessment documents8

back in the mid-nineties or in the early nineties,9

it was predicted that if there was no engineering10

controls or other design measures put in place,11

flows of up to a thousand cubic meters now would12

be possible from that sandstone formation.13

So that's why the original design14

of it was to go in through the -- down, and what15

they did, and designed the shafts and the original16

mine insulation in the basement rock, and then the17

freeze curtain and other engineering controls were18

all put in place to avoid that situation.19

I mean, what happened is, the20

bottom line, we find out, in hindsight, is the21

engineering -- the other engineering controls,22

without the freeze curtain, were not adequate and23

the inflow did occur and we did, indeed, have24

flows upwards of that.25

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106

So those numbers were out there.1

It was known. The porous medium of the Athabaska2

sandstone and its almost unlimited quantities of3

water were -- you know, is a known fact to us and4

to the licensee. They now have a better test case5

to ensure how not to encroach upon that and put in6

these better control measures to avoid any of7

these high inflows.8

THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Jarrell.9

MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for10

the record.11

Just to get back to some of the12

questions you had, Dr. Barnes, about the flow13

conditions that we learned from our inflow event,14

I would say what I have learned is that the flow15

alignment, if you look at it, not in section but16

in plan view -- it's in two-dimensional form --17

it's largely elliptical. The results we have,18

albeit, as you have pointed out, there is a19

limited number of piezometers, did so, sort of in20

an elliptical nature, align with the P2 fault.21

The hydraulic resistance, which,22

ultimately, governed the creation to sort of a23

stable flow, I believe, was largely natural, not24

as a result of any grouting that we had done.25

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107

The way it has been described to1

me is that, in effect, what we did was we dilated2

the flow zone. I say that because in the early3

days of the inflow there was a fair amount of silt4

and clay material, the water was quite turbid, and5

it cleaned up. So that, in effect, we dilated6

this zone.7

We believe the water flow is8

largely horizontal for two reasons: one,9

essentially the model that we have developed10

certainly explains why we saw a difference between11

deep piezometers and shallow piezometers, so,12

hence, the imprints of an aquitard.13

I think the other reason is that14

there continued to be radon inflow in the mine15

water, which, obviously, means the water was in16

close contact with ore. The ore, itself, is17

generally aligned to the P2 fault, so I think18

that's our sort of inferred belief: that there19

was a fair amount of horizontal flow.20

I don't believe it's a case of,21

necessarily, voids in that flow zone, as opposed22

to the fact that there's enough sand and gravel23

that we could open it up, which is what we saw.24

Maybe I would ask Scott Donald.25

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108

Maybe he could just sort of either confirm or sort1

of add to those observations.2

MR. DONALD: I think the only3

thing I would like to add is to comment on the4

voids issue and the potential misconception.5

Maybe that's there in that.6

Based on the monitoring data we7

have looked at following the April 2003 collapse,8

we don't believe that there's voids of water out9

there ready to be tapped which have unlimited10

inflow potential.11

The delivery mechanism to this12

area of the fault, the fracturing around the P213

fault, looks like it's controlled by the bulk14

characteristics of the sandstone, the bulk15

characteristics of the sandstone having been16

fractured and having a porosity, you know, in the17

range of 2 per cent to 4 per cent, and that's18

providing the inflow over time, which sustained19

the steady inflows for a few-months period.20

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.21

That ends the first round of22

questioning. We are now going to move to the23

intervenors and to the interventions.24

I would like to note -- and25

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perhaps we should have noted this at the1

beginning -- that we do have people in the2

Saskatoon office, intervenors, who have been3

linked by video conference with us throughout the4

proceedings and they will be linked more directly5

as we move to that area.6

I would like to now, then, to move7

to the interventions.8

We have allocated approximately 109

minutes for the oral presentation. We have read10

your more detailed submission with great care and11

interest and we will continue to include the12

written submissions, as we duly consider those13

through the -- for the decision and through for14

the reasons for the decision.15

You will note that some16

intervenors have filed the same submission for17

hearings on the licence renewal of McArthur River18

and Key Lake licences and, again, for the19

environmental assessment on the production20

increase. But we would like, as noted earlier, we21

will try to avoid repetition and we will invite22

intervenors to make their presentations here and23

then we will be asking -- coming back and asking24

if you have anything to add for the other two25

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hearings.1

04-H17.2 / 04-H17.2A2

Oral presentation by the Canadian Nuclear Workers3

Council and the United Steel Workers of America,4

Local 89145

THE CHAIRPERSON: With that I6

would like to move to our first intervention,7

which is the oral presentation by the Canadian8

Nuclear Workers Council and the United Steel9

Workers of America, Local 8914. These are10

outlined in CMDs 04-H17.211

and 04-H17.2A.12

We have the president of the13

Canadian Nuclear Workers Council with us, who has14

appeared with us before.15

And so welcome, sir, and the floor16

is yours.17

MR. SHIER: Good morning, Madam18

Chair and members of the Commission.19

My name is David Shier. I'm20

president of the Canadian Nuclear Workers Council.21

With me today, my colleague on my22

far left is Gordon Telfer. Gord is the local23

union president of the United Steel Workers of24

America for the Cameco sites in Saskatchewan.25

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On my right is Ed Morelli. Ed is1

the vice-president of United Steel Workers of2

America Local for the Cameco operations in3

Saskatchewan.4

Both Gord and Ed work at the5

McArthur River mines and the Key Lake mines and6

are very familiar with the operations, being7

long-term miners.8

On my left is Bob Walker. Bob is9

an executive member of the Canadian Nuclear10

Workers Council and was the key investigator in11

our investigation of the health and safety issues12

that I will be talking about. It was talked about13

in our written presentation and also in our oral14

presentation today.15

Prior to moving on, I would just16

like to talk about one little housekeeping item.17

Our group, when we hit Slater Street this morning,18

was quite concerned when we saw a picket line up19

in front of the building. We just want to assure20

everybody that we did not break any labour21

protocols by coming into the building today, that22

we did talk to the labour representatives out from23

the Public Service Alliance and they assured us24

that we should go into the building. So we didn't25

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cross their line, they actually opened it up. So1

I would like to make that clear.2

Our presentation, as indicated, is3

to cover off the three issues that are going to be4

heard today. What we would like to do is5

basically provide kind of a quick overview of our6

written submission and an update.7

I guess I should just give a8

little background of the Canadian Nuclear Workers9

Council. For anybody who is not familiar, the10

Canadian Nuclear Workers Council is a council, as11

the name implies, of unions that are involved in12

the nuclear industry in Canada. Naturally, the13

steel workers are a very active member of our14

council and the steel workers are the local union15

in regards to the licensee.16

We are going to talk briefly over17

the next few minutes about the safety and union18

involvement in the mine sites, a little update on19

labour relations, an update on our CNWC20

investigation, our view, our view being the view21

of the workers, the benefits to the mines and our22

conclusions.23

In the area of worker safety24

committee representatives, we believe it's a good25

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strong safety culture in the mines. We have about1

eight joint health and safety committees, with the2

shifts at different locations. There is one for3

-- there is always a committee on site and the4

union members on those committees are appointed by5

the United Steel Workers of America6

representatives. Actually, the union appointing7

these people, they work very close with them.8

I think the United Steel Workers9

of America has a very strong safety history. It's10

a major union across North America in which safety11

has a high priority. They have been involved in12

the mining industry, naturally, for many years and13

have been in the forefront, for example, back in14

the days of the Elliott Lake mines. It was15

actually the steel workers that was one of the16

main drivers of our current occupation of health17

and safety legislation in Ontario.18

Looking at our investigation, many19

people ask: why did the Nuclear Workers Council20

do an investigation in regards to the mine21

situation, the flooding that occurred several22

months ago, now? It's no big secret, the media23

reports in May was the main catalyst that got us24

going in that area. The media reports caught our25

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council off guard, caught the local union off1

guard and actually caused a lot of agitation2

amongst the steel worker members in the mining3

community.4

Also, it has been a long-standing5

issue and it's the -- some of the major groups,6

they have always viewed that these areas are not7

as safe as we may say they are, so this gave us8

the opportunity to have an independent look at9

what is happening in this particular situation and10

we were very happy with the results.11

Where we sit today with the12

investigation, as indicated Bob Walker was our key13

investigator on that. We are fortunate to have14

Bob on our executive, as he has some experience in15

the mining community so he knows the culture. He16

actually worked at Key Lake for a period of time17

and, then, his background in health and safety as18

a union representative at the Darlington Nuclear19

Station.20

So the full report is available.21

I have a few copies here which I will share with22

the Commission. What we found is that safety is a23

priority, that the workers were very informed and24

knew their rights.25

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Specifically, the United Steel1

Workers of America members, they had a clause in2

their collective agreement which allows them to3

refuse unsafe work. All the members that were4

interviewed were very well aware of that and had5

indicated they would use and have used it from6

time to time.7

The other issue, which has been8

talked about under Cameco's presentation and the9

staff, the area of lack of understanding of10

radiation, this is not a surprise to us. It's our11

understanding. We know there's kind of a12

two-pronged approach to radiation safety.13

Basically, that is, in Canada, for14

example, in the nuclear generating stations,15

people are trained to basically self-protect and16

they receive a lot of training in that area. The17

other approach, which seems to be outside of the18

generating business, is to give the workers a19

little bit of training and understanding and,20

then, have experts that look after their safety,21

as far as radiation goes.22

Now, this is not unique to Canada.23

For example, there is places in the U.S. and other24

places around the world where, even in the25

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generating stations, people don't receive1

extensive training. They use a model, where they2

have the radiation expert that trains them.3

So this is an area that has got a4

lot of -- had a lot of discussion and I think it5

will continue to be discussed.6

Communication issues: again, I7

think these were identified earlier. There was a8

lot of communication concerns around at the time,9

and, in hindsight, where things could possibly be10

done a little different and they will be11

corrected.12

The safety issues were not as13

reported by the CBC or the media. In this regard,14

I guess some of the factual information was there,15

but just the interpretation, which caused a lot of16

anxiety amongst the United Steel Worker members17

and other workers there, I guess, just from our18

view, it's the way kind of the media come across.19

We did concur with the findings of20

the CNSC and the employer in regards to the dose21

assessments. We had an expert that was involved22

in that area to look at that, so that did provide23

some assurance to the people who had concerns.24

So we were very happy with this25

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independent view. As I indicated, it was strictly1

arm's length from the employer, so we now have a2

good labour perspective of the health and safety3

issues, what happened on site.4

Investigation update: since our5

submission, there has been meetings with the6

employees and they have all been briefed and had7

their questions asked in regards to what had8

happened, what the team found. The employer was9

also briefed on what we found, as well. That's10

where some of the lessons learned are starting to11

be looked at.12

The United Steel Workers of13

America health and safety committees will be14

following up on a lot of these lessons that were15

learned. There was a pamphlet produced for16

workers, which I have one copy here of, which is17

being -- I was told today is being mailed out to18

all the workers' homes, so they will have19

something in hard copy to say what the20

investigation was about, what they found and,21

hopefully, reassure people of their concerns.22

Also in that pamphlet there's a23

whole list of contacts that the workers and other24

members may have concerns in this area can contact25

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people for further information.1

The release of the report: we2

haven't officially released it. We wanted to go3

through our protocols to make sure that our health4

and safety committee people have been updated on5

it.6

The United Steel Workers of7

America representatives at the national office8

were briefed and Gord Telfer was able to do that9

last night, so we will be releasing the report10

officially. It will be posted on our web site11

later this week and, as indicated, there is a -- I12

have a few hard copies here for any of the13

commissioners that may be interested in taking a14

look at them.15

We did send a copy, courtesy copy,16

to the CNSC site representative in Saskatchewan a17

few weeks back.18

Moving onto our view, the19

beneficial aspects of having the licences renewed,20

is, naturally, the local economic impact in the21

area of Saskatchewan. The jobs: this creates22

skilled, good paying jobs in the north and the23

south in Saskatchewan and it kind of goes without24

saying the provincial and federal benefits of25

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having these good jobs, having a good product and1

being the world's largest producer of uranium in2

the world.3

In conclusion, our view being the4

view of the workers at the steel worker locals, as5

well as the rest of the council, a lot of our6

council members have visited the mines over the7

years. We find the workplaces are safe.8

Naturally, there is risk involved, but we feel9

that there is very good safety programs in place.10

There is many benefits to all11

Canadians in having this industry and we provide12

our full support, from the Nuclear Workers Council13

and the United Steel Workers of America, for the14

relicensing of the Key Lake mine and the McArthur15

River, as well as the EA Guidelines.16

With that, to thank the17

opportunity for having our presentation and we18

are, naturally, open for questions.19

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr.20

Shier.21

Are there questions? Dr. Dosman.22

MEMBER DOSMAN: I would just like23

to ask Mr. Shier, on the issue of training and24

safety, in the first hearing the report card that25

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Cameco got in several areas were Cs, that is the1

below requirements, in operations, quality2

assurance, environmental protection and the3

emergency preparedness.4

Are you satisfied that your5

workers are receiving adequate training? Are you6

satisfied that your workers are open and7

enthusiastic about adequate safety training?8

MR. SHIER: I will give you a9

quick overview comment, and then I will have Gord10

Telfer comment from the local unions' perspective.11

As I indicated in my presentation,12

on the radiation safety aspect there is that13

two-pronged approach. We recognize that they14

don't get this -- the miners don't get the same15

training as the people in the generating stations.16

I think they are going to be17

looking at that, on how much training. That's18

going to be one of the lessons learned, the19

follow-up item. I think the health and safety20

committee people will be looking at that, as well21

as the union.22

So I think Gord will maybe have a23

better comment on that.24

MR. TELFER: Gord Telfer,25

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president of Local 8914.1

I just want to outline that2

through the issues in the influx of water our3

members have concerns common to the training4

aspect that came out of the findings that we had5

here today.6

We recognize that and we have7

approached the company, with our occupational8

health and safety committees, to draft up in years9

where we might have been -- fallen down on and to10

really get the gist of what our members are11

telling us: to provide these areas of training12

and to make sure that they are going to be dealt13

with and make sure that everybody really14

understands.15

I guess with that, you know, from16

that perspective, I look at our occupational17

health and safety committees telling me that, you18

know, they feel comfortable with making their19

recommendations and to talk to each area of the20

facilities, whether it be a Key Lake or McArthur21

River, to make sure that those areas of training22

that we have missed are overlooked or we see23

differences with will be addressed and I feel24

comfortable in that area.25

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MEMBER DOSMAN: Madam Chair, does1

the union actively support the training2

initiatives? Is there a culture in the union of3

saying, "Hey, we are going to be the safest union4

in any company" and really internalize and support5

the workers in their efforts to work safely?6

MR. TELFER: Yes, that's foremost7

in our minds all the time with the unionized work8

force, the bargaining unit members, including the9

contractors that come on site. We are very clear10

in the safety aspect of it, that we want all our11

members to work safely and to understand that the12

training that they are receiving is for the13

betterment of them in the work force.14

Yes, we are very behind the safety15

culture and we push that, again, through our16

occupational health and safety. At our general17

meetings that is always an issue that comes18

forward and we really make a strong, strong19

position, as a union, to make sure that's a20

follow-up and that we do the correct thing.21

MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you.22

THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Graham.23

MEMBER GRAHAM: Just as a24

follow-up to Dr. Dosman's question and your25

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answer. The incident of 2003, I think, was a1

wake-up call for everyone: industry, CNSC, the2

unions and everyone else.3

Could you explain or advise or4

confirm that the business will probably have to be5

done in a different way and there's probably going6

to be some major changes required in the way7

Cameco is going to operate that mine?8

Does the union, I guess, first of9

all, endorse those changes? Are they willing to10

address and work with Cameco to make sure that11

those changes are in the best interests of safety12

to the workers?13

MR. TELFER: Clearly, we are. We14

want to work with Cameco, particularly that our15

issues, which will be brought forward by our OT16

committees. We will be working with Cameco to17

make sure that they are addressed. We feel,18

again, as I indicated before, very strongly in19

this area and we are willing to work with Cameco20

to make sure that is done.21

MEMBER GRAHAM: My other question22

would be to Cameco, and that would be: in view of23

the fact, as stated by the union on page 3 of the24

presentation that most of the workers had very25

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little real understanding of the different types1

of radiation exposure, the individual dose2

reports, can Cameco confirm or give us some3

feeling that this is going to change and their4

will be more communication and explanation and5

work with the workers to make sure that they do6

understand the hazards and the benefits of a good7

safety culture and the necessity of a very strong8

safety culture that may not have existed in the9

past?10

MR. ROGERS: Terry Rogers, for the11

record.12

Mr. Graham, yes, that obviously is13

what I was alluding to just before the break,14

about in addition to some increased training, it's15

at least as important that the education part, the16

understanding of the training -- I mean, there's17

rote exercise and prescriptive sorts of remedy to18

reduce exposure.19

It's equally as important now, and20

has been borne out by -- I toured all the21

operating sites at Cameco -- it's called a safety22

culture tour -- and this theme came up: a lack of23

formal or more of an internalized understanding of24

the issues. They know the prescriptive techniques25

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to follow, procedures to follow, but we want to1

broaden the education base so that we have a2

deeper understanding of that. That's the road we3

are embarked upon now.4

THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Barnes.5

MEMBER BARNES: That was going to6

be my question, but I will follow up a little bit7

more because I felt this report was very valuable8

and that those paragraphs in the middle of page 3,9

I think, were quite illuminating and that we10

probably all are exposed to this in our lives in11

different ways, where you get some information and12

you know what the words mean -- you can read the13

words, but you don't necessarily fully appreciate14

the meaning of it, is the implication.15

In the same way we have been16

discussing some other aspects this morning, I17

wonder -- for Comeco -- how are you going to18

actually put this into practice in preparing19

documents which will have a reasonable success of20

achieving those objectives?21

For example, is this just going to22

be left to the health and safety committees or are23

you going to involve other consultants or people24

at the University of Saskatchewan or other25

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academic institutions, that spend their lives1

trying to translate information, to use the groups2

that, in fact, communicate meaning, as well as3

words and data?4

MR. ROGERS: This is Terry Rogers,5

for the record.6

I'm sure just by the nature of the7

question you can appreciate how difficult it is to8

do that, the programs, sort of starting from the9

corporate centre of it, to sort of define it, but10

I would like to ask Scott Grant, who is our -- the11

guy with the long title, Quality Management12

Systems, Environmental and so on, behind us. He13

is actually actively involved in the health and14

safety management system and will be part of this15

ongoing program.16

MR. GRANT: Scott Grant, for the17

record.18

I can give you an update on our19

most immediate plans. Starting next Tuesday, we20

are going to have a consultant up to site from the21

AHz Learning Technologies Company of Regina --22

"AHz" is spelled A-H. It's a group that are very23

familiar with improving training programs for24

companies in Saskatchewan. They come highly25

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recommended to us. Our corporate training group1

in Saskatoon, our Saskatoon office, chose them.2

So what we are going to do, first3

of all, is bring one of their principal members of4

their company up to McArthur River next Tuesday5

and put them through our orientation and our6

training -- basic radiation protection training7

program as if the person is a worker, starting8

work at McArthur River.9

After they go through that10

training, they are going to go underground and11

probably want to interview people, but just see12

what it's like to go underground after you have13

had your radiation protection training.14

After a couple of days of that,15

they are going to present a proposal to Cameco --16

I think we have October 8th as the day for that --17

and I will have -- they should have in that18

proposal details of how they want to go about19

improving our radiation protection training.20

The elements that we know will be21

part of that training will be -- one is revising22

our material to make it simpler for people to23

learn from. Secondly, they are going to work very24

hard with the people who deliver radiation25

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protection training, which are largely what we1

call our radiation protection specialists, to get2

them to improve their delivery and, basically,3

their teaching techniques.4

The third thing that this group5

will do, for sure, is they do follow-up6

assessments. This is one of the things that7

attracted us to them. They claim a retention of8

understanding of material, once they have improved9

your training program, upwards around 80 per cent.10

They say industry standards, based11

on their work, are much lower, down around 20 per12

cent, 30 percent. So they will do some follow-up13

work to find out the retention, the understanding14

of workers, after we have improved the program.15

THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. McDill.16

MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.17

I have several questions and,18

Madam Chair, I seek your guidance on several of19

them because my first question is about the20

pamphlet, which is not a matter of the record.21

May I try and dance around it?22

THE CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And just23

because it's important that any evidence is24

available for everyone. So certainly we will25

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proceed, and then I think, in the long-run, one of1

the questions would be: would that be available?2

MEMBER McDILL: My question: I3

think the pamphlet is probably excellent. I have4

two questions concerning it. Is the language in5

the pamphlet simple enough -- and I don't mean to6

demean intelligence. Words like "Becquerel" just7

sort of don't work for many people -- simple8

enough for easy understanding of the workers?9

The second question is: how does10

it, or can it, address questions of aboriginal11

workers who work with an oral tradition?12

MR. SHIER: As I say, I have a13

copy of the pamphlet here and I have a copy of the14

full report which I will pass up to you.15

I would suggest that the pamphlet16

is very straightforward and simple to read and17

that is being distributed to all workers, being18

mailed out to them. They have also had a briefing19

with the investigation team that answered a lot of20

their questions as well.21

I will ask Bob Walker, who was our22

main investigator to maybe comment. He has23

firsthand experience in this area and got the24

feedback from the people.25

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MR. WALKER: For the record, Bob1

Walker.2

That pamphlet was reviewed by3

workers to make sure that it did meet those needs.4

It was specifically tailored to be given to5

workers in language that we all understand.6

Any other issue about workers and7

whether the training is in their language, that is8

something that was passed on to Cameco and they9

are already looking at a more hands-on approach to10

training. That was one of the things that was11

passed on and that is part of what they are12

reviewing right now.13

MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.14

My follow-up question was to15

Cameco on that and then finally to staff.16

THE CHAIRPERSON: Any comment from17

Cameco?18

MR. ROGERS: Terry Rogers.19

We have seen the pamphlet but we20

didn't draft it. But it is, at least in our view21

I think, in more common understandable things. It22

is sieverts and becquerels and all those things.23

I just think you need to see it and pass judgment24

on that.25

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MEMBER McDILL: But with respect1

to training and other methodologies other than the2

written word, is that part of the plan that is3

coming down through AHZ you said, A-H-Z?4

MR. GRANT: Scott Grant, for the5

record.6

They have used a number of methods7

and that could be one, but we don't know for8

certain whether that is what they are going to go9

with. We certainly are mostly interested in10

approving the understanding and if that is what11

gets it done, then that is what we will do.12

MR. TELFER: For the record, Gord13

Telfer here.14

In our collective agreement we15

have looked at this particular area on oral16

testing and written testing and we have recognized17

that in our collective agreement as well with the18

contract with Cameco so that the people in this19

area have an opportunity to be tested in both20

frames, oral and written.21

MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.22

Staff, would you care to comment?23

MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.24

In regards to the information and25

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success of it, we will be doing follow-up on site1

and confirmation with discussions and evaluations2

with the workers. We also realize it is an3

outstanding action item as a result of our audit4

on the whole training component.5

So once Cameco has put in a6

revised program and gone through their steps, we7

will then -- and they have informed us that they8

have implemented it, we will then have an9

opportunity to go back and reassess it and10

determine the success of it and whether it has11

fulfilled our action as a result of our audit. So12

we will be doing the follow-up and it will be part13

of our compliance program.14

MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.15

I have one other question and it16

is to the intervenor.17

We have a submission later on from18

unspecified miners. I don't know if you have seen19

it. I just wonder if the group of unspecified20

miners is within your envelope.21

MR. TELFER: There are some miners22

that don't fall under the umbrella of the United23

Steel Workers. There are contractor miners. This24

could be the area. We don't represent them and25

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that could be an area.1

Clearly anything that we do as a2

steel worker reflects on contractor miners as well3

to make sure that they are working in a safe and4

appropriate way, but they don't have the5

collective agreement language to protect them in6

some areas.7

MEMBER McDILL: Will they receive8

your pamphlet?9

MR. TELFER: Yes.10

MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.11

MR. SHIER: Dave Shier, for the12

record.13

If could make one comment on that,14

the contract miners were, I believe, interviewed15

as well during this investigation.16

THE CHAIRPERSON: I would just17

like to note that I think that the Commission in18

the long and fulsome of time would appreciate19

receiving copies of the pamphlet. Because it20

isn't generally available it will not be part of21

our record of decision.22

I think the concept of unions23

providing information in -- I don't mean in24

parallel in a negative sense, but in parallel25

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meaning supplementary and complementary to the1

work of a company makes sense.2

I just want to clarify that the3

Commission holds the company responsible for the4

training program and the staff for auditing those5

programs and certainly understand the important6

role that the worker representatives can place in7

both, as Dr. Dosman questioned, encouraging8

people, saying this is important but also9

providing, as you see fit, further information.10

So I think it is a synergistic relationship I11

think one would conclude.12

My question for the intervenor is:13

I should declare that I have been involved in coal14

mines quite a bit in my life, coal mines with a15

lot of water, so I kind of understand this a bit.16

But my sense is that it is one17

thing to prepare for situations, seek to do this,18

but when a problem hits -- like this really hit.19

It isn't a day to day, it isn't the cool and calm20

every day job. This is something that really hits21

and people are expected to respond and do it.22

Do you have thoughts about23

anything in terms of lessons learned about this24

from your interviewing of the workers, et cetera,25

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about when the proverbial hits the fan, is there1

something that needs to be done to communicate2

amongst workers or between representatives and3

workers or whatever that was a lesson learned from4

this?5

MR. TELFER: Gord Telfer, 8914.6

Yes. I just want to say that the7

lesson that was learned was a communications issue8

clearly. That has been kind of reported in all9

our findings that it was a communication thing. I10

guess that is something ourselves, the union, and11

Cameco have to sit down when we do have the12

emergency situations.13

Clearly throughout the influx of14

water the communications improved drastically. We15

had, through the companies, a presentation16

informing the employees day to day in a written17

format to let us know what was going on. We18

didn't do that before. I think that was a19

positive thing.20

Also, with the union correctly21

having updates at our monthly union meetings and22

quarterly meetings to make sure that everybody was23

aware of it.24

Yes, there was a big change from25

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the start to the finish. At the end of it I1

believe that the communications and the updates2

that the employees received and the day to day3

updates on oral presentations that the managers at4

both facilities did and the process, we didn't5

have that before.6

Clearly that is something that we7

will have to look at to make sure that the8

communication aspect is really addressed.9

MR. SHIER: Dave Shier, for the10

record.11

I'm going to get Bob Walker to12

comment on his views from the interviews. Then,13

Ed Morelli works right at the McArthur River site14

so I think it would be worthwhile getting his15

views as well.16

MR. WALKER: For the record,17

Bob Walker.18

Our investigation focused on the19

radiological issues, but the interviews are very20

open to every issue that was associated with the21

inflow. The number one issue people had, except22

for the dose assessments, was: Are we ready for23

when this happens again?24

It is not directly part of the25

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report, but in a summary of the findings at the1

back of the report there is a number of things. A2

lot of them have been talked about here today3

already, such as making sure there is sufficient4

pump capacity, making sure there is adequate5

training, adequate CBA, things like that.6

So people wanted to make sure that7

this was a lesson learned, that everything that8

was learned from this was captured so that next9

time there is an inflow -- if there is another10

inflow -- that they are ready for it. That is in11

the report.12

MR. MORELLI: Ed Morelli, Vice13

President for Local 8914.14

I think over this influx of water15

we had daily meetings and updates which covered16

probably 99 per cent of the workers -- it depends17

if they were on night shift or day shift -- to18

inform them as the inflow come along, how our19

process was on the water. Because there were20

people on surface that never seen the underground21

part or knew what was going on, just the update to22

keep them informed on the communication part.23

So that part was carried on fairly24

good. Maybe not everybody understood the actual25

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138

parts of what was going on in the flood because1

they never even had an aspect of the mine and what2

it even looked like. It didn't matter if the3

person was from Key Lake or McArthur that come4

over and helped, whether they were surface or5

underground when they come, the information6

meetings were there, they updated the employees as7

things went on -- that is everybody, it was the8

contractors, the union and staff there -- to know9

what was going on during the inflow.10

I think it was good. Like the11

report comes back, I think we lack in that and12

that is probably on the union side too. What we13

try to do on our Health and Safety Committee is14

inform our members on it, but we are not in the15

educational aspect on it.16

Cameco's safety department on17

radiation is well versed in their knowledge of it,18

but it is to get it across to the average person.19

I don't understand it and I have been there for20

15 years and probably had every year an update on21

it and whatever.22

To find the person that is going23

to be -- I won't say well educated, but the person24

that the other person can understand it. I think25

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139

that is where some of the communication problems1

involved where we had trouble with radiation. It2

is such a -- I won't say complicated thing to3

understand, but when you can't see it physically4

you don't understand what the radiation is doing5

to you.6

Our members do the practical7

part of it, you know, bring in all the safety8

procedures. Whatever thing has to be done,9

they follow the procedure in cleaning up and10

getting the radiation as low as possible and11

moving on, but under the education part they12

probably really don't understand it but they can13

do a practical on it.14

THE CHAIRPERSON: I will note back15

to the original CMD 3.6 evaluates emergency16

preparedness in terms of a program and rating for17

program and implementation and then speaks to it.18

One of the things in reading19

this -- this is a question for the staff and20

perhaps Cameco -- it talks about accident21

scenarios. Are there specific requirements for22

exercises in areas, because that is where I think23

we get a feeling of greater comfort when you do24

exercises in certain instances.25

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140

Is that a requirement? Then back1

to Cameco about it.2

MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.3

In terms of emergency preparedness4

and exercises, yes, there are requirements and5

expectations for the licensees to carry them on.6

The main concerns for an7

underground mine operation, the first priority8

thing would be for a fire underground and the9

proper personnel to go in there and perform rescue10

operations for that.11

In regards to a high water inflow12

incident, it was never an issue about workers13

being able to safely get out of the mine with this14

inflow, but it is an exercise and I think it will15

be expanded upon for their response to this type16

of incident.17

Also, it requires qualified18

personnel to go back and reassess the safety of19

the mine before workers return to the area to do20

remediation measures, whether the fire -- after21

the fire has been put out, but to handle inflows22

and water flows and groundfall conditions and23

remediation of the ground support system.24

So there are exercises and this25

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141

lesson will be to expand with that with the1

licensee and address that under their emergency2

preparedness.3

THE CHAIRPERSON: Cameco?4

MR. BUCK: L. Wyatt Buck, for the5

record.6

We do several drills in the course7

of a year. A lot of them fall under the mine regs8

so we do stench gas drills, we do fire drills and9

those types of things. I want to assure you that10

that is a part of our program.11

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.12

Dr. Dosman, did you have a13

follow-up question?14

MEMBER DOSMAN: Yes, Madam Chair.15

I have alluded to this issue of safety culture16

from the top down and, if you like, the other way17

around, and I would just like to ask the President18

or Vice President of Local 8914: Do you detect19

any change in safety culture efforts by the20

company, if you like, from the top down?21

We have heard of the Chief22

Operating Officer making a safety culture tour and23

other initiatives. Do you think something real is24

going on here in terms of change?25

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142

MR. TELFER: I guess our response1

from the union is that we look at everything,2

different options that come through to us on3

safety.4

One of the things we like to do,5

if there is a new process on safety being6

developed, we would like to be a part of it. In7

the past they were maybe somewhat reluctant to8

maybe include us in all the issues, but clearly9

that environment has changed. I know that we have10

had an opportunity from the executive and from our11

rank and file on the floor to visit all areas of12

the new safety programs that are being developed.13

So I would answer your question,14

yes, we feel that there are some positive changes15

developing and I think it is because of some of16

the questions that we have had in the past and17

some of the issues of other safety programs that18

were developed.19

They allowed us, as a local and20

the union executive to question these other safety21

programs, and then if they weren't meeting the22

needs of the bargaining unit members from a safety23

aspect, we clearly outlined that to them. And24

they have listened to us.25

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143

So I think that the culture is1

changing from the top down to the bottom and2

reversed. So I really believe that in these areas3

that issue has been addressed and they are4

changing.5

MEMBER DOSMAN: May I ask6

Mr. Rogers: Is this assumption correct? Do I7

take that Cameco really is embarking on a new era8

in safety culture? Is this a new vigorous9

initiative from the top down in the company?10

MR. ROGERS: Terry Rogers, for the11

record.12

Trying to put a more well defined13

understanding of safety culture has made the14

difference in terms of our approach to it. My15

experience with Cameco in about five years -- a16

year and half here in Canada, but overseas -- was17

that the strong safety culture existed but now we18

are starting to understand more the details of19

what I guess is the official definition of it.20

In the context of the question21

about the local and the company, we see everybody22

working at our sites as part of Cameco, whether23

they are union people, contract people, it really24

doesn't matter from the aspects of the safety25

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144

culture, what our standards are and what is1

expected, and to try to encourage an enthusiastic2

approach and every individual understands the3

ramifications or the implications of what is being4

done and understands their rights as well as the5

safe work practices that we are trained to know.6

So the commitment is from the top7

of the organization, from the Board of Directors8

down, that we will improve the safety culture. We9

understand the safety record of Cameco is10

excellent and is leading in the industry, but we11

can improve on the cultural aspects of safety and12

that is the road we are headed down.13

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very14

much. We would like to thank you very much for15

the union representatives to come here. We are16

very used to this on some of the power plant17

sides, but we do really appreciate your views and18

it is helpful for us in terms of making these19

decisions.20

What we are just going to do is21

give you a chance to shut down your computers22

because we would like to see the EQC people behind23

you. So we would just like to ask you if you24

wouldn't mind moving. We will just give you an25

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opportunity to do that.1

Thank you very much.2

--- Pause3

4

04-H17.3 / 04-H17.3A5

Oral presentation by the Northern Saskatchewan6

Environmental Quality Committee, Athabasca7

Subcommittee8

THE CHAIRPERSON: I would then9

like to move to the next submission, which is an10

oral presentation by the Northern Saskatchewan11

Environmental Quality Committee, the Athabasca12

Subcommittee, which is outlined in CMD 04-H17.313

and 04-H17.3A.14

We are very pleased to see you15

here with us today. I know it has been a long16

trip for you so thank you very much for taking the17

time to be with us today. We did really18

thoroughly find our trip up north in northern19

Saskatchewan great when we did that earlier this20

year, so thank you very much for coming.21

I believe Mr. McDonald is going22

to do the presentation and Mr. Wolverine and23

Mr. Woods are with you. The floor is yours, sir.24

MR. McDONALD: Good morning,25

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146

President Keen and Members of the Commission. We1

have made this trip from northern Saskatchewan2

today so our voices could be heard on the issue of3

relicensing the McArthur River uranium mine, a4

project that affects our home and our neighbours.5

My name is Felix McDonald. I am a6

member of the Fond du Lac Denesuline First Nation.7

We make our home on the north shore of Lake8

Athabasca in a community of about 800 people, Fond9

du Lac, Saskatchewan. Norman Wolverine, who is10

also here today, and I were some of the original11

representatives of the EQC.12

I am also a nuclear industry13

worker. I have been employed at the Rabbit Lake14

operations for over 20 years where I currently15

work as a mill operator. Over my career I have16

been able to learn a great deal about uranium17

mining, milling and safety.18

The McArthur River mine is located19

in the Athabasca Basin, about 250 kilometres south20

of my home in Fond du Lac. The water from the21

McArthur River site eventually ends up in the Fond22

du Lac River which empties into Lake Athabasca.23

The South Central Subcommittee of24

the EQC visits the McArthur River site at least25

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147

once per year. On different occasions McArthur1

River has hosted the entire EQC or certain groups2

within the EQC. The events and status of the3

McArthur River operation are also provided to the4

EQC as a whole at various meetings throughout the5

year.6

Cameco visits communities7

throughout the north to provide status reports on8

the activities at the various mine sites and to9

share future plans with the community members.10

In 2003, the McArthur River mine11

experienced a major water inflow. While no one12

wants such a thing to happen, it proved the13

strength and importance of good communication.14

Cameco was in continual contact15

with the EQC via our manager during the water16

inflow incident. At the beginning, our manager17

would write and fax out the information that she18

received. As the incident progressed, Cameco19

would provide the written information in the20

Clarifier.21

Sask Environment, who participated22

in daily conference calls with both Cameco and the23

CNSC, would verify the accuracy of the information24

and the Clarifier would be faxed out to the25

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148

various communities. Each EQC representative was1

responsible for hanging up the faxes in their home2

communities for the people to read. Without daily3

newspapers in the northern towns and villages this4

was the best way to make sure people had current5

and accurate information.6

As soon as possible, three7

representatives went to McArthur River to tour the8

site. This gave us an opportunity to check that9

the information we were receiving was accurate.10

We could not go underground at that time, but we11

were able to follow the water flow through the12

treatment and discharge process. We could report13

back to the EQC representatives and communities14

that the information we had been getting on water15

treatment was true. We also had a chance to talk16

with employees over our lunch break and get their17

understanding of the situation.18

Throughout the incident both the19

CNSC and Sask Environment were in communication20

with the EQC through our manager.21

On September 23, 2003 all of the22

EQC representatives were taken to McArthur River23

and given an underground and surface tour.24

This was an unfortunate thing to25

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149

happen, but in the end it proved that we could all1

work together to make northern Saskatchewan2

stronger.3

The uranium mining industry has4

provided the north with jobs and with training5

opportunities for over 20 years. McArthur River6

is no different. The operation allows for7

hundreds of northerners to support their families8

independently. It provides educational9

opportunities for upgrading secondary schooling,10

trades, apprenticeships, mining technician and11

technology training through many programs. The12

mining industry also provides scholarships for13

post secondary training in a number of areas.14

Across the north, individuals,15

communities and partnerships have developed16

businesses to provide the contracting services17

required by the mining industry. Many of the jobs18

from these businesses go to northerners. My son19

works for the security contractor at a northern20

mine site. The revenue from these businesses21

helps to strengthen our communities.22

The mining industry also supports23

the north with contributions to community24

infrastructure such as health facilities, schools,25

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150

recreational and cultural facilities.1

In other cases, people bring their2

mining experience back to make a difference in3

their home towns. In my community, one of the men4

who learned his mechanics trade through the mining5

industry has opened a mechanics shop, a business6

we never had before.7

Others who are employed have gone8

back to their communities and invested in small9

business that in turn employs more people. In10

this way, the north can grow and provide a11

healthier community for our families to live in.12

We recognize that things maybe13

could have been done differently during the water14

inflow of 2003. We also recognize that hindsight15

is 20/20.16

In a situation that could have17

shut down the world's richest uranium mine, men18

and women, northern and southern, professional and19

labourer, worked side by side to save the20

environment, to preserve their safety and jobs and21

to save their mine.22

On behalf of the EQC, I would like23

to voice my support for the renewal of the24

operating licence for the McArthur River uranium25

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151

mining operation.1

Thank you.2

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very3

much, Mr. McDonald.4

Are there any questions?5

Dr. Barnes.6

MEMBER BARNES: Yes. Thank you7

for the presentation.8

I was curious on page 4 when you9

said:10

"As soon as possible, three11

representatives went to12

McArthur River to tour the13

site."14

The inflow event occurred on15

April 6th. When did you actually get to the mine?16

MR. McDONALD: We were there on17

the 23rd of that month.18

MEMBER BARNES: Was that by19

invitation or did you press to have a tour?20

MR. McDONALD: Both.21

MEMBER BARNES: Simultaneous.22

Thank you, sir.23

THE CHAIRPERSON: Any questions?24

Dr. Dosman.25

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152

MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you,1

Madam Chair.2

I would just like to ask the3

representatives of the committee because it4

doesn't quite come out, were you satisfied during5

the water event that the company was making6

adequate provision for the environment?7

MR. WOODS: Yes, Bobby Woods, for8

the record.9

I was one of the members that went10

up to the site. We were given a float tour and I11

guess we saw exactly what the procedure was and we12

were quite happy with the way things were going.13

They showed us the full treatment process and, I14

guess, the period when they had to take some of15

the employees out until they decommissioned16

everything and got everything back in order. So17

we were quite happy with that.18

MEMBER DOSMAN: And could you19

comment on your view as to the adequacy for the20

environment that the company is making, in terms21

of the extra pumping capability and the new22

treatment facilities and so on? Does your23

committee view -- what view does the committee24

have on these provisions?25

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153

MR. WOODS: Bobby Woods, again.1

Yes, we are quite happy with that.2

We get our information also, I guess I could say,3

second-hand a lot of times from the company4

because we have to inquire about all these things.5

But, basically, we get a lot of information from6

the employees that are there from our communities.7

I have asked, and I think on-site8

at the time we asked, one of the people who were9

there and working with the water treatment that10

the process that they were operating and following11

is quite sufficient for, you know, what's going on12

there. And, yes, we are, I guess, okay with that.13

MEMBER DOSMAN: To prolonging -- I14

realize we are getting close to our past15

lunchtime -- with regard to information provision,16

not just during the water event but in the normal17

course of events, could you comment on the18

adequacy and regularity of information that the19

committee receives from company representatives20

with regard to events at the McArthur River mine?21

MR. WOODS: I was just trying to22

get some information from Betty here, however,23

yes, in my own experience, we meet, you know,24

approximately six times a year with the company25

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154

and they give us updates. We do on-site tours and1

we also have a consultation process with them2

through our EQC meetings and, you know, whenever3

we require certain information, we get, of course,4

the experts in the certain fields to come up and5

talk to us.6

So the information is there. And7

as Felix mentioned in his report, when we go back8

to our home communities, we either get9

information, through pamphlets and so on, and we10

distribute it throughout our communities. Many of11

us have local radio-television, so we have a12

scroll, so we get the information, we pass it on.13

We haven't been questioned too14

much about it. Of course, the odd people that do15

come out and ask, but, basically, the employees16

come out and say, "Well, what's happening in this17

area?", whatever the area of concern may be. 18

According to the information that19

we receive, we certainly provide that. And the20

companies also provide, I think, with adequate21

information. So it's quite well -- there's quite22

good communication open there.23

MEMBER DOSMAN: Madam Chair?24

THE CHAIRPERSON: Yes, if you have25

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a further question, go ahead.1

MEMBER DOSMAN: It's very minor.2

I was just wondering, in Mr.3

McDonald's presentation, he spoke of the4

"clarifier". This term, "the clarifier"?5

MR. McDONALD: It's the company6

newsletter.7

MEMBER DOSMAN: Oh, thank you.8

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very9

much. And thank you very much, again, for coming10

all this way to talk to us. We will have an11

opportunity to hear from you again on the other12

hearings. So thank you very much for that.13

14

04-H17.4 / 04-H17.4A15

Oral presentation by Maisie Sheill16

THE CHAIRPERSON: We are going to17

move to the next submission, which is coming to us18

via a video conference from an oral presentation19

by Mrs. Maisie Shiell, as outlined in CMDs H17.420

and H17.4A.21

Mrs. Shiell, are you there?22

MS SHIELL: I am, yes.23

THE CHAIRPERSON: The floor is now24

yours, Madam.25

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156

--- Technical difficulties1

MS SHIELL: Furthermore, both2

Thorium-230 and Radium-226 are high-LET radiation,3

a high-LET alpha radionuclides, and decay into4

four more short-lived high-LET alpha-emitting5

radionuclides.6

The high-LET alpha radiation7

causes very dense ionization of atoms and8

molecules in genetic and somatic cells of the9

organism.10

As a lay person, my understanding11

of the science of this is that Einstein's famous12

E=mc2, is the perfect analogy for the action of13

alpha particles. And if you look at beta14

particles or gamma ray, this cannot be said.15

The alpha particle is comprised of16

two protons and two neutrons. In subatomic terms,17

a huge mass travelling along its track at a very18

high velocity from the five MvE energy, the 519

million electron volt energy, plus two charges in20

a tiny space of 40 microns, the length of a human21

cell, this particle has been internalized by the22

organisms, and it is the organisms that I am23

concerned about.24

The alpha particle is comprised in25

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Radium-226 and the energy from its1

inevitably-produced, short-lived alpha-emitting2

progeny is included in your calculations. The3

energy produced in an interaction with the cells4

in a genetic or somatic organ has a very high5

relative biological effectiveness compared to the6

gamma or beta. Although this is happening7

internally in the plant or animal and, therefore,8

cannot be observed or measured in populations9

today, making the assumption, as CNSC does appear10

to be doing, that no significant chemical changes11

are taking place may be a serious mistake with12

these long-lived radionuclides.13

This high linear energy transfer14

in this small space knocks off the electrons from15

the neutral atoms in a plant or animal's cells16

causing atoms in the organism to become charged17

ions if the alpha particles have been ingested or18

inhaled by animals or absorbed by the roots of19

plants and these plants are the basis of all our20

energy.21

As the government PSL2 document22

said:23

"genetic effects are the24

major consequence from radio25

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exposure at low and moderate1

dose rates."2

This document cited experiments on3

genetic effects from gamma radiation, as well as4

two experiments with alpha.5

The long-term from the long decay6

time and from the genetic inheritance of this7

high-risk internal damage through the coming8

centuries is the basis for my concern for future9

generations, but I do not find these hearings to10

be very democratic or whether the public is11

invited to comment.12

The commissioners do not address13

their questions to me. Usually, they ask only the14

CNSC staff what they think. And recently I have15

even had difficulty in hearing the staff's16

answers.17

What I am trying to say to you18

commissioners this morning is that I believe19

licensing a renewal of McArthur River mine for20

four years is too risky. Never being licensed for21

four years before, we do not understand well22

enough the long-term consequences for our children23

in the future.24

When in 1997 the joint commission25

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advised that this project be allowed to go ahead1

using extreme caution, the McArthur River2

documents, at that time, had said that the grade3

of ore was only 15 per cent, which was what the4

panel was judging.5

A 15-per-cent ore would bring to6

the surface less than 2,000 becquerels of radium7

with each gram of ore. Now, Cameco, with the8

government's blessing, has raised that to 3,0009

becquerels per gram, after very little public10

participation.11

Section 24(4)(b) of the Canadian12

Nuclear Safety Act says no licence should be13

renewed unless, in the opinion of the14

commissioners, the applicant15

"will, in carrying out activity, make adequate16

provision for the protection17

of the environment".18

In my opinion, it is not possible19

to make adequate provision for the long-term20

protection of the environment with ore from a 24.421

per cent uranium mine at present. The scientific22

community does not understand well enough the23

long-term consequences of alpha radiation.24

I would be very pleased if the25

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commissioners would enter into discussion with me1

about these concerns that I have done a great deal2

of study about or suggest how my perceptions or my3

calculations are in error.4

I note during this hearing, the5

commissioners are going to be discussing CMD6

04-M39 on the problems of the effects of alpha7

radiation. I would very much like this discussion8

to take place in the public.9

Thank you.10

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very11

much, Mrs. Shiell.12

I would like to note that there13

was a few problems at the beginning, but certainly14

we were able to hear her later, although I don't15

see her on the screen. Is she still there?16

MS SHIELL: I thought I was being17

watched all this time.18

THE CHAIRPERSON: Hello. The19

miracles of technology.20

Before I open the floor for21

questions, Mrs. Shiell, I would like to note that22

I will be asking the secretary to make23

arrangements for you to be on teleconference on24

Friday, if you are available, at the time that we25

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161

are discussing CMD 04-M39. So we will make those1

arrangements for you to participate in that2

discussion.3

I'm just turning to my fellow4

Commission members. Are there any questions from5

the Commission?6

Mrs. Shiell, I just wanted to --7

your recommendation is for a two-year licence. Is8

that correct?9

MS SHIELL: That is correct.10

THE CHAIRPERSON: I would just11

like to --12

MS SHIELL: With the stipulation13

that -- my recommendation in my written paper,14

which was written for McArthur and Key Lake, is a15

two-year licence because we do not know and I16

don't think it's fair to future generations to17

continue to go on, "Oh, we can make it go five18

years, anything". But anyway, that is me.19

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very20

much. I just wanted to clarify that.21

Mrs. Shiell, I would just like to22

make a comment that the Commission members do have23

your written paper and we do note that you have24

spoken on this subject. We do read your papers25

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very seriously and very diligently and you1

shouldn't regard the lack of questioning. It's2

just that you write the paper is so clearly, we do3

understand your position quite clearly.4

So don't look at the lack of5

questioning as meaning that we are not paying6

attention. We certainly are.7

MS SHIELL: But does this mean8

that you agree with everything I'm saying, is what9

you are saying? I mean, this is what the10

questioning is about, isn't it?11

THE CHAIRPERSON: Well, Mrs.12

Shiell, we have had the opportunity to have13

questions to you in the past with regards to this14

subject. The Commission takes in a great deal of15

evidence on the whole range of issues, including16

yours, and we will certainly take your evidence17

into consideration when we make the decision.18

We treat all the CMDs the same.19

We look at it as objectively as possible, based on20

our knowledge and experience in making those21

decisions. So silence doesn't mean that we do22

accept or we do not accept; silence means that we23

do understand the position that you have put24

forward.25

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MS SHIELL: To put my position a1

little more clearly, I realize the jobs angle to2

it. I realize the industry is very, very3

important to the development of the North, but you4

have got to weigh that, in my opinion, against5

what is the consequence to future generations. Is6

the jobs today more important than the future for7

the human race? Because, I mean, this is not8

going to stay locally, like any chemical might.9

This is going to spread, and spread through the10

decay. So that is why I say we need -- this is11

the question we have to look at: are we and12

who -- I mean, this has got to go further than the13

CNSC, probably. It has to go to the government,14

but people do not understand it and CNSC,15

supposedly, understands it.16

THE CHAIRPERSON: Well, certainly,17

Mrs. Sheill, we do weigh all the evidence. I just18

wish to reassure you that -- you had quoted19

section 24(4)(b) of the Canadian Nuclear Safety20

Act. I can assure that the commissioners take21

very seriously their responsibility, in terms of22

ensuring that the applicant does carry out the23

activity with due concern for the protection of24

the environment and, as we have discussed earlier25

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today, the safety of the workers.1

So thank you very much for your2

input today and thank you for patience, as it has3

been a little longer than we assumed it would be4

this morning. So thank you for that.5

We will take your written6

submission into consideration, as well, and we7

will make provisions to connect you, if you are8

available, on Friday, as well. So thank you very9

much, Madam.10

MS SHIELL: I'm very grateful that11

you will on Friday. Thank you.12

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.13

14

04-H17.515

Written submission from Keewatin Visions16

THE CHAIRPERSON: We will now move17

to the next submission. It's the last submission18

for this hearing today.19

It is a written submission from20

Keewatin Visions, outlined in CMD 04-H17.5.21

The members had an opportunity to22

look at this written submission. Are there any23

questions or comments to the licensee or to the24

staff with regards to this?25

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Mr. Graham.1

MEMBER GRAHAM: Just a question to2

CNSC staff.3

Have you had any dealings or had4

any communications with this group in the past.5

MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.6

They have basically come into the7

office -- or a representative has come into our8

office to obtain information. It was the same9

information we provided and the very extensive10

details, under access to information, of all the11

details and monitoring information, exposures, et12

cetera, in incident reports that we actually also13

provided to the media. So we have had a very14

extensive interchange of information and15

background to them.16

MEMBER GRAHAM: A subsequent17

question: how large an organization are they?18

How large an organization are they and how many19

different mine sites do they represent?20

MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.21

I do not have any more details22

about them whatsoever, other than that's the first23

time they came into the office was to just obtain24

information. This was their first written25

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submission or filing we have had from them, so I1

do not have any other details.2

THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. McDill.3

MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.4

Since the submission is written, I5

would like to ask Cameco to comment on the6

paragraph on the -- the pages are unnumbered. It7

would be the fourth page of text -- one, two,8

three, four -- on the back of the fourth page of9

text, fourth paragraph down. It begins:10

"The miners report that11

during the rush to save the12

mine, dirty water was13

inadvertently pumped into the14

clean water line." (As read)15

Et cetera. I wonder if that could be clarified16

for the record, please.17

MR. BRONKHORST: David Bronkhorst,18

speaking for the record.19

You probably don't know this, but20

all of the water at McArthur River, we don't bring21

any water underground. We recirculate water that22

we have there.23

Part of our water supply during24

the inflow was cut off from the shaft 3 and it was25

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167

supplemented with water that was coming in from1

one of the piped lines. It was a conscious2

decision. The risk was analyzed. We communicated3

the situation with radon. There was a frequently4

asked question flyer put out to all employees and5

it was discussed at our occupation health and6

safety committee meetings.7

So, yes, there was bay 12 water in8

our process water, but that water is recirculated9

in the best cases.10

MEMBER McDILL: Can I ask staff to11

comment on that because, obviously, it's a concern12

to this group?13

MR. ASHLEY: Fred Ashley, for the14

record.15

We did have some communication.16

We discussed with the occupational health17

committee the aspects of radon concern within the18

lunchrooms. That was one of their areas. As far19

as our understanding, the occupational health20

committee did receive the information and were21

satisfied that as soon as the water source --22

another water source was made available, that was23

switched so that there wasn't a further problem24

with potential radon, but there never was a25

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problem with radon build-up in the lunchroom areas1

because of it.2

MEMBER McDILL: So, if I may, it3

wasn't inadvertent, it was deliberate and it was4

explained at the time, as well. I understand it's5

explained at the occupational health and safety,6

but was it explained at the time? Maybe Cameco7

could address that.8

Mr. ASHLEY: Yes. A number of9

information bulletins were put out in the form of10

frequently asked questions, and employees -- at11

the time, I can't remember exactly the sequence.12

Maybe Scott Grant or --13

MEMBER McDILL: I understand that14

there was discussion. What I'm asking is: when15

the line was switched and the deliberate choice16

was made, was it explained to the workers at that17

time?18

MR. ASHLEY: To the best of my19

recollection, yes.20

THE CHAIRPERSON: The submission21

makes a series of recommendations. Reading these,22

I think it may be more appropriate for CNSC staff23

to particularly address the questions that they24

had with regards to the recommendations.25

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169

So I'm looking at conclusions on1

the last page. Could you specifically address2

those?3

MR. HOWDEN: Yes. Barclay Howden,4

speaking for the record.5

Just going through the conclusion,6

with regard to notification requirements, those7

notification requirements are already in place.8

In terms of the CNSC doing9

independent radiation -- assessment independently10

the radiation exposure level, from our point of11

view we will do independent verification when we12

go to the site, but when we go to the site it13

depends on the nature of the event what we will be14

looking at.15

In terms of the McArthur inflow16

event, we mobilized very quickly, but we didn't17

spend a lot of time on site. I think that gave a18

perception that we weren't in the loop to the19

workers, even though we were.20

But we were being provided21

radiation protection information in detail on a22

regular basis daily, as Mr. Scissons says, and23

there were some changes made to radiation24

protection practices during the event, but no25

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170

regulatory limits were changed or requirements1

changed.2

So when we actually went to the3

site, we went up there from more of a focus on4

environmental protection because they were in the5

process of constructing the contingency dam.6

That takes us, actually, to the7

next statement in the conclusion, talking about8

the plans. In our view, when plans are prepared9

for contingency, there are various inputs. The10

inputs that do require design and verification11

activities would be required to be reviewed by a12

qualified engineer and we would expect that to be13

the case.14

In the case of the contingency dam15

in the McArthur River case, we explicitly informed16

Cameco that we expected that all the work was done17

under the review of a qualified engineer. So for18

anything that requires a qualified engineer to19

review, we do expect it. There are provincial20

engineering laws that require this.21

That's about it. I think, for the22

most part, we are doing this.23

And the final point is, in terms24

of "that all requirements for implementation, the25

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contingency plan shall be in place prior to any1

development of new mine areas", that ties in with2

licence condition 2.3 that we have proposed to the3

Commission.4

THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Barnes.5

MEMBER BARNES: Mr. Howden, could6

you remind me again what date staff first appeared7

on the site after the water inflow incident?8

MR. HOWDEN: I believe it was9

April 12 or 13th after the incident.10

THE CHAIRPERSON: I guess this is11

a question -- this isn't a question to the staff,12

so you don't have to answer this, but one of the13

things that this bring up, when we look at lessons14

learned, is this is almost a focus group for the15

staff, in terms of what miners, at least a certain16

group of miners, know or do not know about what17

the CNSC does.18

There has certainly been other19

instances when the CNSC staff have gone out and20

talked more broadly about their role and whatever21

and answered questions. So I think that perhaps22

the staff may think through the good offices of23

Cameco or EQC or the union, or combinations24

thereof, of providing some information about the25

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role of the CNSC and open the communication1

channels so that the miners, the workers on site,2

if they have any question about what the CNSC is3

or is not doing, has a vehicle for that.4

I think that certainly that has5

been in other facilities that that's been done.6

So there may be vehicles out there, communications7

vehicles, that are available that you can8

piggyback with, or whatever. But that may be9

something: that you want to use this as a bit of10

a focus group for that kind of consideration.11

Are there any further questions?12

Okay, then, this completes the13

record for the public hearing on the matter of the14

application by Cameco Corporation for the renewal15

of the McArthur River mining operating licence. 16

The Commission will deliberate and17

will publish its decision in due course. And it18

will be published on the CNSC web site and will be19

distributed to participants.20