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Building Resilience in Space Domain
Awareness
Linton Wells II, PhD Avascent Senior Advisor
Tokyo February 27, 2020
2/27/2020 final 1
International Symposium on Ensuring Stable Use of Outer Space
[email protected], 202.436.6354, Skype: linwells
What is Resilience?
Judith Rodin—former head, Rockefeller Foundation: • The capacity of any entity –
• an individual, a community, an organization, or a natural system
• to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and stresses,
• and then to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience
Two critical concepts
• Organizational capacity • Ability to adapt and grow
“Be prepared to bounce forward better”
2/27/2020 final 2
A Profile of Resilience (Be Prepared to Bounce Forward Better)
Figure 1. Conceptual diagram for measuring vulnerability and resilience (expanded from KANG Shian Chin, et. al. (2014); based on Richards, Ross, Shah, & Hastings, 2009
[email protected], 202.436.6354, Skype: linwells
Security vs. Resilience
2/27/2020 final 3
• “locking up and protectingthings”
Security is about:
• Achieving organization’s goals• Under any level of shock or
stress• Fighting back• Emerging stronger
Resilience is about:
Mission Assurance
• Resilience is very close to MissionAssurance• Absorb shocks, “fight hurt,” restore full capability
quickly
• Not just tactical approaches, but also• Design• Configuration control• Rigorous training at all levels• Command culture
[email protected], 202.436.6354, Skype: linwells
Types of Resilience • Cultural
• Organization fights back • Foundation of ethics, principles, governance
• Operational • Resilient networks and telecoms systems • Comms flows, Command & Control (C2) maintained
• Infrastructural • Essential services are sustained and restored • Growing infrastructure interdependencies are understood
2/27/2020 final 4 [email protected], 202.436.6354, Skype: linwells
Today’s Space Domain
2/27/2020 final 5
swiftutors.com
Space Segment Link, Ground, User Segments
Types of Orbits
Source: Google Congested, Contested, Commercial Space Key to Military, Commercial and Civilian Uses
~5,000 Satellites on Orbit, ~2,000 Active, Lots of Debris [email protected], 202.436.6354, Skype: linwells
SSA vs SDA in Japan
• Space Situational Awareness (SSA):
• “catalog maintenance” • Detect, track, and identify all artificial objects in Earth orbit
• Space as a Domain* • NDPG 2018 added space as a domain in which to protect Japan’s national interests, and Japanese nationals’ life, person and property • Not same as a “warfighting domain” in US military context • Still, Space Domain Awareness (SDA) requires more than SSA
*NDPG Dec 2018
2/27/2020 final 6
Source: Sasakawa Peace Foundation, USA
[email protected], 202.436.6354, Skype: linwells
Implementating Effective SDA in Japan • SDA: identify, characterize and understand factors, passive or active,
associated with space domain that could “ensure superiority in use ofspace at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies… ”
• Japanese capabilities could reduce likelihoodof conflict
• Japan “promote partnership and cooperationincluding SSA & mission assurance of entirespace system, through consultations,information sharing…& multilateral exercises”
• Must include “effective defense capability”• Japan-US Alliance is essential• Contribute to comprehensive, whole-of- government efforts
2/27/2020 final 7 [email protected], 202.436.6354, Skype: linwells
The Counterspace Continuum*
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* DIA, CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE Jan 2019,Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf
[email protected], 202.436.6354, Skype: linwells
Resilience of SDA Assets • Life-cycle issue
• Layers of resilience = hardware, software, data, information, humans, processes,facilities, materials, and natural physical entities
• Combine “resilience engineering,” “systems security engineering,” and “cyberresiliency engineering” with risk management
• Excellent references available, e.g. NIST Special Publications
• Example: Principles of cyber-resilient spacecraft• Intrusion detection systems (IDS)• Intrusion protection systems (IPS)• Supply chain risk management (software & hardware)• Logging--verify legitimate ops and do forensics• Other standard cyber protections
• Implement resiliency in all segments, at all layers2/27/2020 final 9 Source: NASIC [email protected], 202.436.6354, Skype: linwells
Japan’s Other New Domains Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) and Cyberspace relate closely to Space domain • Both essential to operations in and through Space • Superiority in both can help prevent conflict
EMS • Space activities depend on spectrum • Frequency allocation—not just RF • International agreements Cyberspace • Cyber situational awareness key • Must defend all segments against cyber attack • Cyber – EW convergence • Include physical threats to cyber infrastructure
2/27/2020 final 10 [email protected], 202.436.6354, Skype: linwells
Evolving Nature of SDA • Future space domain (2030)
• Include operations around and beyond the moon • Many more satellites near earth • Many more players—national, non-governmental, commercial • Dramatic tech change
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• What changes in SDA will be needed?
[email protected], 202.436.6354, Skype: linwells
Building Resilient SDA • No easy, magic solutions • Cultural—Takes time to develop
• Stand up ASDF SDA office with forward-looking view • Provide decision authority • Grow cadre of people • Build collaboration
• Operational—design resilience in from beginning • Make use of references
• Infrastructural—Anticipate growing interdependencies • Interoperability is key to success
• Effective information security will be very important • Anticipate expanding space domain and tech changes • Link SDF SDA to commercial and civilian—broad portfolio of capabilities
2/27/2020 final 12 [email protected], 202.436.6354, Skype: linwells
Questions? Linton Wells II, PhD +1.202.436.6354,
[email protected], [email protected],
Skype: linwells
2/27/2020 final 13
*記載内容は個人的な見解であり、Avascent社や米国を代表するものではありません。*These views are personal, and not those of Avascent or the U.S.