Building Bridges Not Walls: Engaging with political Islamists in the Middle East and North Africa

8/14/2019 Building Bridges Not Walls: Engaging with political Islamists in the Middle East and North Africa

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BuildingBridges,

NotWallsEngagingwithpoliticalIslamistsintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica

ByAlexGlennie

September2009

ippr2009

InstituteforPublicPolicyResearchChallengingideas Changingpolicy

WWW.IPPR.ORG


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ippr|BuildingBridges,NotWalls:EngagingwithpoliticalIslamistsintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica2

Aboutippr ............................................................................................................................. 3

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... 3

Abbreviationsanddefinitions................................................................................................ 4

Executivesummaryandrecommendations........................................................................... 6

1.Introduction....................................................................................................................... 8

2.PoliticalIslaminEgypt .................................................................................................... 12

3.PoliticalIslaminMorocco ............................................................................................... 18

4.PoliticalIslaminJordan .................................................................................................. 22

5.WesternpolicyintheMENAregion................................................................................ 26

6.WesternengagementwithIslamistmovementsintheMENAregion ............................ 35

7.Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 40

Referencesandrecommendations ...................................................................................... 49

Appendix:Projectmethodology ........................................................................................ 50

Contents


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TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUKsleadingprogressivethinktank,producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand

sustainableworld.Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.

WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,whileourGlobalChangeprogrammeextendsourpartnershipsandinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.

ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected]

www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065

ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinSeptember2009.ippr2009

Aboutippr

Thisreportistheoutcomeofalengthyresearchproject,andwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthesupportofanumberofcolleagues.Atippr,thankstoAndyHull,KatiePaintin,IanKearnsandCareyOppenheimfortheircommentsandtoGeorginaKyriacouforeditingandproduction.ThanksalsotoNathalieTocci(ItalianInstituteforInternationalAffairs)forhercommentsonanearlydraft,andtoresearchpartnersintheMENAregionfortheirinputtothecasestudiesonMorocco,JordanandEgypt.Finally,manythankstotheindividualswhohavespokenatorparticipatedinconferencesorganisedinRabat,Amman,Brusselsand

London.ThisworkwascarriedoutwiththegeneroussupportoftheUKForeignandCommonwealthOffice,theDanishMinistryofForeignAffairs,andtheMiddleEastGoodGovernanceFundoftheInternationalDevelopmentResearchCentreinCanada.

Theviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthoralone,andarenotattributabletoanysponsoringorganisation.

Acknowledgements


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AKP AdaletveKalkinmaPartisi[Turkey]

BMENA BroaderMiddleEastandNorthAfricaInitiative

CONTEST UKStrategyforCounteringInternationalTerrorism

CFSP CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy

CTD CounterTerrorismDepartment

DFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment[UK]

DPA DevelopmentPartnershipArrangement

EC EuropeanCommission

EIWG EngagingwiththeIslamicWorldGroup[UKForeignandCommonwealthOffice]

EMP Euro-MediterraneanPartnership

ENP EuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy

ENPI EuropeanNeighbourhoodPartnershipInstrument

EP EuropeanParliament

EU EuropeanUnion

FCO ForeignandCommonwealthOffice[UK]

G8 GroupofEight

IAF IslamicActionFront[Jordan]

ICM IslamicConstitutionalMovement[Kuwait]

IRI InternationalRepublicanInstitute

MENA MiddleEastandNorthAfrica

MEPI MiddleEastPartnershipInitiative

MSP MovementfortheSocietyofPeace(Algeria)

NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation

NDI NationalDemocraticInstituteforInternationalAffairs

NDP NationalDemocraticParty[Egypt]NED NationalEndowmentforDemocracy

NGO Non-governmentalorganisation

ODA OverseasDevelopmentAssistance

OPT OccupiedPalestinianTerritories

PA PalestinianAuthority

PJD PartyofJusticeandDevelopment[Morocco]

PLO PalestineLiberationOrganisation

UN UnitedNationsUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

USAID USAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

WTO WorldTradeOrganisation

Abbreviationsanddefinitions


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MENA: ThispaperfollowstheWorldBankdefinitionoftheMENA(MiddleEastandNorthAfrica)region,whichincludes:Algeria,Bahrain,Djibouti,Egypt,Iran,Iraq,Israel,Jordan,Kuwait,Lebanon,Libya,Morocco,Oman,thePalestinianterritories(theWestBankandGazaStrip),Qatar,SaudiArabia,Syria,Tunisia,theUnitedArabEmiratesandYemen.(SeeWorldBank2009)

Arabicterms

Fatwa: AscholarlyopiniononamatterofIslamiclaw,issuedbyarecognisedIslamicreligiousauthority

Hadith: Acollectionofsayingsandactions,attributedtotheprophetMohammed,whichformthebasisofIslamicjurisprudenceorSharia law

Jahiliyya: Apre-Islamicstateofpaganignorance

Jihad: Usedinthiscontext,aformofIslamicarmedstrugglethatmaybeinternal(combatingMuslimregimesconsideredtobeimpious),irredentist(fightingtoredeemlandruledbynon-Muslimsorunderoccupation),orglobal(combatingtheWest)

Salafism: ASunnimovementthatseekstoreturnIslamtoitspurestrootsthroughcloseadherencetotheteachingsandpracticesoftheProphetandotherforefathersoftheIslamicfaith.SalafistIslamiststendtofocusonthemissionaryactivityofdawa (preaching)andonreinforcingthemoralvaluesoftheumma(communityofbelievers)ratherthanexplicitpoliticalactivismorthepursuitofpoliticalpower.However,therearethosewhohaveabandonedthisnon-violentapproachandwhoseektoachievetheirobjectivesthrougharmed jihad

Sharia: ThebodyofIslamiclawthatgovernspubliclifeandcertainaspectsof

privatelifeforallMuslims.Ratherthanasetofcodifiedlaws,Sharia lawisbasedontheinterpretationofanumberofsources,includingtheQuran,traditionsandsayingsattributedtotheProphetMohammedandreligiousfatwas

Takfiri: RadicalIslamistswhorejectcomponentsofsociety,cultureandlawinMuslimcountriesthattheyconsidertohaveslippedbackintoastateofjahiliyya.Takfiris oftensupportmilitancyagainstMuslimregimesthattheyconsidertobejahiliyya

Ulema: ThehighestclassofMuslimlegalscholars.Theulema engageinmanyfieldsofIslamicstudyandareusuallyreferredtoasthearbitersofSharialaw


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Sincetheterrorattacksof11September2001therehasbeenanexplosionofinterestinpoliticalIslamismintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(MENA)region.Untilfairlyrecently,

analystshaveunderstandablyfocusedonthoseactorsthatoperateattheviolentendoftheIslamistspectrum,includingAl-Qaeda,theTaliban,someofthesectarianpartiesinIraqandpoliticalgroupswitharmedwingslikeHamasintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritories(OPT)andHezbollahinLebanon.

However,thishasobscuredthefactthatacrosstheMENAregioncontemporarypoliticsarebeingdrivenandshapedbyamuchmorediversecollectionofmainstreamIslamistmovements.Wedefinetheseas

groupsthatengageorseektoengageinthelegalpoliticalprocessesof

theircountriesandthathavepubliclyeschewedtheuseofviolenceto

helprealisetheirobjectivesatthenationallevel,evenwheretheyare

discriminatedagainstorrepressed.

ThisdefinitionwouldencompassgroupsliketheMuslimBrotherhoodinEgypt,thePartyofJusticeandDevelopment(PJD)inMoroccoandtheIslamicActionFront(IAF)inJordan.

Thesenon-violentIslamistmovementsorpartiesoftenrepresentthebestorganisedandmostpopularelementoftheoppositiontotheexistingregimesineachcountry,andassuchtherehasbeenincreasinginterestonthepartofwesternpolicymakersintherolethattheymightplayindemocracypromotionintheregion.Yetdiscussionsonthisissueappeartohavestalledonthequestionofwhetheritwouldbeappropriatetoengagewiththesegroupsonamoresystematicandformalbasis,ratherthanonthepracticalitiesofactuallydoingso.

Thisattitudeispartlylinkedtoajustifiableunwillingnesstolegitimisegroupsthatmightholdanti-democraticviewsonwomensrights,politicalpluralismandarangeofotherissues.

ItalsoreflectspragmaticconsiderationsaboutthestrategicinterestsofwesternpowersintheMENAregionthatareperceivedtobethreatenedbytherisingpopularityandinfluenceofIslamists.Fortheirpart,Islamistpartiesandmovementshaveshownaclearreluctancetoforgeclosertieswiththosewesternpowerswhosepoliciesintheregiontheystronglyoppose,notleastforfearofhowtherepressiveregimestheyoperatewithinmightreact.

Thisprojectsfocusonnon-violentpoliticalIslamistmovementsshouldnotbemisinterpretedasimplicitsupportfortheirpoliticalagendas.CommittingtoastrategyofmoredeliberateengagementwithmainstreamIslamistpartieswouldinvolvesignificantrisksandtradeoffsforNorthAmericanandEuropeanpolicymakers.However,wedotakethepositionthatthetendencyofbothsidestoviewengagementasazerosumallornothinggamehasbeenunhelpful,andneedstochangeifamoreconstructivedialoguearoundreformintheMiddle

EastandNorthAfricaistoemerge.

Summaryofrecommendations

Anumberofspecificrecommendationsflowfromthisanalysis:

1.Westernpolicymakersneedtofundamentallyrethinktheirpoliticalstrategyfor

engagingwithIslamistpartiesandmovements

PolicymakersmustfaceuptothedifficultrealitythatinorderforprogresstobemadetowardsdemocratisationintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,therewillhavetobedialoguewithsomeoftheexistingmainstreamIslamistmovementsthere.Progressivewesternleadersmustcontinuetovoicetheirconcernsaboutpoliticalandsocialissueswherethereare

substantivedisagreements,butwillalsohavetobepreparedtoopenupchannelsofcommunicationwiththemiftheyareseriousaboutsupportingpoliticalreformandconflictresolutionintheMENAregion.

Executivesummaryandrecommendations


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2.Westernpolicymakersandnon-governmentalinstitutionsshouldbemore

proactiveincreatingchannelsforseriousandsustaineddialoguewithIslamists

ByshuttingmainstreamIslamistmovementsoutofthedialogueaboutpoliticalreform,EuropeanandNorthAmericanpoliticiansaremissingimportantopportunitiestostart

buildingtrustandovercomingthehostilityandmisunderstandingsthathavecharacterisedrelationsinthepast.Withoutgivingthempreferentialtreatment,thereisscopeformoreconsistentlyinvolvingIslamistsinconferencesanddebatesaboutrelationsbetweentheWestandtheMiddleEastandNorthAfricaalongsideothernon-governmentalactors,includingsecularoppositionpoliticians.

3.Thisdialogueshouldengagewiththepoliticalaswellasthereligiousvaluesof

Islamistpartiesandmovements

Crucially,westernpolicymakersshouldmoveawayfromthefixationontestingthedemocraticcredentialsofIslamistmovements,andfocusinsteadondiscussionoftherangeofpolitical,economicandsocialissuesthatconcernthesegroups,manyofwhicharesharedbytheirwesterncounterparts.Thisdoesnotmeanthatdifficultissuesshouldbeavoided,

butitdoesrecognisethatasolidbasisforengagementcannotbebuiltwithoutsomeattempttofindcommonpoliticalground.

4.Westernleadersshouldbemoreeven-handedincondemningallhumanrights

abusesinauthoritarianregimesintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,including

againstIslamists

ThefailureofmanywesternpolicymakerstobeconsistentintheircriticismofhumanrightsabusesintheMENAregionhasdamagedtheircredibility,andhasledmanypoliticalandcivilsocietygroupsintheregiontocomplainthatinternationalpartnerssimplyturnablindeyewhenhumanrightsviolationsarecommittedbyauthoritariangovernments.AvisiblechangeinapproachcouldreducesomeofthesetensionsandgosomewaytowardsrepairingtheWeststarnishedimageintheregion.Again,whileIslamistsdonotneedtobesingledoutforspecialtreatment,westernleadersneedtobemuchmorevocalintheircondemnationofallhumanrightsabusesintheregion,includingwhentheyaredirectedagainstnon-violentIslamistpoliticiansandactivists.

5.Westerngovernmentsmustdisplaygreaterconsistencyinpressingauthoritarian

governmentsintheMENAregiontoopenuptheirpoliticalsystems

IfIslamistpartiesandmovementsbenefitfromopeningsinrestrictivepoliticalstructures,thiswillundoubtedlyposeuncomfortabledilemmasforwesterngovernments.Butanapproachthatseekstoignorethesepoliticalcurrentsisneithermorallynorstrategicallydefensible.Decadesofpayinglipservicetotheideaofpoliticalfreedomswhilesimultaneouslyproppingupauthoritarianleaderswholackdemocraticlegitimacyhavehelpedtocreatean

environmentthatisnotconducivetostabilityordevelopmentyetbothareneededinorderforwesternpowerstoprotecttheirconsiderableinterestsintheregion,whilealsosupportingindigenousreformprocesses.


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AlthoughpoliticalIslamismhaslongbeenofinteresttoacademicsthinkingandwritingaboutMuslim-majoritycountries,itssignificancehasonlybeenrecognisedmorewidelyby

westernpolicymakersinthelastdecade.Therewassomeawarenessofthephenomenonpreviously,particularlyfollowingtheIranianrevolutionin1979andduringtheterroristattacksofthe1990scarriedoutbytheviolentEgyptianal-JihadandJamaatal-Islamiyyagroups.However,itonlybecamethesubjectofsustainedattentionafterthedramaticeventsof11September2001,whennearly3,000peoplediedintheattacksonNewYorkCityandWashingtonDCthatwereorchestratedbytheradicalIslamistAl-Qaedamovement.Sincethen,terrorstrikesagainstwesterngovernmentsandciviliansinSpainandtheUnitedKingdom,andagainstwestern-linkedtargetsinSaudiArabia,Jordan,BaliandEgypt,haveservedtoreinforceabeliefthatthestruggleagainstradicalIslamisfastbecomingoneofthedefiningforeignpolicychallengesofthetwenty-firstcentury(Satloff2004).

Whiletheprofoundlyshockingandhighlyvisiblenatureofthisnewterroristthreathasled

manytofocusprimarilyontheorganisationsthatoperateattheradicalandviolentendoftheIslamistcontinuum,thishasobscuredthefactthatacrosstheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,contemporarypoliticsarebeingdrivenandshapedbyamuchmorediversegroupofmainstreamIslamistmovements.Asmanyanalystsnote,itistheseIslamistsandnottheradicaljihadistgroupsthatwillhavethegreatestimpactonthefuturepoliticalevolutionoftheMiddleEast(Brownetal2006:3).

Definitionsarecriticalwhendealingwithasubjectofthiskind,soitisimportanttobeclearfromtheoutsetwhatthisreportmeansinitsuseofthetermmainstreampoliticalIslamism.

EvenamongandwithinpoliticalmovementsandpartiesthatconsiderthemselvestobeIslamist,therearecleardifferencesofopinionaboutthisconcept.MembersofthePartyofJusticeandDevelopment(PJD)inMoroccodescribetheirorganisationasapoliticalparty

withanIslamicframeofreference,whileleadersofTurkeysJusticeandDevelopment(AdaletveKalkinmaorAKP)partyfrequentlycharacterisethemselvesasconservativedemocrats(Kristianasen2003).OtherIslamistparties,includingtheMovementfortheSocietyofPeace(MSP)inAlgeriaandtheWasat(Centre)partyinEgypt,presentthemselvesasdefendersofIslamicvaluesandculturalpracticeswithintheirrespectivesocieties.ThesesitincontrasttomovementslikeHamasandHezbollah,whichlinktheirIslamicbeliefsmuchmorecloselytotheideaofviolentresistanceagainstexternalenemies.TheCovenantofHamasexplicitlyidentifiesitsmembersasMuslimswhofearGodandraisethebannerofJihadinthefaceoftheoppressors(Hamas1988).

CharacterisationsofpoliticalIslamismhavealsovariedsubstantiallyamongexternalcommentators.SomedefineIslamistsasindividualswhobelievethatIslamasabodyoffaithhassomethingimportanttosayabouthowpoliticsandsocietyshouldbeorderedinthecontemporaryMuslimWorldandwhoseektoimplementthisinsomefashion(inthewordsofGrahamFuller;Fuller2003:xi).OtherssuggesttheyshouldbedescribedasthosewhosubscribetoanIslamicvarietyofreligiousfundamentalism(inthewordsofBassamTibi;Tibi2005:ix).AbdelwahabEl-AffendioftheUniversityofWestminsterdefinesIslamistgroupsmorepreciselyasthosethatareactiveinthepoliticalarenaandcallfortheapplicationofvaluesandlawsinthepublicandprivatesphereandthatopposetheirgovernmentsandotherpoliticalandsocialmovementswhichtheyregardaseithernotfollowingoropposingtheteachingsofIslam(El-Affendi2003:7).

However,evenEl-AffendisdescriptiondoesnotapplyneatlyandconsistentlytoallIslamistmovementsatalltimes.Inrecentyears,movementssuchasthePJDhavemadeastrategicdecisiontoavoidgovernmentcrackdownsbytoningdowntheircriticismofpoliciesthattheyconsidertobeun-Islamic(forexample,revisionsmadetotheconservativeMoroccanfamilycodein2004).Otherparties,includingtheIslamicConstitutionalMovement(ICM)inKuwait

1.Introduction


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andtheJordanianIslamicActionFront(IAF),havedemonstratedawillingnesstoformallianceswithsecularpoliticalpartiesthatdonotnecessarilysharetheirinterpretationsofIslamicteachings,inordertopresentamoreeffectiveunitedfrontagainstoppressiveregimes.

Thisresearchprojecthasthereforetakenadeliberatelyneutralapproach,usingthetermmainstreamtoreferto:

thoseIslamistmovementsthatengageorseektoengageinthelegal

politicalprocessesoftheircountriesandthathavepubliclyeschewed

theuseofviolencetohelprealisetheirobjectivesatthenationallevel,

evenwheretheyarediscriminatedagainstorrepressed.

Thisdefinitiondoesnotmakeanyassumptionsaboutthecontentofthepoliticalplatformsofsuchmovements,butisausefulwayofdifferentiatingmovementslikethePJD,theIAFandtheMuslimBrotherhoodfromthosesuchasHamasintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritories(OPT)andHezbollahinLebanon.1

Todate,westernpolicymakershavedisplayedamarkedreluctancetoengagewitheventhoseIslamistgroupsthathavecommittedthemselvestoastrategyofpeacefulparticipationindomesticpolitics,althoughdevelopmentsintheregionhavenecessitatedsomechangestothisapproachinrecentyears.Forinstance,westerngovernmentshavenormaldiplomaticrelationswiththeIslamistAKPgovernmentthatcametopowerinTurkeyin2002.TheUnitedStates,UnitedKingdomandothershavealsobeendrawnintoextensivedealingswithpoliticalIslamistmovementsinIraq,particularlytheShiaparties,whocurrentlyrepresentthelargestblocofelectedrepresentativesintheIraqiparliament.AndsincetheelectionofPresidentObama,therehaveevenbeensignsthatwesterngovernmentsarenowtakingcallstoengagewiththepoliticalwingsofmilitantgroupslikeHamasandHezbollahmoreseriously,withtheUKgovernmenthavingannounceditsintentiontotalktomembersofHezbollahspoliticalbranchinMarch2009.

However,acrosstheMENAregionasawhole,formalengagementremainstheexceptionratherthantherule.ToparaphraseEdwardDjerejian,formerUSAssistantSecretaryofStateforNearEasternAffairs,wearestillbuildingmorewallsthanbridgesinourpoliciestowardspoliticalIslamists(Djerejian1995).

Thisispartlyduetothelong-standingrelationshipsbetweenwesterngovernmentsandmanyoftheregimesintheregion,whichtendtobevehementlyopposedtoexternalinterferenceintheirdomesticpoliticalaffairs.Indiscussionswiththeirwesterncounterparts,MENArulersfrequentlyinvokethethreatofanIslamisttakeover,particularlywhentheyarebeingpressedtoundertakepoliticalliberalisationandreformmeasuresthatwouldlimittheirownpower.Forexample,EgyptianPresidentHosniMubarakhaslongarguedthatthe

bannedMuslimBrotherhoodsreligiousviewsrepresentacleardangertothecountryssecurity.Hehaswarnedthatshouldthismovementgainamonopolyonpower,manywilltaketheirmoneyandfleethecountry;investmentwillcometoahalt;unemploymentwillincrease;and,worseyet,Egyptwillbeirrevocablyisolatedfromtheworld(Mubarak2007).Otherleadersintheregionhaveofferedsimilarcautions,statingthatanyIslamistpartythatcomestopowerwillimplementdomesticandforeignpoliciesinimicaltotheinterestsofwesterngovernments.

1.Thisresearchprojectandthis,itsfinalreportdonotseektoaddressthequestionofwesternpolicy

towardsHamasandHezbollah.Althoughbothmovementspursuegoalsthatareessentiallypoliticalandterritoriallyboundinnatureunliketheglobalneo-jihadimovementtypifiedbygroupslikeAl-Qaeda,their

useofviolenceagainstexternalandinternalopponentsmeansthattheydonotfallwithinourclassification

ofmainstreampoliticalIslamism.


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Inmakingthisargument,authoritarianrulersareundoubtedlythinkingabouthowtheymightlimitchallengestotheirownpowerandauthority.IslamistpartiesgenerallyrepresentthebestorganisedandmostpopularoppositionmovementsthroughouttheMENAregion,anditisreasonabletoassumethatanyexpansionoftheirformalpoliticalrepresentationwouldcreatedifficultiesforleadersthatdonothaveastrongbaseofdomesticpopularsupportandrelyonintrusivesecurityservicesorelaboratesystemsofpatronagetomaintaintheirstanding.

Theseulteriormotivesnotwithstanding,thepointtheyaremakingdeservesseriousconsideration.TherearelegitimateconcernsaboutthesocialagendasofIslamistparties,andasignificantincreaseintheirinfluencewouldlikelyaffectwesterneconomicandsecurityinterestsintheregion,whichinclude:

Ensuringthecooperationofgoverningregimesincounterterrorismactivities

Preventingfurtherregionalnuclearproliferation

Engaginginconflictresolutionactivities(particularlyinIraqandIsrael-Palestine)

Securingstableandreliableaccesstoenergysupplies

Developingtradelinks

Promotingthespreadofdemocracyandgoodgovernance(inprincipleifnotalwaysinpractice).

However,therearefewsignsthatacontinuationofcurrentwesternstrategieswillsucceedinprotectingtheseinterestsinthelongterm.

TheMENAregionisenormouslydiverseandsomeofitscountriesaremakingsignificantprogresstowardseconomicmodernisationbutasaregionitperformspoorlyonmanyinternationalindicatorsofdevelopment,democracyandhumanrights.Italsosuffersfroma

widespreadandentrenchedauthoritarianism.ThedangersofthispoliticalmodelhavebeenhighlightedinaseriesofinfluentialArabHumanDevelopmentReportspublishedbytheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),whichidentifythechronicdeficitinpoliticalfreedomandgoodgovernanceasoneofthekeybarrierstotheemergenceofarenaissancethatissoughtbysomanybothinsidetheregionandoutside(UNDP2005).

Inthiscontext,thetendencyoftheUSandtheUKandotherEuropeanpowerstocallforgreaterdemocratisationwhilesimultaneouslyproppingupsupportivebutdespoticleadersispatentlycounterproductive,andhascausedwesternstandingintheregiontoplummetoverthelastdecade.EvidenceofthiscanbefoundinanumberofglobalopinionpollsthatshowdeclininglevelsofMuslimapprovalfortheactionsandvaluesofkeywesternpowers(seeEspositoandMogahed2008,PewGlobalAttitudesProject2006,2008).

ThearrivalofanewandmoreprogressiveUSadministrationpresentsavaluableopportunityforchange,butrhetoricalpromisesofadifferentandmoreprincipledapproachtoengagementwiththegovernmentsandpeopleoftheMiddleEastandNorthAfricawillneedtobefollowedthroughoniftheyaretohaveanypracticaleffect.Analterationinpoliciesmustoccuratthreedifferentlevels,intermsof:

StrategytowardstheMENAregionasawhole

Amoredifferentiatedandthoughtfulapproachtorelationswitheachcountryintheregion

PolicytowardssomeofthemainstreamIslamistmovementsthatoperatewithinthem.

Itisthelastofthesepolicyshiftswithwhichthispaperisparticularlyconcerned.


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Purposeandstructureofthereport

Thisreportmarkstheculminationofatwo-yearipprresearchprojectonpoliticalIslamintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,whichhasdrawnondesk-basedresearch,reviewsofrelevantEnglish,FrenchandArabicliterature,discussionswithMiddleEastern,EuropeanandNorth

Americanexperts,semi-structuredinterviewswithmembersofmainstreamIslamistpartiesintheregionandhigh-levelseminarsandconferencesheldinRabat,Amman,BrusselsandLondon.(SeetheAppendixforfurtherdetails.)

ippranalysedandproducedcasestudiesontheMuslimBrotherhoodinEgypt,thePartyofJusticeandDevelopmentinMoroccoandtheIslamicActionFrontinJordanallofwhichfallintothecategoryofmainstreampoliticalIslamistmovementasdefinedabove(seeStacher2008,GlennieandMepham2007andGlennie2007respectively).

BecauseEgypt,MoroccoandJordanarenotdemocraciesandbecausefreedomofexpressionandorganisationarecurtailedineachofthem,itisdifficulttomeasurewithprecisionthepopularityofthesemovements.Nevertheless,itseemsclearthattheyrepresentthebestorganisedelementoftheoppositiontotheexistingregimesineachcountry.For

westernpolicymakerswhoarecalling,publiclyatleast,fortheregimesintheregiontomovetowardsgreaterpoliticalpluralism,democracy,theruleoflawandrespectforhumanrights,thisraisesobviousquestions,namely:

WhatwouldbetheeffectonthedomesticandforeignpoliciesofthesecountriesifmainstreampoliticalIslamistsweretoobtainagreatershareofpoliticalpowerandalargersayoverthegovernanceoftheirsocieties?

Howshouldwesternpolicyadaptaccordingly?

Toaddressthesequestions,thisreporthasbeenstructuredinthefollowingway:

Chapters2,3and4revisitandupdateourthreecasestudies,providinganoverview

oftheMuslimBrotherhood,thePJDandtheIAFandthepoliticalenvironmentstheyoperatewithin,asummaryoftheirpolicypositionsonkeyissues,andanaccountoftheirbehaviouraspoliticalactorsinrecentyears.

Chapters5and6considerrecentwesternpolicytowardstheMENAregioningeneralandIslamistpartiesinparticular,identifyingwhathasandhasnotworked,andwhatsomeoftherealbarrierstodialogueandengagementare.

Aconcludingchapter7drawstogetherthisanalysis,andofferssomepolicyrecommendationsforhowastrategicrethinkofwesternpolicytowardsmainstreamIslamistmovementsandpartiesmightlookinpractice.


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ThetrajectoryofEgyptspoliticalreformprogrammehasbeenhighlyerraticoverthecourseofthelastcentury.AlthoughBritaingrantedEgyptformalindependencein1922,it

continuedtoexertagreatdealofinfluenceoverthecountrysdomesticaffairsforthenextthreedecades,withpowerstrugglesbetweenBritishgovernmentofficials,KingFuad(andhissuccessorKingFarouk)andaParliamentdominatedbytheliberalWafdpartypreventingtheemergenceofastrongindigenouspoliticalsystem.Duringthe1930sand1940s,ParliamentwasfrequentlydissolvedbytheKing,whiletheConstitutionwassuspendedentirelybetween1930and1936.InstabilitypersistedinthewakeoftheSecondWorldWarasamilitaryoppositionmovementcoalescedaroundthefigureofGamalAbdelNasser,andin1952theseso-calledFreeOfficerscarriedoutacoupthatresultedintheabolitionofthemonarchyandthepermanentexpulsionofBritishforces.

Althoughnewconstitutionswerepromulgatedin1956and1964,thesedidlittletoencouragethegrowthofanindependentanddemocraticpoliticalsystem(Dunne2006).

Oppositionpartieswereabolished,andEgyptwasruledasaone-partystatewithNasserfirmlyincontroluntilhisdeathin1970.Someliberalisationoccurredduringthe1970sunderPresidentAnwarSadat,whosoughttoempowertheIslamistMuslimBrotherhoodsothatitmightactasaneffectivecounterbalancetoleftistforces,butthisbriefopeningwasrolledbackagainasunpopulareconomicandforeignpoliciesledtoanincreaseindissatisfactionwiththeregimeand,ultimately,totheassassinationofSadatin1981(byamilitantcellwithlinkstoradicalIslamists).

Politicalactivityresumedduringthe1980s,andoppositionpartieswereallowedtoparticipateinparliamentaryelectionsduringthisperiod.However,Sadatssuccessor,PresidentHosniMubarak,restoredmanyoftheemergencylawsbywhichEgypthadbeenintermittentlygovernedsincethe1950sandwhichplacedsubstantiallimitsontheexercise

ofcivilandpoliticalliberties.Duringthe1990shealsointroducedaseriesoflawsthatcurbedfreedomsofexpressionandassociation.Thesewerepartlydesignedtocementtheregimesauthority,butwerealsoareactiontotheemergenceofextremistIslamicgroupslikeal-Jamaaal-Islamiyya,al-Jihad andAl-Takfirwal-Hijra,whichusedactsofterrorismtoexpresstheirhostilitytowardstheregime.Theviolentactivismofthesegroupshashadaclearknock-oneffectonEgyptsmoremainstreampoliticalIslamistmovements,particularlytheMuslimBrotherhood.

Despiteabriefperiodoftoleranceduringthe1970s,theEgyptianregimehasconsistentlysoughttoportraytheBrotherhoodasadangerousmovementthatissimplybidingitstimeuntilitisinapositiontoimposeitsdogmaticreligiousconvictionsontherestofthepopulation.Inearly2007,MubarakarguedthattheBrotherhoodsreligiousviewsposeda

significantthreattostatesecurity.Hecautionedthatifthemovementevercametopower,overseasinvestmentinEgyptwouldcease,unemploymentwouldriseandthecountryasawholewouldbecomeirrevocablyisolatedfromtherestoftheworld.Buthowvalidaretheseaccusations?

TheMuslimBrotherhood

TheMuslimBrotherhoodistheoldestofthepoliticalIslamistmovementsestablishedinthetwentiethcentury,foundedbyHassanAl-Bannain1928inresponsetothedifficultpoliticalandeconomicconditionsfacingEgyptatthattime.Al-BannalookedtoreligiontofillthepoliticalvacuumcreatedbythestrugglebetweenforeignandEgyptianrulingelites,althoughitisnotablethathiswritingsdevotelessattentiontodiscussionofhowtounitetheumma(IslamicNation)andmoretimeonconsiderationofhowtosolveEgyptsimmediatedomesticpolitical,socialandeconomictroubles.

DespitetheMuslimBrotherhoodshighlypoliticisedorigins,ittookmanydecadestotransformitselffromalooselyorganisedandpersonality-drivenmovementintoacoherent

2.PoliticalIslaminEgypt


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andnon-violentpoliticalinstitution.Earlyon,Al-Bannacreatedanumberofcouncilsandcommitteestofacilitateeffectiveself-governanceandpeacefulpoliticalorganisation,butmanyamongitsleadershipstillfeltthatitwasnecessarytomaintainaparamilitarywingtotrytoinfluencedomesticpolitics.TheBrotherhoodsTanzimal-Khas SpecialOrganisations wereactiveinthe1940sasEgyptspoliticalandeconomicsituationdeteriorated,andcarriedoutanumberofbombingsandassassinationattempts.Al-Bannalostcontrolofthesefactionsin1948whenaBrotherhoodmemberassassinatedthesittingPrimeMinisteral-Naqrashi.Despitehisappealsforcalmandaccommodation,stateordersweregiventoretaliateagainsttheorganisation,andAl-BannahimselfwasassassinatedinJanuary1949.

BythetimetheFreeOfficersMovementoverthrewthemonarchyin1952,theBrotherhoodsmembersandoperationswerehighlyfragmented.RelationsbetweenthenewmilitaryregimeandtheBrotherhoodwereinitiallypeaceful,ifwary,untilanapparentassassinationattemptbytheorganisationonNasserinOctober1954.AlthoughNasserescapedunharmed,heusedthiseventasanopportunitytocrackdownontheorganisationaswellasotherpotentialoppositiongroupsinthecountry.Manyofthegroupsmostsenior

leadersspentnearlytwodecadesinNassersjailsandwereroutinelyexposedtoinhumanetreatmentandharshconditions.

Duringthisperiodanumberofideologicaldisagreementsbegantoemergewithinthemovement,andmanyofthoseespousingmoreextremeideassplitawayfromtheBrotherhoodtoformtheirownpoliticalgroups.ThebestknownofthesedissidentswasSayidQutb,whosetouthisradicalviewsinthe1964book Mualimfil-Tariq(Signposts).QutbsphilosophiesreflectedhisexperienceofrepressioninNassersprisons.HedrewontheworkoffourteenthcenturythinkerIbnTaymiyatojustifytheuseofviolencetooverthrowgovernmentsthatdidnotproperlyapplythetenetsof Shariaandcouldthereforebeconsideredtohaverevertedto jahiliyya(astateofpre-Islamicignorance)(Qutb1964).IntheEgyptiancontext,NasserstorturoustreatmentofMuslimprisoners

qualifiedhisregimeas jahiliyya,andundeservingofpowerorauthority.QutbsawitasincumbentonproperMuslimstofreethemselvesoftheseun-Islamicpoliticalsystems,throughpreachingandproselytisingwherepossible,butthroughphysicalpowerandjihad wherenot.

AlthoughQutbwashangedin1966beforehavingthechancetodescribeexactlywhatmethodsthisresistancemovementshouldemploy,hisphilosophiesstruckaresoundingchordamongmanyIslamistgroups,andhehascontinuedtoserveasaninspirationforthoseorganisationsthatemployterroristtactics,includingAl-Qaeda.

Sincethe1970s,theMuslimBrotherhoodhastakenpainstodistanceitselffromQutbswritingsontheuseofviolenceandhastransformeditselfintoamorepragmaticpoliticalforce.ChangestoEgyptsconstitutionthathavemadeSharia themainsourceof

legislationhaveenabledtheBrotherhoodtoretractitsclaimthattheEgyptiangovernmentisapostate.LeadingmoderatefigureswithinthemovementsuchasDrAbdulMonemAbul-FutouhhaveoftenassertedthattheEgyptianstateisnowIslamicandnotkufr(impious),eventhoughitdoesnotfullyapplytheIslamicprinciplesofhurriyya(freedom)andadla(justice)(InternationalCrisisGroup2004).

However,QutbslegacyremainsathornyissueforthecontemporaryBrotherhood.Heisreveredasoneoftheleadingfiguresofthemovement,andascommentatorshaveobserved,hisviewscannotbereducedtothesimpleadvocacyofarmed jihad (LeikenandBrooke2007).TheBrotherhoodsargumentthatQutbsviewsontheuseofviolenceshouldnotbetakenoutofcontexthasnotbeenunequivocalenoughtoreassuresomeobservers,manyofwhomclaimthatthegrouphasadaptedtodemocracyonatemporary

basisandmayreverttoviolenceinthefuture(AzarvaandTadros2007).ButtheBrotherhoodsmodeofpoliticalengagementoverthepastfewdecadesthrowssomedoubtontheseassertions.


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TheMuslimBrotherhoodasapoliticalactor

ThepoliticalspacethatEgyptianIslamistsoperatewithinisheavilycircumscribedbythegovernment.WhiletheregimesinMoroccoandJordanhavelongsoughttomarginaliseandunderminetheirIslamistoppositionmovements,theyhavestoppedshortofbanning

legitimatepoliticalpartiessuchasthePJDandtheIAF.However,theMuslimBrotherhoodisdesignatedasanillegalorganisationunderEgyptianlaw,whichprohibitstheformationofpoliticalpartiesonthebasisofreligion.

Duringthe1980sand1990stheBrotherhoodfoundanumberofwaystocircumventtheserules.Membersofthemovementcampaignedinnationalelectionsusuallyinpartnershipwithotherlegalpoliticalpartiesandwerealsoactiveintheprofessionalsyndicatesandunions.Butitdeliberatelylimiteditsattemptstoentertheformalpoliticalsysteminordertoavoidunnecessaryclasheswiththegovernment.

Thisuneasystatusquochangedattheendofthe1990s,asanerosionofthegovernmentspopularlegitimacyforcedittoreformsomeofEgyptsmoribundpoliticalstructures.In1999PresidentMubarakpledgedtosupportaSupremeConstitutionalCourtrulingthatcalledfor

judicialsupervisionofelections.Healsopromisedtooverseeafreeandfairparliamentaryelectoralprocessin2000.ThesedevelopmentswerebeneficialfortheMuslimBrotherhood,whichhadalreadycometotheconclusionthatitshouldadoptamoreproactivepoliticalstrategyifithopedtohaveanykindofinfluenceonthedirectionofpolicy(El-DinShahin2007).Tothisend,itfieldedanumberofindependentcandidatesinthe2000parliamentaryelections,winning17seats.Buildingonthissuccess,itranmorecandidatesinthe2005elections,winninganunprecedented88outof444seats,or20percentofthevote.

ThishasnotsignificantlyaugmentedtheMuslimBrotherhoodspoliticalpower.Withamajorityof73percent,therulingNationalDemocraticParty(NDP)hasmaintaineditsstrangleholdontheparliamentarysystemandremainsabletocontrolthepassageorrejectionoflegislation.TheBrotherhoodsunexpectedgainsinthe2005electionshavealso

ledtheregimetoreversesomeofitsearlierliberalisationmeasures,andin2007aseriesofconstitutionalamendmentswerepassedthatoutlawedallpoliticalactivitybygroupswithanykindofreligiousframeofreference.ThishasgiventheEgyptiangovernmentgreaterfreedomtoarrestanddetainBrotherhoodmembersonthechargeofbelongingtoabannedgroup.

However,themovementsinclusioninparliamentsince2005hasgivenitusefulexperienceofdirectpoliticalparticipation.IthasalsoallowedexternalobserverstolearnmoreabouttheBrotherhoodspolicypositions,andtogaugehowitmightactintheunlikelyeventofgainingamonopolyonparliamentarypower.

ContrarytoMubaraksgrimpredictions,theBrotherhoodsparliamentaryblochasnot

focuseditseffortsonpushingthroughconservativereligiouslegislation,buthasmanagedtocoordinateeffectivelywithotheroppositiongroupstotackleamuchbroaderrangeofchallengesfacingEgypt.Theseincludeaweakparliamentthatexistsprimarilytorubberstampexecutivedecisions,deeply-rootedeconomicproblemsandaninsufficientlyindependentjudiciary.Forexample,inJune2006anumberofBrotherhoodMPsworkedcloselywiththeEgyptianJudgesClubinanefforttoachievethepassageoflegislationthatwouldincreasethejudiciarysautonomyfromtheexecutivebranch.

Since2004theMuslimBrotherhoodhasissuedanumberofgeneralstatementsthatemphasisethegroupscommitmenttoademocratic,constitutional,parliamentarianandpresidentialregimeintheframeworkofIslamicprinciples,reaffirmitssupportforthefreedomsofexpressionandreligionandargueinfavourofthepracticeofholdingregular

elections(SocietyofMuslimBrothers2004:12).IthasalsomadespecificsuggestionsabouthowpoliticalfreedominEgyptmightbeenhanced,suchasgrantingcitizenstherighttodemonstrateandassemble,removingrestrictionsontheformationofpoliticalpartiesand


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claimedthattheyhadnotbeenconsultedaboutthislast-minuteinsertion.Afiercepublicdebateonthispointsubsequentlybrokeoutamongdifferentwingsoftheparty,whichwashighlyunusualforagroupthatpridesitselfonpresentingaunifiedfacetotheoutsideworldeveniftherearedifferencesofopinionbehindthescenes.

Since2007,theBrotherhoodhasretreatedsomewhatfromthesecontroversialpositions.Theconservativewingofthepartyhasconcededthatanyfutureulema councilwillnotbegivenbindingauthorityonquestionsofSharialaw.Ithasalsosofteneditslineonthequestionofequalpoliticalrightsfornon-Muslimsandwomen,suggestingthatthesegroupsshouldonlybebarredfromassumingtheEgyptianpresidency.However,thepublicairingofdisputesovertheseissueshasnegativelyimpactedontheBrotherhoodsinternalcohesivenessandhasdamageditsreputationasadeliberativeanddemocraticmovement.

ThesepersistentambiguitiesaroundtheBrotherhoodspolicypositionshavealsostrengthenedthehandoftheregimeinitseffortstocrackdownonthemovement.PriortolocalcouncilelectionsinApril2008,aroundathousandmembersoftheMuslimBrotherhoodwereroundedupandarrested,andthousandsmorewerepreventedfromsubmittingtheir

candidacypapers.Themovementultimatelydecidedtoboycotttheelections,butthishasnothadthedesiredimpactofenhancingitslegitimacyamongtheEgyptianpublic:ifanything,ithasshownthegovernmentthatitcanforceitsmostorganisedoppositionmovementintosubmissionthroughtheuseofviolenceandpoliticalpersecution(HerzallahandHamzawy2008).Ofcourse,thisapproachholdsitsownrisks,forthereisapossibilitythatiftheMuslimBrotherhoodgainslittlefromengagementintheformalpoliticalprocess,themoderateswithinthemovementwhoadvocateonbehalfofpeacefulparticipationmaylosegroundtothosewhodonotbelievethatthisisanappropriatepathfortheBrotherhood.

OtherIslamistmovementsinEgypt

AlthoughtheMuslimBrotherhoodrepresentsmostofthosewhobelongtotheIslamist-sympathisingsectionoftheEgyptianpopulation,thereareanumberofotherpoliticisedIslamistgroupsinEgyptthatofferdifferentvisionsofreform.ToonesideoftheBrotherhoodsitmoremoderatecentristmovementssuchastheunlicensedWasat(Centre)party,whileontheotheritisflankedbyradicalgroupswillingtoengageinviolencetoachievetheirgoals.

Wasatwasfoundedin1995byahandfulofformerMuslimBrothers,includingAbuAlaMadi,SalahAbdal-KarimandEssamSultan,duringaperiodofintensestatepersecutionoftheBrotherhood.Paradoxically,itseemsthatthisrepressivepoliticalenvironmentactuallypromptedmanyoftheBrotherhoodsmoreliberalmemberstomoderatetheiragendas,notonlytoseizenewpoliticalopportunitiesbutalsotoevadenewpoliticalconstraints(Rosefsky-Wickham2004:213).TheemergenceofWasatalsorepresentedthedissatisfaction

ofthosewithintheBrotherhoodwhowerechafingunderaconservativeleadershipandwantedtospeeduptheprocessofcreatingaformalpoliticalparty.

TheWasatisoneofthemostprogressiveIslamistgroupsintheregion,andithastakenarelativelyliberalapproachonanumberofissues.Forexample,ithasallowedwomentojointheorganisation,andithasbeenopentotheideaofworkingwithnon-Muslims.Foratime,anevangelicalChristianevenservedonitsfive-personboard.Initspolicyplatforms,itadvocatesthecreationofanEgyptiandemocracybasedonequalcitizenship,thepromotionofcivilsocietyandneo-liberaleconomicreformsagainstthebackdropofIslamicheritageandvalues.Inthissense,WasatbearsacloseresemblancetoothermainstreamIslamistpartiesintheregionlikethePartyofJusticeandDevelopment(PJD)inMorocco,whichportraysitselfasapoliticalpartywithanIslamicframeofreferenceratherthanareligious

party.Indeed,AbuAlaMadihasstressedthattheWasatdoesnotputforwardtheocraticideas,norenvisagetheocraticgovernment[butrather]presentsacivicdiscourse(InternationalCrisisGroup2004:17).


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Unfortunately,theWasatmovementhasnotsucceededingeneratingmuchenthusiasmforitsprogramme.Thelasttimethatitsleadersappliedforapoliticalpartylicence,in2006,justover100peoplesignedthegroupsfoundingdocuments.Meanwhile,theregimeroutinelydeniesitsstatusasalegalpoliticalparty,claimingthatitsplatformfailstoaddanythingnoveltoEgyptianpoliticallife.

ItisperhapssurprisingthattheWasathasnotattractedmoreofafollowing,giventhatithasexplicitlydistanceditselffromtheMuslimBrotherhoodbybeingmoreinclusiveandpoliticallypalatabletonon-MuslimsandChristians,andthatitseemstobedevelopingaclearpoliticalandeconomicplatform.ButtheinstitutionalinfrastructurethatenablestheBrotherhoodtooperatesmoothlyintimesofpoliticalrepressionandseizeopportunitiesintimesofregimetoleranceisabsentfromtheWasats11-yearexperiment.Atpresent,itremainsunclearwhethertheWasatwillreconstituteitselfforafourthattempttoobtainalicence,orwhetheritwilltransformitselfintoanorganisationwithsocialratherthanpoliticalobjectives.

RadicalIslamisminEgypt

Betweenthe1970sandthe1990s,EgyptexperiencedawaveofQutbist-inspiredviolenceperpetratedbyradicalIslamicmovements.QutbhaddiedbeforesettingoutacomprehensiveaccountofhowtrueMuslimsshouldopposethesupposedlyillegitimateEgyptianstate.However,hisideasaboutthepracticeoftakfir(thedenunciationofinfidelorimpiousindividualsorpoliticalsystems)weretakenupandexpressedbyagenerationofyoungIslamistswhohadbeenradicalisedbythePalestinianconflictandtheSadatgovernmentsmovestowardsrapprochementwithIsraelinthelatterhalfofthe1970s(InternationalCrisisGroup2004).

Thisradicalismmanifesteditselfthroughtheactivitiesofthreemaingroups:theextremistbutinitiallyapoliticalAl-Takfirwa-Hajra(ExcommunicationandExodus),andthemore

militantAl-Jihad (JihadOrganisation)anditsoffshoot,Al-Jamaaal-Islamiyya (IslamicGroup).3 Al-Jamaa wasparticularlyactiveinthelate1980sandearly90s,frequentlyengaginginarmedclasheswithEgyptiansecurityforcesandCopticChristianminoritygroupsandcarryingoutanumberofhigh-profileassassinations,includingthemurderofanotablesecularistintellectual,FaragFoda,in1992.ItalsomadeapointoftargetingtouristsasameansofinflictingdamageonEgyptstouristtradeandwidereconomy.Thisculminatedinthemassacreof58touristsandfourEgyptiansatLuxorinNovember1997,whichinturnpromptedahugegovernmentcrackdown.

ViolentactivisminEgypthasbeenonthewanesincethispoint,withmanyimprisonedjihadistshavingnowrenouncedtheirearlierviewsandapologisedfortheircrimes.However,Egyptremainsaprimetargetforterroristgroups,asindicatedbyanumberofseriousattacks

overthelastfiveyears.TheseincludethebombingsofthreehotelsintheSinaiPeninsulain2004andaseriesofcoordinatedattacksintheEgyptianresortcityofSharmel-Sheikhin2005,whichresultedinthedeathof88peopleandthewoundingofover150more.ThisisaworryingindicationofthecontinuingappealofradicalideologiesamongcertainelementsofEgyptspopulation.

3.Formoreontheemergenceandideologiesofthesemovements,seeInternationalCrisisGroup2004.


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Comparativelyspeaking,MoroccospoliticalsystemisfreerthanmanyothersintheMENAregion.Sinceinheritingthethronein1999,KingMohammedVIhasimplementedaseriesof

modernisingreformsintermsofpoliticalandhumanrights.Hehasreleasedalargenumberofpoliticalprisoners,amendedthepenalcodetoformallyabolishtortureandstrengthenedtheConsultativeCouncilonHumanRightsthatwasestablishedbyhisfather,KingHassanII,toinvestigateclaimsofstate-sanctionedhumanrightsabuses.Hehastakentheunusualstepofacknowledgingthegovernmentsresponsibilityforforceddisappearancesandtorturethattookplaceunderhisfatherandgrandfather.SomeofthespecificdetailsoftheseabusescameoutduringtheproceedingsofanEquityandReconciliationCommission.MohammedVIhasalsopushedthroughprogressivechangestothecountryspatriarchalmudawana familycode andloosenedsomeoftherestrictionsonpressandpoliticalpartyfreedom.

WhilethesereformmeasureshavehadsomesuccessinmakingMoroccomoreopenandless

authoritarian,theyhavefailedtodismantletheessentialstructuresofpowerthathavebeeninplacesincethecountrybecameindependentin1956.TheMoroccanrulerisconsideredtobeadirectdescendantoftheprophetand,asAmiralMu-minin(CommanderoftheFaithful),thesupremereligiousauthorityinthecountry.Themonarchalsoexertsinfluenceandpowerthroughanetworkoftraditionalinstitutionscalledthemakhzan.4 TheseopaquenetworksoftenenjoymorepowerandaccessthantheelectedParliament,whoseactivitiesareheavilycircumscribed.In2002,forexample,MohamedVIrevertedtotheoldpracticeofnamingaPrimeMinisterwithoutanyreferencetotheelectionresults,choosingapremiernotfromthelargestparty,butatechnocratwithoutanypoliticalaffiliation.

Moroccostandsapartfrommanyofitsneighboursinthatithasarelativelywell-establishedhistoryofmulti-partypolitics,datingbacktothe1940s.Intheyearssinceindependencethe

palacehasoftencrackeddownonpoliticalparties,butunlikeotherauthoritariangovernmentsintheregion,ithasneverbannedthemoutrightorattemptedtocreateasinglepartysystem(OttawayandHamzawy2007).However,althoughanumberofMoroccospartieshavebecomeentrenchedinthepoliticallandscape,notablytheIstiqlal(Independence)partyandthesocialistUnionSocialistedesForcesPopulaires (USFP),fewofthesecurrentlyofferawell-organisedchallengetotheregime.Byaligningthemselveswiththemonarchy,thesepartieshaveguaranteedtheircontinuedinclusioningovernment.Butthetrade-offhasbeenasignificantlossofpopularlegitimacyandsupporttotheIslamistparties,whicharewidelyacknowledgedashavinggreatercredibilityasoppositionmovementsandasbeingmuchmoreeffectiveatdeliveringsocialservicesonalocallevel.

PoliticalIslamistmovementsgainedsupportinMoroccofromthelate1960s,bothasan

alternativetonationalist,leftistandsecularpartiesandinresponsetothefailuresoftheregimetodeliverdevelopment,jobsandjusticetothepopulation.Thiscontextcreatedafavourablerecruitinggroundforthoseespousingmoreovertlyreligiousratherthansecularsolutionstothecountrysproblems.Toshoreuphisownpositionandtoweakenhissecularopponents,thegrowthofpoliticalIslamistmovementswasactuallyencouragedbyKingHassanIIinthe1960s.LikeotherrulersintheMENAregion,hejudgederroneously,asitturnedoutthatIslamistforceswouldbeeasiertoco-optandthattheywouldserveasausefulcounterweighttotheNasseritesandtheleftistparties.ThesecombinedfactorshavecontributedtothegrowthofpoliticalIslaminMoroccooverthelastfewdecades,althoughsomeoftheimplicationsofthesedevelopmentswerenotfullymanifestuntilthe1990s.

3.PoliticalIslaminMorocco

4.Thisisaratherimprecisetermthatisoftenusedtodescribeaneliteofpalaceretainers,regionalandprovincialadministrators,andmilitaryofficers,connectedto[theregime]byentrenchedpatronage

networks(OttawayandRiley2006:4).


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Second,asnotedinthecontextofreformstothemudawana,thePJDhasdemonstratedawillingnesstocompromisewhenfacedwithpoliticalissuesthatmightappeartoconflictwithitsinterpretationofIslamicvalues.Bycontrast,AlAdl condemnsanysecularinitiativeaimedatseparatingreligionandpolitics,andadvocatesthecreationofanIslamicdemocracy.

Third,whilethePJDhasadoptedthecharacteristicsandlanguageofamodernpoliticalparty, AlAdl isbuiltaroundthecentralfigureofSheikhYassineanditsdoctrinedrawsheavilyonmysticalSufiinfluences.Thisoftenmakesitdifficultforoutsiderstogetaclearsenseofwhatthemovementstandsforandwhatithopestoachieve.

ThePJDasapoliticalactor

Inpoliticalstatements,thePJDhasaffirmeditsacceptanceofthedoctrinalandconstitutionallegitimacyofthemonarchysreligiousauthority.ItdoesnotcallforthecreationofanIslamicstate,butdescribesitselfinsteadasanationalpoliticalpartywithanIslamicframeofreference.Thisvagueterminologyconcernssomecritics,whoarguethatmanyIslamistpartieshaveadoptedthelanguageofdemocracyinabidforlegitimacy,butthattheirideologicalpositionsareultimatelyincompatiblewiththepracticesofdemocracy(Pipes2000).

ItistruethatthePJDhasoftenprioritisedconservativereligiousissuesinitspublicactivism.In2004,thepartyinitiallycampaignedagainstMohammedVIsproposedchangestothemudawana,whichwouldraisethemarriageagefrom15to18,givewomentherighttodivorcebymutualconsent,putcurbsonthepracticeofpolygamy,limittheabilityofmentoaskfordivorceunilaterallyandsubstituteawifesdutyofobediencewiththeconceptofjointresponsibility(OttawayandRiley2006).Hardlinemembersofthepartywereunhappywiththesereforms,whichtheybelievedwouldbeharmfultotraditionalconceptsoffamilylife.However,thePJDultimatelyacceptedtherevisionstothesocialcodeonthegroundsthattheyweretheoutcomeofademocraticprocess,indicatingitswillingnesstoaccepteven

thosecompromisesthatmightappeartoconflictwithitsvaluesasanIslamicmovement.ThePJDhasfurtherdemonstrateditscommitmenttodemocraticproceduresinthewaythatitorganisesitselfasaparty.Incontrasttoitssecularcounterparts,whohavebeenco-optedbytheregimeandareabletobenefitfromthepatronagesysteminplaceinMorocco,itmustrelyonthestrengthofitsideologicalmessageandpoliticalplatformtoattractvotes.Asaresult,thepartyhasprioritisedinternalaccountabilityandefficiency,andPJDdeputiesmustadheretoaninternalcodeofethicsthatrequiresthemtoattendplenaryandcommitteesessions,draftamendments,makelegislativeproposalsandseektoholdparliamenttoaccountbyaskingoralquestions.Thisapproachhasenabledthepartytobuildupastrongorganisationalbaseandconsiderablepopularsupportacrossthecountry.Ithasalsobenefitedfromitsdecisiontofocusonmorepopularandlessovertlyreligiousissues

suchasanti-corruption,judicialreformandpoliticalrenewal(seeHamzawy2008).Thevalueofthisstrategywasapparentduringthe2002parliamentaryelections,whenthePJDlimitedthenumberofdistrictsinwhichitstood(adecisionthatthepartywaspressuredtomakebythepalace),butwhereitstillmanagedtowin42ofthe325seats,establishingitselfasthethirdlargestnationalpartyafterIstiqlalandtheUSFP.

TherewasawidespreadexpectationthatthePJDwouldmakesimilarlystronggainsinthe2007parliamentaryelections,withsomeobserverspredictingthatitwouldwinenoughseatstoeffectivelycontroltheparliament.Intheevent,thepartyonlymanagedtoaddfourseatstoitsprevioustally,winning46toIstiqlals52.

AlAdlwalIhsan,whichhaslongcriticisedthePJDforitsdecisiontoparticipateintheflawedpoliticalsystem,suggestedthatitsfailuretoreceiveahigherproportionofthe2007votereflectedthepartyslackoflegitimacyamongthecountrysdisenfranchisedIslamistconstituenciesachargewhichmaywellhavesomevalidity(Hamzawy2008).ButthePJDssurprisingdefeatwasalsoaverdictonthegeneralstateofMoroccanpolitics.Despite


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MohammedVIsearlypromisestoworktowardsdemocratisationandsocialandeconomicreform,Moroccoremainsplaguedbyunderemploymentandpersistentpoverty.Increasinglydisillusionedbythefailureofsuccessivegovernmentstoinfluencethedirectionorcontentofpolicy,theMoroccanpublicappearstohavelostfaithintheballotboxasaninstrumentofpoliticalchange.Voterturnoutwasapaltry37percentinthe2007elections,comparedwith51percentin2002and58percentin1997.

Encouragingly,thePJDdoesnotseemtohavegivenuponitsstrategyofpoliticalparticipationinreactiontothisdefeat.Instead,ithasintensifieditsfocusondemandingrealconstitutionalreformsandputtinganendtoelectoralcorruption(Al-Khalfi2008).AndinJuly2008,AbdelillahBenkiranewaselectedasthenewSecretary-Generaloftheparty,replacingSaadEddineEl-Othmani,whohadbeenexpectedtowinanothertermcomfortably.ThisexampleofatransparentandpeacefultransferofpowerhaschallengedthosewhobelievethatIslamistpartiesonlypaylipservicetodemocracyasameansofachievingpower,andreflectsthePJDsambitiontoserveasamodelforrespectableIslamism(EconomistIntelligenceUnit2008).

RadicalIslamisminMorocco

ThereareotherpoliticisedIslamicforcesinMorocco:radicalIslamiststhatadvocateandpractiseviolenceandterror.Fromtheearly1990sonwards,anumberofradicalimamstookadvantageofthemoreliberalatmosphereinthecountrytoespousehard-lineandoftenanti-Semiticviews.Aparticularlyaggressivefatwa wasissuedjustoneweekaftertheattackontheWorldTradeTowersandthePentagoninSeptember2001.

Inthisperiodanumberofviolentattackswerealsolinkedtoreligiousextremists.In2002,theMoroccansecurityforcesuncoveredanAl-QaedanetworkinCasablanca.ThisgroupwasallegedtohavebeenplanningattacksagainstAmericannavalvesselsintheStraitsofGibraltar,andonpopularMoroccantouristdestinations.Afewweekslater,theauthorities

alsomadepublictheirdiscoveryofaclandestinenetworkofIslamicextremistswhowereimplicatedinviolenceandkillings.

Butitwastheeventsof16May2003thatshatteredthenotionthatMoroccowasimmunetotheviolencethataffectsotherpartsoftheregion:14MoroccansuicidebombersattackedforeignandJewishtargetsinCasablanca,killing45people.ThisexperiencewasprofoundlyshockingformostordinaryMoroccans.ItwascompoundedayearlaterwhenamajorterroristattacktookplaceinMadrid,killing191peopleandwounding1,800.TheinvestigationbytheSpanishpoliceandintelligenceagenciesrevealedthatitwasprimarilyMoroccansthatwereimplicatedintheplanningandexecutionofthebombings(Howe2005).

Despitethegovernmentcrackdownthatfollowedtheseevents,radicalIslamismcontinuesto

findanoutletinMorocco.InMarch2007,asuicidebomberblewhimselfupinaCasablancaInternetcafinwhatappearedtobeanisolatedincident.Yetinvestigationsuncoveredalargerallegedterroristoperationtotargettouristsitesacrossthecountry.InApril2007,foursuspectsinthisplotwereconfrontedbythepolice.Onewasshotdeadandtheremainingthreedetonatedexplosivebeltstoavoidcapture,killingapolicemanandinjuring21civilians.Afortnightlater,anothertwoindividualsblewthemselvesupoutsidetheUSConsulateandLanguageCenterinCasablanca.

ThesesporadicactsofterrorismhaveimpactednegativelyonmoremoderategroupslikethePJD,whofearbeingtarredwiththesamebrushastheradicals.Indeed,thousandsofIslamistswereroundedupandarrestedintheaftermathoftheCasablancabombings,andanumberofpoliticiansfromthepro-governmentpartiescalledforthePJDtobedismantled

(Hamzawy2008).Thepartysurvivedthispublicsmearcampaign,butitwasforcedtotonedownitsreligiousrhetoricandacceptthepassageofdraconiananti-terrorismlawsthatgreatlyrolledbackcivillibertiesandpoliticalfreedoms.


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JordanisoftenheldupbywesternleadersasanexampleofacountryintheMENAregionthatissuccessfullymovingtowardsdemocraticreform.However,whilethecurrentking,

AbdullahII,hascertainlydemonstratedanenthusiasmformodernisation,hehasfollowedinhisfathersfootstepsbyprioritisingeconomicliberalisationovermoredeep-seatedpoliticalchange.Somemodeststepshavebeentakeninthisdirection,suchastheestablishmentin2002ofthequasi-independentNationalCentreforHumanRightsandthecreationin2003ofaMinistryforPoliticalDevelopment.Butthevalueofthesemeasureshasbeenlimitedbyaseriesoflawsanddecreesthathavefurthershrunkthepoliticalspaceopentooppositionparties,thepress,non-governmentalorganisationsandprofessionalassociations.

Since1947,Jordanhashadabicamerallegislature,withadirectlyelectedlowerhouse(theMajlisal-Nuwwab,orChamberofDeputies)andaroyallyappointedupperhouse(theMajlisal-Ayan,orSenate).Butthesestructureshavedonelittletochecktheabsoluteauthorityoftheking.The1952constitutionestablishedthemonarchsimmunityfromanyliabilityor

responsibility,andgavehimsweepingrightstopromulgateandratifylawsandtoappointanddismisstheprimeminister,thecabinetandthesenateatwill.Italsoallowedthekingtodissolveparliament,tovetolegislationandtoissuetemporarylawsintimesofemergencywithouttheapprovalofthegovernment.

KingHussein(19521999)madeliberaluseofthesepowersthroughouthisreign,oftenresortingtomartiallawtoquellviolentpopularuprisingsandpreservethestabilityofJordansfragilepoliticalsystem.Between1957and1992,politicalpartieswerebanned,fullelectionsweresuspended,andthelegislativefunctionsofthelowerhouseofparliamentwereseverelycircumscribed,withasuccessionofappointedgovernmentsexistingprimarilytogiveaveneerofdemocraticlegitimacytodecisionsmadebytheking.

Electionshavebeenheldonasporadicbasissincetheearly1990sbutarenotgenerally

consideredtohavebeenfreeorfair.Therehasalsobeensomecontroversyovertheimpositionoftheoneperson,onevotelawin1993.Previously,votershadbeenabletocastasmanyvotesastherewerecandidatesintheirconstituency,therebyallowingthemtovotealongtribalorfamilylinesaswellasformoreideologicalcandidatessuchastheIslamists(George2005).However,underthenewsystemeachindividualcouldonlycastonevote.Whilenotundemocratic,thesechangesensuredthatruralandtraditionallypro-regimeconstituentswhocouldcountonsupportfromextensivefamilynetworksdiddisproportionatelywell,largelyattheexpenseofIslamistandother,secular,partiesbasedinurbanareas.

Morethan30partieshavebeencreatedsinceKingHusseinsdecisiontolegalisepoliticalpartiesin1992,butmostoftheselackdynamismandpopularappealandhavefailedtosignificantlyinfluencethedirectionofpolicy.AnexceptiontothisgeneralpictureofmalaisecomesfromJordanspoliticalIslamists,whoaremuchbetterorganisedthantheirsecularcounterparts.Ofthesegroups,theJordanianMuslimBrotherhoodanditspoliticalwing,theIslamicActionFront,arethemostprominentexamplesofnon-violentIslamisminJordan.

TheMuslimBrotherhood

ThefirstorganisedIslamistgroupinJordanwastheMuslimBrotherhoodanoffshootofthereligiousreformmovementthatemergedinEgyptundertheleadershipofHassanal-Bannainthelate1920s.ThepoliticalinfluenceofthisorganisationquicklyspreadbeyondEgypt,withbranchesbeingsetupinotherMuslimcountries,includingJordan,Syria,SaudiArabiaandKuwait.Althoughthesegroupsshareanumberofideologicalsimilarities,theyare

organisationallydistinct,andhavetakendifferentapproachestoissuesofpoliticalandsocialreform.

InJordan,theinteractionbetweentheregimeandtheMuslimBrotherhoodhasbeenrelativelycivil,withbothsidesrecognisingthemutualadvantagestobederivedfrom

4.PoliticalIslaminJordan


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cultivatingacooperativerelationship.AlthoughthegovernmenthasoftentakenactionagainstindividualBrotherhoodmembers,ithasneverattemptedtobanthegroupoutright(ashasbeenthecaseinEgyptandSyria),judgingthatitspopularityhasservedtocheckthepowerofmoreradicalandconfrontationalmovements.Foritspart,althoughtheMuslimBrotherhoodhasoftendisagreedwithgovernmentpolicies,ithasrefrainedfromchallengingthelegitimacyoftheHashemitemonarchyandhaschosentoexpressitsdissatisfactionthroughpoliticaloppositionratherthanviolentactivism.

Sinceobtaininglegalstatusasacharityin1945,theBrotherhoodhasplayedanimportantroleinJordanssocialandpoliticaldevelopment.Anumberofitsmemberswereofferedministerialpositionsinthefirstpost-independencegovernment,andin1953,themovementwassuccessfulinitsapplicationtoassumeaquasi-politicalroleasacomprehensiveandgeneralIslamiccommittee(Wiktorowicz2001:96).ThisallowedthemovementtospreaditsmessageofIslamicrenewalandsocialmoralityinmosquesandpublicplaceswithouttoomuchinterferencefromtheauthorities,evenduringageneralcrackdownonpoliticalactivitythattookplaceinthe1950sand60s.

ThroughoutthisperiodtheMuslimBrotherhoodconsolidateditspositionthrougharangeofsocialandcharitableactivities,andparticularlythroughthecreationofanextensivecivilsocietynetwork.Themostprominentofthesenon-governmentalorganisationswastheIslamicCenterSociety,whichwasestablishedin1965andhassinceservedasthemaincharitablearmoftheMuslimBrotherhood.

However,theBrotherhoodhasnotlimiteditselftocharitableactivism.DuringthebriefpoliticalopeninginJordanattheendofthe1980s,itbegantoengagemuchmoredirectlyinformalpolitics.Individualmembersoftheorganisationcampaignedinthe1989elections,runningonthesloganIslamisthesolution.TwentyBrotherhoodofficialsandafurther12independentIslamistcandidateswonparliamentaryseats,gainingcontrolofnearlyhalfofthelowerhouse.Butitsshiftintotheformalpoliticalarenapromptedagreatdealofinternal

discussionaboutwhatthemostappropriategoalsandactivitiesofthemovementshouldbe.SomemembersfearedthatparticipationinpoliticallifewouldforcethemtomakecompromisesontheirIslamicvaluesandgoals.ButthedebatewaswonbythosewhobelievedthatthecreationofapoliticalpartywouldallowtheBrotherhoodtosignificantlyexpanditsinfluenceinsociety.In1992,thisledtotheestablishmentoftheIslamicActionFrontparty.

TheIslamicActionFront

AlthoughtheIslamicActionFrontwassupposedtoactasanumbrellapartythatwouldincludeMuslimBrotherhoodmembersandindependentIslamistsalike,ithasessentiallybecomethepoliticalwingoftheBrotherhood.Mostmembersofthefoundingcommitteeof

theIAFweredrawnfromtheBrotherhood,andtheirideashaveprofoundlyinfluencedthestructureandbehaviouroftheparty.Evennow,theMuslimBrotherhoodcontinuestobeinformallyinvolvedindeterminingtheleaderoftheparty,andtheIAFoftendeferstoitsparentorganisationonimportantpoliticalquestions.

TheIslamicActionFrontdiffersfromanumberofotherIslamistpartiesintheregioninthatitdoesnotalwaysspeakwithacommonpoliticalvoice(eventhoughmembersultimatelyrespectthedecisionsreachedbythepartysleadership).ThereisabroadconsensuswithintheIAFthatthepartyspriorityshouldbetopromotetheIslamicisationofJordaniansociety.However,therearesubstantialdisagreementsbetweendifferentideologicalgroupingsabouthowthisgoalshouldbeachieved.Therearealsothosewhoremainambivalentabouttheideaofparticipatinginpoliticsatall,andwouldprefertheIAFtoconcentrateitseffortson

questionsofreligiouseducationandfurtherapplicationofSharia law.Differencesofopinionwithinthepartytendtofocusonthreekeypoliticalissues:cooperationwiththeJordanianregime,theroleofIslaminpoliticsandthePalestinian


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TheJordanianregimeslackofprogressontheseissueshasbeenasourceofconsiderablefrustrationfortheIslamicActionFront,andinJuly2007thepartymadealast-minutewithdrawalfrommunicipalelections,accusingthegovernmentoffraudandelection-rigging.ItwaswidelyexpectedthatitwouldalsoboycottparliamentaryelectionsinNovember2007,butafteraperiodofheateddebatethepartydecidedtofield22candidates.Onlysixofthesewonparliamentaryseats,representingtheIAFsworstelectoralperformancesincethelegalisationofpoliticsintheearly1990s.ThispromptedasignificantrealignmentofinternalpartypoliticsandinMay2008ahardlinefigurewithinthemovement,HammamSaid,waselectedastheIAFsGeneralGuide.

Unexpectedly,thishasnotledtoasignificantbreakdowninrelationsbetweentheIAFandthegovernment.Onthecontrary,Saidhasprovedwillingtotonedowntherecentstridencyinthepartysstatementsandtoworkmoreconstructivelywiththegovernmentonarangeofdomesticpoliticalissues.TherehasalsobeenagreaterconvergencebetweenbothsidesonthequestionofengagementwithHamas,withtheIAFhavinghelpedtofacilitateanopeningofcontactsbetweentheJordaniangovernmentandthePalestinianresistance

movementinGaza(Hamid2008).Thisrecentrapprochementmaybeatemporarymarriageofconvenience,andtheregimeremainskeentolimitthelong-terminvolvementoftheIAFingovernmentandingovernance.ButitwoulddowelltofurtheropenupthespaceforparticipationavailabletothemainstreamIslamistparties,whicharethemostpopularorganisedoppositionforcesinJordan.Thereisariskthatifitdoesnot,individualsandgroupsespousingmoreradicalsolutionstoJordansproblemswillbecomeincreasinglyattractivetothosemembersofthepopulationwhoaredisillusionedwithpoliticsandangryaboutdomesticeconomicconditionsandregionalcrises.

RadicalIslamisminJordan

AlthoughtheIslamicActionFrontandothernon-violentIslamistparties,suchastheJordanianWasat(Centre)Party,havestatedtheircommitmenttoworkingwithinexistinginstitutionalstructurestoachievetheirgoals,thereareotherpoliticisedIslamicforcesinJordanthathavenotbeenpreparedtotakesuchanaccommodatingapproach.TheseincludeSalafiactivists,whorefusetoparticipateinformalpolitics,aswellasmoreradicaljihadistswhocondemntheIAFforitswillingnesstocompromisewithanon-Islamicregimeandwhoadvocatetheuseofviolencetoachievetheirgoals(Brown2006).

OppositiontothemonarchyspolicyofnormalisationwithIsraelanditscloserelationshipwiththeWesthasintensifiedoverthepastfewyears,exacerbatedbytheworseningsituationsinIraqandPalestine.Until2005,JordanwassparedthekindofjihadiactivismandbombingsseensofrequentlyinthesestatesandotherssuchasEgypt.However,horrific

suicideattacksinthreehotelsinAmmaninNovember2005thatappearedtohavebeenorchestratedbyAbuMusabalZarqawi(aJordanian-bornmilitantwhoactedasacommanderofAl-QaedainIraquntilhisdeathin2006)demonstratedthatJordanwasnotimmunefromextremism.

TosuppressthegrowthoftheseradicalideologiesinJordan,thegovernmenthasadoptedanincreasinglysecurity-basedapproachtodissent.Aftertheterroristattacksof11September2001andtheoutbreakofwarinIraq,theGeneralIntelligenceDepartment(GID)arrestedhundredsofIslamistsonthesuspicionofcollaborationwithAl-Qaeda,andanumberofthosetakenintocustodyreportedtheirexperiencesofbeatingsandtorture.AsimilarcrackdownfollowedtheAmmanhotelbombings.Buttheseheavy-handedtacticsareunlikelytodiscouragepopularprotest,andmayservetoundercuttheappealofmore

moderateIslamistforcesinJordan.


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Beforedrawinganyconclusionsaboutwhattherisingpopularityandinfluenceofnon-violentIslamistpartiesmightmeanforwesternpolicymakers,itisnecessarytoassessthe

legacyofpastpoliciestowardstheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.ThescopeofthispaperdoesnotpermitacomprehensiveanalysisofallwesternpoliciesintheMENAregionbutitdoesseektohighlightsomeofthemostrelevantinitiatives,includingpoliciesonpromotingpoliticalreform,economicdevelopmentandtheMiddleEastPeaceProcess.ItalsotouchesbrieflyonEuropeanandNorthAmericanpoliciestowardsIraqandIran,recognisingthatthesehaveprofoundlyshapedthecurrentregionalpoliticalcontext.

ThischapterlooksatthebroadMENAstrategiespursuedbytheEuropeanUnion,theUKandtheUS,whileChapter6considerstheextenttowhichtheseactorshaveengagedwithIslamists,eitherformallyorinformally.

EuropeanUnionpolicy

TheEUhasaclearinterestinhelpingtofostersecurityandprosperityintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.ConflictinthisregionhasseveraldirectconsequencesforEuropeanstatesandsocieties,includingincreasedflowsofpoliticalrefugees,theproliferationoftransnationalcriminalnetworks,aheightenedriskofterroristattacksandthedisruptionofcriticalenergysupplies.Yetifmanagedwell,cooperationbetweenEuropeandMENAcountriespromisesconsiderableeconomicandsocialbenefitsforbothregions.RecognitionofthishasledtheEUtostriveforgreaterpolicycoherencetowardstheMiddleEastinrecentyears.

Onthesecurityfront,theCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP)pillaroftheEUhascontributedtopeacebuildinginitiativesintheregion,forexample,throughtheUNIFILIImissioninLebanonandtheEUPoliceMissionforthePalestinianTerritories(EUPOLCOPPS)(seeCounciloftheEuropeanUnion2009).TheEUalsoactsinconcertwithother

internationalorganisationsandstatesoncertainissues,mostnotablythroughitsparticipationintheMiddleEastQuartetoftheEU,UN,RussiaandtheUSthatexiststoaddresstheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict.Meanwhile,economicandpoliticaldevelopmentandcooperationintheMENAregionhasbeenpromotedthroughtheestablishmentoftheUnionfortheMediterranean(formerlytheEuro-MediterraneanPartnershiporEMP)andtheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy(ENP).

However,theEUhashaddifficultydeliveringonmanyoftheseobjectives.Inpart,thisisareflectionofthedifficultiesinvolvedinachievingconsensusbetweenEUmemberstatesoncontroversialpoliticalissues.The27statesthatmakeupthenewlyenlargedEUhavecompetinginterestsandattitudesinrelationtotheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,whichhasoftenresultedinpolicybeingreducedtothelowestcommondenominatorofwhatcanbe

agreedon.EffortstodesignacoherentsetofpoliciestowardstheregionhavealsobeencomplicatedbythestructureoftheEU,whichhasasix-monthrotatingpresidency.WhilethechallengesandopportunitiesintheMENAregionarehighontheprioritylistofmostEUstates,therearedifferencesofopinionabouthowtoapproachquestionsofcooperation,conflictresolutionandpoliticalandeconomicdevelopment,withtherecenthagglingoverthequestionofreplacingtheEuro-MediterraneanPartnershipwithanewMediterraneanUnionbeingjustoneexampleofthis(TheEconomist2008).

Euro-MediterraneanPartnership

TheEuro-MediterraneanPartnership(EMP),otherwiseknownastheBarcelonaProcess,wasborneofanambitiousobjectivetotransformtheMediterraneanregionthroughthedevelopmentofarangeofpolitical,economic,socialandculturalpartnerships.Concerned

aboutoverwhelmingEuropeanfocusonthenewly-liberatedstatesofCentralandEasternEuropefollowingtheendoftheColdWar,FranceandSpainwerebothparticularlykeentorebalanceattentiononachievingcloserintegrationoftheMediterraneanregion,keytoboth

5.WesternpolicyintheMENAregion


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oftheireconomicandforeignpolicyinterests.OnthepartoftheMiddleEasternandNorthAfricanstatesaroundtheMediterraneanSea,therewasalsoastronginterestinconcludingagreementsthatwouldgivethempreferentialaccesstocovetedEuropeanmarkets.

Tothisend,theEMPwaslaunchedatameetingofEuro-MediterraneanForeignMinistersin

Barcelonain1995.5 Theobjectivesofthisprogrammewerethreefold:

Enhancingpoliticalandsecuritydialoguesoastoestablishacommonareaofpeaceandstability

Expandingeconomicandfinancialcooperationandworkingtowardsthecreationofaregionalfreetradearea

Strengtheningdialogueandexchangeinordertopromoteunderstandingbetweendifferentcultures.(EuropeanUnion1995)

Thesegoalsweretobeachievedthroughamixtureofregionalsummitsandactivityprogrammes,andmoretargetedbilateralagreementsbetweentheEUanditsMediterraneanpartnerstates.

Inspiteofitsadmirableintentions,commentatorsgenerallyagreethattheEMPhasstruggledtomakegoodonitspromisesofregionalregenerationandreform.StrategicdevelopmentsbeyondtheEUscontrolarepartiallyresponsibleforthis.TheEMPwaslaunchedduringararemomentofpoliticaloptimismintheMENAregionshortlyaftertheconclusionoftheOsloAccordsbetweenIsraelandthePalestinianAuthority(PA)andwasthereforegreatlyweakenedbythesubsequentstagnationandcollapseoftheMiddleEastPeaceProcessinthelate1990s(Edwards2008).TheeventsofSeptember2001andterroristattacksinMadridandLondonhavealsohadtheunfortunateeffectofsecuritisingthedebateaboutEuropesrelationshipwithitsneighbours,forcingtheEUtocallforgreateropennessandcooperationwhilesimultaneouslyattemptingtostrengthenitsbordersandprotectitselffromterrorism.

However,theEMPsfailuretopromoteclosercooperationbetweenstatestothenorthandsouthoftheMediterraneanSeaalsoreflectsfundamentaldifferencesofopinionbothbetweenandwithinitsmemberstatesaboutthepurposeoftheinitiativethathavebeenpresentsinceitscreation.Althoughdesignedasanassociationofequals,someEUstatesclearlywantedtoplayindependentleadershiprolesintheirownright.Forexample,then-PresidentJacquesChiraccommentedatthetimethatFrancedidnotwanttoleavethedirectionofEMPpolicyinthehandsofEuropeasawhole,butratherwaskeentoserveastheprincipalarchitectofthisbridgebetweentheoppositeshoresoftheMediterranean(referencedinEdwards2008:57).TheUKshistoricaltiestotheregionhavealsomadeitreluctanttorelinquishitsindependentpoliciesinrelationtoparticularMiddleEasternandNorthAfricanstatesandadoptapan-Europeanapproach.

Meanwhile,theattitudeofsomeofthemoreauthoritarianMENAregimesoverthepastdecadehassignificantlyunderminedtheEMPscredibilityandeffectiveness.ManyhavepaidlipservicetotheBarcelonaDeclarationsrequirementthatStatesPartiesworktodeveloptheruleoflawanddemocracyintheirpoliticalsystemsandrespecthumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms,butfewhavemadegenuineorconsistenteffortsonthisfront.Indeed,somestateshaveusedthedeterioratingsecuritysituationintheregionasapretextforcrackingdownoninternaldissentwhilesimultaneouslyrequestingmoresupportfromtheEU.Forexample,TunisiaandEgyptweregrantedconsiderableincreasesinMEDAaid6

duringthelatterhalfofthe1990s,evenastheauthoritiesinbothcountrieswerebusylimitingwhatpoliticallibertiesdidexist(Youngs2005).

5.Attheoutset,theEMPincludedthe15(pre-enlargement)EUmemberstatesandAlgeria,Cyprus,

Egypt,Israel,Jordan,Lebanon,Malta,Morocco,thePalestinianAuthority,Syria,TunisiaandTurkey.

6.TheMEDAprogrammeisthemainfinancialinstrumentoftheEUfortheimplementationoftheEMP.


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TheEMPshouldnotberegardedasanunmitigateddisaster.ItdidmakeprogressonmanyofitscommitmentsconcerningthepromotionofculturalunderstandingbetweenEUstatesandnon-EUMediterraneanstates,notablyinthecreationofforumsliketheAnaLindhEuromedFoundationandtheDialogueonCulturesandCivilizations.Nevertheless,itwasclearbythetimeoftheEMPstenthanniversaryin2005thatthesesofteractivities,intendingtocreateaconduciveenvironmentforthespreadofdemocracyandeconomicgrowththroughouttheregion,hadnotgonefarenough,andthatanewapproachwasrequired.

UnionfortheMediterranean

AtameetingoftheHeadsofStateandGovernmentattheSummitfortheMediterraneanheldinParison13July2008,theEMPwasofficiallyre-launchedastheBarcelonaProcess:UnionfortheMediterranean.ThisdevelopmentwastheoutcomeofintensiveFrenchdiplomacyoverthecourseof2007and2008,fuelledbyPresidentNicolasSarkozysconvictionthattheMediterraneanwastheregionwhereeverythingisbeingplayedoutandwhereitwasthereforeimperativeforpersistenthatredstobeovercomeinordertomake

spaceforagreatdreamofpeaceandcivilization(Bennhold2007).YetthisgrandrhetoricalsoconcealedmoreopportunisticpoliticalconsiderationsonthepartofthenewFrenchpresident,whohasbeenconsistentlyopposedtotheideaoffullTurkishmembershipoftheEUandmayhavecalculatedthatgivingTurkeyaprominentroleinanewMediterraneanUnionwouldsatisfyitsdemandsforinclusion.

AsoriginallyenvisagedbySarkozy,theMediterraneanUnionwastoincludeonlythosestateswithaMediterraneancoastline,namely:Portugal,Spain,France,Italy,Greece,Cyprus,Malta,Turkey,Lebanon,Israel,Egypt,Libya,Tunisia,AlgeriaandMorocco.Acouncilofmemberstateswouldholdregularsummitmeetingsunderarotatingco-presidency,andthefocusofactivitieswouldbedevelopingstrongerregionalcooperationmechanismsinthefieldsofsecurity,energy,counter-terrorismandimmigration,allunderpinnedbyanewtrade

agreementandthecreationofaMediterraneanInvestmentBank.WhilemostEUmembersandnon-EUMediterraneanpartnerstateswereinbroadagreementwiththestatedaimsandrationaleofsuchanorganisation,theearlyproposalsfacedconsiderableoppositionfromthosewhofearedthatthisapparentlynewandimprovedEMPwoulddomuchtoadvanceFrenchinterests,butratherlesstodeveloptherelationshipbetweenEuropeanditsMediterraneanneighbours.GermanChancellorAngelaMerkelwasparticularlyoutspokeninhercriticism,arguingthatanyconsortiumthatdidnotincludeallEUcountrieswouldruntheriskofunderminingEuropeanidealsofacommonforeignpolicy.ImplicitinthiscensurewasastrongaversiontotheideaofusingfundingfromthecommonEUpooltowhichGermanyisthelargestsinglecontributorforprojectswhichwouldonlybenefitsomememberstates.TurkishForeignMinisterAbdullahGulwasequallydismissiveof

Sarkozysplans,emphasisingthatTurkishinvolvementinaMediterraneanUnioncouldnotberegardedasasubstituteforthecontinuationofaccessiontalks.

ThescopeoftheUnionfortheMediterraneanthathasemergedfromthisnegotiationprocessisthereforemuchlessambitiousthanitsarchitectshadhopedfor.7 Itsprovisionsforarotatingco-presidencyandapermanentsecretariatstaffedbyofficialsfromallofitsmembercountriesdosetitapartfromtheEMP(seeEuropeanCommission2008)butitremainsunclearwhetherthisnewinitiativewillbesignificantlymoreeffectivethanitspredecessor,especiallysincethesixareasidentifiedasimmediateprioritiesfortheUnionarelargelytechnicalinnature.

7.TheUnionfortheMediterraneannowincludesall27EUmemberstates,16partnerstatesfromtheSouthernMediterraneanandtheMiddleEast(Albania,Algeria,BosniaandHerzegovina,Croatia,Egypt,

Israel,Jordan,Lebanon,Mauritania,Monaco,Montenegro,Morocco,thePalestinianAuthority,Syria,

TunisiaandTurkey)andoneobserverstate(Libya).


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Initialprojectsinclude:

CleaningupoftheMediterraneanSea

Creationofmaritimeandlandhighways

Initiativestocombatnaturalandman-madedisastersAMediterraneansolarenergyplan

InaugurationoftheEuro-MediterraneanUniversityinSlovenia

AMediterraneanBusinessDevelopmentInitiativethatfocusesonmicro,smallandmedium-sizedenterprises.(EuropeanCommission2009a)

Theseareworthyprojects,tobesure,buthardlyboldenoughintermsofdrivingforwardpoliticalreformprocessesintheregion.

ThecohesionoftheUnionfortheMediterraneanhasalsobeencalledintoseriousquestionasaresultoftheGaza-IsraelwarinDecember2008andJanuary2009.Followingtheendof

hostilities,EgyptreportedlycalledforasuspensionofallfuturemeetingsoftheUnioninlightofwidespreadunwillingnessonthepartofregimesintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricatoparticipateinanyforumthatincludedIsrael.ConcertedFrenchdiplomacyappearstohavesmoothedoverthisearlycrisis,buttheepisodeindicatesthefaultlinesthatwillcontinuetoplagueeffortstounitetheEUanditspartnersintheMENAregioniftheyarenotaddressedasamatterofurgency.

EuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy

FollowingtheenlargementoftheEUin2004,theEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicywasestablishedasacomplementtotheBarcelonaProcess.AlthoughthepolicywasintendedtobuildstrongerpoliticalandeconomicrelationshipswiththeEUsnewneighbours,itwasalsodrivenbythestrongsenseonthepartofsomememberstatesthatfurtherarrangements

wereneededtostrengthenandsecuretheEUsvastlyexpandedborders.

WhilesharingmanyoftheEMPsguidingprinciplesandobjectives,theENPwasdesignedtoofferEUpartnercountriesmoretailoredincentivestoimplementpolitical,economicandsocialreformsthroughthenegotiationofbilateralAssociationAgreementsandActionPlans.AccordingtoBenitaFerrero-Waldner,EuropeanCommissionerforExternalRelations,theENPwouldgiveeachneighbourcountrythechancetochooseitsownpathtowardsengagementwithEurope(EuropeanCommission2009b).

Since2004,theEUhasconcludedENPActionPlanswith12ofitsneighboursthatareineligibleforfullmembership:Armenia,Azerbaijan,Egypt,Georgia,Israel,Jordan,Lebanon,Moldova,Morocco,theoccupiedPalestinianterritories,TunisiaandUkraine.Backedby

approximately12billioninEuropeanCommissionfundingfortheperiod20072013,eachActionPlanoutlinesasetofreformsthatthepartnercountryagreestoworktowardsinreturnforavarietyofinducements,includingfinancialandtechnicalsupport,theprospectofparticipatingmorefullyinarangeofEUinstitutionsandprogrammes,andenhancedaccesstotheEUssinglemarket.

Theexactreformprogrammeforeachpartnercountryvariesinresponsetothespecificchallengestheyface.However,commonthemesdorunacrossanumberoftheActionPlans,includingcooperationinthefightagainstterrorism,actiontopreventtheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionandjointeffortstocombatillegalmigrationflows.

ObjectivesrelatingtodemocratisationandpoliticalreformarealsoincludedineachActionPlan,althoughthesearefrequentlydescribedinunhelpfullyvagueterms.Forexample,

JordansENPActionPlanrequiresthecountrytotakeforwardanationaldialogueondemocracyandpoliticallifewithintheframeworkofthenationalpoliticaldevelopmentplan,butfailstoprovideaclearexplanationofwhatthismeansinpractice(EuropeanCommission


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2005).Fundingfordemocracyandgovernance-relatedreformprojectshastendedtoaccountforaverysmallpercentageofENPaid,withthebalanceoffinancialresourcesbeingdirectedintoprogrammesrelatingtoeconomicinfrastructureandinstitutions.

Todate,theEUhasprovedreluctanttowithholdfundsfromcountriesthatrenegeontheir

obligationsrelatingtopoliticalreform,preferringinsteadtorelyonasystemofpositiveconditionalityandreward.ThislikelyaccountsforthefactthatMoroccoandEgyptaretwoofthelargestbeneficiariesofthefundingthatischannelledthroughtheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPartnershipInstrument(ENPI),eventhoughbothcountriescontinuetofacesignificantchallengesintermsoftheirlevelsofpoliticalfreedomandopennessandtheirrespectforhumanrights(forinformationontheallocationofENPIfunds,seeEuropeanCommission2007a).

However,thisapproachdoesnotseemtohavebeenparticularlysuccessfulinachievingitsdesiredgoals.WithouttheprospectoffullEUmembershiporsignificantfinancialcompensationtomotivatethem,fewoftheMENAcountriesinvolvedintheENPprogrammehavedemonstratedmuchenthusiasmforengaginginmeaningfulreformoftheirpolitical

systems.

TheEUhasrecognisedsomeoftheENPsshortcomingsonthisfront.InApril2008afirstsetofreportsontheperformanceofeachENPpartnercountryconcededthatnotenoughprogresshadbeenmadeacrosstheboardinrelationtopoliticalgovernanceandidentifiedthisasapriorityforthefuture.However,manycommentatorsstilltakearatherdimviewoftheEUscommitmenttopromotingdemocracyinitsneighbourhood,notingthattheexpansionofsecurityandeconomicrelationscontinuestotakeprecedenceoversupportforgenuinepoliticalreform(Youngs2008).

TheEUandtheMiddleEastPeaceProcess

Europeanstateshavebecomeincreasinglyengagedinconflictresolutioneffortsinthe

MiddleEastinrecentyears,asthedirectsecurityandeconomicimplicationsofregionalconflagrationforEuropehavebecomemoreapparent.SofartheEUhasfocusedonachievingatwo-statesolutiontotheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict,whichitviewsasbeingcriticaltothestabilityoftheMENAregionasawhole.TothisendithasprovidedsupportforPalestinianinstitutionsandstate-buildingprojects,attemptedtoaddressthewiderconflictbetweenIsraelanditsneighboursandworkedtocreateamorepeacefulandprosperousregionalenvironmentthroughtheaforementionedEuro-MediterraneanPartnershipandEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy(Asseburg2009).However,itisonlyveryrecentlythatEuropehasmovedawayfromitstraditionalroleastheUnitedStatesjuniorpartnerinthisfield.

AftertheMadridpeacetalksin1991,theEUbecameheavilyinvolvedintheMiddleEast

PeaceProcess,providingconsiderablemonetaryandtechnicalsupporttoboththeRegionalEconomicDevelopmentWorkingGroup8 andtotheUnitedNationsRefugeeandWorksAgencyforPalestinianRefugeesintheNearEast(UNWRA).Ithasalsosupportedavarietyofconfidence-buildingcivilsocietyinitiativesbetweenIsraeliandPalestiniancitizens.Yetwhiletheseactivitiesareinherentlypoliticalinnature,predicatedastheyareonthegoalofdevelopingaviablePalestinianstatethatcantakeitsplaceintheinternationalcommunityalongsideIsrael,theEUhasbeensurprisinglyreluctanttoinvolveitselfatthesharpendofpeacenegotiations,preferringtoleavethistotheUnitedStates(Asseburg2009).

8.TheRegionalEconomicDevelopmentWorkingGroupwasestablishedin1992toaddresstheissuesof

infrastructure,trade,financeandtourismdevelopmentintheMiddleEast,includingtheWestBankand

Gaza(IsraelMinistryofForeignAffairs2000).


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ThisattitudehasalsobeenvisibleinrelationtoEuropesparticipationintheso-calledQuartetontheMiddleEast,whichcoordinatesUN,EU,USandRussianpolicyonthepeaceprocessandwasresponsiblefordevelopingthe2003roadmapthathasservedasaplanforPalestiniansovereignty.Since2007,theQuartetsprimaryobjectivehasbeentobuttresstheUS-initiatedAnnapolisProcess,whichseekstolaythegroundworkforatwo-statesolutiontotheIsraeli-PalestinianconflictthroughasustainedprocessofpoliticaldialogueandeconomicsupportforPalestinianstate-building.

Again,theEUhasbeenparticularlyactiveonthefinancialfront,andinDecember2007theEuropeanCommissionco-chairedadonorsconferenceinParisthatgeneratedover5billioninpledgestosupportthePalestinianReformandDevelopmentPlanmanagedbythePalestinianAuthority.Europeanassistanceaccountedforalmostafifthofthistotal(includingECandbilateralmemberstatecontributions).FollowingtheexpirationoftheceasefirebetweenHamasandIsraelinlate2008andthesubsequentwarinGaza,theEUannouncedafurtherpledgeof440millioninsupportofthePalestinianeconomyandthereconstructionofGazaataconferenceinSharmEl-SheikhinMarch2009

(EuropeanCommission2009c).Intheory,thiseconomiccloutgivestheEUagooddealofleveragetobringtobearonthepeaceprocess.However,ithasnotmadethemostofthisinfluence,deferringinsteadtotheambitiousbutflawedpoliticalstrategypursuedbytheUS.

TheconflictinGazaduringDecember2008andJanuary2009exposedtheseriouslimitationsoftheAnnapolisframeworkasatoolcapableofdeliveringasustainablepeacesettlementintheregion(Hanelt2008).Toomanykeyplayerswereleftoutofthepoliticaldialoguefromtheoutset,whileeconomicaidchannelledthroughthePalestinianAuthorityintheWestBankhasfailedtoaddressthedirelivingconditionsexperiencedbyPalestinianslivinginGaza.Anewapproachthattakesintoaccounttherealitiesofpowerstructuresintheregionisthereforeurgentlyneeded.TherecentchangeofleadershipintheUSoffersa

valuableopportunityforafundamentalchangeinpolicies,anditmustbehopedthattheEU,workingthroughtheQuartetandtheotherregionalcooperationmechanismsdescribedabove,willadopta

Documents

Building Bridges Not Walls: Engaging with political Islamists in the Middle East and North Africa