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Bureaucratic Capacity in Brazil and Argentina: Does Politics Matter? Celina Souza INCT-PPED and IESP-UERJ Sienna, May 6, 2014

Bureaucratic Capacity in Brazil and Argentina : Does Politics Matter?

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Bureaucratic Capacity in Brazil and Argentina : Does Politics Matter?. Celina Souza INCT-PPED and IESP-UERJ Sienna , May 6, 2014. Objectives. Analyze the process of bureaucratization and the construction of bureaucratic capacity in Brazil and Argentina - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Capacidade burocrtica e de coordenao horizontal

Bureaucratic Capacity in Brazil and Argentina: Does Politics Matter?Celina SouzaINCT-PPED and IESP-UERJ

Sienna, May 6, 2014ObjectivesAnalyze the process of bureaucratization and the construction of bureaucratic capacity in Brazil and ArgentinaMeasure the quality of the Brazilian bureaucracy in agencies in charge of four developmental policies (environment, infrastructure, industrial and innovation)Creation of an index of bureaucratic capacity in Brazil (Index of Bureaucratic Capacity - IBC) Capture and analyze the perceptions of bureaucratic and social actors in Argentina about the quality of their bureaucracy

Why study bureaucratic capacity and why compare Brazil and Argentina? The capacity of the bureaucracy is a predictor of what is likely to happen to public policiesBrazil and Argentina began their bureaucratization process at the same time (1930s), their systems were quite similar but they followed a completely different path regarding the selection of their civil servants after redemocratization. Literature: State capacity and Evans and Rauch (1999; 2000).The argumentThe difference between Brazil and Argentina after the end of the military dictatorships is explained by different political agendas Brazilians decided to write a new Constitution in 1988 to inaugurate the new democratic regime. The main goal was to rebuild democratic institutions. Access to public employment through competition and meritocratic criteria was part of the redemocratization agenda to distance the new regime from the previous one, based mainly on patronage. Furthermore, meritocratic criteria was seen as a requirement of advanced democraciesIn Argentina no new Constitution was written and in 1994 a constitutional amendment was approved with no major institutional change, except the constitutionalization of several international treaties for the protection of human rights, heavily violated during the military regime.

Structure of the presentationState formation and bureaucratization in Brazil and Argentina and its relation to state capacityData and analysis: Index of bureaucratic capacity in Brazil (IBC) Perceptions of bureaucratic and social actors in Argentina about the quality of their bureaucracy Discussion

State formation, bureaucratization and their relation to state capacity

Tilly x Silberman And what about Latin America? Questions:What were the differences and similarities in the bureaucratization processes?Do different trajectories explain subsequent decisions about the rules for civil servants recruitment?Both countries adopted a politico-technocratic criteria for recruitment, but why Brazil has opted for changing it and not Argentina?Do similar trajectories alone explain why they distance themselves from each other?Hypotheses:Similar trajectories in the early 1930s but institutions created in Brazil survived but not in ArgentinaPolitics matter: rational actors (politicians) addressing issues of different agendas

IBCObjectivesTo capture the quality of the federal bureaucracy in four policy areas: environment, industrial, infrastructure and innovation

To capture differences among agencies

Dimensions of bureaucratic capacity and sourcesDimensions: Recruitment I: proportion of the higher officials in the agencies who entered the civil service via formal examination and competitionRecruitment II proportion of higher officials with temporary contractsTypes of professionalization:Generalist (English-speaking model)Specialist (French model)Internal promotion: rules for the promotion of civil servantsAccountability: civil servants fired for wrongdoingSources: Federal government of Brazil: several sites 18 agencies and 28.578 higher level civil servantsSurvey in Argentina: 18 interviews

IBC : ContributionsDisaggregation of the index by policy areas innovation, environment, infrastructure, industrialDisaggregation of the index by dimensions of bureaucratic capacityTake advantage of the availability of online dataLittle knowledge about who is and where is the new bureaucracy recruited by competitive examsAnalyze the bureaucracy in charge of policy formulation and implementation and not the entire bureaucracyProposition of a methodology applicable to other policiesIdentify outliers and explain why and what policymakers can doDifferent from other studies, we added state companies and appointed officials to high positionsDifferent from other studies, we searched for a connection between bureaucratic capacity and developmental policies and not economic growth

IBC - ResultsPolicyIBCIndustrial 0,68Innovation0,66Environment 0,62Infrastructure0,59IBC by DimensionDimensionIndicatorWeightEnvironmentIndustrialInfrastructureInnovationRecruitment I IR10,20,5040,007 0,226 0,039 Recruitment IIIR20,20,0100,012 0,039 0,014 Generalist IF10,20,0110,018 0,007 0,005 SpecialistIF20,20,8260,591 0,279 0,647Internal Promotion IP10,11,2201,196 1,588 0,973 AccountabilityIA10,10,0180,010 0,004 0,000 IBC0,6240,6770,5900,66Bureaucratic Capacity - ArgentinaNo data online or systematic information available Different from Brazil, it is not possible to construct an index or to analyze specific policy areasSurvey (questionnaire) to capture perceptionEx-post evaluation - answers were consistent: bureaucrats, politicians, scholars, members of think tanks.

Recruitment: % of civil servants selected by competitive examinationCivil Servants with university degreeGeneralists x SpecialistsInternal PromotionTemporary workersAccountability: civil servants fired for wrongdoingAnalysis: Brazil and Argentina in comparative perspectiveTwo main distinct political decisions with consequences for the political and bureaucratic systems: The writing up of a new Constitution in Brazil based on broad societal participation and on several instruments to legitimize the new democracy. Argentinas political elites mainly addressed the issue of human rightsStarting in 1994, the federal government in Brazil created thousands of new jobs in the civil service and officials became to be selected by competition By any dimension analyzed (recruitment, types of professionalization, internal promotion and accountability) Brazil scores better than Argentina, although in Brazil there are differences between and among agencies and policy areas. Brazilian policymakers have large information advantage over Argentinean. DiscussionThe research confirms the literature in bureaucratic capacity: its distribution is not uniform The concept of path dependency explains only partially why Brazil followed one path and Argentina another after redemocratization. To depend only on path dependence arguments without specifying different political environments and political agendas does not explain why rational actors took different decisions at the same critical junctureBecause civil servants in Argentina, in particular higher officials, are not selected through competition, it does not mean that patronage alone prevails and that the government is unable to provide public policies. Its capability is selective, to policies high on the Presidents agenda. Brazil now fulfills all the requisites of a Weberian bureaucracy whereas in Argentina public officials still face uncertainty and are subjected to electoral cycles.

DiscussionDifferent redemocratization agendas guided political/rational actors in Brazil and Argentina

Brazil looked towards the future and Argentina towards the past