Bruun - Weber and Neokantianism

THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF VALUES AND THEIMPORTANCE OF CONSEQUENCES: MAX WEBER ANDTHE KANTIAN LEGACYphil_348 51..68

HANS HENRIK BRUUN

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In Max Webers case, the crisis referred to in the overall title of the Confer-ence can be subdivided into three parts. First, the methodological crisis of thesocial sciences which manifested itself at the end of the 19th and beginning of the20th century. Weber dealt extensively with this in his methodological writingsfrom 1903 until 1917. Second, the ethical aspect. This is closely linked to themethodological one, and Webers discussions of it are interwoven with his meth-odological arguments, so that the methodological crisis shades over into an ethicalone. Finally, the political crisis which Germany faced after her defeat in WorldWar I. Weber wrote extensively on political matters, particularly after 1914; but inthe present context, I shall confine myself to certain points where a treatment ofwhat one might call the Kantian legacy seems particularly relevant.

It is widely, but not invariably, accepted that Webers methodology owesmuch to the influence of neo-Kantian thought, in particular that of his friendHeinrich Rickert,1 and many scholars go so far as to classify Weber himself as aneo-Kantian, and sometimes try to systematize his methodological views alongRickertian lines.2

1 Among the few exceptions are Eugne Fleischmann, De Weber Nietzsche, Archives Europennesde Sociologie V (1964): 190238 and, following him, W. G. Runciman, A Critique of Max WebersPhilosophy of Social Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972). Fleischmannsposition is not well documented, however, and partly based on regular misunderstandings.

2 Among more recent commentators, Thomas Burger, Max Webers Theory of Concept Formation(Durham: Duke University Press 1987 [1976]), Karl-Heinz Nusser, Kausale Prozesse und sinner-fassende Vernunft (Freiburg/Mnchen, Germany: Karl Alber, 1976), and Peter-Ulrich Merz, MaxWeber und Heinrich Rickert. Die erkenntniskritischen Grundlagen der verstehenden Soziologie(Wrzburg, Germany: Knigshausen & Neumann, 1990) are among those who go farthest in

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Much less attention has been paid to Webers position vis--vis Kant himself.But some authors do go into the question in some detail,3 and in particular, theeminent Weberologist Wolfgang Schluchter has claimed to find a unitary theory ofethics or values within Webers writings, a theory which he claims has strong linksto Kant.4

I do not find the Kantianizing or neo-Kantianizing interpretations whollyconvincing. My own thesis, which I shall try to substantiate later, is the following:Although Weber certainly saw himself as standing within the Kantian tradition ina general sense, the most distinctive elements of his contribution to the method-ology of the social sciences and his ethical thinking owe less than is usuallysupposed to Kant and neo-Kantianism,5 and on central points, his thought seemsto be in direct opposition to the Kantian legacy. The same, I believe, is true ofWebers political thought. The main distinctive elements to which I refer in thisconnection are, first, Webers thesis of the incompatibility of valuesin otherwords, that there is a fundamental conflict between different value spheres; and,second, his strong emphasis on the importance of the consequences of action,separately from the intentions behind it.

I shall try to argue my thesis in detail on a number of specific points within thethree critical areas referred to. Whenever possible, I shall consider the original

identifying Webers views with Rickerts; Horst Baier, Von der Erkenntnistheorie zur Wirklich-keitswissenschaft, Doctoral thesis, mimeographed, Mnster, Germany, 1969; Gerhard Wagner,Geltung und normativer Zwang (Freiburg/Mnchen, Germany: Karl Alber, 1987); Bjarne Jacobsen,Max Weber und Friedrich Albert Lange. Rezeption und Innovation (Wiesbaden, Germany: DUV,1999); and Sven Eliaeson, Max Webers Methodologies (Cambridge: Polity, 2002) are less Rick-ertian in their conclusions.

3 Martin Albrow, Max Webers Construction of Social Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990) is onefairly recent example.

4 See in particular Wolfgang Schluchter, Paradoxes of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress, 1986). On this point, Schluchter to a significant extent builds on the doctoral thesis of DieterHenrich, Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre Max Webers (Tbingen, Germany: Mohr/Siebeck,1952).

5 This thesis, which is not often met with in its full scope, embracing both Kant and the neo-Kantians,is also sustained by Milos Havelka, Bis zu welchem Punkt kann man Max Weber neukantianischlesen?, Neukantianismus. Perspektiven und Probleme, eds. Ernst Wolfgang Orth and HelmutHolzhey (Wrzburg, Germany: Knigshausen & Neumann, 1994) 28695. On the other hand,doubts have quite frequently been voiced by important scholars as to Webers dependence on Kanthimself: see for instance Wilhelm Hennis, Max Weber. Essays in Reconstruction (London:Allen&Unwin, 1988) 175 (with a note quoting Karl Jaspers statement in a letter to Hannah Arendtthat Weber knew hardly anything of Kantian ideas). Other insightful commentators (for instanceJohannes Weiss, Ist eine Kantische Begrndung der Soziologie mglich? Kant oder Hegel?, ed.Dieter Henrich (Stuttgart, Germany: Klett-Cotta, 1983) 53146 and Wagner (1987) raise the ques-tion whether Rickerts ideas concerning the basis of historical knowledge can, strictly speaking, besaid to be Kantian at all; but this is a wider philosophical issue, which I shall not address here.

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texts; on the other hand, references to the arguments of other authors have, forreasons of space, been kept to a minimum. I am sorry if this lends a somewhat tooapodictic air to some of my arguments. At least, it may provoke more debate thanwould a more gentle and balanced approach.

A few words on Webers relationship to the field of philosophy in general maybe useful.

Weber did not claim to be a philosopher, nor did he in fact elaborate philo-sophical systems or theories. References to his philosophy of social science, histheory of concept formation, his system of values, and so on, are therefore inmy opinion misguided. He himself stressed that the philosophical tools that hewielded were borrowed ones, furnished above all by the neo-Kantians, Rickert inparticular. But this did not mean that he was a purely passive recipient of philo-sophical ideas. He had some formal philosophical training at university; he keptabreast of philosophical literature; and in his letters and articles, he obviously feelsquite competent to comment on and criticize the philosophical points of view ofothers, including his friend Rickert.6 But his basic interest is empirical, notabstract. If he wrote so extensively on methodology, it was not for its own sake,but in order to help an empirical science heading down what he believed were thewrong tracks.7 When he writes on ethics, his points of reference are also largelyempirical, astonishingly so, considering the fundamental character of his conclu-sions in that area. And his theory of politics is not speculative but realistic, both inits empirical basis and its understanding of the dilemmas of acting politicians.

THE METHODOLOGICAL CRISIS

Toward the end of the 19th century, there was a growing belief that the questionof the objectivity of scientific knowledge had been solved. The enormous advancesof natural science, whose objectivity seemed beyond doubt, led its disciples toclaim that it held a methodological monopoly in all scientific disciplines, and the

6 See for instance Webers letters to Rickert of July 25, 1909, Max Weber Gesamtausgabe (MWG) II/6(where he voices dissent concerning Rickerts reading of Kant) and at the end of 1913 (MWG II/8).

7 Max Weber, in his essay from 1906 on The Logic of the Cultural Sciences, The Methodology of theSocial Sciences, eds. and trans. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York: The Free Press,1959) (henceforth MSS) 114 / Gesammelte Aufstze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 3rd ed., ed. JohannesWinckelmann (Tbingen, Germany: Mohr, 1968 [1922]) (henceforth GAW) 21516), Weber empha-sizes the limitations of the contribution that methodology can make to the development of adiscipline. Evidence of Webers relatively cool estimation of the value of theory can be found quiteearly on. In a letter from 1887 (he was 23 years old) to his friend Emmy Baumgarten, Weber saysthat years ago, I struggled valiantly with all those impossible concepts (Begriffsunwesen); theydont yield very much, as I now know [. . .] from Jugendbriefe, ed. Marianne Weber (Tbingen,Germany: Mohr/Siebeck, 1936) (henceforth JB) 262.

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cultural sciences, with their strong historicist tradition, were therefore on a con-stant defensive. Dilthey made an attempt to define the non-natural sciences bymeans of their spiritual material, as Geisteswissenschaften, but this onlyredefined, but did not solve, the methodological problem, and the development ofa psychologya science of the spiritwhich sought to formulate laws of thekind found in the natural sciences, struck at the very heart of this line of reasoning.Instead, Windelband tried to define the differences between the two groups ofsciences in terms of their method: the natural sciences were nomotheticlawformulatingwhile the non-natural sciences were idiographicconcerned withthe individuality of phenomena. This looked more promising, but the problem ofthe objectivity of the idiographic sciences remained. In his book The Limits of theConcept Formation of Natural Science,8 Heinrich Rickert tried to address thisproblem systematically. His central thesis was that the historical or culturalsciences9 form the objects of their scientific interest by means of a Wertbezie-hung, a value relation. The values to which the relevant elements of reality arerelated are purely theoretical, and logically situated on a higher plane than anyordinary subjective and practical value or valuation: they are not subjectivelyempirically or normativelybut objectively and absolutely valid for a givencommunity. This distinction between theoretical (objective, absolute) and practical(subjective) values was central to Rickerts construction. While there might beconflicts between lower values or between the corresponding valuations, therecould be none at the level of absolute values. The relation of a given concept to anabsolute value was a theoretical value relation; any concept formed by theoreti-cal value relation was therefore objective; and any proposition (judgment)formed by means of such concepts was consequently objectively true.

When Weber read the second and most important part of Rickerts work justafter its publication in 1902, he was deeply impressed. But he was not uncritical.He had terminological doubts, and in particular, these doubts were directed atthe term value.10 In fact, we know from manuscript notes of Webers made alittle later11 that in fact he regarded Rickerts values as being simply the embodi-ment of a theoretical interest in a particular object.

8 Heinrich Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung (Tbingen, Germany:Mohr/Siebeck, 1896/1902). The fifth edition of the book was partly translated as The Limits ofConcept Formation in Natural Science, trans. Guy Oakes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1986 [1929]).

9 Rickertand Weberuse both designations.10 See H. H. Bruun, Science, Values and Politics in Max Webers Methodology (Aldershot: Ashgate,

2007) 27.11 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Hauptabteilung I, Berlin, Rep. 92, No 31/6. For

a transcript of and full commentary on these notes, see H. H. Bruun, Weber on Rickert: From ValueRelation to Ideal Type, Max Weber Studies 1, 2 (2001): 13860.

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From Rickerts point of view, this was a serious comment indeed. Withoutvalues, his whole construction supporting the objectivity of the cultural scienceswould collapse. But, interestingly, this does not seem to have worried Weberhimself. The reason for this apparent indifference may have been that Webersmethodological purpose was different from Rickerts. He was deeply worried notonly by the positivist methodological imperialism which claimed that the findingof laws was the only purpose of true science, but also, more generally, by thetendency to believe that the necessary criteria of relevance or importance for socialscience were somehow inherent in the material itself. Webers fight against thisbroad current of thought runs through most of his methodological work. In thisfight, Rickerts stringent analysis of the principles of concept formation of thehistorical sciences, along the hallowed lines of Kantian reasoning, provided Weberwith a highly useful weapon. But he mainly employed it for the polemical purposeof demonstrating effectively the errors of objectivism in all its various forms. Inhis methodological writings, he never refers to Rickerts final anchoring of sci-entific objectivity in absolute values. In fact, he fundamentally disagreed withRickert on this point. However, he formulates his divergent position not in directopposition to Rickert, but as an independent postulate, that of a fundamental valueconflict. I shall come back to this postulate in greater detail in my discussion of theethical crisis.

The second of the instruments with which Weber indefatigably sought toconfound his methodological opponents was the principle of the value freedom ofscience. In its general form, this principle demands a strict distinction betweenempirical knowledge and value judgments: practical values should not intrude intothe process of scientific inquiry, and on the other hand, empirical science [. . .]can tell us nothing about how things ought to be.12

Weber was apparently so convinced of the logical correctness of this principlethat he never went into a substantial argument to underpin it. Nor did he giveconcrete references to indicate where he had found it. So where should we look forits source? Of course, we find the basic elements of it in Kants distinctionbetween the realms of nature and freedom. But in the final analysis, Kant wantedto construct a bridge between these two spheres,13 while Weber steadfastly deniesthat any bridge can be found leading from one sphere to the other. Webersdistance from Kant in these matters is clearly brought out in his discussion, in anarticle from 1905, of Kants causality through freedom. Weber pays due rever-ence to the grandeur of Kants idea, and above all, characteristically, to its

12 Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufstze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik (Tbingen, Germany: Mohr,1988[1924]) (henceforth GASS) 417.

13 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Kants gesammelte Schriften. Akademie-Ausgabe(henceforth KGS) 5: 17576.


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frank and undisguised logical nature; but he qualifies it as inconsistent and asthe philosophical archetype of all metaphysical theories of culture and per-sonality. The degenerate latter-day versions of such theories, with their fatalconception of a creative and valuational causality, distinct from ordinary,value-neutral causality, were precisely among the prime objects of his method-ological attacks14 because they ignored the ethical irrationality of the world.

Nor can Webers usual supplier of methodological arguments, Rickert, be thesource of his demand for value freedom; Rickert does distinguish between theo-retical value relation and practical valuation, but this distinction is not identicalwith the principle of value freedom, as Weber propounds it.15 The best candidate16is probably another neo-Kantian philosopher, Fr. Albert Lange, who preached theabsolute incompatibility of the world of values with the world of the existent inhis influential History of Materialism, which we know that Weber read with greatinterest in his student years.17

The principle of value freedom, which Weber affirms and applies with vigor andconsistency from the Objectivity essay in 1904 until the end of his life, is ofteninterpreted as a defense of value-free, and in that sense objective, science.18That aspect is obviously present in Webers discussion, but in my opinion, it is notnearly as prominent as his other concern: that of defending the sphere of valuesagainst the illegitimate encroachment of science. Again and again he tells hisreaders that science cannot prove any value right or wrong. Maybe this asymmetryin Webers formulations can be seen as a reflection of his general Kantianbackgroundsince Kants assertion of the gulf between nature and reason19 ismost absolute in the direction from nature to reason. But the asymmetry must also

14 Max Weber Roscher and Knies. The Logical Problems of Historical Economics, trans. and intr. GuyOakes (New York: The Free Press, 1975) (henceforth ORK) 11819/GAW, 62.

15 In an illuminating comment Max Weber und seine Stellung zur Wissenschaft, Logos 15 (1926):23031article translated in Max Webers Science as a Vocation, eds. Peter Lassman, IrvingVelody, and Herminio Martins (London: Unwin Hyman, 1986) 7686Rickert says that, as aspecialized scholar (Spezialforscher), Weber saw it as self-evident that there was no way in whichtheoretical research could deal with the question of the validity of values, but that he did not askhimself whether this was the last word in every respecta gentle hint indicating Rickerts own,divergent position.

16 See Jacobsen (1999): 910.17 JB, 65.18 In a paradigmatic discussion of Webers significance, Talcott Parsons makes a statement to this

effect: The concept of value-freedom may be said to be the foundation of [Webers methodologi-cal] position. Its negative complement is formulated by Herbert Marcuse in the course of the samediscussion: [Webers] theory of the internal value-freedom of science is [. . .] in practice: thefreeing of science for the acceptance of evaluations imposed from outsideOtto Stammer (ed.),Max Weber and Sociology Today (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971) 33, 133.

19 See footnote 13 above.

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be interpreted as evidence of Webers preponderant interest in defending the valuesphere, and in this context, his dissatisfaction with Rickerts use of the termvalue acquires a new dimension.

Why does Weber have terminological doubts regarding Rickerts term value?In my opinion, this is because he feels that the concept of theoretical valuewhatwe might call value with a small vtends to devalue the dignity of the sphereof active valuesvalues with a capital V. Indeed, this committed attitude onWebers part seems to spill over into the version that he gives of Rickerts theoryof value relation. This is noticeable in Webersunusually programmaticstatement: The transcendental precondition of any cultural science is not that wefind a particular, or indeed any, culture valuable, but that we are cultural beings,endowed with the capacity and the will to take up deliberate positions to the world,and to bestow meaning on it.20 While Weber is still careful here to distinguishbetween valuation and value relation, he formulates the transcendental precondi-tion in very active terms (will, take up positions, bestow). The same ten-dency is found in many other passages where Weber describes the process of valuerelation.21 Similarly, he more or less consistently replaces the bloodless transcen-dental Ought of the neo-Kantians with a will, a claim, or a necessity. Theseexpressions are much more highly charged than those employed by Rickert;indeed, one may ask if Webers formulations are always consistent with orthodoxneo-Kantian phraseology.22

Another aspect of Webers concept of culture, and one which is highly signifi-cant in the present context, is his discussion of the nature of cultural values.Rickert takes up a markedly staticone might say, conservativeposition in thisrespect: The only values to which the scholar can legitimately relate a givenculture are those to which the persons living in the culture itself related it. Thisapproach serves Rickerts methodological purposes because it anchors the his-torical analysis in the material itself. Weber, however, refuses to go down thatpath; instead, he emphasizes the advantages of applying new analytical criteria toa given cultural material (what he calls value interpretation).

Webers emphasis on the independent dignity of values as a main aspect of thedemand for value freedom is not inconsistent with his rejection of the idea ofobjective values. In fact, it can be shown that Webers theory of a fundamentalvalue conflict coincides, both positively and negatively, with the demand for valuefreedom.23

20 MSS, 81/GAW, 180.21 See for examples Bruun (2007): 13134.22 Herbert Schndelbach, Philosophy in Germany 18311933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1984) 164.23 See Bruun (2007): 20103.


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Webers especial concern with the value aspect of the principle of valuefreedom is reflected in his much more cursory treatment of the basis of scientifictruth and of its objectivity. He is not much concerned with the objectivity of thecultural sciences at all. In fact, he obviously does not like the concept of objectivity:The word occurs only seven times in his whole production, and he invariably,evensignificantlyin the title of his famous programmatic essay on the objec-tivity of knowledge in social science, provides the word with inverted commasindicating distancing and doubt. He does now and then affirm that the results of thecultural sciences are objective (usually with that word in quotation marks!), but hedoes not discuss the question thoroughly, neither in theoretical nor in empiricalterms. Occasionally, we find an unargued reference to the norms (again, some-times in quotation marks!) of our thought or to intellectual ordering of reality.And when, in one passage (GAW, 610), he does directly refer to the point ofdeparture of Kants epistemology (scientific truth exists; it has validity; how is thatpossible?), he does so in a different context, as part of a discussion of the urge to givemeaning to life and the world. One gets the feeling that, from Webers point of view,while Rickerts theoretical valuesor even the Kantian normsare too weak asvalues, they are at the same time almost too intrusive to function as the necessarybasis for actual historical research. In this respect, it is interesting to compareRickerts delicate, but empirically not very useful, statement A fact is what I oughtto think with Webers heavily underlined references to facts as they are.24

To sum up, in broad terms, on this point: Weber takes over the general logic ofRickerts value relation, but he is hesitant about the concept of value in thisconnection, not terribly interested in discussing the basis of objectivity, and quitedefinitely opposed to the idea of objective values.

THE ETHICAL ASPECT

The main discussion of the possible Kantian dimension in Webers ethicalthought is provided by Wolfgang Schluchter. He constructs a whole system ofethics based on what he calls Webers theory of values, which in turn, accordingto Schluchter, has strong links to Kant. However, Schluchter admits that, inelaborating his thesis, he is going beyond what Weber himself was aware of.25 Inmy opinion, there is indeed a problem of over-systematization here. In Weberswritings, we find scattered discussionsmany of them characteristicallypolemicalof ethical problems, but there is nothing that merits the label of a

24 Heinrich Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (Tbingen, Germany: Mohr, 1928[1892]) 216;MSS, 19/GAW, 509; GASS, 482.

25 Wolfgang Schluchter, Religion und Lebensfhrung (Frankfurt, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1991) 297 andParadoxes of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996) 101.

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system or theory of values, nor is there any indication that Weber had theambition of constructing such a theory or system.26

What do we find, then, about values in Webers work? Above all, his famousIntermediate Reflection from 1917. Here, Weber demonstrates that as religionretreated as the overarching frame of reference of peoples lives, it increasinglyfound itself in conflict with a number of other value spheres; among thesevalues, he discusses the family, economics, politics, aesthetics, erotic love, andtruth. This account is basically empirical. Weber clearly has no desire to rank ororder these value spheres; in fact, in other works from the same period, Weberquotes with approval the remark by John Stuart Mill that, from a purely empiricalpoint of view,27 polytheism is the only appropriate metaphysics. We do find somediscussions in Webers work of a more theoretical nature,28 and here, Weber seemsto reason on the basis of what we might call the traditional triad: Truth, Goodness,and Beauty. But he regularly expands the group of relevant values to include, forinstance, religion and erotic love, without apparently reflecting on the systematicimplications of this expansionsuch as whether the traditional values shouldhold a special place. Altogether, one can only agree with Oakes when he says thatWebers analysis is surprisingly casual.29

However, there is nothing casual about the conclusions of principle that Weberproceeds to draw: He affirms that there is a fundamental conflict between all thespheres mentioned (and possibly others). Each of them can be chosen or rejectedby the individual on the basis of purely subjective commitment, but at the sametime, each of them has its own set of intrinsic laws (Eigengesetzlichkeiten)which the individual is caught up in and has to follow once he has embraced thatvalue sphere. This is the postulate of the value conflict referred to previously.

As I interpret it, Webers reasoning weakens but at the same time generalizesthe Kantian ethics, as represented by the categorical imperative. His insistence thatone must choose a value sphere seems to imply that the Kantian ethical imperativeis not categorical but only hypothetical, that is to say, only binding on those whohave freely chosen to be bound by ethics.30 But at the same time, each of the value

26 For a more thorough discussion of this point, see Bruun (2007): 3334.27 This part of Mills dictum is often forgotten. He is not talking about the absolute theoretical value

conflict, but about a much more relativistic, empirical view of values.28 Particularly in the essay on Value Freedom (MSS, 1219/GAW, 50108) and the lecture on

Politics as a Vocation, From Max Weber, eds., trans., and intr. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills(London: Routledge, 1948) (henceforth FMW) 14749/GAW, 60305).

29 Guy Oakes, Weber on Value Rationality and Value Spheres, Journal of Classical Sociology 3(2003): 29.

30 One might have supposed that the traditional value spheres had a special status which protectedthem from this subjectivity. Rickert (1892): 77, for instance, argues that anyone taking part in anargument will ipso facto have recognized the value of truth. But Weber is intransigent in this respect:


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spheres will make its own absolute demands on those that embrace them; thevalue sphere has its own categorical imperative, so to speak.31 This seems to be thesense of Webers remarks in a letter to Fr. Tnnies:

Certainly, I am of the opinion that if someone accepts the general necessity, as far as his own actionsare concerned, of letting oneself be guided by values, value judgments or whatever you want tocall them, then it is possible to demonstrate in a compelling way that he is bound by all theconsequences of the Kantian imperative (no matter in what more or less modernized formthesubstance remains the same as before).32

However, Weber goes on to say, this is only a demonstration of the formalcharacteristics of a moral attitude. That is to say that the formalism of the Kantiancategorical imperative has now been generalized to cover the ethic of any valuesphere. But nothing permits us to stipulate that the choice for or against any suchvalue is obligatory. That holds even for the value of truth, as Weber explicitly says,apparently without bothering about the inherent logical contradiction in thisposition.

In his article on Value Freedom, Weber returns to the formalism of theKantian categorical imperative, in its means-end version. Using an example fromthe sphere of erotic love, he argues that this formalism does not imply that onecannot make substantive deductions from the Kantian principle.33 These deduc-tions, he claims, support the position previously outlined: There are other valuespheres besides that of ethics; the supreme value of one such value sphere mighteven be action which only treats another person as a means, and which therefore,in Kantian terms, would be profoundly anti-ethical; nevertheless, no science candemonstrate that this attitude should be rejected.34

he explicitly says that nothing can compel anyone to accept the value of truth (cf. Bruun [2007]:7172, with references). The same holds for ethics: this is implicit in the argument in the letter fromWeber to Fr. Tnnies quoted immediately below).

31 Interestingly, Rickert, in a work written after Webers death, comes close to a similar interpretation,including the concept of inherent laws; but he only seems to advance it with respect to thetraditional value spheres of science, politics and religion (Heinrich Rickert, Kant als Philosoph dermodernen Kultur [Tbingen, Germany: Mohr, 1924] 12225).

32 Letter dated 19 February, 1909 (MWG II/6). Schluchter (1996) 90 interprets this passage differently,as dealing only with the ethical sphere. The letter is certainly not crystal clear, and it is understand-able that Hans Albert, Weltauffassung, Wissenschaft und Praxis. Bemerkungen zur Wissenschafts-und Wertlehre Max Webers, Das Weber-Paradigma, eds. Gert Albert et al. (Tbingen, Germany:Mohr/Siebeck, 2003) 90 finds the passage mysterious.

33 His reason for introducing this argument is polemical and of less importance in our context.34 MSS, 1617/GAW, 50607. We find a similar line of reasoning in a Fragment on Normative Ethics

published by Eduard Baumgarten, Max Weber. Werk und Person (Tbingen, Germany: Mohr, 1964)399401.

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Even within the sphere of ethics in the traditional sense of the term, Weberclaims that there are conflicts which cannot be resolved on purely ethical grounds.This is the point at which he introduces his famous distinction between the ethicof conviction and the ethic of responsibility. According to the ethic of conviction,the purity of intention is enough to justify an action, while the ethic of respon-sibility in addition prescribes a responsibility for the consequences of onesaction. This distinction, Weber says, is necessary because reality is ethicallyirrational. The axiological system and the system of causality are not congruent.The purity of ones intentions cannot guarantee that the consequences of onesaction are acceptable.

There is no doubt that Weber has much sympathy with the ethic of responsi-bility. His profoundly anti-naturalist bent predisposes him to acknowledge theethical irrationality of the world, with all the burdens that this may entail. But heinsists that there is no binding way of deciding in favor of one of the two ethics.

How does this discussion look in a Kantian perspective?At first glance, one might suppose that Webers claim that the conflict between

the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility was ethically irresolvablewould by itself place him in fundamental opposition to Kant, whose conception ofethics is usually regarded as non-consequentialist. However, the discussion mustbe taken a little further, in two directions, before we can come to a firm conclusionon this point.

On the one hand, although the ethic of conviction only operates on the basis ofthe purity of intention, it is not necessarily in accordance with Kants moralteachings. For instance, Kant argues that we have a perfect duty not to commitsuicide,35 while the ethic of conviction may, to take an example mentioned byWeber himself, motivate an officer to blow himself up to avoid surrendering.36

And on the other hand, Kants categorical imperative is not so completelynon-consequentialist that this would by itself rule out that the ethic of responsi-bility could be in accordance with it. As Paul Guyer argues, Kants ethical theorymay not give intrinsic value to consequences simply because they are desired, but

35 Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, KGS 4:42122.36 MSS, 25/GAW, 515. Paul Guyer, Kant (London/New York: Routledge, 2006) 196 notes that, in his

Lectures on Ethics, Kant moved some distance towards an acceptance of suicide in cases like thatof Cato, who chose to take his own life in order to encourage the Romans to continued resistance.Guyer suggests that this is a consideration which introduces quantitative considerations into moralevaluations (since the death of a few more Romans might save the lives of many more Romancitizens). Whether or not this interpretation is plausible, Kants modification is not entirely irrel-evant to the examples quoted. But Weber explicitly, when discussing the example of the officer, saysthat his action may well be totally useless in terms of its possible consequences for others. The samewould hold, for instance, for a captain who goes down with his ship. Here again, a sense of honouris the only motivating force, and one which would, I think, always fail Kants test.


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it greatly values the realization of our freely chosen ends as an expression of ourrespect for the value of our capacity of free choice itself.37 Well and good, and ina sense perhaps not so far removed from Webers great respect for values with acapital V. But the problem still persists: Guyers final formulation on this point isthat, in Kants view, we must act so that not just human beings but also theirfreely chosen ends can become a systematic union. The harmony of the realm ofends is what holds all this together. And the idea of such a harmony is quiteincompatible with Webers thesis of the value conflict.38

In this connection, Webers discussions of personality, in particular in itsrelation to guilt, are illuminating. Because of the fundamental value conflict, hesays, there will always be a possibility that acting in pursuit of one value will leadto the violation of another one. To be aware of this, and of the guilt that mustnecessarily ensue, and being able to live with it, is in Webers eyes an essentialpart of a mature personality.39 In a letter to the young philosopher Emil Lask, whohad just broken into the marriage of a senior colleague (Gustav Radbruch), Weberwrites (MWG II/8), with an astonishing lack of traditional moralism:

[. . .] guilt can become a source of strength, or not, depending on how one deals with it. It would bea terrible thing if only the integer vitae, and not its opposite (properly dealt with), could make usinto complete human beings. In that case, I at least would have had to forego such full humanity.

We may conclude that the ethic of responsibility is at the core of the Weberianconcept of a true and full personality, based on a triple acknowledgement: of thevalue conflict, of the necessity of choice forand by implication, againstcertainvalues; and of the valuational irrationality of the consequences of action in theservice of the values that one has chosen. I cannot help feeling that, leaving asidedetails of interpretation, the general inherent tension in this conception runsdirectly counter to the harmonizing character of Kants approach to ethics.40

37 Guyer (2006): 205.38 For a similar conclusion, see Wolfgang Schluchter, Rationalism, Religion and Domination. A

Weberian Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) 32.39 In the Fragment on Normative Ethics referred to above (n. 34), Weber contemptuously dismisses the

procedure by which guilt is defined in such a way that a conflict of duties is logically impossible andtherefore cannot ariseprobably a slightly roundabout way of describing the ethic of conviction.

40 Schluchter (and Henrich) are much more Kantianizing in their conclusions (Schluchter [1989]:3132; Henrich [1952]: 135ff). Among other things, these authors ascribe to Weber a theory oforiginal reason (ursprngliche Vernnftigkeit). I have strong doubts concerning this line of inter-pretation. There is little evidence to support it in Webers writings. He only uses the term Vernn-ftigkeit once, paraphrasing the ideas of others; and even Vernunft is rarely found, and never inarguments of Webers own. Joachim Radkau, Max Weber. Die Leidenschaft des Denkens, (Munich,Germany: Hanser, 2005) 577 directly denies that Weber believed in inherent natural reason, andbacks up his denial with a quotation from a letter from Weber to Mina Tobler from 1915, in which

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THE POLITICAL CRISIS

Webers considerations with respect to the ethics of conviction and of respon-sibility are particularly relevant when applied to the sphere of politics. Althoughhe first formulated them as early as 1905, in comments on the political situationin Russia, they only gained their full conceptual rigor, and at the same time theirfull historical relevance, during and, especially, after World War I, when Germanywas faced with a political crisis of the first magnitude.

In this area, when looking for the Kantian legacy, it seems natural to bypassthe neo-Kantians and to go back to Kant himself, and particularly to his treatise onEternal Peace. I shall confine my discussion of Webers and Kants positions toa few points: first, their view of the nature of politics as such; second, and arisingout of this, their evaluation of the possibility of achieving eternal peace; andthird, Webers discussion of the political ethic, compared to Kants distinctionbetween the political moralist and the moral politician.

Webers definition of the political sphere is focused not on the goals pursued bypoliticiansany goal, he says, can be pursued by a political organizationbut bythe means that they must necessarily employ to attain these goals.41 The politicianmust try to realize his goals in the real world, and therefore, he must be ready touse power (Macht), defined as the ability to make ones will prevail, even againstresistance. This certainly does not mean that the use of power always impliesactual physical coercion, but coercionpsychological, economic, or physicalmust always be the politicians last resort.42

Weber certainly does not sweeten the politicians pill in this respect: as he putsit,43 politics, defined in this way, means making a pact with the Devil. In hispolitical endeavors, the politician must at all times take due account of facts,including the expected behavior of others, and try to calculate their consequences.But causality, in Schopenhauers words, which Weber quotes with approval,44 is

Weber speaks of the completely innocent and childish belief in the power of reason. In its context,this phrase may owe something to the intimate, erotic character of Webers relationship to MinaTobler; but we find similar sceptical reflections from his pen much earlier, for instance in a letter toEmmy Baumgarten from 1887, in which he speaks of the very limited bounds of reason,compared with the heart and moral judgment (JB, 261).

41 Max Weber, Weber. Political Writings, eds. and intr. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs, trans. RonaldSpeirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) (henceforth LSPW) 16/Max Weber, Gesam-melte politische Schriften, 3rd edition, ed. Johannes Winckelmann (Tbingen, Germany: Mohr,1971[1921]) (henceforth GPS) 14.

42 Max Weber, Economy and Society, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: BedminsterPress, 1968) 53, 54/Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziolo-gie, 5th ed., ed. Johannes Winckelmann (Tbingen, Germany: Mohr, 1976 (1921) 28, 29.

43 LSPW, 352, 365, 366/GPS, 554, 557, 558.44 ORK, 135/GAW, 77.


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not a cab that can be stopped at will. The consequences of political action areincalculable. They go beyond the politicians control and his span of prediction.And, because of the essential irrationality of the causal system via--vis any realmof values, the consequences of political action may even possibly45 be contrary tothe original intention behind it.

Kant, as I read him, takes almost the opposite position. He does acknowledgethat the common will to bring civil society into being is based [. . .] on thecompulsion [. . .] of force;46 but what interests him are the ends of politicsinThe Eternal Peace, that of peaceand the spirit in which they are pursued. Judgedby his standard, one would suppose that politics, as described by Weber, would bydefinition be a-moral, since it necessarily implies looking at other persons, theiractions and reactions, as means.

The basic opposition between Kant and Weber in this area takes on almostparadigmatic form when we look at their views on the possibility of achievingpeace as a lasting goaleternal peace, in Kants words.

In Kants treatise with this title, he proposes two kinds of assurance in thisrespect.47 One is the argument that the goal of eternal peace is required by purepractical reason, and that there are (consequently) means available within natureto enable us to achieve it.48 This abstract argument is supplemented by another,more empirical one which asserts that there are forces within nature itself whichpush us in the direction of peace. The achievement of this goal may take a verylong time, but it is not a pipe dream: We can approach it ever more closely.

Webers position, which is closely linked to his thesis of the insoluble valueconflict, is in complete opposition to Kants: Conflict cannot be eradicated fromcultural life, he states, and continues a little later with the formidably apodicticstatement that: Peace means new forms of conflict, or new opponents, ornew objects of conflict or finally new chances of selectionand nothing else.49Admittedly, when we analyze his statements carefully, we come to realize that, ina sense, he is simply widening the scope of the concept of conflict. Nevertheless,

45 Weber is usually careful to argue in terms of risk and tendencies, not from any conception of theintrinsic badness of political means. However, he does seem to depart from this position ofprinciple when he says that according to an inescapable pragma that attaches to all action, forceand the threat of force unavoidably breed more violence (FMW, 334/Gesammelte Aufstze zurReligionssoziologie I [Tbingen, Germany: Mohr/Siebeck, 1920/21] 547). However, while this maybe regarded as a sort of law of nature of politics, it does not in Webers mind detract from theethical irrationality of the world.

46 Immanuel Kant, Principles of Lawful Politics. Immanuel Kants Philosophic Draft: Toward EternalPeace, trans., intr. and comm. Wolfgang Schwarz (Aalen, Germany: Scientia Verlag, 1988) (hence-forth EP) 10809/Immanuel Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden (henceforth EF), KGS 8: 371.

47 See Guyer (2006): 30001.48 It is a general premise of Kants that a moral ought presupposes a can.49 MSS, 27/GAW, 517.

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his view is fundamentally incompatible with Kants: Empirically, forces of naturemay push developments in all sorts of directions; but even if some of these mayseem conducive to peace, they will in fact always conceal a new kind of conflict.So much for the empirical prong of Kants reasoning. As for the theoreticalprong, it is defeated on its own terms: If conflict is ineradicable, then eternal peaceis unobtainable; consequently, it cannot be a moral requirement.

Given his distinction between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of respon-sibility, one would expect Weber to declare clearly in favor of the ethic ofresponsibility as being the proper political ethic: If, by definition, politics impliesacting to achieve certain goals in the real world, the ethic of conviction, whichexpressly refuses to take into account the actual consequences of such action,would seem obviously inappropriate as a guideline for politicians. Weber, in acharacteristically obstinate defense of the principle of value freedom, expresslystates that it is impossible to demonstrate scientifically that a politician shouldfollow one or the other of the two ethics;50 but his actual discussion makes it quiteclear that the ethic of responsibility will in principle be the most appropriate onefor the sphere of politics, provided the responsibility extend not only to thepractical consequences, but also to the maintenance of the goal. If there isanything that Weber loathes even more than purely convictional politics, with itsdisregard for facts, it is Realpolitik, where the end is made completely subser-vient to the means.

Where do we find Kant in this discussion? Interestingly, he makes a distinctionwhich at first glance seems relevant to the comparison with Webers position: thatbetween the moral politician and the political moralist. The moral politi-cian, Kant says will so take the principles of state prudence that they can coexistwith moral doctrine; the political moralist, on the other hand, is a contradictionin terms (cannot be thought) since he so moulds a moral doctrine for himselfas fits the statesmans advantageand a moralist cannot, by Kants definition,subordinate morality to advantage.51 But this unthinkable creature, the politicalmoralist, proves to be a hardy perennial: shortly afterward,52 he seems to be backin business as a sort of straw man, with the confusing new designation of amoralizing politician, who sees the question of attainment of political ends,including the supreme one of eternal peace, as a purely technical one, while themoral politician will see it as a moral task. Kant tries to show that the variousrealist tricks of the moralizing politician/political moralist (like do it andmake excuses; once you have done it, deny it; and create division and retain

50 LSPW, 367/GPS, 546. The precise interpretation of this passage is discussed in Bruun (2007):271n156.

51 EP, 372/PP, 110.52 EP, 373/PP, 112.


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command) will defeat their aim because they ignore the necessary moral dimen-sion of the ends of politics.53

When one tries to compare these two figuresone of them rather fuzzytotheir Weberian counterparts, what is striking is the apparent symmetry which wecan find, at least up to a point.

Kants political moralist in his unthinkable form looks much like Weberspolitician acting on the basis of the ethic of conviction. Kants political moralist isa pure moralist and therefore cannot, logically speaking, be a politician. Webersconvictional politician explicitly refuses to enter the proper field of politics, that ofactual consequences, in order to keep his conviction pure; in this sense, he, too, isnot a proper politician at all. Weber does not, like the rigorous Kant, pronouncesuch a person unthinkableindeed, he discusses him at length. But in essence,the two types are alike.

When we come to Kants apparent second incarnation of the political mor-alist, the one who pursues his political ends with all sorts of political tricks, butwithout regard for the fact that political ends need to be in accordance with themoral law, we seem to be confronted with some prototype of the Realpolitikerwhom Weber despised. To be sure, the Kantian type still strives for politicalgoals, which the Realpolitiker would perhaps have given up entirely in orderto concentrate only on retaining power. But the thrust of Kants comments goesin the real-political direction, not least when he castigates this type forbusying itself not with the practice of politics but with the practices of poli-tics.54 We should not push the parallel too far, though: one of the political tricksthat Kant comments unfavorably on is that of denying a thing, but neverthelessdoing it. But Weber himself advocates precisely that course in a letter duringWorld War I:

During the Boer War, Lord Salisbury said: We dont want any diamond or gold mines. Thisstatement had a very positive effect. When eventually the military and diplomatic situation put himin possession of them, and he could keep them, he kept them. So far, we have done exactly theopposite. We believe that to be the honest way. But surely, it must be possible to make clear [. . .]that Lord Salisburys method was cleverer than ours.55

Finally, Kants third (or second?) type: the moral politician. Here, the symmetrywith Webers categories seems to break down: The moral politician regards thecounsels of state prudence as compatible with the demands of moral doctrine, andtempers his action to respect and uphold this compatibility. This position, from

53 EP, 37476/PP, 11316.54 EP, 373/PP, 112.55 Max Weber, Gesammelte politische Schriften, 1st ed., ed. Marianne Weber (Tbingen, Germany:

Mohr, 1921) 47172.

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Webers point of view, rests on the fundamental deluded belief that this compat-ibility is generally possible. To be sure, a politician may try in his political actionto act both politically and in consonance with the demands of morality. For sometime, this may even be possible. But in the end, the value conflict will erupt andpresent the politician with a choice between the demands of state and the demandsof conscience. And he will also realize, if he reflects on the consequences of hisactions, that he may already have violated the demands of conscience withoutknowing it since Schopenhauers causal cab rolls on and on, out of sight and downunimagined roads. This existential tension is the polar opposite of Kants defini-tional harmony.

But Weber takes a final step in his consideration of the political ethic. Yes, theethic of responsibility may normally be the adequate political ethic. But when thisbreaking point appears, as it must, to a mature politician who reflects on what heis doing, he may in the last resort choose to renounce the responsibility and to takerefuge in pure conviction, like Luther: Here I stand, I can do no other. God helpme.56 So, while Kant sees the moral conscience as a necessary precondition ofpolitical action in the proper sense of the word, the corresponding attitude, theethic of conviction, is in Webers view the last resort of the politician who can nolonger carry the moral burden of his office, and who, in this, chooses to respectvalues above consequences, while giving them both their full due and acceptingthe ensuing guilt.

To conclude, in highly condensed form: Where Kant and his disciples lookedfor order and harmony, Weber saw multiplicity and conflictthe incompatibilityof values. Weber, like Kant, conceived duty to be a central anchor of personality;but where the Kantian duty pushes the individual along a path towards the dictatesof reason, the Weberian duty forces the individual to acknowledge that confron-tation with harsh realities which his free choice of values and aims necessarilyentailsthe importance of consequences. Commentators57 have pointed out thatthe development of a specifically responsibility-oriented ethic is historicallylinked with paradigmatic situations of crisis. As Weber formulated it, this ethicseems to me to be particularly appropriate in an age of crisis.

Department of SociologyUniversity of Copenhagen

56 LSPW, 36768/GPS, 559.57 Christian Mller, quoted by Martin Endress, Max Weber zwischen Immanuel Kant und Jrgen

Habermas Verantwortliches Handeln in gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen, eds. Agathe Bienfait &Gerhard Wagner (Frankfurt, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1998) 57.


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Bruun - Weber and Neokantianism