Brief For Appellee Lawrence Dicristina

7/28/2019 Brief For Appellee Lawrence Dicristina

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12-3720IN THEUnited States Court of Appealsfor the Second CircuitUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellant,

v.

LAWRENCE DICRISTINA,

Defendant-Appellee,

STEFANO LOMBARDO, a.k.a. MITZIE,

Defendant.______________________

On Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Eastern District of New York

______________________

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LAWRENCE DICRISTINA______________________

NEAL KUMARKATYALCHRISTOPHERT.HANDMANDOMINIC F.PERELLAELIZABETH BARCHAS PRELOGAR

HAGAN C.SCOTTENHOGAN LOVELLS USLLP555 13th Street N.W.Washington, D.C. 20004(202) 637-5600

Dated: March 21, 2013 Counsel for Lawrence DiCristina

Case: 12-3720 Document: 52 Page: 1 03/21/2013 884118 75


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. iii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ....................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 2

ISSUES PRESENTED ............................................................................................ 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 4

STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................... 4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................................. 9

ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................12

I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THATTHE IGBA DOES NOT CRIMINALIZE HOSTINGPOKER GAMES .................................................................................. 12

A. The IGBAs Definition Of Gambling Does NotEncompass Poker ........................................................................... 12

B. Plain Meaning And Common Law Underscore ThatThe Statutory Term Gambling Does Not Reach Poker ............. 17

II. THE GOVERNMENTS CONTRARY ARGUMENTSARE MERITLESS ................................................................................ 24

A. The Governments Definition Does Not Comport WithThe IGBAs Text .......................................................................... 24

B. The Governments Proposed Definition Of GamblingConflicts With The Statutes Text, Common Usage,

And Common Sense ...................................................................... 33

C. The Governments Definition Of Gambling ConflictsWith The Common Law ................................................................ 38

D. Legislative History Does Not Aid The GovernmentsArgument ....................................................................................... 42



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TABLE OF CONTENTSContinued

Page

ii

III. THE RULE OF LENITY REQUIRES RESOLVING ANYAMBIGUITY IN THE IGBA AGAINST THE

GOVERNMENT ................................................................................... 49

IV. DICRISTINAS ACQUITTAL MUST STAND BECAUSETHE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TOSUBMIT THE ELEMENT OF GAMBLING TO THEJURY ..................................................................................................... 52

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 57

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE



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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

iii

CASES:

Am. Amusements Co. v.Neb. Dept of Revenue,807 N.W.2d 492 (Neb. 2011) ....................................................................... 23, 40

Apprendi v. New Jersey,530 U.S. 466 (2000) ............................................................................................ 52

Automatic Music & Vending Corp. v.Liquor Control Commn,396 N.W.2d 204 (Mich. 1986) ............................................................................ 21

Bayerv. Johnson,

349 N.W.2d 447 (S.D. 1984) .............................................................................. 23

Beckv. Prupis,529 U.S. 494 (2000) ...................................................................................... 19, 24

Begay v. United States,533 U.S. 137 (2008) ................................................................................ 14, 27, 40

Bifulco v. United States,447 U.S. 387 (1980) ............................................................................................ 51

Boies v. Bartell,310 P.2d 834 (Ariz. 1957) ...................................................................... 19, 22, 31

Boosalis v. Crawford,99 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1938) .................................................................. 22, 31, 33

Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia,541 U.S. 913 (2004) ............................................................................................ 13

Chiarella v. United States,

445 U.S. 222 (1980) ...................................................................................... 37, 38

Christopherv. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) ........................................................................................ 25

City of New Yorkv. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008) ............................................................................... 29



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TABLE OF AUTHORITIESContinued

Page

iv

City of St. Paulv. Stovall,

30 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1948) ............................................................................. 23Clevelandv. United States,

531 U.S. 12 (2000) .............................................................................................. 51

Commonwealth v. Dent,992 A.2d 190 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) .................................................................... 41

Commonwealth v. LaBella,458 N.E.2d 763 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) .............................................................. 22

Commonwealth v. One Electro-Sport Draw Poker Machine,443 A.2d 295 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) .............................................................. 19, 21

Commonwealth v. Two Electronic Poker Game Machines,465 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1983) ......................................................................... 19, 22, 23

DOrio v. Startup Candy Co.,266 P. 1037 (Utah 1928) ..................................................................................... 23

Delano v. State,

168 P.2d 659 (Okla. Crim. App. 1946)............................................................... 23

Donovan v. United States,580 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1978) ............................................................................. 28

Drew v. State,10 Ark. 82 (1849) ................................................................................................ 22

Evans v. Michigan,133 S. Ct. 1069 (2013) ........................................................................................ 55

Faircloth v. Cent. Fla. Fair, Inc.,202 So. 2d 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) .......................................................... 21

FCCv. AT&T Inc.,131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) ........................................................................................ 33



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Page

v

Games Mgmt., Inc. v. Owens,

662 P.2d 260 (Kan. 1983) ................................................................................... 23Garrettv. State,

963 So. 2d 700 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).............................................................. 41

Giordenello v. United States,357 U.S. 480 (1958) ............................................................................................ 38

Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. Wilson,130 S. Ct. 1396 (2012) ........................................................................................ 34

Ill. Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc.,547 U.S. 28 (2006) .............................................................................................. 51

In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor,856 A.2d 320 (R.I. 2004) .................................................................................... 41

In re Allen,377 P.2d 280 (Cal. 1962) ........................................................................ 15, 22, 37

In re Lee Tong,

18 F. 253 (D. Or. 1883) ................................................................................ 21, 23

In re Request of Governor for Advisory Op.,12 A.3d 1104 (Del. 2009) ................................................................................... 22

Johnson v. Phinney,218 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1955) ........................................................................ 31, 33

Joker Club LLCv. Hardin,643 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) ................................................................. 41

Jones v. United States,526 U.S. 227 (1999) ............................................................................................ 48

Kingv. St. Vincents Hosp.,502 U.S. 215 (1991) ............................................................................................ 29



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Page

vi

Ladnerv. United States,

358 U.S. 169 (1958) ............................................................................................ 51Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson,

359 P.2d 85 (Nev. 1961) ..................................................................................... 23

Lashbrookv. State,550 N.E.2d 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) ................................................................. 22

Ling Nan Zhengv. Liberty Apparel Co.,617 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2010),cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2879 (2011) .................................................................. 53

McBoyle v. United States,283 U.S. 25 (1931) .................................................................................. 13, 25, 46

Medley v. D.L. Runnels,506 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2007) ........................................................................ 53, 54

Mendelsohn v. Bidcactus, LLC,2012 WL 1059702 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2012) .................................................... 22

Mohamadv. Palestinian Auth.,132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) ........................................................................................ 25

Molloy v. MTA,94 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1996) ..........................................................................passim

Morrow v. State,511 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1973) ................................................................... 22, 31, 54

People ex rel. Ellison v. Lavin,71 N.E. 753 (N.Y. 1904) ..................................................................................... 31

People v. Hunt,616 N.Y.S.2d 168 (City Crim. Ct. 1994) ............................................................ 39

People v. Li Ai Hua,885 N.Y.S.2d 380 (City Crim. Ct. 2009) ...................................................... 23, 39



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Page

vii

People v. Melton,

142 Misc. 2d 649 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1991) ............................................................... 39People v. Mitchell,

444 N.E.2d 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) ................................................................. 42

People v. Stiffel,61 Misc. 2d 1100 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1969) ............................................................... 39

People v. Tillman,820 N.Y.S.2d 511 (City Crim. Ct. 2006) ............................................................ 39

PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,532 U.S. 661 (2001) ............................................................................................ 36

Postv. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co.,691 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2012) ............................................................................... 28

Progress Vending, Inc. v. Dept of Liquor Control,394 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) ................................................................ 23

Question Game Co. v. Ploner,

273 Ill. App. 187 (1933) ..................................................................................... 22

Ramirezv. City Demonstration Agency,549 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1976) ................................................................................ 28

Reddv. Simmons,167 So. 65 (Miss. 1936) ...................................................................................... 23

Roberts IIv. Commns Inv. Club of Woonsocket,431 A.2d 1206 (R.I. 1981) .................................................................................. 23

Rosenkranzv. Vassallo,473 A.2d 991 (N.J. Ct. App. 1984) ..................................................................... 19

Rouse v. Sisson,199 So. 777 (Miss. 1941) .................................................................................... 21



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Page

viii

Sanabria v. United States,

437 U.S. 54 (1978) .............................................................................................. 55Sash v.Zenk,

428 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2005) ............................................................................... 50

Scheidlerv. Natl Org. for Women, Inc.,537 U.S. 393 (2003) ............................................................................................ 38

Simpson v. United States,319 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2002) ................................................................................. 51

Skillingv. United States,130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) .................................................................................. 49, 52

Smith v. United States,507 U.S. 197 (1993) ............................................................................................ 44

Smith v. United States,508 U.S. 223 (1993) ............................................................................................ 46

Staples v. United States,

511 U.S. 600 (1994) .............................................................................................. 3

State ex rel. Green v. One Five Cent Inning Base Ball Machine,3 So. 2d 27 (Ala. 1941) ....................................................................................... 22

State v. Bally Beach Club Pinball Mach.,119 A.2d 876 (Vt. 1956) ..................................................................................... 19

State v. Dorau,198 A.2d 575 (Conn. 1938) ................................................................................ 20

State v. Grimes,49 Minn. 443 (1898) ........................................................................................... 22

State v. Hahn,586 N.W.2d 5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) ............................................................. 23, 40



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Page

ix

State v. Pinball Machs.,

404 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1965) ............................................................................... 19State v. Shorts,

32 N.J.L. 398 (N.J. 1868) ................................................................................... 20

State v. Stroupe,76 S.E.2d 313 (N.C. 1953).................................................................................. 23

State v. Wassick,191 S.E.2d 283 (W. Va. 1972) ............................................................................ 23

Town of Centerville v. Burns,126 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1939) ............................................................................ 21

Town of Mount Pleasantv. Chimento,2012 WL 5870814 (S.C. Nov. 21, 2012) ............................................................ 35

Union Bankv. Wolas,502 U.S. 151 (1991) ............................................................................................ 46

United States v. Aleynikov,

676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012) ........................................................................... 27, 51

United States v. Atiyeh,402 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2005) ............................................................................... 26

United States v. Banki,685 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2012) ................................................................................. 53

United States v. Bass,404 U.S. 336 (1971) ............................................................................................ 50

United States v. Gaudin,515 U.S. 506 (1995) ............................................................................................ 52

United States v. Gonzalez,110 F.3d 936 (2d Cir. 1997) ............................................................................... 52



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x

United States v. Gotti,

459 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2006) ............................................................................... 39United States v. Granderson,

511 U.S. 39 (1994) ........................................................................................ 50, 51

United States v. Hohn,8 F.3d 1301 (8th Cir. 1993) ................................................................................ 54

United States v. Marcucilli,287 F. Appx 126 (2d Cir. 2008) ........................................................................ 54

United States v. Persico,832 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1987) ............................................................................... 38

United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005) .................................................................... 28, 29

United States v. Plaza Health Labs, Inc.,3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993) ....................................................................... 11, 25, 49

United States v. Reyes,

302 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2002) ................................................................................. 55

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,489 U.S. 235 (1989) ............................................................................................ 12

United States v. Santos,553 U.S. 507 (2008) ............................................................................................ 50

United States v. Vasquez,267 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001) ..................................................................... 52-53, 55

United States v. Venturella,391 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2004) ............................................................................... 30

United States v. Wilson,420 U.S. 332 (1975) ............................................................................................ 55



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xi

Van Peltv. State,

246 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1952) .............................................................................. 23West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey,

499 U.S. 83 (1991) .............................................................................................. 45

STATUTES:

2 U.S.C. 285b(4) ................................................................................................... 48

18 U.S.C. 1955 ........................................................................................................ 5

18 U.S.C. 1955(a) ................................................................................................. 54

18 U.S.C. 1955(b) ....................................................................................... 2, 17, 25

18 U.S.C. 1955(b)(2)......................................................................................passim

18 U.S.C. 1955(e) ..........................................................................................passim

18 U.S.C. 3231 ........................................................................................................ 1

18 U.S.C. 3731 ........................................................................................................ 1

Act of April 29, 1878, 20 Stat. 39 ............................................................................ 48

Act of Jan. 31, 1883, 22 Stat. 411 ............................................................................ 48

Act of Sept. 19, 1890, 26 Stat.465 ........................................................................... 48

Gambling Ships Act, 23, 63 Stat. 89 (1949) ......................................................... 48

Johnson Act, 1, 64 Stat. 1134 (1951) .................................................................... 48

Paraphernalia Act, 1, 75 Stat. 492 (1961) ............................................................. 48

Revenue Act of 1941, 555, 55 Stat. 687 ............................................................... 48

Wire Act, 2, 75 Stat. 491 (1961) ..................................................................... 48-49

Act of Aug. 3, 1996, 110 Stat. 1484 ........................................................................ 48



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xii

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 28-1(b)(2) ............................................................................. 21

Ala. Code 13A-12-20(4) ....................................................................................... 20

Alaska Stat. 11.66.280(2) ...................................................................................... 20

Cal. Penal Code 337j(e)(1) ................................................................................... 41

Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-10-102(2)(a) .......................................................................... 21

Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-278a(2) ................................................................................. 21

D.C. Code 22-1704 ............................................................................................... 20

Fla. Stat. 849.08 .................................................................................................... 20

Fla. Stat. 849.086(1) .............................................................................................. 41

Ga. Code 16-12-20(2) ........................................................................................... 20

Haw. Stat. 712-1220(4) ......................................................................................... 20

Idaho Code 18-3801(1) ......................................................................................... 21

Ind. Code 35-45-5-1 .............................................................................................. 21

Kan. Stat. 21-6302(a)(2) ....................................................................................... 21

Kan. Stat. 21-6302(d)(1)(A) ................................................................................. 20

Ky. Rev. Stat. 528-010(3)(a) ................................................................................. 20

Md. Code 12-101(d)(1) ......................................................................................... 20

Md. Code 13-305(a)(4) ......................................................................................... 21

Me. Rev. Stat. 952(4) ............................................................................................ 20

Minn. Stat. 609-75(4) ............................................................................................ 20

Mo. Rev. Stat. 572.010(4) ..................................................................................... 20



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xiii

Mont. Code 23-5-112(13)(a) ................................................................................. 20

N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-292 .......................................................................................... 20

N.D. Cent. Code 12.1-28-01(1) ...................................................................... 20-21

N.D. Cent. Code 12.1-28-01(1)(a) ........................................................................ 21

N.J. Stat. 2C:37-1(b) ............................................................................................. 20

N.M. Stat. 30-19-1(B) ..................................................................................... 20, 21

N.M. Stat. 30-19-1(C) ........................................................................................... 20

N.Y. Penal Law 225.00(1) .................................................................................... 39

N.Y. Penal Law 225.00(2) .................................................................................... 20

N.Y. Penal Law 225.05 ........................................................................................... 4

Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1101(4) ............................................................................. 20, 39

Ohio Rev. Code 2915.02 (A)(2) ........................................................................... 21

Ohio Rev. Code 2915.02 (A)(4) ........................................................................... 21

Okla. Stat. 21-942 ................................................................................................. 21

Or. Rev. Stat. 167.117(7) ...................................................................................... 21

R.I. Gen. Laws 11-19-18 ....................................................................................... 21

Tenn. Code 39-17-501 .......................................................................................... 21

Tex. Code 47.01(1) ............................................................................................... 21

Utah Code 76-10-1101(2)(a) ................................................................................. 21

Va. Code 18-2-333 ................................................................................................ 21

2Vt. Stat. 13-2135(3) .............................................................................................. 1



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xiv

W. Va. Code 29-22C-3(32) ................................................................................... 41

W. Va. Code 61-10-5 ............................................................................................ 21

Wash. Rev. Code 9.46.0237 .................................................................................. 21

Wis. Stat. 945.01(1) .............................................................................................. 21

Wis. Stat. 945.01(1)(b) .......................................................................................... 21

Wis. Stat. 945.01(3) .............................................................................................. 21

Wyo. Stat. 6-7-101(a)(iii)(A) ................................................................................ 21

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

N.D. Const. art. XI, 25 .......................................................................................... 20

S.D. Const. art. III, 25 ........................................................................................... 20

LEGISLATIVE:

H. Rep. No. 91-1549 (1969) .................................................................................... 26

S. Rep. No. 91-617 (1969) ..................................................................... 13, 26, 43, 45

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the S.Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. (June 3, 1969) .................................... 45, 46

Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong. (1970) ......................................................................................... 43, 46

116 Cong. Rec. 854 (Jan. 22, 1970) ......................................................................... 44

116 Cong. Rec. 35204-05 (Oct. 6, 1970) ................................................................. 44

OTHERAUTHORITIES:

2 Whartons Criminal Law 1465a (1896) ............................................................. 19

C. Black,Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full(2007) ................................................. 13



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Page

xv

A. Brisman, Casino Gambling: Winning Ways (1999) ........................................... 33

A. Cabot & R. Hannum,Poker: Public Policy, Law, Mathematics, and theFuture of An American Tradition, 22 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 443 (2005) ............ 23

R. Flanagan, Tasmanian Devil, The New Yorker (Jan. 21, 2013) .......................... 31

H. Friendly,Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes,in Benchmarks (1967) ......................................................................................... 51

Group Invests $5 Million To Hedge Bets in Lottery,N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1992 .................................................................................. 31

C. Matthews,Kennedy & Nixon (1998) ................................................................... 13

J. McManus, Cowboys Full(2009) .......................................................................... 43

Merriam Websters Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1996) ..................................... 18

P. Mushnick,Playoff System Fit for Losers,N.Y. Post, Aug. 30, 1998 .................................................................................... 16

The National Game, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1875 ..................................................... 13

Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) ................................................................ 17

A. Reber, The New Gamblers Bible (1996) ............................................................ 32

I. Rose & M. Owens, Jr.,Internet Gaming Law:Gambling and the Law (2005) ...................................................................... 32, 33

Websters Third New International Dictionary (1971) ........................................... 18



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IN THE

United States Court of Appealsfor the Second Circuit

_____________________________

No. 12-3720_____________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellant,

v.

LAWRENCE DICRISTINA,

Defendant-Appellee,

STEFANO LOMBARDO, a.k.a. MITZIE,

Defendant.______________________

On Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Eastern District of New York

______________________

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LAWRENCE DICRISTINA

______________________

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3231. The

Government filed a notice of appeal on September 19, 2012. This Court has

jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3731.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents a question of statutory interpretation: Does the Illegal

Gambling Business Act (IGBA), a criminal statute aimed at fighting organized

crime, make hosting a poker game a federal crime punishable by up to five years in



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prison? The District Court correctly recognized that the answer is no. The IGBA

criminalizes certain types of gambling operations. 18 U.S.C. 1955(b). And it

defines the term gambling to include onlygames of chancea definition

consistent with the common law. Poker is no game of chance. As the District

Court found, and as the Government now concedes, Govt Br. 14, poker is

predominantly controlled by skill. The District Court therefore held that the IGBA

does not criminalize poker, acquitting Lawrence DiCristina.

In arguing that the District Court erred, the Government flees from the

IGBAs plain text. The Government openly urges this Court to ignore the IGBAs

definition of gambling. It argues instead that the statute should be read to

incorporate the Governments own definitionthat gambling is betting on an

uncertain outcome. Govt Br. 21. But that definition fails to give meaning to

Congresss words. And it is tethered neither to common law nor common sense.

After all, one cannot bet on a certain outcome, and so the Governments definition

amounts to betting on anything. That stunningly broad formulation would

classify investing, golf and fishing tournaments, and many other common activities

as gambling under federal law. It should be rejected.

The Government also suggests that this Court should defer to a historical

perception that poker is gambling. Govt Br. 39. But this case is not about any

supposed historical perception of poker (a perception the Government presents



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in one-sided fashion). It is about a criminal statute. Because the statute defines

gambling in a particular wayas including only games of chancethat is the

end of the matter. After all, [t]he definition of the elements of a criminal offense

is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are

solely creatures of statute. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604 (1994)

(alteration & quotation marks omitted). Congress could, of course, criminalize

poker if it saw fit. But Congress did not do so in the IGBA.

The District Courts decision thus honors the IGBAs clear language. And

affirmance would have no significant impact on law enforcement. States already

regulate poker and could continue to do so. SPA119. Federal prosecutors could

still go after organized crime. And Congress could weigh in if it wants to broaden

its regulatory reach. This Court should reject the Governments invitation to take

that decision away from the legislature, where it belongs.

ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Whether the District Court correctly held that hosting a poker game

does not constitute a federal felony under the IGBA.

2. Whether DiCristinas acquittal must be affirmed because he was

deprived of a jury determination of every element of the offense.



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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 9, 2011, a grand jury returned an indictment charging

DiCristina with violating the IGBA and conspiring to do so. GA10.1

On July 12,

2012, a jury convicted DiCristina on both counts. GA7. On August 21, 2012, the

District Court granted DiCristinas motion for a judgment of acquittal. GA9.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Lawrence DiCristina owns a small business on Staten Island selling electric

bicycles. SPA53. In December 2010, DiCristina began hosting poker games at his

shop after business hours. GA10. On game nights, DiCristina set up two tables at

which guests played a version of poker called No Limit Texas Holdem.2

Guests

played for chips representing money. A typical player might buy $100 worth of

chips, and the amount at stake in any hand started between $3 and $10. DiCristina

provided card dealers, food, and drinks. In return, he charged five percent of the

pot at stake in each hand played. SPA53-55.

Promoting gambling is a misdemeanor in New York,seeN.Y. Penal Law

225.05, but the State has shown no interest in prosecuting DiCristina for hosting

poker games. No one was ever harmed during or because of DiCristinas games.

1 GA refers to the Governments appendix, SPA to the special appendix,and R to District Court docket entries.2 When using the word poker, this brief typically refers to No Limit TexasHoldem. For an explanation of the games rules and mechanics,see SPA11-13.



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5

DiCristina has not been accused of any unlawful activity other than hosting poker

games, and no connection between the games and organized crime has been

suggested. See SPA55. The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York

nonetheless chose to charge DiCristina with committing federal felonies

violating the IGBA and conspiring to do sopunishable by up to five years in

prison. SPA5. The IGBA provides, as relevant:

(a) Whoever conducts * * * all or part of an illegal gambling businessshall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years,

or both.

(b) As used in this section

(1) illegal gambling business means a gambling business which

(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision inwhich it is conducted;

(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage,supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and

(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation fora period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000in any single day.

(2) gambling includes but is not limited to pool-selling,bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dicetables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, orselling chances therein.

* * *

(e) This section shall not apply to any bingo game, lottery, or similargame of chance conducted by an organization exempt from tax [underI.R.C. Section 501(c)(3)].

18 U.S.C. 1955.



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6

Before trial, DiCristina moved to dismiss the indictment. He argued that

poker does not constitute gambling under 1955(b)(2). That provision defines

gambling by enumerating nine specific games, and poker did not make

Congress list. To be sure, 1955(b)(2) contemplates that gambling also could

include other games. But DiCristina argued that the IGBA prohibits only those

that share the enumerated games common denominator: They are all games of

chance, i.e., games in which the outcome is predominantly controlled by chance

rather than skill. Poker does not share that key trait, he argued. In support, he

cited studies showing that players skills predominantly determine the results of

poker games. R69.

In response, the Government argued that hosting poker games violatedstate

law. And it contended that state infractions automatically qualify as gambling

under the IGBA, because 1955(b)(2) notwithstandingthere is no federal

definition of gambling in the Act. R76.

Before trial, DiCristina moved to call Dr. Randal Heeb, an economist,

statistician, and game-theory expert, as an expert on the role of skill in poker. R73.

At a pretrial hearing, Dr. Heeb described the rules and mechanics of poker,

detailing the myriad skill-based decisions poker players must make. SPA14. For

example, he described techniques for bluffing an opponent into folding superior

cards. SPA14-17. Dr. Heeb also explained his work analyzing 415 million hands



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of poker played online. The results demonstrated that skill affects the likely result

of even a single hand of poker, and that as the game is typically playedover

hundreds of handsthe role of skill outweighs that of chance. SPA21-22, 30, 41-

45. He acknowledged the chance involved in drawing any particular cards, but

explained that over time luck evens out while differences in skill persist, so that

skill matters more. He noted that other academic work uniformly embraced this

conclusion. SPA17-39.

The District Court accepted Dr. Heeb as an expert. But it rejected

DiCristinas argument that Dr. Heeb should testify at trial to help the jury

determine whether poker is gambling under the IGBA. R78 at 2-7. Instead, the

court took that question from the jury, reserving it as a matter of law to decide after

trial. GA188. DiCristina urged the court to reconsider on the ground that pokers

status qualified as an essential element of the IGBA offense and a mixed

question of law and fact for the jury. R79 at 2 n.1. The court again refused. For

purposes of trial it instructed the jury that [g]ambling includes playing poker for

money. GA205. With that instruction in mind, the jury convicted DiCristina.

DiCristina then moved for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that poker

is not gambling and that the jury should have been permitted to determine that

issue. SPA5. The District Court granted the motion. The court rejected the

Governments claim that state law defined gambling under the IGBA. SPA92-



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101. Looking to the IGBAs text, the court held that poker did not fall within

1955(b)(2)s definition of gambling.

The District Court first determined that under the IGBAs definition, only

games predominated by chance qualify as gambling. SPA104. The court

recognized that in every game identified in 1955(b)(2), chance predominates

over the skill of the players in determining the outcome. SPA105. It rejected the

Governments claim that some of the enumerated games are games of skill. In

particular, it explained that sports-betting is not a game of skill because, unlike in

poker, a sports bettors skill does not influence game play. A sports bettor is

better able to picking a winning team, but cannot make them win. SPA111. The

court further reasoned that chance (as compared to skill) has traditionally been

thought to be a defining element of gambling and is included in dictionary,

common law, and other federal statutory definitions of it. SPA110. And it noted

that 1955(e), which exempts game[s] of chance played for charity, suggested

that the IGBA applies only to such games. After all, it would be notably odd if

games of skill were encompassed in the federal definition [of gambling], but only

games of chance were exempted from prosecution under 1955(e). SPA106.

The court then found that poker is not a game of chance. It observed that

the majority of poker hands end when one player induces his opponents to fold

so that regardless of the cards, the players decisions alone determine the



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outcome. SPA113. The court thus likened poker to golf and bridge, games of

skill in which luck nonetheless plays some role. It reviewed the expert testimony,

cataloguing the evidence that poker is a game of skill: Poker requires complex

decisions based on psychology, math, observation, and strategy; many people

reliably earn a living playing pokersomething that cannot be done playing a

game with random results; studies showed that skilled players perform better than

unskilled players when dealt the same cards; and all published studies conclude

that skill predominates in poker. SPA114. The District Court found those studies

accurate and persuasive. SPA118. By contrast, the court rejected the testimony

of the Governments expert, Dr. David DeRosa, who contended that poker is a

game of chance. SPA30. It found that Dr. DeRosa has provided no basis for the

court to conclude that chance predominates over skill in poker. SPA118.

Having determined that the IGBA defines gambling to include only games

of chance, and that poker is predominantly a game of skill, the District Court held

that the Government may not prosecute people under the IGBA for hosting poker

games. The court thus acquitted DiCristina.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. Switching course before this Court, the Government concedes that

poker is a game in which skill predominantly determines outcomes. Govt Br. 14.

That concession goes a long way toward resolving this appeal, for the only real



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dispute that remains is whether the IGBA covers only games of chance, as the

District Court held. It does. The statute evinces that key limitation twice over: It

defines gambling by enumerating nine games of chance, 18 U.S.C. 1955(b)(2),

thereby limiting the terms scope to similar games, and it uses the phrase game of

chance elsewhere in delimiting the statutes application, id. 1955(e). Dictionary

definitions confirm that gambling is limited to games of chance. And the common

law is to the same effect: Nearly all states limit gambling to games of chance,

and further provide that chance must predominate over skill for a game to

constitute gambling. In short, because the statutory term gambling applies only

to activities in which chance predominantly controls the outcome, and the

Government concedes that chance does not do so in poker, DiCristina did not

violate the IGBA by hosting poker games.

2. The Governments contrary arguments are weak. The Government

brazenly asks this Court to ignore the statutory definition of gambling altogether.

Govt Br. 16-18. But that is statutory nullification, not statutory interpretation.

Having abandoned the statute, the Government next proposes its own preferred

definition of gambling: betting on an uncertain outcome. Id. at 21. That

definition, however, is vastly overbroadsweeping in activities from stock

investing to bridge tournamentsand devoid of grounding in the IGBA or

common law. Finally, the Government says the legislative history shows that



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Congress intended to give federal prosecutors sweeping authority to target all

betting games that might violate state law. But that is an impermissible effort to

make legislative history trump statutory text: Congress did not rely on state law to

define illegal gambling in the IGBA; it included its own definition, and that

definition must be given effect. In any event, the legislative-history argument fails

on its own terms. Congress disclaimed any intent to bring all local gaming matters

into federal courts. The IGBA instead was designed to target syndicated illegal

gambling activities providing billions of dollars to the Mafia. The Government

concedes that poker was not such a game.

3. For these reasons, the IGBA does not criminalize DiCristinas poker

game. If, however, this Court determines that the IGBAs scope is ambiguous, it

should rely on the rule of lenity to affirm. The rule requires that [b]efore a man

can be punished as a criminal under the Federal law[,] his case must beplainly and

unmistakably within the provisions of some statute. United States v.Plaza Health

Labs, Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 649 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted; emphasis

added). Whatever may be said for the Governments arguments, they do not

establish that poker is plainly and unmistakably criminalized by the IGBA.

DiCristina thus cannot be punished as a criminal under the Federal law. Id.

4. In any event, DiCristinas acquittal must stand because the District

Court wrongly prevented jurors from determining whether poker qualifies as



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gambling under the IGBA. That violated DiCristinas right to a jury

determination of every essential element of the offense. And, because the District

Court subsequently acquitted DiCristina, the issue cannot be submitted to jurors in

a second prosecution without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.

ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE IGBA

DOES NOT CRIMINALIZE HOSTING POKER GAMES.

As the Government now concedes, the IGBA applies only to games that fall

within the statutes definition of gambling. Govt Br. 14. DiCristinas poker

game does not qualify.

A. The IGBAs Definition Of Gambling Does Not Encompass

Poker.

Determining the meaning of gambling in the IGBA begins where all such

inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself. United States v. Ron

Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). The IGBAs terms demonstrate that

poker is not gambling under the Act.

1. Section 1955(b)(2) defines gambling: As used in this section * * *

gambling includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining

slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy,

bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein. Poker is conspicuously

absent from the list. That is significant because 1955(b)(2) comprehensively



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defines the term gambling. S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 155. It thus includes

archetypal forms of gambling, such as slot machines and roulette. It also identifies

more obscure games such as bolita and policy. That the Act does not mention

poker in its wide-ranging enumeration of gambling activities is the first indicator

that it does not cover poker. It is, as the District Court said, the dog that didnt

bark. SPA103.

Pokers absence is all the more notable given that Congress was surely

aware of the game. Nearly a century before the IGBA, poker had already been

called The National Game. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1875. In the era of the IGBAs

enactment, many Washington political figures played poker, including the

President who signed the Act into law. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of

Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 917 (2004); C. Black,Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full

61 (2007); C. Matthews,Kennedy & Nixon 33 (1998). That Congress carefully

enumerated so many activities to which the Act appliesfrom the obvious (dice

games) to the obscure (bolita)but chose to omit the well-known game of

poker, strongly suggests that poker does not fall within the Act. See McBoyle

v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1931) (omission of airplanes from statutory

list indicates statutory definition of vehicle excludes airplanes, given that they

were well known in 1919 when this statute was passed).



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2. Of course, 1955(b)(2) provides that gambling includes, but is not

limited to, the nine games listed. The definition can thus encompass unlisted

gamesbut only if they are similar to those the statute enumerates. See Begay

v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146-147 (2008);Molloy v. MTA, 94 F.3d 808, 811-

812 (2d Cir. 1996). InMolloy, for example, this Court interpreted the term

alteration in light of this definition: Alteration means a change to an existing

facility, including, but not limited to, remodeling, renovation, rehabilitation,

reconstruction, [and] historic restoration[.] 94 F.3d at 811 (emphasis added). The

Court explained that a definition featuring the phrase including, but not limited

to sweeps in only things similar to those enumerated: Under the common sense

approach to interpreting a general provision in the light of a list of specific

illustrative provisions, ejusdem generis, we construe the general term (here,

change) to include only things similar to the specific items in the list. Id. at 812.

Thus, the Court found it significant that [b]y way of non-exclusive example, the

regulation lists only physical modifications of a relatively permanent nature to the

facility, and it construed the word alteration accordingly. Id.

Just like the regulation inMolloy, 1955(b)(2) defines the key term

gamblingthrough a non-exclusive list signaled by the phrase includes, but is

not limited to. 28 U.S.C. 1955(b)(2). As a matter of common sense, then,

gambling should encompass games similar to the specific items in the list.



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Molloy, 94 F.3d at 812. And there is one key common denominator shared by the

items in the IGBAs list: Each is a game of chance. 28 U.S.C. 1955(e). That

is to say, in each of the nine games, from lotteries to roulette to bookmaking to

bolita, chance is the dominating factor in determining the result of the game. In

re Allen, 377 P.2d 280, 281 (Cal. 1962); infra at 20-24 (describing common-law

test for games of chance). Winning in each game rests more on events the player

cannot controlwhere the ball lands on the roulette wheel, what lottery number is

picked, whether the Giants cover the spread against the Cowboysthan it does on

the players skill.

Not so in poker. The Government now concedes that skill predominates

over chance in poker. Govt Br. 14. That concession is correct. Although poker

players do not control the cards they are dealt, the cards are not the primary

determinant of outcomes. Indeed, in three-quarters of all poker hands, one player

wins because he convinces the other players to fold without ever learning who held

stronger cards. SPA45-46. As the District Court explained, poker players draw

on an array of talents, including facility with numbers, knowledge of human

psychology, and powers of observation and deception * * * to win even if chance

has not dealt them the better hand. SPA111. Moreover, the goal of a poker game

is not to win the greatest number of hands, but to win the most money. A skilled

poker player can therefore succeed even if she is unlucky in that she draws many



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weak hands and only a few strong ones. The skilled player will deduce when she

holds weak cards relative to her opponents, investing little in those hands.

Although she may lose those hands, she will lose little money in them. SPA14-15.

But on the occasions when she has strong cards, she will play skillfully to

maximize the value of the pot, so that her profits from a few strong hands outweigh

the losses from many weak hands. SPA14-17. She will also sometimes win pots

by bluffing opponents into folding even when she holds the weaker hand. SPA15,

SPA113.

Indeed, over the length of the best-known poker tournament the most skilled

players will outperform the least skilled 99 percentof the time. SPA44-45. In just

a single nights play at DiCristinas, the best players will tend to beat the worst

players 88 percent of the time. SPA40-41, SPA116-117. That exceeds the

advantage the best teams have over the worst in a major-league baseball game. See

P. Mushnick,Playoff System Fit for Losers, N.Y. Post 94 (Aug. 30, 1998). And

that is why the academic studies catalogued below uniformly conclude that poker

is a game of skill. SPA17-39;see SPA46 (quoting a study determining that poker

is as much a game of skill as golf). Poker is not just nota game of chance, it is

nothing like a game of chance. Poker thus does not fall within a statutory

definition of gambling that defines the term using games of chance, as the IGBA

does. See, e.g.,Molloy, 94 F.3d at 812.



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3. If there were any doubt about how to read 1955(b)(2) standing

alone, 1955(e) confirms that the unifying characteristic of the prohibited games is

that each is a game of chance. Section 1955(e) is a carve-out provision meant to

protect charities from the IGBA. It provides: [T]his section shall not apply to

any bingo game, lottery, or similar game of chance conducted by charitable

organizations. As the District Court observed, it would be notably odd if games

of skill were encompassed in the federal definition but only games of chance were

exempted from prosecution under 1955(e). SPA106. Congress surely did not

intend to protect the PTAs holiday raffle but not its annual bridge tournament.

Instead, reading the statute as a coherent whole establishes that 1955(b) prohibits

hosting a game of chance for profit, while 1955(e) allows hosting a game of

chance for charity. The Act simply has nothing to do with games of skill.

B. Plain Meaning And Common Law Underscore That The

Statutory Term Gambling Does Not Reach Poker.

The statutory term gambling thus does not reach poker. The words plain

meaning and common-law definition underscore that conclusion.

1. Plain Meaning. The word gambling typically applies only to games

of chance. After an extensive survey of dictionaries, the District Court concluded

that dictionary * * * definitions of gambling argue in favor of a definition limited

to games of chance. SPA112;see SPA60-61 (citing, among other sources,

Gamble, The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (To play games of chance



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for money * * * .); Gamble, Websters Third New International Dictionary 932

(1971) (1: a: to play a game of chance for money or other stakes)). The

Governments brief itself identifies still more dictionaries defining gambling

using the phrase game of chance. Govt Br. 19-20 & n.5.

Of course, dictionary definitions of gambling vary widely. SPA60. But

the definitions that encompass more than games of chance are far too broad to fit

the IGBAs text and structure. Defining gamble as to play a game for money or

propertyas does Merriam Websters Collegiate Dictionary 478 (10th ed.

1996)might cover poker, but it would also reach chess tournaments and the U.S.

Open, where players pay an entrance fee to compete for cash prizes. And one

could capture poker with the definition risking something on an uncertain event,

SPA61 (quoting the second meaning in Websters Third New International

Dictionary (1971)), but that would also sweep in speculative options trading,

401(k) investment decisions, and even dating. Such broad definitions make little

sense in a criminal prohibition and fail to account for the statutory definitions

inclusion of only games of chance. Investing, professional tennis, and poker are

unlike the nine games of chance enumerated in the statutory definition of

gambling; any definition that includes them should therefore be rejected. Instead,

the more common dictionary definitionplaying games of chance for money

best comports with the Acts text and structure.



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2. Common Law. The broad historical trend among the states provides

further support for defining gambling under the IGBA as playing games of

chance. That is so because the states have generally agreed on two crucial points:

First, chance is an essential element of gambling, and second, the categorization of

an activity as a game of chance (which is gambling) or a game of skill (which is

not) hinges on whether chance or skill predominates. Since the statutory term

gambling has a settled meaning at common law, it should be interpreted in

accordance with [this] widely accepted definition[ ], not as a departure from [it].

Beckv.Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 500-501 (2000).

a. Under the common law, gambling refers to games of chance. The

three elements necessary to gambling [are] consideration, a result determined by

chance rather than skill, and a reward. Commonwealth v. Two Elec. Poker Game

Machs., 465 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. 1983);see also, e.g.,Rosenkranzv. Vassallo, 473

A.2d 991, 995 (N.J. Ct. App. 1984); State v.Pinball Machs., 404 P.2d 923, 925

(Alaska 1965);Boies v.Bartell, 310 P.2d 834, 837 (Ariz. 1957); State v.Bally

Beach Club Pinball Mach., 119 A.2d 876, 879 (Vt. 1956). As one of the most-

cited common-law treatises put it, [f]air and honest contests of skill * * * have

always been regarded as sustained by the common law, notwithstanding the fact

that a prize is attached to success; in contrast, gambling occurs when parties

stake money on chance. 2 Whartons Criminal Law 1465a (1896). That



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distinction makes sense. As many courts have emphasized, a game that fosters

* * * a desire to gain profit, not by [the players] own efforts, not as a reward for

skill or accomplishment, but solely by the lucky turn of chance * * * encourages

* * * the gambling instinct and * * * appeal[s] to the baser elements in [the

players] nature. State v.Dorau, 198 A.2d 573, 575 (Conn. 1938);see also, e.g.,

State v. Shorts, 32 N.J.L. 398, 401 (N.J. 1868) (chance is the evil principle against

which all [gambling] laws are aimed).

In accordance with this well-accepted definition, nearly all states have

recognized that gambling involves only games of chance, not games of skill.

Some states include game-of-chance language in constitutional provisions

prohibiting gambling. See, e.g., S.D. Const. art. III, 25 (The Legislature shall

not authorize any game of chance); N.D. Const. art. XI, 25. Others have

codified the game-of-chance element in their statutory definitions of gambling or

gambling device. See, e.g. Ala. Code 13A-12-20(4) (A person engages in

gambling if he risks something of value upon the outcome of a contest of

chance); N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-292 (prohibiting operating any game of chance).3

3 See also, e.g., Alaska Stat. 11.66.280(2); D.C. Code 22-1704; Fla. Stat.

849.08; Ga. Code 16-12-20(2); Haw. Stat. 712-1220(4); Kan. Stat. 21-6302(a)(2) and (d)(1)(A); Ky. Rev. Stat. 528-010(3)(a); Me. Rev. Stat. 952(4);Md. Code 12-101(d)(1); Minn. Stat. 609-75(4); Mo. Rev. Stat. 572.010(4);Mont. Code 23-5-112(13)(a); Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-1101(4); N.J. Stat. 2C:37-1(b); N.M. Stat. 30-19-1(B) and (C); N.Y. Penal Law 225.00(2); N.D. Cent.



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And still others expressly exclude games of skill from the statutory definition of

gambling. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-10-102(2)(a) (Gambling * * * does

not include * * * [b]ona fide contests of skill).4

Although the state enactments use

varied language, the consensus is striking: There has long been a legislative

distinction between games of chan[c]e, which are prohibited [as gambling], and

games of skill, which are not. Faircloth v. Cent. Fla. Fair, Inc., 202 So. 2d 608,

609 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).

State courts, like state legislators, agree that gambling involves playing

games of chance. Thus, even in those states that at some point lacked game of

chance language in their gambling laws, courts have refer[red] to the common-

law definition, which they have emphasized requires chance. Automatic Music &

Vending Corp. v.Liquor Control Commn, 396 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Mich. 1986);see

also, e.g.,Rouse v. Sisson, 199 So. 777, 778 (Miss. 1941); Town of Centerville

v.Burns, 126 S.W.2d 322, 323 (Tenn. 1939);In re Lee Tong, 18 F. 253, 257 (D.

Code 12.1-28-01(1); Ohio Rev. Code 2915.02 (A)(2) and (4); Okla. Stat. 21-942; Or. Rev. Stat. 167.117(7); R.I. Gen. Laws 11-19-18; Tenn. Code 39-17-501; Tex. Code 47.01(1); Utah Code 76-10-1101(2)(a); Vt. Stat. 13-2135(3);Wash. Rev. Code 9.46.0237; W. Va. Code 61-10-5; Wis. Stat. 945.01(1) and(3).4 See also, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-278a(2); Idaho Code 18-3801(1); 720Ill. Comp. Stat. 28-1(b)(2); Ind. Code 35-45-5-1(d); Kan. Stat. 21-6302(a)(2);Md. Code 13-305(a)(4); N.M. Stat. 30-19-1(B); N.D. Cent. Code 12.1-28-01(1)(a); Va. Code 18-2-333; Wis. Stat. 945.01(1)(b); Wyo. Stat. 6-7-101(a)(iii)(A).



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Or. 1883); State v. Grimes, 49 Minn. 443, 446 (1898). In short, historically and

traditionally, gambling has been held to include * * * a result determined by

chance as opposed to * * * skill. Commonwealth v. One Electro-Sport Draw

Poker Mach., 443 A.2d 295, 297 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981), revd on other grounds,

Commonwealth v. Two Elec. Poker Game Machs., 465 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1983).

b. The states likewise agree about how to decide whether an activity is a

game of skill or of chance: they ask which predominates. As one canonical case

put it: The term game of chance has an accepted meaning established by

numerous adjudications. * * * The test is not whether the game contains an

element of chance or an element of skill but which of them is the dominating factor

in determining the result of the game. In re Allen, 377 P.2d at 281 (emphasis

added). Although gambling laws frequently change, the majority of states have

relied on this predominance test to sort games of chance from games of skill under

diverse statutory enactments. See, e.g., State ex rel. Green v. One Five Cent Inning

Base Ball Machine, 3 So. 2d 27, 29 (Ala. 1941);Morrow v. State, 511 P.2d 127,

129 (Alaska 1973);Boies, 310 P.2d at 837 (Ariz.);Drew v. State, 10 Ark. 82, 84-

85 (1849);Mendelsohn v.Bidcactus, LLC, 2012 WL 1059702, at *3 (D. Conn.

Mar. 28, 2012);In re Request of Governor for Advisory Op., 12 A.3d 1104, 1112

(Del. 2009);Boosalis v. Crawford, 99 F.2d 374, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Question

Game Co. v. Ploner, 273 Ill. App. 187, 192 (1933); Lashbrookv. State, 550



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23

N.E.2d 772, 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Games Mgmt., Inc. v. Owens, 662 P.2d 260,

264 (Kan. 1983); Commonwealth v.LaBella, 458 N.E.2d 763, 765 (Mass. App. Ct.

1984); City of St. Paulv. Stovall, 30 N.W.2d 638, 641-642 (Minn. 1948);Redd

v. Simmons, 167 So. 65, 67-68 (Miss. 1936);Am. Amusements Co. v.Neb. Dept of

Revenue, 807 N.W.2d 492, 502 (Neb. 2011);Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson,

359 P.2d 85, 87 (Nev. 1961);People v.Li Ai Hua, 885 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (City

Crim. Ct. 2009); State v. Stroupe, 76 S.E.2d 313, 317 (N.C. 1953);Progress

Vending, Inc. v.Dept of Liquor Control, 394 N.E.2d 324, 329 (Ohio Ct. App.

1978);Delano v. State, 168 P.2d 659, 663 (Okla. Crim. App. 1946);In re Lee

Tong, 18 F. at 257 (D. Or.); Two Elec. Poker Game Machs., 465 A.2d at 977-978

(Pa.);Roberts IIv. Commns Investment Club of Woonsocket, 431 A.2d 1206, 1211

(R.I. 1981);Bayerv.Johnson, 349 N.W.2d 447, 449 (S.D. 1984); Van Pelt

v. State, 246 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tenn. 1952);DOrio v. Startup Candy Co., 266 P.

1037, 1039 (Utah 1928); State v. Wassick, 191 S.E.2d 283, 287 (W. Va. 1972);

State v.Hahn, 586 N.W.2d 5, 10-11 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).

In sum, the District Court correctly found that gambling under the common

law has historically required playing a game of chance, and that [m]ost states

find that an activity is * * * illegal gambling if a person risks something of value

on an activitypredominately determined by chance. SPA62 (quoting A. Cabot

& R. Hannum,Poker: Public Policy, Law, Mathematics, and the Future of An



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American Tradition, 22 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 443, 445 (2005)). Because Congress

presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas attached to language with a

settled meaning at common law,Beck, 529 U.S. at 500-501 (citation omitted), this

consensus supports interpreting gambling in the IGBA the same way. And that

definition excludes pokera game the Government concedes is predominated by

skill.

II. THE GOVERNMENTS CONTRARY ARGUMENTS ARE

MERITLESS.

The Government argues for a far broader understanding of gambling. But

its arguments ignore the IGBAs text and fail to provide a workable definition of

the term.

A. The Governments Definition Does Not Comport With The

IGBAs Text.

1. The nine gambling games enumerated in 1955(b)(2) demonstrate

that the statute is limited to games of chance. See supra at 12-16. The

Governments counter to this approach, quite literally, is to suggest that this Court

ignore 1955(b)(2) altogether. The Government concedes that there is a federal

definition of gambling under the IGBA. Govt Br. 14. But the Government then

blithely asserts that 1955(b)(2) does not supply that definition. Id. at 16

(contending that 1955(b)(2) does not define gambling for purposes of the

IGBA (capitalization omitted)). In the Governments view, the provision merely



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contains a non-exhaustive list of examples of gambling activities, and those

examples should not be read to exclude other activities from the reach of the

statute. Id. at 16-17. The Government argues, in other words, that 1955(b)(2)

does no work and that the statutory definition of gambling must be found

elsewhere. Under its approach, the IGBA reaches the same games as it would have

if Congress had omitted 1955(b)(2).

That reading is untenable for two reasons. First, 1955(b)(2) obviously

does define gambling in the IGBA. As the Government admits, 1955(b)

provides definitions of the [statutes] relevant terms. Govt Br. 14. Section

1955(b) begins, like every statutory definition, with the words [a]s used in this

section. It then contains three terms in quotation marks, followed by words

explaining what each term means. The second term is gambling. If the

provision does not define gambling, it is hard to say what it does do.

The Government suggests that Section 1955(b)(2) is not a definition because

it is a non-exhaustive list. Govt Br. 16. But many cases treat non-exhaustive

lists as definitions. See, e.g., Christopherv. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct.

2156, 2162, 2171-72 (2012);Mohamadv. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1707

(2012);McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 26. That is true even for statutes using the words

includes but is not limited to; indeed, this Court has said such lists are

definition[s]. Molloy, 94 F.3d at 812;Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 645-646. And if



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there were any doubt, it is resolved by the legislative history, which makes clear

that Congress itself considered 1955(b)(2)s list a definition. See S. Rep. No. 91-

617 at 155-156 (Section 1955(b)(1)-(3) define an illegal gambling business.

* * * State and gambling are also defined comprehensively.); H. Rep. No. 91-

1549, at 54 (Paragraph (2) defines gambling * * * ). Indeed, the Government

acknowledges that Congress included 1955(b)(2) in the statute to replace an

earlier definition of gambling. Govt Br. 22-23. If Congress did not want

1955(b)(2) to define gambling, it would not have modifiedthe earlier definition,

it would have deletedit. The notion that 1955(b)(2) is something less than a

definition, and thus can be ignored, is baseless.5

Second, the Governments approach reads 1955(b)(2) out of the statute.

The Government advances a capacious definition of gambling that

5 The Government suggests certain cases have held that 1955(b)(2) does notdefine gambling. But it admits (at 17) that the only court of appeals that hasdirectly addressed the issue is the Third Circuit in United States v. Atiyeh, 402F.3d 354 (2005). AndAtiyeh acknowledged the definition of gamblingprovidedfor in 1955(b)(2). 402 F.3d at 372 (emphasis added). It declined to apply thatdefinition only because it believed a state-law violation alone satisfied the IGBA.See id. The Government concedes in this case (at 14) that a federal definition ofgambling must be satisfied and that a state-law violation alone will not suffice.

Atiyeh thus does not help the Government. Quite the contrary: It confirms that 1955(b)(2) contains the definition the Government seeks elsewhere.

The Government (at 17-18) also cites several cases upholding convictionsbased on activities not enumerated in 1955(b)(2). Those precedents serve onlyto illustrate a point never in dispute: The definition of gambling in 1955(b)(2)is not exhaustive. As the District Court explained, SPA103, none of those casesexamined whether poker is gambling under the IGBA. The cases thus do notsupport the Governments position.



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1955(b)(2)s non-exhaustive list of examples does not expand or contract.

Govt Br. 16, 21. But as the Supreme Court explained when confronting a broad

definition followed by a list of narrower examples, if Congress meant the statute

to be all-encompassing, it is hard see why it would have needed to include the

examples at all. Begay, 553 U.S. at 142. The Governments attempt to ignore

1955(b)(2) thus fails to give effect to every clause and word of this statute. Id.

(alteration & quotation marks omitted). That is particularly pernicious here

because the IGBA is a criminal statute and judges must be especially hesitant to

create surplus when the words describe an element of a criminal offense. United

States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). To

avoid rendering 1955(b)(2) surplus, the provision must at least limit the meaning

of gambling to activities similar to those it enumerates. Begay, 553 U.S. at 142.

Perhaps aware that its construction creates surplus, the Government offers

that Congress listed these games because they provided the most lucrative sources

of gambling revenue for organized crime. Govt Br. 17 n.3. But explaining why

a provision might appear in a statute is a far cry from giving that provision effect.

Surplus provisions are surplus because they dont do anything, not because they

are mysterious.

2. Having deemed 1955(b)(2) irrelevant, the Government quibbles

with the District Courts effort to apply the provision through the canon ejusdem



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generis. The Government suggests that the canoncannot apply to definitions using

the phrase includes but is not limited to. Govt Br. 40-41.

This Courts decision inMolloy eviscerates the Governments claim. The

Court there applied the canon in circumstances identical to those here. See 94 F.3d

at 811-812 (applying canon to a non-exclusive definition that used the phrase

including, but not limited to). Other courts have done the same. See, e.g.,

United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

(applying ejusdem generis to a non-exhaustive list containing [t]he words

including, but not limited to );Postv. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500,

520 (3d Cir. 2012);Donovan v. United States, 580 F.2d 1203, 1207 (3d Cir. 1978).

Molloy controls here. The cases on which the Government relies (at 41), by

contrast, come from other circuits. They are also inapposite because they involve

statutes containing broad language, indicating that their drafters intended an

expansive scope. For example,Ramirezv. City Demonstration Agency dealt with a

clause containing the words any such project * * * including but not limited to.

549 F.2d 97, 104 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). Absent such an indication that

a list was not intended to limit the term it defines, courts routinely apply ejusdem

generis to lists beginning with the phrase includes but is not limited to. See, e.g.,

Molloy, 94 F.3d at 811-812;Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1200;Post, 691 F.3d at

520;Donovan, 580 F.2d at 1207.



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The District Court thus was correct to invoke ejusdem generis. But even if

that canon were put to one side, that would not make 1955(b)(2) irrelevant. After

all, the canon noscitur a sociis would accomplish the same end. SeeCity of New

Yorkv. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 401 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing both canons

to explain that specific words limit general ones in the same list);Philip Morris,

396 F.3d at 1200. And even apart from Latin maxims, it is plain that a statutory

definition limits the meaning of the term it defines. Nothing (in Latin, English, or

any other language) suggests that the District Court should have determined the

meaning of gambling by disregardingCongresss description of that word in the

Acts definition section. [A] statute is to be read as a whole, since the meaning of

statutory language, plain or not, depends on context. Kingv. St. Vincents Hosp.,

502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991). The Governments approach does not read the IGBA as

a whole. Under its construction, 1955(b)(2) does nothing at all.

3. The Government also largely disregards a second important element

of the statute 1955(e). In its lone mention of 1955(e), it argues that the

provisions use of the phrase game[s] of chance demonstrates that Congress

plainly knew how to include such language in the statute when it wished to do so.

Thus, it says, that phrases absence from 1955(b)(2) must mean the term

gambling is not so limited. Govt Br. 16.



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That gets things backwards. As the District Court observed, the fact that

1955(e) exempts charitable game[s] of chance from the IGBA but says nothing

about charitable games ofskillstrongly suggests that games of skill were never

within the IGBA in the first place. SPA106;see supra at 17. If it were

otherwiseif the Governments approach were correctthen the two subsections

read together could criminalize games of skillrun by charities but not those same

charities games of chance. That would be absurd. And [a] statute should be

interpreted in a way that avoids absurd results. United States v. Venturella, 391

F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2004). That is particularly so here given that Congress used

a term, gambling, that has historically referred to games of chance, thus uniting

the two subsections (b)(2) and (e).

4. The Government offers a final salvo on the statute: that reading the

IGBA to encompass only games of chance cannot be correct because 1955(b)(2)

lists bookmaking, which the Government claims is a game of skill. As evidence,

the Government cites news stories about a handful of people who have managed to

make money betting on sports through bookmakers. Govt Br. 29-33.

The argument is flawed. A few exceptional individuals do apparently use

rigorous analysis to profit from betting with bookmakers. Likewise, an elite group

of MIT students managed to consistently beat the house at blackjack, at least one

clever individual learned to exploit defects in a roulette wheel to make a sizeable



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profit, and investment firms have identified rare occasions when probabilities favor

buying lottery tickets. See SPA110; Group Invests $5 Million to Hedge Bets in

Lottery, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1992;R. Flanagan, Tasmanian Devil, The New

Yorker 54 (Jan. 21, 2013). But as courts consistently hold, the fact that a few

outliers can profit from a game of chance does not make it a game of skill; whether

a game is one of skill or chance is determined by examining the game as ordinarily

played. See Johnson v. Phinney, 218 F.2d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 1955);Boosalis, 99

F.2d at 376 ;Morrow, 511 P.2d at 129;Boies, 310 P.2d at 839;People ex rel.

Ellison v. Lavin, 71 N.E. 753, 756 (N.Y. 1904).

In all poker gameswhether the World Series of Poker or DiCristinasthe

players skill predominantly determines the outcome. The same is true in tennis,

chess, or any game of skill. Although only the top tier of players possess enough

skill to make a reliable living at the game, even a casual contest among rank

amateurs will likely be won by the best player. See SPA45 (in typical game, better

half of players will beat worse half 76 percent of the time).

Placing bets with a sports book, by contrast, is an activity in which chance

predominates, by design and in practice. The bookmaker typically establishes odds

with the goal of ensuring that 50 percent of all bets succeed and 50 percent do not.

It guarantees its profit by taking a fixed portion of all bets, setting the odds to

balance the money paid out on winning bets against the money it keeps on losing



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bets. When the system works properly, skill cannot help or hurt the typical bettor:

a bet has the same odds as a coin-flip. See A. Brisman, Casino Gambling:

Winning Ways 202 (1999).

The exceedingly rare professional sports-bettor profits by identifying

individual games in which the bookmaker got the odds wrong, so that one side of a

bet is more likely to succeed than the other. See A. Reber, The New Gamblers

Bible 286 (1996). But even the skilled bettor does not have some ability that

allows him to influence a games score.6 He works hard to identify the rare games

of chance where the odds favor himhe does not so much win a game as beat the

system. Again, however, the existence of a few such experts does not make

6

The Government claims (at 32) that the professional sports-bettorstechnique of placing strategic bets to shift the odds is analogous to bluffing in

poker. That is wrong. By bluffing, a poker player can win a hand withoutdepending on the one factor he cannot influencethe cards he is dealt. There is nomeans by which a sports-bettor can win without depending on a factor he cannotinfluenceathletes performance on the field. There is no sports-betting analogyto bluffing, because sports-betting is not analogous to poker. See I. Rose & M.Owens,Jr.,Internet Gaming Law: Gambling and the Law 19 (2005)(Where doesskill stop, and chance begin? The deciding factor lies in the individual bettors

participation in the event and the control over the results. The less input and

control a bettor has over the outcome of the contest, the higher the likelihood it is agame of chance.); SPA 110-111 (explaining array of poker skills unavailable tosports-bettors). In any event, even if the two skills were comparable, only one

bluffingis part of the game as ordinarily played. See supra at 6, 16. Bluffing isan inherent part of poker; every player, even a rank amateur, bluffs. By contrast,only the rarest of sports-bettors possess the analytic and financial resources to bet

both sides of a game in order to influence the bookmakers odds. See Govt Br. 32.



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bookmaking an activity where skill typically determines the outcome. See

Phinney, 218 F.2d at 307;Boosalis, 99 F.2d at 376.

The difference between poker and

Documents

Brief For Appellee Lawrence Dicristina