By Hooshang Amirahmadi

\1iddle East. with the possible excep-tion of Israel. At the time of the revolu-tion in 1978. Iran was committed tomultiple contracts with American armsproducers worth $17 billion. One of thefirst foreign policy initiatives of theIslamic Republic was to cancel thesecontracts. Iran also let the militaryindustries slip into inactivity. reducedthe period of conscription from twoyears to one year. and cut the standingarmy and its budget in half. These fac-tors. along with other policy shifts.

moved Iran away from a military build-up.

War and Renewed Military BuildupThe Iran-Iraq war was an unfortu-

nate awakening and maturing processfor the Islamic Republic. Both the lead-ership and the public were caught offguard when Iraq launched its offensiveinto Iranian territory in September1980. The United Nations failed to con-demn Iraq. while the Arab states active-ly supported it. Saudi Arabia. alongwith Kuwait and other Gulf Arab

T he location of the April 1993international arms fair in AbuDhabi was telling. At a time

when arms procurements had droppedsubstantially around the globe, PersianGulf countries embarked on an armsbuild-up. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwaitand the obvious inability of the GCCstates to defend themselves in the laceof an Iraqi attack have resulted in anunprecedented arms buying spree in theregion, Another contributing element isthe fear on the part of the GCC states ofthe supremacy of Iran's military power.The United States has also alleged thatIran intends to develop mass destruc-tion war technologies and that it isbuilding its conventional forces beyondany legitimate needs, The critical ques-tion is whether these assertions areaccurate and if Iran's purchases are sothreatening as to justify spiraling armsprocurement,

The development of Iran's armsindustries predates the IslamicRepublic, Under the Shah. and with theassistance of a number of Americanmultinational corporations, a rapidlygrowing arms industry focusing on air-power had been developed by the mid-1970s. It included helicopter industries.missile repair and modification facili-ties. jet engine maintenance industries.and armament factories manutacturinga wide variety of small arms. The Shahalso sought. unsuccesst'ully. to expandIran's nuclear power-generating capac-ity. Meanwhile. Iran became the largestimporter of military hardware in the

Hooshang Amirahmadi i.\" Pr~fessor ofUrban Plannincl? and InternationalDevelopment at Rutgers Uni~'er.\"it.,.He chairs the Dryartment of Urbtl/lPlanning and Polic., De~'elopment andi.\" director ~f Middle Eastern Studies.Dr. Amirahmadi has published numer-ous journal articles and book.\". lec-tit red in o~'er 20 countries. and ser~'esa.\" a c0l1.\"ultant to .\"everal multination-al a,l?encie.\". go~'ernments. ant/ pri~'atecompanies.

JANUARY-FEBRUARY \'iq'f 45\(6/.

10 /}I/, 2I

use of modem technology in a variety ofproduction areas. including high-speedcomputers. avionics technology. andoscilloscopes. The Western media andgovernments have stressed the "dualuse" or "military usetur' nature of thesetechnologies and Iran's potential. aswell as intention. to apply them toward amilitary build-up. Indeed. Iran has uti-lized these technologies in projects thatcould have both civilian and militaryuse. such as airports and port tacilities.

And yet. the dual-use nature of theseprojects does not necessarily indicateIran's militaristic intent, In fact. theirlimited scope may be seen as evidenceof the constraints on the Iran' s ability tobecome a regional threat to Westerninterests in the foreseeable future. Inaddition. Iran claims a commitment tointernational rules of conduct on tech-nologies of mass destruction. Forexample. the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) investigatedIran's nuclear projects and materials inearly ~ and. alonlZ with US go~ern-

~ officials. cleared Iran of any rnali- --cious intent, The IAEA is also to mon-itor the Sino-Iranian nuclear energyproject which has become another ral-lying point for those in the West and inthe region who fear Iranian intentions. IOn January 13. 1993, Iran signed aNmajor treaty banning chemicall'

states, gave some $50 billion to Iraq inloans and aid, while Egypt and Jordansent military support. Meanwhile.American-led sanctions (e.g.Operation Staunch) made it very diffi-cult for Iran to procure arms at a timewhen it was at war with a better armedand continuously supplied enemy.Both superpowers, perhaps for the firsttime in the Cold War era, sided withand militarily supponed the same sidein the conflict, namely Iraq. Toward theend of the conflict, the United Statesbecame directly involved, bombardingIranian oil platforms in the PersianGulf and downing an Iranian passengerplane.

As a result, Iran began, thoughbelatedly. to revitalize its existing mili-tary industries, especially the mainte-nance and service of its existing stock-pile. Soon, however, Iraq initiated its"war on cities" strategy using longrange missiles. To reciprocate, and inthe absence of easy access to the armsmarket. Iran rejuvenated its missileproduction. It also expanded its capa-bilities in the production of light arms,ammunition. mortars, howitzer andartillery barrels, and aircraft parts.Meanwhile, Iran was also imponing aarmaments from a variety of sources,including the black market. Yet, itsmilitary stockpile was steadily in

decline. reaching a critically insuffi-cient level by the end of the war. Anindication of this decline was that in thelast two years of the war ( 1987-88), thetotal figure for Iranian military imponsstood at less than $1.5 billion.Comparable figures tor Iraq and SaudiArabia were $8.2 billion and $5 billionrespectively. In the next three years, thegap between Iran and the other twonations widened funher. Thus. Iran'stotal military impons bill for the 1989-91 period was $2.8 billion while thosefor Iraq and Saudi Arabia had jumpedto $10.3 billion and $10.6 billion.respectively. In 1992. Iran's militaryimpons dropped to less than $850 mil-lion. Measured in per capita terms. thegap becomes considerably wider as[ran's population is 60 million- com-pared to 17 million tor Iraq and 1.1, mil-lion for Saudi Arabia.

This gap notwithstanding. in theimmediate post-war period. Iran still didnot emphasize a military build-up.Instead. it directed attention andresources to economic reconstructioneffons. It was only after the Gulf Warthat Iran began to reconsider its defensestrategy and replenish its military hard-ware. The present strategy is focusingon both domestic production andimpons. On the domestic side. thenoticeable change is an emphasis on the

46 MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT

this prospect. recent history suggeststhat the only periods of turmoil for the~//'region occurred when Iraq reached mil- ~itary parity with Iran in the early 1980s.

Collective Security ArrangementsA stable and effective Persian Gulf

re-gional security arrangement shouldinclude all parties and be attentive totheir sensitivities and interests.Whether such a comprehensive systemcould be created given the current stateof regional affairs is highly unlikely.The dilemma facing both Iran and theGCC states is that Iran's participationis crucial to the success of any regionalsecurity system. But Iran cannot partic-ipate unless it is prepared to safeguardthe security of other states. As evidenceof this dilemma. one need only point tothe many recent failed attempts to setup a regional security system, the see-saw quality of Iran's relations with theGCC, and the apprehension'in theregion about the future of Iraq.

The GCC was established in 1981 asa mechanism to contain Iranian andIraqi power, and radical political Islamin the Gulf. For most of the 1980s, theIslamic Republic applied a stick policy,with occasional doses of carrot, to theGCC states. Relations with the Saudisbecame particularly antagonisticbecause of differences over Islam, the

weapons: Arab countries did not partic-ipate in that international event. citingIsrael's stockpile of chemical weaponsas their reason.

On the imports side, Iran is repon-edly in the process of acquiring mili-tary aircraft trom both Russia (Mig 29s,Su24s) and China (F-7s), tanks (T-72s)from Russia and Eastern Europeancountries. ballistic missiles and rocketguidance systems from North Koreaand China. and satellites and threediesel-powered Kilo-class submarinesfrom Russia. According to someAmerican intelligence experts, the totalimport bill is still far below the outlaythe Shah devoted to his peacetime mil-itary build-up. The $2 billion:.per-yeartotal of military imports is also lessthan ten percent of Iran's total importbill of $28 billion for fiscal year 1991-92. Iran.s current annual militaryexpenditures are only about 40 percentof what Iraq was spending each year onweapons after the Iran-Iraq war, andonly a fraction of a single Saudi-US air-craft deal of $9 billion.

The general impression. particularlyamong Western observers, is that theoutcome of the US-led war against Iraqwas beneficial to Iran in at least twoways: it substantially weakened Iraq'smilitary power and it strengthenedIran's air defense system. Implied in

this assertion is that Iran did not need tobuild up its military because a balancehas been established between the twoold rivals. From Iran.s perspective.however. the Gulf war introduced addi-tional elements of risk and uncertaintyin its regional environment. Iraq hasbecome unstable and even moreaggressive. The war also led toincreased US involvement in the regionthrough a series of bilateral defensearrangements with Saudi Arabia.Kuwait. Bahrain. and Qatar.

More importantly, the Gulf war ledto new arms build-ups by Saudi Arabia,Israel. and Kuwait. In a single deal in1992. the Saudis purchased 75 F-15 jetsfrom the US at $9 billion. In anotherdeal the same year. Kuwait purchased236 American M l-A2 advanced battletanks which. with the spare parts andtraining involved. will eventually costthe Kuwaitis some $4 billion. The exactfigures related to arms purchases fol-lowing the UAE arms show are not yetavailable. but the preliminary reportsindicate continuing procurements bythe GCC states. The U AE. for example.purchased about $3.5 billion worth ofFrench military equipment. includingtanks.

Despite these developments. Iranmay still emerge as a leader in thePersian Gulf region. While some fear

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Israel

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Turkey0 10020 40 60 80

Expenditures in US $billions, at fixed 1988 prices & exchange-rates1983-1985 CJ 1986-1988

~

1989-1991

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 47

--Iran's airforce was especially hard hit during Iran-Iraq war and was only marginally helped by defecting aircraftduring Operation Desert Storm: Iranian fighter at Mehrabad in September 1980.

struggle tor OPEC leadership. the quest Khomeini' s hardline position sprang sored Damascus Declaration of Marchfor supremacy in the Persian Gulf, the from the recognition that a more stable 1991 (the "GCC-plus-two'. formula)US-Saudi alliance, and Saudi-led GCC regional environment was needed if aimed at creating an ,. Arab peace-keep-support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran wanted to resolve its problems ing force" in the Gulf with the partici-When Iran took the upper hand in the with Iraq and accomplish its domestic pation of the GCC. Syria. and Egypt-war (from 1985 to 1987) the symbiosis economic goals. Iran's steadfast oppo- but excluding Iran, The GCC empha-that had developed between the GCC sition to the Iraqi annexation of sized the "Arab" identity of any securi-and Iraq was extended into GCC-US Kuwait. and its unwavering neutrality ty arrangement. but insisted on the par-cooperation. American intervention in during the ensuing hostilities, ticipation of Iran and Turkey in athe war on the side of Iraq and US pro- improved Iran-GCC relations. broader non-military union. Alarmedtection ofGCC tankers followed. Iran's Signiticantly, diplomatic ties between by the prospect of non-Gulf Arab statesrelations with the GCC deteriorated to Tehran and Riyadh were re-established playing such a major role in Gulf secu-an all-time low. Confrontation with the in March 1991. rity affairs. Iran abandoned its balanc-Saudis reached a dangerous point when Negotiating a new regional order ing idea in favor of a collective securi-the two nations severed relations after with the GCC states became Irans chief ty order, In pursuit of shared securitythe 1987 incident in which some 400 post-war priority, in the aftermath of the arrangements with the GCC. Iran evenIranian pilgrims were killed during a US-led war against Iraq, First. however, made an explicit pitch for formal inclu-political demonstration. Iran needed to gain the organization's sion in the organization. Meanwhile,

After the ceasefire with Iraq in cooperation. To this end, Iran empha- the Damascus Declaration never led toAugust 1988. Iran launched a "charm sized the GCC's concept of self- an actual security regime, as its signa-offensive" to improve relations with reliance and non-interVention by exter- tories found it difficult to resolve theirthe GCC states, By the time of the nal powers. This strategy, Iran hoped, competing interests,Kuwait crisis, these confidence-build- would reduce the GCC's foreign depen- The sudden prospect of cooperationing measures had resulted in a steady dency (and its reliance on the United between Iran and the GCC dismayedupturn in Iran-GCC relations. Some States) and would solidify Iran's image the United States. whose commitmentGCC leaders even expressed hopes that as the guardian of autonomy in the Gulf. the region had been legitimized by itsIran and Iraq might soon earn observer Iran's main concern remained the estab- military protection of the GCC states,status in the organization. In turn. the lishment and maintenance of a regional With Iraq no longer a threat. Iran wasIslamic Republic reaffirmed its respect balance of power among the various viewed as the primary regional threat.for the sovereignty of its neighbors in a parties in the Persian Gulf. Before the Iran-GCC dialogue devel-resolution issued only a few days Iran's balancing strategy, however, oped into any specific plan, the Unitedbefore Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, This soon clashed with the plans of other States offered the GCC its own termsselecti ve disengagement from nations. The Syrian-Egyptian spon- for regional security. Specifically,

48 MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT

main regional rivals. namely Iraq andSaudi Arabia. Although Iran may be ina better position to back up such claimswith its sizable population, large econ-omy and relatively strong army, theother two countries also possess con-siderable potential: Iraq in militarytechnology and the Saudis in financialterms. In the 1970s, a three-powerentente was established to preserveregional stability; in the 1990s, a simi-lar arrangement may again becomenecessary. If Saddam Hussein survivesthe present domestic and internationalpressures he is facing, Iran's relationswith Iraq will become even more hos-tile in the future. Saddam' s departurewill not reduce such potential tensionsunless the Ba'ath Party also looses itsgrip over Iraq. Moreover. if Saddam issuccessfully replaced by a pro-Westernleader. there is a good possibility thatIraq will return to prominence withconsiderable speed, which is a distinct-ly undesirable scenario for Iran. Butneither can Iran afford a weakened cen-tral government in Iraq. for it couldresult in Iraq's disintegration as a coun-try. A dangerous precedent may then beset for the multi-ethnic Iran. whoseown Kurdish population may pose athreat to its internal stability.

Iran considers the Persian Gulf its.'backyard" and becomes concernedwhenever conflicts occur in and aroundthe Gulf region. In Iran's view, itsinterests are best served if the PersianGulf is an open international waterway.with free navigation rights for all andwithout any major disturbances.Ironically, this view is also shared bythe American administration. Iran hasalso indicated its willingness to partici-pate in any regional security systemthat ensures the Persian Gulf s open-ness and political stability and recog-nizes a role for Iran commensurate withits power and imponance. These sharedinterests can more than legitimize a"marriage of convenience" between theUnited States and Iran. But whether thetwo countries can put aside their differ-ences and work toward the commongoal of Gulf security is very much indoubt. .

President Bush indicated that theUnited States wished lO create sharedsecurity arrangements in the region...This would entail. ..American participa-tion in joint exercises involving both airand ground torces:. he said. This pro-gram led to bilateral security arrange-ments with a number of the GCC states.

Deprived of an opportunity to enactits plan. Iran focused on confidence-building measures via enhanced com-munication and increased bilateral eco-nomic ties with various GCC states. Iranalso intensified its policy of creating treeeconomic zones in its Persian GulfIslands of Qeshm and Kish. hoping thatthe policy would further boost Iran-GCC economic relations. Nevertheless,the GCC's military dependence on theUnited States ran contrary to Iran'sgrowing desire tor cooperation with aself-reliant GCC. Some sectors of theIranian leadership also remained suspi-cious of the ultimate American objec-tives in the Persian Gulf. To weaken thealliance between the United States andthe Gulf states. Iran emphasized theprinciple of self-reliance as enshrined inthe GCC's charter. Many observersbelieved that the Islamic Republic's de-alignment strategy followed naturallyfrom the "anti-Western" predilection ofits Islamic ideology. Yet. the strategylargely reflected Iran's nationalisticview of its leadership position in theGulf.

A complex web of historical. geopo-litical. ideological and cultural factorsworked against the development ofsecurity cooperation between Iran andthe GCC states. Despite a constructiveengagement that brought Iran and GCCcloser during the Kuwait crisis. it didnot go far enough to eliminate theGCC's suspicion toward Iran.Moreover. the Arab states-particular-ly those who are members of the US-led anti-Iraq coalition-have yet to befully convinced of the durability ofIran's emerging pragmatic foreign pol-icy. They fear that Iran's membershipin a Persian Gulf security system wouldinevitably lead to its dominance of theGulf in the long run. As an Arab diplo-mat contended. the security arrange-ment "comes down to whether we wanta Middle East order [with Iran]. or a

new Arab order [without Irani with theWest as a shield..' The DamascusDeclaration and the security agree-ments with the United States reflect theArabs. preference for the latter option.

America. s powert'ul position in theGulf (along with the diminished threatposed by Iraq) has reduced the GCC'sincentive to look to Iran for securitycooperation. Additionally, significantdivisions of opinion existed betweenIran and the GCC states concerning therole of external states in the securityaffairs of the region. The military weak-ness of the GCC states made them toodependent on Western security guaran-tees to afford a purely regional solutionto security issues.. American oppositionto collective security and its preferencefor creating a patchwork of overlappingbilateral alliances also proved a majorstumbling block to better GCC-Iranianrelations. Finally.lran.s lack of en thus i-asm for membership in a collective inwhich its primacy could be jeopardizedby potential American interferenceworked against the development ofsecurity cooperation.

This last point reflects Iran's oftencontradictory approach to Persian Gulfsecurity. While collective securitydemands that Iran participate in themultilateral system on an equal basiswith others, the Tehran government hascontinued to underscore its power andprimacy among the Gulf states. Thus.according to President Rafsanjani:.iran has had the role of guardian in thePersian Gulf. ...There is only onepower that can provide the peace andstability of the Persian Gulf, and that isIran's power:' Since such statementshave often coincided with a renewedemphasis on collective security, Iran'scommitment to such an approach hasbeen questioned. Iran has at times beenaccused of expressing a willingness toparticipate in collective security only inan attempt to mask its desire to estab-lish a Pax Iranica-and to preventsmaller states from employing the pro-tective services of outside powersagainst Iran.s hegemonic tendencies.

Rivalry for PrimacyIrans emphasis on its primacy is in

part a reaction to similar claims by its

49JANUARY.FEBRUARY