Burma Strategic and Political

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Burma: Strategic and Political

John L. Christian

Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 11, No. 3. (Feb. 9, 1942), pp. 40-44.

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40 F A R E A S T E R N S U R V E Ylanding fields have been made unusable for planes. the United Nations time to bring more planes, navalThey are even protected against parachute troops by forces, tanks, and troops into Java.sharpened bamboo poles stuck into the ground. I t is quite possible th at Java will become one of theThe longer the Dutch defenders are able to delay startin g points of operations designed to dislocate thea Japanese attack on Java, the better are the chances Japanese from those areas in southeast Asia that haveof beating th e aggressors off, because delay will give fallen into their hands since December 7, 1941.

Burma: Strategic and PoliticalBy JOHN L C H R I S T I A N

OR more than a century after the first annexationof Burmese territor y by Britain in 1824, the "landof pagodas" was regarded as the Cinderella of theInd ia Em pire, useful principally as a sup plier of rice,oil, teak, and lucrative appointments in the variousImperial Services. Burma vegetated under the axritannica in her quiet backwater on the eastern shoreof th e B ay of Beng al, a sor t of a rcad ian lan d wellremoved from the alarms and excursions of war. Pro-tected in her coastal district by Britain's undisputedsupremacy in the Indian Ocean and on her northernand eastern land frontiers by malarious and inacces-sible hill tracts, the country was described by SirGeorge White as . . .one vast military obstacle."

Burma in TransitionDue to long association (1824-1937) with India asa province in the old British Indian Empire, Burmawas regarded erroneously by the western world asIndian in character. Spiritually, the Burmese cling toBuddhism, the Indian religion that has almost dis-appeared from the land of its birth. Ethno logically,they a re the first 1Iongolians encountered in a n east-ward journey along Asia's southern coast. Politically,the country cut its ties with India in April 1937, andsubsequently has enjoyed economic development and apolitical status described by Sir Arthur Page, formerChief Justice of B urm a, as having "all the powers of

self-government except the title."But Burma was not long to enjoy a period of peacein her transition from authoritarian to representativegovernment. Three months after Burma's separationfrom India the Sino-Japanese war broke out and bythe en d of 1938 the c oun try fou nd itself th e focus ofconsiderable attention in the world press as a resultof the construction of the Burma Road. During thecentury 1830-1930 official and commercial interestsmade numerous efforts to develop a trans-Burma tradewith western China. Despite a brief spurt during theSino-Japanese W ar of 1894-95, only casual fro ntiertrade resulted from the completion of the LashioBranch of th e Bu rma Railway s in 1911 and the estab-

lishm ent of efficient steam er serv ice on 1,000 milesof the mighty Irrawaddy from Rangoon to Bhamo,40 miles from the Chinese frontier. In 1936, the lastyear of normal Sino-Burmese trade, the total valueof merchandise passing through Bham o to China wasonly Rs. 96,000 (U.S. $32,000).During October and Nov ember 1941, new in terestwas focussed upon B urm a by the visit to London andWashington of U Saw,l Premier of Burm a. The Pre-mier was accompanied by U Ti n Tu t, the first Burm anadmitted (in 1920) to the sacrosanct Indian CivilService and who has recently held various importantofficial post s, including t ha t of V ice-Chancellor ofRangoon University. U Saw was reported in the pressas having been disappointed in his efforts to havePrime Minister Churchill implement the AtlanticCharter by supporting Burma's desire for full andimmediate dominion status.

Saw s DisappointmentU Saw commented upon leaving London for Wash-ington early in November 1941 ('The discussions withPrime Minister Churchill have not fulfilled the highhopes of my cou ntrym en, bu t I leave your shores withno bitterness." Th e Prim e Minister of B urm a spen tabo ut a mo nth in the United S tates, somewhat longerthan he had expected due to the attack upon PearlHarbor on December 7 and the return to San Fran-cisco of th e trans-Pacific Clippe r on which he had

taken passage. In his final interview with the Ameri-can press before his departure for Burma via Canadaand Australia (a s reported in the New York Times ofDecember 29, 1941), U Saw again indicated disap-pointment over his failure to secure immediate andcomplete dominion status for Burma, but he statedthat he was "still hopeful."Meantime came Prime Minister Churchill 's state-ment that the famed third article of the AtlanticCharter governing the future of states and nationsunder the Nazi yoke does not apply to "regions theThi s article was written before news was received of U Saw'sarrest. Possible reasons for his flirtations with the Japanesewill be discussed in the next issue of the Far astern Survey


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F E B R U R Y 9 , I 9 4 2people of w hich owe allegiance to the Britis h Crown.And that is the most recent word on the probablefutur e course of constitutional development in B urma.The Japanese attack upon southeast Asia struck imme-diately thereafter and both air and overland attacksagainst the cities and te rritory of B urma followed inswift succession.

Burma s Political StructureBrief description of Burma's present political struc-ture may perhaps dispel the current impression thatthe country is a Crown Colony. Actually, Burma hasadvanced further than India, its former partner, alongthe path of representative government. Although theGovernor of Burm a, at present Sir Hug h Dorman-Smith, is easily the most important single factor inthe government of Bu rma under war conditions, theConstitutional plan under which Burma has operated

since 1937 transfers to the Burmese Premier and hiscabinet very extensive powers of government. Underthe Instru me nt of I nstru ction , issued anew to eachgovernor, that executive's powers are so limited thatin practice Burmese Ministers have effective controlover almost the entire internal administration. TheMinisters actually exercise executive authority. Al-though the Government of Bur ma Act sta tes tha t allexecutive action shall be in the governor's name, itis the Ministers who actually exercise this power. Th usall orders are issued in the form tha t The governoris pleased to direct. . . bu t this is a mat ter of formonly as the Ministers issue the orders; the governorhimself m ay be, and usually is, qu ite unaw are of thecontext in ordinary matters.In short, the actual authority rests with the Premierand seven other cabinet ministers whose continuancein office is dependent upon support by the House ofRepresen tatives of 132 mem bers. T h e usual featur esof British parliamentary government are operative inBurm a, with a Senate of 36 members acting as anupper house of limited powers. The governor's extraor-dinary powers are restricted in the main to the army,foreign affairs, and the control of the back war d hilltracts that surround Burma proper. He does have, itis true, power to veto bills, but he has never yet exer-cised this power. Likewise, he has power to certifya bill that has been rejected by the legislature or topromulgate a governor's act without consulting thelegislature, but the first power has been exercised onlytwice, while the power to LLpromulgate as not oncebeen used. Thus even during the present war the Bur-mans' fear that the emergency would result in curtail-ment of legislative functions and expansion of theexecutive power has not materialized.

I t should be mentioned t ha t the preservation of lawand order and t he control of the police are responsi-bilities of the legislature and a re unde r direction of

Burmese ministers. During 1938-41 there was defi-nitely less censorship of the press, more person al free-dom, and less evidence of the police in a Bur maa t war than in neighboring neutral Thailand. Forexample, not until June 1940 was a ban issued pro-hibiting the broadcasting at public gatherings ofpropaganda or news bulletins from German or Italianradio stations, and then the communiquC stated thatthere w ere no strictu res upon priva te reception ofGerman or Italian broadcasts.There were persistent reports during November andearly December 1941 tha t Japan contemplated a nattack upon the Burma Road either through Thailandor across the 130-mile stre tch where the fro ntier ofBurm a marches with th at of occupied French Indo-China. Therefore, some examination of the strategicarea about Burma and the measures for its defenseis indicated, particularly in view of Japan's suddenthrust through Thailand in December.

Communications n BurmaFirst, there is no railway nor modern highway inFrench Indo-China or Thailand within 300 miles ofany point on the Burma Road. The intervening coun-try is one of th e least known a nd m ost malarious are asin all Asia, utterly impassible to any mechanizedequipment in force. In brief, the Burma Road cannotbe blitzkrieged, least of all by an att em pt to reach inoverland through Thailand or Burma. Conditions arelittle better on the Chinese side. A recent official Chi-

nese report of th e area between Bur ma and the Fren chYunnan Railway complained that . .human carriersand pack animals are the only available means oftransportat ion. .One of the first points attack ed in the Japaneseinvasion of the M alay Peninsula was Victoria Pointat the extrem e southern tip of Burm a. This outpost,entirely without railway or highway connection withthe remainder of Bu rma or with Siam or BritishM ala ya , is of va lue because of its radio stat ion andsecondary airport of the Imperial R ailways. I t lies atthe Burm a outlet of the proposed K ra Canal, in whichJapan has been interested for decades and which wasdiscussed in the Japan Chronicle of November 10 1941.Mere occupation of this site and atta ck s upon otherpar ts of the Tenasserim distric t of Bur ma could notL L ~ ~ t B urm a and Singaporeommunication betweenas has been reported in the press on this side. Therehas never been land communication between Singa-pore and Rangoon, both cargo and passengers goingby sea only. Japanese occupation of Pe nan g is qu iteanother matter, and Japanese vessels in the IndianOcean or occupation of the Nicobars or the Andamanswould be a most serious threat to Singapore and Ran-goon, as well as to Calcutta, Madras, and Colombo.At the end of No vemb er 1941, the governm ent


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of B urn la anno unce d the orga nizatio n of 300 airobservation stations stretching from Tenasserim andBurma s A raken coast on th e B ay of B engal to herlong northern and eastern frontiers that march withthose of China, Indo-China, and Thailan d. Twenty -four of these .station s are with in a 50-mile radius ofRangoon and presumably went into action during thefirst week of war with Japan. Rangoon had two airraids in force within.ten days of war; there was anattack by more than 100 planes on Christmas Day,and there have been numerous sporadic attacks onother parts of Burm a. British and American volunteerairmen of the international air patrol defending theBurm a Road parried these attacks.British on the Offensive

The British in Burma carried the fight to the enemyby destroying early in January the Thai airport atRaheng, less than 200 air miles from Rangoon, andon January 7 announced damaging attacks upon mili-tary objectives, including the airport, in Bangkok.Indeed, during the first ten days of Janu ary there werethree punishing raids upon Siam s old capita l andadditional raids upon Mehsod and Rahang in an effortto destroy these Thai airports within easy reach ofRangoon. American pilots participated in these raidswhich destroyed numbers of Japanese planes and largequa ntit ies of petrol.Japan s initial successes did not necessarily presagecontinued easy progress in the direction of Rangoo n.The only highway from Thailand to Burma is a dry-season road leading no rth from Chiengmai and Chieng-rai in Thailand to Kengtung in the Southern ShanStates of Burm a and thence by an old military ca rtroad to Taunggyi, the administrative and militarycenter of the Shan S tate s more than 400 miles fromRangoon. The total distance from Bangkok to Ran-goon by this rou te is some 1,300 miles. Incidenta lly,many Europeans and Americans escaped from Thai-land by this route when Japan moved in. There is nobridge over the Salween, which is crossed by a nativeferry at Takaw between Kengtung and Taunggyi.

In addition to her inaccessibility, Burma s climateis a formidable obstacle to overland invasion. Theent ire length of th e Tha ilan d frontie r is poisonouslymalarious everywhere below 4,000 feet. Moreover themountainous areas that separate the two states aresubject to torrential rainfall during the monsoon sea-son, i.e. from hl ay to October, with rain fall of 200inches in much of this region of thick jungle, dir troads, and cart tracks. An extensive campaign involv-ing use of m echanized equip me nt is unthin kable dur-ing the rains.W hat defense, other than na tural, does Burma h ave?Although recent detailed information is lacking, it isknown that there were in 1939 only 5,374 troops in

F A R E S T E R N S U R V E Y

the entire cou ntry. Of these 1,807 were Europ eans an d3,s 17 were Asiatics of the Ind ian A rmy . These troopsare in add ition t o the 12,000 officers and men of hlil i-tary Police and the Burma Frontier Service. Sincethe outbreak of the Europ ean w ar, these troops havebeen repeatedly and considerably reinforced with sea-soned European and Indian units. It was announcedin November 1941 that the Burma Frontier Force andthe Mi lita ry Police, formerly under contro l of theGovernor and the legislature respectively, were incor-porated in the force of the M ajor-General Command-ing in B urma a s a pa rt of the imperial army under SirRob ert Brooke-P opham of Singapore (sinc e replacedby General Sir Henry Royds Pownall). Now theBurma Army, having been from April to December1941 und er th e com mand of Singapore, has been re-turned to th e India Command of w hich it had beencontinuously a part since 1824.Burma s Land and Air Forces

M ilita ry forces in Burm a are believed to be of atype particularly suited to the terrain and climate ofthe country. Including recent reinforcements, Burmahas a lan d force of n ot less th an 50,000 men of a llarms. The air force is equipped with Brewster-Buffalofighters and numerou s bombers of th e R.A.F. AthIingaladon, ten miles east of Rangoon, B urm a hasthe largest airport in the entire Orient. In addition,there are numerous civilian and military airports inother part s of Burm a, including suitable waters forseaplanes. Th e huge flying boats of the British O ver-seas Airways anchor in the Rangoon River, and thegreat Irraw addy provides sa fe landing for flying boatsthrough the center of Burm a proper as far as Bhamo,less than 40 miles from the Chinese frontier.Service in the armed forces in Burma is entirelyvoluntary for the Burmese; there is no conscription.Euro pean British su bjects of m ilitary age were regis-tered a t the beginning of the war and placed in appro-priate services as needed. The Burman traditionallyhas little adap tab ility for the disciplines of m ilita rylife (the personnel of the hlilitary Police and theFrontier Force was largely Gurkha from Nepal asBurma ns would not enlist ), bu t now tha t the Japanesehave been joined by Thai troops the Burmese may becounted upon to join up in resisting their ancient foes.Many Burmans are winning commissions as reserveofficers in the army in Burma, in which promotionnow is only from the ranks. After some delay a Burmavolunteer air unit and a naval volunteer reserve forcewere organized. A ma jor ity of the officers in the latte rforce are natives of Burm a.Rangoon dockyards have completed five naval ves-sels for coastal patrol and mine sweeping. Workshopsof the state-owned B urm a Railways and of the Irra-waddy Flotilla Company are entirely capable of turn-


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F E B R U R Y 9 , I 9 4 2ing out large numbers of a rtille ry shells, as they didin the first World W ar.Burma has had its internal difficulties during thedecade just ended; for example, there has been evi-dence of the develop ment of a N azi complex amongBurmese extremists. On several occasions nationalistleaders have in public or private expressed admirationfor the Hitlerian system, probably with only a vagueunde rstand ing of the aims and methods of tota litar ian -ism. This manifestation sprang from anti-British sen-timents. The Nazis are in conflict with the British:therefore the opponents of British power in Burm aprofessed in some instances to be Nazis. Shortly afterthe beginning of the war, an Ang lo-Burman wasarrested for possessing numerous swastika flags andpictures of Hitler.

Internal PoliticsDuring the decade 1925-35 there was considerable

adm iration of th e Soviet system for similar reasons,and some Burmese nationalists claimed to be Com-munists. Several W untha nu (nation alist) organizationshad photographs taken with the hammer and sickleflag as a background, although it is doubtful that asingle Burman has ever visited Russia or knows theRussian language or has a competent knowledge ofSoviet political philosophy. D uring 1940 and 1941 com-munism was replaced by totalitarianism as a rallyingground for the intellectuals and theorists among theanti-British elements. It should be added that neithertotalitarianism nor communism has ever been a basicmotivating factor among any appreciable number ofthe few Burmese who have political consciousness.Current Burmese politics are connected intimatelywith, and complicated by, the entire imperial scene insoutheast Asia. Burmans have been hitherto extremelyprovincial and naive, a situation well illustrated bythe quaint suggestion made by Dr. Ba Maw, prede-cessor of U Saw as Prime M inister of Burma, as toBurm a's course in the event of a G erman victory .B a Maw proposed th at the Nazis be requested to givehome rule to Burm a and that, if Hitler refused,Burmans would then demand th at the Germans re-tu rn homen-a proposal widely approved by Burmesenationalists as a workable alternative for the prospectof Na zi dom ination . Unfo rtunate ly, no such idealisticsolution is possible for political problems, even inarcadian Burma.Although the western powers owning territory insoutheast Asia have long since abandoned plans forfurther conquests, they are confronted with two im-portant problems in the area: first, according somerecognition to the nationalistic asp irations of colonialpeoples in the region an d, second, protec tion of Euro -pean interests from expansionist aims of indigenousFar Eastern states, i.e. Japan and Siam. These two

problems present two additional complexities, par-ticularly in Bu rma and In dia. Fir st, provision of suit-able measu res of defense for teem ing populations-mostly agricultural and pacific in outlook-againstaggression from their mechanized fellow-Orientals, theJapanese. Second, the unwillingness of important mi-norities to submit to majority rule, a reluctance whichimmensely complicates all advances in self-governmentin Burma. I t is quite true tha t minorities in Burmaare potentially less formidable than in India, but it isby no means certain tha t such will alway s be the case.Karen, Chin, Kachin, Shan, and other minority groupsin Bur ma account for one-third of Burm a's 15 millionpeople. Politically most important may be the twomillion In dia ns and the hund reds of thous ands ofChinese. In many cases the only political concept ofthe more primitive hill tribesmen is one of a ntip ath yfor the 10 million Burm ans who now wield politicalpower.

Curiously enough, the power of th e Burmese m ajor-ity is upheld by civil and military police which arerecruited almost entirely from Indians, Gurkhas,Karens and the tribesmen of upper Burma. Th at is,the ultim ate sanc tion of the civil government of theBurmese majority rests upon a police and militaryforce composed of repres entativ es of th e mino ritygroups. Efforts to persuade Burmans to volunteer forthe services have been only slightly successful. Forexample, during the 1914-18 war, sund ry military unitswere recruited in Burma, but only Kachin, Karen, andChin units were retained to the end of the h ostilities;the Burmese units could not be kept up to strengthby voluntary enlistment and were abandoned.

ritish Reservations on IndependenceTherefore, the question arises Could the majo rityparty, composed almost entirely of Burman s, maintaininterna l peace and a measure of se curity agains t exter-nal aggression if the prote cting hand of the Britishwere withdraw n? U Saw's demands for complete inde-pendence for Burma at some fixed date were refusedby L. S. Amery, Britis h Secreta ry of S tate for Ind iaand Burma. He reasoned that it was impossible toforecast postwar conditions, including the growth ofinternal confidence and political capacity in Burmato the point where the five million minority in Burmawould entrust themselves to the rule of the Burmesemajority.Burma's relations with neighboring Thailand havepresented a difficult problem, particularly since No-vember 1941. For a century prior to th at time relationsbetween the two countries had been cordial, thanksto the Pax Br i tannica which had ended the quarrelsof the ancien t rivals. For th e past year th ere has beensuspicion in Rangoon and London that Bangkok'srelations with Tokyo had gone somewhat beyond


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proper limits, that there was actual collusion againstFrench Indo -China, and th at possible joint action wasplanned against Burma and British Malaya. Recentdiscoveries of petrol dum ps in Siam arra nged a t inter-vals along the line of Japan ese ad vance tow ard Sin-gapore have given credence to these suspicions andled to retaliatory attacks against Thai cities, airports,and communications during January 1942. It wasnoted that Thailand offered scarcely token resistanceto the Japanese advance.

Thailand omplicates the ProblemThaila nd, with a population equal to that of Y ugo-slavia, has a not negligible army and air force, andher neighbors have long been aw are of rising T ha iirredentist sentiment. Moreover, the Japanese attackupon Kuomintang China, whose spokesmen have re-

peatedly proposed the e ntry of Burm a and Siam intoa federal union w ith C hina, was regarded a s extremelyhelpful to Thailand which for the past decade hastaken energetic economic measures against its Chinesepopulation. For these reasons it is certain that theappo intm ent of G eneralissimo Chiang Kai-shek asAllied comm ander in "such portio ns of Indo -Chin a andThailand as may be available to the United Nations"wiil arouse serious misgivings in Thailand, as it wouldin Burma. Imperial and Allied forces in Burm a were,however, placed under Lieutenant-General Hutton,form erly Chief of Staff to Gen eral Sir Arc hibaldWavell, as a part of the arm y in India. General Hut-ton's force includes an undetermined number of Chi-nese troops (probably not less than 50,000) who passedthrough upper Burma and are believed to be deployedin the remote areas along the Thai frontier.

Tokyo radio news during December 1941 circulatedpaten tly ina ccurate reports of a n invasion of n orthernThailand from Burma, and alleged that Chinese,British, and Burmese troops (there are no Burmesetroops) had reached Chiengrai, 40 miles inside Thai-land from Burma. British sources promptly deniedany invasion from Burma or fighting anywhere be-tween Thai troops and Empire forces based uponBurma.

At the moment, Burma's great value to the demo-cratic powers lies in its unequaled position as a basefrom which to launch a flank attac k upon the Japanesein Thailand and Malaysia. Rangoon, with the largestairport in the entire Orient, is less than 400 miles byair from Don Aluang, Bangkok's modern airport, andis thu s well positioned for air strafing of J apa nes ecommunication lines to the Malayan front. Aforeover,Rangoon has the advantage of ample supplies of avia-tion petrol refined in the great Sy riam works of t heBurm a Oil Company. In addition, Burma's seaportsfront on the Indian Ocean and thus are invaluable

F A R E A S T E R N S U R V E Y

as a supply route to China and the front which musteventually be used to destroy Japan's land forces.That the Allies have already recognized Burma'sprim e imp ortanc e is evidenced by th e presence of anAllied air force in Rangoon, at stations along theBurm a railways, and north over the course of theBurma Road. These forces already have made bomb-ing by Japanese planes so costly to Nippon that bymid- Janua ry mass atta cks upon Burm a were ab an-doned. Ther e are numerous Am erican commissions a ndinvestigators in the Burma area: the Haas MedicalCommission to the Yunnan-Burma Railway, DanielArnstein, John H. Hall, an American oil companyengineer who recommended a 700-mile oil pipe linefor the Burma Road, Madison Hall , Baltimore engi-neer whose re port resulted in send ing 10,000 tons oflend-lease asphalt for the Burma Road, some 250American pilots and mechanics for the Burma Roadair force, and selected motor transport techniciansfor the highway itself. There is already a joint Sino-British commission at work on problems arising fromthe Burma Road, and China has indicated her desireto turn over the entire managem ent of the road toan international body, preferably one headed by anAmerican.Thes e facts indicate increased awareness of th evital importance of the Bu rma route and the potentialBurma front. In short, Burma is certain to become avital easter n salient of the demo cracies and possiblyan area of grea t interna tional ac tivity.

Alz abbreviated but co~r~prehei tsiacibliography opt tlzeFar Ea st ha s just bcelt colnpilcd by tlze dlrzcrican C o14~ cilof the I P R . I t may be secl lred a t a n y o f t h e A~ t t e r i c a i lCo~rrzcil ffices price 1 cents.

F A R E A S T E R N S U R V E YB O A R D O F E D I T O R S C A T H E R IN E O R TE R ,Chairnzan; K U R TBLOCH , OROT HY MIRIAMORG,S. FARLEY,WILLIAMW . LOCKWOOD.R ES EAR C H AS S OC I ATES : ROBERTW. BARNETT,D E B O R A H J O H N R. S T E W A R T ,. H U E B A R D , J O H N H. OAKIE,GEORGEE. TAYLOR, THOMPSOX.IRGIKIAF O R T N I G H T L Y R E S E A R C H S E R V I CE P UB L IS H ED B Y T H EA M E R I C A N C O U N C I L OF T H E I N S T I T U T E O F P A C I F I C R E LA -TIONS, INC., 129 EAST 5 2 N D STREET, NEW YORK, N. YA N N U A L S U B S C R I PT I O N $ 2 . 5 0 ; S I N G L E C O P IE S , 25 C E N T S .Th e Far Eas te rn Sur vey i s a journal of fac t . Respons ib il -i t y for in terpre t ing the fac t s res t s in each case wi th t heindividual author.

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