Bulletproof Arms Trade Treaty - The Case for Ammunition

8/9/2019 Bulletproof Arms Trade Treaty - The Case for Ammunition

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Control Arms 12 July 2010 www.controlarms.orgControl Arms is a global civil society alliance campaigning for a bulletproof Arms Trade Treaty that will save lives and livelihoods.

Briefing Note12 July 2010

A Bullet-Proof Arms Trade Treaty: The case for ammunitionAccording to the Global Burden of Armed Violence report 2008, more than 740,000 people die every year asa result of armed violence; an estimated 90 per cent of victims are civilians, of which 70 per cent are womenand children. i

Ammunition is a critical factor in perpetuating armed violence in many countries where NGOs work. Intensearmed conflict and criminal activity can be sustained with a relatively small number of weapons as long asaccess to ammunition is unrestricted. Currently, international transfers of ammunition are insufficientlydocumented, monitored, and controlled.

There are no provisions within the framework for establishing the first international, legally binding ArmsTrade Treaty (ATT), guaranteeing that ammunition transfers will be included within the scope of this newinstrument. ii Yet the inclusion of ammunition is critical to an effective ATT. The importance of controllinginternational ammunition transfers is already well established; the omission of ammunition from the ATTwould be totally contrary to widespread current national arms transfer control best practice. It wouldundermine the overarching principle of an ATT that aims to create high international standards, and wouldleave legal and practical loopholes that would allow illicit transfers and armed violence to continue unabated.

To have real impact, the ATT must be bullet proof. It must include ammunition, for the following reasons:

1. The exclusion of ammunition would contradict established norms in export control policies

Ammunition is already controlled within the export control systems of all states that operate comprehensivearms export controls. iii For example, the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) placescomprehensive export controls over transfers of ammunition, ordnance, components, explosives andpropellants for small arms and light weapons, export controls that not only include direct transfers, but alsore-exports, licensed production and brokering activities iv. The international shipping of ammunition, duelargely to the hazardous nature of the explosives and propellants contained within it, is also regulated. TheChicago Convention relating to air transport, which includes ammunition within its 'Dangerous Goods'provisions v, currently has 190 state parties, and similar provisions are also operated via the InternationalMaritime Organisation. vi

The exclusion of ammunition from the scope of an ATT would weaken these clearly established norms over international ammunition transfers, and would limit opportunities to promote best practice standards at aglobal level.

2. Ammunition is the most controllable factor in limiting weapons abuse

A weapon becomes lethal when supplied with ammunition. Therefore, regulating the availability of ammunition and making its irresponsible supply or diversion to illicit markets more difficult can help curbinstances of armed violence and criminality, even in cases where guns themselves are already in-situ (and to

which an ATT will not apply). Preventing the re-supply of ammunition to irresponsible end-users would take alarge degree of control away from those that perpetrate abuses and undermine peace and security by usingguns already in circulation, stockpiled, or manufactured illicitly.

Evidence strongly suggests that the availability of ammunition has a strong impact on the lethality of crimeand armed violence. In Mali during the 1990-96 rebellion, ammunition shortages forced combatants toengage in less indiscriminate forms of shooting, resulting in fewer civilian deaths and injuries. vii During awave of attacks on Monrovia, Liberia in 2003, the ready availability of new supplies of ammunition wasdirectly connected to the ability to re-engage in hostilities and the consequent loss of civilian life. viii


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Poor oversight and regulation makes ammunition easily available, meaning that even a relatively smallnumber of arms can quickly turn communities to chaos. The May 2000 coup in Fiji was executed by onlyseven gunmen, with arms later supplied to around 100 young rebels.In the Solomon Islands , the contents of one police armoury, approximately 500 firearms, was sufficient tooverthrow the government. These weapons remain in circulation, and with ammunition easily available,continue to contribute to lawlessness and impunity.

(Alpers & Twyford, 2003: 3, 24)

Deadly consequences of ammo diversion:In 2006, 16 soldiers were shot dead by Karimojong warriors in Northern Uganda , with evidence stronglypointing to Ugandan state security forces as the source of the deadly ammunition. In Rio De Janeiro,Brazil, police involvement in large scale diversion of ammunition to criminal organizations was uncoveredin 2005, one year after 52 police officers were killed on duty. In the Pacific region, with security forcesimporting the bulk of ammunition, theft from state armouries is a common means of illicit diversion.

(Bevan & Dreyfus, 2007)(Alpers & Twyford, 2003)

Better regulation of international ammunition movements has proven successful in limiting the use of weapons in situations of armed conflict and armed violence. For instance, export limitations on ammunitionto Papua New Guinea initiated by the Australian and New Zealand governments in response to the highlevels of armed violence have significantly lowered the stocks of ammunition in PNG and raised pricesbeyond many peoples reach. ix

However, without the support of an internationally binding framework of obligations relating to the control of international transfers of ammunition, alongside mechanisms for implementation, cooperation andassistance, measures such as those outlined above remain ad hoc. Furthermore, their effectiveness ishampered by a lack of international legal pressure and limited state capacity to support these measuresfinancially and systematically.

3. Inadequate oversight of ammunition transfers and stockpiles poses serious risks of theft,diversion or loss

The vast majority of ammunition that finds its way into illicit markets is legally produced and transferred. x Yetlawfully authorised international transfers of ammunition are frequently diverted through theft from statearmouries and other stockpiles xi or illegal on-sales of ammunition by security forces or gun dealers. xii Thispractice is prominent in post-conflict settings, xiii with corruption, poverty and limited state capacitysignificantly increasing the risk of diversion.

A strong ATT that incorporates ammunition could help reduce the risks of ammunition diversion in a number of ways. Incorporating both ammunition in the scope, and risk of diversion within the criteria of an ATT,would help prevent ammunition transfers to states where a substantial risk of diversion existed. This would

increase pressure on states to adequately secure and monitor their legitimate ammunition stockpiles.Incorporating binding comprehensive transparency and record-keeping mechanisms and outlining a highcommon standard for transfers of ammunition xiv, would push states with poor record-keeping standards toimprove their documentation on transfers and stockpiles, reducing opportunities for corruption and theft.

A comprehensive framework for international cooperation and assistance would similarly support under-resourced states to improve record-keeping of ammunition transfers, in line with their ATT obligations, and toenhance the security of state armouries.

4. The ammunition trade is considerably less transparent than the trade in weapons

An estimated 10-14 billion rounds of ammunition are produced each year. xv Worth an estimated USD$1.77billion annually, the international trade in small arms ammunition is more valuable than the trade infirearms. xvi Furthermore, the market for small arms ammunition has also grown at a faster rate than that of SALW over the past ten years. xvii


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A robust ATT must include:

1. All weapons, related equipment, components, expertise, production equipment andammunition.

2. Transparency and implementation mechanisms that establish a global accountability standardcommon to international transfers of all conventional arms and ammunition.

3. A comprehensive framework for international cooperation and support allowing states torequest and receive assistance to facilitate full implementation of their treaty obligations.

However, the international trade in ammunition is characterized by an acute lack of transparency, with publicdisclosure of the trade in both small arms and light weapons ammunition apparently a low priority for theinternational community. xviii With ammunition widely and easily available, the lack of information and controlmechanisms increases the potential for ammunition to be transferred to those using it to perpetrate crime,terrorism and serious human rights violations.

5. Challenges to the traceability of ammunition shipments after export do not mean that statescannot regulate ammunition exports

Arguments that ammunition shipments are more difficult to mark and trace than are individual weapons arenot an adequate justification for excluding ammunition from transfer controls. Simply because the tracing of ammunition after its export may pose particular technical challenges does not mean that states cannotassess and license shipments of ammunition prior to export in the same way as other types of weapons. Astouched on above, almost no state with significant arms transfer controls excludes ammunition from its armsexport control list. xix This existing global standard to license ammunition transfers would be gravelyundermined by its exclusion from an ATT.

A number of relatively uncomplicated technologies and procedures already exist to mark and allow thetracing of ammunition boxes and individual rounds of ammunition, which are already being implemented bymany states, including in the developing world. xx States should support further research and internationalconsultation throughout the ATT negotiations around practical, feasible and enforceable systems for marking, recording and tracing ammunition, which can be implemented within available resources.

Key Recommendations:

For an ATT to truly be effective and capable of contributing meaningfully to human security, it must becomprehensive; it must cover all types of conventional ammunition, including SALW.

It is imperative that the ATT harmonises, develops and enhances clearly established norms around

international arms transfers, including norms around ammunition transfers. The exclusion of ammunitionfrom an ATT would fatally undermine existing best practice standards in ammunition export controls.It is critical that the ATT includes ammunition in its scope and subjects ammunition transfers to the samecriteria assessments as arms transfers. The ATT should establish a global standard of transparency andaccountability across all arms and ammunition transfers. Finally, it should be supported include acomprehensive framework for international cooperation and capacity-building that assists states to fullyimplement their ATT obligations and to take measures to reduce the risks of ammunition and weaponsdiversion.


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References iGeneva Declaration 2008, Global Burden of Armed Violence , Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Geneva, p. 2;

Platform Women and Sustainable Peace 2010, Women, Peace Security: Implementing Resolution 1325, p.2, viewed 27 June 2010, http://www.peacewomen.org/brochureengels2010.pdf ii G.A. Res. L.38/Rev.1, 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/64/L.38/Rev.1 (Octo. 28, 2009).iii Saferworld 2009, The Arms Trade Treaty and military equipment: the case for a comprehensive scope ,viewed July 7 2010, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/ATT_and_military_equipment.pdf iv U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 2009, International Traffic in ArmsRegulations 2009, viewed July 7 2009, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/itar_official.html v International Civil Aviation Organization, Appendix H Dangerous Goods List, Transport of DangerousGoods by Air , viewed 7 July 2010,http://www.icao.int/anb/FLS/DangerousGoods/PackingInstructions/ConsultativeDocument/AppendixH.pdf vi International Maritime Organization, International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code , viewed 7 July2010, http://www.imo.org/safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=158 viiAnders, Holger 2006 Ammunition: the fuel of Conflict - Oxfam International Briefing Note , viewed 27 th June

2010, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/ammunition.pdf viii Human Rights Watch 2003 Weapons Sanctions, Military Supplies, and Human Suffering: Illegal ArmsFlows to Liberia and the June-July 2003 Shelling of Monrovia, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper,November 3 2003.ix Alpers, Philip 2005, Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, pp. 77-79.xBourne, M and Berkol, I 2006 Deadly Diversions: Illicit Transfers of Ammunition for Small Arms and LightWeapons in S Pzard and H Anders (eds.) Targeting Ammunition: A Primer, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, p.102xi Alpers, Philip & Twyford, Conor 2003, Small Arms in the Pacific, Small Arms Survey, Geneva.pp. 20, 24,26, 39, 90, 98; Issar, Y & Maze, K, 2009, International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of

Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects: Case Study of the SouthPacific, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva,. pp. 6, 14, 18, 22.xii Bevan, J & Dreyfus, P 2007, The Enemy Within: Ammunition Diversion in Uganda and Brazil Small Arms

Survey 2007: Guns and the City, Cambridge University Press, Cambridgexiii Capie, David 2003, Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific, Victoria University Press,Wellingtonxiv Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee 2009 Global Principles for the Parameters of an ATT - PositionPaper No. 1 , July 2009 viewed June 30 2010,http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Global%20Principles%20of%20an%20ATT.pdf xv Greene, Owen 2006, Ammunition For Small Arms and Light Weapons: Understanding the Issues andAddressing the Challenges, in S Pzard and H Anders (eds.) Targeting Ammunition: A Primer, Small ArmsSurvey, Geneva, p. 2; Anders, Holger 2006 Ammunition: the fuel of Conflict, Oxfam International BriefingNote, viewed 27 th June 2010, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/ammunition.pdf xvi Herron, P, Marsh, N, Schroeder, M, Lazarevic, J 2010, Emerging From Obscurity: The Global AmmunitionTrade, Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups and Guns, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pg. 18;Dreyfus, P, Marsh, N, Schroeder M, Lazarevic, J 2009, Sifting the Sources: Authorized Small ArmsTransfers, Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pg. 7xvii Dreyfus, P, Marsh, N, Schroeder M, Lazarevic, J 2009, Sifting the Sources: Authorized Small ArmsTransfers, Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pg. 13xviii Herron, P, Marsh, N, Schroeder, M, Lazarevic, J 2010, Emerging From Obscurity: The GlobalAmmunition Trade, Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups and Guns, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, p. 7xix Saferworld 2009, The Arms Trade Treaty and military equipment: the case for a comprehensive scope ,viewed July 7 2010, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/ATT_and_military_equipment.pdf xx Dreyfus, Pablo 2008 Conventional Ammunition Marking in James Bevan (ed.), Conventional Ammunitionin Surplus, Small Arms Survey, Geneva; Bevan, James 2008, Conventional Ammunition Tracing in JamesBevan (ed.), Conventional Ammunition in Surplus, Small Arms Survey, Geneva

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Bulletproof Arms Trade Treaty - The Case for Ammunition