Building e-Resilience in Mongolia - UN ESCAP · i | Building e-Resilience in China The secretariat of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) is the regional

Building e-Resilience in Mongolia

Building e-Resilience in China

Enhancing the Role of Information and Communications

Technology for Disaster Risk Management

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The secretariat of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) is the regional development arm of the United Nations and serves as the main economic and social development centre for the United Nations in Asia and the Pacific. Its mandate is to foster cooperation among its 53 members and 9 associate members. It provides the strategic link between global and country-level programmes and issues. It supports Governments of countries in the region in consolidating regional positions and advocates regional approaches to meeting the region’s unique socioeconomic challenges in a globalizing world. The ESCAP secretariat is in Bangkok. Please visit the ESCAP website at http://www.unescap.org for further information.

The shaded areas of the map indicate ESCAP members and associate members.

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Building e-Resilience in China: Enhancing the Role of Information and

Communications Technology for Disaster Risk Management

© United Nations, 2016 This study was prepared by Peter Lange in 2015. The views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. The designations employed and material presented do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. References and maps obtained from external sources might not conform to the United Nations editorial guidelines. Mention of firm names and commercial products does not imply the endorsement of the United Nations. For more information contact: Information and Communications Technology and Disaster Risk Reduction Division United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific The United Nations Building Rajadamnern Nok Avenue Bangkok 10200 Thailand Telephone: +66 2 288 1234 Fax: +66 2 288 1000 Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.unescap.org/idd

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Contents List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... iv Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................................................... v Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. vi 1. Background ........................................................................................................................ 1 2. Objective and Scope ........................................................................................................... 1 3. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 2 4. Natural Disasters in China ................................................................................................. 3

4.1 Natural Disaster Risk ............................................................................................... 3 4.2 Relevant Government Agencies .............................................................................. 5

5. Telecom and Broadband Infrastructure in China ............................................................... 5 5.1 Access Networks ...................................................................................................... 6 5.1.1 Fixed Networks ..................................................................................................... 6 5.1.2 Mobile Networks ................................................................................................... 9

5.2 Backbone Network Infrastructure ....................................................................... 12 5.2.1 Terrestrial Fibre Optic Network .......................................................................... 12 5.2.2 Terrestrial Microwave ......................................................................................... 20 5.2.3 Satellites .............................................................................................................. 20

5.3 International Infrastructure ................................................................................. 21 5.4 Smart Grids ............................................................................................................. 23

6. Trends in Applications ..................................................................................................... 25 6.1 Space Technology .................................................................................................. 25 6.2 Mobile and Cloud GIS ............................................................................................. 26 6.3 Social Media and Big Data ..................................................................................... 28 6.4 Free and Open Source Software ........................................................................... 30

7. The Digital Divide in China ............................................................................................. 31 8. Lessons Learned and Recommendations ......................................................................... 35

8.1 Narrow the Digital Divide ..................................................................................... 35 8.2 Promote Technology-Neutral Licensing and Spectrum Re-Farming ................. 36 8.3 Provide Licensing for More Service Providers .................................................... 36 8.4 Develop First Responder Network ....................................................................... 36 8.5 Improve the Resilience of the Backbone Network .............................................. 37 8.6 Review Building Codes and Incorporate DRR Elements .................................... 37 8.7 Improve the Provisioning of Emergency Communication Equipment .............. 37 8.8 Liberalize Applications and Content .................................................................... 38

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ListofFigures Figure 1: Natural disasters in China from 1980 to 2010 ........................................................... 4 Figure 2: Location of major natural disasters in China, 1900 - 2000 ........................................ 5 Figure 3: Aggregated daily download speeds in selected ESCAP member countries, 2014 ..... 8 Figure 4: Aggregated daily upload speeds in selected ESCAP member countries, 2014 ......... 8 Figure 5: Aggregated daily download and upload speeds in China, 2008 – 2014 .................... 9 Figure 6: Shift from 2G to 3G and 4G mobile technology in China, 2011 – 2020 ................. 10 Figure 7: Speed and Latency on China Unicom's mobile network, 2015 ............................... 11 Figure 8: Speed and Latency on China Telecom's mobile network, 2015 .............................. 12 Figure 9: Speed and Latency on China Mobile's mobile network, 2015 ................................. 12 Figure 10: China Unicom's domestic MPLS Virtual Private Network ................................... 13 Figure 11: Terrestrial fibre optic backbone infrastructure in China and population density ... 14 Figure 12: Terrestrial fibre optic backbone networks and nodes in China .............................. 15 Figure 13: Mean server distance in speed tests as per Figure 3 and Figure 4, 2014 ............... 15 Figure 14: Network latency in selected ESCAP member countries, 2013 .............................. 16 Figure 15: Network latency in milliseconds and percentage change, 2010 – 2013................. 16 Figure 16: Packet loss in selected ESCAP member countries, 2013 ....................................... 17 Figure 17: Packet loss in per cent and percentage change, 2010 – 2013 ................................. 17 Figure 18: Terrestrial fiber optic backbone infrastructure in China, single and multiple links 19 Figure 19: China Unicom's domestic backbone network ........................................................ 19 Figure 20: IPSTAR satellite coverage in China ...................................................................... 21 Figure 21: International submarine fibre optic cables in China .............................................. 22 Figure 22: International submarine fibre optic cable landing stations in China ...................... 22 Figure 23: International Internet bandwidth in China, July 2014 ............................................ 23 Figure 24: SuperMap Mobile GIS system architecture ........................................................... 27 Figure 25: Mobile GIS mapping of Yushu earthquake, 2010 ................................................. 27 Figure 26: Active social media accounts in China, January 2015 ........................................... 28 Figure 27: Crowdsourced crisis map of Beijing floods, 2012 ................................................. 30 Figure 28: Mobile penetration in selected Chinese province, 2011 vs. 2013 .......................... 32 Figure 29: Internet users and Internet penetration rate in China, 2014 ................................... 33 Figure 30: Internet penetration in China by province, 2013 .................................................... 33 Figure 31: Urban vs. rural Internet users in China, 2013 – 2014 ............................................ 34 Figure 32: Internet, urbanization, income & illiteracy regression analysis by province, 2013 34

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AbbreviationsandAcronyms 2G Second Generation 3G Third Generation 4G Fourth Generation CNNIC China Internet Network Information Centre DRM Disaster Risk Management DRR Disaster Risk Reduction DSL Digital Subscriber Line ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (United Nations) FOSS Free and Open Source Software FttX Fibre to the X (a generic term for fibre deployment to the premise, home,

building, etc.) GIS Geographic Information System GSMA Global System for Mobile Communications Association HFA Hyogo Framework for Action ICT Information and Communications Technology IP Internet Protocol MIIT Ministry of Industry and Information Technology MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching NDRC National Disaster Reduction Centre NGO Non-Governmental Organization SDG Sustainable Development Goal SLA Service Level Agreement SMS Short Message Service TASIM Trans-Eurasian Information Super Highway TAE Trans-Asia-Europe (a terrestrial cable network between Europe and Asia) VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol

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ExecutiveSummary China is one of the world’s most disaster-affected countries. This report examines the role of the information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure, services and applications in disaster risk management (DRM) and disaster risk reduction (DRR). Particular attention is given to the concept of e-resilience, i.e. the ability of ICT systems to withstand, recover from and change in the face of an external disturbance such as a natural disaster. The study looks at the gaps and performance weaknesses in the ICT infrastructure, from its local access networks and national backbone, to its international connectivity. The study also assesses the extent of the ‘digital divide’ in China, with the aim to identify priorities for future infrastructure deployments and to provide guidance to policymakers. Key findings in the report include the following:

• There are significant regional differences across China in its deployment of the ICT infrastructure, and the availability and affordability of ICT services to the local population. Most natural disasters in the country affect densely populated areas where, on the positive side, the telecommunications infrastructure is relatively well developed. But even in these areas, their e-resilience can be further enhanced.

• Like in most countries around the world, mobile phones have replaced fixed-line telephones as the preferred means of communication in China, both for voice calls and access to the Internet. Mobile network coverage is available to nearly 100 per cent of the population, while 3G and 4G mobile broadband coverage is still in the process of being extended beyond the urban areas.

• While major cities in China already have mobile and Internet market penetration rates comparable to fully developed countries, a ‘digital divide’ exists in the country where only around half of the population own a personal mobile phone or have access to the Internet. The divide is mainly caused by differences in disposable income, and this has an impact on the effectiveness of ICT systems for DRM.

• Indicators related to the quality of the ICT services, such as average download and upload speeds and packet loss in China, are mostly in line with regional averages, but significantly lags behind Asia’s leading markets. Latency on China’s mobile broadband networks is generally not very good. On the positive side, significant improvements have been made in recent years in most categories.

• The mobile market structure in China is not ideal for fostering competition and innovation, which has had negative consequences for the overall e-resilience of the country’s mobile infrastructure. The market would benefit from an additional network operator or regional operators in underserved areas.

• China’s national fibre optic backbone offers good redundancy in terms of network topology in the more densely populated eastern part of the country, but many important routes are operated by only one dominant carrier. The less populated western part of the country has fewer fibre links and is therefore more vulnerable to disruptions. Licensing additional backbone network operators would increase competition and improve the overall resilience of the national backbone.

• At the international level, China is well equipped with many submarine fibre optic cables landing at various locations along the east coast, providing good diversity to protect against service disruptions. Strengthening terrestrial fibre links to Europe and India would

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create additional redundancy and provide additional bandwidth to the underdeveloped regions in the western part of the country.

• China’s international Internet bandwidth per Internet user is very low in comparison with the global average; an effect from the country’s ban of many international websites, applications and social media platforms. There are good examples of home-grown software, applications, web and social media platforms that have been successfully used in DRM, but the sector would clearly benefit if international platforms were more easily accessible.

• A USD 600 billion expansion and modernization of the power grid is underway, to be completed by 2020, including Smart Grid technology that will make the network more efficient, stable and resilient.

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1. Background The Information and Communications Technology and Disaster Risk Reduction Division of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) carries out a variety of activities aimed at improving regional connectivity through the development of the information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure in Asia and the Pacific. This study is part of an ESCAP project entitled, “Strengthening information and communications technology capacities for disaster risk reduction and development: Addressing information, knowledge and policy gaps in Asia”. The project is in line with ESCAP Resolution 69/10 on, “Promoting regional information and communications technology connectivity and building knowledge-networked societies in Asia and the Pacific”, adopted by member states at the 69th session of the ESCAP Commission. Importantly, this resolution encourages member states to continuously promote regional cooperation to address the digital divide, and to formulate and implement coherent ICT policies that build knowledge-networked societies.

2. ObjectiveandScope This study contributes to the improved capacity of policymakers to integrate ICT into disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy and planning, by providing a better understanding of the role of ICT in disaster risk management (DRM) in China. The study includes a comprehensive analysis of connectivity-related data in China. It identifies key bottlenecks and missing links in the network infrastructure that should be remedied to reduce disaster risk, and explores different aspects of the digital divide. Drawing reference from the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030,1 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG),2 the study begins with an overview of the evolving role of ICT in DRM. Particular focus is given to the issue of e-resilience, in line with SDG no. 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation. The readiness, quality and resilience of the ICT infrastructure to provide early warnings, withstand disaster events and support recovery is examined. Special attention is given to fibre optic connectivity networks and broadband as critical infrastructure for DRM, as well as the need to narrow the digital divide by striving towards universal and affordable access for all. Turning to applications, the study showcases a number of examples of how ICTs have been used to enhance DRM, including government- and private sector-driven initiatives, and those offering opportunities for public-private partnerships. Innovative solutions that empower individuals and communities to organize themselves in response to a disaster are included, as well as applications that did not meet expectations. Towards the end of this study, lessons are drawn and recommendations are made from policy and implementation perspectives, for the future development of infrastructure and the creation of an environment that fosters innovation and cooperation in the interest of economic development and human well-being.

1 The Sendai Framework was adopted by United Nations member states on 18 March 2015 at the Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. The Sendai Framework is the successor instrument to the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015. For more information see http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai-

framework. 2 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that includes a set of 17 SDGs was adopted by United Nations member states on 25 September 2015 at the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit. The SDGs build on the eight Millennium Development Goals that the world committed to achieving by 2015. For more information

see http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/.


3. Introduction The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA) was the first plan to detail the work required by different sectors and actors to reduce disaster losses. It was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in the Resolution A/RES/60/195 following the 2005 United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR) in Kobe, Japan. In March 2015, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 succeeded the HFA. The Sendai Framework builds on the work done by member states and other stakeholders under the HFA and introduces a number of innovations to prevent new risk and reduce existing risk, based on the lessons learned from implementing the HFA. Since the adoption of the HFA in 2005, progress has been achieved in reducing disaster risk at local, national, regional and global levels. Countries have enhanced their capacities in DRM, which have contributed to a decrease in mortality in the case of some hazards such as floods and tropical storms. Furthermore, there has been growing evidence that DRR is a cost effective investment in preventing future losses. The 10-year period of the HFA, however, did not substantially reduce human and economic losses. From 2005 to 2015, more than 700,000 people lost their lives, over 1.4 million were injured, and around 23 million were made homeless as a result of disasters. Overall, more than 1.5 billion people were affected by disasters in various ways, and the total economic loss was more than USD 1.3 trillion.3 Disasters are increasing in frequency and intensity, and those exacerbated by climate change are significantly impeding progress toward sustainable development. The preparatory process for the third WCDRR in 2015 concludes that it is urgent and critical to anticipate, plan for and act on risk scenarios over at least the next 50 years to protect ecosystems, human beings and their assets more effectively. It calls for business to integrate disaster risk into their management practices, investments and accounting, for closer cooperation between the public and private sectors, and for a broader and a more people-centred preventive approach to disaster risk. Global, regional and transboundary cooperation remains pivotal, especially for developing countries and in particular small island states, landlocked countries and least developed countries. These countries require special attention and support through bilateral and multilateral channels for capacity building, financial and technical assistance, and technology transfer. ICT plays a significant role in DRR. ICT allows speedy communication that is essential for saving lives, protecting assets and coordinating rescue and recovery efforts once a disaster has struck. ICT is also indispensable to the continuous monitoring of hazards, the timely transmission of data to relevant actors, the analysis of data to predict impending disasters, and the issuance of warnings to people. The amount of data and voice traffic generated in hazard monitoring and around disaster events is enormous. Geographic information systems (GIS) are continuously being improved for a wide range of applications in hazard monitoring, surveillance and reporting that can provide high-resolution and multi-spectral imagery, as well as video streaming. Moreover, machine-to-machine communication is playing an increasing role in DRM. All this leads to a need for wide coverage of high-bandwidth, low-latency broadband transmission infrastructure. The population density in many areas potentially affected by natural disasters is very high, as is the case in parts of China. This means that when a disaster strikes, the aggregate voice and 3 United Nations, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. Available from

http://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf.


data traffic from issuing warnings, communicating with those affected, and coordinating among authorities is also very high, putting exceptional strain on access as well as backbone networks. Ideally, the network infrastructure in such areas would be scalable and flexible enough to absorb these traffic peaks. Yet, more often than not, telecom networks become congested in disaster areas, not only because of the exceptional traffic load, but also because their capacity is diminished due to destruction or temporary incapacitation of infrastructure, for example through power failures. Bandwidth, speed and scalability are therefore not the only requirements for the ICT infrastructure in disaster-prone areas; it is equally important that the infrastructure is robust against damage or destruction and that it has built-in redundancy. Ideally, redundant infrastructure would also be self-organizing and self-healing in case of partial failure. In addition, the ICT infrastructure and services, particularly at the access network level, need to be inclusive for effective DRM, i.e. access needs to be available and affordable to the entire population, including the poor and those living in rural and remote areas. In many countries, however, including China, a so-called ‘digital divide’ exists, excluding parts of the population from access and/or affordable services. The above characteristics of the ICT infrastructure are embodied in the term ‘e-resilience’, which is also in line with the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, in particular Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation. Box 1: What is e-resilience?

e-Resilience is defined as the ability of a system to withstand, recover from and change in the face of an external disturbance (such as acute or chronic climate change). Resilience constitutes an important property of livelihood systems which, through a set of seven dynamic sub-properties (robustness, scale, redundancy, rapidity, flexibility, self-organization and learning) can enhance adaptive capacity. e-Resilience is a property of livelihood systems by which ICTs interact with a set of resilience sub-properties, enabling the system to adapt to the effects of climate change.

Source: Association for Progressive Communication

4. NaturalDisastersinChina

4.1 Natural Disaster Risk

Due to its vast territory and complicated weather and geographical conditions, China is one of the most disaster-affected countries in the world—primarily affected by floods, earthquakes and tropical cyclones (typhoons). Five of the world's top ten deadliest natural disasters in recorded history occurred in China, including the top three. The country has had six of the world's top ten deadliest floods and landslides of all time, including the top five. According to China’s National Disaster Reduction Centre (NDRC, see Section 4.2), floods affected over 77 million people and caused 712 fatalities between January and October 2014. In the same period, over 3.6 million people were evacuated and 249,000 houses destroyed. The cost of the floods in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces in mid-2014 alone, which affected three million people and damaged 120,000 hectares of crops, was estimated at more than USD 335 million.


China has also had three of the world's top ten most fatal earthquakes, including the top two, according to the United States Geological Survey. The 1976 Tangshan earthquake, with an estimated death toll of up to 779,000, is ranked the third deadliest earthquake and eighth deadliest natural disaster of all time. The 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, which took the lives of close to 70,000 people and left 15 million homeless, was the deadliest since 1976. According to the NDRC, 2014 saw at least 15 major quakes in the first three quarters of the year, the worst being the Ludian earthquake in August, for which ESCAP has estimated economic losses at USD 6 billion. Almost every year, multiple typhoons hit the coastal areas of southern China. Typhoon Rammasun in 2014 killed 62 people and destroyed 51,000 homes, according to local media, and economic losses amounted to USD 6.25 billion. Facing the seismically active Pacific Ocean, low lying coastal areas are also at risk of tsunamis.

Figure 1: Natural disasters in China from 1980 to 2010

Source: http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/?cid=36

The NDRC claims that over 254 million people in China were affected by a natural disaster of some sort in the first three quarters of 2014 alone. As many as 1,536 people lost their lives during the same period. In 2012, China’s total economic losses due to natural disasters were estimated at USD 66 billion. What makes natural disasters in China so deadly and costly is the fact that much of the country’s huge population concentrates in disaster-prone areas, especially along the coasts, in major river basins and in high-rainfall areas. There is a strong correlation between population density and the occurrence of floods and typhoons. Droughts are also widespread in densely populated areas. Earthquakes occur mostly along the western fringe of China’s more densely populated eastern half, and in the far northwest. On the positive side, these highly populated disaster-prone areas have a relatively well-developed ICT infrastructure (see Section 5) that is accessible and affordable to those living in these areas (see Section 7).


Figure 2: Location of major natural disasters in China, 1900 - 2000

Source: NDRC

4.2 Relevant Government Agencies

The NDRC is a specialized government agency under the Ministry of Civil Affairs, engaged in information services and supporting decisions on various natural disasters. It provides information to disaster management departments for their decision-making. It also offers technical support to China's DRR undertakings by way of collecting and analysing disaster information using technologies such as satellite remote sensing, and conducting post-disaster assessments. The National Earthquake Administration was established in 1971 to take charge of monitoring, research and emergency response to earthquakes. It was renamed China Earthquake Administration in 1998, as mandated by the Earthquake Prevention and Disaster Reduction Act. Each provincial, autonomous regional and centrally administrated municipal government has its own earthquake administration under the direction of the China Earthquake Administration.

5. TelecomandBroadbandInfrastructureinChina The telecom infrastructure in general, and in particular, telecommunications for DRM, consists of three main layers:

• The access network

• The national backbone network

• The international infrastructure The access network provides access to and from the end-user, i.e. individuals, businesses and institutions that use telecommunication services and applications. It consists of the fixed-line infrastructure and wireless/mobile connections, which in many countries, including China,


now vastly outnumber fixed lines. The fixed-line infrastructure is traditionally made up of copper telephone lines and coaxial cable TV networks, but increasingly also includes fibre optic connections directly to homes (fibre-to-the home) and premises (fibre-to-the-premises). Mobile networks typically have many thousands—in the case of China hundreds of thousands—of base stations, each of which serves a relatively small area of some square kilometres or less. The national backbone network, consisting of several sub-layers itself, connects the various elements of the access network with each other, e.g., wireless base stations, switching centres, operation and maintenance facilities, and international gateways. It includes metropolitan networks within cities and trunk lines connecting major cities or population centres with each other. Major trunk lines are typically implemented as fibre optic connections due to the high capacity demand on them. At the local level, microwave radio links are common because of their relatively low cost, and their ease and speed of implementation. However, they too are increasingly being replaced by fibre optic connections due to the rising demand for broadband data services on the access network, especially in densely populated areas. Satellite connections are used for national backbone connections to remote areas or as backup for other types of connections. The international infrastructure connects a country to the rest of the world. This typically takes the form of very high capacity fibre optic subsea cables spanning entire oceans, which have largely replaced satellite technology in this segment. Landlocked countries depend on terrestrial transit connections via countries with coastal landing stations, or on satellites for their international connections. All three layers—access, backbone and international infrastructure—are critical for the overall functioning of effective communications, i.e. sufficient capacity, and ideally redundancy, needs to be provided in each layer. It is of no use to build the best high-speed broadband access network if sufficient backbone and international capacity is not available to carry the traffic, and vice-versa. In many markets around the world, the three layers are open to competition, i.e. there are several licensed service providers who have built their own network infrastructure and are offering services in competition with others. This in itself creates redundancy in network infrastructure covering the same geographical areas, but each operator will also strive to have redundancy within its own network in order to be able to provide uninterrupted service in case of temporary partial failures or outages. In China, however, the level of competition across the three layers is relatively low.

5.1 Access Networks

5.1.1 Fixed Networks

China has two major fixed-line network operators, China Telecom with around 145 million subscribers, and China Unicom with around 87 million subscribers in 2014. Although the two companies are licensed to operate nationwide, for historical reasons China Telecom has an overwhelming market share in 21 provinces in the south of the country, while China Unicom dominates in 10 provinces in the north. By 2010, 100 per cent of China’s ‘administrative villages’ had voice telephony services and 100 per cent of towns were connected to the Internet, 98 per cent through broadband. Despite this widespread availability of fixed-line services, only a relatively small proportion of Chinese households are actually connected. Many have replaced their fixed line with one or several mobile phones, leading to a steady decline of fixed lines in service from a peak of 370


million in 2006 to 250 million in 2014, while the number of mobile subscriptions grew from 460 million to 1.3 billion during the same time period. Including the 21 million public payphones, fixed-line penetration as a percentage of the country’s population now stands at around 18 per cent, which is low in comparison with a 94 per cent mobile penetration rate (see Section 5.1.2). This trend of declining fixed-line subscriptions and near 100 per cent mobile penetration means that the mobile networks play a much greater role for DRM when it comes to reaching people in affected areas. The use of mobile networks also has the added advantage of reaching people on the move. Nevertheless, fixed lines—especially on a fibre optic network—will always be superior to mobile access when it comes to supporting very high data rates and low latency. Therefore, fixed lines remain indispensable for those aspects of DRM that involve very high bandwidth and real-time applications, such as exchange of large amounts of GIS data and high-definition video streaming. Around 75 per cent of China Telecom’s and China Unicom’s fixed-line customers use their subscriptions for broadband services. Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) is still the dominating fixed-line broadband technology, but it has declined from a peak of 119 million subscribers in 2012 to around 95 million in 2014, according to data from the China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC). DSL is gradually being replaced by direct fibre optic connections to businesses and homes (FttX), and an overwhelming number of Chinese now also access the Internet through mobile devices (see Section 5.1.2). According to statistics from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), FttX increased from 27.5 million to 68.3 million subscribers in 2014, accounting for 34 per cent of all broadband subscriptions. Ninety per cent of FttX subscribers are from the business and public sectors, and 10 per cent are residents. Besides DSL and FttX, cable modem services using the cable TV network infrastructure plays a relatively small role in China’s fixed-line broadband access market. This is despite the fact that the country has the world’s largest cable TV market with an estimated 235 million subscriptions, and a household penetration of 55 per cent in 2013.4 Cable TV operations exist in all of China’s 31 provinces, covering most cities and many parts of rural China, so they do add a certain infrastructure redundancy to the telecom networks that may be helpful in disaster situations. Yet, due to regulatory uncertainty and a fragmented market structure, only a few of China’s cable TV providers offer voice telephony and broadband Internet access through their cable networks. The subscriber base for these services has fallen from a peak of almost 15 million in 2006 to below 5 million in 2013, according to Infonetics Research. This trend appears to be in line with the drop in DSL subscriptions as FttX gains traction in the market.

5.1.1.1 Speed

China’s telecom operators offer ADSL2+, VDSL and FttX connections with up to 100 Mb/s. By 2013, 20 Mb/s services were available to 80 per cent of the population in urban areas, and 4 Mb/s to 85 per cent in suburban areas. However, according to speedtest.net, the average download speed for fixed-line broadband in China was just under 18 Mb/s in 2014, although these results were based on a relatively small sample of about 264,000 tests, considering the country’s broadband subscriber base of 200 million. This is a relatively good result given the country’s geographic size and urbanization demographics, but it does lag significantly behind leading markets in Asia, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, Republic of Korea and Japan, as shown in Figure 3.

4 http://www.budde.com.au/.


In terms of upload speeds, the gap between China and Asia’s leading markets is even more pronounced, as shown in Figure 4 China lags behind countries like Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in this regard.

Figure 3: Aggregated daily download speeds in selected ESCAP member countries, 2014

Source: Based on ESCAP, speedtest.net

Figure 4: Aggregated daily upload speeds in selected ESCAP member countries, 2014


However, as Figure 5 shows, the development of both downlink and upload speed in China in recent years is encouraging, reflecting the continued investment into expanding and improving the network infrastructure.


Figure 5: Aggregated daily download and upload speeds in China, 2008 – 2014


Download and upload speed do not depend on the quality of the access network alone, they are also influenced by the backbone network (see Section 5.2). This is also the case for other quality criteria such as latency and packet loss (see Section 5.2.1.1).

5.1.2 Mobile Networks

Mobile networks play a vital role in DRM because they reach a far greater percentage of the population than fixed-line networks, they offer mobility, and they are more robust against damage as they offer fewer potential points of failure per connection than fixed-line networks (although underground wires offer the best robustness). At least in densely populated areas, mobile networks also offer a certain degree of redundancy in case of local failure of individual base stations, since a neighbouring base station will often be able to provide some degree of service in the affected area. Moreover, mobile networks can be scaled up relatively easily for temporary extraordinary traffic demand, for example in disaster areas, by bringing in mobile base stations or so-called ‘cells on wheels’. Mobile networks, including mobile broadband access therefore need to be included in any DRM plan. China is the world’s biggest mobile market both in terms of subscribers and infrastructure deployed. Mobile network coverage is available to 100 per cent of the country’s population, provided by three operators with a total of 3.41 million mobile base stations at the end of 2014.5 There are around 1.3 billion mobile subscriptions, a population penetration rate of 94 per cent. However, the Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA) estimates that the number of unique subscribers is only about half of this number (or 630 million), with the remaining subscriptions being additional SIM cards that unique subscribers own for various purposes. So while mobile network coverage has reached virtually every populated part of the country, only around half of the population is currently able to afford mobile services. This has implications on the ability of people to communicate in disaster situations and receive warnings, given that the penetration rate for fixed-line telecom services is even lower (see Section 5.1.1).

5.1.2.1 Transition from 2G to 3G and 4G

With regard to network compatibility and redundancy, both of which are key components of e-resilience, the market structure in China is not ideal. For second generation (2G) 5 Barclays Equity Research. This figure may include 2G, 3G and 4G-enabled sites.


technology, two of the country’s mobile operators, China Mobile and China Unicom operate GSM networks; while China Telecom operates a CDMA-2000 network that is incompatible with GSM. Since there are very few GSM/CDMA dual-mode handsets, a customer of China Telecom’s CDMA-2000 network would need to buy a separate GSM handset to use the GSM networks, and vice versa. Which means in a disaster situation, if one of the networks is down, access to an alternative network may require the purchase of a separate handset. The market became even more fragmented with third generation (3G) technology. In 2009, MIIT took the unusual step of issuing licences for three different technology standards to the three carriers, whilst the trend elsewhere in the world was moving towards technology-neutral licences. The Chinese-developed standard, TD-SCDMA was assigned to China Mobile; China Unicom received a licence for the W-CDMA standard; and China Telecom received a licence for the CDMA-2000 EVDO standard. EVDO is again incompatible with the other 3G technologies and globally ended up in a niche; further development of the technology has stalled due to the superiority of other standards in terms of data rate, interoperability and future migration roadmap. But even the other two carriers, China Mobile and China Unicom, are operating incompatible 3G standards, limiting choices for consumers. Multi-mode handsets only became available on a larger scale with the emergence of fourth generation (4G) mobile technology. China Mobile led the charge by committing early to the TD-LTE standard and launching services in 2012. China Unicom and China Telecom were both favouring FD-LTE, but licences for this standard were only granted in 2014, by which time the two operators had started rolling out hybrid FD/TD-LTE networks. 3G and even more so 4G mobile networks can deliver broadband data services at much higher speed to more people than 2G networks. Moreover, 3G and 4G offer significantly higher capacity for voice traffic and machine-to-machine communication, which means they open up a whole new world of services and applications that are relevant to DRM. Some of these are discussed in Section 6. However, while basic 2G services are available nationwide, 3G and 4G coverage will take some time to become available across all populated areas in China, and fewer people will be able to afford them initially due to the higher cost. As shown in Figure 6, GSMA expects 50 per cent of China’s mobile subscriptions to be 4G-enabled by 2020.

Figure 6: Shift from 2G to 3G and 4G mobile technology in China, 2011 – 2020

Source: GSMA

Out of China Mobile’s 800 million mobile subscriptions in October 2014 (representing a market share of over 60 per cent), only 243 million were 3G-enabled and 55 million 4G-enabled, the latter growing at around 10 million per month. Around one third of its


approximately 1.5 million base stations were 3G- and 4G-enabled, with 4G coverage available in 300 cities, covering 75 per cent of the country’s population. The operator is now preparing to deploy LTE-Advanced and carrier aggregation technology to progressively raise the peak data rates on its 4G network towards 1 Gb/s. China Unicom had 295 million mobile subscribers in June 2014, of which 141 million were 3G- and/or 4G-enabled. China Telecom had 183 million mobile subscribers in October 2014, of which 115 million were 3G-enabled. In order to speed up the development of their 4G networks and to save costs, the three mobile carriers formed an infrastructure joint venture in 2014, the China Communications Facilities Services Corporation, also known as ‘China Tower’, which will aggregate existing infrastructure and build an additional one million shared telecom towers across the country. According to Goldman Sachs, China Mobile currently owns 350,000 towers, China Unicom 150,000 and China Telecom 100,000.

5.1.2.2 Mobile Broadband

GSMA research in 2013 showed that almost four in five of China’s 630 million unique mobile subscribers also access the Internet through their mobile devices, adding up to 500 million mobile Internet users. Of these, 69 per cent or 345 million people used 3G or 4G mobile broadband services. This highlights the importance of the mobile networks not only for basic voice services but for data services as well, including those relevant for DRM. The research results also point to the fact that there were 155 million mobile Internet users in China who still used relatively slow 2G services. A lack of mobile broadband network coverage and/or the higher cost of ownership were likely to be the key reasons for the continued use of 2G services. As shown in Figure 7, Figure 8 & Figure 9, download speeds on China’s 4G mobile networks were in line with the global average of 8.1 Mb/s, according to Opensignal.com. However, some 3G networks lagged behind the global average of 1.8 Mb/s. This was likely to be due to the fact that 4G was relatively new and the traffic load on the networks was still low, whilst the penetration for 3G was already much higher.

Figure 7: Speed and Latency on China Unicom's mobile network, 2015

Source: Opensignal.com


Figure 8: Speed and Latency on China Telecom's mobile network, 2015

Source: Opensignal.com Note: China Telecom does not operate EDGE/HSPA

Figure 9: Speed and Latency on China Mobile's mobile network, 2015

Source: Opensignal.com

Latency, in general, is not very good in China. At around 600 to 700 milliseconds, 3G latency is hardly better than 2G, although theoretically it should be around 25 to 200 milliseconds. 4G latency should be around 10 milliseconds. The fact that latency is poor across the board indicates that there may be issues with the backbone network (see Section 5.2 for discussions on these various issues). Low latency is important for real-time services such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and video streaming, which are relevant for DRM. If Voice over LTE is to be used for voice calls in the future, latency will have to be significantly improved.

5.2 Backbone Network Infrastructure

5.2.1 Terrestrial Fibre Optic Network

China has eight major backbone networks, some of which were merged as a result of market reform in 2008. The resulting major commercial networks are:

• ChinaNet (China Telecom)

• UniNet (China Unicom)

• CMNet (China Mobile) In addition, there are three academic and public sector networks:

• CERNET – China Education and Research Network (Ministry of Education)

• CSTNet – China Science and Technology Network (Chinese Academy of Sciences)


• CIETnet – China International Economic and Trade Network (Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation)

China Telecom’s ChinaNet is the country’s largest Internet Protocol (IP) network, providing access for all major Internet service providers nationwide through a 40 Gb/s Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS)-enabled IP backbone using synchronous digital hierarchy and dense wavelength division multiplexing technologies. Backed by service level agreements (SLAs), access is available via IP, asynchronous transfer mode and frame relay with speeds ranging from DS1 (1.5 Mb/s) to gigabit Ethernet. It offers public and private peering using the Border Gateway Protocol, flexible billing options (flat or usage-based), and real-time monitoring and reporting. A map from 2011 on the company’s website shows that the vast majority of its backbone fibre is installed underground, providing the best possible robustness against damage e.g. due to natural disasters. China Unicom’s UniNet also covers all 31 provinces of the country, uses the same state-of-the-art technologies as ChinaNet, and offers many of the same features.

Figure 10: China Unicom's domestic MPLS Virtual Private Network

Source: China Unicom

The fibre optic backbone networks of the two main operators—China Telecom and China Unicom—show good geographic correlation with population density, and therefore also with areas of high natural disaster occurrence as per Figure 2. However, some neighbouring countries with similar or lower population densities have higher fibre densities, for example in Bangladesh, India and Viet Nam.


Figure 11: Terrestrial fibre optic backbone infrastructure in China and population density

Source: International Telecommunication Union

China also has a relatively low density of fibre nodes compared with most neighbouring countries, even in the more densely populated areas of China, as shown in Figure 12. In areas at greater distances from the nearest node, the effective transmission speed and quality of service may be compromised (see Section 5.2.1.1). China’s relatively low fibre node density becomes apparent in the speed test results in Section 5.1.1.1, and as shown in Figure 13, the mean server distance in China (at 141 miles) was higher than in most other countries in 2014. Among ESCAP member countries, only the tests in Uzbekistan, Iran, Bhutan and Afghanistan saw greater server distances.


Figure 12: Terrestrial fibre optic backbone networks and nodes in China


Figure 13: Mean server distance in speed tests as per Figure 3 and Figure 4, 2014


5.2.1.1 Quality of Service

Besides speed (see Section 5.1.1.1 for fixed-line and Section 5.1.2.2 for mobile broadband access), latency and packet loss are the key performance indicators for data networks. Both are particularly important for real-time services such as VoIP and video streaming. In terms of latency, China’s performance is average in the region, at around 100 milliseconds, but it does lag behind leading markets such as the Republic of Korea and Singapore (see


Figure 14). However, China is among the top three countries in the region in terms of latency reduction since 2010 (see Figure 15).

Figure 14: Network latency in selected ESCAP member countries, 2013


Figure 15: Network latency in milliseconds and percentage change, 2010 – 2013

Source: ESCAP, speedtest.net

In terms of packet loss, China’s performance is also average in the region, at around 1.3 per cent, and it lags behind countries such as the Republic of Korea, Viet Nam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines (see Figure 16). However, China has shown the best performance in terms of packet loss reduction since 2010 (see Figure 17).


Figure 16: Packet loss in selected ESCAP member countries, 2013


Figure 17: Packet loss in per cent and percentage change, 2010 – 2013

Source: ESCAP, speedtest.net

In summary, the quality of service on China’s telecom networks in terms of latency and packet loss is in line with regional averages, but the strong improvement in both key performance indicators in the past few years is testament to the fact that continued significant investment in network infrastructure is taking place that will see the country catch up with leading markets in the region.

5.2.1.2 Redundancy

Network redundancy is important for ensuring service availability and minimal downtimes, as expected from operators who guarantee certain performance parameters in SLAs. SLAs typically include a force majeure clause that relieves the operator from performance obligations in cases of extraordinary events or circumstances beyond its control, such as war, riots, strikes, crime, or natural disasters—in legal terms often referred to as ‘Acts of God’. However, service reliability becomes most vital especially in disaster situations.


There are several levels of redundancy that can improve network and service reliability in disaster situations. China’s fibre optic backbone infrastructure is relatively well developed in this regard, but there are some areas of concern, which are outlined below. Two of the country’s leading backbone network operators—China Telecom and China Unicom—claim to have fully meshed and fully redundant backbone networks. This means that every network node can communicate with any other node, and the backup of certain network components and databases are held in standby, ready to take over in case of any failures in the primary network. This is common practice for backbone network operators. In terms of network topology, China’s fibre optic backbone infrastructure consists of many interconnected fibre rings. A ring structure is the best solution for creating redundancy because if a ring is broken, virtually all locations along it can still be reached by routing traffic in the other direction around the ring. The IP and other advanced routing mechanisms commonly used in modern telecom networks provide dynamic self-healing capabilities to these networks to minimize disruptions caused by local failures. A total of 60 fibre rings can be identified on the map in Figure 18 (not including metropolitan fibre rings, which are not visible on the map). However, closer analysis reveals that a significant number of the fibre routes nationwide are operated by only one carrier (shown in red in Figure 18). The routes shown in brown contain cables operated by at least two different carriers, and the ones shown in green are those where a second cable is currently under construction.6 Some routes contain two cables operated by the same carrier; in these cases one of them is likely to be an older low-capacity cable. Not shown in Figure 19 is China Mobile’s backbone network (which appears to be used for internal purposes only), and the non-commercial academic and public sector networks. In most cases, the single carrier operating the red fibre routes is China Telecom; China Unicom is the single carrier on only seven of them, most of which are relatively short. This means that the China Unicom network is more vulnerable to service disruptions. It also means that when a carrier experiences a catastrophic failure on one or several of the red routes, there would be no other carrier’s fibre infrastructure in place that could potentially take over at least some of the traffic load. Satellite and terrestrial microwave links (see Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3) can be used as a backup in such cases, but their coverage and/or capacity is limited. China Unicom’s domestic backbone network map (see Figure 19) shows that the company does operate on more than seven of the red routes in Figure 18, and it also shows some additional ones. If both maps are correct, this most likely means that China Unicom is leasing capacity on some of China Telecom’s fibre routes, and the deployment of new routes is ongoing. Some of the additional routes may be microwave radio links.

6 Details can be examined at http://www.itu.int/itu-d/tnd-map-public/index.html.


Figure 18: Terrestrial fiber optic backbone infrastructure in China, single and multiple links


Figure 19: China Unicom's domestic backbone network

Source: China Unicom


The central and western parts of China are most vulnerable to disruptions of fibre optic backbone connectivity due to a lack of redundancy since they are where some of the country’s worst earthquakes have occurred. Other vulnerable areas include the extreme northeast that is frequently affected by forest fires, some densely populated eastern and southern parts of the country, and the coastal areas where floods and tropical cyclones occur regularly.

5.2.1.3 Internet Interconnection Points

In a joint project, China’s three leading telecom carriers—China Telecom, China Unicom and China Mobile—completed the construction of seven new Internet interconnection points in 2014, including over 3,000 km of new fibre optic cable at a cost of USD 477 million. The additional interconnection points are mostly located inland in Chengdu, Xian, Wuhan, Shenyang, Nanjing, Chongqing and Zhengzhou. They will relieve traffic in the three existing interconnection points in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou; increase average download and upload speeds; and provide better redundancy to protect against service disruptions, for example in disaster situations.

5.2.2 Terrestrial Microwave

Terrestrial microwave radio links have largely disappeared from China’s long-haul backbone network and have been replaced by fibre optic cables, which offer higher bandwidth, are not susceptible to radio interference or performance degradation in heavy rain, and have lower maintenance costs. China Telecom’s remaining microwave backbone network has a total link length of 31,551 km, which is a little more than 5 per cent of the total length of the fibre backbone network. This trend can be observed in all developed economies and most developing countries, even though fibre deployment does require a greater initial capital investment than microwave. The map in Figure 12 shows that some of China’s neighbouring countries still use microwave in the national backbone network, either due to their extremely challenging terrain (in the case of Nepal) and/or their low development status (in the case of Myanmar). Maintaining a microwave network in parallel to a fibre optic backbone network would improve infrastructure redundancy in disaster situations, especially in more remote areas where there is less redundancy from ring structures in the fibre network (see Section 5.2.1.2). However, the additional operational and maintenance cost is usually not considered economically feasible once fibre has been deployed. Instead, satellites are more commonly used to provide emergency backup for broken terrestrial links, but their capacity is much lower and latency much higher.

5.2.3 Satellites

Satellite operations in China are strongly backed by the government and they have attracted many local and foreign interests, and cover every part of the country for telecommunication services, broadcasting, navigation and weather forecasting. There is a domestic satellite system with 55 Earth stations; and international satellite Earth stations include five Intelsat (four Pacific Ocean and one Indian Ocean), one Intersputnik (Indian Ocean region), and one Inmarsat (Pacific and Indian Ocean regions). With gateways in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, China Telecom owns the exclusive operating rights for the IPSTAR broadband satellite system in China, with 23 Ku-band spot beams across the country (171/116 MHz per beam forward/return), one shaped beam (250/111.5 MHz), and one 200 MHz broadcasting beam. China uses 12 Gb/s out of the satellite’s total capacity of 45 Gb/s.


Figure 20: IPSTAR satellite coverage in China

Source: IPSTAR

China Telecom has 18 beams from Inmarsat covering the country with a bandwidth of 3.6 MHz (432 channels). China Unicom works with a variety of satellite service partners to provide connectivity to challenging locations in the country and offshore.

5.3 International Infrastructure

China has 11 landing stations for international submarine fibre optic cables in five major cities spread along 2,500 km of coastline, connecting the country to its neighbours and the rest of the world. The landing stations are located in:

• Qingdao

• Shanghai (3 landing stations)

• Shantou

• Hong Kong (5 landing stations)

• Macau The geographic spread of the landing stations and the multitude of cables at each one provide the country with good diversity to protect against service disruptions. In terms of natural disasters, submarine cables and their landing stations are most vulnerable to onshore and offshore earthquakes, but they can also be affected by flooding in coastal areas and especially tsunamis.


Figure 21: International submarine fibre optic cables in China

Source: cablemap.info

The thickness of the lines in Figure 21 represents the total capacity of each cable. The highest capacity cable currently landing in China is the SJC cable with a total capacity of 23 Tb/s, and landing points in Hong Kong and Shantou, as well as in Japan, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei. But there are also some legacy cables with capacity of as little as 1 Gb/s.

Figure 22: International submarine fibre optic cable landing stations in China

Source: cablemap.info

In total, China’s international Internet bandwidth stood at close to 3.8 Tb/s in July 2014, of which China Telecom held 64 per cent, China Unicom 24 per cent, and China Mobile 9 per cent. However, in global comparison, the international Internet bandwidth per Internet user in China is very low, around 4 Kb/s according to 2012 statistics from the International Telecommunication Union, placing China in 140th position worldwide, behind countries such


as Ethiopia and Mali. Hong Kong was in second position worldwide with 1.2 Mb/s, Macau in 46th with 58 Kb/s and Taiwan 52nd with 44 Kb/s per Internet user.

Figure 23: International Internet bandwidth in China, July 2014

Source: CNNIC

China Telecom’s SLA promises 99.99 per cent availability, packet loss of less than 3 per cent, and round trip latency of less than 180 milliseconds between China and the USA. Besides international submarine fibre capacity, China has direct terrestrial fibre connections with most of its neighbouring countries (see Figure 18), creating additional diversity and redundancy. Exceptions are Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal due to the very difficult terrain in the Himalaya region. A single fibre link winds its way through the mountains to East Sikkim in India. However, the bandwidth on most of these terrestrial links is likely to be relatively small in comparison with the more recent submarine cables. In addition, satellites (see Section 5.2.3) provide minimal emergency backup bandwidth. China’s two terrestrial fibre links into Kazakhstan form part of the multinational Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE) and Trans-Eurasian Information Super Highway (TASIM) projects, providing connectivity to Europe. TAE is an older cable with very low capacity. China Telecom is a partner in the TASIM project.

5.4 Smart Grids

A ubiquitous, stable and resilient power grid is a key element in a country’s ability to cope with natural disasters. Not only is electricity needed to power the telecommunications infrastructure that is the focus of this report, it is also vital for directly protecting the lives and well-being of affected people immediately after a disaster strikes, and for facilitating a speedy rebuilding effort. The vulnerability of China’s electricity grid against natural disasters and extreme weather was highlighted during the Chinese New Year holidays in 2008 when more than a dozen provinces in southeast and central China were hit by the most severe snowstorm in the past 50 years. The power grid throughout the region was severely disrupted, both by downed lines and delayed coal deliveries, affecting more than 30 million people, according to the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The extent and duration of the outage also highlighted the low self-recovery and regional coordination capacity of the power grid in China. However, large-scale power outages are not only products of extreme weather or natural disasters in China. In general, the electricity grid has not been able to keep up with the


country’s rapid economic growth during the past three decades. Blackouts and brownouts7 are common in many of China’s most populated cities, costing the economy as much as one percentage point of its annual GDP growth, according to a report by the Global Energy Network Institute. The reasons for this situation are threefold: high demand, low generation capacity, and the inability of the transmission network to distribute electricity efficiently. Moreover, with coal supplying around 80 per cent of the country’s electricity, the inefficiencies in power generation, transmission and consumption not only waste energy and create economic losses, they also increase pollution. The World Bank estimated in 2007 that 750,000 people in China die from respiratory illnesses each year caused by air and water pollution, far more than are killed by natural disasters. Box 2: What is a Smart Grid?

A Smart Grid is a modernized power grid that uses ICTs to increase the efficiency and reliability of electricity generation, distribution, transmission and consumption through monitoring and control in an automated fashion, with the aim to reduce energy waste, economic losses and pollution of the environment.

In view of the problems described above, China has embarked on a major smart grid development programme since 2007 when a feasibility study of relevant technologies and related research was initiated. Dubbed ‘The Strong and Smart Grid of China’, the government is not only focusing on the ‘smart’ capabilities of the system, but also on its strength, which includes its robustness and resilience against natural disasters. Responsible for about 80 per cent of the country’s territory, with more than 300 million customers and USD 330 billion in revenues, the government-owned State Grid Corporation of China is at the forefront of these developments. It has divided the programme into three phases, to be completed by 2020:

• Phase 1 in 2009 and 2010 focused on planning, defining technical standards and implementing 228 pilot projects, ranging from metering households to connecting wind and solar power plants and automating distribution networks. Out of a total investment of USD 78 billion in this phase, USD 9.2 billion went into smart grid technology.

• Phase 2, with total investments of USD 283 billion between 2010 and 2015 saw the construction of a nationwide transmission grid based on an ultra-high-voltage backbone, including smart grid management systems, widespread deployment of smart meters, and charging stations for electric vehicles. USD 46 billion was dedicated to smart grid technology in this phase.

• Phase 3 from 2016 to 2020 will see the completion of the nationwide grid construction, and the connection of all coal, hydroelectric, nuclear and wind power generation facilities to areas of high demand through a reliable, intelligently managed transmission network. Another USD 46 billion out of total investments of USD 241 billion in this phase will be dedicated to smart grid technology.

By the end of 2013, a total of 370 million smart meters had been installed across China, with the figure expected to reach 500 million in 2015, according to RNR Market Research. The West-East Electricity Transfer project is part of the Strong and Smart Grid initiative that is scheduled to be completed by 2020. It addresses the lack of power infrastructure in western China and the imbalance between energy resources and demand in the country. According to the Energy Transition Research Institute, two-thirds of China’s coal, wind and solar resources

7 A reduction in or restriction on the availability of electrical power in a particular area.


are found in the north and northwest of the country, and four-fifths of its hydropower resources are located in the southwest. But two-thirds of the electricity demand concentrates in eastern and central China. Three cross-country transmission corridors were designed to help match demand with supply, which should help make the network more stable and resilient overall.

6. TrendsinApplications This section focuses on a number of examples of how ICTs have been used to enhance DRM in China, including government- and private sector-driven initiatives, and those offering opportunities for public-private partnerships. Innovative solutions that empower individuals and communities to organize themselves in response to a disaster are included, as well as applications that did not meet expectations. Lessons are drawn that will lead to recommendations in Section 8 for the creation of an environment that fosters innovation and cooperation in the interest of economic development and human well-being.

6.1 Space Technology

Although satellites, due to their limitations in bandwidth, cannot fully replace damaged or destroyed fibre optic and mobile telecommunications network infrastructure on the ground, they remain indispensable in DRM. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, they are often the only functioning platform left for carrying vital two-way communication during rescue and recovery operations. They also play important roles in disaster risk monitoring, prevention and improving preparedness. China had 100 active satellites in space in 2011—49 for communication, 25 for Earth observation, 12 for meteorology, 12 for navigation and 2 for oceanography).8 China is a major regional space technology player, second only to Russia with 224 satellites in space at the time. China has made considerable efforts in the past two decades to integrate satellite technology into various aspects of its development goals, including DRM. The country has been an active participant in ESCAP’s Regional Space Applications Programme for Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific since 1994, with Wuhan Technical University of Surveying and Mapping as a major academic partner. In 2008, a satellite constellation—the Small Satellite Constellation for Environment and Disaster Monitoring and Forecasting—was launched specifically for DRM. It forms an important component of China's Earth observation satellite system with applications including disaster risk assessment, disaster monitoring, loss assessment and recovery assessment. The first two optical satellites, Huanjing-1A and Huanjing-1B were launched in September 2008, followed by Huanjing-1C in November 2012. China has also developed its own satellite navigation and positioning system, BeiDou (formerly known as Compass) since 2000. In 2012, a regional system covering China and neighbouring countries in the Asia-Pacific region became operational, and global coverage with the BeiDou-2 system is planned for 2020. Satellite services and applications are delivering invaluable benefits in disaster risk monitoring and management in China, but recent events have highlighted some issues with potential for improvement. According to a report by the ESCAP Committee on DRR, the NDRC was able to produce a map from satellite images within two hours after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake struck. The map showed basic information about the affected areas, which was used in decision-making. Yet, it took 30 hours before the first satellite phone call

8 http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/asp/CMS/Events/2011/disastercomm/S3-escap.pdf.


could be made from the most affected area, and it took four days to restore mobile phone services using satellite links to temporarily replace damaged terrestrial backbone infrastructure. A total of 383 emergency telecommunications vehicles were dispatched, many of them equipped with satellite communication facilities. At the same time, 1,300 broadband satellite terminals and more than 2,000 mobile satellite handsets were deployed. But in many cases they could not reach their destinations sooner due to road damage or flooding. Some of the equipment had to be carried by hand to the most affected areas. These difficulties and delays point to weaknesses in the organizational disaster response structure, rather than to problems with the technology or applications. A more decentralized structure for warehousing and provisioning of emergency communication equipment in disaster-prone areas may be required so that distribution and implementation can be effected in a more timely manner. Once the equipment was in place and operational, it was used effectively for networking, transmitting remote sensing images, videoconferencing among decision makers, and communicating with hospitals through telemedicine applications used by field teams. Much more detailed assessment reports and maps from aerial photography using small planes and unmanned drones were produced and transmitted to coordination centres, providing critical information on road blockages and flooding, collapsed buildings, and possible relocation areas. The information obtained was then used to deploy rescue and recovery forces, and relocate affected people more effectively. Within the first four days following the disaster, more than 1,300 images from 23 satellites were used, including those provided by foreign space agencies, which indicates that international cooperation was also functioning. One of the results from the cooperation was the creation of a three-dimensional digital model that was used to manage risk from quake-lake outbursts. A unique feature of the BeiDou satellite positioning system—a two-way short message service (SMS) with up to 120 Chinese characters per message—proved useful in the response to the Wenchuan earthquake. During the initial stage of disaster response, BeiDou’s SMS service was the only way for rescue teams to convey textual information from the field and receive written instructions, until other means of communication were restored. The BeiDou SMS service can be interconnected with SMS servers of mobile phone networks, opening up a range of possibilities for new applications. On the downside, the two-way capability makes the BeiDou terminals bigger, heavier and less battery-efficient than regular GPS terminals.

6.2 Mobile and Cloud GIS

The emergence of smartphones and tablets, coupled with the rapidly increasing network coverage for mobile broadband services (see Section 5.1.2) are creating many opportunities for new mobile applications in DRM. Beijing-based company, SuperMap Software has developed a Mobile GIS solution that allows field staff to record various types of data on mobile devices—text, images, audio and video—that can then be uploaded through the mobile broadband network to a central database. Geo-tagged with GPS or BeiDou location information, the data can be combined with other GIS data sets, e.g. imagery acquired by satellites or aerial photography.


Figure 24: SuperMap Mobile GIS system architecture

Source: SuperMap Software

Following the SARS epidemic in 2003, SuperMap developed an application for the Ministry of Health that enables the display and analysis of the spatial distribution of suspected and confirmed SARS cases, and the spread of the disease. The application was used for disaster risk assessment following the Yushu earthquake and the Zhouqu landslide in 2010. Data acquisition teams on the ground equipped with mobile terminals were able to quickly map the extent of the affected area, and record losses and damage information.

Figure 25: Mobile GIS mapping of Yushu earthquake, 2010

Source: SuperMap Software

SuperMap has also developed a cloud-based GIS solution that reduces the hardware investment for clients, and increases infrastructure resilience by using a distributed architecture.


6.3 Social Media and Big Data

The rapidly growing popularity and widespread use of social media is creating a new realm of possibilities to develop applications and services for DRM. Social media platforms offer a number of strengths that make them particularly useful in disaster situations, but they also have some weaknesses that need to be taken into account. Although China’s relationship with social media is a difficult one, there are a growing number of examples from China demonstrating how social media have been effectively used for various aspects of DRM. Popular social media platforms have user communities that rival or exceed the subscriber base of major telecom companies. In China, the number of active social media accounts (629 million according to wearesocial.net) is almost the same as the number of active Internet users (642 million) and the number of unique mobile phone users (630 million, see Section 5.1.2). The same source has also found that 21 per cent of the population in China, or 287 million people, use social media applications on mobile devices.

Figure 26: Active social media accounts in China, January 2015

Source: wearesocial.net

Weibo, the Twitter-like Chinese micro-blog platform has more than 500 million registered accounts. Monthly active users were 176 million in December 2014, with a year-on-year increase of 36 per cent. Daily active users were 81 million, with a year-on-year increase of 31 per cent. The large user base of social media platforms, especially on mobile devices, and their ability to spread messages quickly through sharing/forwarding means that they can be a powerful medium to reach large numbers of people, for example with warning messages or evacuation instructions in disaster situations, and also for fundraising appeals. Social media platforms have a particular advantage over other conventional communication channels such as SMS or phone calls in that social media platforms are independent of the medium used to access them. For example, if a mobile network is down in an area, people in that area may still be able to access their social media accounts through their broadband service at home or at the office, or by placing a SIM card from another network that is still operational in their mobile device. While their phone number for calls and SMS would change in the latter case, their social media account identity remains unchanged, making them reachable regardless of the access medium used.


Another strength of social media in disaster situations is that they enable two-way communication in a structured manner. In other words, not only can information be sent to a large number of people, it is also possible to receive information from large numbers of people. This ‘big data’ can be analysed systematically and used for situational analyses and decision-making. Box 3: What is Big Data?

Big data is a popular term used to describe structured and unstructured data sets so large or complex that traditional data processing techniques and applications are inadequate. Challenges include capture, storage, transfer, sharing, search, visualization, analysis and information privacy.

Research9 has shown that disaster events such as tsunamis, tornadoes and forest fires can be detected very quickly through systematic monitoring of Twitter data for relevant keywords and suitable post-processing. Using location information contained in the data, the geographic extent of affected areas can be assessed much more quickly than by conventional means, i.e. by ‘crowdsourcing’ the information rather than sending professional field teams out to gather it. Moreover, affected people can be encouraged to post requests for help or needed materials to special social media accounts set up by the relevant authorities. Of course the use of social media and big data for applications in disaster situations is not without risk. Crowdsourced data comes from many different individuals from all walks of life; it is therefore inherently diverse, unstructured, and can contain bias or even malicious intent. An information overload can occur, and inaccurate or unclear information or rumours—whether created intentionally or unintentionally—can confuse and mislead the public, or even create panic and hamper DRM efforts rather than aid them. It is therefore essential that applications using such data contain advanced algorithms for verifying, filtering and post-processing of crowdsourced data in order to minimize the risk of misinformation. On the other hand, an absence of information and transparency can be equally damaging. China found this out ‘the hard way’ during the SARS epidemic in 2003. Social media as such did not exist at the time, but Chinese citizens communicated information and opinions regarding the spread of the virus, symptoms, possible remedies etc. through SMS text messaging. Reportedly, SMS traffic in Guangdong province tripled during the period 8-10 February. The Chinese government did not report the outbreak to the World Health Organization until 11 February, and even afterwards references to SARS were removed from official media. Of course the information passed between people was not always accurate and this led to rumours and even panic. Despite these difficulties, there are fine examples from China of citizens using social media to organize volunteer initiatives. A New York Times article10 describes how a single individual rallied support from almost 500 people using social media within hours of the 2013 Lushan earthquake, and organized a group of 19 volunteers to deliver food, water and tents to remote villages two days after the disaster, soliciting further donations via social media while travelling. Another group of volunteers put together by a local TV sports commentator through his seven million Weibo followership, delivered 498 donated tents, 1,250 blankets and 100 tarps to areas where government supplies had yet to arrive. These successes prompted the China Internet Information Center, the official government web portal, to

9 See Hongwon Yun, "Disaster Events Detection using Twitter Data", International Journal of KIMICS, vol. 9, no.

1 (February 2011), pp. 69-73. Available from http://koreascience.or.kr/search/articlepdf_ocean.jsp?url=http://ocean.kisti.re.kr/downfile/volume/kimics/E1ICAW/2011/v9n1/E1ICAW_2011_v9n1_69.pdf. 10 Dan Levin, "Social Media in China Fuel Citizen Response to Quake", New York Times, 11 May 2013. Available

from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/world/asia/quake-response.html.


publish an article11 on the role of social media in disaster relief, although the article focused mainly on social media initiatives by government institutions and major corporations and foundations, rather than by citizens. In 2012, users of the Guokr social network launched a campaign to create a live crisis map within hours of flash floods hitting Beijing. According to TechPresident.com, the crowdsourced map was widely circulated on Weibo and was not only more accurate and easier to read than the one launched by the Beijing Water Authority, it was also available almost a day earlier.

Figure 27: Crowdsourced crisis map of Beijing floods, 2012

Source: irevolution.net

6.4 Free and Open Source Software

Hand in hand with the growing trend of using social media in DRM applications is a need for software that is inexpensive, widely available and open to a large developer community. Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) can be used, copied, modified and redistributed without restriction. Often, FOSS is not only used and supported by volunteers, academics and non-profit organizations, but also by major international corporations. The Sahana Open Source Disaster Management Software is an example. Initiated by Sri Lankan volunteers as a web-based collaboration tool after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, it was released as FOSS and has since been developed further into a generic DRM tool with sponsorship from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the United States National Science Foundation and IBM.

11 Yang Xi, "Social Media Vital to Disaster Relief", China.org.cn, 24 April 2013. Available from

http://china.org.cn/china/2013-04/24/content_28643049.htm.


Sahana addresses the common coordination problems during a disaster, including:

• Reuniting separated families through registering missing and found persons;

• Tracking and managing requests for help from individuals and organizations;

• Tracking organizations and programmes responding to the disaster, including the coverage and balance in the distribution of aid, and providing transparency in the response effort; and

• Enabling sharing of relevant information across organizations, connecting donors, volunteers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and government organizations.

It has been used by governments and NGOs in many of the world’s most disaster-affected countries, including China, Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, the USA and Venezuela.12 In China, Sahana was used by the Chengdu Police to track over 40,000 families in the aftermath of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake; at least 42 separated families were reunited as a direct result. Within 24 hours of the earthquake, IBM donated, installed and configured six high-end enterprise servers to support the Zhongmin Charity Information Centre under the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the Blood Centre of the Beijing Red Cross Society. IBM also mobilized teams to customize and translate the Sahana software for the Emergency Command Centre in Chengdu and the NDRC in Beijing.

7. TheDigitalDivideinChina

Box 4: What is the digital divide?

The term ‘digital divide’ refers to a gap between regions and/or demographics that have access to modern ICTs, and those that do not or have limited access. Relevant technology can include the telephone, television, personal computers and the Internet, particularly broadband Internet access. A lack of access can result from limited or non-existent infrastructure in an area, limited disposable income, illiteracy, lack of awareness, or a combination of these factors.

A lack of access to ICTs and connectivity in certain regions or among parts of the population is a critical bottleneck for DRR. Modern early warning systems can only be fully effective if end-to-end connectivity is provided to nearly all members of the public in an affected area; and in the aftermath of a disaster, rescue and recovery operations depend on the availability of telecommunications infrastructure in the area. Basic telecom infrastructure in China is relatively well developed. All of the country’s ‘administrative villages’ had voice telephony services by 2010 and mobile network coverage is now available to virtually 100 per cent of the population. Mobile phones have replaced fixed lines as the preferred means of communication; BuddeComm reported in 2009 that 94 per cent of Chinese households owned at least one mobile phone, compared to 60 per cent of households with a fixed-line subscription. Nevertheless, when it comes to personal communication with people on the move, i.e. away from their homes or workplaces, less than half of the population actually have a personal mobile phone (see Section 5.1.2). The other half would have to rely on family members or other means of communication in disaster situations. Mobile penetration varies greatly from province to province in China—from 157 per cent in Beijing to 57 per cent in Jiangxi (see Figure 30). In Beijing, Shanghai and relatively wealthy

12 More information can be found at http://www.sahanafoundation.org.


coastal provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang, mobile penetration rates are already comparable with those in developed countries, at 100 per cent or more. But in other provinces such as Anhui, Henan and Jiangxi, the mobile penetration rates are significantly lower. It is important to note that a mobile penetration rate of 100 per cent does not mean that every single member of the population has a mobile phone. As mentioned in Section 5.1.2, around half of all mobile subscribers have multiple SIM cards. The number of multiple SIM card owners is likely to be higher in cities and relatively wealthy provinces, which means that even in these areas there is still a sizeable part of the population without a personal mobile phone. However, the unconnected part of the population is mostly found in the rural areas of these provinces, as will be examined in more detail below.

Figure 28: Mobile penetration in selected Chinese province, 2011 vs. 2013

Source: MIIT

A similar picture emerges when looking at Internet penetration in different provinces in China. According to CNNIC statistics, 47 per cent of the population age six years and above were Internet users in mid-2014, and again it is the relatively wealthy coastal provinces where penetration rates above 50 per cent are mostly found. The principal cities of Beijing and Shanghai had Internet penetration rates of more than 70 per cent in 2013. According to statistics from the International Telecommunication Union, 41 per cent of all Chinese households had a computer in 2012 (up from 38 per cent the previous year), and as discussed in Section 5.1.2.2, around 40 per cent of the population access the Internet through mobile devices. The Figure 29 shows the overall Internet penetration rates and number of Internet users in China, 2014. There is an approximate geographic correlation between the Internet penetration map in Figure 30 and the backbone network infrastructure maps in Section 5.2, but infrastructure availability at the province level alone does not explain the digital divide in China. For example, Anhui and Jiangxi have significantly lower Internet penetration rates than the immediately adjacent coastal provinces of Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang, even though the network infrastructure is relatively well developed throughout this part of the country.


Figure 29: Internet users and Internet penetration rate in China, 2014

Source: CNNIC

Figure 30: Internet penetration in China by province, 2013

Source: CNNIC

The digital divide is also a function of the rate of urbanization within each province and the infrastructure distribution resulting from it. The Internet infrastructure in China is not yet as developed as the infrastructure for basic voice services, especially in rural areas. While 100 per cent of China’s ‘administrative villages’ had voice telephony services by 2010, this level of coverage had only been achieved at the ‘town’ level in terms of Internet connectivity at the time. There are around 19,000 administrative towns but over 600,000 administrative villages, and many more including the so-called traditional villages that are not administrative divisions (although their number and the population living in them is rapidly shrinking with the massive migration to urban areas that is taking place). A distinct difference between Internet penetration in urban and rural areas of China is evident from CNNIC statistics that show a penetration rate of 72 per cent in urban areas and only 28 per cent in rural areas (see Figure 29). The drop in the number of rural Internet users between 2013 and 2014 points to rural-urban migration.


Figure 31: Urban vs. rural Internet users in China, 2013 – 2014

Source: CNNIC

A regression analysis of Internet penetration in the different provinces in China shows a clear correlation with the urbanization rate, and an even stronger correlation with the average disposable income in each province (see Figure 30). In other words, the Internet infrastructure is more developed in urban areas than in rural areas, but the average income is also higher, which makes Internet services more affordable to the urban population. This income dependency is also confirmed by the fact that only a relatively small number of mobile subscriptions in China are currently using the more costly 3G (around 30 per cent) and 4G services and devices (7 per cent), see Section 5.1.2.1.

Figure 32: Internet, urbanization, income & illiteracy regression analysis by province, 2013

Source: Based on National Bureau of Statistics data

A notable deviation from the Internet/urbanization trend line is Zhejiang province, which has a relatively high Internet penetration rate of 59 per cent despite a very low urbanization rate of only 10 per cent. This may be due to its proximity to the megacity Shanghai and the commuting patterns resulting from it. At CNY 29,775, Zhejiang does have a relatively high average disposable income.


Illiteracy does not seem to be a defining factor for Internet penetration in China. The illiteracy rate is below 10 per cent in most provinces, and while the illiterate part of the population are almost certainly not Internet users, there is no strong correlation between illiteracy and the Internet penetration rate in different provinces. Tibet stands out with the highest illiteracy rate (41 per cent), and at 33 per cent its Internet penetration rate is relatively low, but it is not the lowest in the country; seven out of China’s 31 provinces have lower Internet penetration rates than Tibet. It is Tibet’s low urbanization rate (28 per cent, the second lowest in the country) and the low average income level (the only province below CNY 10,000) that result in relatively poor infrastructure availability and affordability of Internet services. While penetration rates for Internet use, mobile subscribers and computer ownership in China are currently all still between 40 and 50 per cent, penetration rates for traditional media are much higher. According to BuddeComm, terrestrial TV infrastructure covers over 95 per cent of China’s 456 million households, and 89 per cent of households had a TV set in 2012, according to data from the National Bureau of Statistics. Nearly 100 per cent of the population have access to radio, and research by the United States Department of Commerce has found that listenership grew by more than 21 per cent year-on-year between 2009 and 2011, mainly driven by growth in car ownership, which is a trend that is set to continue. These traditional media will therefore continue to play an important role for early warnings and information distribution in disaster situations, but they cannot replace the bidirectional, interactive and omnipresent communication that mobile networks and the Internet offer.

8. LessonsLearnedandRecommendations Building on key findings in this report, this section highlights the lessons learned and provides recommendations from policy and implementation perspectives for the next 1-5 years. Placing emphasis on the importance of ICT as critical infrastructure in DRM, the following recommendations target the development of quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, to support affordable and equitable access for all, economic development and human well-being.

8.1 Narrow the Digital Divide

Mobile and Internet penetration rates of close to 100 per cent are essential for the effective utilization of ICTs in DRM. These penetration rates are currently only around 50 per cent in China. More detailed research is needed, but it appears that part of the reasons for the digital divide in China is a lack of Internet infrastructure in certain parts of the country, especially in rural areas. The establishment of a Universal Service Fund may be considered, a concept that China has not yet adopted and which in many countries has not been managed well, but there are positive examples from which inspiration can be drawn, e.g. in Pakistan. A lack of infrastructure can also be addressed by licensing additional service providers (see Section 8.3). However, the main obstacle to increased Internet penetration in China, and also increased mobile phone ownership and uptake of basic services, seems to be related to their unaffordability due to limited disposable income, especially in rural areas. This is of course a multi-faceted problem for which there is no simple solution. Subsidized low-cost basic devices and services in rural areas may be considered, provided by existing operators or possibly through specialized new service providers (see Section 8.3).


8.2 Promote Technology-Neutral Licensing and Spectrum Re-Farming

As discussed in Section 5.1.2.1, the licensing of mobile network operators in China has not been technology-neutral. This has led to a fragmented market structure with incompatible technologies, limited choices for consumers, and delayed roll out of 4G technology as well as its overall cost increase. Future licensing, be it of existing operators for more frequency spectrum or new market entrants, should be technology-neutral, i.e. licensees should be free to use any technology within the allocated spectrum that they see as the most suitable. A licensing policy of this kind stimulates innovation and competition, and in the context of DRR it would improve e-resilience by creating redundancy between compatible networks, which would be the likely outcome if technology choice was liberalized. In particular, China Telecom’s CDMA-2000 network uses an outdated technology with no future-proof development roadmap; it is expected to be shut down in the foreseeable future. The company has started rolling out a hybrid FD/TD-LTE network (although it would have favoured FD-LTE if not restricted by licensing). The CDMA-2000 network operates in very attractive spectrum in the 450 and 800 MHz band that is particularly suitable for wide area coverage in rural areas. It is recommended that the company be allowed to re-farm this spectrum for its LTE network.

8.3 Provide Licensing for More Service Providers

China’s technology-restrictive mobile licensing policy has resulted in a market structure with two operators using GSM-based technologies and one using an outdated technology (China Telecom, CDMA-2000 EV-DO). One of the GSM-based operators, China Mobile has been able to amass a market share of 63 per cent as of early 2015, and China Telecom has only 14 per cent. There are claims that mobile network coverage is available to nearly 100 per cent of the population in China, but none of the operators have actually published coverage maps. China Mobile claimed to provide 4G coverage to 75 per cent of the population as of October 2014, most of which would be covering the 53 per cent of the population that live in urban areas, according to World Bank statistics. It remains to be seen to what extent 4G mobile broadband coverage will be rolled out in rural areas where deployment is relatively costly and the return on investment limited. A market the size of China would be able to support a fourth mobile network as is the case in many countries around the world, although it would be questionable whether such a late market entrant would be able to compete with the established operators if it was obliged to cover rural areas as well. Infrastructure deployment in rural areas could be stimulated through a Universal Service Fund (see Section 8.1), or the licensing for additional service providers with special concessions for rural areas could be considered. Remote villages could be covered by community-based initiatives using cheap technology such as Wi-Fi, provided a regulatory regime conducive to this concept is in place. With emerging features such as Wi-Fi Calling, these community networks could eventually be integrated into the major mobile networks or have roaming agreements with them. The Chinese market would also benefit from and be able to support additional operators of backbone networks (see Section 8.5).

8.4 Develop First Responder Network


Given the lack of mobile network coverage in parts of the country, particularly for mobile broadband services, the establishment of a dedicated ‘First Responder’ network could be considered. This network could follow the example of the ‘FirstNet’ initiative in the United States that aims to provide one common platform based on the LTE standard for all emergency services (police, fire, ambulance etc.), each of which are currently operating their own outdated trunked radio networks in parallel. The investment in a nationwide network including rural and remote areas would be substantial, but savings from replacing and unifying the many existing old platforms would compensate for some of it. Furthermore, public-private partnership models can be envisaged that prioritize rural and remote areas (those with relevance for DRR) for the roll out of the new network while roaming agreements with existing commercial operators are made for already well covered areas.

8.5 Improve the Resilience of the Backbone Network

Like the mobile market, China’s backbone network is also characterized by a dominant player (China Telecom) as shown in Section 5.2.1.2. There is a lack of competition and redundancy on major routes, and parts of the country have no fibre backbone. This market segment would also benefit from additional operators. Newly licensed operators should be able to find viable business models in providing additional domestic backbone capacity whilst improving overall redundancy by laying alternative fibre routes. Specialized regional operators may have a business case in rural and remote areas using relatively low-cost wireless technologies, again possibly supported by a Universal Service Fund. Wireless/microwave links should also be considered as a redundancy backup along fibre routes that are particularly vulnerable, i.e. those in disaster-prone areas, served by only one carrier. At the international level, China’s 11 landing stations for submarine fibre optic cables in five major cities along the east coast (see Section 5.3), and the recently expanded network of domestic Internet interconnection points (see Section 5.2.1.3) provide good redundancy against disruptions in disaster situations. A recommendation for further improvement would be an upgrade of the international bandwidth on the terrestrial fibre links to Europe and India, which would create ‘mega-redundancy’ with the landing stations on the east coast and provide additional bandwidth to the underdeveloped regions in the western part of the country.

8.6 Review Building Codes and Incorporate DRR Elements

Many sources examined during this study indicate that the telecommunications infrastructure has frequently been damaged during natural disasters in China, particularly as a result of earthquakes, and that it has taken considerable amounts of time until services were restored. To a certain degree this will be unavoidable, and although a detailed analysis was beyond the scope of this study, a general recommendation is to review relevant building codes in order to maximize the robustness of future telecom infrastructure deployments against damage or destruction in disaster-prone areas, particularly fibre optic cable ducts and telecom towers.

8.7 Improve the Provisioning of Emergency Communication Equipment

Sources examined during this study also indicate that it has taken considerable amounts of time until the first satellite call could be made in areas affected by earthquakes (see Section 6.1) and for temporary satellite links to be set up as a replacement for damaged terrestrial backbone infrastructure, due to difficulties in reaching the affected areas from the outside. Again, a detailed analysis was beyond the scope of this study, but it appears that improvement may be possible by establishing a more decentralized structure for warehousing and provisioning of emergency communication equipment in disaster-prone areas so that distribution and implementation can be effected in a more timely manner.


8.8 Liberalize Applications and Content

There are good examples from China of how social media and crowdsourced data have been used in DRM (see Section 6.3), but it seems their impact could be far greater if country policies promote easy access to international platforms and the content on local platforms is less tightly controlled. China’s very low international Internet bandwidth per Internet user (see Section 5.3) illustrates the strong government-driven focus on domestic content and applications. Control of the Internet in China is a sensitive issue, liberalization in this sector is likely to be a slow process and there are risks involved, but it should be mentioned at the close of this report as a long-term prospect.

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