British Infantry in the Falklands

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THE RRlIISI I INFANTRY IN THE FRLKLANDS CONFLICT:LI:.SSONS OF THE LIGHT INFANTRY IN 1982 AND

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MASIER OF MII.ITARY ART AND SCIENCEII HIS AIIROVAL. PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Andrew M. lullanThesis litlc: lhc ISritish Infantry in the ~:alklands Conflict: I .cssons of the I.ight Infantryin 19X2 and Their Relevance to the British Army al the Turn of the Century

Approved by:

.., lhcsis Committee Chairman

, Mcmbcr

, Mcmbcl

Accepted this 4th day of June 1999 by:

( irector, Graduate Dcgrec ProgramsThe opinions and conclusions expressed hcrcin arc those ol the student author and do notnecessarily reprcscnt the views ofthc U.S. Army Command and (ieneral Staff College orany other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoingstatement.)

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TABI ,FI OF CONTENTS

,~lll~OVAL IACil: ..........................................................................Al3SIKAC:T ..................................................................................ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................I.lSl 01: II.1.USTRATIONS ...............................................................CHAPll:R

I, THESIS OVERVIEW ..............................................................2. ll-1l.iFAI.KLANI)S ISLANDS: TIIEIR HTSIORYAND AN OVERVIEW 01: l-HE 1982 CONFLICT ................................3. .TRAINING. E~lJIPMENl: AND MEN ........................................1. AD IlOC FORMAIIONS, LIGI 11 Nl~ANTlIY LOADS,AND TIIE l~EGlMENlAI. SYSTEM ................................................5. CONCLIJSIONS AND RI:T.EVANCI~ ..........................................

APPENDIXA. IARTICIIANTS AND CASUALTIES IN THli MAJOR LANDBATTI.l?S ............................................................................B. BR1TlSll ARMY: GROIJND FOR(:IS ORDER OF

BA1II.T:..............................................................................

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5576

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C. HRllISlI ARMY TRIAL FITNl?SS TESI AS AlMARC11 1999 .......................................................................

l~IBLIOGllAPlIY,, ........................................................................INITIAL L~ISTRlBlJlION LIST .........................................................


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11.1USlIIAIIONS

IGgurci.2.3.4.5.6.I.8.9.

IO.II.

lablc

- . .....I hc Falklands, South Georgia and Soufh Sandwich isiands ........................I&t and West Falkland ..................................................................South Georgia .............................................................................I listory of the Falklands .................................................................Operation Sutton and the Hrcakout from the Reachhcad .RattIc for Stanley -- Ihasc I ............................................................Rattle for Stanley -- Phase 2 & 3 ......................................................Marching: A Strategic Issue ............................................................fhe Relationship Rctwcen Identified Key Factors in the I:alklands ...............The lnflucnce of Key Factors and Modifying Factors on t!nit Capability ........rhc Organization of the Infantry in the British Army, March 1999 ...............

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I, Summary of Main Lessons and Sub Lessons 77

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CIIAPTER I1IIESIS OVERVI~.W

On 2 April 19X2Argentinean orces nvaded he Falkland slands.Three days after the. . _^ .invasion, H&LYiiernes and 111%4Snvincihie icft the United Kingdom to head what was tobc the largest ask force in recent history. On 25 April the task force repossessed outhGeorgia. On the night of20/21 May the first major landing on the Falkland Islandswasmade at San Carlos Water. In the actions hat followed there were inevitable set backsand casualtics.Nevertheless,justover three weeksafter the landing the Argentineanforces surrendered. t was by any standards brilliant campaign,marked by exceptionallogistics planning and improvisation, anclcarried through with outstandingskill andli)rtitudc.Ministry of Defense,?he~ulkluntls Wart The I,essons

Keep your handsoff lhe Regimcnls,you iconoclasticcivilians who meddle and muddle nArmy matters; you are not soldiersand you do 1101nderstand hem.2I:ield Marshal Viscount Wolseley, Se Story of a Soldiers I-!/i

Problem-lhc 19x2 FalklandsConflict descended pon Britain out of a seemingly clear

blue diplomatic sky. catching he Armed Forcesof the IJnited Kingdom off guard.Dcspitc this. within three daysa Royal Navy task force was steatningsouth prepared odispute the Argentinean nvasion, by force if necessary.Mobilized in direct support 01this operation were thirty thousandservicemenand women and I08 ships. Included inthis packagewere two light intiiilry brigades:5 Infantry ljrigdde (5 Inf Hde) and 3Commando 13rigadc 3 Cdo Bdc). In total, these wo brigadescomprisedof five Armyinfantry battalions and three Royal Marine commandos defined later). Of concern o thisthesis are the lessons earnedby the Armys live infantry battalions,and the cominuedrelevanceof these cssons o the British Army at the turn of the century.


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A brief survey of history tells us that, for the British Army, being caughtunprepared s nothing new. nor hassuch a pattern ofcvcnts changed in the interveningyears since he l~alklandsConllict. lhc most recent cxamplc of this being Kosovo in1999.with the imminent dcploymcnt ofcight thousandsoldiers to the bordersof Serbiaincreasing he proportion ofsoldicrs WI operations O 27 percent of the recruited strengthofthc Army. This figure takesno accountofthosc preparing to deploy or those whohavcjust returned rom operations. t is fair to conclude from this that the British Army isover committed. I:urthcrmore,all the opcrntionsare, currently. pcacc support tasks.all 01which are a distraction to the preparation01 he Army for its pcrccived primary role --high intensity warlighting.

Nowevcr, the root causeof the Armys plight is not the commitment level tooperations,which is the Armys raison detre. but the heavy-handedcut backs n the sizeoithc Army following the end of the (:old War. The ush to cash n on an apparentpcaccdividend has eft the Army under rcsourccdand under strength. This, despite all thewarning signs hat the demiseofthe Soviet 1Jninnwould lcave a power vacuum intowhich chaoswould, and did, step.

Symptomaticofthc changes n the British Army is the infantry. By the end of1998 he Hritish Army had reducedby one third. with infantry battalions being cut innumber rom fitly-eight to forty. Ihc key planning assumptiondriving rcstructuriny wasthat a major war or operation requiring a substantialnational commitment would berecognizedwith months lnot years n which to react. Consequently, not only has heArmy reduced n size but readiness imes and training levels have also been cut. Theinkmtry, as all regular units, now operateon a method of graduated readiness.That is, a

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small proportion of infantry battalionsare al a high stateofrcadiness (between wo andfive days notice IOmove), a higher proporlion are at a medium stateof readiness ten lotwenty days) and the majority arc at the lower stateof readiness thirty days). Thoseinfantry units at thirty days notice to mnve are rcsourced o conduct little (if any)cnllcctivc training with the other arms and services. The nfantry, therefore, camlot affordto squander ts limited training opportunities. However, with such a high proportion ofthe Army deployedon peacesupportoperationsone wonders f the policy of graduatedrcadincss emainsa viable method of preparing an army for warlighting or whether tsimply scrvcsas an impediment o unit preparation. lnlortunately, answering hisspecific question ies nutsidc of the scopeof this thesis.Purposeand Sconeof the Study

The FalklandsConflict represents he last time that the British infantry,specifically the light inlaniry, ought in pitched battle. The purpose of this study is tn re-evaluate he lessons f the FalklandsConflict and consider heir continued relevance othe British Infmtry. The scopeof this study s the three week ground campaign n whichsix battlcs wcrc fought. II is from the approach o and conduct ofthese battles that themain lessons or the British Infantry will be sought. As such, the primary question or thisthesis s: Are the lessonsof the infantry from the EalklandsConflict relevant to theBritish Infantry at the turn of the twentieth century? Therearc two subordinatequestionsthat support his primary question: I ) What lessonsdid the British infantry learn fromthe FalklandsConflict? and (2) Are these essonsstill relevant? A study of theFalklandsConflict, a limited-war conductedby light inf&ntry, may help determine, npurr, those actors hat are essential o infantry success n the battlefield.

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This hesis will not comment upon the immediatepolitical eventssurrounding heconflict nor make udgments as to the moral rights and wrongs of the British and

Argentineanposilion in the Falklands. When determining he lessonsof the conllict, thatis answering he first subordinate question, the focus will hc on the lessons s regards helight infantry. I Iowever, on a broader scale all these cssons rc applicable o all theinfantry of the British 4rmy. For the purposesofthis thesis he following aspects f theground campaign are not considered n any detail: the initial defenseofthe islands:SpecialBoat Service (SBS) operations, SpecialAir Service SAS) opcmtions,or therecapturingof South Georgia.Ihc Infantry

The irst brigade to deploy lo the Falklands was 3 Cdo Brigade, which comprisedof40.42 and 45 Commando (Cdo)?2nd Ilattalion the ParachuteRegiment (2 PARA),and 3rd Hattalion Iarachutc Regiment (3 IARA), under the commandof Brigadier JulianIhompson.Five Inf Bde arrived in the Falklands somenine days after 3 Cdo Hde.ThisBrigade comprisedof the 2nd Rtlttalion ScatsGuards ScatsGuards), I SIBattalion WelshGuards Welsh Guards),and 1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburghs Own Gurkha Rifles(7 GR), under the command of Brigadier Tony Wilson. With the arrival of 5 Inf I3dc nthe arca ofopcrations, a divisional headquarterswas establishedunder the commandofMqjor GeneralJeremy Moore.

The three Royal Marine commandoscommit ted o the Falklands Conflict weresimilar in size, organization, and basic equipment o their infantry counterpart n theArmy. However, being part of the Royal Navy, they were, and are, outside of theeveryday unning of the British infantry and are resourccd o select and train their

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soldiers for missions that are outside of the standard nfantry requirement.Because f thisthey are not a major consideration n this thesis. n the authors opinion, the battalionsofthe ParachuteRegiment and the commandounits of the Royal Marines rcprcsent heelite light infantry of the Armed Forces. Without the commitment of theseunits at thectlrly stagesof the Falklands Conflict it is doubtful if the ground campaignwould havebeen such a remarkable success.

The infantry from the Army that deployed o the 1;alklands perated n the lightrole, although of the infantry that deployedonly the parachutebattalionsanclQurkhaswere dedicated ight infantry. The two Guardsbattalions,akin with the rest of theinfantry, arms plot between various roles, ncluding armored nfantry, mechanizedinfantry and light infantry. The role of light infantry has many guises, ncluding airmobileinfantry, public duties (which includesccrcmonial guard duty at BuckinghamPalaceandWindsor Castle, and providing the guard for stateoccasions),overseasgarrisons, esidentinfantry in Northern Ireland, and so on. The processof arms plotling is the moving 01units from basesand between oles every two to six years.As an example,over a periodof twenty years a battalion can expect o be based n about tight different locations(overseas nd in the Ilnited Kingdom) and have been n tight different roles. During thistime a battalion will be called upon to do severalsix month operational ours to Bosnia,Northern Ireland, or wherever there s a requirement.The exception o the armsplottingprocess s the parachute ole, which is only conductedby the three battalionsof theParachuteRegiment (there are currently two in role parachutebattalions). The out of roleparachutebattalion is normally serving two years n Northern Ireland.

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I)espile their diIfcrcn1 oles, the organizationof 1he ive Army batlalions wasbroadly similar. Each haltalion had five companies, hree n the rillc role (although bo1hparachu1c atlal ions had one of thesecompanysdouble taskedas a patrol company). oneheadquarters ompany (responsible or administrationand logistics) and one supportweaponscompany. All support weapons ompanies ad an 8 I millimeter mortar (8 I mmmonar) platoon and a Milan anti-lank platoon, the carriageof whose ammunition provedu major tes1oLimprovisationand toughness uring the conflict.

Irach olthc ritlc companieshad hree platoons,eachplatoon having three sectionsofcighl men (as a general rule). Sect ionswere themselves ivided into two four-man lircteams. n commandof each section. deally, was a corporal with a lance-corporal as thesecond n command. In commandof eachplatoon. ideally. was an officer (lieutenant OIsecond ieu1cnant)with a sergeantas he platoon second n command. Majorscommanded he rillc cornpanicsand were servedhy a small headquarlers.usuullyconsisting of a captain (second n command),a sergeantmajor, a color sergeant(responsible or administra1ion). couple of signalersand a couple of storemen.Marcmen could be added o the companyheadquarters s required, although at the cxpcnse ofthe rillc platoons or anolher company n the battalion.

Platoonswcrc armed with (approximately)1wclve66 millimeter light antitankweapons G6mm .AW), one X4 millimeter medium antitank weapon (Carl Gustav), and a2-inch mortar to provide local il lumination and smoke.Each section had one gcncral -purposemachine gun (CiIM(i), with the remainderof the section urmed with the 7.62rim sclf-loading rille (SLK). The GIMG was also used n the sustained ire role, whichresulted n a ma.jor ogistics and portability burden for the in~mtry. Most soldiers carried

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OIICor twn high explosive (IK) or phosphorousgrenades.Radio commmiications wentdown IO lirc team level using a new radio system hat had been distributed to thebattalions ust before deployment.

lhc other arms and servicessupported he infimtry that fought in the Falklands, osomeclcgree r other, in what is ternled combined arms operalions. This term is delincdas the synchroniycdor simultaneousapplication of several arms, such as infantry, armor.artillery, engineers,air defense,and aviation, to achieve an effect on the enemy that isgreater han if each ami was usedagainst he enemy n scquencc. As the Falklandsproved. combined armsoperationsare mportant to the successof the infantry battle.Ilowcver, its successfulapplication rcquircs ntensive raining, preferably on a liequcnthasis, n order to avoid skill fade.ThesisOutline

This thesis will bc divided into five chapters.Chapter 2 provides an overview ofthe I:alklands Conflict to help place he lessons ater described n some form of conLex1.Included in this chapter s a brief description of the islands terrain and climate, anannotatedchronology and a short description of the ground campaign.

The infantry lessonsof the conflict are dentified in chapters 3 and 4, thcrehyanswcriny the lirst subordinatequestion. Chapter 3 focusesupon those lessons hat can bcidentified from official sourcesand the writings of those who participaled in the conflict.Chapter4 will describe hose lessons dentified by an analysis ofall the availableinformation on the conflict. As such, he Icssonsdescribed n chapter 3 reflccl theperceivedwisdom of the lessons carncd rom the conflict, and the lessons n chapter 4are lessonsunique to this thesis.

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Chapter 5, the concluding chapter, considers he lesso~ls rom the precedingchaptersand describes he root causesollhe identified in~mtry lessons. Ihc rclcvancc01these essons o ~hcBritish Army at the turn oithc twentieth century s then discussed.thcrchy answering he secondsubordinatequestion and the primary question.

Ministry ollkfensc. The Falkland~ WW: The 1xsson.sLondon: I ler MajestysStationeryOllice, Dcccmbcr 1982). 5 - 0.*Peter i. lsouras~Wurri0r.s Words: .4 Dictionar~~ c~/Mi/i/ur~~ L)uotari ons(I .ondon:Arms and Amiour Press, 1992): 35X.Ministry oflkfcnsc, Soldier IO Soldier: Overs!re/ch und /he ~Jnplunnuhle in

Soldier: :Mugazine ctf/he l3rirish Army (Andover: St lvcs Ltd., March 1999), 3.U.S. Departmentof the Army, FM 101-S I, Opera/ionul 7bwzs und Graphics(Washington,DC: IJ.S. Government Printing Office, IS Scptcmber1997).1-32.

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TIIE FAI.KI.AND ISlANDS: THEIR HISTOKY ANDAN OVIXVIEW 01: IHli 1982 CONFLICI

lhe mosl detestableplace I was ever at in my life .one wild heath wherever you turnyour eye.Lieutenant ThomasColeman, Wcrr n the Fdklunds

lhe 1982 FalklandsConllict was fought over the issueofthe sovereignty ofthcI;alklands Islands,South Georgia,and the South Sandwich slands. Iogether, hese hreeisland groups orm the I~alklanclslandsDependencies lig. I). What follows is adescriptionof the islands,an overview of the history of the Falklands,an annotatedchronology ofcvcnts, and a bricfdcscription of the land campaign,

I:igure 1. lhc Falklands,South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands9


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lh IslandsThe I:alkland Islands ie some eight thousand miles from IMain and three

hundred milts from the cask oast of Argentina and arc the only ma,jor sland group in rhcSaudi Atlantic. They consist (as sho~vn n fig. 2) ol t\hn main islands, T:asland WestFalkland.and more than one hundred smaller ones, which in total cover 4,700 squaremilts in area approximately two-thirds the sbc of Wales). Falkland Sound,a narro\\strip of water, separates Cast nd West I:alkland. All the Islandsarc mainly moorland andtree&.


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On East and West I~alkland here are several ow mountains, he highestbeingMount Ushornewhich standsat 2,3 I2 feet. Although more akin to moorland hills thanmountains, heir slonc runs, craggy tops, and ubiquitous peat bogs make them formidahlcterrain for heavily laden infantry to move and tight over. Easy o defend, most ottheinfantry f ighting was to take place on these fcaturcs.

lhc climate of the islands s cool and damp. It is frequently cloudy, although hereis little rainfall (annual average s twenty-five inches).The winds blow strong and often.with a meanannual speedofscventeen knots. Mean monthly temperatures ary fromforty-nine degreesFahrcnhcic n January (summer) o thirty-six degreesFahrenheit nJuly (winter). During the period ofthe land campaign he temperatureshoveredaround orfell below freezing. In sum, the Falklands climate is tempcratc.The Iatc autumn andwinter monthsarc rarely severebut are unpleasant: he constantwind, damp, cold, andlack ofsheltcr will slowly debilitate a well-equipped and motivated prol&sional soldier.lhc ll-equipped or inadequaccly rained and poorly motivated soldier will struggleCOsurvive n such conditions, let alone remain combat effective. As a rule, during thecampaign,once a man was wet hc stayed wet; the hcst hat could hc achievedwas a stateofdarnpncss.Most mens feet never dried and many men suffered rom trench foot.

The otal population of the Falklands at the 1980censuswas 1 X 3.* III 19X2,ustover one thousandpeople ived in the capital, Stanley, he only town on the Falklands.The remainderofchc population was dispersed hroughout the islands n smallscttlemencs, ollectively referred to as the camp (coming from the Spanishwordcrrtnpnna,meaningan open grasslandprairie). The largestsettlementand the sccncofthctirst land battle, was GooseGreen, with a population ofapproximately one hundred.

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Outside of Stanley here was no road network; tracksdid exist hut were little nmcthan sheep uns or wheel ruts in the peat. lhc absence f a road network meant that, onceashore:all suppliesand casualtieswere carriedcm the hacksofmcn or Ilown hy theovertaxed and small hclicoptcr ibrce. Significant ogistics drag was incvitablc giventhcsc conditions. Ihc rate of advancewas determinedby the speedat which the in&trymarched and the time required o drag up more supplies.

Some olthe settlementshad an airstrip: the majority ofwhich were nothing morethan clcarccl ields. Thesewould bc uscclby the Argentineans or their close supportaircraft but were ollittle value to the IWish, cxcepcas a target. An airport was located atStanIcy and at the time ofthc conflict was capableoftaking civilian medium-hauljcts:hut not military jets unless he runway was Icngthened. lhc Argentineansused Stanleyairport until the day or surrcndcr.

Most ofthc lslandcrs were of British extractionand regarded hcmsclvcsasBritish. The main industry was sheep18rming. lthough due to poor pasture he sheeppopulation was calculated n acresper sheep ather han sheepper acre. In 19X0.exportsCOBritain of wool and hides otaled 2.X million poundsand imports of food.manufacturedgoods, imber and machinery from South America and Britain) wcrcvalued at two mil lion pounds. In local waters herewas abundantsea ife, but therewasno significant fishing industry based rom the islands.Prior IO he conflict the secondlargest source of income was the philatclic industry. which receivccla major boost afterhostilities due to increaseddemand rom an awakened nternational community to theexistenceof the islands.

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Over all this ruled the Governor, appointedby the British Foreign Ofticc whoheadeda local governmentbasedupon an ExecutiveCouncil and a Legislative Council.In 19X X2 this local governmentbalancedpublic revcnucand expenditure at around 2.4million pounds. lhe governmentalso administered he two dcpcndencicsof SouthGeorgia and the South Sandwich slands.

Figure 3. South Georgia

South Georgia s a long thin island measuringone hundred miles by an average01twenty miles, and lies nine hundredmiles east-southeast fthc Falklands (fig. 3). It iscompletely mountainous,covered with glaciersand s gripped by fierce cold. The highestmountain is Mount Pagetstandingat 9,625 feet. Conditions throughout the year are nearAntarctic, with soldiering being more a battle against he elements han against any

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The Dutch Captain SebaldDC Wcert was the first to plot someof the islands01the Falklandsgroup when he recorded hem on the Dutch maps of the early seventeenthcentury.The first man to set foot on the t:alklands was the English Captain John Strongin 1690.Staying only briefly, hc named Falkland Sound after I.ord Falk land of theAdmiralty. The first to make use ofthc resourcesof the islands were Frenchsealhuntersfrom Brit tany who made regular rips to the islands from 169X.They named hesehunting grounds ts Iles Malounines after their homeport of St. Malo.

llnder the 1713 lreaty of Utrecht (signatories ncluded Britain and France):Spainscontrol of its lerritories in South America, including the Falklands,wasconfirmed. This: however, did little to curb the British and French amhitions for the area.

It was the French noblemanAntoine de 13ougainvillcwho acted irst. By mid-I764 he had establishedPort Louis, north of the present day site of Port Stanleyandclaimed he islands or France. n 1765 Commodore John Byron briefly stoppedon WestFalklandand hoisted he Union Jack, counter-claiming the Islands or Dritain. He namedthe spot Port Egmont, planted a small vegetablepatch, andpromptly sailed away. A yearlater CaptainJohn McBride was sent out to consolidate Byrons claim by building a fortand ejecting any other settlerswho may be on the islands.

The Spanishwere furious at the blatant breach of the Treaty of IJtrccht by bothUritain and France.Under signilicanl diplomatic pressure he Frenchceded he PortI .ouis colony to the Spanish n return for financial compensation o dc Bougainville. Thetransferwas completed n 1767 when Don Felipe Ruiz Puentewas nstalled as the firstSpanishGovernor of the islandsand the colony was renamedPuerto Solcdad. lwo yearslalcr, a Spanish orce of five ships and 1,400 troops evicted the British colony in Port

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&nom. War was averted only when Spainagreed o Mtain returning to the colony,although Spain reserved he right to sovcrcignty. ronically, the British colony wasabandonedsome three years ater (I 774).

In 1700, Spain and Britain signed he Tiootka SoundConvention, by whichBritain formally renouncedany colonial ambitions n South America and the islandsadjacent. For the next thirty years he Falklandswent uncontested s he Spanishcolon)of lslas Malvinas.

I:ollowing indcpcndencc rom Spain n I XI 6, the (Jnited rovinccs of Rio dc laPlata. he future state of Argenlina (and henceforth efcrrcd to 21s rgentina), claimed theprevious colonies of Spain n South America. ncluding the Mklands. In 1X20 heydispatcheda frigate to take possession f Has Malvinas. and in I X23 BuenosAiresappointed he first governor of the islands.fhc new Ciovcrnor, ,ouis Vernct. arrived in182Xand began he dcvclopmcnt of fishing, farming. and the control of scaling.

In 1X3 Vcrnet arrested he American crew of the schooner fwrief for sealpoaching and confiscated the ships cargo. Vernct then sai led with the Ifurrief and ~CIcrew LO ~ucnosAires to place her captain on trial. In reprisal the American consul nI3ucnosAries. encouragedby the British Consul: dispatched he IJSS Lexing!on(fortuitously in harbor), under the commandofCaptain Silas h~ica~~, lo Iucrto Solcdadin order to reclaim the confiscated properly. Taking matters nto his own hands,and in anact of blatant piracy, Duncan reclaimed he property then proceeded o spike heArgentinean guns, to hlow up the garrisons powder, to sack he settlementbuildings, andto arrest most of the inhabitants. Ilc then declared he islands ree of all governmentandsailedaway.

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Argentina protcstcd uriously to the Americans, to no avail, and a year of chaosensued.Argentina dispatcheda new governor charged with setting up a penal colony. Onlanding, howcvcr. his prisonersabruptly murdered him a~lclestablished heir own colony.On hearingof this latest disaster he Argentineansdispatcheda force to the islands orestoreorder. Advised by the British consul in Buenos Aires of the confusion, the IWishAdmiralty dispatched he warshipsUio and Tyne, under the commandof CaptainOnslow; to claim the Falklands or Britain (despite the Nootka SoundConvention).

Onslow wcighcd anchor on 2 January, I X33, and going ashore he next day struckthe Argcntincan lag ancl aised he Union Jack. The Falklands slandswere now theproperty of the IJnited Kingdom as a result of an action that, as John Troutbcck of theBritish Foreign Office in 1936observed, is not easy o explain . without showingourselvesup as nternational bandits.

lhc Argentineanswere understandablyoutraged by the action, The IICWS f thecapturecut deep nto the psycheof the new nation. As the Falklandshistorian W.1:Uoyson records The young Republic was ablaze with indignational 111~nsult to herdignity and the resentment asted or long. The seeds or the 1982Falklands Conflictwcrc sown.

Britain started o settle he islands and formally declareda colonial administrationin I X42 see ig. 4). In 1908,Hritain declared sovereignty over the uninhabited territorysouth of the Falklands, hus creating the Falk land Islands Dependencies, hich includedSouth Georgiaand the South Sandwich Islands.

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Argentina continued o pursueher claim to the islands, n 196.5. ficr a period ofintcnsc Argentinean lobbying, the United Nations passedResolution 2065 specifying thatthe FalklandslMalvinas was a colonial problem and thus t fell to Britain and Argentina tofind a peaceful solution. Talkscontinued oliand on for the next seventeen earswithoutsstisfactory resolution. R&in argued hat its right to ownership estedon her pcaccli~land continuous possession fthe islandsover a long period of time and upon the

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Islanders right of self-determination. n 1980 he Islandersand Argentina rejected heone remaining solution of Icase-back nd shared esponsibility.

lhc Argentinean decision o invade the Falklandswas made n 1982 by a militaq,junta hat faced growing political and inlernal unrestand a call for a return lo democracy.Capturing the Malvirzas proved an irresistible way of stifling, in part, internal dissentanda meansof uniting the countr>.Additionally, If the Falklands slandswere brought undctArgentinean control by force of arms hen it would also serveas a vindication olmil itar)rule.Annotated Chronoloav of the 1982 Conflicl

The following is an annotatedchronology of the key eventsof the FalklandsCampaign. Limited spaceprecludesa more detaileddescription.The datesand cvcntsrecorded are taken from a British perspective.2. Argentina launchedOperationAzzrl (Blue), the invasion of the I:alklandsIslands. Al 925 A.M. Governor Hunt ordered he sixty-nine Royal Marines basedonEast Palklands o surrender o the invading force of approximatelyone thousandArgentinean marines and special orces supportedby the Argentinean leet. lhreeCdoHde and 5 Inf Bdc were warned or operations.3 April. Argentina invaded South Georgia. After a bricffirelight the Royal Marines onthe island surrendered. The IJN passedSecurity Council Resolution 502, whichcondemned he invasion and demanded he immediatewithdrawal of Argentinean orces.5. A task force carrier group, spear-headed y the carriersHMS Hermes and IIMSInvincible, set sail from the United Kingdom for the South Atlantic.

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(j Ati. Over the proceedingweek units oF3 Cdo Hde, under 1heCommand ofI3rigadictJulian Thompson. sailed or the South Atlamic. The Brigade arrived at the AscensionIslands,a midway point, throughoui 1hcmiddle of April and remained 1hercconductingtraining and essentialadminis1ration ntil departing on 1he6 May.I2 April. The United Kingdom declareda two hundred-mile maritime exclusion zonearound he I;alklands sltlnds. Task Force3 19.9. dcpar~ed heAscension Islands oconduct 0pcra1ion artrque!, the planned epossession f South Georgia.IX AtCl. A naval batrlc group comprising of thirteen warships and four supply ships.commandedby Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, sailed or the South Atlantic 10commcnccoperationsagainst he ArgentineanNavy and Air Force.21 Aoril. The SAS and SBS madean abortive anding on Sou1hGeorgia.22 Anrii. Five infiidc siaried cxcrcise, iieisil F&on. in preparalion for depioyment.25 April. The Argentinean submarineSunrcz e was auackcd md disabled when i1 wascaught on the surfaceby two hclicoptcrs near Sou1hGeorgia. The crippled submarinewaslater abandoned n (jrylvikcn Harbor, South Georgia. Operation araquef was swiftlylaunched o take maximmn advantage f any disorder caused10 he Argentineans by thisincident. South Georgia wds recapturedwithout a shot being lircd.26 April. lwo PARA and a troop ol1hc Blues and Royalswith four Scimitar tend woScorpion ight tanks departedPortsmouth.30 April. The United Kingdom dcclarcda total exclusion zone around the Falklands. TheArgentineanshad. by this date, garrisoned he islands with thirteen 1housand crviccmcn.three quartersof whom wcrc locatedaround he Stanley arca.

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IMa,. The carrier battle group entered he total exclusion zone and commenced eaandair operationsagainst he Falklands.RAF Vulcan bombers rom Ascension slandconducted heir lirst of a seriesofhombing raids against he Falklands,codcnamcd MuckIluck.2. Ihc ArgentineancruiserC;enrruI llelpwx~ (previously the American Ihoeniswhich had beenat Pearl Harbor in Dcccmher I941 ) was smik by the Bri tish nuclearsubmarineHMS C.onqucror. One Argentinean patrol vesselwas sunk and anotherhadl)damagedwhile operating n Falklandswalers.4l. IIMS Sh@ld, a Type 42 destroyer.was hit and baclly damagedby an Exocctmissile. Shewas he first Bri tish ship to be hit and was to sink five days ater when underlow. lhc first Sea Iarrier was shot down during a raid on CiooseGreen.6. ThreeCdo Rrigadc departedAscension Island for the South Atlantic, less2IAKA, which arrived at Ascension sland on the same ay.7. The British Governmentdeclared hat anyArgentinean warship and militaryaircraft over 12 miles from the Argentineancoasl would be regardedas hostile. TwoPARA deparledAscension slands.9. lhc Argentine ntelligence rawler, Nun&, was sunk.IO May. The Argentine submarineSan I.uis made her last reported, and unsuccessful,attack on the ships01 he Task Force.I 1 May. HMS Alucrily sank he store ship Cuho de lm Esrudus in Falkland Sound.12. QMl left Southamptonwith 5 InlRde. HMS Glasgow was badly damaged n anair raid and was he lirst ship to return to home waters becauseof battle damage.

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Brigadier Thompson received the li rllowing directive from Mgjor tieneral Moore:You are to securea bridgeheadon Last 1:alkland. nto whichreinforcementscm bc landed, n which an airstrip can be establishedand fromwhich operations o repossesshe I~alklands slandscan bc achieved.You arc LOpush forward f rom the bridgeheadarca as far as he maintenanceof securityallows, to gain information to establishmoral and physical domination over thecncmy, and to forward the ul timate objective ofreposscssion.You will retaiuoperational control of all forces anded n the Falklands. .it is then my intentionto land 5 Infantry Brigade into the beachhead nd to develop operations or thecomplete repossession f the I%lkland Islands.

14!15 Mav. Spccinl forces conducted a night raid against he Argentinean air baseatPebble sland destroying eleven Argentineanaircraft.18, 'lhc British Cabinet approved he SanCarlos anding plan. Chilean authoritiesfound a burnt-out SW King on sovereign erritory and apprchendcd he threemiencrew.lo&. Twenty-one men were killed when a SeaKing hclicoptcr crashedwhiletransferring roops hctween HMS Z1erme.s and IIMS Intrepid.20 May. I:ivc Inf Bde arrived at Ascension sland. Major GeneralMoore oined the13rigudc nd assumedcommand ofthe Landing Force. although operational controlremainedwith Urigtldicr Thompson.2 I Mav. Operation Sutton. the amphibious anding on East Falkland, was aunched. n theearly morning the lirs~ Argcntinenn aircralt attacked lx ships supporting the IandinX nI,alklandSound and those n the San Carlos anchorage. Theattackscontinued hroughoutmost of the day, hampering the landing operation. So startcd he crucial battlc for controlofthe air and sea, asting for the next six days.

Five Inf Bdc departed Ascension shdndwith Major General Moore On departingAscension,Moore lost contact with the land forces n the Falklandsdue tocommunications ailure. He would not regain contact until 2X May.2

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23 May. An Argentinean bomb crippled HMS Anklope, the ship sinking the next day.25 May. IIMS Chven/ry was sunk and an Exocet missile hit theA/h/k Convc~yor, heship sinking three days ater. lhc loss of the A~lnntic ( onveyorand ts cargo oftwclvchelicopters, ncluding three Chinooks, was a seriousblow to the land campaign2 Asnoted by Brigadier Thompson after heariny he news of the sinking:

I ordered a full staff confercncc.. .Thcy were taskedwith investigatingwhat, if anything, could hc done to salvage he wreck of the plan using existinghclicoptcr and landing craft assets.As the K Group dispersedsomebodysaid.Well have to bloody well walk.22This was the high watermark of the Argentineanair effort. Iwo PARA was

ordcrcd to attack the Argentinean position at Darwin and GooseGreen.26, Two PARA conductedan tight-milt march to Camilla Creek -louse npreparation or i ts attackon Goose Green.27 May. British shore positions were bombedaround SanCarlos for the lirst time,causingsevendeathsand numerous njuries. This was the last day of conccntratcdArgentinean air attacks.The air and seawar of attrition was effectively over; theArgentinean Air Force had heen whittled down to the extent that it no longer posedamajor threat to land and sea operations. 3 ThreePARA and 4.5Cdo departed hebeachhead nd started heir march towards Stanley.2X May. At 6:30 A.M. the battlc for GooseGreen started.Major GeneralMoore arrivedin the IYalklands reaof operations.29 Mav. At 2:30 P.M. the Argentinean garrison al GooseGreen surrendered o 2 PARA.A helicopter night assault on Mount Kent by 42 Cdo was thwarted by bad weather.

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30, Four-Two (Ido, in a night helicopter assault, eizedMount Kent.24Major(icncral Moore landed at San Carlosand assumed perationalcommand of all landIbrces.3 1 .Mav.Two PARA were transferred rom 3 Cd0 ISdc o 5 Ini Ikle.I, Five lnf Bdc commenced anding at SanCarlos. An additional tight SeaKingsand twenty Wcssexhelicoptersarrived in the Falklands o support the ground opcration.cThe last Sea larrier was ost to enemy action.2. The ScatsGuardsand Welsh Guards andedat San Carlos. TheWelsh Guardsattempted o march out of the bridgehead o GooseGreen hut maddcittle progressbdbrcthe march was cancelled.Deteriorating weatherconditions and heavy equipment loadswcrc blamed.4&. Deteriorating weather conditions incrcasinyly hampered lying operations andmade i fe for the infantry increasingly unpleasant. hree Cd6 Bde closed on Stanlcy andcommcnccdpatrolling in preparation or the coming attacks.5 lunc. The ScatsGuards conducteda night move by ship and landing craft 1013luffCove. arriving early on 6 June.2Three companicsof 2 IARA wcrc shipped from BluflCove to T:itzroyby landing craft to marry up with the remainderof their Dattalion, whichhad hccn low forward on the 3 JUIK.6 Iunc. The Welsh Guards moved hy ship to Bluff Cove. but lack oftimc, poor weatherband limited numbersof landing craft meant that only Battalion I-Icadquarters nd a ritlecompany were anded. Ihc rcmaindcr of the Battalion returned o San Carlos WateraboardHMS Fcurless.

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7. Three companiesof the Welsh Guardswere shipped rom SanCarlos Water oFitzroy aboard Sir Galahad, arriving at dawn on the 8 hme.&&. At 2:OOP.M. the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) shipsSir G&h&and Sir Trisrramwere attacked by live Skyhawks,which hacl ust bombed IMS /lynzou/h.The SivGalahad was seriously damagedand forty-three men were killed and 1SOwere njured,many suffering serious burns. The Welsh Guardsalone had thirty-eight killed andseventy-nine njurcd.2xSir Galahad was scuttledat seaon 25 Juneas a wdr grave.Laterthat afternoon Argentinetln aircraft sanka landing craft bringing lleadquarters5 Inl Bdcssignal vehicles around to I: itzroy.2YI l/12 June. Mount Harriet, Two Sistersand Mount Longdon wcrc securedaftersuccessfulnight battles. HMS Glumorgon was hit by a shorebasedExocet missile andwas badly damagedhut remainedsea-worthy.This was hc last British ship damagedbyenemy action during the conflict. Three civilians were killed in Port Stanleyby navalgunlire: these were the only fatal civilian casualt iesof the conflict.I2 June. Stanley airlield was bombed or the linal time by Vulcan bombers romAscension sland in OperationB/uck Buck 7.l3/14 June. Tumblcdown Mountain and Wirclcss Ridge were securedafter successfulnight hattles. Mount William was securedwithout a light, al though casualtieswere akenon the approach march.I4 June. Gcncral Mcnendez surrendered ll Argentine forces n the I:alklands.

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I he Uritish Land CamnainnInhc early hoursof21 May 1982, IMS Feurkw Icd the amphibious lendinggroup. in whom were cmharked3 Cdo Hde, stealthily into Falkland Sound. At 3:40 .4.1M.the landings began, he troops being liirried ashore n the sixteen anding craft from tbctwo assaultships HMS Feurless and IiMS Inrrepid. First ashorewere 2 PARA and 40Cdo on two bcachcs n the SanCarlos ScttlemcntArea. lwo IARA then turned southand establisheda defensiveposition on the SussexMountains, effectively blocking theroute that any counter attack rom the Darwin arca would have o take.

Meanwhile. 40 Cdo moved east.up onto the Verde Mountains. Next ashorewas45 Cdo, in Aiax Hay, which was to become he main force logistic arca throughout therest of the campaign. The last assaultunit. 3 IARA. went ashoreat Port San Carlos 10protect the northern Ilank: Icaving 42 Cdo afloat as the rcservc. The artillery, consistingof four light gun batteriesand one Rapier missile battery, hen cstahlished hemselvesashore.By the end of the day more than three housandmen and almost one thousandtons of storesand equipmenthad beensuccessfully anded. Argentinean ground or navalforces madenottempt to intcrlerc with the landing, nor subsequentbuild up. Allattempts o defeat the invasion were eft to the Argentinean Air Force. which wasoperatingat the limit of i ts ttlctical reach.

The buildup ofthe bridgehead ontinued or the next live days under constantthreat of air attack during daylight. It was only fol lowing the lossof the ArlunticConveyor and the apparentstalling ofthe land campaign, hat Brigadier Thompson wasordered by Northwood to mount an operationagainst GooseGreen and start movingtowards Stanley.32 lthough of no tactical or operational significance the operation

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ngainstGooseGreen was ordered ollowing intensepolitical, public and cvcn Naval andServicepressure or the land campaign o get going. A quick victory was needed norder to maintain public and political support. As statedby Admiral Sandy Woodward, itwas time for the Army to go high risk.3 Against his better judgementDrigadictThompsonwas forced to go againstMajor GeneralMoores directive of I2 May.

On 26 and 27 May: 3 CIdoBdc began o break out from the beachhead see ig.5).Theoverall plan was to close up to the Port Stanlcy arca as quickly as possible. Late on26 May, 2 PARA started ts move south for the mission against Goose ireen. At dawn on27 May, 45 Cdo and 3 IARA started o advancecast towards Douglas SettlementandTeal Inlet respectively.All moveshad o he conductedon foot due to an ahnost total lackof helicopter and vehicle support.The ability of the infantry to reach Stanley on foot, dueto the lack of infantry iogistics support,had becomea strategic ssue.Throughout 27May. while the other two battalionscontinued heir advances,2 IARA waited at CamillaCreek House, five milts north of the Argentineanposition. An artillery troop ofthreclight guns was flown forward to support he attack on l Iarwin and Goose Green, whichbeganon 28 May.

By mid-afternoonof the 28 May, Darwin had beencapturedand 2 PARA wasfighting its way south down the narrow isthmus owards Goose Green, some two mileson. The Battalion had to crossopen ground n broad daylight, and was opposedby strongdefensivepositions that were well dug in and sited n depth. Low cloud, strong windsand driving rain madeearly air operations n support of the advance mpossible.

The battle for GooseCh-eenastedmany hours, frequently at very close quarters.During the fighting the CommandingOfficer of 2 IARA, I,ieutenant Colonel H. Jones,

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wets illed. 13~ast light the battalion had surrounded he remaining garrison n the GooseGreen Scttlcmentwhere over one hundred civilians wcrc held.

Figure 5. Operation Sutton and the Rrcakout from the Ueachhcad28


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During the night the Acting CommandingOfficer conductednegotiationswith theArgentineansand, by early afternoon on 29 May, their surrenderwas accepted.As aresult of their action, 2 PARA took over one thousandprisonersand had neutralized henearestenemy orce on East Falkland to the bridgehead

Meanwhile, after a crosscountry march of some ifty miles over very difficultterrain n adverseweather, 45 Cdo had reached Teal nlet, and 3 PARA had reachedLstancia I louse. Meanwhile, D Squadron22 SAS had establishedan operationsbase nthe area of Mount Kent and were carrying out aggressive atrolling and intelligencegathering operations.After severalattemptsal rcinforccment,which were preventedbythe atrocious weather, he first half of 42 Cdo oined them on I June, he remainderjoining on 2 June. Mount Kent was clearedof enemyafter a brief li reIight.

On 30 May, General Moore assumed ommandof operationsashore.HisHeadquarterswas established n HMS Fearlexs in SanCarlos Water. After arriving inSanCarlos Water on 3 I May, MV Norland disembarked GR during the morning of IJune,and immediately moved down to Darwin and GooseGreen o relieve 2 PARA.I.ater that day, the Scats Guardsand the Welsh Guardsdisembarked rom SS Canherrrr.Two PARA was put under the command of 5 Inf Bde and, on 2 June, moved forwarcl othe Fitzroy and Bluff Cove areas.Further reinforcementand resupply forward wasseverelyhamperedby bad weather. In order to close up 5 Inf Bdc it was decided o movethe ScatsGuardsand Welsh Guards and supporting units and equipmentby ship toFitzroy. During this operation, on 8 June, he Argentineans ntercepted he troopmovcmcntsand bombed he Sir Galahud, which was carrying clcmentsofthe WelshGuards.

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IIespitc the disasterat Fitzroy, 3 Cdo IIdc and 5 Inf Bde continued preparing folopcrtltions against he sevenArgentinean nfantry and marine battalions, ogether withsupporling troops, in the Port Stanley area. Approximately three of thesebattalions wcrcIbrward on the important featuresof Mount I.ongdon, Two Sistersand Mount tlarriet.GeneralMoore plamled hat the attack on Port Stanleyshould be conducted n threephases. fhc first phasewas scheduled or the night of I I / I2 Junewhen 3 Cdo Bde was tocapture he three featuresof Mount I .ongdon,Two Sistersand Mount Harriet. lhc secondphase:planned o take place twenty-four hours ater, required both brigades o capture henext features o the cast; hese wcrc Wireless Ridge, Tumbledown Mountain and MountWil liam. IGnally, n phase hree, he Welsh Guards.with two companiesof 40 Cdo undercommand,were to capture SapperHill.

As scheduled,on I I June phaseone of the battlc for Stanley was launched lig.6). The cncmy was outfought and soon after dawn all the Brigades objectives werefirmly held. In the center, after a hard fight in very diflicult mountain terrain, 45 Cdocaptured Iwo Sisters.Further south 42 Cdo madean indirect approach,exploiting a gapin the enemymincfields which had been cstablishcdas a result of ski lled and aggressivepatrolling, and captured Mount Harriet from behind, aking over two hundred prisoners.Meanwhile in the north 3 PARA had an extremely tough light against one of the cncmysbest battalions o captureMount Longdon. This was the costliest battle of the Campaign,with nineteensoldiers rom 3 PARA being killed. During the day of 12 June all thesepositions cameunder heavy artillery iirc, and further casualtieswere sustained.

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Figure 6. Battle for Stanley Phase1

For this and subsequent ttacks. roop movements nd nfantry assaultswerecoveredby Harrier attacks,naval gunfire and the supportof tivc field batteries,whichfired [ifteen-thousand ounds.The Royal Engineers,who had completed he hazardoustask of clearing routes hrough the minefields, provided men with each of the assaultingunits.

10allow further time for preparation,Phase wo (fig. 7) was delayed by twenty-four hours and eventually launchedon the night of 13114 une.Two IARA, once moreunder commandof 3 Cdo Ude, n a well-executedand very skillful attack took Wireless

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Ridge. While on Tumhledown IMountain. he ScatsGuards had a particularly difficultbattlc before hey overcame he regular Argentinean marine battalion delcnding heposition. Thercaftcr 7 GR passed hrough the Scats Guards o secureMount William.

- .~. , . .g/----m).+ j-L J- ._ ..- ;,__ .. ,

Figure 7. Rattlc for Stanley--Phases & 3

At this stage t became lear that enemy resistancewas collapsing. Argentineanscould be seen etreating owards Port Stanley from many directions, including Mood)Brook and Sapper Iill, neither olwhich had yet hccn attacked.

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Phase hree of Major GeneralMoores plan was never aunched.Realizing thatthe Argentinean orces WCTCeaten,Mrr,jorGeneralMoore launched wo battalions npursuit, IO closeup to the outskirts of Port Stanlcyas quickly as possible. During theafternoonof 14 June, with large numbersof enemyabandoning heir armsandsurrcndcring,~hcBritish troops were ordered o lirc only in self-dcfcnsc. Thatnight (14June),after somehours ofnegotiations; Major GeneralMoore flew by helicopter intoPort Stanleyand took the formal surrenderof all Argentinean hrceson the Falklandislands

The SundayTimes of I.ondon Insight Team, War in the Fulklurds (New York:llarper and Row, l982), 35-36.2GordonSmith, Bdes ofthc I;u/kltmd.s Wur (Surrey: Ian Allan Ltd., 19X9), 1 .Julian Thompson, Xo Picnic: 3 C.ommundoBrigade in rhe Soulh Ailunfic. 1982(Glasgow: Wil liam Collins Sons& Co. I.td., 19X5),xvi.Smith, 11Smith. 1 .%mith, 11.Sunday Times of London Insight Team, 40.sSundayTimes of London Insight Team, 39.Ihe Operations was nitially called tosario but the name was changed o dzul,after the color of the robe of the Virgin Mary, so that the invasion should be seenas asemireligiouscrusade.There were no British casualties n the invasion; Argentine casualtieswereestimatedat hetween ive and twenty deadand sevcntccnwounded.One Royal Marine was njured. The Argentineans ost three killed and seveninjured; small arms ire and hand held missilesalso damageda frigalc and destroyedaPumahelicopter.

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121he ritish submarine $uv/rm arrived off the Falklands o enforce the exclusionzone. The Task Forceconsistedof HIMS 4n~im, llymoufh, and the tanker 7Tde.~~1r,ring.Embarkedon the ships were M Company42 Cdo and D SquadronSAS, both unitshaving flown to Ascension sland.Scvcrc weatherconditions prevcntcd any meaningful military action and arescuemission was launched o save he deployed SAS t roops on the Forrunu GltrcierTwo Wessexhelicopterscrashed n the attempt due to the appalling weather.A thirdWcsscxwas able to extract all personnel; here were no casualties.The Genenll Belpuna had a crew of approximately 1,042 of whom 368 losttheir lives. Although the action is surrounded n controversy the operational bcnctits were

undoubted.As a result of the action lhe main Argentinean surface leet never clared ovcnturc from the continental shelfwherc the water was too shallow for the Britishsubmarines o operate.hThompson,74.A force of forty-eight SAS raiders was inserted by helicopter from IEMStlernw, and was supportedby naval gunlire from HMS Glumorgun and Hroadnvord.The raid was a completeSLICCCSSnd the Argentineans were denied the USC f the airstripat a crucial time.% is probable hat the helicopter deployed a special-forcespatrol in Argentina onI7 May, prior to being deliberately destroyed n a neutral country. The British submarine1 MS O~JLYas rcportcd to have ifted off special forces from near he Rio Grandc at theend of May.lhc killecl included eighteenmen from the SAS, many of whom had conducteclthe Icbhlc Islancl aid. lhis was the largest single loss of lific for the SAS since heSecondWorld War.%oth lhompsonand Moore received operational tasking signals romNorthwood, but Thompson eceived no conlirmation or instructions rom Moore due to

the lack of communications.With no further guidance. Thompson continued as directedby his operational commanderon the 12 May. Political and military tension wasexacerbated y this stateof affairs and led directly to the order to attack GooseGreenfrom Northwood.2lhe tentagcand living equipment or ten-thousandmen was also lost, whichmeant hat the conflict had to be terminated before winter set in and the weather worked

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IO he advantage fthc Argentineans,who had Port Stanlcy as an operating base.Critically, nine helicopterswere lost, including the three Chinooks, upon which so manyplans hinged.Only eleven SeaKings, five Wesscxand one Chinook helicopter wereavailable o support he operation for the next six days. Ofthc remaining eleven SeaKings; one was permanentlyattached o the Rapier batteries anti-aircraft system) o keepthem fueled and serviced,and four were equipped for night operationsand were onlyavailableduring the day for emergencies.Of note, it takes eight SeaKings eleven iftseach o move a single light artillery hattcry and f&-hundred rounds, which is barelysuflicicnt to supportone battle. Much more also went down with the ship: one milt 01portable steel unway, many vehicles, essentialhelicopter nnd aircraft spares, ndammunition.

221hompson,8..Onc-hundred nd twenty sorties had been aunched rom the mainland, of which

ninety reached he operationalarea. Of theseninety aircraft, twenty-one had been shotdown. Six other Argentineanaircraft basedon the islands were shot down attacking heshipping. In the six days of ferocious attacks, hree warships and theAflanric Chvtyorwere sunk; three warshipsand three amphibious ships were struck by bombs which failedto explode; numerousother ships were damagedby cannon fire. Two Sea larricrs andthree helicopterswere shot down. The British lost seventy-sevenmen killed during thisperiod, mostly sailors.24There as a brief ski rmish on the Mountain hetween he SAS and anArgentineanspecial-forcespatrol. Later that day 42 Cdo advancedon Mount Challengerrrom Mount Kent.A shortageof pilots resultecl n twelve of the Wessexbeing laid up in varioussmall valleys until more pilots arrived. Many of the crews for the helicopterswere takenstraight from anti submarineduties and therefore lacked experience n supporting andoperations.Map reading errors were frequent and there was an almost total lack oftactical awareness mongst he pilots. Thompson, 116.2Thc inal seaapproachof the Scats Guards was made n four open landing craliand took sevenhours n violent seas.% one of the most controversial acts of the war t-IQ 5 Inf 13dc ommandccrcdthe one availableChinook helicopter, and without reference o divisional headquarters,llcw one companyof 2 PARA forward to the area of Bluff Cove and Fitzroy, therebyopening up the southern lank. Five Inf Bdc were now strung out hetwcen SanCarlos,GooseGreenand Bluff Cove. The move of 2 PARA, the ScatsGuards and Welsh Guardshy sea o the areaof Fitzroy and Bluff Cove was conducted n order to close up theBrigade. 1 was his moment ol ill-planned opportunism that gave ittle regard o thesubsequentmplications that Icd to the tragedy at Fi tzroy.

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sMartin Middlebrook, 7irsk orce: The Fulklundv Clur, f9X2 (London: PenguinIk)oks, 1987), 30X.27hc anding craft was at seawhen the 2 121:A hipswere hit. Six men werekilled and much valuahlc equipmentwas lost. Three ofthe four attacking aircraft wereshot down by Sea Harriers in what was the last Ilarrier air to air success f the conflict.Ihc inal tragedy played out on this black day for British forces occurredwhen a SASobservation post near Port Iloward was surrounded,and Captain Hamilton was killed ashc tried to light his way out. Captain Hamilton had led the raid on Icbhlc Island.Simultaneously to the two battlesa party of G Squadron22 SAS in rigid-ridershad taken casualties n an abortive raid on a fuel depot north of StanleyHarbor. The needfor urgent casualty evacuation was met at 3 Cdo Udcs CommandPostwith the retort,bloody special forces; the whole world has o stop for them 1 suppose. hompson, p.

179.By the end of OperationCorporu/e the Koval Navy had only suflicicnlammunition for two more nights of bombardment ;hh the next re-supply hree or soweeks away.British casualties or the campaignwere: 255 killed (2 I7 from enemy ire, 10from own iire, anti 28 in aircrdii crashesjand 777 wounded.Equipmeni osseswcrc: 7ships sunk (4 of which were warships), 10 warships damaged, nd 3 RFA ships damaged;IO I larricrs. and 24 h&copters were destroyed.Eight of the 34 aircraft los( were toenemy fire, I3 wcrc lost in accidents,and 13 ost when their parent ship sank. Of thekilled, 148 were from the Army and Royal Marines and of these66 were killecl n set

piece battlcs.Argentinean losseswere 746 killed (393 Navy. 55 Airforcc, and 298 Army andMarines), I, IO5 wounded, and 12,978 aken prisoner. Argentineanequipment osseswcrcstaggering. One cruiser, I submarine, intelligence trawler, 2 patrol craft, and 3 transportships were sunk. Numerous olhcr ships wcrc damaged;3 small ships were capturedfollowing the surrender. Seventy-five ixcd wing aircraft and 2.5helicoplerswcrcdestroyedor captured. 44 while flying in action. The ArgentineanArmy lost theequivalent of 3 Brigades worth of vehicles,weaponsand stores.Middlcbrook, 251.Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Duy,.vt hhc Memoirs o/the I;irlklund.vButtle Group Curnmunder (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval lnslitute Press,1092),257.j3Little regard was given to the slow logislics buildup. Ironically, the loss oftactical mobility causedby the sinking of theAtluntic Convqyor added o the pressureof3 Cdo Bde to produce results.

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CHAPTER 3TRAINING, EQUIPMENT AND MEN

We have carnetl a great deal from the TalklandsCampaign.Many of the lessonsarc notnew but they are no less mportant for that.Ministry of Dcfensc, he Fulklands Wur: lhe Lessom

A study ofthc oflicial documentsof the FalklandsConflict enabled heidentification of three broad essons hat were acceptedby the establishment, lthoughwcrc not necessarilyactedupon. These essons over the areasof training, equipment,and the relative importanceofman over technology.Each ofthese lessonswill bediscussed n this chapter.

At the heart of all the problemsexperienced y the infantry in the Falklands wastheir standarcl f training. This was a point that the Ministry of Defencc (MOD) appcarcdreluctant to admit, an initial comment n their official analysisof lessons earnedstatingthat the conllict highligbtcd the value ofthc realistic training that all three Serviceshad.*However, later in the sameanalysis,and n apparent ecognition of the failings of prc-conflict training, the MOD stated hat all restrictionson training and activity levels thathad been mposed o savemoney were to bc l ifted.

The result ofthcsc training restrictionswas that the light infantry deployed to theFalklands without the benefit of realistic training that had presented hem with dressrehearsalconditions. As noted by Clausewitz, A soldier high or low should not have toencounter n wdr things which seen or the first time set him in terror or perplcxity.5 TheDirector of Infantry echoedClausewitzspoint when he commentedafter the conflict

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that, Every effort should be made o make training as realistic as possible somepeacctimc estrictionsmay bc overgenerous owards safety thereby diluting trainingIcssons.This observationwas based. n part. on commentsmade by 2 PAIL2 in theirpost operational eport: lcacetimc training with its safety regulations, its rcstrictcdquantities oftraining ammunition, and problems with simulating rc-supply, casualticsandprisonershave Icd to a situation where our understandingof certain facets of war isincomplctc. It was a point of view sharedby 3 PAKA, The period at seaundcrlinetl,just how much lip servicewe often pay to the basicswhen the immincncc of an operationis lacking.

This lack of realistic and relevant ight infantry training directly impacteduponthe standard hat could bc attainedon ExerciseWelsh I~ulcon; the two-week pre-deploymentexerciseconductedby 5 Inf Hde in Sennybridge. his hastily conceivedtraining packagemadeuse of resources hat would not he availnblc in the I~alklands ndwas forced IO ocus on rudimentary raining at battalion level and below in order to coverthe gaps n infantry t raining. The exercisewas given to Headquarters5 Inf Bde to run butwas subject o constant nterferenceby senior officers and highcr headquarters.As such.the 1 eadquarters f the Hrigadc were themselvesnot exercised.Even so, the singlelargestcriticism leveled against he Brigade was that command and control were nottheir strong points. I-lowevcr, t seems nconceivable that a hastily pullet1 ogether wo-week exercisecould hope o overcomeyears ofneglcct in light infantry training; 5 InfRdc was condemned o deploy on operationswithoul the necessarypreparalion.

Two points that operations n the Falklands demonstratedarc important to lightinl:dntry raining are the developmentof patrolling skill s and realistic simulat ion of

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ammunition carriageand resupply. There s no doubt that patrolling played a critical rolein determining the outcomeof the ground campaign. Without effective aerialrcconnaissanccI and with no flow of information down lo the battalions from SAS andSBS patrols, he battalionswcrc compelled o gather all their own intelligcncc. Thiscould only hc achievedby conducting small team reconnaissance atrols and establishingobservationposts.

More importantly, by patroll ing the British infantry dominated the battlelicld andretained he initiative. During periodsof slow build up, patrolling gave the soldiers hefeeling of progress,dominanceand aggression--al lkey to maintaining offensive spirit..This is nothing new, as GeneralSlim observedwhen in command ofthc 14thArmyduring World War II, patrol skills provided a measureofjust how good a battalion was:and was an important part in the hattlc for domination and moral supremacy. Newequipmentharnessing he latest echnology might replace some of the requirement orinlantry o gather heir own intel ligence. However, the requirement for the infantry todominate mentally and physically the battlefield by meansof patroll ing should alwaysremain an essential nfantry task. It is worth noting that the Argentineans relied upontechnology o dominate he battle spaceand consequentlydid not patrol. This was amajor factor in their lossof the tactical initiative and their loss of the will to fighl. TheFalklandsdemonstrated hat patrolling maintains and develops an infantrymansaggressive pirit; it is a skill that placesgreat demandsupon unior leadersand soldiersand s a skill that must be practiced horoughly.

AS regards o ammunition supply, the main problem this posed was one of scale.Infantry battalions were not trained for, nor expecting, the problems with ammunit ion

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supply that they facet1 n the campaign. For example,British troops routinely tired four orfive times their estimateddaily ammtmition consumption ntcsper weapon, rcllecting along standing British failure to update ainmunition cxpcnditure plans because f tiscalconstraints.Consequently. units did not have standingarrangementsn place to cope withthe demand or ammunit ion from the front: this problem was only overcome hroughimprovisation.

The insatiable appetite of modern warfare for ammuniti on is nothing new but wasa lesson hat lhc British Army had to learn again he hard way. As Major General lcwIikc (the commanding officer of 3 IARA in the Falklands)commented, the I~alklandsimpressedupon us all ,just how long battles can take. and hencehow important is thesustained am of all forms ofdircct and indirect tire to breaking he enemys will.s Ihisindicates hat preconflict training glossedover the problemsposedby fighting aprotracted battle, a scenariohard to simulalc when training is under-resourced. ailure totrain as you might have to fig111 ill lead to false essonsheing learned, ncluding inmatters egarding infantty logistics. individual equipment oads and ndividualammunit ion scales. Consequently he perceivedwisdom oihow to conduct operations sall to often iounded on unrealistic training. the infantry experienceas regardsammunitionusage n the Falklands being a cast in point. In order to avoid a repeatof this situation thelight infantry must plan for and train with realistic ammuniti on scales.

I lowevcr, the ability to conduct combinedarms operationswas identiticd as thecrilicat capability gap in preconflict training, a capability so critical to the winning ofbattlesat minimum cost. As the Director of Infantry stated, The importanceof the AllArms Battle was perhaps he most important lesson o emerge rom 01 IJIperation]

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Corpornre.~n observation ully supportedby Pike, [the] significant weakness, otonly in battalions,hut throughout both brigades, ay in combined arms ntegration.

Many of the problemsexperiencedbccduseof this weaknesswould not haveoccurred fthc infantry had conducted ealistic training during peacetime. nstead hetraining gaps n combinedarmsoperationshad to be overcome hrough operatiomdlexperience.which undoubtedly esulted n the unnecessary oss of life. Such practicecannot hc regardedas good business,

It is lelling that the only infantry battalion in the Palkl ands o conduct an cffcctivecombinedarmsbattle was 2 IARA, the only battalion to light two battles. lhc lesson hat2 PARA drew from their first battle, the bruising clash at Goose Green,was that thecorrect coordination and application of tircpowcr is a major element of winning battles atminimum cost.9This was a view sharedhy 3 PARA, who had no doubt that armoredsupportwould have casedprogressonto the strongly held ob,jectiveof Mount Longdonand would have reduced heir own casualties.*The poor USC f the available armor insupport ofthe infantry leadsone to wonder ifall the hard won lessonsabout infantry tankcooperation earned n World War II had been forgotten.*

The importanceof comhincdarms operations s a lesson hat each battalion had tolearn the hard way in their own first hattlcs. As a consequcnccof a lack ofrelcvant andrealistic raining the British infantry that deployed o the Falklands n 1982 wereno1intuitive combinedarmsoperators.Consequently, he light infantry tactical paradigmwasnot a full reflection of operational eality. It can bc argued that the infantry go1 awaywith their inadequate ombinedarms raining as a consequence f the static and almost

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passiveenemy t faced and the limited nature of the conflict. fhc conflict served oIalsely llattcr the combined arms capability ofthe light infantry in 1982.

lhc infantry were not alone n this failure; there is little doubt that the passage ftime hetwccn World War II and the Falklandshad also dulled the collective memory ofhow to light combined arms battles.Not only was there a general ailure to createancffcctive fusion of intelligence, logistics. air ground support.and armor but thcrc was alsoa crippling failure to dispatch an elfcctive all arms force to the Falklands.* The forcepackagesent to the Falklands demonstrated disdain for Rommels age-old adageofplastcring he enemy with Iirc in order to start the processof hrcaking his will to lightand reducing the casualt ies n the infantry.2 As descrihcdby Pike, the supportingarmscleploycd o the I;alklands were a mistakenly small fnrcc. Major CicneralBrianlennicott. Commander Royal Artillery at the time of the Falklands,supported his view,stating. Them was inadequateartillery to support a two-brigade division properly.* Asan example, he normal allocation of artillery for a brigadegoing into bdttlc is threebatteries.S Inf Bde had one battery.

lhc Falklands Conflict reinforced the lessonof past wars hat the infantry,although a critical element of combinedarms operations, equiressupport n order to hctruly effective. Yet, it is not enough o have an understanding f thc importanceofcombined arms operations, it must also be thoroughly practiced.Combinedarmsoperationsmust be instilutiondlized acrossan army on a professionalbasis.

If an army Iails to train as t will fight then the faults of equipmentand weaponrywill often be overlooked or dismissedas nsignificant. To suggest hat the Falklandspresentedconditions that the infantry wcrc not used o ignores he remarkablesimilarity

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between he weather and terrain in the Falklandsand three of the key infantry trainingareas n Great Britain--Sennyhridge, Dartmoor, and Otterhurn. It also ignores he years01Arctic training in Norway and training in lhc harsh mid-winter conditions found on thecentral plain of Germany. Prior to the conflict, ample opportunity was presented o theinfantry to get its cquipmcnt and weaponry n order; it was an opportunity that could notbe, or was not, taken.

It is in this context that the following comment rom the MOD must hc viewed:in [the] exceptionally demandingconditions of the Falkland slandswinter a number01short comings wcrc identilied in clothing tml equipment.* Items of personalcquipnicnlthat wcrc dccmcd to have failed were he waterproofjacket, sleepingbag and fifty cight-pattern webbing. As regards he webbing, 3 PAllA commented hat, Once the wehhingbecamewet and old it hecamcdifficult to wear and has a tendency o fall apart it isdifficult to fight and move in, especiallywhen digging tools Iare] attached.

To all concerned,however, the critical i tem of personalequipment hat failed wasthe standard ssue boot. I1 was noted by 3 IAIW that, Once wet the boot remainedwet.92Rhe btilure of the hoot to keep he foot warm or dry was also amentedby 2PARA, who wrote That the Battalion lost nearly as many men from frostbite and trenchfoot than from enemy action indicalcs 11~ more attention should be paid to footwear.*This s a rate of diseaseand nonbattle elated njury that is hoth unsustainable y aninfantry battalion and unacceptableby modern standardsof warfare. The failure of theboot should not have come as a surprise;as statedby Major Thomas7 Broyles n hisanalysisof the medical support of the FalklandsConflict, Some of the soldierswho

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participated n the Campaignhad also rcccntly been nvolved in exercises n Germanyand had already sustainedminor dcgrecsof non-freezingcold injury to the feet.

Joining the majority in their condemnationolthc military boot was Major General.lohn Frost, who stated. The appropriate oot gear s appropriate o all who would dothings properly, and that this inadequacy thc boot1was responsible or more casualticsthan enemy action. Ihc lesson hat Frost draws from this: and one which is axiomatichut all too oiien ncglccted, s that. it is pointless o spendseveral housandpounds narming a man if he becomes neffective through failure to spend wenty or thirty poundsin covering his feet. This is the lessonoffalsc economy:combat power, a pricclcsscommodity, s eroded by a parsimoniousprocurementpolicy towards basic equipment.

In sum: the apparent ailure of the service boot dangerouslyhampered heiniantrys mobrltty and Imperiled he outcomeofthc campaign.Following the loss of theArlunric C.bnve,yo~ith all but one ofthe heavy ift helicopters. he ability to moveoverland by foot becamea strategic ssue fig 8.):r2 Icspite this, in the final mlalysis itwas the men who slogged up to Port Stanleywith rifle and pack that ultimately carr iedthe day. Furthermore,poor equipmentcan ower the morale and damage he fitness of asoldier, and, consequently,degrades he combatpower of a unit. For a unit to lost asmany men from enemy action as from non-battle relatedcasualtiesbecauseof inadequaleequipment s to unnecessarily quander he combat power of a unit. This further imperilsthose who have to conduct comhatoperations n under-strengthunits.. It is telling thatmany soldiers deployed with items of privately purchased quipment, n part, toovcrcomc he failings of that which was ssued.

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indirccl fire.As statedby the MOD, Milan and 66mm anti-tank weaponsproved highI>

successful gainst preparedcncmy positions. but there s also a rcquircmcnt for an arcaattack weapon such as a grcnadc auncher.. 1 owever. the improvised use of the 66mmI.AW 10cover this capability gap was ~1source of unnecessary risk. AS statedby 2PARA:

Ihe ability to deliver high cxplosivc onto the ob,jcctivc ight down tosection evel is csscntial.The Raltalion was scaledwith 3 M7Osper companyandthis was inadequate.Consequently he 66mm LAW was the main weaponused,hur the firing position ofthc 66mm unnecessarily xposes he firer.lhis point was rcinforccd by 3 PAR/\: lhc firer [ofthe 66mm I..AW( is Ibrccd to

exposehimself n order to form a good sight picture.- If this capabili ty gap had beenlilled il would probably have rcduccd casualties mong wry brave grenadiers.38

Al some stageduring each of the battles. he advancehoggeddown due o losingthe local lirclight. In part, and depcndem upon eachcircumstance. he ability of theinihntry to bring lo bear ndirect high explosive organic o the platoon or section maywell have reduced he number olcasualtics and reduced he amount of time pinneddown. Ihe British infantry in the Falklands bad to resort to improvisation and personalgallantry in order to overcome an apparcm weaponscapability gap. A grenade auncheratsection evel bvouldhave solved many of the infantrys tactical prohlcms. his capabilitygap was recognized by 5 Inl Bde prior to their dcploymenl . unfortunately their rcqucst orgrcnadc auncherswas re,jcctcdwith the rationale that it was a weapon or special orces.

Ilowcver, the provision of a grenade auncbcr doesnot replace he continued needfor anti-tank guided and unguided weapons o fulfill a broader actical role as a hard point

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killer, as exemplified by the 66mm LAW and Milan system,Suchweapons,by theirdirect tire nature hvc the advantageof being surgical weapons hat can supplementmortar and or artillery tire with grcatcr accuracyand faster ime on target.

However. it was the rillc and machine gun that dominated he infantry battles.If, as suggested y Anthony II. Cordesmanand Abraham K. Wtlgner, a successful ifle ormachinegun must combine portability, range, and volume of tire and hitting power andreliability, then the issue rillc and GPMG fell short. The rifle lacked volume of tire.having no automatic capability; and the GlMG lacked portability, weighing in excessofthirty pounds when carried with a belt of fifty rounds. While the rifle and the GIMGwere not failures, both surviving the test of battle, both systemshad imitations thatimpaired unit tactics. Indeed, some soldiers ditched their personalweapon in htvor of theArgeniinean iiie, which was iighter and capabicof automatic rc. Weaponswill alwayshave heir limimtions and thcrc will always bc capability gaps n the arsenalof theinfantry; however, 21 modern army must have modern equipmentwhose imitations do notadversely mpede the conduct of tactics.

The limitations of the weaponswere exacerbated y the quality of the infantrynight viewing equipment. GooseGreen servedas I timely reminder that operationsconductedat night saves ives. Consequently,all subsequent ttackswcrc to be concluctedunder he cover of darkness,despite the scarcity of night viewing equipmentposscsscd ythe infantry, s The equipment that was available was of first-generation echnology.which was rendered neffective by white light. By contrast, he Argentineansweregenerouslyequipped with second-generation ight gogglesand other night viewingdevices,which were not adverselyaffected by white l ight.

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lIespite having the technological advantage n infantry equipment, heArgentineans ost all 1hebattlcs andskirmishesof the campaignsubsequent o their initialinvasion, 13yany mathematicalmodel the British Army should have had no chanceofsuccess gainst an Argcntincan land force superior n both numbersand weaponry, andfighting from preparccldefensivepositions. II can hc concluded rom this that thecritical difference belween he Argentinean and British infantry was not material butmoral. It is noteworthy that SOIW analysts aid part of the blame for the Argentineand&at on their American training which, had taught them to rely too heavily onresources ather than human endeavor. he quality of the man and 1he nfantry skill ofoperating at night proved more critical than any technologicaladvantage.

As such, he FalklandsConflict demonstrated hat, without doubt, physicalrobustness md endurancewcrc fundamental10a soldiers ability to do his ob properly.As noted by rhe Dcfcnsc Committee, Although there is no one factor tha1can he singledout as having contribuled more than any other to British victory, high on the list is theenclurancc nd staminaof the land forces. .TheMOD was more direct stating: Themost important factor in the success f the task force was the skill, staminaand resolutiondisplayed by individual serviccmen.sFurthermore, he MOD stated The Campaignhighlighted the importanceof both physical and mental toughness,which it bclicved canonly be achievedby maintaining readiness nd training at the highest evel. A pointeasily made, but in the intervening years arely followed through.

Peacetime itness, however, s no guaranteeof operational obustness ndendurance.Numerous caseswcrc reportedwhere the super-athleteencounteredsevere

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difficulties with the conditions due to a general ack of mental and physical stamina.0Nor is rank a guarantee hat the individual will cope, as 3 PARA noted ofsomc ofthcit,junior leaders:

~lhcy] found the conditions so demanding hat they had little or no energyleft to either think, or to lead others.Robustnessmust be a significant pointer tofuture officer and NC0 selection. Perhapswe do not give it enoughpriority thesedays5This is a stark admission rom one of the elite battalions n the British Army and it

is probably a fair reflection ofthc expcricncesof the other infantry battalionsduring thecampaign.

I:or Pike, it was thescjunior leaderswho were the key players n the infantrybattles. Regardless f how much firepower was delivered onto the ohjectivc, and thedegreeof surpriseachieved n the attack, eachbattle involved a long and difficult brcak-in and tight-through. For the infantry this proved to be the greatest esting ground ofleadership.s2 l though rcsponsihility for the tactical conduct olthc battle often restedwith the company commander here is little doubt that the burden of leadership,and itssupreme est during these most difficult phases, ell upon the unior leaderat platoon,sectionand tire team level. Here, example was everything, as the proportion ofofticersand noncommissionedoflicers to private soldier killed in the infantry battlestestities ( I : I) (SWappendix A).

The Falklands Conflict dcmonstratcd hat key to the success f the individualleader was his resourcefulness, nitiative and courage.53 1 s apparent hat good trainingfor independentaction will often bc far more important than any conceivableimprovement n technology. One of the major lessons rom the ground campaign s that

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professionalism, nnovation and the ability of infmtry to adapt o condit ions Ibr whichthey had imited training will often hc the decisive orce multiplicr.4 The battles ofthcground campaign, hat, as Clauscwitz put it. led directly to peace were won with riilcand bayonetand with the age-old nfantry lactic of closing with the enemy anddestroyinghim by fire and maneuver.ss

10 um up chapter 3? he three broad nfantry lessonsof 1heconllict that can bciclentifcd in all the official documentsarc: the importanceof realistic training, cspcciallyin combinedarms operalions (a lack of being the too1causeof so many problems n 1heTalklands).1hc mportanceof correctly equipping he infantry (and training with thisequipment),and the continued mportanceof man over technology.

Iurthcrmore, thcrc is little doubt that the Falklandsproved that the infantry ha1tlcstill hingeson the abilily of the soldier to closewith and destroy he enemy. ?\lways adifficult task. he British infantrys experience n the l;alklands demonstrated1ha1t is,junior infantry leadershipand the will to win 1hatare the csscntial ngredienls ndetermining he outcomeofsucl~ encoun1ers.1ethnology. in such a contest, s unlikely toreplace he rclativc impor lancc ofthc man. Therefore, t is intensive and realistic training(focusedon combined arms operations) hat will emphasiyc he dominanceof 1hemanover technologyand give the soldier confidence o make maximum and innovative USC ftried and testedequipment. I%nrlly, the natureof inlantry combat s hound to revealsoldiers hat lack the mental or physical robustness o cope: training must, thcrcfore, bcgeared o weed out those who will fail. III the IICXL hapter hree mom lessonswill beidentilicd that have a direc1 mpact upon 1hese bservations.

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MOD, 31, paragraph301.MOD. 16: paragraph207MOD, 33. paragraph.3073 PARA, Operation Corporate: Post Opcrutional Report of the Third Uattalion

the Parachute Regiment in Lessons qf he l~ulkland.~Campaign: Post Operutionul Reportqf the Third Battalion The Parachute Regiment (Ottawa, Ontario: National DefenccI leadquarters, I January I983), Annex C. paragraph2.

5Tsoiuas, 40. The Director of Infantrys (DINF), Operation Corpornte Dehriqf in /,e.wons oj

rhe Mk/and.s War (Ottawa. Onlario: National DefenseHcadquartcrs,2 February 1983)Annex A, paragraph5d.

2 PARA. Operation Corporute. Post Operutional Report ojthe Second llrrttulionthe Parachute Regiment in Operation Corporate .- Post Operational Report efthe .SecondBattulion The Parachute Regiment (St-Hubert,Quebec:Mobile CommandHcadquartcrs,16 July l984), p. 6, paragraph33.

3 PARA, Annex C. paragraphMichael Clapp and Ewen Southby-lailyour,Amphibious Assuult Fulklunds: 7he

f&t/e ofSm (hrhs Wa/er (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press,1996), 68.For the preparation f the assaulton Mount Longdon, 3 PARA had only oneaerial photograph hat was taken rom 10,000 eet someyearsprior to the events nquestion, Brigadier Hew Pike, The Army :v lnfnntry und Armored reconnaissance Forcesin Ten Years On: The British Army in the Fulklands War, ed. I .inda Washington (GreatBritain: Jolly & Uarber I .imited), 44.2 PARA p, 2 paragraph8; 3 PARA, Annex C, paragraph23.,Pike, 46.3 PARA, Annex C, paragraph 4.Pike, 44.Pike, 46.2 PARA, p. 7. 3 PARA, Annex C, paragraph7.

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DIN:. Annex 13,paragraph8.Pike. 42.2 PARA: p. 7, paragraph33a.*3 PARA, Annex C, paragraphs , IO, I I I I2 and I32Major GeneralJohn Frost,2 PARA fiirlklunds: The U&u/ion at Wrrr London:ISuchan I;nright Publishers, 983), 159.*Anthony Il. Cordcsmanand Abraham 12.Wagner, he 1,esson.sof Modem

Wurftire Volume III: The /ifihun und hirlk1und.y Cmflict (San Irancisco: Wcstvicw Ircss,1990).328.Pike, 46.*Pike, 40.SMajor GeneralBrian Pennicott,The Gunners in En Yours On: ?he 1Iritish Army

in the I*blklands War, cd. Linda Washington (Great Britain: Jolly & Barber Limited), 49.MOD, p, 23: paragraph235 e.3 PARA. Annex G, paragraph .3 PARA. Annex F, paragraph7.)2 PARA, p. 5. paragraph26.Thomas E Uroyles, Maj. USA, A Comparutive Analysis of the Medical Support

in the C ombat Operutions in the t*blklands Cumpuign and the Grenudu Expedition,M,NtS, (Kansas:Fort Leavenworth, 1987) 62.Frost, 158.Harry Ci. Summers r.. Ground Way/tire lessons in Militury Lessons of the

fiirlklunds Wur: View.cjvm the United Stutes, cd. Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn(ljouldcr, Colorado: West View Press, 990), 75.s31ts worth noting that an infantry battalion at peacecstahlishment s cadcriscdby some en percent. nfantry battalionsarc only brought to war establishment n times 01generalconflict, operationssuch as the Palklandsare fought at peaceestablishment.Battalionsarc therefore already at a minimum strength at the start of the operationwithout the combined effect of bdtlk and non-battle casualties urther reducing their

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CHAPTER 4AD IIOC FORMATIONS, LIGHT INFANTRY LOADS:ANT) TIE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

We didnt know how soon war would come, but WC new it was coming. W/edidntknow when wed have to fight, but WC new it was coming at any time, and we had to gettogether somefhing of an Army pretty darn fast. WCdidnt stop for the progressiveandlogical building of a war machine. As a result, the machinewas a bit wobbly vvhen t firstgot going. The men knew it. The officers knew it. Everyoneknew it.Lt. (icn. Lesley J. McNair, Ure (I.S.Army GHQ Maneuvers ~(1941

A study of all the litcraturc available o the author concerning he balklands(:onflict enabled he identification ofthree further broad essons hat are not stated nthese sources.These hree hroad essons over the performanceof ad hoc formations, heload carrying capability of infantry, and the impact of the RegimentalSystemon unitperformance.

What are ad hoc formations?The word ad hoc is defined in the 1995 version otthe Collins Eng/i.sh Dicrionury and Thesuurus as an adjectiveor adverbmeaning, for aparticular purpose only: an ad hoc committee. There s no American or British militarydclinition for the term ad hoc, but the term is usedcommonly to describehow units arcgrouped together to create emporary ormations for operations. Theuseof ad hocformations in the Falklandsexacerhatcd he problemscausedby imtldequatcraining olthe infantry, idcntilied in chapter3 as one of the root causes f the infantrys problemsduring the campaign.

The useof ad hoc formations s the essence fthc westcm military way ofconducting businessancl s encapsulated y such erms as combinedarms3 ointoperations, and mancuvcr. The creationof ad hoc formations s a cornerstone 1

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military organization for operationsand is provided for in paragraphone of an operationsorder (attachments nd detachments), nd is rctlected in the creation of task forces andhattlcgroups. n the British Army, peacetimegarrison relationships bear only a passingrescmblancc o operationalorganization when deployed.

The ability of an army to opcrale with ad hoc formations is, perhaps,a mark olhow adept that army is at practicing ts profession. Ad hoc formations are aninstitutionalized reality in the standing formations of the British Army, rcflccting both thenegativeand positive connotationofthe term. What imp

Documents

British Infantry in the Falklands