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BURMA OPERATIONS REOORD 28th ARMY OPERATIONS IN AKYAB AREA
(Revised 1958)
PREPARED BY HEADQUARTERS USAFFE
AND EIGHTH- Us ARMY (REAR)
DISTRIBUTED BY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Foreword
This record was compiled b7 the formerstatfott1~erotmiddotthe 28th Army ex-Col Aiichi Ckamura during middoth1s 1nte~t 111 Burma afterthe termination of the war an~wasI-eViewedb7ex-tt Genbull
Shozo Sakurai~ former cOJIJJl18nder o the28thAnnyeA[terthereshycord was received by-the Informatiollmiddot and HistQrica1 RecordDiV1shynon Japanese Demobilization Bureau 1twasltsJpjectt9somecorshyrection by ex-Maj Nizo Yamaguchi former staffQfficeriofthe Southern Area ArIIr3 andpres$ntlyamember ofthegt $1)ove-tll$ntionedDivision
This record is based on the documents which were available at the former Army headquarters just atter tbetermination of the war and on the recollection of former staffofficersoithe 28th ArIrr3 ex-Ltmiddot Col Eiichi Tsuchiya exMajors Masakatsu Okudaira TatsurU Yamaguchi and all f ormar depar1mentehieisltgtf the Army headquarliers and commanders of units under the command or the Army
29 August 1952
Revised Edition
Many former officers or the Japanese 28th ArllfJ1 were of a_st ance to the Foreign Histories Division in filling in the gaps and correcting the inaccuracies in the original manuscript We acknOld edge our indebtedness and express our thanks to the following
Lt Gen Hanaya Commanding General 55th Division Maj Gen Roba COlI1l1Wldipg General 54th Infantry-Group Maj Gen Yamamoto Commanding General 72d Mixed Brigade Col Kawamura Chief of Start 55th Division Col Furuya Commanding Officer lJ2th Inrantry- Regiment Col Yoshida Commanding Officer l44th InfantryRegiment Lt Col Saito Starf Officer 54th Division l~aj Tsujimoto Commanding Orficer 1st Battalion
1430 Infantry Regiment Maj Matsuo CommandingOfiicer 2d Battalion
143d Infantry Regiment Maj Kurooka Commanding Officer 3d Battalion
143d Infantry Rfitgiment Maj Yamanaka Conunanding Officer 1st Battallon
29th Infantry Regiment
iii
We are also indebted to Mr Nishiuraeh1~t otmiddotthe War H1eto- ries Section Artq StaffOollege Japanese Self Detense Foree for his assistance to this division in makLngottieial records availa ble in particular The emQries of LtGenSakurlaquo1(CG 28th Jrma) Diary 01 Maj Gen Sakurai (CG 55th Infant 17 GrOtp) Operashytions Report of the 28th Army bl Lt bullbull cot 1sucbi3a and Maj Pukutom1 (Stat Officers of the 2Sth Army) and the Operations Report of the 54th Division Casualty lists were furnished by the 1st Demobilis tion Bureau of the Ministry of Public Welfare
30 April 1958
iv
Through Instructions No 126 bullto the lapaneseGovernment 12 October 1945 subject Institution tor Wer~cordsInvest1gat1ontI steps were initiated to exploit m1J1tarrhist0ricalrecorQ and official reports of the Japanese War MUttstryandJapaneseGeMral Staft Upon dissolution oithe lVarMinist7antithe)Jap~seGftn eral Stait and the transfer or their formerfunctopsto theD$shymobilization Bureau researCh atldcompilati011 continue1 anctdevelshyoped into a series of bistorical Jl1()nograplus
The paucity or original bull orders plans aJyenlcenttJ~SIwbicn are normaJly essential in thepreparat1onsottbis type ltgtfrecord most of which were lost or destr07eQ Qun11$ field operation=s 01- bombing raids rendered the taskotompilat1onmostdtfti~tj181- tioularly distressing has beenth~eompletelaCk ot Oftic1alstrength reports normal in AG or G3 records Rowever whLle manfot the important orders plans and e$timates have bullbull been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually-identical witb the originals they are believed to be generally accurate am reI1a~le
Under the supervision of the Demobilization Bureau thebasLc material contained in this monograph was compilelttand written in Japanese by former officers on dutyiA command and staft units within major units during the period otoperat1ons Translation was effected through thetacilitiesof~edTransJatorandIntr shypreters Service G2 General Headquarters iar ~astCornmand
This Japanese Operational Monograph was rewritten in English by the Japanese Research Division 1w1ilitary Hlstory SectionGenshyeral Headquarters Far East Command and is based on the trana1ation or theJ~panese original Editorial corrections were llnxitedto those necessary tor coherence and accuracy
29 August 1952
Revised Edition
This monograph origtnaUT editedin Augu5t 1952 Ifbullbull eocnpJEtte ly revised in 1958 Theorlginal edition vmich was (ievft1Dpecl trom fragmentary records and recollections tailed to presentmiddot the various operations in proper relationship to each other_This lack of co- besion made it virtuallT impossible to gain an understanding of th~
v
over-all operational situationin Burmabull middot1)uringtmiddothetive ant ~ half years that elapsedbetween ~f) bullbull pt1bl1cation~tthe twoeQl1o_ a tremendous amount otadQitiona1 informati(i)n bec~ bullbull svsilable ing it possible to rect1tTthe matl7errorsotoadse~onandQomad sion in the original Map coverage hasaJso been expanded anA ~ proved
The rewriting and editing of the revised monograph was acooe- plish~ by the Foreign HistoriesDivisionOftice ottheMil1tlrf History Officer Headquarters UnitedStates~Japansucceaeor to the orlgtnal editing agency Research and eompilationof data for the revised edition was performed byformer Lt ColM lwata1 now a Senior Military Operational Analyst wttht~eForeign Hi~middot ries Division
30 April 1958
vi
bull bull bull bullbull
bull bull
bull bull
Chapter
1 THE HA-GCgt OPERATION bull bull bull bull middot ~ 1
TABtEOF CONTmfrS
Pa8e
Situat1Ol1lnLate 194 bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 1
The U-Go (Imphal) Qpera~~~aaMed bull bull ~ bullbull 2
Ha-Go Operat~onmiddotP1s Activation of the 28th ~
Dispositionot2athmiddotAJltt3Urnt~-
Early 1944 bull bullbull bull bull bullbull 10
Task ForceOrganizatiotl bull bull bull bullbullbull l
BritishOftens~ve -Jarula17144 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 15
Ha-ao OlratiQl1 Cbtders~ bull bull bull bull bullbull 15
The NorthernArakan OperatlDa- Fretae bull bull 17
Southward Drive of the sakurai uint bull 20
Doi Unit Northward 1J1overnent 22
Division Reserve ComrrJtted bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 22
Attacks on Sinzweya middot bull bull bull 23
The orrensive Halted middot bull bull 24
middot bull bull
Enemy Reinforcements bull bull bull bull bull 26
The Northern Arakan Operation -second Phase Z7
Tactical Blunders bullbull 2
Withdravlal tromSinzweya bull bull bullbull bull 26
Defense Dispositions bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 29
British Offensive -March 3944 bull bull 5J
Chal1r
1
British Attack on Kal8danmiddotVaUeybullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull
Reintorcementstor the KaJadan Ftont
Co Wlterattacks by the Koba Detachment bull bull bull bull
Troop Disposition -lay 19M bull bull bull
Line of Conmunications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Signal Communications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
2 THE KAN OPEEATION NUMBER ONE bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Situation in Mid 1944bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull 47
New 28th Arms Mission bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Task Force Organization and Missions bull bull bullbull SO
Regrouping bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull S2
bullbullbull Chapter
2 Burma Area A1Dyen CQlUDll1d~tt bull bull bull 53
Imper1al General Headqwatera Db-ectlve 53
Operational InstNCtlonsb1 the Bqrma ~bullA1ftJt bull 55
28th A1JfJY Final Karl Operation Plaitbullbullbullbullbullbull J1
Operational Po11Qf bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull S8
Planning formiddot the KanmiddotOpe ration bull bull bull __ bull bull bull bullbull 56
Operations Coatfol bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 58
Loss ot Air Support bull bull bull bull bull jI bull bull bullbull bull 61bull
Operations of the Sakura Detachmentbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 61shy
Britilh OffenI - Nov_bel 1914 bull bull 64
Reinto rcernent ot the Ka1aclanArea bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Withdrawal of the Sakura Detampchttent bullbullbullbull 6
Road Const ruction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Final Preparations tor the KIA Operat1oa bullbullbullbullbull 66
Fortification Construction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 66
Communicationa bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 68
Ordnance Matenel bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 69
Training bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 70
Start of the Kan Operation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
54th Div1s1Qt1 Operations P1aA bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
Abandonment or the Alqab-lf1OhaungmiddotAreit bull bull bull 74
Fighting 111 the Upbon Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 75
C IDss of RamreeIsland bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
2 Start of the KaD Operation (Conttcl)
Action in the Kangaw Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 78
pepoundense ot the Tamancm-An Sectorbullbullbull ~ 79II bullbullbullbullbull
~
New 54th Division Plan bull ~II 81bullbull
Continued British Attaekamiddot ~ bullbullbullbull S3II
The Counterottensiva F1rstPbasemiddotmiddot bull bull bull bull bull 84
The CoWlteroffensive -Second Phase bull bull bull bull bull 84
Fighting in the Taungup Sector bullbullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull _ 86
THE KAN OPERATION NUMBER lWO bull bull 91II bull bull bull bullbullbull bull bullbullbull
The Northeast Sector __ II bull _ 91II bull bull
Activation ot the 72d 1ixedBrigade bull bull bull 91 II bull
Defense Construet1on bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull It bull 92bull
81tuation in Early 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _ 94II bull
Operations on the Irrawad~Front bull bullbull _ 95
Orders for Kan Operation No2 bull bull bull bull bull bull 97
The Kantetsu Group orrens1ve bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 99
General 8ituation - March II bull bull bull bull bull 100
II bull bull bull bull bull II bullCoW1terattacks in the Mt Popa Area 101
Transfers Regroupings and New wsslons bull bull bull bull bull bull 102
II II bull bull bull bull bullbull bullRevolt of the Burma National Army lev Withdrawal or the 28th Army to AU~ bull bull bullbull bull bull lOS
Delensa Concept of the 28th Artrr1 ~ bullbull bull II bull 105 bull
x
bull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull
bull bull bull bull bull
Cbaptel
3e Withdrawal Of1he 2Sth Amt W AlJ(CoAt1tt)
Withdrawal t~ tile ZIT_abullbullJlOa~
TheSh1al Poreeat Al1anmJcgt bull bull no
W1thdrawalot the S1+tb DlV1alotl trcgtJa An to Kama bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~
The Fall of Rangoon bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot113
Log1stacs in the XenOperat1on
Stockpiling andmiddot Storage bull bull bullbull bull middot ~ bullbull 117
Transportation bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull us Medical bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbull l22
THE UAI OPEBATION bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullmiddot123~
AdV8ftce Planningmiddotbullbullbull ~123
Decision to Withdraw to the ~__bullbullbull Mal Operaticnmiddot Planbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 124II bull bull bull bull
Final Plans Del81ed bull bull bull bull bull bull bull JZ1
Mamp1 Operation rLrst Phase bullbullbullbullbullbull II 127bull bull bull It bull
Concentration ot theAxm Headqua~er8 Group bull bull bullbullbullbullbull bullbull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull bull 129middot
Movement ot Rear semceUn1ts bullbull bull bull 131
Concentration of the ShimbuQroup bull 131
Irrawaddy RLverCroBEdng 01 the 5lIth Division bull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull II bull bull bull 12bull
54th Division Withdrawal 1raquo middotmiddotPukkaW1g bull bull bull bull 134
Fighting in the Paukkaung Sector bullbullbullbullbullbull bull 337
bull bull bull
Chapter
M81 Operation First Pha$e (Conttd)
lVithdrawalt~mfaukkaungto the pegu EtMgebullbull J41
Concentration ot the KanjoForce lt bullbullbull l43cbullbullbull
Withdrawal or the 72d JAixed Brigade (Ksntetsu Group) bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull l44
Progress of the Kan-i Group bull bull bull bull bullbull bull 145
J4a1 Operation - Second Phase bull bull bull bullbull bullbullbull 1441
Raiding Operationsmiddot ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 145
Decision to WithdraW the 28th Amy to Tenasserim bull bull bull 41 41 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Mai Operation - Third Phase bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbullbullbull J47
Situation in June-J~y 1945 bull bull bullbull bull bull bull us41
Qperational Policy bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 149
Movement of the eft Column bullbullbullbull ~ bullbullbullbull 161
eros sing the Kun River bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 41 bull 164
Crossing of the Sittang River bull bullbull bull bull 41 bull 167
Preparations for the Breakthroughbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 152
Strength and Disposition of Forcesmiddot bullbullbullbullbullbull 156
The A1my Headquarters Breakthrough Operation bull bull bull 161
Movement Across the Mandalay Road 41 bullbullbullbull 166
bull
Breakthrough by the Right and central Columns bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 168
Plans and PrePl rations bull bull bullbullbull 169 middot
Movement of the 54th Division bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 169
bull bull
bull bullbull bullbullbull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
Uovement 0middot the S4thD1ri4oa(OOrtbiltI)
Breakthrough by the KObaPorct
Movement of theSb1mbu GlOup bull bull 111
Withdrawal of the KaniGrcup bull bull bull bull bull 119
Mal Operation - Fourth Phase bull bull o bullbull bull bull bullbullbull 181
Re-establishment of 28th AtqContrtgtl bull bull it 181
The Movement Toward BU1n bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bullbull 18l
Communications andLOSlsticslAthe ted Operation bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bullbull
TeleCOlDmicat1Dns bull bull bull bull Suppliesbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull 184
Casualty Evacuation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull lSSIgt bull
ERMINATION OF THE V1AR bull bull bull bull bull 51tuation in Late Septemb~r ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 195 bull
B SONG BREAKfHROtnH HENlICf bullbull bull bull bull bull
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
Foreword
This record was compiled b7 the formerstatfott1~erotmiddotthe 28th Army ex-Col Aiichi Ckamura during middoth1s 1nte~t 111 Burma afterthe termination of the war an~wasI-eViewedb7ex-tt Genbull
Shozo Sakurai~ former cOJIJJl18nder o the28thAnnyeA[terthereshycord was received by-the Informatiollmiddot and HistQrica1 RecordDiV1shynon Japanese Demobilization Bureau 1twasltsJpjectt9somecorshyrection by ex-Maj Nizo Yamaguchi former staffQfficeriofthe Southern Area ArIIr3 andpres$ntlyamember ofthegt $1)ove-tll$ntionedDivision
This record is based on the documents which were available at the former Army headquarters just atter tbetermination of the war and on the recollection of former staffofficersoithe 28th ArIrr3 ex-Ltmiddot Col Eiichi Tsuchiya exMajors Masakatsu Okudaira TatsurU Yamaguchi and all f ormar depar1mentehieisltgtf the Army headquarliers and commanders of units under the command or the Army
29 August 1952
Revised Edition
Many former officers or the Japanese 28th ArllfJ1 were of a_st ance to the Foreign Histories Division in filling in the gaps and correcting the inaccuracies in the original manuscript We acknOld edge our indebtedness and express our thanks to the following
Lt Gen Hanaya Commanding General 55th Division Maj Gen Roba COlI1l1Wldipg General 54th Infantry-Group Maj Gen Yamamoto Commanding General 72d Mixed Brigade Col Kawamura Chief of Start 55th Division Col Furuya Commanding Officer lJ2th Inrantry- Regiment Col Yoshida Commanding Officer l44th InfantryRegiment Lt Col Saito Starf Officer 54th Division l~aj Tsujimoto Commanding Orficer 1st Battalion
1430 Infantry Regiment Maj Matsuo CommandingOfiicer 2d Battalion
143d Infantry Regiment Maj Kurooka Commanding Officer 3d Battalion
143d Infantry Rfitgiment Maj Yamanaka Conunanding Officer 1st Battallon
29th Infantry Regiment
iii
We are also indebted to Mr Nishiuraeh1~t otmiddotthe War H1eto- ries Section Artq StaffOollege Japanese Self Detense Foree for his assistance to this division in makLngottieial records availa ble in particular The emQries of LtGenSakurlaquo1(CG 28th Jrma) Diary 01 Maj Gen Sakurai (CG 55th Infant 17 GrOtp) Operashytions Report of the 28th Army bl Lt bullbull cot 1sucbi3a and Maj Pukutom1 (Stat Officers of the 2Sth Army) and the Operations Report of the 54th Division Casualty lists were furnished by the 1st Demobilis tion Bureau of the Ministry of Public Welfare
30 April 1958
iv
Through Instructions No 126 bullto the lapaneseGovernment 12 October 1945 subject Institution tor Wer~cordsInvest1gat1ontI steps were initiated to exploit m1J1tarrhist0ricalrecorQ and official reports of the Japanese War MUttstryandJapaneseGeMral Staft Upon dissolution oithe lVarMinist7antithe)Jap~seGftn eral Stait and the transfer or their formerfunctopsto theD$shymobilization Bureau researCh atldcompilati011 continue1 anctdevelshyoped into a series of bistorical Jl1()nograplus
The paucity or original bull orders plans aJyenlcenttJ~SIwbicn are normaJly essential in thepreparat1onsottbis type ltgtfrecord most of which were lost or destr07eQ Qun11$ field operation=s 01- bombing raids rendered the taskotompilat1onmostdtfti~tj181- tioularly distressing has beenth~eompletelaCk ot Oftic1alstrength reports normal in AG or G3 records Rowever whLle manfot the important orders plans and e$timates have bullbull been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually-identical witb the originals they are believed to be generally accurate am reI1a~le
Under the supervision of the Demobilization Bureau thebasLc material contained in this monograph was compilelttand written in Japanese by former officers on dutyiA command and staft units within major units during the period otoperat1ons Translation was effected through thetacilitiesof~edTransJatorandIntr shypreters Service G2 General Headquarters iar ~astCornmand
This Japanese Operational Monograph was rewritten in English by the Japanese Research Division 1w1ilitary Hlstory SectionGenshyeral Headquarters Far East Command and is based on the trana1ation or theJ~panese original Editorial corrections were llnxitedto those necessary tor coherence and accuracy
29 August 1952
Revised Edition
This monograph origtnaUT editedin Augu5t 1952 Ifbullbull eocnpJEtte ly revised in 1958 Theorlginal edition vmich was (ievft1Dpecl trom fragmentary records and recollections tailed to presentmiddot the various operations in proper relationship to each other_This lack of co- besion made it virtuallT impossible to gain an understanding of th~
v
over-all operational situationin Burmabull middot1)uringtmiddothetive ant ~ half years that elapsedbetween ~f) bullbull pt1bl1cation~tthe twoeQl1o_ a tremendous amount otadQitiona1 informati(i)n bec~ bullbull svsilable ing it possible to rect1tTthe matl7errorsotoadse~onandQomad sion in the original Map coverage hasaJso been expanded anA ~ proved
The rewriting and editing of the revised monograph was acooe- plish~ by the Foreign HistoriesDivisionOftice ottheMil1tlrf History Officer Headquarters UnitedStates~Japansucceaeor to the orlgtnal editing agency Research and eompilationof data for the revised edition was performed byformer Lt ColM lwata1 now a Senior Military Operational Analyst wttht~eForeign Hi~middot ries Division
30 April 1958
vi
bull bull bull bullbull
bull bull
bull bull
Chapter
1 THE HA-GCgt OPERATION bull bull bull bull middot ~ 1
TABtEOF CONTmfrS
Pa8e
Situat1Ol1lnLate 194 bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 1
The U-Go (Imphal) Qpera~~~aaMed bull bull ~ bullbull 2
Ha-Go Operat~onmiddotP1s Activation of the 28th ~
Dispositionot2athmiddotAJltt3Urnt~-
Early 1944 bull bullbull bull bull bullbull 10
Task ForceOrganizatiotl bull bull bull bullbullbull l
BritishOftens~ve -Jarula17144 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 15
Ha-ao OlratiQl1 Cbtders~ bull bull bull bull bullbull 15
The NorthernArakan OperatlDa- Fretae bull bull 17
Southward Drive of the sakurai uint bull 20
Doi Unit Northward 1J1overnent 22
Division Reserve ComrrJtted bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 22
Attacks on Sinzweya middot bull bull bull 23
The orrensive Halted middot bull bull 24
middot bull bull
Enemy Reinforcements bull bull bull bull bull 26
The Northern Arakan Operation -second Phase Z7
Tactical Blunders bullbull 2
Withdravlal tromSinzweya bull bull bullbull bull 26
Defense Dispositions bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 29
British Offensive -March 3944 bull bull 5J
Chal1r
1
British Attack on Kal8danmiddotVaUeybullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull
Reintorcementstor the KaJadan Ftont
Co Wlterattacks by the Koba Detachment bull bull bull bull
Troop Disposition -lay 19M bull bull bull
Line of Conmunications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Signal Communications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
2 THE KAN OPEEATION NUMBER ONE bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Situation in Mid 1944bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull 47
New 28th Arms Mission bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Task Force Organization and Missions bull bull bullbull SO
Regrouping bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull S2
bullbullbull Chapter
2 Burma Area A1Dyen CQlUDll1d~tt bull bull bull 53
Imper1al General Headqwatera Db-ectlve 53
Operational InstNCtlonsb1 the Bqrma ~bullA1ftJt bull 55
28th A1JfJY Final Karl Operation Plaitbullbullbullbullbullbull J1
Operational Po11Qf bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull S8
Planning formiddot the KanmiddotOpe ration bull bull bull __ bull bull bull bullbull 56
Operations Coatfol bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 58
Loss ot Air Support bull bull bull bull bull jI bull bull bullbull bull 61bull
Operations of the Sakura Detachmentbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 61shy
Britilh OffenI - Nov_bel 1914 bull bull 64
Reinto rcernent ot the Ka1aclanArea bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Withdrawal of the Sakura Detampchttent bullbullbullbull 6
Road Const ruction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Final Preparations tor the KIA Operat1oa bullbullbullbullbull 66
Fortification Construction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 66
Communicationa bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 68
Ordnance Matenel bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 69
Training bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 70
Start of the Kan Operation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
54th Div1s1Qt1 Operations P1aA bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
Abandonment or the Alqab-lf1OhaungmiddotAreit bull bull bull 74
Fighting 111 the Upbon Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 75
C IDss of RamreeIsland bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
2 Start of the KaD Operation (Conttcl)
Action in the Kangaw Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 78
pepoundense ot the Tamancm-An Sectorbullbullbull ~ 79II bullbullbullbullbull
~
New 54th Division Plan bull ~II 81bullbull
Continued British Attaekamiddot ~ bullbullbullbull S3II
The Counterottensiva F1rstPbasemiddotmiddot bull bull bull bull bull 84
The CoWlteroffensive -Second Phase bull bull bull bull bull 84
Fighting in the Taungup Sector bullbullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull _ 86
THE KAN OPERATION NUMBER lWO bull bull 91II bull bull bull bullbullbull bull bullbullbull
The Northeast Sector __ II bull _ 91II bull bull
Activation ot the 72d 1ixedBrigade bull bull bull 91 II bull
Defense Construet1on bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull It bull 92bull
81tuation in Early 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _ 94II bull
Operations on the Irrawad~Front bull bullbull _ 95
Orders for Kan Operation No2 bull bull bull bull bull bull 97
The Kantetsu Group orrens1ve bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 99
General 8ituation - March II bull bull bull bull bull 100
II bull bull bull bull bull II bullCoW1terattacks in the Mt Popa Area 101
Transfers Regroupings and New wsslons bull bull bull bull bull bull 102
II II bull bull bull bull bullbull bullRevolt of the Burma National Army lev Withdrawal or the 28th Army to AU~ bull bull bullbull bull bull lOS
Delensa Concept of the 28th Artrr1 ~ bullbull bull II bull 105 bull
x
bull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull
bull bull bull bull bull
Cbaptel
3e Withdrawal Of1he 2Sth Amt W AlJ(CoAt1tt)
Withdrawal t~ tile ZIT_abullbullJlOa~
TheSh1al Poreeat Al1anmJcgt bull bull no
W1thdrawalot the S1+tb DlV1alotl trcgtJa An to Kama bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~
The Fall of Rangoon bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot113
Log1stacs in the XenOperat1on
Stockpiling andmiddot Storage bull bull bullbull bull middot ~ bullbull 117
Transportation bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull us Medical bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbull l22
THE UAI OPEBATION bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullmiddot123~
AdV8ftce Planningmiddotbullbullbull ~123
Decision to Withdraw to the ~__bullbullbull Mal Operaticnmiddot Planbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 124II bull bull bull bull
Final Plans Del81ed bull bull bull bull bull bull bull JZ1
Mamp1 Operation rLrst Phase bullbullbullbullbullbull II 127bull bull bull It bull
Concentration ot theAxm Headqua~er8 Group bull bull bullbullbullbullbull bullbull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull bull 129middot
Movement ot Rear semceUn1ts bullbull bull bull 131
Concentration of the ShimbuQroup bull 131
Irrawaddy RLverCroBEdng 01 the 5lIth Division bull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull II bull bull bull 12bull
54th Division Withdrawal 1raquo middotmiddotPukkaW1g bull bull bull bull 134
Fighting in the Paukkaung Sector bullbullbullbullbullbull bull 337
bull bull bull
Chapter
M81 Operation First Pha$e (Conttd)
lVithdrawalt~mfaukkaungto the pegu EtMgebullbull J41
Concentration ot the KanjoForce lt bullbullbull l43cbullbullbull
Withdrawal or the 72d JAixed Brigade (Ksntetsu Group) bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull l44
Progress of the Kan-i Group bull bull bull bull bullbull bull 145
J4a1 Operation - Second Phase bull bull bull bullbull bullbullbull 1441
Raiding Operationsmiddot ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 145
Decision to WithdraW the 28th Amy to Tenasserim bull bull bull 41 41 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Mai Operation - Third Phase bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbullbullbull J47
Situation in June-J~y 1945 bull bull bullbull bull bull bull us41
Qperational Policy bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 149
Movement of the eft Column bullbullbullbull ~ bullbullbullbull 161
eros sing the Kun River bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 41 bull 164
Crossing of the Sittang River bull bullbull bull bull 41 bull 167
Preparations for the Breakthroughbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 152
Strength and Disposition of Forcesmiddot bullbullbullbullbullbull 156
The A1my Headquarters Breakthrough Operation bull bull bull 161
Movement Across the Mandalay Road 41 bullbullbullbull 166
bull
Breakthrough by the Right and central Columns bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 168
Plans and PrePl rations bull bull bullbullbull 169 middot
Movement of the 54th Division bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 169
bull bull
bull bullbull bullbullbull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
Uovement 0middot the S4thD1ri4oa(OOrtbiltI)
Breakthrough by the KObaPorct
Movement of theSb1mbu GlOup bull bull 111
Withdrawal of the KaniGrcup bull bull bull bull bull 119
Mal Operation - Fourth Phase bull bull o bullbull bull bull bullbullbull 181
Re-establishment of 28th AtqContrtgtl bull bull it 181
The Movement Toward BU1n bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bullbull 18l
Communications andLOSlsticslAthe ted Operation bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bullbull
TeleCOlDmicat1Dns bull bull bull bull Suppliesbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull 184
Casualty Evacuation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull lSSIgt bull
ERMINATION OF THE V1AR bull bull bull bull bull 51tuation in Late Septemb~r ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 195 bull
B SONG BREAKfHROtnH HENlICf bullbull bull bull bull bull
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
We are also indebted to Mr Nishiuraeh1~t otmiddotthe War H1eto- ries Section Artq StaffOollege Japanese Self Detense Foree for his assistance to this division in makLngottieial records availa ble in particular The emQries of LtGenSakurlaquo1(CG 28th Jrma) Diary 01 Maj Gen Sakurai (CG 55th Infant 17 GrOtp) Operashytions Report of the 28th Army bl Lt bullbull cot 1sucbi3a and Maj Pukutom1 (Stat Officers of the 2Sth Army) and the Operations Report of the 54th Division Casualty lists were furnished by the 1st Demobilis tion Bureau of the Ministry of Public Welfare
30 April 1958
iv
Through Instructions No 126 bullto the lapaneseGovernment 12 October 1945 subject Institution tor Wer~cordsInvest1gat1ontI steps were initiated to exploit m1J1tarrhist0ricalrecorQ and official reports of the Japanese War MUttstryandJapaneseGeMral Staft Upon dissolution oithe lVarMinist7antithe)Jap~seGftn eral Stait and the transfer or their formerfunctopsto theD$shymobilization Bureau researCh atldcompilati011 continue1 anctdevelshyoped into a series of bistorical Jl1()nograplus
The paucity or original bull orders plans aJyenlcenttJ~SIwbicn are normaJly essential in thepreparat1onsottbis type ltgtfrecord most of which were lost or destr07eQ Qun11$ field operation=s 01- bombing raids rendered the taskotompilat1onmostdtfti~tj181- tioularly distressing has beenth~eompletelaCk ot Oftic1alstrength reports normal in AG or G3 records Rowever whLle manfot the important orders plans and e$timates have bullbull been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually-identical witb the originals they are believed to be generally accurate am reI1a~le
Under the supervision of the Demobilization Bureau thebasLc material contained in this monograph was compilelttand written in Japanese by former officers on dutyiA command and staft units within major units during the period otoperat1ons Translation was effected through thetacilitiesof~edTransJatorandIntr shypreters Service G2 General Headquarters iar ~astCornmand
This Japanese Operational Monograph was rewritten in English by the Japanese Research Division 1w1ilitary Hlstory SectionGenshyeral Headquarters Far East Command and is based on the trana1ation or theJ~panese original Editorial corrections were llnxitedto those necessary tor coherence and accuracy
29 August 1952
Revised Edition
This monograph origtnaUT editedin Augu5t 1952 Ifbullbull eocnpJEtte ly revised in 1958 Theorlginal edition vmich was (ievft1Dpecl trom fragmentary records and recollections tailed to presentmiddot the various operations in proper relationship to each other_This lack of co- besion made it virtuallT impossible to gain an understanding of th~
v
over-all operational situationin Burmabull middot1)uringtmiddothetive ant ~ half years that elapsedbetween ~f) bullbull pt1bl1cation~tthe twoeQl1o_ a tremendous amount otadQitiona1 informati(i)n bec~ bullbull svsilable ing it possible to rect1tTthe matl7errorsotoadse~onandQomad sion in the original Map coverage hasaJso been expanded anA ~ proved
The rewriting and editing of the revised monograph was acooe- plish~ by the Foreign HistoriesDivisionOftice ottheMil1tlrf History Officer Headquarters UnitedStates~Japansucceaeor to the orlgtnal editing agency Research and eompilationof data for the revised edition was performed byformer Lt ColM lwata1 now a Senior Military Operational Analyst wttht~eForeign Hi~middot ries Division
30 April 1958
vi
bull bull bull bullbull
bull bull
bull bull
Chapter
1 THE HA-GCgt OPERATION bull bull bull bull middot ~ 1
TABtEOF CONTmfrS
Pa8e
Situat1Ol1lnLate 194 bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 1
The U-Go (Imphal) Qpera~~~aaMed bull bull ~ bullbull 2
Ha-Go Operat~onmiddotP1s Activation of the 28th ~
Dispositionot2athmiddotAJltt3Urnt~-
Early 1944 bull bullbull bull bull bullbull 10
Task ForceOrganizatiotl bull bull bull bullbullbull l
BritishOftens~ve -Jarula17144 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 15
Ha-ao OlratiQl1 Cbtders~ bull bull bull bull bullbull 15
The NorthernArakan OperatlDa- Fretae bull bull 17
Southward Drive of the sakurai uint bull 20
Doi Unit Northward 1J1overnent 22
Division Reserve ComrrJtted bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 22
Attacks on Sinzweya middot bull bull bull 23
The orrensive Halted middot bull bull 24
middot bull bull
Enemy Reinforcements bull bull bull bull bull 26
The Northern Arakan Operation -second Phase Z7
Tactical Blunders bullbull 2
Withdravlal tromSinzweya bull bull bullbull bull 26
Defense Dispositions bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 29
British Offensive -March 3944 bull bull 5J
Chal1r
1
British Attack on Kal8danmiddotVaUeybullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull
Reintorcementstor the KaJadan Ftont
Co Wlterattacks by the Koba Detachment bull bull bull bull
Troop Disposition -lay 19M bull bull bull
Line of Conmunications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Signal Communications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
2 THE KAN OPEEATION NUMBER ONE bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Situation in Mid 1944bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull 47
New 28th Arms Mission bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Task Force Organization and Missions bull bull bullbull SO
Regrouping bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull S2
bullbullbull Chapter
2 Burma Area A1Dyen CQlUDll1d~tt bull bull bull 53
Imper1al General Headqwatera Db-ectlve 53
Operational InstNCtlonsb1 the Bqrma ~bullA1ftJt bull 55
28th A1JfJY Final Karl Operation Plaitbullbullbullbullbullbull J1
Operational Po11Qf bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull S8
Planning formiddot the KanmiddotOpe ration bull bull bull __ bull bull bull bullbull 56
Operations Coatfol bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 58
Loss ot Air Support bull bull bull bull bull jI bull bull bullbull bull 61bull
Operations of the Sakura Detachmentbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 61shy
Britilh OffenI - Nov_bel 1914 bull bull 64
Reinto rcernent ot the Ka1aclanArea bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Withdrawal of the Sakura Detampchttent bullbullbullbull 6
Road Const ruction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Final Preparations tor the KIA Operat1oa bullbullbullbullbull 66
Fortification Construction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 66
Communicationa bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 68
Ordnance Matenel bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 69
Training bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 70
Start of the Kan Operation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
54th Div1s1Qt1 Operations P1aA bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
Abandonment or the Alqab-lf1OhaungmiddotAreit bull bull bull 74
Fighting 111 the Upbon Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 75
C IDss of RamreeIsland bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
2 Start of the KaD Operation (Conttcl)
Action in the Kangaw Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 78
pepoundense ot the Tamancm-An Sectorbullbullbull ~ 79II bullbullbullbullbull
~
New 54th Division Plan bull ~II 81bullbull
Continued British Attaekamiddot ~ bullbullbullbull S3II
The Counterottensiva F1rstPbasemiddotmiddot bull bull bull bull bull 84
The CoWlteroffensive -Second Phase bull bull bull bull bull 84
Fighting in the Taungup Sector bullbullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull _ 86
THE KAN OPERATION NUMBER lWO bull bull 91II bull bull bull bullbullbull bull bullbullbull
The Northeast Sector __ II bull _ 91II bull bull
Activation ot the 72d 1ixedBrigade bull bull bull 91 II bull
Defense Construet1on bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull It bull 92bull
81tuation in Early 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _ 94II bull
Operations on the Irrawad~Front bull bullbull _ 95
Orders for Kan Operation No2 bull bull bull bull bull bull 97
The Kantetsu Group orrens1ve bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 99
General 8ituation - March II bull bull bull bull bull 100
II bull bull bull bull bull II bullCoW1terattacks in the Mt Popa Area 101
Transfers Regroupings and New wsslons bull bull bull bull bull bull 102
II II bull bull bull bull bullbull bullRevolt of the Burma National Army lev Withdrawal or the 28th Army to AU~ bull bull bullbull bull bull lOS
Delensa Concept of the 28th Artrr1 ~ bullbull bull II bull 105 bull
x
bull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull
bull bull bull bull bull
Cbaptel
3e Withdrawal Of1he 2Sth Amt W AlJ(CoAt1tt)
Withdrawal t~ tile ZIT_abullbullJlOa~
TheSh1al Poreeat Al1anmJcgt bull bull no
W1thdrawalot the S1+tb DlV1alotl trcgtJa An to Kama bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~
The Fall of Rangoon bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot113
Log1stacs in the XenOperat1on
Stockpiling andmiddot Storage bull bull bullbull bull middot ~ bullbull 117
Transportation bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull us Medical bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbull l22
THE UAI OPEBATION bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullmiddot123~
AdV8ftce Planningmiddotbullbullbull ~123
Decision to Withdraw to the ~__bullbullbull Mal Operaticnmiddot Planbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 124II bull bull bull bull
Final Plans Del81ed bull bull bull bull bull bull bull JZ1
Mamp1 Operation rLrst Phase bullbullbullbullbullbull II 127bull bull bull It bull
Concentration ot theAxm Headqua~er8 Group bull bull bullbullbullbullbull bullbull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull bull 129middot
Movement ot Rear semceUn1ts bullbull bull bull 131
Concentration of the ShimbuQroup bull 131
Irrawaddy RLverCroBEdng 01 the 5lIth Division bull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull II bull bull bull 12bull
54th Division Withdrawal 1raquo middotmiddotPukkaW1g bull bull bull bull 134
Fighting in the Paukkaung Sector bullbullbullbullbullbull bull 337
bull bull bull
Chapter
M81 Operation First Pha$e (Conttd)
lVithdrawalt~mfaukkaungto the pegu EtMgebullbull J41
Concentration ot the KanjoForce lt bullbullbull l43cbullbullbull
Withdrawal or the 72d JAixed Brigade (Ksntetsu Group) bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull l44
Progress of the Kan-i Group bull bull bull bull bullbull bull 145
J4a1 Operation - Second Phase bull bull bull bullbull bullbullbull 1441
Raiding Operationsmiddot ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 145
Decision to WithdraW the 28th Amy to Tenasserim bull bull bull 41 41 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Mai Operation - Third Phase bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbullbullbull J47
Situation in June-J~y 1945 bull bull bullbull bull bull bull us41
Qperational Policy bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 149
Movement of the eft Column bullbullbullbull ~ bullbullbullbull 161
eros sing the Kun River bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 41 bull 164
Crossing of the Sittang River bull bullbull bull bull 41 bull 167
Preparations for the Breakthroughbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 152
Strength and Disposition of Forcesmiddot bullbullbullbullbullbull 156
The A1my Headquarters Breakthrough Operation bull bull bull 161
Movement Across the Mandalay Road 41 bullbullbullbull 166
bull
Breakthrough by the Right and central Columns bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 168
Plans and PrePl rations bull bull bullbullbull 169 middot
Movement of the 54th Division bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 169
bull bull
bull bullbull bullbullbull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
Uovement 0middot the S4thD1ri4oa(OOrtbiltI)
Breakthrough by the KObaPorct
Movement of theSb1mbu GlOup bull bull 111
Withdrawal of the KaniGrcup bull bull bull bull bull 119
Mal Operation - Fourth Phase bull bull o bullbull bull bull bullbullbull 181
Re-establishment of 28th AtqContrtgtl bull bull it 181
The Movement Toward BU1n bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bullbull 18l
Communications andLOSlsticslAthe ted Operation bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bullbull
TeleCOlDmicat1Dns bull bull bull bull Suppliesbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull 184
Casualty Evacuation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull lSSIgt bull
ERMINATION OF THE V1AR bull bull bull bull bull 51tuation in Late Septemb~r ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 195 bull
B SONG BREAKfHROtnH HENlICf bullbull bull bull bull bull
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
Through Instructions No 126 bullto the lapaneseGovernment 12 October 1945 subject Institution tor Wer~cordsInvest1gat1ontI steps were initiated to exploit m1J1tarrhist0ricalrecorQ and official reports of the Japanese War MUttstryandJapaneseGeMral Staft Upon dissolution oithe lVarMinist7antithe)Jap~seGftn eral Stait and the transfer or their formerfunctopsto theD$shymobilization Bureau researCh atldcompilati011 continue1 anctdevelshyoped into a series of bistorical Jl1()nograplus
The paucity or original bull orders plans aJyenlcenttJ~SIwbicn are normaJly essential in thepreparat1onsottbis type ltgtfrecord most of which were lost or destr07eQ Qun11$ field operation=s 01- bombing raids rendered the taskotompilat1onmostdtfti~tj181- tioularly distressing has beenth~eompletelaCk ot Oftic1alstrength reports normal in AG or G3 records Rowever whLle manfot the important orders plans and e$timates have bullbull been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually-identical witb the originals they are believed to be generally accurate am reI1a~le
Under the supervision of the Demobilization Bureau thebasLc material contained in this monograph was compilelttand written in Japanese by former officers on dutyiA command and staft units within major units during the period otoperat1ons Translation was effected through thetacilitiesof~edTransJatorandIntr shypreters Service G2 General Headquarters iar ~astCornmand
This Japanese Operational Monograph was rewritten in English by the Japanese Research Division 1w1ilitary Hlstory SectionGenshyeral Headquarters Far East Command and is based on the trana1ation or theJ~panese original Editorial corrections were llnxitedto those necessary tor coherence and accuracy
29 August 1952
Revised Edition
This monograph origtnaUT editedin Augu5t 1952 Ifbullbull eocnpJEtte ly revised in 1958 Theorlginal edition vmich was (ievft1Dpecl trom fragmentary records and recollections tailed to presentmiddot the various operations in proper relationship to each other_This lack of co- besion made it virtuallT impossible to gain an understanding of th~
v
over-all operational situationin Burmabull middot1)uringtmiddothetive ant ~ half years that elapsedbetween ~f) bullbull pt1bl1cation~tthe twoeQl1o_ a tremendous amount otadQitiona1 informati(i)n bec~ bullbull svsilable ing it possible to rect1tTthe matl7errorsotoadse~onandQomad sion in the original Map coverage hasaJso been expanded anA ~ proved
The rewriting and editing of the revised monograph was acooe- plish~ by the Foreign HistoriesDivisionOftice ottheMil1tlrf History Officer Headquarters UnitedStates~Japansucceaeor to the orlgtnal editing agency Research and eompilationof data for the revised edition was performed byformer Lt ColM lwata1 now a Senior Military Operational Analyst wttht~eForeign Hi~middot ries Division
30 April 1958
vi
bull bull bull bullbull
bull bull
bull bull
Chapter
1 THE HA-GCgt OPERATION bull bull bull bull middot ~ 1
TABtEOF CONTmfrS
Pa8e
Situat1Ol1lnLate 194 bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 1
The U-Go (Imphal) Qpera~~~aaMed bull bull ~ bullbull 2
Ha-Go Operat~onmiddotP1s Activation of the 28th ~
Dispositionot2athmiddotAJltt3Urnt~-
Early 1944 bull bullbull bull bull bullbull 10
Task ForceOrganizatiotl bull bull bull bullbullbull l
BritishOftens~ve -Jarula17144 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 15
Ha-ao OlratiQl1 Cbtders~ bull bull bull bull bullbull 15
The NorthernArakan OperatlDa- Fretae bull bull 17
Southward Drive of the sakurai uint bull 20
Doi Unit Northward 1J1overnent 22
Division Reserve ComrrJtted bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 22
Attacks on Sinzweya middot bull bull bull 23
The orrensive Halted middot bull bull 24
middot bull bull
Enemy Reinforcements bull bull bull bull bull 26
The Northern Arakan Operation -second Phase Z7
Tactical Blunders bullbull 2
Withdravlal tromSinzweya bull bull bullbull bull 26
Defense Dispositions bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 29
British Offensive -March 3944 bull bull 5J
Chal1r
1
British Attack on Kal8danmiddotVaUeybullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull
Reintorcementstor the KaJadan Ftont
Co Wlterattacks by the Koba Detachment bull bull bull bull
Troop Disposition -lay 19M bull bull bull
Line of Conmunications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Signal Communications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
2 THE KAN OPEEATION NUMBER ONE bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Situation in Mid 1944bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull 47
New 28th Arms Mission bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Task Force Organization and Missions bull bull bullbull SO
Regrouping bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull S2
bullbullbull Chapter
2 Burma Area A1Dyen CQlUDll1d~tt bull bull bull 53
Imper1al General Headqwatera Db-ectlve 53
Operational InstNCtlonsb1 the Bqrma ~bullA1ftJt bull 55
28th A1JfJY Final Karl Operation Plaitbullbullbullbullbullbull J1
Operational Po11Qf bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull S8
Planning formiddot the KanmiddotOpe ration bull bull bull __ bull bull bull bullbull 56
Operations Coatfol bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 58
Loss ot Air Support bull bull bull bull bull jI bull bull bullbull bull 61bull
Operations of the Sakura Detachmentbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 61shy
Britilh OffenI - Nov_bel 1914 bull bull 64
Reinto rcernent ot the Ka1aclanArea bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Withdrawal of the Sakura Detampchttent bullbullbullbull 6
Road Const ruction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Final Preparations tor the KIA Operat1oa bullbullbullbullbull 66
Fortification Construction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 66
Communicationa bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 68
Ordnance Matenel bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 69
Training bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 70
Start of the Kan Operation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
54th Div1s1Qt1 Operations P1aA bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
Abandonment or the Alqab-lf1OhaungmiddotAreit bull bull bull 74
Fighting 111 the Upbon Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 75
C IDss of RamreeIsland bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
2 Start of the KaD Operation (Conttcl)
Action in the Kangaw Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 78
pepoundense ot the Tamancm-An Sectorbullbullbull ~ 79II bullbullbullbullbull
~
New 54th Division Plan bull ~II 81bullbull
Continued British Attaekamiddot ~ bullbullbullbull S3II
The Counterottensiva F1rstPbasemiddotmiddot bull bull bull bull bull 84
The CoWlteroffensive -Second Phase bull bull bull bull bull 84
Fighting in the Taungup Sector bullbullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull _ 86
THE KAN OPERATION NUMBER lWO bull bull 91II bull bull bull bullbullbull bull bullbullbull
The Northeast Sector __ II bull _ 91II bull bull
Activation ot the 72d 1ixedBrigade bull bull bull 91 II bull
Defense Construet1on bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull It bull 92bull
81tuation in Early 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _ 94II bull
Operations on the Irrawad~Front bull bullbull _ 95
Orders for Kan Operation No2 bull bull bull bull bull bull 97
The Kantetsu Group orrens1ve bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 99
General 8ituation - March II bull bull bull bull bull 100
II bull bull bull bull bull II bullCoW1terattacks in the Mt Popa Area 101
Transfers Regroupings and New wsslons bull bull bull bull bull bull 102
II II bull bull bull bull bullbull bullRevolt of the Burma National Army lev Withdrawal or the 28th Army to AU~ bull bull bullbull bull bull lOS
Delensa Concept of the 28th Artrr1 ~ bullbull bull II bull 105 bull
x
bull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull
bull bull bull bull bull
Cbaptel
3e Withdrawal Of1he 2Sth Amt W AlJ(CoAt1tt)
Withdrawal t~ tile ZIT_abullbullJlOa~
TheSh1al Poreeat Al1anmJcgt bull bull no
W1thdrawalot the S1+tb DlV1alotl trcgtJa An to Kama bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~
The Fall of Rangoon bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot113
Log1stacs in the XenOperat1on
Stockpiling andmiddot Storage bull bull bullbull bull middot ~ bullbull 117
Transportation bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull us Medical bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbull l22
THE UAI OPEBATION bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullmiddot123~
AdV8ftce Planningmiddotbullbullbull ~123
Decision to Withdraw to the ~__bullbullbull Mal Operaticnmiddot Planbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 124II bull bull bull bull
Final Plans Del81ed bull bull bull bull bull bull bull JZ1
Mamp1 Operation rLrst Phase bullbullbullbullbullbull II 127bull bull bull It bull
Concentration ot theAxm Headqua~er8 Group bull bull bullbullbullbullbull bullbull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull bull 129middot
Movement ot Rear semceUn1ts bullbull bull bull 131
Concentration of the ShimbuQroup bull 131
Irrawaddy RLverCroBEdng 01 the 5lIth Division bull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull II bull bull bull 12bull
54th Division Withdrawal 1raquo middotmiddotPukkaW1g bull bull bull bull 134
Fighting in the Paukkaung Sector bullbullbullbullbullbull bull 337
bull bull bull
Chapter
M81 Operation First Pha$e (Conttd)
lVithdrawalt~mfaukkaungto the pegu EtMgebullbull J41
Concentration ot the KanjoForce lt bullbullbull l43cbullbullbull
Withdrawal or the 72d JAixed Brigade (Ksntetsu Group) bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull l44
Progress of the Kan-i Group bull bull bull bull bullbull bull 145
J4a1 Operation - Second Phase bull bull bull bullbull bullbullbull 1441
Raiding Operationsmiddot ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 145
Decision to WithdraW the 28th Amy to Tenasserim bull bull bull 41 41 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Mai Operation - Third Phase bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbullbullbull J47
Situation in June-J~y 1945 bull bull bullbull bull bull bull us41
Qperational Policy bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 149
Movement of the eft Column bullbullbullbull ~ bullbullbullbull 161
eros sing the Kun River bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 41 bull 164
Crossing of the Sittang River bull bullbull bull bull 41 bull 167
Preparations for the Breakthroughbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 152
Strength and Disposition of Forcesmiddot bullbullbullbullbullbull 156
The A1my Headquarters Breakthrough Operation bull bull bull 161
Movement Across the Mandalay Road 41 bullbullbullbull 166
bull
Breakthrough by the Right and central Columns bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 168
Plans and PrePl rations bull bull bullbullbull 169 middot
Movement of the 54th Division bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 169
bull bull
bull bullbull bullbullbull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
Uovement 0middot the S4thD1ri4oa(OOrtbiltI)
Breakthrough by the KObaPorct
Movement of theSb1mbu GlOup bull bull 111
Withdrawal of the KaniGrcup bull bull bull bull bull 119
Mal Operation - Fourth Phase bull bull o bullbull bull bull bullbullbull 181
Re-establishment of 28th AtqContrtgtl bull bull it 181
The Movement Toward BU1n bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bullbull 18l
Communications andLOSlsticslAthe ted Operation bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bullbull
TeleCOlDmicat1Dns bull bull bull bull Suppliesbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull 184
Casualty Evacuation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull lSSIgt bull
ERMINATION OF THE V1AR bull bull bull bull bull 51tuation in Late Septemb~r ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 195 bull
B SONG BREAKfHROtnH HENlICf bullbull bull bull bull bull
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
over-all operational situationin Burmabull middot1)uringtmiddothetive ant ~ half years that elapsedbetween ~f) bullbull pt1bl1cation~tthe twoeQl1o_ a tremendous amount otadQitiona1 informati(i)n bec~ bullbull svsilable ing it possible to rect1tTthe matl7errorsotoadse~onandQomad sion in the original Map coverage hasaJso been expanded anA ~ proved
The rewriting and editing of the revised monograph was acooe- plish~ by the Foreign HistoriesDivisionOftice ottheMil1tlrf History Officer Headquarters UnitedStates~Japansucceaeor to the orlgtnal editing agency Research and eompilationof data for the revised edition was performed byformer Lt ColM lwata1 now a Senior Military Operational Analyst wttht~eForeign Hi~middot ries Division
30 April 1958
vi
bull bull bull bullbull
bull bull
bull bull
Chapter
1 THE HA-GCgt OPERATION bull bull bull bull middot ~ 1
TABtEOF CONTmfrS
Pa8e
Situat1Ol1lnLate 194 bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 1
The U-Go (Imphal) Qpera~~~aaMed bull bull ~ bullbull 2
Ha-Go Operat~onmiddotP1s Activation of the 28th ~
Dispositionot2athmiddotAJltt3Urnt~-
Early 1944 bull bullbull bull bull bullbull 10
Task ForceOrganizatiotl bull bull bull bullbullbull l
BritishOftens~ve -Jarula17144 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 15
Ha-ao OlratiQl1 Cbtders~ bull bull bull bull bullbull 15
The NorthernArakan OperatlDa- Fretae bull bull 17
Southward Drive of the sakurai uint bull 20
Doi Unit Northward 1J1overnent 22
Division Reserve ComrrJtted bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 22
Attacks on Sinzweya middot bull bull bull 23
The orrensive Halted middot bull bull 24
middot bull bull
Enemy Reinforcements bull bull bull bull bull 26
The Northern Arakan Operation -second Phase Z7
Tactical Blunders bullbull 2
Withdravlal tromSinzweya bull bull bullbull bull 26
Defense Dispositions bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 29
British Offensive -March 3944 bull bull 5J
Chal1r
1
British Attack on Kal8danmiddotVaUeybullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull
Reintorcementstor the KaJadan Ftont
Co Wlterattacks by the Koba Detachment bull bull bull bull
Troop Disposition -lay 19M bull bull bull
Line of Conmunications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Signal Communications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
2 THE KAN OPEEATION NUMBER ONE bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Situation in Mid 1944bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull 47
New 28th Arms Mission bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Task Force Organization and Missions bull bull bullbull SO
Regrouping bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull S2
bullbullbull Chapter
2 Burma Area A1Dyen CQlUDll1d~tt bull bull bull 53
Imper1al General Headqwatera Db-ectlve 53
Operational InstNCtlonsb1 the Bqrma ~bullA1ftJt bull 55
28th A1JfJY Final Karl Operation Plaitbullbullbullbullbullbull J1
Operational Po11Qf bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull S8
Planning formiddot the KanmiddotOpe ration bull bull bull __ bull bull bull bullbull 56
Operations Coatfol bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 58
Loss ot Air Support bull bull bull bull bull jI bull bull bullbull bull 61bull
Operations of the Sakura Detachmentbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 61shy
Britilh OffenI - Nov_bel 1914 bull bull 64
Reinto rcernent ot the Ka1aclanArea bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Withdrawal of the Sakura Detampchttent bullbullbullbull 6
Road Const ruction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Final Preparations tor the KIA Operat1oa bullbullbullbullbull 66
Fortification Construction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 66
Communicationa bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 68
Ordnance Matenel bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 69
Training bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 70
Start of the Kan Operation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
54th Div1s1Qt1 Operations P1aA bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
Abandonment or the Alqab-lf1OhaungmiddotAreit bull bull bull 74
Fighting 111 the Upbon Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 75
C IDss of RamreeIsland bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
2 Start of the KaD Operation (Conttcl)
Action in the Kangaw Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 78
pepoundense ot the Tamancm-An Sectorbullbullbull ~ 79II bullbullbullbullbull
~
New 54th Division Plan bull ~II 81bullbull
Continued British Attaekamiddot ~ bullbullbullbull S3II
The Counterottensiva F1rstPbasemiddotmiddot bull bull bull bull bull 84
The CoWlteroffensive -Second Phase bull bull bull bull bull 84
Fighting in the Taungup Sector bullbullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull _ 86
THE KAN OPERATION NUMBER lWO bull bull 91II bull bull bull bullbullbull bull bullbullbull
The Northeast Sector __ II bull _ 91II bull bull
Activation ot the 72d 1ixedBrigade bull bull bull 91 II bull
Defense Construet1on bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull It bull 92bull
81tuation in Early 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _ 94II bull
Operations on the Irrawad~Front bull bullbull _ 95
Orders for Kan Operation No2 bull bull bull bull bull bull 97
The Kantetsu Group orrens1ve bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 99
General 8ituation - March II bull bull bull bull bull 100
II bull bull bull bull bull II bullCoW1terattacks in the Mt Popa Area 101
Transfers Regroupings and New wsslons bull bull bull bull bull bull 102
II II bull bull bull bull bullbull bullRevolt of the Burma National Army lev Withdrawal or the 28th Army to AU~ bull bull bullbull bull bull lOS
Delensa Concept of the 28th Artrr1 ~ bullbull bull II bull 105 bull
x
bull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull
bull bull bull bull bull
Cbaptel
3e Withdrawal Of1he 2Sth Amt W AlJ(CoAt1tt)
Withdrawal t~ tile ZIT_abullbullJlOa~
TheSh1al Poreeat Al1anmJcgt bull bull no
W1thdrawalot the S1+tb DlV1alotl trcgtJa An to Kama bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~
The Fall of Rangoon bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot113
Log1stacs in the XenOperat1on
Stockpiling andmiddot Storage bull bull bullbull bull middot ~ bullbull 117
Transportation bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull us Medical bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbull l22
THE UAI OPEBATION bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullmiddot123~
AdV8ftce Planningmiddotbullbullbull ~123
Decision to Withdraw to the ~__bullbullbull Mal Operaticnmiddot Planbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 124II bull bull bull bull
Final Plans Del81ed bull bull bull bull bull bull bull JZ1
Mamp1 Operation rLrst Phase bullbullbullbullbullbull II 127bull bull bull It bull
Concentration ot theAxm Headqua~er8 Group bull bull bullbullbullbullbull bullbull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull bull 129middot
Movement ot Rear semceUn1ts bullbull bull bull 131
Concentration of the ShimbuQroup bull 131
Irrawaddy RLverCroBEdng 01 the 5lIth Division bull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull II bull bull bull 12bull
54th Division Withdrawal 1raquo middotmiddotPukkaW1g bull bull bull bull 134
Fighting in the Paukkaung Sector bullbullbullbullbullbull bull 337
bull bull bull
Chapter
M81 Operation First Pha$e (Conttd)
lVithdrawalt~mfaukkaungto the pegu EtMgebullbull J41
Concentration ot the KanjoForce lt bullbullbull l43cbullbullbull
Withdrawal or the 72d JAixed Brigade (Ksntetsu Group) bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull l44
Progress of the Kan-i Group bull bull bull bull bullbull bull 145
J4a1 Operation - Second Phase bull bull bull bullbull bullbullbull 1441
Raiding Operationsmiddot ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 145
Decision to WithdraW the 28th Amy to Tenasserim bull bull bull 41 41 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Mai Operation - Third Phase bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbullbullbull J47
Situation in June-J~y 1945 bull bull bullbull bull bull bull us41
Qperational Policy bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 149
Movement of the eft Column bullbullbullbull ~ bullbullbullbull 161
eros sing the Kun River bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 41 bull 164
Crossing of the Sittang River bull bullbull bull bull 41 bull 167
Preparations for the Breakthroughbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 152
Strength and Disposition of Forcesmiddot bullbullbullbullbullbull 156
The A1my Headquarters Breakthrough Operation bull bull bull 161
Movement Across the Mandalay Road 41 bullbullbullbull 166
bull
Breakthrough by the Right and central Columns bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 168
Plans and PrePl rations bull bull bullbullbull 169 middot
Movement of the 54th Division bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 169
bull bull
bull bullbull bullbullbull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
Uovement 0middot the S4thD1ri4oa(OOrtbiltI)
Breakthrough by the KObaPorct
Movement of theSb1mbu GlOup bull bull 111
Withdrawal of the KaniGrcup bull bull bull bull bull 119
Mal Operation - Fourth Phase bull bull o bullbull bull bull bullbullbull 181
Re-establishment of 28th AtqContrtgtl bull bull it 181
The Movement Toward BU1n bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bullbull 18l
Communications andLOSlsticslAthe ted Operation bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bullbull
TeleCOlDmicat1Dns bull bull bull bull Suppliesbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull 184
Casualty Evacuation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull lSSIgt bull
ERMINATION OF THE V1AR bull bull bull bull bull 51tuation in Late Septemb~r ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 195 bull
B SONG BREAKfHROtnH HENlICf bullbull bull bull bull bull
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
bull bull bull bullbull
bull bull
bull bull
Chapter
1 THE HA-GCgt OPERATION bull bull bull bull middot ~ 1
TABtEOF CONTmfrS
Pa8e
Situat1Ol1lnLate 194 bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 1
The U-Go (Imphal) Qpera~~~aaMed bull bull ~ bullbull 2
Ha-Go Operat~onmiddotP1s Activation of the 28th ~
Dispositionot2athmiddotAJltt3Urnt~-
Early 1944 bull bullbull bull bull bullbull 10
Task ForceOrganizatiotl bull bull bull bullbullbull l
BritishOftens~ve -Jarula17144 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 15
Ha-ao OlratiQl1 Cbtders~ bull bull bull bull bullbull 15
The NorthernArakan OperatlDa- Fretae bull bull 17
Southward Drive of the sakurai uint bull 20
Doi Unit Northward 1J1overnent 22
Division Reserve ComrrJtted bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 22
Attacks on Sinzweya middot bull bull bull 23
The orrensive Halted middot bull bull 24
middot bull bull
Enemy Reinforcements bull bull bull bull bull 26
The Northern Arakan Operation -second Phase Z7
Tactical Blunders bullbull 2
Withdravlal tromSinzweya bull bull bullbull bull 26
Defense Dispositions bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 29
British Offensive -March 3944 bull bull 5J
Chal1r
1
British Attack on Kal8danmiddotVaUeybullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull
Reintorcementstor the KaJadan Ftont
Co Wlterattacks by the Koba Detachment bull bull bull bull
Troop Disposition -lay 19M bull bull bull
Line of Conmunications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Signal Communications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
2 THE KAN OPEEATION NUMBER ONE bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Situation in Mid 1944bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull 47
New 28th Arms Mission bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Task Force Organization and Missions bull bull bullbull SO
Regrouping bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull S2
bullbullbull Chapter
2 Burma Area A1Dyen CQlUDll1d~tt bull bull bull 53
Imper1al General Headqwatera Db-ectlve 53
Operational InstNCtlonsb1 the Bqrma ~bullA1ftJt bull 55
28th A1JfJY Final Karl Operation Plaitbullbullbullbullbullbull J1
Operational Po11Qf bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull S8
Planning formiddot the KanmiddotOpe ration bull bull bull __ bull bull bull bullbull 56
Operations Coatfol bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 58
Loss ot Air Support bull bull bull bull bull jI bull bull bullbull bull 61bull
Operations of the Sakura Detachmentbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 61shy
Britilh OffenI - Nov_bel 1914 bull bull 64
Reinto rcernent ot the Ka1aclanArea bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Withdrawal of the Sakura Detampchttent bullbullbullbull 6
Road Const ruction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Final Preparations tor the KIA Operat1oa bullbullbullbullbull 66
Fortification Construction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 66
Communicationa bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 68
Ordnance Matenel bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 69
Training bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 70
Start of the Kan Operation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
54th Div1s1Qt1 Operations P1aA bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
Abandonment or the Alqab-lf1OhaungmiddotAreit bull bull bull 74
Fighting 111 the Upbon Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 75
C IDss of RamreeIsland bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
2 Start of the KaD Operation (Conttcl)
Action in the Kangaw Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 78
pepoundense ot the Tamancm-An Sectorbullbullbull ~ 79II bullbullbullbullbull
~
New 54th Division Plan bull ~II 81bullbull
Continued British Attaekamiddot ~ bullbullbullbull S3II
The Counterottensiva F1rstPbasemiddotmiddot bull bull bull bull bull 84
The CoWlteroffensive -Second Phase bull bull bull bull bull 84
Fighting in the Taungup Sector bullbullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull _ 86
THE KAN OPERATION NUMBER lWO bull bull 91II bull bull bull bullbullbull bull bullbullbull
The Northeast Sector __ II bull _ 91II bull bull
Activation ot the 72d 1ixedBrigade bull bull bull 91 II bull
Defense Construet1on bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull It bull 92bull
81tuation in Early 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _ 94II bull
Operations on the Irrawad~Front bull bullbull _ 95
Orders for Kan Operation No2 bull bull bull bull bull bull 97
The Kantetsu Group orrens1ve bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 99
General 8ituation - March II bull bull bull bull bull 100
II bull bull bull bull bull II bullCoW1terattacks in the Mt Popa Area 101
Transfers Regroupings and New wsslons bull bull bull bull bull bull 102
II II bull bull bull bull bullbull bullRevolt of the Burma National Army lev Withdrawal or the 28th Army to AU~ bull bull bullbull bull bull lOS
Delensa Concept of the 28th Artrr1 ~ bullbull bull II bull 105 bull
x
bull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull
bull bull bull bull bull
Cbaptel
3e Withdrawal Of1he 2Sth Amt W AlJ(CoAt1tt)
Withdrawal t~ tile ZIT_abullbullJlOa~
TheSh1al Poreeat Al1anmJcgt bull bull no
W1thdrawalot the S1+tb DlV1alotl trcgtJa An to Kama bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~
The Fall of Rangoon bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot113
Log1stacs in the XenOperat1on
Stockpiling andmiddot Storage bull bull bullbull bull middot ~ bullbull 117
Transportation bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull us Medical bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbull l22
THE UAI OPEBATION bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullmiddot123~
AdV8ftce Planningmiddotbullbullbull ~123
Decision to Withdraw to the ~__bullbullbull Mal Operaticnmiddot Planbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 124II bull bull bull bull
Final Plans Del81ed bull bull bull bull bull bull bull JZ1
Mamp1 Operation rLrst Phase bullbullbullbullbullbull II 127bull bull bull It bull
Concentration ot theAxm Headqua~er8 Group bull bull bullbullbullbullbull bullbull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull bull 129middot
Movement ot Rear semceUn1ts bullbull bull bull 131
Concentration of the ShimbuQroup bull 131
Irrawaddy RLverCroBEdng 01 the 5lIth Division bull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull II bull bull bull 12bull
54th Division Withdrawal 1raquo middotmiddotPukkaW1g bull bull bull bull 134
Fighting in the Paukkaung Sector bullbullbullbullbullbull bull 337
bull bull bull
Chapter
M81 Operation First Pha$e (Conttd)
lVithdrawalt~mfaukkaungto the pegu EtMgebullbull J41
Concentration ot the KanjoForce lt bullbullbull l43cbullbullbull
Withdrawal or the 72d JAixed Brigade (Ksntetsu Group) bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull l44
Progress of the Kan-i Group bull bull bull bull bullbull bull 145
J4a1 Operation - Second Phase bull bull bull bullbull bullbullbull 1441
Raiding Operationsmiddot ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 145
Decision to WithdraW the 28th Amy to Tenasserim bull bull bull 41 41 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Mai Operation - Third Phase bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbullbullbull J47
Situation in June-J~y 1945 bull bull bullbull bull bull bull us41
Qperational Policy bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 149
Movement of the eft Column bullbullbullbull ~ bullbullbullbull 161
eros sing the Kun River bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 41 bull 164
Crossing of the Sittang River bull bullbull bull bull 41 bull 167
Preparations for the Breakthroughbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 152
Strength and Disposition of Forcesmiddot bullbullbullbullbullbull 156
The A1my Headquarters Breakthrough Operation bull bull bull 161
Movement Across the Mandalay Road 41 bullbullbullbull 166
bull
Breakthrough by the Right and central Columns bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 168
Plans and PrePl rations bull bull bullbullbull 169 middot
Movement of the 54th Division bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 169
bull bull
bull bullbull bullbullbull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
Uovement 0middot the S4thD1ri4oa(OOrtbiltI)
Breakthrough by the KObaPorct
Movement of theSb1mbu GlOup bull bull 111
Withdrawal of the KaniGrcup bull bull bull bull bull 119
Mal Operation - Fourth Phase bull bull o bullbull bull bull bullbullbull 181
Re-establishment of 28th AtqContrtgtl bull bull it 181
The Movement Toward BU1n bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bullbull 18l
Communications andLOSlsticslAthe ted Operation bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bullbull
TeleCOlDmicat1Dns bull bull bull bull Suppliesbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull 184
Casualty Evacuation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull lSSIgt bull
ERMINATION OF THE V1AR bull bull bull bull bull 51tuation in Late Septemb~r ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 195 bull
B SONG BREAKfHROtnH HENlICf bullbull bull bull bull bull
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
Chal1r
1
British Attack on Kal8danmiddotVaUeybullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull
Reintorcementstor the KaJadan Ftont
Co Wlterattacks by the Koba Detachment bull bull bull bull
Troop Disposition -lay 19M bull bull bull
Line of Conmunications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Signal Communications bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
2 THE KAN OPEEATION NUMBER ONE bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Situation in Mid 1944bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull 47
New 28th Arms Mission bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 47
Task Force Organization and Missions bull bull bullbull SO
Regrouping bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull S2
bullbullbull Chapter
2 Burma Area A1Dyen CQlUDll1d~tt bull bull bull 53
Imper1al General Headqwatera Db-ectlve 53
Operational InstNCtlonsb1 the Bqrma ~bullA1ftJt bull 55
28th A1JfJY Final Karl Operation Plaitbullbullbullbullbullbull J1
Operational Po11Qf bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull S8
Planning formiddot the KanmiddotOpe ration bull bull bull __ bull bull bull bullbull 56
Operations Coatfol bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 58
Loss ot Air Support bull bull bull bull bull jI bull bull bullbull bull 61bull
Operations of the Sakura Detachmentbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 61shy
Britilh OffenI - Nov_bel 1914 bull bull 64
Reinto rcernent ot the Ka1aclanArea bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Withdrawal of the Sakura Detampchttent bullbullbullbull 6
Road Const ruction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Final Preparations tor the KIA Operat1oa bullbullbullbullbull 66
Fortification Construction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 66
Communicationa bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 68
Ordnance Matenel bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 69
Training bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 70
Start of the Kan Operation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
54th Div1s1Qt1 Operations P1aA bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
Abandonment or the Alqab-lf1OhaungmiddotAreit bull bull bull 74
Fighting 111 the Upbon Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 75
C IDss of RamreeIsland bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
2 Start of the KaD Operation (Conttcl)
Action in the Kangaw Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 78
pepoundense ot the Tamancm-An Sectorbullbullbull ~ 79II bullbullbullbullbull
~
New 54th Division Plan bull ~II 81bullbull
Continued British Attaekamiddot ~ bullbullbullbull S3II
The Counterottensiva F1rstPbasemiddotmiddot bull bull bull bull bull 84
The CoWlteroffensive -Second Phase bull bull bull bull bull 84
Fighting in the Taungup Sector bullbullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull _ 86
THE KAN OPERATION NUMBER lWO bull bull 91II bull bull bull bullbullbull bull bullbullbull
The Northeast Sector __ II bull _ 91II bull bull
Activation ot the 72d 1ixedBrigade bull bull bull 91 II bull
Defense Construet1on bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull It bull 92bull
81tuation in Early 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _ 94II bull
Operations on the Irrawad~Front bull bullbull _ 95
Orders for Kan Operation No2 bull bull bull bull bull bull 97
The Kantetsu Group orrens1ve bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 99
General 8ituation - March II bull bull bull bull bull 100
II bull bull bull bull bull II bullCoW1terattacks in the Mt Popa Area 101
Transfers Regroupings and New wsslons bull bull bull bull bull bull 102
II II bull bull bull bull bullbull bullRevolt of the Burma National Army lev Withdrawal or the 28th Army to AU~ bull bull bullbull bull bull lOS
Delensa Concept of the 28th Artrr1 ~ bullbull bull II bull 105 bull
x
bull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull
bull bull bull bull bull
Cbaptel
3e Withdrawal Of1he 2Sth Amt W AlJ(CoAt1tt)
Withdrawal t~ tile ZIT_abullbullJlOa~
TheSh1al Poreeat Al1anmJcgt bull bull no
W1thdrawalot the S1+tb DlV1alotl trcgtJa An to Kama bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~
The Fall of Rangoon bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot113
Log1stacs in the XenOperat1on
Stockpiling andmiddot Storage bull bull bullbull bull middot ~ bullbull 117
Transportation bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull us Medical bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbull l22
THE UAI OPEBATION bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullmiddot123~
AdV8ftce Planningmiddotbullbullbull ~123
Decision to Withdraw to the ~__bullbullbull Mal Operaticnmiddot Planbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 124II bull bull bull bull
Final Plans Del81ed bull bull bull bull bull bull bull JZ1
Mamp1 Operation rLrst Phase bullbullbullbullbullbull II 127bull bull bull It bull
Concentration ot theAxm Headqua~er8 Group bull bull bullbullbullbullbull bullbull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull bull 129middot
Movement ot Rear semceUn1ts bullbull bull bull 131
Concentration of the ShimbuQroup bull 131
Irrawaddy RLverCroBEdng 01 the 5lIth Division bull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull II bull bull bull 12bull
54th Division Withdrawal 1raquo middotmiddotPukkaW1g bull bull bull bull 134
Fighting in the Paukkaung Sector bullbullbullbullbullbull bull 337
bull bull bull
Chapter
M81 Operation First Pha$e (Conttd)
lVithdrawalt~mfaukkaungto the pegu EtMgebullbull J41
Concentration ot the KanjoForce lt bullbullbull l43cbullbullbull
Withdrawal or the 72d JAixed Brigade (Ksntetsu Group) bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull l44
Progress of the Kan-i Group bull bull bull bull bullbull bull 145
J4a1 Operation - Second Phase bull bull bull bullbull bullbullbull 1441
Raiding Operationsmiddot ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 145
Decision to WithdraW the 28th Amy to Tenasserim bull bull bull 41 41 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Mai Operation - Third Phase bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbullbullbull J47
Situation in June-J~y 1945 bull bull bullbull bull bull bull us41
Qperational Policy bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 149
Movement of the eft Column bullbullbullbull ~ bullbullbullbull 161
eros sing the Kun River bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 41 bull 164
Crossing of the Sittang River bull bullbull bull bull 41 bull 167
Preparations for the Breakthroughbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 152
Strength and Disposition of Forcesmiddot bullbullbullbullbullbull 156
The A1my Headquarters Breakthrough Operation bull bull bull 161
Movement Across the Mandalay Road 41 bullbullbullbull 166
bull
Breakthrough by the Right and central Columns bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 168
Plans and PrePl rations bull bull bullbullbull 169 middot
Movement of the 54th Division bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 169
bull bull
bull bullbull bullbullbull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
Uovement 0middot the S4thD1ri4oa(OOrtbiltI)
Breakthrough by the KObaPorct
Movement of theSb1mbu GlOup bull bull 111
Withdrawal of the KaniGrcup bull bull bull bull bull 119
Mal Operation - Fourth Phase bull bull o bullbull bull bull bullbullbull 181
Re-establishment of 28th AtqContrtgtl bull bull it 181
The Movement Toward BU1n bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bullbull 18l
Communications andLOSlsticslAthe ted Operation bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bullbull
TeleCOlDmicat1Dns bull bull bull bull Suppliesbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull 184
Casualty Evacuation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull lSSIgt bull
ERMINATION OF THE V1AR bull bull bull bull bull 51tuation in Late Septemb~r ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 195 bull
B SONG BREAKfHROtnH HENlICf bullbull bull bull bull bull
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
bullbullbull Chapter
2 Burma Area A1Dyen CQlUDll1d~tt bull bull bull 53
Imper1al General Headqwatera Db-ectlve 53
Operational InstNCtlonsb1 the Bqrma ~bullA1ftJt bull 55
28th A1JfJY Final Karl Operation Plaitbullbullbullbullbullbull J1
Operational Po11Qf bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull S8
Planning formiddot the KanmiddotOpe ration bull bull bull __ bull bull bull bullbull 56
Operations Coatfol bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 58
Loss ot Air Support bull bull bull bull bull jI bull bull bullbull bull 61bull
Operations of the Sakura Detachmentbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 61shy
Britilh OffenI - Nov_bel 1914 bull bull 64
Reinto rcernent ot the Ka1aclanArea bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Withdrawal of the Sakura Detampchttent bullbullbullbull 6
Road Const ruction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 6S
Final Preparations tor the KIA Operat1oa bullbullbullbullbull 66
Fortification Construction bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 66
Communicationa bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 68
Ordnance Matenel bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull 69
Training bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 70
Start of the Kan Operation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
54th Div1s1Qt1 Operations P1aA bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
Abandonment or the Alqab-lf1OhaungmiddotAreit bull bull bull 74
Fighting 111 the Upbon Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 75
C IDss of RamreeIsland bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 71
bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
2 Start of the KaD Operation (Conttcl)
Action in the Kangaw Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 78
pepoundense ot the Tamancm-An Sectorbullbullbull ~ 79II bullbullbullbullbull
~
New 54th Division Plan bull ~II 81bullbull
Continued British Attaekamiddot ~ bullbullbullbull S3II
The Counterottensiva F1rstPbasemiddotmiddot bull bull bull bull bull 84
The CoWlteroffensive -Second Phase bull bull bull bull bull 84
Fighting in the Taungup Sector bullbullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull _ 86
THE KAN OPERATION NUMBER lWO bull bull 91II bull bull bull bullbullbull bull bullbullbull
The Northeast Sector __ II bull _ 91II bull bull
Activation ot the 72d 1ixedBrigade bull bull bull 91 II bull
Defense Construet1on bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull It bull 92bull
81tuation in Early 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _ 94II bull
Operations on the Irrawad~Front bull bullbull _ 95
Orders for Kan Operation No2 bull bull bull bull bull bull 97
The Kantetsu Group orrens1ve bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 99
General 8ituation - March II bull bull bull bull bull 100
II bull bull bull bull bull II bullCoW1terattacks in the Mt Popa Area 101
Transfers Regroupings and New wsslons bull bull bull bull bull bull 102
II II bull bull bull bull bullbull bullRevolt of the Burma National Army lev Withdrawal or the 28th Army to AU~ bull bull bullbull bull bull lOS
Delensa Concept of the 28th Artrr1 ~ bullbull bull II bull 105 bull
x
bull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull
bull bull bull bull bull
Cbaptel
3e Withdrawal Of1he 2Sth Amt W AlJ(CoAt1tt)
Withdrawal t~ tile ZIT_abullbullJlOa~
TheSh1al Poreeat Al1anmJcgt bull bull no
W1thdrawalot the S1+tb DlV1alotl trcgtJa An to Kama bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~
The Fall of Rangoon bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot113
Log1stacs in the XenOperat1on
Stockpiling andmiddot Storage bull bull bullbull bull middot ~ bullbull 117
Transportation bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull us Medical bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbull l22
THE UAI OPEBATION bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullmiddot123~
AdV8ftce Planningmiddotbullbullbull ~123
Decision to Withdraw to the ~__bullbullbull Mal Operaticnmiddot Planbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 124II bull bull bull bull
Final Plans Del81ed bull bull bull bull bull bull bull JZ1
Mamp1 Operation rLrst Phase bullbullbullbullbullbull II 127bull bull bull It bull
Concentration ot theAxm Headqua~er8 Group bull bull bullbullbullbullbull bullbull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull bull 129middot
Movement ot Rear semceUn1ts bullbull bull bull 131
Concentration of the ShimbuQroup bull 131
Irrawaddy RLverCroBEdng 01 the 5lIth Division bull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull II bull bull bull 12bull
54th Division Withdrawal 1raquo middotmiddotPukkaW1g bull bull bull bull 134
Fighting in the Paukkaung Sector bullbullbullbullbullbull bull 337
bull bull bull
Chapter
M81 Operation First Pha$e (Conttd)
lVithdrawalt~mfaukkaungto the pegu EtMgebullbull J41
Concentration ot the KanjoForce lt bullbullbull l43cbullbullbull
Withdrawal or the 72d JAixed Brigade (Ksntetsu Group) bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull l44
Progress of the Kan-i Group bull bull bull bull bullbull bull 145
J4a1 Operation - Second Phase bull bull bull bullbull bullbullbull 1441
Raiding Operationsmiddot ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 145
Decision to WithdraW the 28th Amy to Tenasserim bull bull bull 41 41 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Mai Operation - Third Phase bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbullbullbull J47
Situation in June-J~y 1945 bull bull bullbull bull bull bull us41
Qperational Policy bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 149
Movement of the eft Column bullbullbullbull ~ bullbullbullbull 161
eros sing the Kun River bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 41 bull 164
Crossing of the Sittang River bull bullbull bull bull 41 bull 167
Preparations for the Breakthroughbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 152
Strength and Disposition of Forcesmiddot bullbullbullbullbullbull 156
The A1my Headquarters Breakthrough Operation bull bull bull 161
Movement Across the Mandalay Road 41 bullbullbullbull 166
bull
Breakthrough by the Right and central Columns bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 168
Plans and PrePl rations bull bull bullbullbull 169 middot
Movement of the 54th Division bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 169
bull bull
bull bullbull bullbullbull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
Uovement 0middot the S4thD1ri4oa(OOrtbiltI)
Breakthrough by the KObaPorct
Movement of theSb1mbu GlOup bull bull 111
Withdrawal of the KaniGrcup bull bull bull bull bull 119
Mal Operation - Fourth Phase bull bull o bullbull bull bull bullbullbull 181
Re-establishment of 28th AtqContrtgtl bull bull it 181
The Movement Toward BU1n bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bullbull 18l
Communications andLOSlsticslAthe ted Operation bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bullbull
TeleCOlDmicat1Dns bull bull bull bull Suppliesbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull 184
Casualty Evacuation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull lSSIgt bull
ERMINATION OF THE V1AR bull bull bull bull bull 51tuation in Late Septemb~r ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 195 bull
B SONG BREAKfHROtnH HENlICf bullbull bull bull bull bull
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
2 Start of the KaD Operation (Conttcl)
Action in the Kangaw Sector bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 78
pepoundense ot the Tamancm-An Sectorbullbullbull ~ 79II bullbullbullbullbull
~
New 54th Division Plan bull ~II 81bullbull
Continued British Attaekamiddot ~ bullbullbullbull S3II
The Counterottensiva F1rstPbasemiddotmiddot bull bull bull bull bull 84
The CoWlteroffensive -Second Phase bull bull bull bull bull 84
Fighting in the Taungup Sector bullbullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull _ 86
THE KAN OPERATION NUMBER lWO bull bull 91II bull bull bull bullbullbull bull bullbullbull
The Northeast Sector __ II bull _ 91II bull bull
Activation ot the 72d 1ixedBrigade bull bull bull 91 II bull
Defense Construet1on bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull It bull 92bull
81tuation in Early 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull _ 94II bull
Operations on the Irrawad~Front bull bullbull _ 95
Orders for Kan Operation No2 bull bull bull bull bull bull 97
The Kantetsu Group orrens1ve bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 99
General 8ituation - March II bull bull bull bull bull 100
II bull bull bull bull bull II bullCoW1terattacks in the Mt Popa Area 101
Transfers Regroupings and New wsslons bull bull bull bull bull bull 102
II II bull bull bull bull bullbull bullRevolt of the Burma National Army lev Withdrawal or the 28th Army to AU~ bull bull bullbull bull bull lOS
Delensa Concept of the 28th Artrr1 ~ bullbull bull II bull 105 bull
x
bull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull
bull bull bull bull bull
Cbaptel
3e Withdrawal Of1he 2Sth Amt W AlJ(CoAt1tt)
Withdrawal t~ tile ZIT_abullbullJlOa~
TheSh1al Poreeat Al1anmJcgt bull bull no
W1thdrawalot the S1+tb DlV1alotl trcgtJa An to Kama bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~
The Fall of Rangoon bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot113
Log1stacs in the XenOperat1on
Stockpiling andmiddot Storage bull bull bullbull bull middot ~ bullbull 117
Transportation bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull us Medical bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbull l22
THE UAI OPEBATION bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullmiddot123~
AdV8ftce Planningmiddotbullbullbull ~123
Decision to Withdraw to the ~__bullbullbull Mal Operaticnmiddot Planbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 124II bull bull bull bull
Final Plans Del81ed bull bull bull bull bull bull bull JZ1
Mamp1 Operation rLrst Phase bullbullbullbullbullbull II 127bull bull bull It bull
Concentration ot theAxm Headqua~er8 Group bull bull bullbullbullbullbull bullbull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull bull 129middot
Movement ot Rear semceUn1ts bullbull bull bull 131
Concentration of the ShimbuQroup bull 131
Irrawaddy RLverCroBEdng 01 the 5lIth Division bull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull II bull bull bull 12bull
54th Division Withdrawal 1raquo middotmiddotPukkaW1g bull bull bull bull 134
Fighting in the Paukkaung Sector bullbullbullbullbullbull bull 337
bull bull bull
Chapter
M81 Operation First Pha$e (Conttd)
lVithdrawalt~mfaukkaungto the pegu EtMgebullbull J41
Concentration ot the KanjoForce lt bullbullbull l43cbullbullbull
Withdrawal or the 72d JAixed Brigade (Ksntetsu Group) bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull l44
Progress of the Kan-i Group bull bull bull bull bullbull bull 145
J4a1 Operation - Second Phase bull bull bull bullbull bullbullbull 1441
Raiding Operationsmiddot ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 145
Decision to WithdraW the 28th Amy to Tenasserim bull bull bull 41 41 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Mai Operation - Third Phase bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbullbullbull J47
Situation in June-J~y 1945 bull bull bullbull bull bull bull us41
Qperational Policy bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 149
Movement of the eft Column bullbullbullbull ~ bullbullbullbull 161
eros sing the Kun River bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 41 bull 164
Crossing of the Sittang River bull bullbull bull bull 41 bull 167
Preparations for the Breakthroughbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 152
Strength and Disposition of Forcesmiddot bullbullbullbullbullbull 156
The A1my Headquarters Breakthrough Operation bull bull bull 161
Movement Across the Mandalay Road 41 bullbullbullbull 166
bull
Breakthrough by the Right and central Columns bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 168
Plans and PrePl rations bull bull bullbullbull 169 middot
Movement of the 54th Division bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 169
bull bull
bull bullbull bullbullbull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
Uovement 0middot the S4thD1ri4oa(OOrtbiltI)
Breakthrough by the KObaPorct
Movement of theSb1mbu GlOup bull bull 111
Withdrawal of the KaniGrcup bull bull bull bull bull 119
Mal Operation - Fourth Phase bull bull o bullbull bull bull bullbullbull 181
Re-establishment of 28th AtqContrtgtl bull bull it 181
The Movement Toward BU1n bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bullbull 18l
Communications andLOSlsticslAthe ted Operation bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bullbull
TeleCOlDmicat1Dns bull bull bull bull Suppliesbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull 184
Casualty Evacuation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull lSSIgt bull
ERMINATION OF THE V1AR bull bull bull bull bull 51tuation in Late Septemb~r ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 195 bull
B SONG BREAKfHROtnH HENlICf bullbull bull bull bull bull
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
bull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull
bull bull bull bull bull
Cbaptel
3e Withdrawal Of1he 2Sth Amt W AlJ(CoAt1tt)
Withdrawal t~ tile ZIT_abullbullJlOa~
TheSh1al Poreeat Al1anmJcgt bull bull no
W1thdrawalot the S1+tb DlV1alotl trcgtJa An to Kama bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~
The Fall of Rangoon bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot113
Log1stacs in the XenOperat1on
Stockpiling andmiddot Storage bull bull bullbull bull middot ~ bullbull 117
Transportation bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull us Medical bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbull l22
THE UAI OPEBATION bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullmiddot123~
AdV8ftce Planningmiddotbullbullbull ~123
Decision to Withdraw to the ~__bullbullbull Mal Operaticnmiddot Planbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 124II bull bull bull bull
Final Plans Del81ed bull bull bull bull bull bull bull JZ1
Mamp1 Operation rLrst Phase bullbullbullbullbullbull II 127bull bull bull It bull
Concentration ot theAxm Headqua~er8 Group bull bull bullbullbullbullbull bullbull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bull bull 129middot
Movement ot Rear semceUn1ts bullbull bull bull 131
Concentration of the ShimbuQroup bull 131
Irrawaddy RLverCroBEdng 01 the 5lIth Division bull bullbullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull II bull bull bull 12bull
54th Division Withdrawal 1raquo middotmiddotPukkaW1g bull bull bull bull 134
Fighting in the Paukkaung Sector bullbullbullbullbullbull bull 337
bull bull bull
Chapter
M81 Operation First Pha$e (Conttd)
lVithdrawalt~mfaukkaungto the pegu EtMgebullbull J41
Concentration ot the KanjoForce lt bullbullbull l43cbullbullbull
Withdrawal or the 72d JAixed Brigade (Ksntetsu Group) bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull l44
Progress of the Kan-i Group bull bull bull bull bullbull bull 145
J4a1 Operation - Second Phase bull bull bull bullbull bullbullbull 1441
Raiding Operationsmiddot ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 145
Decision to WithdraW the 28th Amy to Tenasserim bull bull bull 41 41 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Mai Operation - Third Phase bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbullbullbull J47
Situation in June-J~y 1945 bull bull bullbull bull bull bull us41
Qperational Policy bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 149
Movement of the eft Column bullbullbullbull ~ bullbullbullbull 161
eros sing the Kun River bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 41 bull 164
Crossing of the Sittang River bull bullbull bull bull 41 bull 167
Preparations for the Breakthroughbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 152
Strength and Disposition of Forcesmiddot bullbullbullbullbullbull 156
The A1my Headquarters Breakthrough Operation bull bull bull 161
Movement Across the Mandalay Road 41 bullbullbullbull 166
bull
Breakthrough by the Right and central Columns bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 168
Plans and PrePl rations bull bull bullbullbull 169 middot
Movement of the 54th Division bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 169
bull bull
bull bullbull bullbullbull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
Uovement 0middot the S4thD1ri4oa(OOrtbiltI)
Breakthrough by the KObaPorct
Movement of theSb1mbu GlOup bull bull 111
Withdrawal of the KaniGrcup bull bull bull bull bull 119
Mal Operation - Fourth Phase bull bull o bullbull bull bull bullbullbull 181
Re-establishment of 28th AtqContrtgtl bull bull it 181
The Movement Toward BU1n bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bullbull 18l
Communications andLOSlsticslAthe ted Operation bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bullbull
TeleCOlDmicat1Dns bull bull bull bull Suppliesbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull 184
Casualty Evacuation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull lSSIgt bull
ERMINATION OF THE V1AR bull bull bull bull bull 51tuation in Late Septemb~r ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 195 bull
B SONG BREAKfHROtnH HENlICf bullbull bull bull bull bull
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
bull bull bull
Chapter
M81 Operation First Pha$e (Conttd)
lVithdrawalt~mfaukkaungto the pegu EtMgebullbull J41
Concentration ot the KanjoForce lt bullbullbull l43cbullbullbull
Withdrawal or the 72d JAixed Brigade (Ksntetsu Group) bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull l44
Progress of the Kan-i Group bull bull bull bull bullbull bull 145
J4a1 Operation - Second Phase bull bull bull bullbull bullbullbull 1441
Raiding Operationsmiddot ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 145
Decision to WithdraW the 28th Amy to Tenasserim bull bull bull 41 41 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Mai Operation - Third Phase bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbullbullbull J47
Situation in June-J~y 1945 bull bull bullbull bull bull bull us41
Qperational Policy bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 149
Movement of the eft Column bullbullbullbull ~ bullbullbullbull 161
eros sing the Kun River bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 41 bull 164
Crossing of the Sittang River bull bullbull bull bull 41 bull 167
Preparations for the Breakthroughbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 152
Strength and Disposition of Forcesmiddot bullbullbullbullbullbull 156
The A1my Headquarters Breakthrough Operation bull bull bull 161
Movement Across the Mandalay Road 41 bullbullbullbull 166
bull
Breakthrough by the Right and central Columns bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 168
Plans and PrePl rations bull bull bullbullbull 169 middot
Movement of the 54th Division bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 169
bull bull
bull bullbull bullbullbull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
Uovement 0middot the S4thD1ri4oa(OOrtbiltI)
Breakthrough by the KObaPorct
Movement of theSb1mbu GlOup bull bull 111
Withdrawal of the KaniGrcup bull bull bull bull bull 119
Mal Operation - Fourth Phase bull bull o bullbull bull bull bullbullbull 181
Re-establishment of 28th AtqContrtgtl bull bull it 181
The Movement Toward BU1n bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bullbull 18l
Communications andLOSlsticslAthe ted Operation bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bullbull
TeleCOlDmicat1Dns bull bull bull bull Suppliesbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull 184
Casualty Evacuation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull lSSIgt bull
ERMINATION OF THE V1AR bull bull bull bull bull 51tuation in Late Septemb~r ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 195 bull
B SONG BREAKfHROtnH HENlICf bullbull bull bull bull bull
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
bull bull
bull bullbull bullbullbull bullbull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull
Chapter
Uovement 0middot the S4thD1ri4oa(OOrtbiltI)
Breakthrough by the KObaPorct
Movement of theSb1mbu GlOup bull bull 111
Withdrawal of the KaniGrcup bull bull bull bull bull 119
Mal Operation - Fourth Phase bull bull o bullbull bull bull bullbullbull 181
Re-establishment of 28th AtqContrtgtl bull bull it 181
The Movement Toward BU1n bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bullbull 18l
Communications andLOSlsticslAthe ted Operation bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bullbull
TeleCOlDmicat1Dns bull bull bull bull Suppliesbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull 184
Casualty Evacuation bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull lSSIgt bull
ERMINATION OF THE V1AR bull bull bull bull bull 51tuation in Late Septemb~r ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 195 bull
B SONG BREAKfHROtnH HENlICf bullbull bull bull bull bull
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
bull bull
bullbull
I
l4APS- olimiddotmiddot
No 1l~t~middot~middot - 0= J ~
1 D1spoait1on of 55th Division ~ _ J u -I Ope It t I
Pla-UW XcsOB ~ bull I bull bull bullbull bull bull 4 t bull ~
2 Disposition of2Sth Amy LatemiddotFel~~~ bull l bullbull 11shy3a Ie b Northern Araktu Operfltion let P~1 ~1 4 Northem Arakan Oparatioh 2dP~ tmiddot~) 28
1
S Disposit1on of 5th Division Junbull~~9~ bull ~
6 Kaladan Operation Feb-Mq 1944 bull bull - bull bull 6r
Logistics tor the HaQo Operation5~tAi1rlJq bull bull bull +4f ~i bullbullgt~
middot bull ~~8 Area Classification Fort1ficmiddota+middotbulln ~-- Bmiddot Ua middotfand ~ iT
Disposition of 28th Army Sap 1941+~middotmiddot~~ bullbull i ~ 54
lOa amp b Operations of Sakura DetachmenttA~D~1944 bullbullbull 62~
11 The Myebon-KangawSector Jan-Feb 14~ bullbullbullbull bull 16
12 The Tamandu-An Sector Feb-Apr 194$ bullbullbullbullbullbullbull eo 13 The Taungup Sector Mar-Apr 1945 bull bullbullbullbullbullbull en 14 Operationa on the Northem Front~tb 4rml bull bull bull 96
i
I bull
15bull Withdrawal to AUanmyo 28th Anny bull bull bull 1OS I
16 28th Army PlanPegu ftange Concent~t1AA bull It 126 ~ ~ ~
17 Withdrawal from Kama middotto middotPaukkaW1S middot~tbPtv181o bullbull133
1Sa It b Fighting in Paukkaung and VLthdra4to fp Pegu Range 54th Division bull bull middot~bullbull~Abull
f 13amp
19a amp b Breakthrough of Sittang Plain 28tb ADnf~ ~ 162-~)
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
UAPS (Conttd)
~ Title poundta
20 Reorganization 28th Arr1rT bullbull bull bull bullbullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull tI 191
21 Dispoeition inmiddot the Vicinity of Paung aBthmiddot~ bull bull bull middot197
General Reference
I Operations of the 54th Division middot~c 44 - Uq 45 bull bull bull n Progress of Withdrawal to PegumiddotMounta1n Bange
28th Armr bull bull bull bull bull e bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull bull 210
ItI Operational Progrel ot Br1tish-IId1an Force Jan-Mq 1945 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 2U
IV Mai Operation 28th Artq bull bull bull bull bull bull 212
TABUS
No- J1tJe
1 Organization and Order of Battleot the 28tbAlTJrl
2 Units Under Tactical COmmand 01 the 28thArtq bull bull bullbull 9
Organization of the Rangoon Defense Unit bull bull bull bull bull bull ll5shy116
28th Army strength and EquiplXSAt bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1J1shy160
xv
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
CHAPlD 1
lHS n-GOOPDAftOH
Situation 1nLate 194J
Since themiddot endot the 1943 mon()Qseasoathe~~tlA
in Burma bad become increas1nsl1 acuteendlgt S8ptcberthe ene-
ffII was building up strength on all 814bullbullbull
In the Aqab sectOrin westernBwmathe 1rt1shIAdlu
5th and 7th Divisions were disposed 1ndpth QAbull the Butlddewlampshy
Yaungaaw tront with two or three addit1onalmiddot dille1onsbacldq
them up There were signs ot preparatlonstoran oftensive1a
the near tuture Enemey vessels massed 1n Ch1tt~gong Harbor the
Nat River and other points comb1ned with increased eneJD1 ship
movements we believed to be indications ot a possible amphibshy
ious attack on Akyab
In Assam Province Imphal _d vic1n1t7 was the base of en
llf3 operations and the Brit1sb-Indien 17th 20th and 234 Divla1Du
as well as one other division were advancingto this sector Ihe
enemy ~as rebuilding the Imphal-Palel-Tamumiddot road and the Imphalshy
Churachandpur-Tiddim road into motor vehicle roads
At the northern en4 of the Hukawng Valley the New 1st A1ltq
of the Chungking A11DY and a US ~r1gacle botllcoJlnanded b7Gen
Joseph E Stilwell were located in the vicinity ofIsdo The
1
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
New 1st Arnrr w~ grea~ superlormiddotmiddottootber Chlnese ~8 1amp O~
ganization equipment and trainlngHerto01 1nd1cattollSot
preparations tor an otfenslve could be observed
In the Yunnan area ot northeastern Bunna appro~te17 teA
divisions ot the Yunnan Expsditionamp17 Am1 (Chim sa) bad occup1~cl
poe1tiona aloog the east bank ot the Salween R1v~rwest QtTa1
WhUe preparations tor an offensive were not beL~ energetlcaJJi
pushed in this area it was estimated that the Army would be pre
pared to launch an offensive in cooperation nth an ottensive
launched bY the British-Indian forces andstUweUs middottorce
The U-Go (ImPhal) Opration Planned
On 7 August the Southem Araf1 directed the Buma Area A1mT
to make preparations for an offensive against eastern Ind1alll
Atte~a stwtr ot the enemy situation the Area Armr commander deshy
termined to conduct onlY hol~ operations against the YunnanPX-shy
peditional7 Armyin the Balween River area and against StUwellta
torce in the Ihkawng Valley sector Themain offensive against
eastern India would be undertaken by the 15th ArlrJY with thelSth
31st and 33d Divisions Cr1 12 August the B1nna Area Anq issueltshy
2
1
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
Ha-GoOperatiollPlans
As a divers1ol1ampl7 action the Area A1rq ~ecs bullbull tlL GltJ Opshy
eration an offensive to be 1aW1ched 1rlt1te middotAftlatrtmiddotsecto-)J 5th
Division units two or three wee prior to bullbulltbe start-otthe O~
Operations
In November 1943 Lt Gen Hana1lJ was designate4 ascoJllll8AC1shy
er of the 55th Division cd in prepration tor the tortbc~Qtshy
fensive immediatelr proceeded to make- plaos and etto(ttttOqpd1s
positions (Map No1)
Maung~aw-ButhidaungF1Ont bullbullbullbullbull55th tnt Gp It1 143d Inf Regt
West Coast (FlOll Donbai1c to the mouth at the Nat River) bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullll2tb In1Regt
(less lSt Bn)
Alqab Areabullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull55thRecol1 Regt let Bnmiddotmiddot Jl2th
_ IniRegt
Kaladan RiverFront bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbulllst Bn213tb Inf Regt
1 See Japanese Monograph No 134 (ReV1sed)foJdbullbull~d description of the Imphal Operation
MAP NO I
BENGAL BAY
DISPOSITION OF 55th DIVISION PRIOR TO HA-GO OPERATION
NOV 43 - J~N 44 HEIOHTS IN FEET
N
4
bull c- - _ gt
Bata11oaot the 5th 1I0Ubt~ lrM Jlt17 g~~~i~IlC bullbuller - ~ _ bull bull bull ~
~ wdoh had been ~tafie4lt~b~lt~~~~~ the New Go1nea campaign as the Soutl1middot8easTJamptaohmeotreve)tftet1o
5th D1vision ~ntroland arriveldrtrinamp tgteeqber aniJanoar1 Dt -- _- - -
additioD the lUth Infantrr e~nt (les$the aianC3lttBattat
1001) and the 2d BattatloD ltS4th Field~t11le17~$1atezlt we~
transferred from the5lthD1vlslo11t in ~JanUlU7to
Alqab during the Ha-Go Operation
The Dlv1s~01 conmander e pla~ calQfQrtbemiddot middot4~cb1o~
attack aga1nst the eneJD3 B base ot oPGtllat1o11s
maioattack would be aimed at destrov1ng bheBrit1$1l~IndiatJ 7tb~i
vLsion in the areaeast of t113 lIaYtl RangeJlw1~llap1nee1~JnO~em$t
launched simwtaneously from thenor~w1d~tlmiddotth~ Qull~b7$tat~middot
1Dg the main body of the D1Y1s1011tGth$nctD1totNgM~tWg~
they would crush the enemyth Dvlsion itlbheMattngdalyen ~a
ot the Uaru Range fh1s phase ottheta GO~peat1Ot1l8geneml
17 known as the Northern ArakanOpe~t1Qnmiddotasd18t~i1shedtvom
the Kaladan Operation which nee sUbsemiddotqueritdf)wl~pnientmiddotol111e
aGo Operatlon
Activat1011 ()t the 28th _
In consideration olthe War situation in late 1943 Imperlal
General Headquarters had determined to conduct counteroffensives
in China and Burma The Yunnan-Rwangsi offensive wato bemiddotlaunch
ed 1ft China to destroy American air bases am theeastem India ot-
fens1ve would be launched from nortblTestem B~atostrengthenthe
Japam se defensive position
There were obvious indications of possible sea and land ottenshy
s1vee by the enemy including the naval bombardment J)f Ramree Is-
land in December 1943 If the Burma Area Azmywas to be co~ttecl
to operations against eastern India a strong defensive torce would
be necessary to hold southwestern Buxma AceordiQgly on 1 Janua17
194JJ the order of battle of the 2ath Amy Was annoUIlCed (See Table
1 and 2)
Lt Gen Shozo Sakura1had been announced as 2eth AIm1 comnander
on 7 January 1944 He had taken part in the original Burma campaip
in 1942 as commander of the 33d Division and sinee March 194~ had
been commander of the Army Mechanized Headquarters in Tokyo Maj
Gen Hideo IViakuro was des~nated as c~fof staff ~ being relieved
from his position as chief opound the General Mtairs Department Milishy
tary Administration ortice 25th AtftlY (Sumatra)
The chief of start nras sent to Rangoon on 18 January to exshy
pedite the organization of the Army headqua~ers and on21 JanUArf
th~ Armr commander arrived Although thestatfwas composed
6
bullbullbullbullbull middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotimiddotmiddotiimiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbullbullmiddotbullmiddot
nmaril7 middotof personnel ~1Jtemiddot bullbull fttmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullbull middotmiddotbullbull fcf1llmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot~imiddot~mlgt~~middotmiddotmiddot bull w_middotmiddotti~middot~
2ath Amrr
Hq28th Amrr Lt Gen SbOJOmiddot Sakurai Ccmmander Maj Gen Hideo Iwakuro eli
2lt1 Division Lt Gen Seizaburo OkazaklOomtnana$r Col Takeo Kinosh~ta els
54th Division - Lt GenShihachi Katainura Commander Col Jiro Ittal OS
55th Division - Gen Tadashi Hans18Lt al Commander Col Benji ~1amura CIS
14th Independent ~titank Gun Eattalion - Maj Nanao NakaoOndt (Hq 3 cos and Ammo Tn)
7lat Field Antiaircraft Artillery- Battalion MajTeilel1iOta~cmdr (Hq and 3 btrys)
44th Field Antiaircraft MG Company - Unk 20th Field Road Construction Unit - Lt Col Akuta
(200 men) 101st Field Road ConstrUction Unt CaptHiromitsuMatsumoto
(Hq and 3 cos - 16 Off and 321 Evrl 51st Independent Transport BattaJion-MajSadaji Inoue
(Six cos - horse-drawn) 55th Independent Motor Transport Battalion -Maj Takaziro~
(Four cos - 50 trucks each - 1 materiel depOt) 236th Independent Moto r TransportiCornpany 1st Lt Shutaro Katauta 10th Provisional Mo to r Transport Company Unk 26th Ponton Bridge Company - Capt KazushigeKuwabara lOth River Crossing Materiel Company -Capt ToraoFujioka 70th CasualtyClearing Platoon - 1st Lt bullbull MasajiroIsunabuehi 71st Casualty Clearing Platoon - 1st Lt Jitsaji Sugimoto llBth Rear Hospital - Maj Rokuro Kasahara
Units UndermiddotmiddotTaetiC~middoteo~
of the 28th middotArlrrT
lith Shipping Group - Maj Gen GisablU)sudecgtmtrtabd
11th Shipping Fegineer Reg1ment - LtCc)lfJa1Sshl tshtrnvramp 3d Sea Transport Battalion 22d Provisional WaterTransportServtceOtintpan7 38th Water TransfOrt ServicemiddotCompany
Southwestern Branch Burma Area Army F1eldPrOvislQA Depot Southwestern Branch ~urma Area ArmFte1d0rcln~ee Dep9t Southwestern Branch Burma Area ArutYFleld bull Motorl)~pot Southllestern Branch 2lat RearmiddotVeterinarr Hospital Elements or the l06thRear Hospital lOlst Carpenter Company 93d Land Transport ServiceCampany Elements or the 22d Field Water SupplyPuripoundieation Unit
i The 11th Shipping Fagineer Reg1mentiQscomposed otHq3 companies and 1 materiel depot with a totalotU05 men an the poundollm1ing vessels
Large landing barges SS Small landing bargesbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull 54 Motored sampansbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull47 Annored boats bullbullmiddot 2 Fishing boats (60 Ton Classbullbullbullbullbull f~ bullbull I bullbull JO Messenger boat bullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbull 1 Speed boat bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull oo 1
9
Disposition or 28th AmY Unts 1e~1t 19b1t
The zone of responsibility assigned th~ 28th Am7 wasmiddot southwestern
Burma r rom Rangoon north to Maungdaw along the lest coast and extendshy
ing inland to the Arakan and Pegu 1ountain Ranges At the time of its
organization the only portion of the Armyls rrontmiddot actually facing the
enemy was a 50 mile strip from Maungdaw northeast to Thayettabin Ashy
long the Bay of Bengal it was responsible fo r a coastal frent of 400
miles which with the many islands adjacent to the coast was vulnershy
able to an enerny seaborne attack The Arakan Mountains however offshy
ered protection against attack from the northeast Also vlith1nthe opshy
erational area of the Army was the Irrawaddy Delta one of the worlds
great rice producing centers~
Sinc e the First Arakan Operation the 55th Pivision had been taoshy
ing the enemy on the front north of Akyab with its main strength deshy
ployed on the Mayu Penin~ula and some Wlits in the Kaladan River Basin
The 54th Division had been assigned the defense of the long coastal
strip extending from Ruywa south to the mouths of the IrraltaddzrRtver
since the latter rart of 1943bull The 2d Division had been in the proshy
cess of moving from Malaya to Burma since the 1st of Janua171944
The IIth Shipping Group was stationed at Taungup vnth the prinQ1paJ
supply depots being located at Prome At the time or the activation
of the 28th Army the 54th and 55th Divisions were in position and b
the end of February the main force of ~e 2dDivision had amved1n
southwestern Burma Sinee the ~th Army did nat wishtodisturbtne
10
MAP NO2
atatUI quo 111 mak1Dg rad1cal ud IW1dc chmsea a sndal dt~
position of troops to conform nth the mJ7 tactical aM strashy
tegic plana was effected (Map No 2)
One or the highest priority projects on the ~te agenda was
the construction of defense posit10ns and-negt effort wu spared 1ft
rushing them to completion As neither cement nor steel were ashy
vailable locally or through sUPP13 channels defense positions conshy
sisted primarily or crude earthworks Since there was no radar and
only limited assistance could be expected from na val and air units
the army was forced to rely On sentries posted along the coast foxshy
production of intelligence on enemy activities and movements
With sone revisions the commander otthe 28th Army approwd
the 55th Division plans for the launching of the Northero Arakan
Operation In view or the enemys numerically superior strength
he felt it would be extremely hazardous for the main body ot the
Division to effect a penetration as far as Bawli Bazar Further
in the event that the operation did not progress as expected the
Division might encoW1ter difficulties that would prejudice the
over-all operations or the 28thArmy Accordtngly tb9 Army comshy
mander established a line running east and west through Taungmiddot Bazar
as the northem limits of too operation Any advance north of that
line would be subject to his prior approval Vlith these revisions
the commander ordered the ope rationmiddot to commence any time on or
after 4 Februar1
12
In mid-January t11$ 55th DvlsiQn ba-d DegQn~group~ middottor -the
otfensiva the 55th ampconnaiss8nce Regiment lias moved -to the -kaladaa
Valley to replace the 1st Battalion of the 2l3th IntantryRegiaent
the 144th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion) was dispatched to
the west coast to replace the ll2th Infantry- and the main eoinbat eJeshy
-ments of the Division beganassemblir)g at KLndaungas the assault
column Preparations tere well in band to start theoifensive about
the middle of February (Map No1)
Task Force Organization
The 55th Division vias divided into several TaskForce Units to
perform the various actions required by the Ha-Go Operation plan
Sakurai Unit - Commander Maj Gen T Sakurai CG 55th Inf Gp
Hq 55th In Gp 112th Inf Regt (less 1 ritleco and lMG plat) 2d Bn 143d Int Regt(less 5th Co and 1 UGplat) 1st Bn 213th Inf Regt (less 18t am _3d Cos and
1 MG plat) 3d Bn 55th Mt Arty Reyt (4 mt guns and 4 martars) 55th ~ngr Regt (less 12 cos) One plat loth River Crossing Material Co One squad Armgtrer Unit -Med Bn (less elms) One wireless squad DivSig Unit One plat Water Sup Unit
Not to be confused with Lt Gen S Sakurai CG 28tb1rrtr1
Do Unit - Commander Col Do1 CO 143dInf Begt
143d WRegt (less middotmiddot24 4th Mt Btry (2 mt guns) One plat 55th EngrRegt One sect Mad Bn One squad Water Sup Un1t
Yoshida Unit - Commander Col Yoshida CO 144th W Regt
144th In Regt (less 2d and 3d Bns) 14 AT Bn (less 3d Btry) ($ AT Guris - I-mm) 3d Co 55th Recon Regt (lttanks) 1st Bn 55th lit Arty (3mtmiddotmiddotguns) Camp btry (5 mt guns and 1 ild gunOne sect MedBn One squad Water Sup Unit
Kawashima Unit - Commander Col Kawashima CO 55th Recoil Regt
55th Reeon Regt (less 3d Co)
Koba Unit - Coourander Col Koba CO lllth In Regt
lllth Inf Reg (less 2d and 3dEhs) 3d En 144th Inf Regt 2d Bn 54th Fld Arty
Division P~serve
2d En 144th lniRegt
ArtUleil - Commander Lt Col KobayashiCO 55th Mt Arty Regt
55th Mt Arty Regt (less lst and aBbs) mtbull ~_$j 2d Btry 3d Hvy Fld Arty Regt (3 ~ ~J49-fI1n)
Transport _ Commander Col Sei CO 55th Trans Regt
55th Trans Regt (less 1dCo) 3d Co llth Shipping EogrRegt
lilt Illd 2d COl 51lt TranI sa 26th Ponton 00 224 later Trani Sv 00 (ProT) One plat 10th R1ver O~S81namp Mter~a1Co Sea Trans 00
111Vil1on Tro22
Div S18 tfftit (1811 1 W1relees Squad) Amorer Unit (le88 1 Squad) nater Sup Unit (lees elms) 1st 2d and 4th Fld Hosps Vet HaspOne Plat lOlst Carp 00 3d 00 and lUG Plat 2l3th tnt Rest
B~it1shl pffens1v JaU~Blm~
On 18 January the Ent18h-Indian 7th Division took the 1n1t1shy
at1ve and launched an attaok on the main 55th D1v1aLonpoa1t1Qt1 beshy
~ef1etwepetand Ht1n~ww l~e ~th OQtnpanr14c1 Infantry tlea1ment
defending the hill 1mmed1atel) east of Htindaw stood flrm against
repeated attack tor several darSt hold1rlg the hill unt11 24 Januar1shy
During the last week in January the BritiahBInd1an 5th D1v1s1oA made
lev~re but W1slJeo~s~ful attaclcs Qi1 tM ~tBattalion ot the 143d
Infantr ampsim~nt 1n the vic1n1tyo ot Razab1l west or the ~a1U Bange
In view of th11 1MreafJ~d tf1em act1vity the Division cQmn~er deshy
t~rm1ne4 to advance th~ otartins date of the HaHINGo ~rat1on bull
bullHA-Go_9art~ol90mm-r1l
Since th~ 28th Army had alrady approvtdthe initLating of tb
Ha-Go Op~rnt1on 111 marly as 4 F~bruat7J on lrebNIZ7 Lt OWl ~raquo
I
00 55th Division issued orders assip~td$sionst()tb~ta$k
Force Units and directing the startmiddot ot th$middotoper8tdonegttJ4felu141
In brief the Division order dimeted the poundoUolngaeticgtnmiddotsb
the Task Force Units
1 Sakurai Unit willmiddotpie~e the enemy line on the east bank of the Kalapanzin Rdver penetrate into TaungBazar ~ddest1OY the Erieshymy in that area It will thenattaek from the rear the enemy west of the Kalapanzin Rtver and completely destroy-all enemymiddot units in the area north of Buthidaung A detaehment will be sent to the area south of Ngangyaung westmiddot of the Maytl Range to make preparations tor an offensive in that locality Another detachment vd1l be detailed to guard aga1rist a possible enemy advance from thedirection or Goppe middotBazar The unit assigned to hold themiddot pesent line wlll under the direction -0pound Division headquarters employ deceptive tactics to divert the enemys attention from the flanking movement ~
2 Do1 Unit Willremain approximately in its present positions and stand firmly against the enemy As the Sakurai Unit debouches to the right bank of the KalspJnzin River~ the middotDoi Unit will seize ~very opportunity to take the offensive and destroy the enemy to its immedishyate front in order to cooperate with the Sakurai Unit On the night middotof 3 February the Do1 Unit will dispatch p3rties to raid enemy headqparters and generally throw the enemy rear into contua ion The unt will also close the Ngakyedauk Pass and carry out other appropriate diversionshyary tactics During the fighting to the east of the Mayu Range the DoiUnit will facilitate the main offensive by contain1ngtl~ enemy to its front as well as keeping the enemy occupied in the area west ofmiddot the Mayu Range
3 Kawashima Unit will protect the xight flank of the Division by check4lg the advance of the enemy in the Ka1adan Valley
16
4 yohida tJn1t middotmiddotwW colltlauo1io4efend the westmiddot coastfroJl thbull-uth middotQfmiddot~he bull Nafll1nrmiddot to Foul Point
5 Koba Unit w1ll defend AkF8b middotandthshyBoronga Islands
6 Art1lleq Group wUl dire~tl1 support the Doi Unit It willfum1sba group spe~tlshycally organized and t~1nedto utilise eneaqmiddot weapons to accompany the Sakurai Unit
7 DivisionSmiddot Unilt wW establ1ihmiddot a signal center at 8e1nny1nbya on 3 Febraa17and will maintain communicationsbullbetween the DivLshy810n conmand post and the headquarters of all Task Force Umteemiddotmiddot Rad10sUence will be rna1nshytained until 0400 middotonmiddot4Februart
8 Division Reserve will remain in its present location southwestot Suthidaung Separate orders wlllbe issued tor SUbsequent moves
The Northern ArakanmiddotmiddotOpexation -prJ-rat Phase
Uaj Gen Sakurai divided his unita with a total ot appJOZ1shy
matel7 4300 men into two echelons blat Echelon consisted of
the ll2th Infantl7 Regiment tbe 2d BattaJ1on143d Infant17 an4
the 55th Engineer Regiment Wlderth$ COlmlano of Col Tanabasbt
lbe 2d Echelon directlY under thecoimnaad of GeneralSakura1llasmiddot
formed from the balance or the Sakurai Un1t (Mapmiddot No andb)
1be 2d Battalion of the U3dInfantry ~giment act1ng as the
advance guard departed Hill 124 at 0100 on 4 Februarr emplO7inc
SO~ disloyal British-Indian troops as gl1ides~ In order to shQrte~
colWD1l length each battalion of the maiJl bcgtdyadvanced withmiddot a a1xshy
17
MAP NO 30
18
MAP NO 3b
I NORTHERNmiddot ARAKAN OPERATION
1stmiddotmiddot PHASE 4 26 FEB 44
HEIGHTS INmiddot fEET o 2 3 4 5 10
MILES
I SAKURA I UNIT I 1st ECH
112(-)
143(-)
55
01600
19
teen man column front Proceeding northWard through the raquoTOW valshy
181 between Pyinshe Kala and P1inshe and d1sregard1og sporadic n
my tire the Unit succeeded in brea1dng through gaps 111 the~
lines Although the main force of thelstEchelon wasde~ed bf
some contusion the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazsr garr1
son at rJ700 Without delay the Eattaltoa crossed the Kalapanzin
River south of Taung Bazar usingcaptnred boats and was followed
closelY bY the 2d Echelon and the 3d Battalion 01 the nah Intanshy
t17 RegimentThe main bodf of the lst Echelon crossed the river
northwest of Taung Bazar on the mortrlng of the 5th
Southward Drive or the Sakurai Unit bull IS
With allanite across the river General Sakurai issued orders
for their further advance The lst Battalion 2l3thIntantrr wowd
advance toard Ngangyaung to cut the Bawli Bazar-YaWigdaw BDad and
detl7 its use to the enemy as long as possible Col Tanabash1 com
manding the 1st chelon was directed to send the let Battalion
ll2th IntantX7 through Preingyaung to seize and hold the Ngalqedauk
Pass and with the rest of the 112th Infantry- Regiment tomiddot advance on
HUl 315 northwest of Sinzvleya he 2d Battalion 143d Infantq
on the left of the 112th Infantry Regiment would move south towarci
Awlanbyin General Sakurai with his headquarters and the middot55tb Enshy
gineer Regiment proposed to follow the 2d Battalion of the 143d to~
ward Awlanbyin
20
2 There is reason to believe that o platoon of theSth Company of the 143d Infantry Regiment bad already reached Ng~uk Pass having moved north from Hliindaw on4 Itebrua17
operation had an adverse $feet Cli1the en~ ~t$i~n bulltld~~ )
cularly in connection with the e~aganentatSinzwe7a
By the night of the 6th the l$t Battal1onofthe 2l3th Iniantt7
Regiment md succeeded in crossing the Msyu ampngeand establ1shing a
base south or Ngangyaung trom which it could harass and intertere
with trafr ie on the Baw11 Bazar-Maungdaw ROad
The poi Unit Nortlnvard Movement
On 5 February the commander of the 55th Division see1r1s that
the initial a~vance of the Sakurai Unit lIrclS defelopingtgtavorab13
ordered the Doi Unit to take the offensive to the north with all
possible strength in order to compress the enemy 7th Divisiongt The
3d Battalion of the 143d Irifantry Regiment vIas ordered to attack
from Letwedet toward Hill 129 the follOtdng nlOtning 1be Battalion
0001$ the hill on the 7th andwasjoinedon theSth brthe2q Batta~
lion which had advanced from the north Believing that the main
battle was over the two battalions remainedin th~t middotlocation eo
pletely out of the operation
Division Reserve Committed
On the 6th of February the Division eommander received Lnfcrrma
tion from the Sakurai Unit Headquarters that 1tW88 involved nmiddotfignt
ing near Ingyaung Md lacked intentIY PIQteetionTheDiV~si()ncomshy
mander thereupon resolved toeo~t his only-reserve unit the 2d
Battalion of the 1Mth Infant~ Regiment andorderedittomoV~
north to reinforce General Sakurai and the 5th ~eer~gi$ent
near AYtlanbyin The Battalion however founlaquoittsirouteblOdltedb7
strong units of the British-Indiaa7tb~viio1andj8It1icgtUghunab1e
to break through to reinforee the SakuraiHeadquarterswaSStlececssfu1
in seizing and holding an enemy-position northwestQlSlnohbyinon
the night of the 7th
On the 8th the Sakurai Unit Headquarters managed to extricate
itself from its difficulties in the vieinityo Ing~ungandadvance4
to the north bank of the Ngakyedauk 1Uverbull Leamini at thesituashy
tion developing at Sinzweya GeneralSaktUa1 deterndneEl to personalshy
1 direct Col Tanabashits operation Orderinmiddotg the thFAOgin~er
Regiment to cross the river and occupy Hill 147 to protect the lett
flank General Sakurai with hiS headquart~rs moved northWest with
the intention of bypassing the enemy 89th Brigadeandapp~ach1ng
Sinzwe3a from the north
Attacks on Sinzweya
In the Sinzweya area the JJ2th Regiment made a second night at
tack on the 9th and was successful ia breaking through the southwest
comer of the enemys perimeter defense in the Sinzweyamp BasinAlshy
tltough the Regiment was successful in- firing an- anmun1tiondumpmiddot8fld ~---
doing groat damage the enemys employmentopound -t~ksforceditto
draw back without furthe r exploiting the brealcthrougb
On the morning of the lOth l Maj Gen Sakurai met Col Tanabastd
on Hill 315 northeast of Sinzveya ~d encouragedbimto press the
a signal suCCess appeared however to haves()middotdepressedmora1tethE1f
the Regiment was reluctant to repeat ltsatt-aek Inordexoto save
the situation General Sakurai rampquested ~he thDivision to send
the 2d and 3d Battalions opoundthe 143dItltarrt11Reeiment ~ieh werre
still in the vicinitymiddot of Hi11J29 and out of his control Thead~ ~
clition of these two units gaVe Maj GenSal~ifive battlions un~
dar his immediate command but the chancetQaenievea signal success
had gone In the past the JapaneseUad won victories merelyby
surrotmding the enemy but nowtheeneInyhad adop~edanew tacticQt
establishing a strong perimeter defense vvbielt whensupportedbyair
supply enabled them to withstand Japanese encircling tactics
The Offensive Halted
The Sakurai Unit tought aggressivelywithaU available $trellgth
for a period of about ten days reaching a elimax ontm 1ktb and 15th
of February but all efforts failed and oasltualties began to 1llOgnt
Lack of supplies partieularq toad handicapped Japane$e QperatiA~
af~er the 15th while the enemy receiving supplies by air had adeshy
quate food and ammunition
As the offensive of the Sakurai Unit reached its e1imaxqnmiddot the
14th of February the troops of the Unit weredisP0Sed as foJJOW$
Hill 315 Area Hq 55th Inf Gp Hq CO 55thwOp 2d Bn 143laquo Inf Regt middotl1ess4th
and middot$thCOtt
H1ll 103 Area Hq 112th rnr Regt
yenlest of SinZ1ea 1st and 3d Bns li2th int egt and at 4th Co l43d Int Regt Ngakyedauk Pass One Plat 5th Co 143d InfRegh
3d Bn 55th Mt Arty
South of Sinzweya 2d Bn 112th Int Regt
Fast of Sinzweya 3d Sn 143d In Regt
Hill 147 Area 55th F41gr Pegt (less elms)
South of let Bn213th Inf Regt (leIS let IVgangyaung and 3d Cos)
6th Co 143d Int Regt
N B The 2d Battalio~ l44th Infantry Regiment nonbwestof SinohbYin was Mmiddott Meier control otGenel~ Sak~l
Tactical Blunders
The Japanese forces wer$ guilty of a great tactical erro dlJ--
ing this period in that theT assumed that the main enemy toreemiddot Was
contained then the Britis1-Indian7th Division was bottled up at
SinzVleya and failed to take into consid~rationthat theener47 9th
33d and 114th Brigades were in position just north of the orig1nal
Japanese main defensive line This lack orkn~edgeorcons1der-
ation as rnsponsible for the Sakurai Unit putting on sucha brave
front and taking such aggressive action at Sinzweya Fortunately
for the Japanese forces the British Vere even more inept tactically
and the three brigades took no action while the battle at Sinzwea
25
was progressing This surprieiDg lacket tdti1attontbepart
the British brigades permitted thSakura1Un1twaOb ~ CoAduot
an ottensive but amp180 to withdraw to its originalbull pos1tdol1s
Fnelt Reintorcements
Meanwhile dur11g the middle of Fet)Jw~rjl 1t Was learned that
the British-Indian 26th Divis10n was moving down from the nonh
General Sakurai summoned the 55th Engineer Regiment whichmiddot reached
Hill 202 on the lath and made 1t responsibl$ tor coveringthe rear
At this pgtint the besieger found himself besieged and as enemr presshy
sure from the north built up 1n the Vicinity at Hills 315 and 2023
the Sakurai Unit found itself threatened from all sides However
the 55th Engineers and the Sakurai Unit Headquarters withstoodreshy
peated attacks by the en~ 26th Div1s1ofle
Withdrawal fran Sinzwea
The last attack on SirJzweyamade on the 22dl ended in fa1ltw-e
Cb the following night acting on ~8 own respon51bUtt7) Colonel
Tanabashi withdrew his main forcemiddot to KreingyatU1 leaving the 8th
Co~ of the 112th Intant17 at NgakyedaukPasS and the2dBattashy
lion of the 1l2th on a small hUlsouth of Sin~era~ Upon rece
1ng a report or Tanabashi f S withdrawal Maj GlGen Saktl~ai waS EOf
tremely angry but SubsequentlJr realized that the movemiddot was undoubted
ly nevitable being forced by- 1ack oflood and suppliesbull At the
sUggestion otGen Sakurai the Divisiol1commandermiddotdeterndned to
26
suspend the offensive and ordered tneSalturdUntt to witbdrawtbull
the line of the Buthidaung-Ma~dawmiddotRoadMovU1gun1~jntf)tl1e
line to ClOVer the withdrawal the mQVemOOtsouthbeg-nontllen$ght
of 24 February and was eompletedb7 1 Mareh The lstaat~alln ot
the 213th Infantry which hadbeenholdingpositiona in the vicini
ty of the road between l~gangyaungandbull Maunghnama since 6 Februa~
left its positions on the night ot the 25th andatterbreak1ng
through the enemy lines returned safelY on J March
The Northern Arakan Operation -SecondPhase
Although the 55th Division bad failed to achieve its obj~eetiVe
of completely destroying the British-Indian 7th Division during the
first phase of the Northern Arakan Operation the Divisioncormnander
still planned to carry out the second pbase the offensive against
the British-Indian 5th Division in the area west ofthe MaYU Range
However in view of the failure to achieve complete suecess1n the
first phase the commander of the 28th Arrrg advised the Division
that it would not be necessary to adhere to the original plan Acshy
cordingly General Hanaya CO otthe55th Divisionmiddot abandoned his
fo nner plan in favor of establishing astrongdepoundense In order to
gain time for regrouping raiding operations were conducted V(hieD
were calculated to baffle and confUse the enemy at thestartot
their anticipated offensive (Map No4)
21
28
MAP
MAUIlGOAW
t ~
On tba night of 4Karch the IafBatt41loQettha P-2t1ltnt~
trr eg1ment made a surprLsflmiddottaiClewep1tIIsaa wS4rottOalmu - gt - - - o-~ - - - bull
1301 the Battalion madeadawnattaCkoA ~CbI1Di4bullbullp~-
terr1to17 and behind traquo 1111e801 tlvIBr1tlsh-hcl1all5tJimviaioft
On the Sth the lst Battalion ottheu3dIntat1tr7iah8da8hd~
~r attack penetrat1ng as tarae Nawrondauftga1eollellin th~
British rear The raids were 8uccesstulltlcreat1ng eome COntUS1Cln
in the enemy rear and both units withdrebullbullw11ihoutmiddotsuffering exees
sive losses
nefenseDispo8itons
In the _antime the 55th Division middothadrearraaged -t df~
and bY 5 March the following troopdspoe1t10nsbad beeQllla4bullbull
Right Defense Unit (NorttetButhidaUbg ead bullbullbulltot the KeJap4A~ Biver)
Co~andereol Tana~sh1
Rca 112th Int Rest bull 2d Bn 112th Ja Ragt 9th Co 312th Int Ires 3d Co 213th tnt Best
Elms 55th Mt Art gt14th AT Bn (le8s middottwcgt bt
Center Defense ugt (Butrh1daungeoMaUll4aWaoa4)
Oommander ~ajQen~ 143d Int Regt (lessmatl1boc11fi)t2clJD)middot bullbullbullbullbull 1st Bn middota3tP Dt Regt(]oe18tarJ43docs~l 1st and 3dBnsl22thInf BSgt(les9tb CO)2d Bn 1Jamp4th Xnt Regt 2d Co 5thEogr Regt Elms 55thMt Artf aegtOne btry 14th ATBn
Left Defense Un1t(WeetCoaReoubhotQodueampZamp)
Cqnmander COlYehlcla
144th IntB$~(less2d SA and 1th CO) 3d Co 55th RecOl1 Regt Elms 55th ut Arty Regt
British Offensive - March 121ft
Detense dispos1tions were barelYCOJnpletedwhenon fOh~
the enemy launched an intensive attack toward Buth1daungb7 P
tured Hill 12J on the 8th and the vUlage otButh1daqllg 011 the 10th
The enemy also became active in the area west ot the Jayu Bang anct
on or about the 13th Razabil was captured By m1~Jlarcbenemy
pressure had forced the 55th Division to rel1rtquishke1J)OsitiDna oa
the north side of the Bnthidaung-MaungdawRoad
The period from 10 to 20 March was acrltlcal t~ tor the D1shy
vision the battle bad reached a cl1maxlosseswere h1gh and there
were some positions in the Uayu Range that were beingdet811ded by a
mere handful or survivors The dogged resistance of the tront 1Lne
units enabled the Division to hold the majority ot the main po1shy
tiona but the of1eersand men whohadbeenfight1ng almost conshy
tinuously since 1942 were complete11 exhausted
Tle Brit~ehtboi were experiencing heavy losses anel ebort1T
after 15 March the i 7th Division was replace4btm 26th D1v1sson
Becoming aware of this shUt on 2) M~reh the 55th Div1sioncam
mander determined to take advantage ot the s1tt18t1O~ and on the
30
Diiht ot the ~ Ordedag~ti~~tllt~~ttt~ lon of the 1l2thIntant 17 drOve throaghto~C1a bullbull3Jtot-ht
-- -
the 23lt1 to the 27th the attackwu not particcentu11 ettectSvG ina
tar as over-all resulta were ooncernedbullbullce~eJDFltUDed1atellthrult
the British-Indian 36thDiv1ston lnto the lne between the 26th and
5th Divisions
Upon completion ot regroupillg the eneDl7 resumed middotmiddotheavy ampttb~t
with fresh troops and in Aprl1 graduall7 penetratedmiddot the JapMeS8
detens1ve p)sitio1s In the m1dd1eot the JQontbtheJdJ18 no~ poundraquot
Dongyaang and southwest of Buthldaung as we11a a partotH1l1l
a keypolnt in the Jlayu Range feU to the el1em7 HUll62weat ot
Buthldaung and the hlll east or S1nohb71n wer~ 18cgtlatedbut nUl
111 Japanese hande
In spite of the entlcalaltuat1ofttbeSthD1r1a1oa coan4
ma1Bta1ned determined reslstancecohf1deltt thatthellOrse thing
were in Arakan the better the7were 1nAsseaHete1tthatthe
diversloncreated by-the HaQoOperat1on wuundotl1)ted111uuring
the success or the U-Go(Imphal)Opentlon
British Forces Shifted
The 28th Armr coftlmander cametotbe O()Ac1WJ1QIltbat t~OA
31
coa8ider1Dg the tuture d1epoait4011ot themiddot Dlv1so 1ftthe oathe
coastal area Aceord1ag17 oa 11 April 28th Amr 1S1184 orderamiddot
directing the movementot thethD1VleiontO the south As 1t
was desired that the movement be mad atthed1ecretionotGeneral
Hanqa CG ot the Division the date otthe moewas not apec1t1ed
55th Division Offensive Renewed
Before the 55th Division 8 move could be JlBclethere waa a
shUtingof enemy torces apparent17amps a resultot ettorts to re1a
torce the Imphal front middotIn the middle ot April theBntish _aha
nized forces and the 5th and 6th Div1sioM Were successive17DlOve4
from the Arakan area and the British-Indian 25th Division moved 1ft
to replace them
This change of forces and reduc~lon 1nenelDl trengthrelievecl
the s avere pressure on the 55th Division and iMtead of wlthdraW1D8
to the south General Hanaya determ1ned to destlO7 the enem7 forces
in the Buthidaung area prior to the start at tbe monsoon season
Farly in MaY he concentrated tive batta11ons with about 2 SOOmen
and rive batterieS with 10 artillery pieces - the maxLmum strlldAg
torce that could be assembled at that time At dawn on 5 Kay a
coordinated offensive was launched under the comnand otKaj GeD
Sakurai The Kubo Unit (1st BattalIonot the 2l3th Infantry) the 3 )Furuya Unit (Headquarters and 2d Battalion ot the ll2th Intantl1
Col Tanabashi had been replaced as commarder of the ll2th Infantry Regtment by Col Furuya in ead7 Uareh
- -
ampad the K~ Uait (3tlllatta~~~~~~~tJ$Jgt~O to ---- --
HUl 101 trom tbrtW 4lrectlC)nsmiddotmiddotbullbull_J)OSIt4t(1feaa_~$te14clIIl~ bullbull bullbull ltgt middot bullbullbullbullbullmiddotigt
tant17Reg1mentwitb thelst aDd 3d_tt~oll80t ~112tbWaut17
Reg1lDent) aclV8DOed Wwaldtetl(- tolll1~amp~~~tlO~of
retreat trom Buthidauag be Nakao gtt1Att(Heaclqua~r8~th AT Batshy
talion and two 1ntantr oompaniea)ae1zedH111121oproteet the
r1ght flahk or the attacking tl-o middotbaotteD8vewassuceessful
in clearing the sectoreaat ~tthe$trtohb~LetlledetUnelAs _
Fighting in the J4qu Range howevercontiftued until mldUay wjth
aome gains being regi8tE~~tbeJapaneseforce8- aLthoagb tbe7
were unable tD retake the tunna1 oathe Buth1daung-uauogdaw bel
alate USN the m0t180011 season set 1nanclfight1tJg ceasecl
The e11eJD1 withdreW 1tsmain botV totht areamiddotmiddot~rthmiddotot Ngalqedauk
Pass and the 55th D1v18~on graduall7 pUlled 1tstrontlirles back
to the south to wait out the monSOO11season (vap Ho~ 5)
Kaladan middotODratiol
It was 1mportant that the JapeAeaemiddotcont1nlM to hold the ~
R1ver Ba$1n as 1t proVided areal- c~ttII1untcatlol1s11rlefor tbe rgt1v1adon rnadditloDtheJlyenOhaW1gPlaia middot$()tltbot-aktt
an 1Inportarlt rice produclDg middotareatth1chcoQ]dea~1ipi-o4t1 to~
needs of t1vedi11810118
Beeatlse there were teVfbft~bullbullevenoatbetor~c1Sth
most practical means ottravelwaibater
MAP NO5
KALADAN FRONT o 5 10 20
MIl-ESmiddot
N
t
1944JUN
BENGAL
MILES
1
- OUTPOST OR ADVANCe POSITION N
SAWl-1 0
i
~1 ~ rMAIN POSiTION
34
iltii i
au 1and1ng bargesoould IP bullbullbull taruPtbeKa1aaaaal~Da1e
and large land1ng barges a8 tar a8Paletfti tn iteiurOlter bullbull t1a 19abJa middotb1large landing barges as tar as middot~ bullbullaatorlL7ohaUDI
gt -
and dur1ngblgh wate~almosta11thecre~ih~het1a~nrla8()Uth
ot 1hqettab1a could accolDdae larae lanMbargebullbull
BrltiehAttack on KaladanVaUet (Hap 10 6)
In mid-Janua17 1944 tbe5SthJv1e1rgtt1colllD8lderhad()r4-e4 the
55th Reconnaissance Regimentmiddotmiddot UDder C03~wash1ma tothelaledaD
Valley to take over the missions of the lstBattal1onot the a34IA~
tant17 Regiment wh1chwas tocOlll$ middotUQder tbeoomtnand ot)(~an
Sakurai for the Northern Arakan Operatugtn the ReCOMaiSJce legi
ment (less the 3d Companr) was to cbeckan7enerncolD1ngdDwntbullbull
the north along the Kaladan Valle1andtoproteo-t the rear of the
Divislon
The leading brigade ot the WestAtr1c~ Slat Dlv1atoa lett
Daletme on 18 January and headitJg8outh madecontactlflth the 11
Reconnaissance Regiment about the 24th he bullbull ae~nncssancmiddot aeg1JDen bull
badly outnumbered conducted WithdtaTt8lmiddotmiddotmiddot()pe1atiohsP1ttingmiddotmiddotmiddotltlS bull ~ c bull middot middotbull
torce 111 a rear guardact101l aga1nstthetwobngaclel ot the_
The outccmeot suchmiddot an uneven stragglemiddotmiddot could notmiddotmiddot1_s bemiddotltte1ated 8nd
by mid-Februa17the8lst DlvL81on bact o~ttp1ed themouthottbe
Keladan detilewitbout too mucbd1tl1culti Forsome~asoACo1
Kawashima had tailed to report b1s sltuat4ontotbe 5SthDlvialoc
NOS
C--- i
imiddot
36
anelon 18 February GeAeral Hena)l aaraa~whaheleceleltl
report that K1auktaw key plt)lntet the DofrQlltibadbetbullbull
by the eneJD7 At that t1me thre were ~Jlgt8DeetrooPJ oobe eaet
side of the Kaladan atver 801 olWcta~ptaCaptHolljoaacl
h1ssnallUU1ta17 Adm1n1stratlon DetaC-t a1tVOballbgponunateshy
q about 1000 replacement tlOopefoJth14l1t_W~17 Regiment
passed through JqohatU1g at that tlJDemiddotC_ttHC)a3~Jiho badbOqht
the report of tbe tall ot Kraukt- 10 (JeQeral Har1a7attookc~
ot the replacements on b1s own respona1btl1tqandheld tneUne soutb
of Thayettab1n to protectl4JObawtg
Reinforcements tor the Kaladan Front
The emergencY s1tuat1on in the ~ad8A $ector developed bullbull thbull
Northern rakan ~erat1on was at i t8height and the 55th D1vJalOll
was concentrating all poss1b1estrength 1atl1eegttteas1Ye AlthOup
General Hana1a was reluctanttoloseeveQot1e mao tJlOmthe vu
front because of the tremendous stratepc mport-ce of the KaladaA
River Basin he decided to reiJltorce the 55th Reconnaissance Reglmerit
with such strength as he could spare CnlSFebrual1 Maj Jlatsuo
commanding officer ot the 2d Battalion of the 143dIhtantrt was reshy
called from the hospital and on the 21st arrived Ln~bauag 1dtha
composite unit composed otthe followng
(be composite company from3d l3nJMth IntmiddotBest
A detachment from the 2dBn 134 bullmiddot bullbullmiddotInt Regt oon sisti~ of patientsmiddot recent11d1sehargecltrom the hospital
7
lt gt c
Smiddot1multampneoual)laj middotGeobullbullmiddotmiddotmiddotsUUla middotbullrequestecltoi)ehd middotbullmiddotmiddotbullbullbullar cmen as possible from the 2dfettalionottheit)ltOtantrito Kadm General Sakurai complied b1 sending theHeadquarte~$otthe24 Battashy
110ft the 4thCompanyone KG platoon and one batt8l1otlgun Bqtalti
Chtbemiddot 26th this group jo1ned JlajQr IatsnoatMyohauns gidngh1m
a total strength ot approYJmateq halt a battalion
Meanllhile reports or the Kaladan aituattOll had reached 28th ~
nJimiddotwh1chimnediately sent arms viaaLr to Oapt HoAjO8 cOJllpoa1te
unit rhe ami1 commandeX recognized the necessityotleaVina the
55th Division free to conduct the N01themArakan Operat1on aAd 8-middot
organ1~ed the Koba Detachment to nove to the Kaladantront~d ope
ate under direct contro~ of 28th Art1J1 Orl the 21st an order was isshy
sued assigning to the Koba Detachment the miss1onopounddr1v1ngtheeneshy
lff3 as far to the north a~ possible andoccuwJngtheKaladan VaUey
The reorganized Koba Detachment waS composed of the tollowingunlts
Koba Detachment
Commander Col Tomotoki Koba colllth Inr Rest
Hqlllth In Regt bullbull middot From Akrab 3d Bn lllth In Regt (less 9th Co) En zoute to
Alqabmiddotmiddottrom the bull south
2d Bn 14d InfRegt (Composite)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullEnrouteto Uyohaung
55th Reeon Regt (less3dCO)bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullWestbank of Kaladan River
One Plat 3d Hvy Fld Ax1yRegtbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullOnthe Uqu(One 149-mm How) front
Honjo Composite Unit e 41 bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull ~North Qt ~haung
In late February an attempt e made to traaeport the 1st
Battalion of the 29th Infantry Resjment2d Divlslon from )(ape
to Alqab by air Enemy air superioritY however prevented this
move to provide additional re1ntorcemet1tswthe Kaladan frot1i
Col Koba proceeded to Myohaungon 22 February and began assemblshy
ing his torce The two battalions tmm the lllth and 143d Regishy
ments arrived in Myohaung by the 28th
Counterattacks by the Koba Detachment
By 25 February the West African 81st Div1sionhad completeq
occupied Kyauktaw and on the 29th started an advance ~ward Apauk1a
along tm west bank of the Kaladan River tle SthReconnaissance
Regiment was pushedback to the Apaukwa-Kanzauk area and t lB 818t
Division threatened to isolate t~ enttre thDivision from southshy
ern Burma
Col Koba 8 plan ot attack called for the use or the 55th Reshy
connaissance Regiment on the west bank and the Honjo Unit on the
east bank of the Kaladan River While these two forces checked the
enemy advance the 3d Battalion of the lllth rntant 17and t18 2d
Battalion of the 143d would movenortht along the western toot of
JJX)W1tainS north of reinnyo to make a flanking attack onmiddot the enelW
on the east bank Having completed that task the battations WOuld
move acmss the Kaladan River in the rear of the main force of the
Slst Division
On 1 March the 3d Battalion of the ll1~ Intantq drove through
to tamadaw trott Kagyo and captured HUl263 whUlt tbe2d Battalion
otthe 143dIntant17 Reg1mentseized thevic1n1tlotltthaTetta~
By the 5th the eneBO force on the lett bank had beEitlrou ted0 Oft
2 March the enemy bad capturedmiddot A~ukwa but~slBkM bytbe success
ot the Koba Detachments flanking movement began to withdra to
the north
British Withdrawal
Determined to cut oft the retreat otthe West African SlstDishy
vision Col Koba ordered the 3d Battal1onto rush to Bidonegauogwa
and the 2d Battalion to Kaladan Thetwowdts amved at their reshy
spectve destinations abot1t the loth while the maintorce of the
enemy was stillmiddotsouth of Sabaseike The 3dBattalion turned south
to attack the e~emy mar and by the following dayraquo having rttOved to
the area just north of Htabaw Maj Kobayashi the commanding ott1eer
gathered his offie era on ahUlto isstleorders for the future acshy
tions The group Was taken under fire by the enemy andsusta1ned
heavy casualtiea including Maj6 Kobayashi who was killed$ When
Col Koba at Kaladan received word of this serious blow to the
Battalion he was 1a somewhat or a quandar7middotmiddot regerd1nghis next mov~lgt
mentsAt that tims he had no knowledge of the tact tmtthe enerqr
line or communications passed through Sabatseik and because tm onlr
map available to him was a small-seale map (1500000) it was
40
difficult to accurate17 planoperatloJleBased onthelntormatle
available to himt he decided tha-t1tWoalltJbel1ec8~tore1Atorce
the 55th ReCOnnaissance~g1ment which wa$st1LJcheckedastar8OU~
as Laungbangya Ordering the 2laquo1 BattaLtontQihJ1dW~daQ~hemo cl
thE9 balame of his force 1neludingthe3~ BattaJ1otiotth~ ~LlthIt- -
lantry down the Kaladan Riverbl boat toKlntherhere bull - _ c-
fo reed on 15 March by the 9th Oompan7 and the Reg1mentalmiddot Qgn Compan7
(two guns) oftheUlth Infantry
Domination of the Kaladan Vallet
The enemy offered stubborn resistance~ thevicinityot Sabal~1k
whUe the Reconnaissance Regiment continued its extremelt slOW progress
At that time however Col Sugimoto amve4totakeoVer command of
the Regiment tromCol Kawashima and under the aggressive leadership
of the new commander the 55th Reeonnaissance Regitnerittook Ollnew lite
On the 19th the Koba Detachment made a successfulattack on
Sabaseik and again the enelD1middot began anorthernwithdraWal The Detachshy
ment pursued to Kale-dan with the Reconnaissance Reg1ment mOving Ol11and
and the balance or the Detachment traveling by boat~flIn the meantime
the 2d Battalion had been foreed torelinqish Kaladan By the end
otuareh the Koba Detachment was concentrated astridemiddot themiddot middotKalac1an Rivshy
er just south ot Kaladanwhich it succeeded in recapturing in ear17
April
FrOm this point on the enemy made gt110 rurtherQrfensieve threa~a
apparently contented with t~t1ng a step-by~tepdeh7ingaetloft
DUing good IDe of adV$ltageousterralneature~~~A~$
Paletwa fell ~to the hands otthe pnrsu1ttgJapgneseMd ~middot2 Mq
Daletme was captured bytheKoba Detachment)
Regrouy of Forces
In the meantime in consideration of thefavorable progresfJ of
the Kaladan Operation and the importance of protect1J~ A1qab ~ t~
2Sth Army t()rmnlated a plan tor a r-egroupll-got fCl~as~ part
otthat plan the 1st4 Battationotthe29thInt~tl7 BJglment -h1c1l
had been at Akyab since 9 March was ordered to middottatadan 01119 April
Later after the Battalion had advanced up the Pi R~vel to Satwei
and crossed the Burma-India bo~er on 24 April th~2ath A~V1ssued
an order reorganizing the Kaladan front Ool~ ICoba
units (principally the Headquarters and 3d lllth Inshy
fantry Regiment) were to return to Aqab while middotthe 55th l~conaissance
Regiment the 2d Battalion of the 143d Inrant17$ the
ion of the 29th Infantry- ere to take overreeponsibllitjr fen the
Kaladan front under the command of Col Sugimoto~
Because the Kaladan Operation started under very adver8~ eo~
ditions and the Japanese forces engaged were hu~iedly assembled 1a
the face of an energency 1twas felt that the Koba Dataer~nt had
achieved an outstanding success Partic1llarly ngetdotta had beM
iii the employment by COl loba ofmiddotb1$one pteceotart1ileqaJ49
how1t~erUovingthe SUll fromgtOl1e ~ealttoot~onJatge1and -
ing barge be had successf1U7enlp1oyed itto~Xp]()itthewakpoltmiddot -
otthecamparatively lightly equipped e11etajrInrecogniUon bullof its
pertormancein the Kaladan Operation the A1DYconlmander presented
citation to the KobaDetachment
Troop DisP2sit1ol1 - Hq19M
About the middle or May the 2d Battalion althe 143d 1ntant~
occupied Kaletwathe 55th Recorlaissance Reg1ment secured the Duma
India border near Labawa and the lst Battalionotthf929thmadea
raid on Banzai Bazar about ten miles northeastotBawlt Bazar he
Iest Atrican Slst Division was driven completelrout middotoithe sector
and the KaladanOperation was concluded middotmiddotToward the endmiddot 01 Mqaa
the monsoon season began the Sug1motaUn1t revertedto 5SthD1v1sioJl
control and troop dispositions vlere made to wait ~utthe ~seasoa
(Map No5)
Line of Communications (MaP
No 7) _ _ 1 _ - shy
SignalmiddotConmun1cations
The main wire and radio communications netugtrks availablemiddot to
2SthArIIlY Were as shown on Map No 7bullbull Theestablishment otcomun1shy
cations networks was greatly expeditecl by using the existing middotline
that paralleled 1ihe mainoperationa1roadsThecablesthatranun-
derwater along the Irrawaddy RLver bed troJ1P1Oll1$toHen~da bad
43
MAP NO 1
BENGAL BAY
N
LOGISTICS FOR HA-GO OPERATION
28th ARMY
RADIO NETWORK
WIRE NETWORK
bull LINE MAINT CEN
50 1
MILES
44
however deteriorated badlr anet were of middotlittle use
tine maintenance e~nter811ere located atLetpadart P1Qmean~
Kywegu and there was a line between Rangoon and Henzada Whichmiddotmiddot bad
been installed by the Burma National Teleeonmwncations Bureau
Supply
Logistic emphasis for the Ha-Go Operation was placed OD the upshy
plying of fuel and munitions to the 55th Division III order to meet
the requirem~nts or the intensive oparation the Arm3 moved supp7
terminals as tar toward the front as practicable and made eve et shy
tort to maintain transportationcapaeity
The prineipaJ concentrations of AmY sUPPl3 depots were near
Prome and Shwedaung Depots for the 55th Division were located at
Kethala depots for the 54th Division were located at Taungup while
t1xgtse for the 2d Division were at Bassein
Although it was possible for the units on the northern front
as well as those on Ramree and Cheduba Islands to procure local proshy
visions few local sources ensted in the area south or the Kaladan
River Basin and west otthe Arakan Ra~e
Transportation
Transportation posed a particularly difficult problem There
was only one motor road crossing the Arakan Range and north of
Taungup the poor coastal roads combined with increasing enemY air
activity made movement or supplies bY motor vehicle almost impossishy
ble Enemy air activity was also responsible for making water
45
--
transport 80 hazardous anddtfticuJJt that1tw~saImostefit1817
limited to n1ghtmovementbull TransportaUonduroingthe Ha4100perashy
tion was proVided as shown below
Area Served Unit
BetweenPadaung and Taungup 5thIndepetdent Motor Trsnsport 2d and3dCos bullbull 2d Transport middotRegt
~tween Taungup and Kethala llthShipp$ngmiddot Group(aq) lltl1$h1pp~ Engr Regt3dSearransport Bn 5lstIndependent bull TransportBn 236th Independent MotormiddotmiddotTraosportCo 1st Co middot2d Transport Regt 2dmiddotCo 4thmiddotIransport aegt3d Co I 55t h TransportRegt
~tween Taungup and Akyab 38th Water Transport Serv1ceCo
IDcal Transportmiddot at Pmme 3d Co 54th TransportRegtmiddot Composte Motor Transport OQ
Transportation between Rangoon and Prome was conducted chiefly by rail
Medical
The medical situation was generally favorab1e~ Tm percentage
~f mlaria cases by-division was as ollQWs2d Diisioo~ to 8
percent 54th Division 2 to per cent 5thDivisi0l120 per CEUtt
and forces directJy assigned to the 28tb Army 7 to 15middotper ceat I
There was litUe incidence of contagious dissase
C~R2
THE KAN OPERAlION NUMBER 1
51tuationin Mid-194ft
By thebeginnfng of the 1944 monsoon seaS)Q it became clearmiddotthat
the Imphal Operation had failed sad on July the Burma AreaA1m1
issued orders for suspension ot the operation Theactionsinthe
Salvreen River and the Hukawng Valley sectors bullbull weremiddotmiddotalso bullbullbullbull go1rJgmiddotbadlt
tor the Japanese With the exce(tion bull of thenorthemmiddotmiddotmiddotArakanmiddottront
where the 28th Army was still accomplishing its Mission the situ
ation in the entire Burma theater had become critical Furthermore
intelligence estimates indicated that enemy forces including a powshy
erful airborne unit were prepared to launch large-scale attacks af-
tar the end of the monsoon season
Nel 28th Amy Mission
On 12 July the Burma Area Amy in an attempt to cope with the
current situation issued an order assigning the 28th Arm1 a new mts middot
8100
The 28th Army will prepare for further deshyfensive operations wlLh particular importance beshying attached to the Irrawaddy Deltaand the stra tegic coastal areas south or TamandttRamreemd Cheduba Islands will be held as long as possible The 2d Division and the bulk of the motor transshyport units attached to the 28th AntJYwUl be
47
trensterred to the
1 CPPt ) I gt ltAt the time or tle issutDgOfthe91derJl~th~~thA~hav~
been advised of its contents~advanee$waslt)onduo~~~()nt~le1loemiddot ~
of staff officers and divisioncOJmlandereJatP~dfj~~on~darop
erattonal plens for the penodfollowtng thamp19AAmons()on smiddoteason2
en 13 July Lt Gen Kawabe commander oftm BUXlJUlAreArtn1attend
edthe conference Although the basic plan as outliriad at the com
manders I conference was not completed in detail urttilOCtobsJ the
tollONing general concept was esta1gtlitShadat1iheJtiWJJ1eetiD$
Invlew ot the fact thatthecentans1vedeshyfense area of the ~thArmy (400 mlle~long~d 150 miles wide) is WO large to 1gt$ completeJimiddot covered by only two divisionsstrategicax-eas will be defended as follows (Map No Sh
(A) Holding Areas The entire area west of the Kaladan River Basin ineludingAkyab and the coastal islands and the southern tip of the Irrawaddy Delta wUl be designated as Hold1ng AI3as Action in these seato 181111 be primashyrily defensive with every ~vaUab1e meansbe ing employed to check enemy advances
C bullbull
1 The33d Annyhad been organized witnthelsth ~6tllm~~ visions in April 1944 to conductoperat1ons ()o theH~wngart4lt SalTeen fronts Later reintorcedbythe 53dPivision the34Army was commanded by Lt Gen Masaki Honda
2 Headquarters of the 28th AImY had been moved t1OmMaud$lng to Paungde during May
MAP NO8
o TIl-IN
RAMREE
BAY N
t OF
BENGAL
AREA CLASSIFICATION AND FORTIFICATION PLANS
- 28 th ARMY
AREA CLASSIFICATION
A----- HOLDING AFlEAS
B - --- COUNTEFlATTACK AREAS
C ---- DECISIVE SATTLE AREAS
FORTI FI CAT ONS
I ------ ARMY
n ------ DIVISION
o 25 50 75 eOO=
MILES
49
I
- ~
(B) -- Counterattack Ar$ae The coastaL ~~~~(Il~ Upound -
strip from Uyebon s()uth toPaglt)Ctapo1ntan~ ttlraquo Arakan Mountain zonaW3~l middotbe ~onsideredt aCounshyterattack Areasamp ForcesassignedtQ these secshytors wUleonduct8 sem1-mobil~dat~nseandwUl endeavor to destroY enemy~atldandamphiblous a~ tacks by independel1t and aggressiva actJ0n~
(C) - Deeis-~ bullEa~~~e _~~ The IrrawaddT River Basin excaPt-the southern delta region will be the finaldetensiva line Defemepos tiona in depth will be prep9recl in this area and in the final daciaivebattle the etl~ will be met and halted by the entireavaUable strength 0pound the 28th Anny
la-sit Foree Organization and l4is~on
To defend the 28thmiddotArmy zone ofresponsibllity and toean1011~
the missions outlined in the new defense concept three tasktorees
were formed from the 54th and 55th Divisions
~ra petachmen~- Commander Majo Gen Sakurai
55th Int Gp Hq 2d En 112-th Inf Regt 1st Bn 143d Inf Regt 3d Bn 1Mth Inf Regt 2d Bn 55th Mt Arty Regt 55th Recon Regt (less 3d Co)
4th Co 143d Int Regt (attached) 3d Co 4th Shipping Engr Regt One co 55th Engr Rest One co 55th Trans Regt
Missions
1 To take over the defense sectGJ formerly assigned to the 55th Division and screen the withdrawal of the DivisLon
2 To delay the advance of tm enemy in the area northWest of the Akyab-Myohaung line as long as possible
54th Division - COnmart4er LtbullClen Kat8IDQra
Organic Un1t~ middotmiddotHq 54th D1Ymiddot 54th InfGp Bq lllthIntRegt l2lstInt Regt 154th Int Regt(less 2dBn) 54th FlO Arty aegt (le~$lstBttT) 54th Recon Regt 54th Eng Regt 54th Trans ~gt
Attached Units 14th AT Bn (lesslstBtX7) 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld A3tl Regt OllebtryI 35th AA an 1st Co 11th Shipping Enar Rep 26th Ponton Co 38th liater Trans Sv Co
Missions
1 To check and crush the enemy in the zone between the Myebon-lilt Yoma (Hlll 419) line to theDalet River
2 In coordination with the Sakura Deshytachment a strong elementwill)e engaged in conducting delaying actions in the area south of the Akyab-Myohaung line and will cover the vithdrawal of the Detachment
3 lb hold Ramree and Cheduba Ialands as long as possible
55th Division - Commander Lt Gen Hanaya
Organic Unts Hq 55th Div JJ2th tnt Regt (less2d amp1) 1430 Inf ReSt (less lst middotBn and 4th Co) 144th Int Regt (less 3d en) 55th Mt Arty Regt (less 3d Bn) 3d Co 55th Reeon Regt 55th Engr Regt(less one co) 55th Trans Regt (less one co)
Attached Units lstBtry14tbAt Btl 10th RtverCrosfJingUater1almiddotmiddotOO One platUthShipping EngrRegtQnemiddot co51et Trans bull Bn
Missions
1 Withdraw to the BaS8e~ area to replace the 2d Division as eoon as possible
2 Defend the Irrawaddy Delta and the strashytegic area around Basein
Other instructions ot a general nature inCluded theorganiZ1ng
and equipping of all rear area troops to eombatairbome attacks and
to complete the WOrk started in April 1944 to reeonstructthe Y1nbushy
An Road as a ch7 season motor road1heboundarybetweenthe operashy
tional zones ot the 54th and 55th Divis10nswas established as the
Prome-Taungup Road with the road itself beirgin t1le54th Division
zone Fortifications in three echelons wer~ to be constructed 1n
the Arakan Range on the Prome-Taungup arid liinbu-An Roads
Regrouy
On 17 JulY the 2d Division began its movement northeast to
the Shan Plateau while the first echelon or the min body of the
55th Division started its southward movement The Sakura Detachshy
ment remained in themiddot northwest to protect the rear or the 55th Dishy
vision and screen its southward move For the most part men and
draft animals moved by toot water transport being utUizedfor
the transportation of approximately 2000 tonsotaDmunit1on fhe
52
redisposition of the 55th DiVision in the Bassein area as accomshy
lt plished by the end or september and by t~ end of October the
bulk of equipnent and amm~ition had also been moved (Yap No9) bull
In order~o deceive the enemy measures were tak~ to make 1t
appear that the Division had arrived at Bassein from lIalaya botake
part in a new operation which was referred to 8S the Chittagong
Operation It
Burma Area Apny Command Changes
In september there was a tremendous shake-up 1athehea~
of the lhrma Area Axm7and ~ts subord1nateun1tswhich resultedIA
many ot the higher commanderabeing rtplacedLtltGen ~taro
Kimura was newly designated as commander of the Area AtlD1 w1th Lt
Gen Shinichi Tanaka formerly commander ot the 18th Division a8
chief of stat Lt Gen Shihachi Katamura was shifted from coomand
of the 54th Division to the command of the 15th Army and Lt Gen
Shigesaburo Miyazaki who had comnanded the 31st Infantry Group and
the Miyazald Detachment was appointed commanding general ot the
54th Division
Imprial General Headquarters D1rectiva
On 19 September Imperial General Headquarters issued Am17 Dishy
rectiva No Z67 addressed to the Southern Iumy
53
MAP NO9
BAY OF
BENGAL
DISPOSITION OF
28th ARMY SEP 1944
OPERATIONAL ZONES ASSIGNED TO 2911
ARMY IN OCT AND NOV 1944~
~o 2~ ~o
- - xLES i
54
The chief aim in the Burma areawiU be to bolster the north wiDgor the southern sphereb7 ensuring the stability or the strategic areas in southern amp1rma At the middotsame time evei7effort will be made to sever communicat1oAsbetween China and India
After careful consideration the Southem A1m71ssued metinoshy
tions to the Burma Area Army in accordance wi~ the IGHQD1Jectl~1
The Area Arrny will hold that part of Burma south of the Lashio-Manda18Y line and east ot the Irrawaddy R1ver
Qperational Instructionsmiddot bY the Burma AreaAgy
In accordance With the Southem AmrOrder theBurma Area Arshy
rq prepared operational instruct~ns for the 1944-45dr7 season and
directed all subordinate armies to have theirplans prepared bYlate
OCtobar Burma Area Army instructions are outlined
1 The operation along the China-India route the operation in the eentralbasin of the Irrawaddy River and the operation on the coastal areas of Burma will be referred to as the Dan Ban and Kan Operations respectively
2 Preparations tlll be made on the basic assumption that the decisive battle win be exshypected along the Irrawaddy River between Mandashylay and Pakokku or in the Irrawaddy Delta area Mealwhile every effort will be made to cut oft COmEIltUlications between India and China tor as long a time as possible
3 The J3d Anny will be in charge of the Dan Operation and will conduct a strong defense on the line of Lashio Bawdwin and Monglong
55
4 lhe15th Arm71dll bea881gned~i~ ~ Operation with a decisive battle to be eqpaQ~ld in late January ItsdefensezonelVlllraquo irt g~~ eral extend from Manda1ar a)ong the Irrawaooy RLver to YenangyaungD~thedecis1veb~tshytle on the Irrawaddy River the 2Sth and 33d Ar-wgt mies will cooperate with the 15th ArmY ampltllextd as much strength as possible While eOndutfttng holding operations in theiro-m zones
5 The 28thArmy wUl be reaponsibl~ f(H~ the Kan Operation The Array will make every effort to check enemy araprqbious attacks troltt the Bay of Bengal and subsequently will hold on a line from Yenangyaung along the Arakan Mountain Range to Basseip and Rangoon DurLiFlg the period of the KanOperation decisive batt~le)pound
the 15th and 33d Amdes will conduct holding opshyerations on their fronts
6 The AreaAmryreserve vlUl be emplo~ted in reinforcing whiohever army is inlOlved in a decisive battle in the Ban or Kan tronts~
7bull CoWltermeasures agairlSt enemy ctt ~borne
attacks will be made in order to destxyenJJr attacks at their inception For this systematic intelligence and communications nli~tro
work will be established as soon as possible
Planning for the ian Qperai2~
This order of the Burma Area Army confirmed the mission of the
28th Artny and added some new tasks The Rangoon tSitld IJfirbu areas
were transferred to its operational zone while the rttifigoon Defense
Unit composed of the Rangoon Antiaircrat Unit and elements of aame
logistic units as well as the Katsu Foree were plilt~edw1der 28th)r
my command The Katsu Force was eomposedQ untts from the 49thraquo1
vision
56
153lt1 In Regt (less 1st Bn) 3d Bn 49th Fld Arty Regt (less 9th Bt17) 2d Co 49th Engr Regt One medical company
By early October the 28th A1m7 plan tortheplO~ecut1011of the Kan
Operation was in readiness based on theo~al plan prepaNda
July The comnander of the 28th ArmIheldaconferenee of his8Ubshy
ordinate Wlit commanders to brief them on the new plan and their
missions In late October a general conference was held middotmiddot1nR1ngoon
under the auspices of the Area Army The oP3ratioral planot each
or the subordinate armies was thoroughly discussed inmiddot order to inshy
sure coordina tion of the over-aUmiddot Burma operation As 8middot result of
these deliberations the Yenangyaung area wasmiddot added middotw the operashy
bulltiona zone of the 28th Army whteh would be reinforced by the72d
Mixed Brigade soon to be activated
28th Army Final Kan 0P2ration Plan
The original plan of the 28th Amy for operations middot1nla~39lt4
had required no radical changes to bring it into agreemEnt with the
atrma Area Annys plan for the imptementat1onof theKan Operation
Since the basic concept of the 28th ~nnyls planwasnev~r bullchanged
the subordinateunit s were able to makeconeisteritpreparations
throughout the 19LA monsoon season
Operational Pollex
The 28th Army ampUlieel its or1ginal operational planb7 l8sushy
ing detailed instructions on pgtliqanticontrolamps8 guide to tts
subordinate units
1 Major engagements are anticipated in the Irrawaddy Delta area theYenangyaung area and in the environs ot Rangoon
2 As explained 1n theoriginal plan the Army defense area is divi~ed into Holding Areas Counterattack Areas and Decisive Battle Areas
3 To suwlement lack of strength and eshyquipment fortifications will be constrtlcted throughout each operational area munitions wtll be atockpilec1 at locations where engagements are probable and communications facilities to ex- pedite mob~lity will be prepared and maintained Anti-British natves will be encouraged to strengthen civil defenses and in the conduct of combat operations long range raiding tactics will be employed
4 Reinforcement of the 28th Armr by-the 2d and 49th Divisions is expected When a decishysive battle is joined
Operations Control
In addition to designating the type of defense to be employed
in each area the Amy established within the frame work of the aD
Operation three Bub-operations and advised itsmiddot subordinate units ot
the action which the 28th Army would take as eacho the sub-opera-
tiona was activated
Kan Operation No1 will bQaQUvated 1ft the event a decisive operationQt1 the8outhwe~ ern coast develQpesbull It wUlbeeonducted 8follows
1 The 55th Division _111 check the enemiddot my along the maill defensive linemiddottromeast of Gya to the area northeast of BasaeinwhUe the Army prepares tor a counteroffensive
2 The Army wnl coneeatrate thetoUow ing forces within 20 days after the operation begins
a Six infantry and two artille~bat talions of the 54th Division to be assembled at Henzada Foot and motor movement to be employ ed
b The 20 and 49th Divisionsand it required one other division will be dispatchshyed to the Henzada and Danubyu sectors by the Area Amy Movement to be by motor or rail Certain s~cifie elements of the 49th Division will assemble near MaubinMovement tobeby water
c The Kateu Force from the Yenangshyyaung area wlll move to the Henzada sector by motor transport
3 During this phaseot the operation holding actions wUl be conducted on the Yenqshyyaung tront by the72d Mixed Brigade and on the Arakan frontby one artillery and threeintanshytry- battalions or the 54th Division
Kan Operation No 2 will be activatedLn the event a decisive operation intheYenangshyyaung area developes It Will be conducted amp8 follOWs
59
1 The 72d Mixed Brigade with the latsu Foree will conch1ct delqing actions 111 middotthe sec tor between the Tilin-Pakokku Road and the Irrawaddy Riverand will check and crush the eneshyrrtS on the main defense line between Seikp)u and Mt Popa
2 It is expected that two intsnt17 and one artillery battalions of the 54th Divisions and two infantry- battalions of the 55th Division will be utilized to reinforce the units engaged in this operation
3 If the situation permits the main force of the 54th Division will be trans~erred to this front
4 The AlDY will make every- effort to fo rce the enemy to conduct a decisive battle on the right bank of the Irrawaddy River where the batshytle can be coordinated with the 15th ArmY
Kan Qperation No 3 wUl be activatedfor the defense of Rangoon and nll be conducted as 10110118
1 The Rangoon Defense Unit will secure the outskirts ot Rangoon
2 The ArDy will assembl e the following forces within 20 days of the start of the opershyilioo
a The main body of the 54th D1Vision (six infantry and ~o artillery battalions) two infantI7 battalions of the 55th Division and the Katsu Force will be concentrated in the HmawbishyTaikkyi-Maubin sector Foot motorand water tran~portation to be used
b The 2d and 49th Divisions vdllbe dispatched to the Inegu-Peguarea by the Area Amy
3 During the decisive battle holding acshytions will be conducted in the Yenangyaung area by the 72d Mixed Brigade on the Ar~an tront b7
the balsnce otthe S4thDLvistt)Qand 9Jlbullbull itl1e southwest coastal stripbyth~maiftbodyot the 55th Division
Loss otmiddot Air Support
Some changes in planning rega~theaDlOW1totSUpp()ritomiddot be
expected from the air arm weN required1nDecembermiddotamps bout ~
the strength or the 5th AirIgt1visiori 1I4S transterred to the Philip-
pines This move left only about 40 planesavai1able to support
ground operations in all of Burma and limited air support to strashy
tegic air reconnaissance
Operations of the Sakura Detachmmi
MeanWhile I as the 55th D1v1sioJ1 began its movement IOUth-1ft
the latter part of July the Sakura I)etachment r~d 1i po81tion
as a holding and screening unitInitiaU1theDetac~t1tcovered
a bxosd front from Donbatk Ilorth toAlethangyaweJong the OO$8t
and then east to Kaladan The 3d Batta1ionilMthInfmt17 Jteg1nent
was deplo~d in the coastal sector the lst Battalion 143lt1 Intant17
in the Mayu Range the 2d Battalion 112th Inrant11a~rtr1de the
Kalapanzin River the So Partizan Team (about 100 men under Capt
Kanetoshi) in the Mowdok Mountain Rangeandt~ 55th Reconnaissance
Regiment in the Kaladan Valley (Map No lOa and b)
Early in September there were an increasing number ot indicashy
tions that the enemy was pre8ring tor an attack which was intended
61
MAP NO 100
BAY OF BENGAL
LEGEND WITH DRAWAL
ATTACK
-- ENEMY
N
OPERATIONS OF
SAKURA OET
AUG - DEC 1944 HEIGHTS IN FEET
o 2 4 6 e 10 20
MILES 7
62
MAP NO lOb
63
to outtlank tle troops 1n the area west of the lla7URangeOn U Sep
tember in an effort to forestall the enemy attack General Sakurai
launched an attack with units from the Sakura Detachment ~ 1st
Battalion 143d Infant l7and the 3d Battalion 144th Infantry supshy
ported bY six mountain guns made an effeotive surprise raid on an
enemy group of approximately brigade size at Godusara later on
6 Octobe r the Detachment also carried out a surprise attack on
Goppe Bazar when the 2d Battalionll2th Infant17 and tbia 3d Batshy
talion lL4th InfantI7 were successful in cQn1using and delayiDg the
enemys attack preparations
British Off~lsive - November 19
In mid-oetober a powerful elEmEnt of tte West African81st raquo1-
vision had moved into the Kaladan front from the direction 0pound NgabaA
Maj ~n Sakurai rushed to Paletwa to conduct opefttions but by the
end of October the 55th Reeonaissance RegiJoont had been gradually
pressed back to Paletwa and the area to theYe8t The regiment withshy
stood repeated attacks untiJ early November when it was Qrdered to
withdraw to the Kaladan-Bidonegyaungwa line where it was reinforced
by two companies from the May-u front
In mid-November the British launched a general offeneive wiofh
the lest African 82d Division driving along the Kalapanzin RLver and
the British-Indian 25th Division striking west ot the Yayu Range
Vastly outnumbered the Sakura Detachment defended the Buthidaung
81one
Reinforcement of the Kaladan Area omiddot bull ~ bull -
In cons1deration of the 1ncreas1Dg enftJll7 p18SlJurebo1ihlftthe
Kaladan and Mayu areas the 28th Armr ordered theUatsuDetac_t - - --
to assume responss1b111ty tor the Kf31alt1an tront~ middot1heDeta~t~ -
composed of the Hq 54th Intant17GrouptbeJ+LthIntant~ -- - lt -
(less the 2d Battalion) the 3d BattalLo~ 154thInrantry andtbe
Battalion 54th Field Artillery RegimentwLth ltajGenKoba e mander The 55th Reconnaissance Reg1JnentwastEl$poraliJ attchec1
In late November Kaladan was evacuated by the 55th Recotana1a
s8l1ceReg1ment while the MatsuDetachment madelcountemttackteraquo bull
check the enemy at Tinma ltthe southem_d of tmKaLadandelUe
In mid-December howeveranothersnm7 force attempt~anadvance
through the mountains to the easf Tm MatsJ)etachmentwas tore
to tum east to meet this new threat while the thReCOmlA8$at1Qe
Regiment fought a delqing actidn~rth()r~Kyaukt_
Withdrawal or the SakuraDetachment
Whlle tpe Uatsu Detachment tought1ntb KaladanaJlel tbe bad
17 outnumbered SakuraDetachment had beenres~~t1ngc1Qgge4L7tor~~ gt - - -
ing the enemy to battle tor every inchof bulladvancei middotmiddotmiddotOftiiODec$11ber
the Detachment relinquished the HiP- 162-l1tli14aun~areaand~OQlc~
pos4-tions on the south bankot theiSSingdinlltvet butiCOntinued tb
hold the line west of HJarabyin to the west
In late December Maj Gen T Sakurai suggested to ttGen
S Sakurai that the Detachment was reaching the limit of 1tsenshy
durance Considering that the m1ssion otheSmiddota1oUa Detachment
had virtually been accomplished the Army commander ordered1s
withdrawal to Prome The withdrawal froln the area which the Jashy
panese had held for two and a haifyea-s was begun on 26 December
On New Years Eve Maj Gen T Sakurai and his men c1Jssed the
Kaladan River and by the 4th were concentrated south of ~ohatmg
being covered by the Matsu Detachment The Sakura Detachment then
moved to Prome where it Vias awarded a citation by the 28th Army
commander for having successfully checked two enerny divisions from
August through December
Final Preparations for the Kan Ooration
While the Sakura and Matsu Detachments checked the enenw- intbt
north other 28th Army units were able tomalee preparat-0ns tor the
final decisive battles to determine the fateof south westem Buma~
FortifieationConstruetion
The2Sth Army headquart-ers planned the tortifieationsto ~ used
in the expected main battles as well as those over which the Army felt
it eJqgtedient to exelcise control All other fort1f~eat1onBinthe des-shy
ignated defense areas were the responsibility of the subordinate units
In general defense positions were to be of the field type with key
installations to have mediUDl cover capa~e of 1I1th$~and1ng 2QO-kg
bombs or a concentrated attack by middotl5-emguns Const1UctionlIork
TlOuld be accomplished bYthe troops with the aid of local labor
lheArmr encountered great difficulty in performing the necessampr7
constructionwork due to the monsoon season and because ~nellGa1r
interference in many areas meant that llOrk on positionscouldoampshy
11 be done at night
In spite of difficulties however the Work progressed and
during late 1944 and early 1945 the following fortifications were
completed by the 2Sth AnDY
1 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Prome-JaUngup 3
Road
2 In the Arakan Mountain Range along the Minbu-Dmlandu
Road
3 nthe area around Yenangyaung including ehauk and
Seikpyu
3 During the tine the Arakan Range fortitications were being planned some 28th Army staff officers criticized the plan since the positions lay behind the 54th Division they felt that the eonshystruction would have an adverse affect on 54th Division morale The Amy conmander however recognized the possibilitY that the 15th Armr might fail to bring the Ban Operation to a successful-conclushysion and the consequent necessity of the 54th Division beingreshyquired to withdraYi across the Arakan Range
67
4 In the Vic1n1tyotAllanmyo (cons~derdas a strong
point for defense against enslJl3 airborne units)
5 In the environs orUt Popa
6 In the vicinity of Prome (fol protection of Unbullat
conmunications installations)bull
7 In the EIlvirous of Ransoon(for defense agcdnst am
phibious attack)
8 Along the southwestern coastalarea (for defense a I
gainst amphibious attack)
Communications
Because of the necessity tor closely coordinatedoperationemiddot
special emphasis was placed on theestablislunent bullmiddotand maintenance
o communications It was however extremely dirtieultmiddot to comshy
plete communications nets in such a vast andundeveloped territoshy
ryIn addition materiaJ was in short supply and although the
28th Army had an element of the AreaArmy Signal Unit attached it
had no organic signal units and was required to rely almost ent~
ly on existing lines tor wire communications
Road Construction
A large-scale program of road construction and improvement
was W1dertaken to meet the xequirements of the Army (Map No S)
Particular emphasis was laid on the Rangoon-Prcme-Yenangraung
Road the Prome-Taungup road the Henzada-Bassein Road and the
6S
Uinbu-Tamandu Road as the main arteri8forthe movement of ~thmiddot Arshy
my The Minbu-Tamandu Road had been startedby the2Cgttb1e1dkgtad
Construction Unit 10 June 19M ~dwas comPltted middotmiddotiAJanU8J7194Sbull
Otha r nevlly constructed roads tncll1c1ed themiddotmiddotPa~deJounSooRoadmiddotmiddot beshy
gun by the 67th ~ependentEng1neermiddotmiddotmiddotBattal1otigt1n bull septeDlber middot1944 and
roughlY completedin March194S and the~shltpb1-Henza~ Road wh1ch
had been started in October 1944 wdngnativelabor andwaJOu~
completed in Janua17 1945
At important crossing points ofmiddot th~ Irrawadd7 and other larse
rivers in the region ferrying facilitieswere prepared andengiQeel
river crossing units were assigned to thepoLnts
Ordnance Materiel
Because of the disruption of supply lines tromJapaaweapoJ1l
and amnunition were in short supply and the Aztny Was bard put to eshy
quip its subordinate units from the supplies on hand The need tor
antitank mines was particularly acute and 28th Armymade frequent xeshy
quests ot higher headquarters tor 8uppliesof thesede~enseWeapon8
Failing to receive any supplies of munitions fromhighermadquart8rs
the 28th Army was forced to prepare antitank mines and other needed
explosives by removing the charges from aerial bombs As a last reshy
sort the Army urgently requested an air shipment o~ detonating fuzes
but they were not forthcoming either and the supp1r of antitankm1Des
assembled by the Army was completely inadequate
69
Training
Because-of the greatly superiorenemystrqtl1 and equipmsnta
well as the nature ot the operat1onalareasitwasioreseenthatmaD7
aspeets of the coming combat Yfouldltditfer radJeal17fromnonnal pro
cedures Since existing trainingmiddot manuals did not providemiddotthe tra1rJshy
gt ~ information necessary to prepare 28th Anny units forfutureoper-middot
ations the Army prepared the following speeialmanuals tot1tthe
particular needs of the situation
Manual for Antitank Action
Manual for Raiding Action
Manual for Combat Against Airborne Uh1~s
Manual for Coastal middotDefense
Manual for Attackmiddot on Demiddotfense Perimeters
middotManual for Air Defense
Although there was Wldoubtedly some dogmatic theory~luded1n the
new training mnuals on the whole they were middotpraeticaland geared to
current conditiona The Army conducted many mapandterrainexercisea
tor the officers of its subordinate units inefpoundoztstoefiect thoroughshy
ly realistic training The faetthat the Army forces were sondel
dispersed however militated against proViding sufficient training
and the results of the training program tell short of expectations
70
start or the Kan gperation
5hth Division QperatioQ$ Plan
The operations plan otthe 54th middotDlvss1on called for mldiDg 88
long as possible north and west of thel43ebon-Mtbull Yomaline amp8 well
as Oll the principal coastal islands It would secUre thelyebon-llt
Yoma-Dalet River triangle with its main force and th~laungup seetor
with a strong elemmt Any enemy tOrc8 lfhtch rn1ght land south of
Myebon would be attacked by the nearest availablemiddot units The areas
around An and Taungup would be secud ~er allcircwnstances and
ene~ advances toward the Arakan Mountain Range would ~checked
To defend the key points in the 54tbDivisioazone of respoAshy
sibility a series of defense units were tonned
Matsu Detachment Commander middotMaj bull Gen Koba
Hq 54th Int Gp lllth Inpound Regt (less 2dBn) 3d Bn 154th In Regt 2d Pn 54th Fld ArlyRegt (less 4th Bt17) One eo 54th EngrRegt
Mlebon Sector Unit Conimancler Lt 001 Nakamura
54th Recon Regt (lesslt 3damp4thCos) 1st Co 154th IntRegt One ptat 54th Fld Arty lest
Igylgaw Seotor Unit Conl1nander~ Col MurayampoundP
154th In Regt (less 3d E)l) 1st 121 54th Fld ArtY Regt 2d Btry 3d Hv Fld Arty Regt
71
Tamandu Sector Umt Ocmnander Ltbull Col Nakao
14th AT Gunampl (lese 2d and 3d Btrrs) 9th Co lllth Inpound Regt 9th Co 121st In Regt
Kywegu SectorUni~ Commander Col Tanaka
2d Bn lllth Inpound Regt (less one eo) 4th Bt17 54th Fld A-rt1 R~ Hq 54th Div Med Unit
Taungup Sector Unit Commander Col NagasaW6
l2lst In Regt (less 9th Co) 4th Co 54th Reoon Regt 3d Bn 54th Fld ArtyRegt 3d Co 54th Engr Regt 3d Btry 14th AT Bn
Units tinder Direct Division Command 1
Hq 54th Fld Arty Regt 54th Engr Regt (less elms) 1st amp 3d Cos 54th Recon Regt 54th Trans Regt
The Matsu Detachment in cooperation with the Sakura DetachmG
woald hold the enemy in the Kaladan River main with its maintorce
and with an element secure the Akyab sector Atter covering the
anticipated withdrawal ot the Sakura Datachmentlt would withdraw
to and hold in the vicinity otMyohaung Efforts would be made to
limit the intensity of the fighting in the Yyobaung area
In holding the coastal islands emphasis Wogld beplaeed on
Ramree Island llithonly guard units being deploed on the other is shy
lands River mouths that offered landing opportunitiesto enemyamshy
phibious forces would be blocked with engineer placed obstaclos
72
~ ~- -bullbull - - bull - - bull - gt bull- bull- - bullbull - bull bull -- -
ihe Myebon Kangaw~dTamanduSec~rtJ~t~woltJ~~Plamp
-
ganizatLon of the detensesin ltthebullmiddotJl1eb9t141tYO~~Dalet1l1ve~middotmiddottr1
angle The mainposit1on would bemiddotarolU1dlangattltanotil1er~
point around Ilyebon otherdefense middotmiddotposit1ons~uldb~bu1Jttb1-ougb-
out the ent1rearea TheenemlattaQk1rith1sa~aWO~dbeCheck
ed at the main defensive zoneandtheattac~torcesidestroiedin
a counterattack by the main strik1ngtorce oftheDlv1sLonwbleh
would be tormed from tbe Jlatsu Detachment enci~t$middotd~awntromlt)th~r
SectorUnits Aminmum strength tor the counterattack was estimatshy
ed at five Wantry and twomiddotmiddotartillery battalionsbull
The Taungup Sector Unit would check the enemy advancetxompreshy
pared Posit1ons south of the Tanl1l$middotatverandnorth C)t the Tmu2a bull
er Ramree Island muld be secured asmiddotlotJg aspO$siblew1thomreshy
sorting to a decisive battle
The Kywegu Sector Unit in the event ot alargescaleeneJDl
landing uld hold strong points al()lS the coast until such t~ as
the DivLsion could launch a counterattackwithitsma1nforce
In the event that it s)x)uld benecessaryototransterthe
body of the Division east of the ArakanMountaitt Range aun1t
two1ntant17 battalions as a nucleus would renain 1nthe Taungup
tor and another Wl1tcomprisedprinoipall7ofone1ntantry OaliuaLLlCn
would remain in the An sector to checktheen$Ilyanddeay movement
against the Arakan Range defenses
73
Abandonment middot0pound themiddot Alqab-MY9~NSWR~(OM Ref Map I)
Immediately atter the conelus1onof thl 1944 monsoon eeasoDJ) the
British xv Corps launched anoffenslve along the coast of the fkqof
Bengal The SakuraDetaehment which bad been EOCpected to chedtthe
enemy in the area west of the Kaladan RiverwellintoJanuary was
fo reed to withdraw on 26 December and the 54th Division found itself
defending the west coast area of Burma somewhat sooner than expected
The Sakura Detachment which was to eonc~trate in the environs of
Proms conducted an orderly ~dthdrawal which was eolnplet~d OJ th~ middot end
of January Prior to its move south middottthe Detachment transferred the
bulk of its ammunition tothe 54thDivision andtmDiVision planned
to utilize the Sakura Detachment as aeoXlVOY force to transportri-ce
from the Myohaung Plain tor stockpiling iAthe rear However the
early withdrawal of the Detaerment andtha fact middotthatonly native boats
of 11mit~d capacity were available made it impossible to cQmplete the
stockpiling operation
The 1st Battalion of the1Uth Infantrtl Bag1ment had been detendshy
ing Akyab (h31
December as the rear guam
of the Sakura Datachnaat
crossed the Kaladan Riverand moved eastward the Battalion wu order
ed to withdraw after light fighting aga1nstBritish forces attacking
from the north A landing at Akyab was lnad~ by the enemy en) Janushy
ary after the defending battalion had withdrawn toponnagywL0
The main body ofmiddot the Matau Detachment was fighting against the
YVest African 8lst Division in the sector north of Myohaung covering
74
j shy
ther1ght nank ot the SakuraDetactunent~middotmiddotmiddotbullmiddotrbemiddotmiddotmiddotcoJIIUaiottbJiatsu Detachment sh1tted the d Batta1iollot bullbullbull tbbull l1Jth1htaAt~~it1Ora
TiOma to cOver the lettmiddot tlanIltotacOJ1~$ltt)~l~middotmiddot0middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~t~hmiddot111th ) ii lt middotmiddotimiddot middot)4middotmiddotmiddot
which was operating on the west bartk ot the~2$r As the ee-
my advanced south the MatSUDetachmentslolter1~dltiltrol1t aamplltl 11llLde
etfortsto hold the Jqobaungareaaidedbythe1stBatta1ioD ottbe
lUth Infantry which had been withdrawntromPonnadun between 6 bull
and 12 J$l1U817 The rearOftheD8tachmentwaaettectlvlyprotect
shy
held at Minbya tor about 20davs against altvaatly BuperiorenemT S
toree which moved uptromAkyab~
FMht1ng in the yenyebon $ector (Map No 11)
Under both a1rand navalooVer theJjrlt1shIndian~thD1v1
s10n commenced hnd1ng operati()~on the southerot1pottbebon
Peninsula at 1000 hours 12 JanllSl1 1945 usins totUlareetranashy
-- ---------------------------- 4 he composite battalion was a temporal1 t~ctica1unitcClll lt
posed of troops drawn from other battalions of thell1thIntant17gt Regiment
5 Later during the fishting in the KangawsectorcaptYokota commanded theIst Reconnaissance OcmIW11middotmiddotsecuringtherear line of communications of the 54th Divisionltagainstpenetrationby the enemy Slst Division in the vicinity ofKawbull For thiS as lreJJ as his actions at Wdnbya ascomander of the composite Wantrl company Capt Yokota was awarded a posthumous citation bY the can gt
Jnander of the 28th Army
7S
MAP NO II
Nakemu-a was unable to hold aga1nst thL88trolSf0rceandwaspeeeshy
edback to the nortih ot JqebotlltheretheurdtsecuredHUlsland middotmiddot middotbullmiddoti ltbull
held the enemy in check ora~uttandaysAst-eint~reementsth
4thDivision s ant onemiddot compa61ottbe4tbRe()Onna1tusampU1celtR~irnent
trom An and one infantr-companytromtheIcimgawSeetOrUnit amp1
route the two companies w8t$cut-ottby theen8myanafaUedlt to
reach their destinationbull The )yebon Sector Unit w8sforced to lfithshy
draw across the Min ilverto Kanl in late Janua17 whers bull 1tcover-shy
ed the withdrawal of the Matsu Detachment
Loss of Ramree Island (Gen Ret Yap I)
Ramree Island was garlisoned bull b7middot tJamp 2dBattalion Qt tbel2lst
Infantry under thecommanc1 of UajInota
At 1005 hours on 2l January tollow1ngahEiavynavalbombardshy
ment by 4 cruisers 8 destrorers 15 gunbQatsMci20othr ship$ and
an airbornbardrnent by 30 COnso11datedbombers$middot9(Lockfu~edsand1S
carrier planes the main bOdymiddototheBrltlsh-Inc1ian26t~ DlV1s1()n j
using a number of large transports and $5 l~crafteommeneed
landing operations near KyautPyu middoton middotthe tloXtherntipotthemiddot 1s1and
One infantry company with 25 pound guns Sllcceeded in sinldng severshy
al oitha landing craft but the landing was forced and the eneIDl
advanced southward along the northern neck otthe island During
the next few days landings were made atYameyaung Chedtlba Island
and the southern tip oRamree Island on middotthe 23 26 anqmiddot Z1 January
respectively Maj Inomata concentrated his force in thecentta1
part of the island with his main strengthitl prepared positions
south of the Yanbauk River wh$re he wassuccesstulincheeldng the
enemy The 26th Division then directed its main attack onSane aod
moved against the defenders in the vicinity of Yanth1tgyi on 7 Febshy
ruary Although 54th Division orders did not contemplate an allshy
out stand on Ramree Maj lnamoto determined to hold h1s positions
to the last man Ql 9 February however the 54th Division comshy
mander directed the garrison to withdraW tothema1n1andSplittmg
up into small parties the Battalion began evacuation on thelSth
using native boats Although the 5th Air Division supported the
evacuation with about sit aircraft thee6mmand of the sea was so
completely in emniy hands that the withdrawal went bacnYIIl Bythe
middle of March aboat 00 of the island s garrison had reached the
mainland Maj Inomata presumably died in action
Action in the Kangaw Seet0r(Map No 11)
Concurrently with its attack on the Myebon Penins~a the main
body of the eneIIY 25th Division accompanied by tanks began So landshy
ing operation at Kangaw on 23 Janua17 with strong naval and air covshy
er With the support of the 1st Battalion of the 54th Field ArtUshy
lery the 1st and 2d Battalions or the 154thIntantX7 counterattack
ed the invasion force but failed to halt the landing The Division
commander immediately ordered the Matsu Detachment from Myohaung and
78
the Myebon Sector Unit from HUlS31 tomciv6 to thev1c1n1trot
Kangaw to check the enemys southward advancebull Th$(ttlemy adVanced
steadily and captured the main position or theKangaw Sector-Unit
located on Hill 170 The 3d Battalion of the 14t~Want17which
had already been pulled out from the Mat$uDGtachmen~ to reW()~c
the Kangaw Sector Unit was en routefrom~haUbg and was thefirst
of the reinforcing units to arrive an 10 Februal7 a night attack
was launched by the2d and 3d Battalions of the 154th Intant7aDd
Hal 170 was retaken ShortJjTatter however the 2d Battalian was
forced otf the hill and once more it fell into t~ hands of the ene
The West African Slat Divi~ion~ which had captured Uyohaung au
vanced southward pursuing the Matsu Detachment AttaQ1dng the Kangaw
tce~tor from the north and at the SamQ time penetrating theeaetem
mountain area it advanced to the flank and rear of lttls lang Sector
Unit Capt Yokota now commanding the 1st Reconnaissance Company
rushed his unt to Kaw to cover the exposed rightmiddot flank and checked
the enemy advance in the rear or the SectorUn1t
Defense of the Tamandu-An Seetor (Map No 12)
In late January the 28thmiddot Armyehiet of statf amved to direct
54th Division operations In earl February there were 1ndicat1ons
that the British-Indian 26th J)ivis~on which had almost completed
79
MAP NO 12
TH E TAMANDU ~ AN SECTOR
FEB -APR 1945
40 DISPOSITION END OF MAR - OFFENelvE IN APR
HEIGHTS IN FEET o I 2 3 4 ~
MILES
)
C
l) )
l -- ( ) j
Cd ~ _ ( I bull
iL 1 - LJ
j )
so
bull lt
the eecuJlng of Ramree I~_wo~~~~~~tioutbot~dli and the 54th Division was forced to11Oli1ijtDd~bat1tpoal1i1on8
to the sector 80Uth of the J)aJetRi~~iltS~~~i~imiddotDetacbment dishy
rected to rush to Tamandu and on 15 Februarrth~iK~gaw Sector 0shy
nitwamps withdram ~ pos1tionamiddotwest 8nclAO~()frtbe DaletRLyer
just north ot Tamandu
New 54th Division Plan
After stuWing the over-aU sltuatdotllnlateJanUff4jtg thet 54th
Division commander decided it wouldbepossiblet~cRu~hmiddotmiddotthetW~emr
land and $ea attack on the TamaoduAn seetor TQeecomplish ths
feat the following plan WAe developed
Cffimtippal PoliS
Arter making eftartsto ctUshthe en71ft the area north and YlestottheDaletRlve~and in the coastal area between lamandUatldmiddotKTnguthe Division vdUasse~lemiddotaU uncoJ11lll1ttedunits in the viein1tyatAnbull Usiqg theseurdts4sa Divisionstrlldngforoe a counterpffensiwwill be launched to wipe out the enemy west otAn The Taungup sector wiU contlnueto be secured by a stNng force Another to rcewUlsGoure ke7 points in the Arakan Range to check nemyadvances east of the_e
Operational Program
1 Firat Phase
The Tamandu sector will be f1rmlJr Mld as the key positionto separate tneenemyadshyvanoing from the north and tm enemy to rce whic1 is axpe cted to land south of Tamandu The strong~
est defense effort will be concentrated-on the northern front The main body ot the Kangal1secshytor Unit Will conduct a delaying action invdth
drawing to the sectoraortq acd west otthe Daleb River There designated as the Right Defense ushynit it will be responsible tor the defense of the llorthem front Holding actions will be conductshypd in the coastal arE4southot Tamandu
2 Second Phase
In the event that the enemr penetrates the front line and moves toward the east the main bJc11 of the Division will counterattack while haldshyingthe vicinity otK~lan as ake1 position Folshylowing the counterattack the Division will occup1 key points west of An with an element and middotthe str11dng force will regroup in the vicinity oiAn At the first opportunity the Division will launch a general offensive
After the withdraral ot the Division to the vicinity of An elements will be deployed at key points on the traUs through the Arakan Mountains to prevent enemy penetrationa
Task Force Organization
The Sector Units except the Taungup Sector Unit will be diesolved and the following defense units will be formed
Right Defense Unit
l54th In R$gt (less lst amp 2d Bns) 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Cos)
Center Defense Uni~
lllth Inf Regt (less 2d amp 3d Bns) 14th AT Bn (less 2ci and 3d Bt17s)
Left Defense Unit
2d Bn lllth Int Regt Hq Med Unit 54th Div
S2
The 54th Artil1e17 Reg1men(les the 1St and 3d Battalions) wUl ttrri1sbax-tillery sup port to the Center middotDetenseUniidmiddotmiddot th83d Bafi talion of the lllthlntantryRegLment wilL be held in reserve The 54ihEngi1leeI Reglment and the 54th Transport UnitYdll beplacec1 UDshyder direct conunand otth Division
I Continued antish Attacks
In late February an element of theBrit1sh-Indi~25thDLushy
sion advanced southward middotalong the coast south of K~aw~ the kJst
African 8lst and 82d Divisions also moved toward thesQuth- fran the
mountains east otKangaw The Right Defense Unit met both forces
north of the Dalet River but was unable to prevent their advance to
the river
To the south on 16middot February the mlaquoin bodyotthe enerrl1 25th
Division landed in the viainityoof Dokekan The Center Defense Ushy
nit counterattack was ineffampctiVe am witb the support otnavalaad
air bombardment the enenv rapidJy enlarged the beachhead Intil-
trating into the sector just west ot Hill 99Owith a powedUl mrs
the 25th Division threatened to cut the Japanese line otcommun1C)a~
tions on the Tamandn-An Road toward the endotFebruaX7~ Thebalshy -
anee of the enemy force trom Dokekan attacked middotmiddot~amandu from the SQlth
in cooperation with anomiddotther enemy group which landed near Tamandu Ql
3 March
By the end of Februaryl theV111age of Dalet bad faUen1nto
en~ hands The 54th Infantry Group Headquartersmiddot the 1st and2ct
Battalions ot t~ 154th Infant17 Regiment and thelat Batta1loA Qt
the 54th Field Artille17 RegimentWhich we~e orderedgtb12Sth Armr
to move east of the Arakan Range lett Kolan OA 26 February
The Counterotfensiva - First Phas4
As the irst step in countering the Brltiah succes$es the Di-
Vision commander decided to conduct a ltlrJw in the area west ot- HU1
990 On3 March the Center Defense Unit was re1ntorced by the D1shy
nsion reserve (3d Battalion lllth Infantry-) and ordered to attack
the enemy column that h9d moved to the rearot the Tamandu positions
This foree commanded by Col Yagi succeeded in tum~ back the
enemy after a series or engagements between 7 andl7 March There-
arter the British-Indian 25th Division troops iil that area assumed
the defensive
Meanwhile the Right Defense Unit had also made counterattacka
that were successful in checking the enemys advance beyond the Dal8t
River In the central sector along the Tamandu-Kolan Road super1or
enemY strength forced a gradual but stealttrJapanese withdrawal and
bY the middle opound March the British forces had penetrated to the vishy
cinity or Kolan
The counterorrensive - Second Phase
The Right Defense Unit cortt1nued to hold 1n the vicin1ty of the
Dalet River and prevented the two Britishtorces from joining The
54th Division commander taking advantage of thisepl1t 1ft theeneJDT
torces launched an attack against Kolan~2larch middotAlthough the
attack carried Ollt by the B1gbtDefense tJnitfrCl1lthenorth bull- the
Ulth Inrantry Regi~nt (less tbemiddotmiddotmiddot2d Battluon)middotmiddottrQlitbe 80tlthWalJl
moderately successful the Division comandercol1s1cleredmiddotthat the
timGbad come to prepare tor the second phaeottfuDiusionplan
VihUe the 3d Battalion of thelllthIntantry-lnpOu1tion$ 8loag a
north and sonth line based on Hill 990 acted 8S 8 gene~l outpost
the Division completed regrouping middotmiddotmiddotin th$vJcinitymiddotot An bymiddot themiddot end
of March In the regrouping two attackinitorcesweN tor~~
Right Column Commander middotColbull Murqam
154th InfRegt (less lst amp 2dBns) 7th Co lllth Inf Regt 9th Co 1218t IntRegt 54th Recon Regt (less 3d amp 4th Co~) One bt17 54th Fldmiddot Arty Regt One engr plat
Left Column Cornrnander ColYaglmiddot
lllth Inf Regt (less 3d Bnamp7th Co)One btry 54th F1d ArtyRegt bull
On 7 April as the battalion outpostltat Hill990wa8b~irlga~
tended to the utmost the 54th Di~sionis~teatCtheottens1bullbullbull
~
the area between Letmauk andHiU 990wtthiheRtghtcOlum drLYshy
1ng between Letmauk and Hill 990 8ftdth(J~f~Co+111LQYdJ1g1ng 8OUth
of Hlll 990 Under heav PJessurethe eri~~g~~WithdrsrrCD
the night of the 8th and the DivisioncormDanderordered the two col
umns to pursue the enemy toward Tamandu1he 24 Battalion otthe
llltl1 succefded illouttlanktng the enemy- andoecapiedS_ukchonoa
the 14th lio cut off routie~ ot retreatrhebattal1ol1howeverwas
unable to hold control or the road until the main middotstrlldngforcemiddot of
the Division could arrive
I~ spi~e of the favorable progress of thecOUJ1teroffensive the
54thDi~sionwascompelled to suspend the actLononlSApr1l owLn8 to the cri~cal bullsituationmiddotwhich bad developed ea~totthe bull Arakan
Mountain1Ulnge Orders from the 2eth Amr directed the Division to
regroup east or An to prepre for further operations on the Irrawaddy
River
Fighting in the Tauggup Sector middot(Uap middotNQmiddot 13)
Following its occupation ot Ramree Island the Bnt18h-In~ampI1
26th Division commenced landing operations at Maeon 12 March The
Yamane Composite Canpany ass18ned to that area to cover middotthe withshy
drawal of theRamree Island garrison (2dBattalion l21stInfantry)
immediately eounterattacked but was drivenmiddot otf without stopping the
enemys landing operations 1herafte~ the Canposite Co1npany con
ducted a delaying action designed to slow the ensnys southward adshy
vance The enemy to ree now nwnbering more than 1000 was equilPSd
with tanks and too atralgmiddot for the Composite Comp9J1Y to hold The
Canpany was reinforced bY the 4th Company (light armored cars) of
the 54th Reconnaissancemiddot Regiment bull dispatched from Sabyin on 13 Maroh
86
MAP NO 13
f--~
THE TAVN~)P SECTOR MAR APRJ945
IoiEIGHTS IN FE~T
o I 2 3 4 5 MILES
87
On the 14th the 11th Companyot themiddot 121st was also cUspatQhedtxom
Hill 534-middot
erations near Mae and it was teared truat it too~ WQutdmoveaga1nsti
Taungup On 17 MarCh Lt Col Baba comnander otthel21St middotmiddottntu t17 sent the 3d Battalion from Taungup to hit the enecny in the
middot6 Saby1n area and hold it along the Tan)we River as long as possible
The Battalion met the 26th Division force south of $abyinon the 19th shy
and in a sharp engagement inflicted heavy losses
Because the dispatch of the 3d Battalion had greatJy reduced
strength in the Taungup sector the lstBattalionotthe12lst wu moved from the Thade River north to Taungup The 2t Battal1011 and
the Yamane Composite Canpany were directed to movenortheast ot
raungup to hold the upper reachesot the Tanlwe River By the end
ot March the Yamane ComPallf oeeupiedpositiona around Yapale and tbe
2d Battalion was in the sector north of Mogyo
In the meantime) theeny 26th Division had estabUshed beach~
heads near Kyetkaing and Kindaunggyi on the TanlweRiver and ns aP
J6rently receving air support using airstrips beb1ndtheir ltnes
By 27 March the 3d Battalion of the l2lst had nthdrawn to pos1t1Clas
already establishednorth of the Taungup River where 1t suceesstuUT
6 Lt Col Baba replaced Col Nagasaws who was appointed CQD- mander of the 55th Infantry Group in early March
bullbull
-
employed favorable teXTa1nto checsktbe en~hriefJlbullbull ()11~tl~9t~t bull bullbullbullbullbullbull-- bullbull bullbull bullbullbull bullbullbull bull bull bull lt bullbull
howev~ the 26th Divisiontorce suPpo1tedbl~anks~illeX7fjncimiddot
( aircraft captured H1llSlS a ke1detenstv~poiJ1t~vorJ~olctngth~
Taungup Plain On the Jsttheenelllt~o~e~~tcentk~bullbull~ Hill ~outh ot Migyaungdo ~twasarivertott
startiing abou~ 3 April the eneJ11direoteci Ltsmain efton aJotsg
the Taungup Road In amiddot coordinated attackempl0~nstank8~~~
lery and air to supporttheintantry Hill 370wa8 ta1cenon 4 Apr1l
A night counterattack conducted by theKurihama Comp~wh1cb had
garrisoned Hill 370 failedtorecapliureit lheKominamL Qampany
garrisoning Rokko HiJ1 alSoconductedrepeatedattac~s1n~ettort
to regain Hill 370 The KOZDinami CompampV wa eventua1JysucceS8tul
in achieving its objective although ata terrJfic cost-almQSteve
ry man in the compani including the eompanyencommander was e1ther
ldlled orwound$dThe l2lst Reg1mentthenabandoned middotRokkoHiU in
order to shorten its front Theenemu made repeated attempts to reshy
capture Hill 370 but was beaten back vdt~ heavy Jossesandabandonshy
ing its attempts to recapture the Hill shifted itsmainattacldng
force to the upper Tanlwe Riversector
On 15 April the enemy foreeapproxLmately 2000 strong com
~enced an attack alotlgthe Tanlwe River AlthQUghthe IanumeComshy
posite Company fought desperately it was unabletoholcl the vastJ
stronger enemy force The Ccropany withdrew poundrom Yapaleto Ta11Qwa
on 16 April from which point it launched counterattacks tor tour
89
dqs but was f1nall1 forced baei(to Kagosaka Passon the 20thbull At
the same time the 3d ampttallonot the 121stwhiCh bAdbeeAhold1ng
on the north bank of the Taui1gup ntverwas pressed back across 1l1e
river
On 2l Aprll the 2d Battalion of thel2lst was transferrecto
the vicinity of Allanmyo and placed under the middotdirect command ot the
28th Army The Regimental commander rep1aCtdthe2d Battalion 1ft
the Mogyo area with the lstBattalion On the 24th enetn7 light
armored ears appeared on th$ front north otKagosaka Pass and on
the 25th_ an attack by about 2000 British troops preceded by arshy
tllle17 and air bombardmentwas successfuJin takingonecor)er d
the Kagosaka Pass position Repeated night counterattacks hOwever
resulted in the position bein8 retaken
On 29 AprU the l2lst ~antry Regiment (less 2d Battalion)
with the 3d Battalion of the 54th Artillery Reg1mant was placedWlshy
der the direct command of 28th AxmY and received ord~rsto withdralr
to Okpo
90
