Building Capacity by Rebuilding Community Assets: Learning ... · and developed plans to build a replacement town at Kokopo, a small village about 30km east of Rabaul. To carry out

Building Capacity by Rebuilding Community Assets:

Learning from the Gazelle Restoration Authority (GRA) Experience

Background

The purpose of this review is to bring a more locally-relevant perspective to the World Bank‟s

understanding of dynamics of statebuilding, development, and governance in Papua New

Guinea (PNG) by exploring the specific lessons from the experience of the post-disaster

reconstruction program led by the Gazelle Restoration Authority (GRA) in East New Britain

province, after a catastrophic dual volcanic eruption in 1994. Three audiences exist for this

review: those interested in more effective approaches to public works and service delivery in

PNG; specialists in post-disaster reconstruction; and World Bank staff seeking ways to

contribute to institutional and state effectiveness through project implementation choices.

Given these diverse audiences, specific lessons will be offered at the end, for each group.

The GRA is generally considered – both by PNG stakeholders and in the wider development

community – as an effective institution that produced quality results, and its success is all the

more remarkable given the difficulties usually encountered in implementing major public work

programs in PNG. Most observers emphasize the pre-existing strength and quality of the East

New Britain Provincial Administration (ENBPA) – also widely viewed as an exceptionally

capable and effective state institution – and elements of the Tolai culture, dominant in ENB,

described as fostering a collaborative, pragmatic, and dedicated style of working across public

and private sectors. While the Implementation Completion Report for the World Bank-financed

project implemented by GRA acknowledges those two elements, it also highlights a range of

other enabling factors that are less unique to the ENB context – and potentially more useful in

considering these three questions:

1. What aspects of what GRA did, and how they did it, are potentially relevant to the

design and implementation of other post-disaster reconstruction efforts? Are those

elements equally useful for consideration in post-conflict reconstruction efforts?

2. What does the post-eruption reconstruction program, and GRA‟s role in it, suggest are

the critical institutional and operational building blocks for effective state programs at the

provincial or district level in PNG? What can be learned from GRA about the dynamics

of nurturing public and private sector capacity?

3. What lessons should the World Bank learn from the GRA experience about how Bank

processes and procedures can contribute to strengthening institutions in low-capacity

environments?

Background: The 1994 Eruption, and the Gazelle Restoration Authority

The twin volcanoes of Mt. Tavurvur and Mt. Vulcan erupted in September 1994 ejecting 250

million cubic metres of ash, pumice and material over the town of Rabaul and the surrounding

Gazelle Peninsula in East New Britain province (ENBP). Almost all of the physical, social, and

economic infrastructure and facilities in Rabaul town and surrounding areas were completely

destroyed, severely damaged, or ended up being located within the hazardous areas after the

eruption.

Although deaths and injuries were relatively low, there were significant social and economic

disruptions and losses with about 30,000 residents losing their homes and about two-thirds of

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Learning from the GRA Experience

2

them seeking permanent resettlement away from hazardous areas. Estimates compiled soon

after the eruption placed public asset damage and losses at about US$280 million, along with

similar losses for private assets such as homes, businesses, inventory, etc.

In 1995, the GoPNG commenced its Immediate Term Restoration Program (ITRP), supported

by aid and donor agencies, including the World Bank, AusAID, JICA and ADB. Early

investments were focused on two related but equally challenging objectives: improve the

immediate socioeconomic conditions of the displaced population by restoring safe livelihood

opportunities, and plan for longer term investment and development efforts.

In light of the extensive damage to the town of Rabaul and the continuing existence of

hazardous conditions (ashfall, toxic gases, and tremors), the national and provincial authorities

decided to resettle the affected population away from the existing town. They identified

prospective areas for new permanent settlements throughout the northeast Gazelle Peninsula

and developed plans to build a replacement town at Kokopo, a small village about 30km east of

Rabaul. To carry out this transition, the government proposed a Medium Term Restoration

Program (MTRP) that would be implemented by government with support from donors. The

Box 1: Key Facts about the Disaster and the Response

Following a severe tectonic earthquake in the early hours of 18 September 1994, the twin volcanoes of Mt

Tavurvur and Mt Vulcan erupted early the next morning, displacing around 100,000 persons from Rabaul town

and the neighbouring villages, and physically destroying most buildings and infrastructure. A damage and loss

assessment calculated that total damage to both public and private assets was in excess of US$550 million,

and 20,000-30,000 persons were permanently displaced. The Gazelle Restoration Authority (GRA) was

established on 7 February 1995 to act as a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) to manage government and donor-

funded restoration works.

The Immediate Term Restoration Programme (ITRP) was undertaken from 1995 to 2000, with first priority

given to initial emergency and humanitarian works, followed by a programme to restore key public and economic

infrastructure. A significant component of these earlier works was the establishment of permanent resettlement

areas, the establishment of Kokopo as the administrative capital of the province, and sufficient work in Rabaul to

allow it to operate as a port. The structure of the ITRP was based upon a needs assessment report prepared by

the then Australia Aid Agency AIDAB, covering six major sectors: aviation, education, health, lands, police,

and roads. In agreement with both the National and Provincial Governments, the individual projects in the ITRP

were divided between the major donors – AusAID, Japan, and the World Bank. AusAID and Japan largely

managed their own programmes in coordination with the GRA, and the World Bank re-allocated portions of three

existing loans to ITRP, thus allowing monies to flow from national government directly to GRA. Thirty percent of

the ITRP’s total budget of K218.7 million was expended directly by GRA to complete close to 200 projects.

The Medium Term Restoration Programme (MTRP) commenced in 2000 and ended in 2010. It was originally

split into two phases, with significant financing from a World Bank loan that would be supplied in two tranches,

with the second being dependent on the successful disbursement of the first. The primary goal of the MTRP

was to consolidate the activities commenced under the ITRP, restoring in a sustainable and risk-averse

manner the social and economic well-being of the population of the Gazelle Peninsula. The total financing

profile for the MTRP (total of 237.8 million kina) was: budget allocations from national and provincial

governments (K 85.3 million); donor grants (K 60.9 million); international concessional loans (K 78.0 million in the

World Bank Second Gazelle Restoration Project, or SGRP); and PNGSDP Ltd (K 13.6 million). Of the 125

projects prioritized in the MTRP, all of which demanded a high level of technical, managerial and administrative

skills including quality control and engineering oversight, 99 were completed by end-2009; 13 were under

implementation or in tender process; and 13 still await funding, are under design, or have been deferred. The

MTRP portfolio covered three categories: Land and Transport Infrastructure; Public Utilities and Essential

Services; Social and Economic Services Infrastructure. In 2007 GRA joined GoPNG and the Bank in reviewing

the SGRP; although effectiveness and development results were rated very highly, the national government

political landscape had changed and GoPNG decided not to request the second tranche. The SGRP closed in

2008, with the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) done in 2009; the MTRP ended in 2010.


3

Bank‟s Second1 Gazelle Restoration Project was designed as an Adaptable Program Loan

(APL) with two anticipated phases to support implementation of the MRTP by (a) helping

complete the emergency restoration works started under the ITRP and (b) facilitating the return

to more normalized development planning by the provincial government.

The Gazelle Restoration Authority (GRA) was established less than six months after the

eruption to oversee government and donor-funded support and act as a Project Implementation

Unit (PIU) to manage restoration works. The GRA was formed by mainly local experts, with

support from selected and experienced expatriates; planning, engineering, environmental and

social expertise as well as the administrative and financial support functions were sourced from

East New Britain Provincial Administration (ENBPA) and national departments. In the main,

GRA was able to achieve the objectives of improving the quality of life for displaced

communities; consolidating Kokopo Town as the provincial capital of East New Britain; restoring

those parts of Rabaul Town necessary to ensure its viability as the regional port for the New

Guinea Islands Region and district headquarters for Rabaul District; rehabilitating and

expanding utility infrastructure and social services for North East Gazelle Peninsula hinterland

centres; and stimulating the economy while supporting institutional capacity for longer-term

development and public works planning.

Investigating Conventional Wisdom: Enabling Factors

In February 2010 a World Bank team2 travelled to East New Britain and conducted small group

meetings and key informant interviews with a diverse range of stakeholders with first-hand

experience in the reconstruction program and the work of the GRA. Additional inputs from key

informants residing outside of PNG were sought through email and telephone interviews.

The fieldwork was preceded by four weeks of desk review of key documents from the World

Bank‟s own Second Gazelle Restoration Project (SGRP), including the project document,

progress reports, supervision mission aide memoires, the final Implementation Completion

Report (ICR), and the GRA-authored “Borrower‟s Contribution to ICR”. By the time the team

began their fieldwork, the desk review had clearly identified seven themes that emerged in

varying levels of detail as being explanatory variables, or enabling factors, that multiple

informants believed were significant contributors to the success of the GRA program:

political and institutional framework

planning and design of the reconstruction program

GRA systems

GRA staff

external players

communications and public relations

institutional and provincial culture

1 The “Second” Gazelle Restoration Project was so-named because the first intervention by the Bank in support of

the Immediate Term Restoration Project was to restructure three existing sectoral loans with unexpended

balances, available for use almost immediately. Although those resources were not packaged as a standalone

Bank project, in the eyes of the provincial authorities they represented a valuable ‘first’ project from the Bank.

2 The team was led by World Bank Country Manager for PNG, Laura Bailey, and included Raymond Palangat, World

Bank Public Information and Communications Assistant, and Lawrie Carlson, project engineer for the GRA (during

the immediate post-disaster response period) and for the World Bank’s Second Gazelle Restoration Project, SGRP.


4

In the following sections, each of these factors is discussed in greater detail with attention to the

consensus views offered by the wide range of stakeholders interviewed during the review.

Political and Institutional Framework: The Role of Leadership

At the time of the eruption, Sinai Brown was the incumbent Premier of

East New Britain and Ellison Kaivovo the Provincial Secretary. Both of

them played a critical role in the establishment of GRA, with Ellison

Kaivovo taking on the role of Project Manager for GRA‟s Project

Implementation Unit. Beginning even as the eruption was still „live‟, these

two key men mobilized support from others (including Michael Mayberry,

a respected local business leader) to generate a momentum to support

reconstruction efforts. Politicians and senior bureaucrats welcomed the

provincial government‟s request for assistance; across the political

spectrum there appeared to be no objections ... and if there were, none

were voiced. Sir Henry ToRobert, a respected corporate leader of the

Bank of Papua New Guinea, was approached by ENB Premier Brown to

be the first Chairman of the GRA Board, and his selection added

considerable credibility to the effort.

The Premier and Provincial Secretary made presentations to the national

government and donor aid agencies. Although Tavurvur was still

erupting and the threat of further eruptions was still unknown, the

national government accepted AusAID‟s offer to conduct a damage

assessment; those empirical results provided a critical evidence base

which in turn created the donor confidence that resulted in JICA‟s offer to

support the construction of the Tokua Airport, and agreement from the

World Bank and GoPNG Treasury to reallocate an undisbursed and non-

performing education loan to the immediate reconstruction works.

There appears to be little doubt that the prompt action by key players

allowed national political leaders to respond without political, regional and

cultural loyalties emerging in any divisive way3. Although there were

East New Britainers key national government posts at the time of the

eruption, there appears to have been little need to rely upon them as

„friends and wantoks‟ to generate support. However, the restoration

program design did require controversial policy choices – such as

relocation of the institutional assets and provincial state functions from

Rabaul to Kokopo, with the ensuing shift of businesses – and at that

point political criticism did emerge. However, the provincial government

had already been well into contingency planning for a possible move

before the 1994 eruption, and they were transparent about their intent as

they finalized the policy decision to enact the move; although opposition

was mounted, much of the efforts under the Immediate Term Restoration

3 The cohesion across the Tolai ethnic group certainly contributed to a sense of common purpose which served

the post-disaster response effort well. Historically, however, there was a certain amount of resentment regarding

perceived exclusion of Baining, Pomio and Sulka cultures, and to some extent GRA tried to address this in the later

years of the MTRP.

Leadership was an

absolutely critical

factor .....

... as was the ability

to assemble an

evidence-based

proposal and

creatively mobilize

resources for

immediate response.

Policy discussions

about difficult

decisions relied on

the existing good

relationship between

the provincial

government and the

population ...


5

Program (IRP) were well underway, and since those immediate works

were undertaken under emergency procurement arrangements, the

momentum of restoration was hard to stop.

By 1998, political criticism for the capital‟s relocation from Rabaul to

Kokopo started to wane; however support for the entire program had also

started to dim, as the emergency nature of the effort transitioned into a

more medium-term program. After 1998, the center of gravity for

sustaining support came from ex-Prime Minister and Kokopo‟s National

Member of Parliament, Sir Rabbie Namaliu, sustained by the new

Governor Sinai Brown (now a National MP under decentralized political

reforms). Political support was harder to find, as the national government

faced a serious budget crisis and alliances fractured and divided around

party, regional and constituent loyalties. At the GRA level, the GRA

Board and key staff played an important role in rallying support amongst

the Departments of National Planning and Treasury to deliver overdue

counterpart funding that had caused the program to „lull‟ in late 1997.

This re-invigorated support was essential for the planning of the Medium

Term Restoration Program (MTRP) and the World Bank‟s Second

Gazelle Restoration Project (SGRP) which was negotiated and launched

in 1999. Efforts by the GRA to get political traction to hold national

government to its legal commitments to fund the program required

numerous representations from the GRA Board, key expatriate staff,

provincial leaders, and the World Bank. Eventually, some counterpart

funds were received but during the interim period the Bank restructured

the levels of disbursements for civil works to cover the shortfall. Also

GRA generated high levels of interest (up to 18%) on its deposits,

providing a good income stream to supplements its counterpart funds.

These initiatives, together with counterpart funds finally made available,

brought total available funds just barely up to the amount required.

During the period of both the immediate and medium-term programs,

there was remarkably little overt political intervention in the works

program design and implementation; this was possible partly because of

the degree of confidence that the population and private sector felt in the

Provincial Administration, but also was a testament to GRA‟s

management of its own role as focused on reconstruction

implementation. Importantly, the high level of stakeholder consultation

and support done by both GRA and ENBPA appears to have provided a

generally positive local political environment, so there was little need to

tinker with the program to gain support of key individuals or industries.

Taking a step back, it is interesting to note that ENBPA had a number of

options available to consider for institutional arrangements to implement

the reconstruction program, and that those discussions took place in a

larger context of mixed experience across PNG with „special purpose

authorities‟, entities often created in hopes that they would be effective

where „normal‟ government departments were ineffective (despite

inconsistent historical results with SPAs). If required, the ENBPA might

... while success in

implementation and

in overcoming

resourcing lulls

required effective

lobbying at the

national government

level.

Continuous

engagement and

communications

between the

provincial

government, the

private sector, and

the affected

communities helped

reduce the risk of

political interference.


6

have considered working with the National Disaster and Emergency

Services (NDES), but that institution‟s weak implementation capacity –

and lack of clarity around mandate for disaster planning vs. response –

made it a problematic choice. ENBPA was able to execute its preferred

model, which was to create the GRA with its own enabling Act and an

independent Board, and to structure the relationship between the two

institutions with careful attention to transparency, clarity of role, and a

commitment to high quality standards, all meant to enhance the

effectiveness of provincial institutions, not compete with them.

Box 2: East New Britain Provincial Premier Recalls the Catalytic Role of Leadership in

Aligning National and Provincial Action (from an interview with Sir Rabbie Namaliu)

The Prime Minister in 1994 was Sir Julius Chan, a representative of Namatanai in New Ireland with first-hand

understanding of the economic and social networks that linked New Britain to surrounding islands. On the first

day of the eruption, the PM invited me – I was the Premier of East New Britain and Speaker of the National

Parliament at that time – to take a senior official from Air Niugini, Jack Pidik, and travel to Rabaul from Port

Moresby to gain first hand information on the destruction and the evacuation plan to get people out of danger.

On arrival in Rabaul, Islands Aviation made a helicopter available for us to do a quick reconaissance of Rabaul

town and surrounding villages as far as the North Coast and Kerevat. On landing back at Tokua, Mr. Pidik and I

drove by road to Rabaul and to villages on the North Coast, then inland to Kerevat before arriving back in

Kokopo. In the evening, we spent time welcoming the ships from Rabaul Shipping, unloading people from

Matupit and Talwat, Baai, the Nordup villages; we greeted people before they were taken to the Kokopo Show

Grounds, where evacuation centers were set up. We spent the next day speaking to the authorities and visiting

villagers setting up their temporary shelters, and reported back to the Prime Minister on return to Port Moresby.

In addition to formal communication from the ENBPG and the Office of the National Disaster and Emergency, it

was through these kinds of indirect and informal channels that national government was able to anticipate what

was required for the immediate needs of the emergency situation and subsequently the need to establish a

special authority to spearhead the restoration program in the Gazelle Restoration Authority. Clear signals being

sent by the PM showed that the national government was aligned with the provincial authorities in considering

this a national emergency; this was especially useful in relation to donor negotiations and funding. For instance,

negotiations with the Japanese Government for the design, funding and construction of Tokua Airport was done

in Port Moresby with the Ministers for Treasury and Planning, and Civil Aviation taking the lead, supported by

the Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs Minister in regular contact with the Japanese Ambassador. Similarly,

for the Rabaul-to-Kokopo Road, the national government worked through the ministries for Treasury and

Planning, and Works, to gain support from AusAID for that major effort, so critical to restoring essential services

to the province. And in the same vein, Sir John Kaputin, then Member for Rabaul, was empowered to

negotiated directly with the German government to provide a temporary mobile control tower for Tokua Airport

until a proper control tower was constructed as part of the Tokua airport redevelopment (funded by Japan). Sir

John Kaputin was then a member of the Joint African Carribbean Pacific Group (ACP) EU Parliamentary

Assembly representing the PNG National Parliament, and this allowed for close consultations with the European

Union, another major donor for the overall program.

The PM appointed the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance and Planning, the Hon. Chris Haiveta to

be responsible for GRA, with the assistance and advice from the national MPs including the Member for

Gazelle, Mr. Nakikus Konga (then Minister for Commerce and Industry), the Member for Rabaul, Sir John

Kaputin, myself, and senior leaders from both the public and private sectors living in Port Moresby. This allowed

a coordinated effort to steer major proposals including the ITRP through the National Executive Council

(Cabinet) against competing interests from other provinces, during a time when Papua New Guinea was

suffering a budgetary and fiscal crisis with severe political consequences.

The proposal to set up a special authority was canvassed by me with parliamentary colleagues and senior

leaders in Port Moresby including most notably Sir Alkan Tololo, Sir Henry ToRobert and Don Manoa (who were

all on a major fundraising committee), and it was from this united political base that the Prime Minister proposed

to create the GRA by Act of Parliament. Without this aligned and proactive support, the inclination was to do

things through normal channels, which would have slowed us down and possibly let our efforts fall prey to the

fiscal crisis, or result in the kind of delays that post-disaster programs in Manam and Oro have experienced.


7

The provincial administration determined policy and led planning; GRA

implemented the program determined by those decisions. GRA‟s Project

Implementation Unit (PIU) used people from ENBPA, including all but

one of the Project Managers, and regular meetings that included both

GRA and ENBPA senior executives provided almost seamless operation.

Interestingly, GRA refers to itself as „semi-autonomous‟, which seems to

articulate the operational reality that although the GRA‟s enabling

legislation gave it true “independence”, the GRA mandate was seen

implementing choices made by the elected leaders and provincial civil

servants. Key informants from both ENBPA and GRA emphasize that

they cannot remember a time where there were conflicting interests or

serious disputes; this clarity in coordinating mandates was certainly a

hallmark of the effectiveness of these two state institutions.

Planning and Design of Reconstruction Program

The ENBPA was clearly both strategic and opportunistic in their program

planning and design. When formulating the immediate response, the

ITRP, ENBPA appears to have had an implicit understanding of the

program needs; the speedy damage assessment funded by AusAID

played an essential part in providing the neutral evidence base required

to articulate that implicit understanding in enough detail to reassure

political supporters and ensure technical coherence. In those early days,

there were actively conflicting interests emerging, such as the decision to

restore Rabaul or develop Kokopo. However seriously the ENBPA may

have been contemplating a move of the provincial state functions away

from Rabaul before 1994, the formal decision was delayed until the

immediate post-disaster program was completed; importantly, the ITRP

included critical analytical efforts that strengthened the evidence base

from which ENBPA would later make policy decisions:

assessment of hazards and risks and mitigation measures for a

volcanic eruption of a similar size to the 1994 eruption;

assessment of the infrastructure damage to the town and its

environs and scenarios for the restoration of the town; and

development of a town plan in line with the hazard, risk and

infrastructure assessments.

The Rabaul Town Plan4, which was generated by these empirical

studies, received considerable criticism from Rabaul business houses,

their Chamber of Commerce, and a prominent local politician, Sir John

Kaputin. The decision to implement this plan as a foundation element of

the larger Gazelle Peninsula Medium-Term Restoration Program

4 The completed plan envisioned the abandonment of the town south of Namanula Hill Road, including the major

residential area of Malay Town, Rabaul Airport and institutional assets. North of this line, up to the boundary

where buildings had been relatively unaffected by the eruption, only businesses such as operational hotels were

allowed to remain. The unaffected areas to the north-eastern extremity of the town including the regional

seaport were to remain and be protected, with some consolidation of critical urban public infrastructure (such as

the relocated Rabaul Market).

Early decisions on

institutional

structure were

pragmatic, and roles

and mandates were

clearly defined.

Reconstruction

planning, and design

of both the

immediate and

medium-term

programs, was of

necessity both

strategic and

opportunistic.


8

(MTRP), reinforced by continued eruptions which re-damaged areas of

Rabaul that local businesspeople had argued to rebuild, ultimately saw

the demise of Rabaul as ENB‟s business, economic and institutional

center and the emergence of Kokopo as its replacement5. If ENBPA had

succumbed to mounting political and business pressure to delay or

equivocate in the decision to move the provincial state assets, then

efforts to secure wider financial support for the medium-term program

from donor aid agencies and probably from the National Government

would have failed. ENBPA made the hard decisions and staved off

opposition to their intended program.

A hallmark of the success of the program was the ability of the ENBPA to

seek, consider and generally accept advice provided to it. It is through

this process, actively supported by GRA, that ENBPA was able to feel

confident it had a clear understanding of the needs and trade-offs for the

ITRP and then develop the draft program for the medium term. The

Bank‟s project was based on the draft MTRP and the analytical work

undertaken by GRA and ENBPA provided the Government‟s contribution

to the Bank project‟s identification and project preparation stages.

GRA Systems

In the course of implementing both the 4-year immediate restoration

program and the 9-year medium-term program, GRA developed their

own systems for all aspects of the works program they managed,

„growing them‟ in line with what they identified as „best practice‟ but

basing them as much on their own internally-driven initiative as on

standards imposed by external agencies such as the World Bank.

It is noteworthy that ENBPA had pre-existing systems that were

transferred to the GRA, such as procurement arrangements, and that at

the time of the disaster ENBPA was one of the few provincial authorities

to have already begun developing provincial works contracting capacity.

Their early systems provided a good basis in shaping both an institutional

mentality of quality and integrity6, and public expectations of

transparency and fairness.

5 As emotionally painful and politically difficult as the decision to not rebuild Rabaul was, the 16 years since the

eruption have proven it absolutely the correct decision from a public safety and economic efficiency perspective.

In spite of considerable investment in maintaining a minimum set of public infrastructure and in particular

preserving the functionality of Rabaul port, ENB’s only safe harbor, frequent eruptions continue to damage the

roads, homes, and businesses in Rabaul. One the last day of the field team’s visit, seasonal rains combined with

heavy silt and ash loads from the recent 5-month-long eruption culminated in a huge section of the main coastal

Rabaul-Kokopo road being entirely washed away, making it impossible for goods or fuel to be transported by road

from the port in Rabaul to consumers and businesses. Thirty days on, that road is still unusable.

6 By the early 1990’s East New Britain was already seeking increased autonomy from the national government,

and in support of that effort they were actively developing provincial and district capacity and competence. They

were quite successful in doing so, and had proven themselves able to balance provincial revenue collection and

resource allocation even without the windfall profits available to provinces with mines. Thus, at the time of the

An early emphasis

on practical

systems shaped

both an

institutional culture

of quality and

integrity , and

public expectations

of transparency and

fairness.

Success partially

depended on the

Provincial

Government’s ability

to seek, and absorb

advice, and then to

make hard decisions

and stick to them


9

Systems – procurement protocols, quality control manuals, administrative

records – are tools or vehicles that need to be driven by someone;

otherwise they simply gather dust on the shelf. NO matter how simple or

how detailed and comprehensive, systems need to be implemented with

strict attention to both integrity compliance: the state oversight authority,

and the private sector contractor, both need to believe that all the rules of

the game are being followed and applied impartially, consistently, and

with a base in common sense. It is clear from interviewing all

stakeholders that GRA‟s systems were in fact implemented in such a

way, and even when bemoaning the “strictness” of a tenders system

which would not allow a bid to be slid into the box even one minute past

the publically stated deadline, the private sector stakeholders were

adamant that these systems were a hallmark of GRA‟s success.

The GRA team explained that their systems were developed through

teamwork, taking draft building blocks from systems they viewed as „best

practice‟ and then customizing them for the local context. However, they

were clear that consistent application of those systems, and refusal to

abandon them under pressure to “just be a bit flexible, it‟s an emergency”

required constant support and leadership by the management team. In

this regards, the Project Manager, Principal Engineer and the Accountant

must take the credit for the maintenance of such systems, and for the

tactical use of external donor agencies‟ own fiduciary standards to

support their own internally driven insistence on quality.

Senior GRA staff from across the 13 years of the institution highlight an

important nuance: it is a mistake to interpret the robustness of GRAs

commitment to systems, processes, and manuals as acquiescence to a

donor requirement related only to risk management, because it‟s more

about building a joint commitment to quality. GRA felt that for their own

reputation‟s sake, they could not compromise their rigorous systems and

scrupulous attention to quality and detail: the stakes were high and

compromise was not an option, as a critical public and media were

watching and “we‟ll only get this one chance; if we are seen to misuse

money or compromise on quality, the funding will be cut off and the entire

reconstruction program will fail”. Contractors were also watching, and

actively voice concerns if they arose; the fact that the relationship

between contractors and GRA was generally without rancor may be

attributed both to the pre-existing trust built up between contractors and

ENBPA, and to the clarity of GRA‟s motive: compromise would lead to

misappropriation and subversion of the program.

In the area of procurement, GRA maintained an impeccable reputation

acknowledged by all; this required the strictest compliance to the bidding

and selection process and implementation of contracts. There appears to

be a close relationship between compliance of such systems and the

disaster, ENB-PA was “pre-adapted” to respond effectively, and this was a visible contrast to the national

government which has not consistently been capable of effective and efficient response to disasters..

Across GRA staff,

contractors, and

communities, the

robustness of GRA

systems were seen

not as acquiescence

to donor rules

related to risk

management, but as

a commitment to

quality and integrity.

High standards in

procurement did not

result in delays, but

did require skilled

staff and

management

supporting them.


10

confidence of GRA staff to take action when problems did arise.

Likewise, GRA‟s even-handed and predictable demands for compliance

with transparent systems increased the contractor‟s trust in GRA; both

contractors and the Chamber of Commerce expressed a high level of

trust in GRA‟s ability to provide fair and transparent processes and high

quality outcomes. Interestingly, there is no evidence that high standards

for procurement resulted in delays, only that communicating and

maintaining those standards required skilled and patient GRA staff and a

long-enough medium-term program that contractors and citizens would

wee the benefits of high procurement standards translate into high quality

physical assets.

In the dynamic process of developing, using, and improving their

systems, GRA found that relying on the World Bank procurement rules as

a foundation provided not only technical support but also “a useful

defense”, as GRA was able to deflect some criticism, referring to the

need to comply with donor standards. As an example, there was a

marked difference between the contract and quality control measures

applied in by GRA compared to other departments, projects and

programs; at the outset GRA resisted some of these new measures, but

they quickly embraced them and improved them over time. A Contract

Administration Manual and Quality Control Manual were developed with

all of the practices and procedures required under the contract; although

the contractors initially challenged GRA‟s junior engineering and

supervisory staff, the manuals provided comprehensive checklists which

gave staff the confidence to direct the contractor to take appropriate and

corrective action. Contractors soon became aware of the need to comply

with contract conditions and conform to the specifications and drawings,

and several reported that the GRA quality standards caused them to

„raise their game‟ consistently across all contracts. By the time World

Bank-financed SGRP closed, the GRA‟s contract and quality systems

and manuals were being exported to and used by other national and

provincial bodies including the National Department of Works and the

Central Supply and Tenders Board. An important note: the effectiveness

of those tools, and the individuals who use them, is limited by the

environment in which they are deployed; a former GRA engineer who

worked in Northern (Oro) province after the 2007 cyclone brought the

manuals with him, but found a much less enabling environment without

the political will and technical support needed to generate progress.

GRA Staff

The Project Implementation Unit was staffed by local and expatriate staff,

either hand-picked, seconded from other government agencies, or

engaged through a competitive selection process. For the initial works

program under the ITRP, the ENBPA had the opportunity to choose

some of the GRA staff: Ellison Kaivovo (Project Manager), Robert Cohen

(Project Accountant and later Operations Manager), John Eddison

(Principal Engineer) and Joe Enman (Senior Engineer), were all well-

known to the ENBPA and respected in both public and private sectors.


11

GRA‟s staffing was purposefully lean, initially under the misconception

that a staff of less than 10 would avoid mandatory superannuation

entitlements. However, later GRA maintained their minimalistic staffing,

seeking to cultivate a „lean team of respected and motivated people‟. It is

unclear how the organisation structure of GRA grew into its current form;

some staff and observers feel it grew out of necessity, in an natural sort

of way, while others feel that it was shaped at least partially by the key

expatriate advisors, who based their approach on criteria of technical

effectiveness rather than on an ideological position about „the right way‟

to structure the group. Certainly, early in the SGRP the World Bank team

undertook a comprehensive human resource analysis of GRA technical

staff and some informants report that this analysis‟ identification of a lack

of technical staff provided an evidence base for the Operations Manager

and GRA Board to agree to the staffing structure that was maintained

from 2001 through 2008.

Perhaps most critical was that GRA maintained the quality of their staff

by making great efforts to hire the best and, even more importantly,

readily firing people who did not perform. In spite of a demonstrated

willingness to let people go who were not performing up to their energetic

standards, GRA maintained a high level of staff retention: many

informants acknowledged that GRA was able to attract and maintain an

excellent team dominated by national staff who were complemented by –

but not dominated by – a small number of select expatriates. Under its

Act, there is no doubt that GRA had greater flexibility to hire and fire than

the average public sector entity, avoiding a sometimes complex

government personnel management system, but the most important

element of this flexibility is that they used it: people who either under-

performed or misbehaved were quickly dismissed. Other government

agencies have struggled to maintain quality staff and dismiss those

proven unfit.

Most Project Managers were seconded from ENBPA, with the exception

of John Painap who was a senior national public servant and a previous

departmental Secretary. All of GRA‟s Project Managers performed well,

having a clear understanding of the project objectives and requirements

and demonstrating an ability to effectively maintain linkages with the

ENBPA and key stakeholders. They generally made hard decisions and

worked well with donor aid agencies, although it was interesting to hear

that a considerable burden was delegated to key expatriates. This

burden was mostly in the form of workload, rather than decision power

(which was more broadly held across the group), and it was reportedly an

explicitly agreed arrangement that both national and international staff

felt was „fair,‟ in that it would shield national staff from outside pressure. 7

7 There is ample documentary evidence that the Project Managers heavily relied on the Operations Manager

(Robert Cohen) during the ITRP and Principal Engineer (John Eddison) during the MTRP to handle often

burdensome discussions and correspondence with the donor agencies.

‘Common sense’

good management

practices prevailed at

GRA, empowering a

team of skilled,

collaborative and

effective people.

Rewards for good

performance,

sanctions for poor

performance, and

open collaborative

decision-making,

were the base rules

at GRA.


12

Most key informants from ENBPA and GRA believe there was no

differentiation between the selection of either nationals or expatriates for

a particular position, but other observers felt that the selection of

expatriates for the position of Accountant and Principal Engineer was

purposeful, perhaps a strategic choice to provide national staff with both

technical depth and political „cover‟ for decisions that were sometimes

difficult and challenging. Importantly, the expatriates in general are

remembered as working well both with their national counterparts and

team members, and with provincial and Board superiors.8

Perhaps most striking about the way in which GRA managed and used

its expatriate staff as institutional assets is the apparently sophisticated

calibration of their roles. Many development projects which position

expatriate advisors in roles that require both technical inputs and

capacity building of local staff fail in those dual efforts, with the drive for

results overpowering the more nuanced and less linear needs of building

local staff skills and confidence. Additionally, the higher compensation

received by expatriates staff can often drive key counterparts to make an

efficiency argument and demand that delivery of technical results, along

with transaction costs involved with donor agencies, be the primary job of

the expatriate, in order to justify their compensation. Interestingly, GRA

seems to have been able to largely balance the competing objectives of

technical inputs and capacity building, and moreover created a genuinely

level „team playing field‟ where advisors were respected and used for

their expertise and breadth of knowledge but were not „deferred to‟.

John Eddison in his role as Principal Engineer warrants special mention,

as his ability to maintain quality systems over a long period of time, with

meticulous detail and dedication to GRA and its program, helped shape

the GRA. John was able to train national staff, cultivate their technical

skills and their commitment to quality, and engage them in creating a

„culture of quality” that ensured everyone used the systems the team had

created. His influence on the program became more apparent after the

role of Operations Manager was eliminated; in other projects and

government agencies starting with excellent systems, they often are

allowed to slowly deteriorate when the original „quality champion‟ is gone.

However, in the case of GRA, procurement, tendering, contract

administration and quality systems have matured and improved over

time.

GRA‟s ability to appropriately staff key positions was not limited to their

selection of a few expatriates; care in selecting national staff was also

8 The only reported exception to this uniform positive judgement is the period of time when Robert Cohen held a

dual appointment as both the Accountant and the Operations Manager. Some key observers worried there was

an inherent conflict in one person playing both the role of Accountant, which needed to report to the Project

Manager and be concerned with the consistent delivery of fiduciary outputs, and the role of Operations Manager,

created by the Board Chairman as a more strategic function to work with national politicians and donor agencies

in sensitive areas, including successfully challenging the political push to re-build Rabaul and shoring up the

political support needed for securing counterpart funding during the “lull’.

Selection, use, and

retention of

expatriate technical

advisors was careful,

and mindful of

cultural issues.


13

clearly evident. The Community Development Officer position proved to

be a particularly influential role, and during the entire 13 years of GRAs

operations, there were only two CDOs: Ms. Beddie Jubilee and Mr.

Ezekiel ToLulu. As ENB has a matrilineal system and with the relocation

of people from their traditional land to refugee camps and then to

resettlement sites, the choice of a female CDO during the ITRP appeared

to be ideal; Ms. Jubilee is remembered as a confident effective

communicator who had a good understanding of the problems and

sensitivities at hand. Mr. ToLulu was equally capable, and was integral

to the roll-out of MTRP, which required a delicate balancing act between

explaining the public infrastructure projects whose location and

prioritization were a technical decision taken by ENBPA and facilitating

genuine community input into village-level projects (how many schools,

and where they would be built, was not a matter for bottom-up planning,

but selection of a community hall or a water supply could be).

Whilst members of both host and resettled communities expressed

frustration with some aspects in retrospect, communications and public

relations were generally viewed as good by the „beneficiaries‟. Interviews

with a broad cross-section of stakeholders confirms that communications

and consultation improved over time, particularly with the “host”

communities: there was an initial period when the main communication

was with the groups that had to be relocated because their homes near

the volcanoes had been destroyed, and there was a feeling among those

to whose land they were being relocated that they (the hosts) were not

being given as much attention as they should have been. Some of the

host communities comprised ethnic Pomio, Baining, or Sulka people

(non-Tolais), and some of them interpreted the resettlement dialogue as

being dominated by a Tolai-centric bias in the restoration programme.

GRA technical staff members were generally selected through

advertisements: some were just out of university and had no experience

while others had some level of on-the-job experience and proven skills.

This required the staff to be rapidly trained in GRAs systems and to form

a cohesive team that worked well together. Technical staff report that

they felt they had considerable support from their superiors, who would

support them to either make difficult decisions or confront a contractor. A

small number of technical staff was seconded temporarily from ENBPA

and one DoW supervisor provided valuable service and remained with

GRA for 12 years.

Special mention must be made of the lessons GRA itself has drawn from

their experience in using consultants; they strongly counsel against using

a multitude of consultants without pre-existing local knowledge: “don‟t

hire outsiders to repackage what we know already.” Analysis of the

portfolio hints that the best results were obtained by consultants who

worked repeatedly with the program and developed a critical mass of

institutional and contextual knowledge.

Unusually for an

organization

dominated by staff

with engineering skill

sets, the value of

‘softer’ competences

like communication

and team-building

were not neglected.


14

National staff were well compensated and salaries in GRA were

increased by two pay levels (30-40%) to their normal salaries, to reflect

the added workload and conditions. However in comparison, expatriates

salaries were individually negotiated. All of the staff worked extremely

hard, with staff commonly working unpaid overtime and on weekends; it

was not unusual to find GRA staff working at 7pm during the week and

on Saturdays and Sundays. This signalled a high level of dedication and

commitment to the program and personal sacrifice not routinely seen in

other state agencies.

Team building and discipline amongst the GRA staff is a hallmark, with

the management team leading by example; the weekly management

meetings were a transparent model of each department reporting upon

their actions and taking accountability for any problems encountered.

Staff kept themselves accountable to each other, and this mutual

commitments was reinforced by senior management who set the

benchmark. Staff felt that they had suitable levels of delegation; they

were encouraged to take action on issues straight away. The engineering

staff had routine meetings in which each engineer described the current

status of their projects and flagged problems seen; this allowed for group

brainstorming, assured that the entire team was aware of any delays, and

reinforced a sense of mutual accountability by bringing the results of

normal works supervision into the management dialogue.

Staff that did not perform were identified and dealt with; emerging

problems were often addressed first through peer counselling. Discipline

was calibrated to the concern raised, and could involve being informally

counselled or formally warned; in some cases staff were dismissed

immediately for the worst transgressions. In one case, a staff member

was found to be soliciting beer from a contractor: the staff member was

sacked immediately, since even the appearance of exploitation of the

relationship between contractor and contracting agency was seen as

endangering the reputation of the GRA itself.

GRA exhibited the attributes of a highly organised, disciplined and

motivated team characteristic of a successful agency in either public or

private sector of a developed country. Staff held quarterly roundtable

discussions where the chairmanship was rotated and junior staff

encouraged to contribute to the discussions; individual departments had

sub-meetings beforehand to discuss matters pertinent to them and agree

on how to raise them in the larger meeting. All staff members including

senior management were treated as equals, to facilitate open discussion.

Similarly, implementers meetings were convened monthly for those

people and agencies leading components and contracts. These meetings

were considered critical to a sense of ownership of the projects and

accountability for decisions. It also allowed the full range of public and

private sector stakeholders to contribute to the decision-making process

and make them jointly and mutually accountable for the success of the

program.

GRA systems and

staffing choices

created:

the discipline to

hold regular

meetings,

the frankness with

which problems

and issues were

analysed,

an ethic of equality

with respect for

the right to voice

concerns and

opinions

These organizational

practices contributed

to a collective habit:

delivering a high-

quality performance.


15

Taken together, the combination of GRA systems and staffing choices

created a critical mass: the discipline to hold regular meetings, the

frankness with which problems and issues were analysed, the inculcation

of an ethic of equality with respect for the right to voice concerns and

opinions; this all led to the development of habits of performance. All

concerned knew 1) that their performance and the performance of tasks

on which they were involved would be closely monitored and 2) they

would have access to all the expertise of GRA in correcting problems and

issues as they arose. This effectively removed the fear of failure because

individuals knew that it was wiser to admit to problems and seek help

than to try to hide them until they became more serious – and frankly, it

was difficult to hide problems in any event.

External Players

The key external players considered in discussions with GRA were the

donor aid agencies and the private sector contractors. GRA considered

the World Bank a good model of technical competence to emulate, and

relied heavily on their practices and procedures. The GRA generally

found the Bank to be flexible and consistent, although demanding at

times and especially so during supervision missions. AusAID did not

provide any direct contribution to the institutional development of GRA,

although junior technical staff were seconded to the managing

consultant‟s team for work experience. JICA essentially worked

independently, funding the new Tokua Airport. Although their funding

was welcomed, the European Union assistance was challenging for

GRA, as their funding was delayed and their procurement arrangements

difficult to understand.

It appears the levels of Bank involvement and intervention on the ITRP

and MRTP were more comprehensive than other donor-funded projects

and programs, with regular missions and detailed followed up action lists,

fortnightly telephone conferences for a period of time and detailed

monthly reporting against listed actions. Early in the collaboration with

GRA, the World Bank asked GRA to develop a comprehensive works

program and human resource analysis. These tools, which were

considered essential steps in a planning a large works program, proved

to be useful „learning by doing‟ tools for GRA to understand the critical

path of the works program and its individual projects, the inter-

dependencies that could constrain it, and the human resources required

to roll it out. The World Bank required GRA to develop a contract

administration manual and complementary quality control manual, and

while GRA initially resisted the development of these manuals, these

procedures and checklists enabled the systematic, technically strong,

and reliable approach that is now seen as the hallmark of GRA (and a

source of pride for GRA staff). Later in the program, as the MTRP

started to experience delays and cost over-runs, the collaborative nature

of the Bank‟s engagement with GRA management team really became

clear: the GRA team invited the World Bank to intervene in support of

cost cutting measures, devising a risk management system to identify

Continuous

engagement by the

World Bank project

team, far more

intensive than twice-

yearly supervision

missions, allowed

collaborative habits

to develop that

supported GRA in

sustaining high

quality results.


16

risks and manage them, and jointly conducting a market analysis to

target and attract more competition amongst contractors. GRA staff

report that they were generally receptive to advice and inputs from the

Bank because it provided a good sounding board for ideas and an

opportunity for them to learn “on-the-job”.

World Bank actively assisted with delivering a strong message to

government that counterpart funds were essential and a condition of the

loan agreement; it is understood that these messages proved to be

useful in getting money finally released from national government. The

Bank also showed considerable flexibility within its own sphere of control,

adjusting the percentage of disbursement for civil works from 78% to

90% to cover the shortfall in continued lack of counterpart funds. The

World Bank also assisted GRA in lobbying AusAID to fund the Kokopo-

Rabaul Road, thus freeing up needed funds to complete the remainder of

the works program.

Contractors and the Chamber of Commerce, representing the business

community, expressed a high level of satisfaction with GRA. This

reputation and confidence appears to have built upon the good

relationship they had with the ENBPA and they clearly saw the two

institutions as related state institutions with clearly important state

functions. They reported that GRA was well organized, firm but fair,

transparent in its dealings and decisions, possibly too strict on occasions

and yet flexible enough to counsel contractors and discuss options to

rectify a problems. In retrospect both sides agree this marked a healthy

relationship that resulted in better value-for-money outcomes.

Interestingly, almost all contractors were initially challenged by GRA‟s

strict policy of following the contract, specifications and drawings. This

initially caused strife, with claims that GRA was being “unfair” and “too

strict”; however, over time, this criticism subsided, replaced with

admiration and respect. Local contractors benefitted considerably under

the program; competition was originally high, with a number of

inexperienced contractors bidding, but this evolved into more

experienced contractors winning repeatedly over time. Contractors felt

that they matured throughout the program and in at least two cases

contractors greatly expanded the scope of their operations and branched

out elsewhere in PNG. One contractor reported a number of examples

where the very same GRA engineers who would were uncompromising in

their insistence on compliance with technical quality standards would also

invest long hours in brainstorming with the contractor team to solve

unexpected supply bottlenecks through replacement inputs or mutually

agreed design modifications. New contractors developed depth and a

history of performance; experienced contractors grew larger and

expanded to serve other parts of the country.

Contractors believed that GRA was generally impartial, looking after the

interests of both parties, under the contract (that is, the State and

Contractor). This form of contract management is similar to current best

Building on a pre-

existing positive

relationship between

the State and the

private sector, GRA

helped nurture local

contracting capacity

both in volume and

quality terms.


17

practices in developed countries, whereby the Engineer is a neutral

technically-grounded mediator, rather than the Government‟s (or Client‟s)

gatekeeper. It appears this even-handed approach was critical to both

maintaining good relationships and encouraging good outcomes.

Some of the other defining positive attributes of GRA, expressed by

contractors and the Chamber of Commerce are:

Public tenders – everyone knew what is happening.

GRA encouraged competition and resisted cronyism. There were

no „favors‟ given or solicited, at any time.

During tender evaluation, there was a high level of trust that fair

outcomes will be achieved.

The Principal Engineer was seen to provide credible and reliable

leadership of the engineering/procurement team.

The technical staff were strict; “and sometimes too strict”,

although the commentator willingly acknowledged, GRA probably

needed to be “too strict” in order to cultivate credibility in the

generally unrespected and low-credibility world of public works

contracting in PNG.

GRA was seen as “in control of” the contractors, as opposed to

other agencies whose technical skills and management capacity

were so weak as to depend on the contractor to “do the right

thing” by their own initiative.

Contractors felt that the use of donor-compliant funds and

oversight systems provided confidence in the program.

GRA paid within days, instilling confidence in the program.

One contractor suggested that GRA‟s strict application of contract terms

may have resulted in 3-5% increase in tender price. While small, that

surcharge is not trivial for a large public works program, and so further

discussions focused on whether the higher level of quality control

generated higher quality and thus value-for-money. The consensus of

those discussions is that, based on quality differential between GRA and

other PNG works projects, the additional value of final product may well

have exceeded the hypothesized 3-5% surcharge in bids.

Communications and Public Relations

Under ITRP there was a modest program of stakeholder consultation,

commensurate with the emergency nature of the works; Beddie Jubilee

(GRA‟s first CDO) did organize some discussions with host and resettled

communities to hear their views. In retrospect, more consultation could

have been warranted, for both key target groups (host communities and

resettled groups). Some resettled communities feel they were relocated

to unsuitable areas that did not provide adequate scale and type of land

to sustain family livelihoods (although ENBPA has endeavoured to rectify

these deficiencies). For host communities, the situation was more

complex. Firstly, there was a failure early on to hold adequate

consultations with host communities; as the ITRP continued into the late

90s the consultation process was deepened and the host communities in

A reputation as

being ‘firm but fair’,

and a willingness to

be flexible enough to

help troubleshoot

technical challenges

with the contractors,

won GRA the respect

of the private sector.


18

particular were more effectively engaged. Secondly, the more complex

dynamics underlying the perceived „stability‟ of Tolai-dominated ENB

needed to be accommodated: the consultations could have involved

groups who were not in the immediately affected area but who were

feeling that they were being left out of the development process,

particularly once the process moved from immediate to medium term

rehabilitation ... the Pomio, Baining and Sulka populations.

Notably, communication under the MTRP was much more

comprehensive. Communications happened at two levels: dissemination

and explanation, for large scale public asset projects such as roads,

schools and health centers, and iterative consultation for local level

projects such as water supplies and community halls. Communications

was also tiered and structured, from the start of planning to post-

construction. Communications focussed on „ownership‟ to help

stakeholders feel that they were integral to the planning and design

process, which would in turn ensure that the completed works would be

handed over to those well-informed stakeholders as custodians.

The consultation associated with the larger scale projects was thorough,

relying upon a cascade model where GRA reached out to key public and

private sector leaders at multiple levels, but it also seems that some

communities were not as well informed as they should have been of the

rationale and selection of the large new infrastructure, nor of the trade-

offs inherent in the program which needed to serve multiple purposes:

resettle eruption-affected communities, provide „thank you‟ assets for

host communities, and build critical state assets for the resettled

population and the new provincial capital.

For the community level projects, there was also a cascade model used,

although there was more explicit instruction to district and LLG officials

about the expected process they were to use. There is some evidence

that not all District Administrators and councillors fully informed their

constituents of planning and implementation arrangements for the

community projects, nor did they all use the bottom-up planning and

community prioritization approaches that GRA depending on them using.

Communications between key stakeholders on large projects occurred

through the design consultants who undertook joint meetings with GRA

and stakeholders. For community-level projects, communications were

channelled through GRA to District Administrators, local level Councillors

and Ward Development Committees to deliver messages to their people

and provide direction on selected options. GRA‟s Community

Development Officer (CDO) sometime required Engineering staff and

Environmental Officer from GRA to attend selected visits and provided

follow-up.

Recognizing in retrospect that there were blockages in the „cascade‟

transfer of information to communities, the GRA‟s CDO could have also

involved provincial CDOs and information officers in a structured and

proactive way as an additional channel for information.

Communications was

a critical element of

both the immediate

reconstruction effort

and the medium-

term program ....

... and was

considered an

instrumental feature

for program

implementation, not

a remedial action for

solving problems.


19

Box 3: How Community Involvement Shaped Results in Three Water Projects

The field team visited with three communities who hosted displaced groups from the eruption-ravaged Rabaul

area, and whose generosity was recognize through GRA‟s Village Development Fund projects. Of the 20+ VDF

projects nine were water supply, and the team saw three of them:

In Bitapaka, communications were not effective: the LLG and DA did not coordinate the handover of the

asset nor did they facilitate the establishment of the necessary Water Committee and creation of its

maintenance fund bank account. A power struggle over ownership of the asset and the water ensued, and

the impressive two-tank installation is now non-functioning. Repeated pump problems were left unattended

without resources or accountability for repair.

In Vunamami, the communications cycle was fully realized and asset handover and accountability are

functioning as designed; the water supply is well maintained and extensively used, and generates

significant revenues. The water committee is proactive in allocating revenues to other community projects,

possibly to the extent that the balance they hold in the account for repair may be insufficient should they run

into serious trouble.

In Bitavavar, similarly effective communications nurtured similarly strong collective ownership and

accountability, but an early experience with lightening strike that blew out a pump motor has inspired them

to be both more conservative and creative in their asset management. Although they had almost enough

money to pay for the entire replacement pump, they successfully negotiated with their LLG to cost-share,

and instead of drawing down their trust account too low, they took out a loan for their portion of the new

pump, and are paying it back through cash flow generated by the well-functioning repaired installation.

There were up to 20 meetings for each community project, from pre-

concept stage to handover. Dialogue was generally a two-way process

between GRA and the relevant stakeholders; there was no report of

political involvement at the project level and it appears this was not

encouraged. GRA tried to not to inflate stakeholders expectations by not

talking „big‟, but because of the iterative process of consultation,

expectations did rise which were not necessarily tempered by clear

communication about GRA‟s budget constraints and the need for trade-

offs (“... if you want a more sophisticated water supply system we will

have to reduce the size, and will serve fewer people”). Stakeholders were

told about timelines (design through to implementation) and generally

people expected projects to take a long time; uniformly, communities

were both surprisingly patient and pleased with the completed works.

Weekly live radio broadcasts by the CDO allowed GRA to present

messages not only to communities listening for news of „their project‟, but

also to the wider public. News items included project updates,

discussions of recent problems encountered with the program and

concerns such as vandalism of completed works. These broadcasts

appear to have been effective in nurturing a sense of common

endeavour; even years later interviewees commonly referred to hearing

them. Implementers‟ meetings were another part of the communications

process, as they were used a channel for two-way discussion. During the

ITRP and part way through the MRTP, the Advisor for Lands was

influential in dealing with the complex and potentially volatile lands

issues. John Brown was a long time expatriate resident with intimate

knowledge of lands issues, and he commanded respect from the

community at large as a well-informed but neutral advisor; he was

commonly used by GRA and ENBPA to deal with lands issues and


20

mediate solutions. Churches were also helpful to share information and

sometimes used as mediators to resolve problems.

Institutional and Provincial Culture

There are two aspects of culture that were referred to by informants; the

internal culture of GRA and the Tolai culture that derives from the

dominant clan grouping in the Gazelle population.

GRA clearly cultivated its own corporate culture, consisting of loyalty to

the program and to each other, strong work ethic and uncompromising

standards. Confidence and trust appeared to be a hallmark of the GRA,

both internally and externally: stakeholder and long-time observers

continually used these terms to describe GRA and the people working in

it. However, this confidence and trust was continually earned and re-

earned, and it appears that the high level of dedication that GRA staff

had to their job and „their systems‟ was instrumental in this. “GRA is a

good place to work, and GRA staff do good work.”

The Tolai culture has always been regarded as well organised, highly

educated and astute, and GRA consisted of mainly Tolai people. This

largely homogeneous group appears to have allowed GRA to be seen as

being loyal to East New Britain and the reconstruction efforts, and even

the expatriates at GRA understood the culture extremely well. GRA staff

emphasize that they did not act to exclude the smaller Baining or Pomio

clans, but there were nonetheless reports that in the more remote areas

that were not benefitting from the large sums and projects under MTRP

the perception was that the Tolais were monopolizing benefits by

„keeping everything in Kokopo‟.

The evolution that GRA staff and observers described as having

happened over time, and the vocabulary they used to do so, reinforces

the view of key outside observers that GRA established its own cultural

identity, its own clan, a form of wantok.9 This appears to have occurred

through building a joint commitment to common rules and practices that

were systematically observed without differentiation over a period of time,

possibly without any conscious intent to do so. There seems to have

been a gradual melding of local norms applied to westernized systems

such as procurement, administration and finance and quality control, in

which the cultural traits often disparaged as being “undesirable PNG

wantok behaviors” were in fact the very strengths which allowed the GRA

to build its reputation.

9 This same dynamic was observed by a joint World Bank-AusAID-UNDP review of post-conflict capacity building in

the Solomon Islands, where in the wake of violent and socially devastating ethnic clashes between clan groups the

Office of the Auditor General has been rebuilt through a combination of collaborative expatriate technical

assistance inputs and a dynamic national leader (Floyd Fatai, the late Auditor General) who explicitly motivated his

staff by saying “We are the OAG wantok – we’re a national team, not Guale, not Malaitan, just national servants.”


21

These traditional cultural elements – uncompromising loyalty and support

for each other, strong work ethic for the common good, forms of

communal discussions and problem-solving, and shunning of those who

had transgressed the group norms – were used in the GRA to inform and

shape the thoroughly modern and technical systems and processes that

allowed GRA to deliver their much-applauded quality of public works with

an equally admired element of fairness and integrity.

What could have been improved?

Through field interviews and the desk review of implementation documents, suggestions have emerged that point to actions that could have increased GRA‟s effectiveness in delivering its program, and thus might be relevant for other efforts:

1. Constantly renew and cultivate relationship with National Departments, through politicians and community leaders, to prevent or resolve problems like the lack of counterpart funding at key points. GRA expressed that if they had been more successful at this, disruptions would have been fewer even during the period of fiscal crisis in the late 1990s.

2. GRA believes – and the World Bank agrees – that intensive upfront training by donor aid agencies in their procedures and practices would have made the project run more smoothly, reducing delays, costs, and frustration levels. The Bank further believes that undertaking a collective effort across donors to at least cross-train each other on required systems – or better, to harmonize systems through a multi-donor trust fund – would have improved both efficiency and the quality of results.

3. GRA now feels they should have engaged more technical staff earlier in the program.

4. Communications with the full range of stakeholders needed to be better managed to ensure that the information being „given‟ to people was „heard‟, and understood, in context. The program sought to achieve three goals, each of which affected a specific population with their own sense of entitlement and loss: resettle and restore livelihoods to affected communities, move provincial capital to Kokopo and provide associated public infrastructure, and restore and preserve the functionality of Rabaul port. A more proactive and nuanced communication effort would explicitly recognize that each group would instinctively „see‟ only „their part‟ of the effort, and thus would communicate the multiple goals of the reconstruction program to all of the multiple audiences with an emphasis on understanding ‘others’ needs.

5. Explicit attention should have been given to the risk that even groups not directly affected – either as relocated populations or host populations – would feel either invested in or disadvantaged by the MTRP. The Pomio, Baining and Sulka people in more remote areas watched as large sums were expended on populations that, in their minds, had traditionally been advantaged already. In retrospect, it would have been useful to develop political support early in the MTRP to use the GRA „success‟ as a platform to extend effective and inclusive development to areas not directly affected by the disaster. This occurred to some extent later on, but it could have been addressed earlier and might have thus been a critical element in allowing GRA to evolve past 2010.

6. Timeframes needed to be realistic. It was apparent that the MTRP was too ambitious for a 3-4 year timeframe, thus placing pressure on the GRA and other stakeholders to deliver a timeline that could never be achieved. Recognizing that part of that dynamic was generated by the Bank‟s own thinking (now modified) that emergency programs be short10, donor requirements should be explicitly balanced with reality on the ground.

10

Under OP 8.50 emergency recovery loans (ERLs) were to be no more than 3 years in duration; this seems to

have influenced the thinking of the Bank’s design team even though an APL was used for the SGRP.


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7. As an example of transition from reconstruction to development, the GRA transition from the ITRP to the MTRP illustrates the importance of common principles and pillars that are widely communicated (and even publicly debated, as in the move of ENBPA from Rabaul to Kokopo) even though administrative arrangements and implementation modalities may change as the transition is made.

8. GRA experienced considerable problems with No Objection Letters not being issued expediently by the World Bank (until a negotiated 7-day turnaround was agreed in 2004); given the heroic levels at which GRA staff were working, this was more than just a delay or a nuisance. Explicit agreement on both formal and informal „standard operating procedures‟ in the emergency context are important so that the broader team – implementing partner agency and donor agency – are not working at cross purposes.

9. The short notice, intensive meeting schedules, and large volume of documents required for World Bank supervision missions were a significant burden, even as the GRA valued the technical support and mentoring that mission teams provided. GRA indicated that more timely notice was required, along with more clarity on what was to be reviewed.

Selective Transplantation, not ‘Replication’

GRA staff are united in their belief that the success of their institution is a unique product of

unique people operating in a unique circumstance, which therefore cannot be replicated.

However, the review team believes that there are key elements and choices exhibited by the

GRA that can be explicitly selected for and nurtured in other contexts, and important lessons for

the World Bank in how our support for project implementation can help in itself contribute to

nurturing effective state institutions.

What aspects of GRA are relevant to other post-disaster reconstruction efforts?

When considering the utility of and structure for a special-purpose authority, allocate

policymaking and strategic choices to the permanent mechanisms of state whenever

possible, and develop a clear distinction between those functions and the

overwhelmingly large but temporary of implementing and supervising reconstruction.

Undertake a candid analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the „parent‟

institutions; rely on the strengths and build mechanisms into the program (or the special

purpose authority) to compensate for the weaknesses.

Don‟t confuse the need for rapid action and visible results with a need to obscure quality

standards or use non-transparent processes.

o Triage the reconstruction program so that a sequenced approach can launch most

urgent works, based on practical simple designs, with a high degree of transparency

demonstrated in a straightforward but uncompromising procurement process.

o Consider procurement processes inextricably linked to quality control and

supervision processes; procurement doesn‟t end at bid award..

o Build on the trust engendered by those early simple high-integrity works to continue

with an equally transparent and rigorous procurement and works supervision

process for the more complex and larger medium-term works.

Treat communication as instrumental, not remedial; invest in and staff it well, carry it

through the entire project cycle, and „close the loop‟ by bringing back reports of actions

taken based on community and stakeholder inputs.

o Anticipate a need to communicate across stakeholder groups to build their

understanding of and compassion for others‟ needs.

o Explicitly facilitate exchanges about the trade-offs required so stakeholders know

why certain choices are made.


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o Recognize and be sensitive to the likelihood that groups in the vicinity of the disaster

who are not directly affected but feel consistently disadvantaged will feel they

deserve their needs to also be met as part of a longer term development program.

Where a pre-existing relationship of community confidence in state service delivery

exists, explicitly use the institutions and individuals associated with that state

effectiveness to champion the reconstruction program.

Identify compelling goals that can mobilize leadership at the provincial, local and

national levels to align with common objectives, creating a platform of political support.

Where that relationship is damaged, and where the state is viewed as fragile or

ineffective, the political champions and the reconstruction program donors must identify

„early wins‟ that can rebuild some minor degree of confidence; a well-communicated

emphasis on simple processes with clear standards and high integrity, for a few modest

early works, is a good start.

In designing terms of reference and reporting relationships, and in selecting advisors

and project staff, explicitly seek expatriates who have long experience in the local

context and be mindful of the utility of using them to help deal with outside pressure and

interference.

No matter how strong or fragile the local contracting capacity is, develop clear and

straightforward systems and communicate the rules; avoid over-engineering but do not

compromise on standards and requirements of tenders, and then build collaborative

problem-solving into the quality control and supervision processes so that troubles

become learning opportunities.

For consideration in post-conflict reconstruction efforts?

Communication becomes even more central in all dimensions identified above:

o comprehensive, structural and proactive rather than reactive;

o designed to exploit existing social capital and build new capital, across and between

communities and between them, businesses, and the state; and

o sensitive to and healing towards gaps or mistrust between groups.

If the conflict was protracted, much of the domestic contracting and works capacity may

have disappeared; however, mechanisms for joint venturing and local subcontracting

should be emphasized so that the early works program can contribute to rebuilding that

capacity, however rudimentary, especially in ways that mobilize community labor.

Given the much more severe deterioration in state institutions that usually characterizes

post-conflict settings – and the damaged trust between population and state that

accompanies it – the choice of institution(s) for implementation must take into account

the need to re-build confidence by demonstrating competence.

o This does not necessarily mean that one state institution should „do it all‟, since

clarity about mandate and realism in setting (and delivering upon) expectations are

critical elements in rebuilding state effectiveness.

o Nor should it prevent other stakeholders from bearing some of the implementation

burden as long as the state function of policy decisions and strategic choices is

exercised with stakeholder consultation.

What are the critical institutional and operational building blocks for effective state programs at

the provincial or district level?


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The building blocks are similar no matter how large the works program: mobilization of

political will and funding; policy-making and strategic decision-making; program planning

and implementation; financial management and audit; procurement all the way through

to quality control and supervision; communication across stakeholder groups throughout

the project cycle.

If capacity does not already exist in these areas, a willingness to build it must be

evident, as well as a willingness to share responsibility with other levels of government

or supportive donor agencies during program implementation.

Resources are important but not paramount; financing that overwhelms capacity may

risk producing unrealistic expectations but little in sustainable benefits.

Candor is critical in assessing state capacity and calibrating program accordingly: align

the sophistication of systems and the burden of technical supervision to the level of

capacity already available, not to aspirational levels. Build in continuous learning and

joint problem-solving so that early wins rebound to the benefit of the growing reputation

(of strong government entities) and the increasing legitimacy (of weaker units).

How can Bank processes and procedures contribute to strengthening institutions and delivering

investment programs in low-capacity environments?

The Bank task team can support a vision of effective state institutions with transparency

and respect for agreed processes, collaborative problem-solving, and full-circle

communication, by modelling those in its own interactions with the Borrower team. In

fact, the absence of any of those characteristics in how the Bank deals with the

Borrower risks imposing a sense of double-standards that could undermine the

purported rationale of the fiduciary systems themselves.

From the outset, build agreement that a robust commitment to systems should not be

chosen in acquiescence to a donor requirement related to risk management;

procurement, financial management, and M&E are important not only as fiduciary

safeguards but also as mechanisms for building a joint commitment to quality between

financier and Borrower.

o Creating and agreeing upon manuals and systems during the project preparation

period isn‟t just a necessary step for effectiveness and project launch; it also builds

ownership and enhances the credibility of the Borrower. Invest in training early,

respect the value of ideas brought to the table by the Borrower team, and encourage

(even require) frequent updates of the Project Implementation Manual and

associated manuals based on the evolving experience.

o Work with the Borrower and implementers to not attribute fiduciary controls narrowly

as “a Bank requirement”, but to instead communicate clearly with stakeholders

inside and outside Government the reasons why these processes are used, and

transparently explain decisions taken when problems arise: this builds the legitimacy

of state institutions rather than presenting them as subservient to a donor agency.

Recognize that while the Bank‟s primary counterpart is the Government, opportunities

exist for Bank task teams to tailor their project preparation and design work – and the

procurement processes used in the works programs – in such a way as to support

increased capacity in the private sector.


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Conclusion

The reputation of GRA as an effective institution, and the legacy of the post-disaster

reconstruction as a well-communicated consultative public works program that delivered high

quality through a largely nationally staffed team with a reputation for integrity and transparency,

are both clearly demonstrated. This review has helped to „dig beneath the surface‟ of the

„uniqueness‟ claims about East New Britain and the GRA, in order to learn lessons for – among

others – the government leaders and development partners interested in improving our results

in development efforts across Papua New Guinea.

As the Medium Term Restoration Program wound down in 2007-2008, provincial government

leaders and local stakeholders began discussing GRA‟s „life after MTRP‟. Hopes were held out

for a united approach through which the Provincial Government and National Ministers could

develop a sensible plan in which the GRA was retained as an institution, with an amendment to

its mandate to cover the whole province rather than just the Gazelle Peninsula, possibly

including provision for it to „contract out‟ to other provinces for support to their own efforts to

implement public works and build their own capacity. Some stakeholders felt strongly that this

would have been the best mechanism for the province to spearhead the development of the

less developed areas of the province (namely Pomio, Baining and Open Bay in the Gazelle

District), and certainly development partners including the World Bank encouraged approaches

that would sustain the important institutional capacity and learning that had been so carefully

built. This approach was broached by provincial and national actors in 2008-09, and was

initially widely supported, and efforts were begun to draft the necessary amendments for

consideration by Parliament.

However, the consensus needed between national leaders of ENB origin and provincial leaders

proved elusive, and strong differences of opinion regarding the appropriate course of action

resulted in a political stalemate. The 2010 national budget provided no funding for the routine

operations of GRA, and as early as March 2010 staff were being made redundant, even as

other provinces and private sector entities began to circle around GRA in hopes of luring away

key expertise. The capacity of those individuals will hopefully contribute to their new

institutions, and produce strong results for them, but the institutional impact of the GRA – and

its potential to serve broader provincial and national goals – may have been lost.


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Annex 1: Acknowledgements and List of Persons Interviewed

Eminent Persons

Sinai Brown, OBE, MP Leo Dion, CMG, QPM, MP

former Minister responsible for Gazelle Restoration Authority Governor, East New Britain province

Gazelle Restoration Authority Peter Buak Project Manager Gary Thomas Project Accountant Noel Kelly Assistant Principal Engineer / acting

Principal Engineer Joe Enman Contract Administration Engineer Kiramin Karani Kesia Willimon

Office Manager Finance Manager

Peter Buak Project Manager Former GRA staff

Ezekiel ToLulu Former Community Development Officer

East New Britain Provincial Administration Akuila Tubal Bernard Lukara

Provincial Administrator Deputy Provincial Administrator, Policy, Planning and Evaluation

Allan ToVue Adviser, Technical Services Chamber of Commerce Nick Lyons Brian Martin

East New Britain Chamber of Commerce Ex-Chamber of Commerce (owner of Rapopo Plantation Resort)

General Community

Bitipaka and Kokopo/Vunamami Community cross-section of leaders from Host and Resettled Communities Sikut and GelaGela Community

Tour of market in Rabaul and discussion with random selection of market vendors Contractor

Dave Stein General Manager – Nivani Rudy Terracciani Principal – Southern Enterprises Mr Li Manager China Jiangsu International

The GRA Review Team gratefully acknowledges the support and investment of time and wisdom that our

many informants gave to us. We are particularly grateful to the Gazelle Restoration Authority team in

Kokopo, the East New Britain Provincial Administration,

We extend a special ‘thank you’ to our Peer Reviewers: Sir Rabbie Namaliu and Dr. Bruce Harris, in

Papua New Guinea, and Markus Kostner and Wolfgang Fengler, from the World Bank’s global expert

team on post-disaster reconstruction.

The Review Team included World Bank Country Manager for PNG, Laura Bailey; Raymond Palangat,

Public Information and Communications Assistant; and Lawrie Carlson, consulting engineer.

For more information on the Second Gazelle Restoration Project, please visit the World Bank website:

http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P054238


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Annex 2: Overview of GRA and the Restoration Programmes

Following a severe tectonic earthquake in the early hours of 18 September 1994, the twin volcanoes of

Mt Tavurvur and Mt Vulcan erupted early on the morning of Monday 19 September 1994, displacing

around 100,000 persons from Rabaul town and the neighbouring villages, and physically destroying most

buildings and infrastructure. A damage and loss assessment calculated that total damage to both public

and private assets was in excess of US$550 million, and 20,000-30,000 people were permanently

displaced; most were subsequently resettled as part of the restoration programs. The Gazelle

Restoration Authority was established on 7 February 1995 by the national government through the

passing of the Gazelle Restoration Act 1995.

The Immediate Term Restoration Programme (ITRP) was undertaken from 1995 to 2000, with first

priority given to initial emergency and humanitarian works, followed by a programme to restore key public

and economic infrastructure. A significant component of these earlier works was the establishment of

permanent resettlement areas, the establishment of Kokopo as the administrative capital of the province,

and sufficient work in Rabaul to allow it to operate as a port.

The structure of the ITRP was based upon a needs assessment report prepared by the Australian aid

agency (then called AIDAB), covering six major sectors: aviation, education, health, lands, police, and

roads. In agreement with both the National and Provincial Governments, the individual projects in the

ITRP were divided between the major donors11

– AusAID, Japan, and the World Bank. AusAID and

Japan provided significant funds, and largely managed their own programmes in coordination with the

GRA, and the World Bank re-allocated portions of three existing loans to ITRP projects, thus allowing

monies to flow from national government directly to GRA:

Budget Support

National and Provincial Governments K 21.9 million

International Grants

AusAid K 66.5 million

Japan K 84.7 million

European Union Development Funds K 7.9 million

International Soft Loans

The World Bank K 33.3 million

Germany K 2.4 million

Asian Development Bank K 2.0 million

Total ITRP Budget K 218.7 million

Approximately 30 percent of the total K218.7 million was disbursed directly through the GRA PIU: K62.5

million was utilised by the GRA to complete almost 200 projects with well over 300 subprojects.

The Medium Term Restoration Programme (MTRP) commenced in the 2000 financial year and was

originally split into two phases, to be mostly financed by a World Bank loan that would be supplied in two

tranches, with the second being dependent on the successful disbursement of the first. These would

have been: Phase 1 (2000-2007) and Phase 2 (2007-2010).

The primary goal of the MTRP was to consolidate the restoration activities commenced under the ITRP,

restoring in a sustainable and risk-averse manner the social and economic well-being of the population of

the North East Gazelle Peninsula. The key objectives were to:

1. improve the quality of life for displaced communities;

2. consolidate Kokopo Town as the provincial capital of East New Britain;

11 Relative contributions at the rates of exchange on 29 December 2000.


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3. restore those parts of Rabaul Town necessary to ensure its viability as the regional port for the

New Guinea Islands Region and district headquarters for the Rabaul District;

4. rehabilitate and expand utility infrastructure and social services for North East Gazelle Peninsula

hinterland centres; and

5. stimulate economic diversification and undertake institution building for longer-term development

planning.

During the formulation and development of the MTRP, these objectives were used to screen projects

proposed by the LLG‟s, the Provincial Administration, and the national line agencies. Those projects that

responded to one or more of the objectives were subsequently prioritised in a series of stakeholder

workshops to produce the final public works program approved by the Provincial and National Executive

Councils. The financing requirements of the MTRP were provided from the following funding sources:

· World Bank Loan Number IBRD 4525 PNG

· European Development Fund Grants

· AusAID finance for the major part of the Rabaul-to-Kokopo road upgrade

· AusAID participation and support in a range of longer term planning activities

· PNG Sustainable Development Ltd Financing Agreement

· GoPNG counterpart funding

The total financing profile for the MTRP was as follows:

Budget Support

National and Provincial Governments K 79.1 million

Department of Health K 6.2 million

International Grants

AusAid K 37.3 million

European Union Development Funds K 23.6 million

International Soft Loans

The World Bank K 78.0 million

Other

PNG Sustainable Development Ltd K 13.6 million

Total MTRP Budget K 237.8 million

Of the 125 projects prioritized in the MTRP, all of which demanded a high level of technical, managerial

and administrative skills to implement in an efficient and timely manner, 99 were completed by end-2009;

13 were under implementation or in tender process; and 13 still await funding, are under design, or have

been deferred. The MTRP portfolio covers three major categories:

Land and Transport Infrastructure (including Rabaul port structures and roads, resettlement

estates, roads and highways, and clearing and seeding of devastated areas in Rabaul);

Public Utilities and Essential Services Infrastructure (including electricity supplies and water

supplies); and

Social and Economic Services Infrastructure (education facilities, market facilities, incinerator for

national quarantine services, district offices, health facilities, police post, community hall, and

livelihoods assets including cocoa seedlings and a rice milling machine).

Documents

Building Capacity by Rebuilding Community Assets: Learning ... · and developed plans to build a replacement town at Kokopo, a small village about 30km east of Rabaul. To carry out