Briefing to the Security Council

Personal Envoy of the Secretary General for Western Sahara

November 28, 2012

--As delivered----

Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the Council,

It is with more than my customary sense of honor and pleasure that I join you to

brief on developments in the search for a mutually acceptable political solution,

which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara,

since passage of the Council’s latest resolution on April 24, 2012.

After a period of reflection, I embarked on a long-delayed trip to North Africa

from October 25 to November 11 and held consultations in Madrid and Paris from

November 12 to 15 on my way home. I had three objectives in the region: first, to

evaluate the past five years of negotiating efforts and identify the reasons for the

stalemate; second, to look ahead at how the process might be modified to enhance

the prospects of progress; and, third, to gauge the impact of events in the Sahel on

the Western Sahara dossier. Beyond these objectives, I introduced two

innovations: first, I met with political leaders and representatives of civil society in

addition to meeting with officials; second, I paid my first visit to Western Sahara

itself. The governments of Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and France, as well as

the Polisario and MINURSO, extended full cooperation, and I thank them. Special

thanks are due as well to the government of Spain, which generously provided an

aircraft to facilitate my travel.

Without going into a detailed account of each stop, let me present my overall

findings and impressions.

First, everywhere, the highest authorities confirmed their commitment to working

with the UN to pursue a political solution for the final status of Western Sahara,

while at the same time reiterating their attachment to their own proposals. In

Morocco, King Mohammed VI reaffirmed his country’s willingness to continue to

work with me within the framework of its proposal for autonomy under Moroccan

sovereignty. In Tindouf, Polisario Secretary-General Abdelaziz reiterated the

readiness of the Polisario Front to intensify its engagement in the expectation that

the solution would include a genuine referendum of self-determination. In Algeria,

President Bouteflika again stated that, while Algeria is not and will never be a

party to the conflict, it remains willing to accompany the parties in their search for

a solution. That said, he added, any settlement that does not include a genuine

referendum is not a settlement at all. In Mauritania, Prime Minister Laghdaf

reaffirmed his country’s desire to be helpful on the basis of “positive neutrality.”

Second, in looking back at the reasons for the continuing stalemate, it was evident

that, as the parties’ frustration has grown, each has attributed the failure to make

progress not only to the other party’s refusal to negotiate on the basis of its

proposal, but more pointedly to the absence of decisive action by the international

community, the Council, the Secretary-General, and his Personal Envoy. The

parties do not accept that the principal responsibility for making progress rests with

the parties themselves, although others can provide encouragement and ideas.

I stressed this point repeatedly in my contacts with political parties and

representatives of civil society, as well as with officials, pointing out that, since the

UN is dealing with the conflict under Chapter VI of the Charter, and in the absence

of an international consensus, no one can impose anything on the parties and that it

is up to them first and foremost to find a way forward within the framework

provided by UN mediation. Nonetheless, over and over, at every stop, I was told

that the UN should take this action or that action – always in the direction of

bringing one side to accept the proposal of the other. In my role as mediator, I

cannot be an advocate for a specific proposal. I advocate for the negotiating

process.

Third, in looking ahead at how best to proceed, senior officials agreed with my

judgment that it is futile to convene more meetings of the parties any time soon in

the absence of a change in the equation. After four rounds of official negotiations

and nine rounds of informal talks, to hold yet another meeting would highlight the

stalemate, further weakening the credibility of the process. In preparation for

further meetings, formal or informal, I proposed to engage in further consultations

with key international stakeholders followed by a period of quiet shuttle diplomacy

with the parties and neighboring states. My interlocutors accepted this approach,

but some cautioned that periodic meetings remain important in maintaining

contact, minimizing miscalculation, and giving visible evidence that the process

continues.

Fourth, in examining the impact of the rising tension in the Sahel and the dangers

this presents to all parties, I found that, while all agree that these factors argue for

an early solution to the Western Sahara conflict, no one seems ready to take the

first step. Instead, I found that the common reaction to events in the Sahel has

been to bolster local defenses against any possible spillover. On another aspect of

the issue, it was confirmed to me that, in the absence of a settlement, individuals

from all over the region have been enticed into joining one or another of the groups

in northern Mali. In Morocco, the media continued to speak of a connection

between the Polisario and these groups, but senior officials in Rabat and in

Nouakchott were clear in saying that no such linkage exists.

Fifth, my visit to Western Sahara merits special mention. As promised, Morocco,

as the de facto administering power, provided full facilitation, and I will make

additional visits in due course. I had meetings with a wide range of pro-

independence and pro-autonomy Sahrawis, as well as with the local authorities.

There was clearly a hunger to speak with me, since the list of those I did not have

time to meet greatly exceeded the list of those I did meet. All spoke with evident

sincerity, but it should come as no surprise that I was unable to determine where

the balance of opinion lies. All I can say for sure is that there are articulate

spokespersons on both sides of the political divide. The pro-autonomy Sahrawis

emphasized the development of Laayoune and other localities under Moroccan

administration, as well as the numerous other benefits that they see in this

administration. The pro-independence Sahrawis highlighted what they described

as the tense relations between the indigenous Sahrawi population and the residents

from Morocco, the violations of human rights that they see in police repression and

in conditions of arrest, detention, trial, and incarceration, the illegal exploitation of

natural resources, and the absence of jobs. Pro-independence demonstrations and

attendant police responses did in fact occur at some distance from me during and

after my visit. In this regard, I was struck by the fact that almost none of the

security forces in Laayoune and presumably elsewhere in Western Sahara are

Sahrawis from the territory, but are instead from Morocco proper, and I used my

meetings with Moroccan officials during a second visit to Rabat to argue for a shift

in the balance and for better training in managing demonstrations.

Sixth, during my visit to the refugee camps, I had occasion to meet with members

of the Polisario’s women’s, student, and youth organizations. Those present

underscored the frustration that the Polisario leadership itself has reported in the

past. Some in attendance argued that, after 25 years of unsuccessful UN efforts, it

is time to return to armed struggle. Others suggested that, having failed to broker a

settlement, the UN should simply give up and withdraw. Meanwhile, in

Nouakchott, I met with some critics of the Polisario who had left the organization

and were anxious to air their grievances with me.

Seventh, I was dismayed at the degree to which the parties used my visit to score

points. My public statements were too often shortened or lengthened to serve the

agenda of one or another of the parties. In Rabat, Moroccan television edited my

remarks to remove my citation of the Council text calling for “a political solution,

which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.” In

Tifariti, where I visited a MINURSO team site on the east side of the berm, the

Polisario’s military chief unexpectedly appeared and sought to have me review an

honor guard. In the refugee camps, my remarks to a women’s group were edited to

add praise for the role of women in quote “the struggle to liberate Western Sahara”

unquote. I made no such statement.

Eighth, while SRSG Weisbrod-Weber will be briefing you on MINURSO

operations shortly, I must applaud the high degree of professionalism and

commitment that I observed during my visit to MINURSO headquarters and to the

team sites in Mahbes and Tifariti and in my meeting with the UN Mine Action

Service team. Both MINURSO and UNMAS are in need of more resources if they

are to discharge their duties more fully. MINURSO patrols an area larger than the

United Kingdom, while UNMAS is working in what has recently been called one

of the most mine-infested regions of the world.

Beyond this, I want to highlight the respect in which the SRSG is held both within

MINURSO and by his Moroccan and Sahrawi contacts. His is not an easy task. In

addition to supervising MINURSO, he is the Secretary-General’s Special

Representative for Western Sahara. As such, he is expected to provide the

Secretary-General and this Council with independent information on MINURSO’s

working environment in Western Sahara. This territory remains a non-self-

governing territory in the well-being of whose population the UN must, in

accordance with Article 73 of the Charter, show an interest, while recognizing that

Morocco is the de facto administering power west of the berm and that the

Polisario plays a similar role east of the berm. It was precisely because of the

SRSG’s role in this regard that I invited him to attend all of my meetings in

Western Sahara.

Ninth, on UNHCR’S program of humanitarian assistance, I heard concern that both

governmental and private contributions to refugee aid have decreased significantly

because of the ongoing economic crisis, and I was reminded that additional

contributions are sorely needed. On the individual registration of refugees, which

was raised again in Rabat, Polisario and Algerian officials told me that UNHCR is

satisfied with the refugee estimates that they have provided and that those who

argue for individual registration are motivated by political considerations. At a

donors’ meeting in Algiers, I found no eagerness to pursue the issue.

Tenth, on confidence-building measures, there was universal praise for UNHCR’s

superb work in expanding family visits and organizing inter-Sahrawi seminars, the

second of which, on the role of women in Sahrawi society, took place in the

Azores with the generous help of the government of Portugal in July. Shortly

thereafter, a session on CBMs was held in Geneva at which the parties,

neighboring states, and UNHCR reviewed their implementation in a very cordial

atmosphere. The only advice I give when asked is to think creatively about

expanding CBMs, particularly more seminars, family visits on special occasions,

and youth exchanges. Sahrawis of all political persuasions, both in Western

Sahara and in the camps, told me over and over that they are eager for more

contact across the berm, and ways must be found to encourage this, because over

time it has the potential to change perceptions even in the absence of movement in

the negotiating process. One impediment is the lack of funding, and I once again

urge past and potential donors to contribute to UNHCR to make more such

activities possible.

Eleventh, on human rights, each side used my visit to register complaints about the

practices of the other. There have been many visits related to human rights in the

past year, including two special rapporteurs, who visited Western Sahara but not

the refugee camps, and at least one non-governmental organization. In addition,

the Laayoune branch of Morocco’s National Council for Human Rights told me

that it has received large numbers of complaints and conducted numerous

investigations, but is still awaiting responses from the administering authorities.

Human rights are not part of my mandate, but my advice, when sought, has been to

state that it is up to this Council and to the High Commissioner for Human Rights

to decide whether the information that is developed warrants attention and, if so,

how best to do so, bearing in mind that any approach to this issue must look at the

human rights situation not only in Western Sahara, but also in the refugee camps.

Finally, let me say a word about my informal mandate of promoting more normal

relations between Algeria and Morocco. In Rabat, King Mohammed VI authorized

me to carry a message to President Bouteflika, who then authorized me to carry

back a message in response. Both messages confirmed the desire of the two heads

of state to continue the process of improving relations by expanding the bilateral

ministerial visits that had previously been agreed. Each identified priority issues

that should be addressed at an early stage, and I will be following up to encourage

engagement on these issues.

With regard to the Maghreb Arab Union and Tunisia’s call for an early summit, I

explored the advancement of regional integration with UMA Secretary-General

Ben Yahia and with the three member states that I visited. All agreed in principle

that a summit should be held, but Algeria cautioned that, to ensure success, it

should be well prepared through the series of sectoral meetings that are underway

but not yet complete. In Algeria’s view, to hold a summit without adequate

preparation would lead to certain failure.

These, then, are my main findings and impressions as I return from my latest trip to

the region and my first visit to Western Sahara and as I look ahead to a period of

consultation with key international stakeholders, quiet diplomacy with the parties

and neighboring states, and further visits to the region, including Western Sahara,

in preparation for the resumption of face-to-face meetings of the parties.

As I stated in Madrid, the conflict over the final status of Western Sahara has gone

on for far too long. While some may believe that the status quo is stable and that it

is risky to take chances for peace, I believe that this is a serious miscalculation now

that the region is threatened by extremist, terrorist, and criminal elements operating

in the Sahel. In these new circumstances, this conflict could, if left to fester, spark

renewed violence or hostilities that would be tragic for the peoples of the region. It

must be resolved, and I ask the members of the Council and of the wider

international community to encourage the parties to enter into serious negotiations

to bring it to an end.

Thank you.