Btl of El Alamein - Short

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B TL OF EL - ALAMEIN

(23 Oct - 04 Nov 42)

Gen

1. The battle of El-Alamien was fought between the 8th Army Comd FM

Montgomery and the Axis forces comd by FM Rommel from 23 Oct to 04 Nov

1942. This was the most significant battle in the history of World War-II and it

was a turning pt for both the forces .In this battle the Axis forces were

completely routed and thier will were destroyed in North Africa.

2. In this btl the Allied forces defeated the Axis decisively and turned the tide

of North African Campaign in their favour. The btl was significant from both tac

and admin pt of view. The Allied frontal attk successfully estb brH over the Axis

minefds and the op was well sp by superior log back up.

Backgrd

3. The backgrd of the famous btl of El-Alamien are fol:

a. Beginning of North African Campaign. On 10 Jun 40 Italy

joined Germany in Axis force that time she had Libya at North Africa as

her colony and Egypt on the east of Libya was British colony.

b. Adv of Italian Force. On 13 Sep 40, Italian force started advance

towards east and crossed the border. They advanced upto Sidi Barrani

around 75 miles of Egypt and estb themselves in a chain of fortified

camps. Week after week they passed without any attempt to mov on.

c. Adv of Allied Forces. Allied forces capr upto Sidi Barrani by 10

Dec 1940 and pursued Axis forces. They advanced upto Agheila, around

600 miles inside Libya.

d. Arr of Rommel and Adv of Axis Forces. Gen Rommel reached

Libya on 12 Feb 41 and his Africa corps completed reaching North Africaby March 1941.He than started his adv eastward in Mar 41 and pushed

Allied forces. By Jun 41, he capr upto Sollum, an area on the border inside

Egypt.

e. Retreat of Rommel. After the retreat of Allied forces in 3rd

week of June 1941, General wavell was replaced by Gen Auchinlek as

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Comd in Chief of that theatre. In Nov and December 1941. Allied started

their fresh offensive against Axis forces. In November and December

1941, a series of offensive and counter offensive took place in and around

Tobruk - Sollum. By the end of December 1941, Rommel was pushed back

upto Agedabia, approximately 100 miles north-west of Agheila.

f. Fresh and 2nd Adv of Rommel. In Jan 42, Gen Rommel startedhis fresh advance east ward. After series of offensive launched at

Benghazi, Gazala, Tobruk and Marsa Matruh pushing the Allied forces

Rommel reached El-Alamien 60 miles east of Alexandria by the end of

June 1942.

g. First Btl of El-Alamien. The Allied forces took up defence at

El-Alamein to save Egypt from falling into the hands of Rommel. In July

1942, Rommel launched several attack on Allied defence at Alamein but

failed.

h. Btl of Alam Halfa. In August 1942, General Alexander

replaced General Aucninleck as commander in Chief. General Gott also

took over 8th Army, but due to his death on next day by an air crash,

General Montgomery took over 8th Army. Rommel launched attack on

Alam Halfa Ridge behind defence line on 30 August 1942, but failed due

to lack of log, then Rommel quickly took up def in El-Alamein line facing

the Allied def.

ORBAT

4. Allied Forces.

a. Comd. FM Montgomery.

b. 30 Corps.

(1) 9 Aus Div.

(2) 1 South African Div.

(3) 4 Indian Div.

(4) 51 High Land Div.

(5) 2 NZ Div.

(6) 23 Armd Gp.

(7) 9 UK Armd Bde.

c. 13 Corps.

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(1) 7 Armr Div.

(2) 50 Div.

(3) 44 Div.

(4) 1 Free French Bde Gp.

(5) 2 Free French Bde Gp.

(6) 1 Greek Inf Bde Gp.

d. 10 Corps.

(1) 1 Armr Div.

(2) 8 Armr Div.

(3) 10 Armr Div.

5. Axis Forces.

a. Comd.

(1) Gen Stumme (until 26 Oct).

(2) FM Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel.

b. German.

(1) 15 Panzer Div.

(2) 21 Panzer Div.

(3) 164 Mor Div.

(4) 90 Lt Div.

(5) 19 Flak Div.

(6) RAMCKE Parachute Bde.

c. Italian.

(1) Littorio Armr Div.

(2) Ariete Armr Div.

(3) Trento Div.

(4) Bresica Inf Div.

(5) Bologna Inf Div.

(6) Pavia Inf Div.

(7) Folgore Group Para Div.

(8) Trieste Mor Div.

Rommels Plan

6. Threat Analysis.

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a. Early Wng Elms. There were lt out posts with dogs in the no

man's land to provide early wng and dir fire against breaching ops..

b. Main Def.

(1) The main def was behind the mine fd layer and was 2000-3000 yds in depth.

(2) Front lines were held by inf.

(3) Inferior Italian tps and eqpt were interspersed with the

Germans.

c. Res. The Panzar divs were behind the main def line, so that their

guns could fire into the area in front of the def line.

d. Obs.

(1) A mine fd of 1000-2000 yds deep was laid in front of the main

def.

(2) About 5,00000 mines were used in this mine fd.

(3) A huge no of capr bombs were put into the def.

Deceptive Plan/ Cover Plan of the Allied.

10. Objs.

a. To conceal the intension of offn from the en as long as poss.

b. When it would not be poss to conceal, misleading the en about its

dt, time and dir of the main thrust.

11. Deceptive Measures. To make the en think that main thrust was atSouth fol steps were taken:

a. Dummy tpts/guns were placed in northern area in such a manner so

that en air recce could detect them as dummy, these were replaced with

actual ones prior to attk and these change over was carr out at ni. Dummy

vehs were made under which real guns could be concealed.

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b. Dummy pine lines, water instl, dumps were constr in the south and

the progress was kept slow to give the impression that the attk will not be

launched before Nov.

c. Tks were cam as trucks and dummy tks were secretly built to

deceive en recce ac.

d. In the northern sec mov were strictly con and mov in the southern

sec were encouraged.

e. All maj mov in the north was carr out during ni whereas most of the

mov in the south was in the day.

f. Slit trenches to be used by aslt tps were dug a month before.

g. Existing pattern of tps disposn were not disturbed. Maj movs were

carr out at ni.

h. On ni 23/24 Oct 42, the 8th army staged feint landing behind en line

(three hours after the start of the main attk) to confuse the en and

thereby prematurely committing his res.

j. On the ni of attk, wrls tfc of an Armd Div was simulated projecting

mov in the south when the attk was going on the north.

The Btl

15. Op Light Foot. Break in ph of Allied offn at El-Alamein was given code

name "Op Light Foot". Montgomery planned to destroy Rommel's inf fmns first

and then the armr forces. Monty emp his armr to hold Rommel's armr while

Romels inf fmn were being destroyed. It was conducted in two phs:

a. Break in Ph (23 - 24 Oct 42).

(1) Op light Foot began with arty barrage at 2140 was on 23 Oct

42.

(2) At 2200 hrs on 23 Oct 42, 30 Corps with four divs launched

attk from Tell El Eisa to Miteririya Ridge. They could estb two

corridors.

(3) On 240600 Oct 42, Most of the units of 30 Corps reached

their "Oxalic Line Obj".

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(4) On the South, 13 Corps launched two attks simultaneously.

(5) On 24 Oct 42, 10 Corps adv with 1 and 10 Armd div mov

through northern and southern corridor respectively. But 10 Corps

was unable to clear the brH and reached "Pierson".

(6) 13 Corps was held up between the mine fd but was successfulin keeping 21 panzer in its sec.

b. Dog Fight Ph (24 - 30 Oct 42).

(1) On 241800 Oct 42, the adv through northern corridor was

resumed by 1 Armd Div and 51 Highland Div.

(2) The attk through the Southern corridor after a delay was

successful in breaking out.

(3) On 25/26 Oct 9 Australian Div attk NW towards Rahman tr..

(4) Montgomery decided to regp. 2 New Zealand Div was

replaced by 4 Indian Div.

(5) The Allied wdr 7 Armd div from 13 Corps and depl in the

North.

(6) On 27 Oct 21 Panzer Div mov Northward.

(7) By 28/29 Oct 42, further attk by 9 Aus Div in the north drove

a hold into the en posn.

(8) On 30/31 Oct 42, Aus Div cont its attempt to cut off the en

forces in coastal salient.

(9) Op Light Foot ended and failed to breach a maj portion of

Rommel's def.

(10) Montgomery decided to readjust his plan and code named it

as "Op Supercharge".

16. Op Super Charge. The breakout ph of the offn op of the Allied was

given code name "Super Charge". This involved fresh regp of forces and could

not be launched before ni 01/02 Nov 1942. The fol exec took place in this ph:

a. Op Supercharge commenced on 02 Nov 1942.

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b. On 020645 Nov 1942, 9 UK Armd Bde adv but was held up by Atk

fire. A furious btl of tk engagment was fought around Tel El Aaqqir. 1

Armd Div mov to eliminate the posn.

c. After conf with Gen Vom Thorma on 022015 Nov 42, Rommel

decided to wdr to Fuka.

d. At ni on 03 Nov 42, 51 HL Div and 4 Indian Div achieved break-

through in the southern corridor forcing back Axis screen.

d. On 04 Nov 42, after further ftg Axis tps finally began to retreat

along the coastal rd which were fol by 1, 7 and 10 Armd Div.

17. The Pursuit.

a. On 04 Nov 42, 2 NZ Div and 10 Corps mov to cut off en retreatthrough the coastal rd in the North while 13 Corps mov to pursue the

Italians in the South.

b. On 05 Nov 42, Montgomery regp for pursuit but by rain abandoned

all the progress.

Reasons for Allied Success

18. Fol are some of the reasons of Allied success in the historic btl of El-

Alamein:

a. Correct Genship. Gen Montgomery raised the morale and

ensured trg to the tps. He could instil confidence in Allied tps with his

ingenuity and timely decision.

b. Allied Air Sp. Allied forces enjoyed absolute air superiority.

Besides sinking two large German logistic ships the RAF made the mob of

Axis forces absolutely restricted.

c. Superiority of Wpn and Eqpt. Weapon and equipment of the

Allied forces were not only superior in quantity, but also in quality.

d. Good Cover Plan. As there was no scope of achieving

surprise, Allied forces made an outstanding cover plan to achieve tactical

surprise by dir and timing of attk.

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e. Good Admin. Gen Montgomery was called Gen of Admin. He

arrangement of cont flow of sup and ammo helped in keeping the forces

in excellent fighting std.

f. Coop. Prior to the op Gen Montgomery arranged for a number

of ex to impv the coop between the svcs thus complex mnvrs were

successful by Allied.

g. Use of Arty Fire. Extreme use/conc of Arty fire was made to sp

the Allied offensive.

h. Flexibility of Plan. Montgomery had the flexibility in planning to

meet the unforeseen by regp, changing fmns or dir of attk etc.

Principle s of War Applied

22. The principles of war that were applied in this btl are as fol:

a. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. Aim was kept in mind

throughout. In spite of difficulties in the north, weight of attk was not

shifted to the south.

b. Maint of Morale. Montys first address was "if we cannot stay

here alive, then let us stay here dead, there will be no more retreat or

wdr". Constant visits, pep talks to troops of all nationalities convinced

them about the cause and the imp of the war. Regp, rearming, trg and

improving admin of the tps infused new spirit.

c. Conc. Was done both iro of str, resources and use of arty.

d. Offn Act. In spite of difficulties, pressure on the en and an

offensive spirit was maint in all sec through dir aslt on en posn, indir by

harassing fire, bombardment, air actions, raids and aggressive ptl.

e. Flexibility. 8 Armd Div was retained back as res. Adhoc res was

created and sent to the north once 30 corps attk faced difficulty.

f. Surprise. Tac surprise achieved iro weight, dir and time of attk.

Elaborate deception plan adopted to achieve surprise.

g. Admin. Attk delayed by Monty till Oct 42 because of need of resup

his tps. Sup prior and during the battle was adequate and plentiful.

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e. Sy. The plan of attack was not discussed to the attacking troop

till last moment by the 8th army. From 8 Oct no visitor were allowed to

8th army Area.

f. Co-op. Gen Montgomery changed the loc of Army and Air

HQ to remain together for better understanding and co-op.

Significance of Battle of El Alamein

23. Battle of El- Alamein was comparatively small affairs in relation to latter

battles fought during the war. For a number of reasons it must rank high in

importance:

a. It meant the turn of the tide in Allied fortune.

b. The victory stood out as a priceless jewel after a series of

depressing defeat.

c. It provided a much wanted stimulus to Allied forces morale.

d. It convinced Allied armed forces that given the right ldrship and

wpn they could beat the German.

e. It also inspired confidence amongst the British people in ultimate

victory.

f. 30,000 prisoners incl 9 Gens were bagged by the British and causedhuge loss in mat and eqpt to the Axis.

Rommels Sup Ordeal

24. The story of Rommels sup before and during the battle is one of broken

promises. He was concerned not only about mat, but also about the simple nec

for food, fuel and ammo. Rommel submitted the figures of his reqr:

a. 30,000 tons to arr during Sep.

b. 35,000 ton to arr during Oct.

25. These were based on his est of the min scale of stocks nec to fight a btl

-issue of eight ammo per man daily, 2000 miles of fuel per veh and 30 days of

rat. He stated cat that it would only be poss to guarantee a successful def if

those reqr were met. In fact, by 19 Oct there was fuel for eleven and ammo for

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some nine days fighting; rat were still poor spl vegetables and spare parts as

always were short.

26. Other promises proved vain, For example, 22 Air Landing Div, a motorized

inf fmn wdr from Russia, was supposed to be transferred to Africa but never arr.

On 23 Sep enroute to Germany Rommel got the Italians to agree to provide

3000 men for rd constr behind the front and about 100 of these men only came

up. Seven thousand tons of rails and their sleepers were promised to him to

improve the rly but nothing practically arr. 90 Light made the only impvs.

27. When Rommel reached Hitlers HQ a few days later and reported on the

weaknesses in Africa, the Fuhrer and his staff gave assurance that during the

next few weeks many flat-decked ferries with a shallow draught would be added

to the cross Mediterranean tpt fleet; a Nebel werfer Bde of rocket bty would

shortly arr; 40 Tiger tks and self-propelled guns would also be despatched.

These were all empty words. For Rommel the frustration and disappt were

enhanced by his sharp sense of rapidly growing Allied superiority.

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Btl of El Alamein - Short