Brennan Center for Justice: Filibuster Abuse

8/8/2019 Brennan Center for Justice: Filibuster Abuse

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F A

By Mimi MarzianiForeword by Susan Liss

B C Jat New York University School of Law


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ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE

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ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTERS DEMOCRACY PROGRAM

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ABOUT THE FIlIBUSTER REFORM PROJECT

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Mimi Murray Digby Marziani B C D P

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U.S. News and World Report, Te National Law Journal, Politico, Te New York Law Journal, ,

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Susan Liss D D P, C V R E,

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ACKNOWlEDGEMENTS

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FOREWORD

By Susan Liss

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TABlE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction 1

II. How Filibuster Abuse Harms Our Governmental Structure 5

A. Filibuster Abuse Devalues the Senate 5

B. Filibuster Abuse Disrupts Congress 7

C. Filibuster Abuse Threatens to Derail Our System of Government 8

D. Filibuster Abuse Blunts Legislative Accountability 10

III. Why Indefnite and Anonymous Holds Are Wholly Indeensible 11

A. IndeniteandAnonymousHoldsareaRampantFormofObstruction

in Todays Senate 11

B. IndeniteandAnonymousHoldsHarmOurDemocraticProcess 12

IV. Changing the Senates Rules at the Start o the Next Congress 14

A. TheSenatehasInherentRulemakingPowerUndertheConstitution 15

B. TheConstitutionContainsaPrincipleAgainstLegislativeEntrenchment 17

C. EntrenchmentoftheSenateRulesFurtherBluntsLegislative 18

Accountability

D. The Senates Overlapping Term Structure Cannot Justify 19

UnconstitutionalEntrenchment

V. Conclusion

Endnotes 23


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1|Filibuster Abuse

INTRODUCTION

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First, Some Terminology

Filibusters & Cloture

Theterm libusterrefers toany dilatory tactic thatis

strategically deployed to obstruct legislative action. AsoneofthemostdistinctiveproceduralfeaturesoftheU.S.

Senate,libustersarecommonlyassociatedwithsena-

torswho engagein prolonged,andperhaps irrelevant,

oor debate toprevent the adoption ofameasure or

nomination that is favored by the majority. In fact, todays

libusters almost neverinvolve actualcontinuousoor

speechestodayslibustersarelargelysilentandoften

occurbeforeaproposalevenreachestheSenateoor.

ThepossibilityoflibusteringexistsbecausetheSenate,

unliketheHouseofRepresentatives,lacksanyprocedure

throughwhichasimplemajoritycouldforceadebatable

measuretoavote.SenateRuleXXIItheClotureRule

providestheonlywaytoovercomealibusterbyendingdebateandforcingavote;however,itrequiresasuperma -

jorityvotetodoso.Underthisrule,three-fthsoftheentire

Senate(currently,60senators)mustvotetoinvokecloture.

When a cloture motion is successfully adopted, further

consideration of the matter at issue is l imited to 30 hours.

Thereisoneimportantexceptiontothis60-voterequire -

ment:Inordertoinvokeclotureonanymeasuretoamend

theSenateRules,two-thirdsofthosesenatorspresent

andvotingmustvoteafrmatively.Assumingnovacan -

ciesandfullattendance,67votesarethusrequiredtoenda

libusteronanyproposaltoreformtheClotureRuleitself.

Althoughobviouslyrelated,alibusterandacloturemo -tion are two distinct procedural features. Accordingly,

therecanbealibusterwithoutacloturevoteandvice

versa. Typically, eventhe viablethreatofa libuster is

enough to place a hold on legislation; this may effec-

tivelykillthemeasureorresultinanumberofrespons-

esother thana cloturevote.Likewise,cloturemotions

may be led to preempt anticipated libusters rather

thantoovercomelibustersthatarealreadyinprogress.

Holds

The practice of placingholds isan informal custom

bywhich a singlesenator can indenitely andanony-

mously stop legislation or nominations from reaching

theSenateoor.Toplaceahold,asenatorsendsalet-

ter to her partys leadership indicating her desire to halt

progressonaspeciedbillornominee.Theserequests

areseldommadepublic,sothereisnowayforthepub -

lictomonitorhowmanyrequestsaremade,whoisre -sponsible for the delay, or the reasons behind the hold.

A request for an indenite hold contains two implicit

threats:rst, itsignals asenators intentto objectto a

unanimous consent agreement; and then, to libuster

the targeted legislation or nomination. Given the scarcity

ofoortime in thecontemporarySenate, suchthreats

are commanding Senate leaders, fearing retaliatory

obstructionandthepossibilityofgridlock,aregenerally

unwillingtodisregardthem.Asanysenatorcanplacea

hold, this practice gives individual senators considerable

power.Often,senatorsusethistactictogainbargaining

leverageoverothersenatorsorovermembersoftheEx-

ecutive branch.


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Cloture Motions

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Congressional Session

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5|Filibuster Abuse

HOW FIlIBUSTER ABUSE HARMS OURGOVERNMENTAl STRUCTURE

Filibuster Abuse Devalues the Senate

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The Stealth Filibuster

Todays stealth libusterwas createdby a signicant

change in Senate procedure that occurred in the 1960s.

Asaresponseto repeatedcivil rightslibusters,then-

Senate Majority Leader Mike Manseld (D-MT) de-

velopeda two-tracksystemfor handlingoordebate.

Unlikelibustersofthepast,whichdelayedallSenate

business during the course of any prolonged debate,

thenewsystemlimitedthetimetodebatelibustered

legislationandallowednewbusinesstocontinueona

separatetrack.Thiseliminatedthetypeofall-nightde -

bate sessions famously depicted in Mr. Smith Goes to

Washington.Overtime,thelibusterevolvedfromthis

two-tracksystemintothephantomaffairitistoday.

A 1963 Time magazine article paints a colorful picture of

thenewsystem:

ThetraditionalSenatelibusterwastedious,tobe

surerelaysofSenators,hourafterhour,croaking

hoarse-voiced recitations of the glories of South-

ernrecipesorreadingsfromreferencebooks.But

thelibustercouldalsobedramatic,fulloftension

andconictandsuspense.BykeepingtheSenate

insessionaroundtheclock, themajority tried to

wearthelibusteringminoritydowninanordealof

exhaustion.CotsweresetupintheSenatecloak -

room, and bleary, rumpled Senators stumbled from

themtoanswermiddle-of-the-nightquorumcalls.

But all that has changed. Gone is the ordeal, the

struggle,thedrama.Allthatisleftistalk.Lastweek

alibusterwasgoingonintheSenate,anditwas

the dullest show in town. Majority Leader Mike

Manseldtookthelifeoutofthelibusterbylimiting

it to gentlemanly hours: from noon to around 6 p.m.

EvenifManseldcarriesouthisthreattolengthen

theworkingdaytotwelvehours,theSoutherners

wouldstillreturnfreshtoeachdaysroundoftalk.

The Congress: The New-Style Filibuster, Time(Feb.1, 1963),http://www.

time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,829749,00.html#ixzz0dTrT2aD0.

II.


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The 60-Vote Senate

Now,libustersaresomuchthenormthatasuperma-

jority vote of 60 is assumed necessary for all legisla-

tiveaction.Historically,policy-makersassumedthat51

voteswouldbeenoughtopasseventhemostconten-tiouslegislation.Forinstance,inaDecember8,1964

memo concerning the Medicare bill, Mike Manatos

wrotetoLyndonJohnsonscampaigndirector,ifall

oursupportersarepresentandvoting,wewouldwinby

avoteof55to45.FranklinRooseveltsnotoriousat -

tempttopacktheSupremeCourtprovidesanotherex -

ample.Then-U.S.AttorneyGeneralHomerCummings

voicedpublicallythattheadministrationspositionwas

promisingwhenhelearnedof 53supportivevotes.

By contrast, a recent New York Times article reported,

To get the 60 votes needed to pass their bill, Demo-

crats scrapped the idea of a government-run public

insuranceplan.

Memorandum byMikeManatosto Larry OBrien(Dec.8, 1964),avail-

able at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/obriencropped.jpg;

Jeff SheSol, Supreme power: franklin rooSevelTvS, The Supreme CourT 300

(2010);Robert Pear,Negotiating to 60 Votes, Compromise by Compro-

mise, n.Y. TimeS, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/

health/policy/20care.html.


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7|Filibuster Abuse

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Filibuster Abuse Disrupts Congress

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Thepowerofthisminorityvetoisacutelyfeltbymem-

bers of the House. Wisconsin Congressman David

Obey,announcinghisretirementafterover40yearsof

publicservice,lamented:Thewearandtearisbegin -

ningtotakeitstoll....Therehastobemoretolifethan

explaining the ridiculous, accountability-destroying

rules of the Senate to confused, angry, and frustrated

constituents.

Statement by David R. Obey, Representative, Wisconsins 7th Con-

gressional District (May 5, 2010), http://www.obey.house.gov/index.

php?option=com_content&task=view&id=924.


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As James Madison famously argued in Number 51 of

theFederalistPapers:

Inframingagovernmentwhichistobeadministeredby

menovermen,thegreatdifcultyliesinthis:youmust

rst enable thegovernment to control thegoverned;

andinthenextplaceobligeittocontrolitself.Adepen-

dence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on

thegovernment;butexperiencehastaughtmankindthe

necessityofauxiliaryprecautions.

Filibuster Abuse Treatens to Derail Our System o Government

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Empowering the Minority Party

Manyscholarshavesuggestedmoreproductiveways

toempowertheminorityparty.Forinstance,NYUPro-

fessorofLawRichardPildeshasexplained:

[I]fwewanttoempowercongressionalchecksonex-

ecutivepowerthataremorelikelytobeeffectivedur-

ing unied government, we can consider measures

thatwouldgive theminority party,whichhasthe ap-

propriate incentives, greater tools to oversee theex-

ecutive branch. Some other democracies do so. As

Iandothershavedescribed,wemightconsidergiving

the minority control of a certain oversight committee,

such as an auditing committee; enabling the minority to

callhearingsundercertaincircumstances;orotherwise

increasing the opposition partys ability to get informa-

tionfromtheexecutivebranch.Thesemeasuresarenot

minority-vetorights,butwaysofenablingmoreeffective

oversight.

RichardPildes,Ungovernable America?: The Causes and Consequences

of Polarized Democracy(presentedatThomasM.Jordelecture,April14,

2010), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv3/groups/public/@

nyu_law_website__news/documents/documents/ecm_pro_065536.pdf.


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Filibuster Abuse Blunts Legislative Accountability

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11|Filibuster Abuse

WHY INDEFINITE AND ANONYMOUSHOlDS ARE WHOllY INDEFENSIBlE

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Indefnite and Anonymous Holds are a Rampant Form o Obstruction in odays Senate

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Indefnite and Anonymous Holds Harm Our Democratic Process

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13|Filibuster Abuse

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Held Hostage by Holds

In March 2009, Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ)

placedaholdontwocrucialenvironmentalnominees

toprotestawhollyunrelatedissueawidely-support -ed provision of the omnibus spending bill to ease rules

on travel and imports to Cuba.

WhenSenatorShelbyplacedaholdonover70nomi-

neesearlierthisyear,hedidsotoobtainearmarked

funding for his home state. According to Senator Shel-

by, he staged the delays due to unaddressed national

securityconcernsinAlabama.

SenatorJimBunningputamonths-longholdonthe

appointment of Miriam Sapiro, nominated to be the

deputy United States trade representative, over a

Canadian law banning candy-avored cigarettes.

Senator Bunning lifted the hold only after Democrats

agreedtoconrmamemberoftheRepublicanpartyfor a position on the Federal Maritime Commission.

MarthaJohnsonspentnearlyayearwaitingtobecon-

rmedasAdministratoroftheGeneralServicesAd-

ministrationduetoSenatorChristopherKitBonds

(R-MO)hold,atactictoreceiveapprovalforafederal

ofcebuildinginKansasCity.

SenatorJimWebb(D-VA)placedholdsonallpending

military nominations until his demand for information

onaclosedmilitarycommandinhishomestatewas

met.


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Rules Reorm in the Senate

Since itwasrst enacted,the ClotureRule hasbeen

amended several times each time,withthegoalto

make it easier fora majorityto overcome obstruction

and force a substantive vote on the underlying matter.Duringeachsignicantreformpush,senatorshavear -

guedthattheConstitutionallowsamajoritytooverride

alibusterandvoteonproposedreforms,notwithstand -

ingany contraryprovisionswithin theRules.In 1953,

1957,1959,1961,1963,and1967,therewereorganized

movements at the beginning of the congressional ses-

siontoassertthispower.VicePresidentsRichardNixon

(in1957and1959)andHubertHumphrey(in1967)each

issuedadvisoryopinionsexplicitlyendorsing theSen-

atesconstitutionalpowertoeffectruleschangeinthis

manner.

VicePresidentNixonconsideredthisissueatlengthin

1957.Heconcludedthat:

ItistheopinionoftheChairthatwhiletherules

of the Senate have been continued from one Con-

gress to another, the right of a current majority of

theSenateatthebeginningofanewCongressto

adoptitsownrules,stemmingasitdoesfromthe

Constitution itself, cannot be restricted or limited

by rules adopted by a majority of the Senate in a

previousCongress.AnyprovisionofSenateRules

adoptedinapreviousCongresswhichhastheex-pressed or practical effect of denying the majority

oftheSenateinanewCongresstherighttoadopt

therulesunderwhichitdesirestoproceedis,inthe

opinion of the Chair, unconstitutional. It is also the

opinionoftheChairthat[RuleXXII]inpracticehas

suchaneffect.

Thus,Nixon continued, theSenate hasthreeoptions

atthestartofeachnewCongress:(1)proceedtocon -

duct business under the standing rules, thereby adopt-

ingthemforthenewsession;(2)votedownanymotion

to change the rules, also thereby adopting them for the

newsession;or(3)voteafrmativelytoproceedwiththe

adoptionofnewrulesbyamajorityvote.WhiletheSen-ate decided to operate under the standing rules for the

remainderofthe1957congressionalsession,Nixonsin -

terpretationoftheSenatesrulemakingpowerhasbeen

repeatedly embraced by members of the Senate.

103 Cong. reC. 178-89 (1957).

CHANGING THE SENATES RUlESAT THE START OF THE NEXT CONGRESS

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15|Filibuster Abuse

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Te Senate has Inherent Rulemaking Power Under the Constitution

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As Justice Joseph Story put it in his seminal treatise on

constitutionallaw:

No person can doubt the propriety of the provision au-

thorizing each house to determine the rules of its pro-

ceedings.Ifthepowerdidnotexist,itwouldbeutterly

impracticable to transact the business of the nation,

eitheratall,oratleastwithdecency,deliberation,and

order. The humblest assembly of men is understood to

possessthispower;anditwouldbeabsurdtodeprive

thecouncilsofthenationofalikeauthority.

JoSeph STorY, CommenTarieSonThe ConSTiTuTionofThe uniTed STaTeS

835 (1833).


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The Controversy o Senate Rule V

Senate RuleV stating that the Senate Rulesshall

continuefromoneCongresstothenextCongressun -

lesstheyarechangedasprovidedintheseruleswas

addedin1959aspartofacompromisedealbetween

senatorsseekingtoreininobstructionandthosewho

wantedtoretainthelibuster.Ultimately,RuleXXIIwas

tightenedtomakeiteasierfortheSenatetocutoffde-

bate,butRuleVwasaddedtodiscouragefuturerules

reform.

ThedebateoveraddingRuleVwasspirited,withmany

senatorsclaimingthatitwasunconstitutional.SenatorJacobJavits(R-NY),forone,vehementlycriticizedthe

proposedrule:ArewegoingtofollowtheConstitution

oftheUnitedStatesorarewegoingtofollowa rule

made by one Senate for all succeeding time, to bind

allSenates?Inotherwords,arewegoingtotrytogive

ourselvesanextra-constitutionalpowerorarewegoing

toobeytheConstitution?

OthersarguedthattheRulewasharmlessbecauseit

couldhavenolegalsignicance.SenatorThomasHen -

nings(D-MO),forexample,repeatedlyassuredhiscol-

leaguesthatRuleVwaswithoutnalforceoreffect.

Or,asSenatorJohnCooper(R-KY)putit,Idonotthink

[RuleV]would haveanylegal orconstitutionaleffect,butcertainlymighthavesomepsychologicaleffect.

86 Cong. reC.124,447-50(1959).


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17|Filibuster Abuse

Te Constitution Contains a Principle Against Legislative Entrenchment

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Speaking to the House of Representatives in 1790,

James Madison addressed fears that a bill temporarily

establishingtheNationscapitalinPhiladelphiawould

later prevent the capital from moving to Washington

D.C.Heexplained:

Butwhatmorecanwedothanpassalawforthepur -

pose[ofmakingWashingtonthefuturecapital]?Itisnot

inourpowertoguardagainstarepeal.Ouractsarenot

likethoseoftheMedesandPersians,unalterable.Are-

pealisathingagainstwhichnoprovisioncanbemade.

Ifthatisanobjection,itholdsgoodagainstanylawthatcan be passed.

2AnnalsofCong.1666(1790).


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able distinction between substance and procedure.

As modern social science research has demonstrated

time and again, rules of procedure regularly determine

legislativeoutcome.Forinstance,studieshaveshown

thatadenitivemajorityopinionveryrarelyexists.In-

stead, a legislature is typically composed of multiple

andequally-strong competinginterests,any ofwhich

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overoptionB,butnotoveroptionC,optionAcanwin

orlosedependingontheorderinwhichalternativesare

presented.Inthisway,procedureisvirtuallyinseparable

from legislative outcome.


25/36

19|Filibuster Abuse

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27/36

21|Filibuster Abuse

CONClUSION

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23|Filibuster Abuse

ENDNOTES

1 he Federalist No. , 10 (Ax H) (B N ., 00).

A Barbara Sinclair, Te New World of U.S. Senators, in Congress Recon-

sidered 7 (9 . 009).

3A U S S, S A CM, ://.///_/C. ( N. 3,010).

4 S Sinclair, supra , 0; homas Mann & Norman Ornstein, he Broken Branch 1-1(00); P K,A Dangerous Dysfunction, N.Y. imes, D. 1, 009, A31.

5 I F P, x, J M q x ; , q[] x . he Federalist No. 62, 34 (J M) (B N E., 00).

G. J. Grahm & S. G. Grahm, Founding Principles of American Government 11 (1984).

7 SeeJ Cz M G, D: I F C, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PEN-NUMBRA 45, 50-51 (010) (Cz O S); Sarah Binder & Steven Smith,Politics or Principle? Filibustering in the United States Senate 30-33 (1997).

8 SeeBinder & Smith, supra 7, 90-9; G M, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. U. L. REV.1, 5 ( 011), available at://./=154747; Gregory Wawro & Eric Schick-ler, Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate (00).

9 SeeJ B E P, GOP Run Over in Game of Chicken, Roll Call, N. 5, 009, ://..//55_53//4079-1. ([A] 9- []

R R . N R . . . .); M L, Expansion of Unemployment Insurance Stalledby ACORN,Immigration Amendments, Wash. Independent, O. 0, 009, ://./4513/x-------- (T x .).

10 U.S. S, R C V 111 C - 1 S, ://..//LIS/__/___.=111=1=00334 ( M 14, 010) (V B, H.R. 3548 A).

11A S S, . SW S M, Sen. Richard Shelby of Alabama Holding Up Obama Nominees for Home-statePork, Wash. Post, F. , 010, ://../-///010/0/05/

AR0100050098..

1 S J DM, , 93% ; S J B 91.3%. F, T W L, ://./- ( D. 3, 010). Ex , []


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[ j ] . E,After Health Reform, Is AnyoneWilling to Compromise?, Wash. Post, M. 4, 010.

13SeeC F E C, Te Filibuster, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 181, 00-09 (1997).

14

SeeWawro & Schickler, supra 8, 59-0; F C, supra 13, 03; M,supra 8, 4.

15 SeeM, supra 8, 4.

1 T M, N O, R W F-L, O-E, Reconciling With the Past,N.Y. imes, M. 7, 010, WK1; see also Binder & Smith, supra 7, 19-194.

17 See Examining the History of the Senate Filibuster: 1789-2008, Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Rules &Admin. 111 C. 3 (010) ( S P R); Cong. Research Service, Senate Amend-ment Process: General Conditions And Principles (001).

18 U.S. Const. . I, 7. A S C x, [] C -

x . INS . C, 4 U.S. 919, 951 (198).

19 R P, Ungovernable America?: Te Causes and Consequences of Polarized Democracy( T M. J , A 14, 010), available ://.../_3///@____///__0553..

0 Sinclair, supra , 18.

1 SeeJ Sz, H S S R, Cong. Q., A 19, 010, 90; see also Bruce Oppen-heimer, Te Process Hurdles: Energy Legislation from the OPEC Embargo to 2008, in Congress Reconsidered300-03 (9 . 009) ( H S ).

SeeBinder & Smith, supra 7, 14 ( 1-3).

3 homas Mann & Norman Ornstein, Is Congress Still the Broken Branch?, in Congress Reconsidered 3-3 (9 . 009).

4Y S C. . S, 343 U.S. 579, 35 (195).

5 D L R P, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 H. L. R. 311, 343 (00) (- T S, Te Limits of the Parliamentary Critique of the Separation of Powers, 34 Wm. & MaryL. Rev. 79, 718 (1993) W.B. Gwyn, he Meaning of the Separation of Powers 1 (195)).

Id. 344.

7 he Federalist No. 51, 88 (J M) (B N ., 00).

8 SeeL P, supra 5, 3.

9 E K, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 45, 311-15 (001).


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25|Filibuster Abuse

30 Id. 313-314.

31 P, supra 19, 4.

3 U.S. Const. . II, 3; see also U.S. Const. . II, . A j , j

. T -j .

33 E . U S, 50 U.S. 51, 59 (1997). I, Ax H P C .

[I] x , , x , , - , . T , , . I , .

he Federalist No. 7, 419 (Ax H) (B N ., 00).

34 U.S. Const. . II, .

35A W, oward the Framers Understanding of Advice and Consent: A Historical and extual Inquiry, 9Harv. J. L. & Pub. Poly 103, 11-17, 13-4 (005).

3 P R, T W H, P O A R A K AP (M 7, 010), ://../--/-------.

37 U.S. S, N C (C), ://..///___/_. ( N 19, 010).

38 MC . M, 17 U.S. 31, 404-05 (1819) (T U . . . , . I , , . I , x , .).

39J S, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 737, 757 (004) (O .) 90 ( ).

40 SeeGregory Koger, Filibustering, A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate,174 (010).

41 See id. 174-7; see also Cong. Research Service, Proposals to Reform Holds in the Senate (007); C. L E D L, Holds, Legislation and the Senate Parties1 (005) (

C S P, U Ox) ( ).

4 SeeS S. S M F,Managing the Senate Floor: Complex Unanimous Consent Agreementssince the 1950s, 14 Legis. Stud. Q. 349, 350 (1989). A S,

.See also Koger, supra 40, 175 ( -


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).

43 N , q. SeeKoger, supra 40, 180-8.

44 SeeS F, supra 4, 353.

45 SeeE L, supra 41, 4.

4J. R,At Least Tree Senators Who Oppose Secret Holds Have Secret Holds of Teir Own, he Hill,M 17, 010, ://.///9891------; see also D

W, Reid Blasts Republicans Over Surgeon General Vote Delay, Other Holds, and Filibusters, Wash. Inde-pendent, O. 9, 009, ://./599/-----------.

47 SeeE MM-S, Report: Shelby Blocks All Obama Nominations In Te Senate Over AL Earmarks,alking Points Memo, F. 4, 010, ://../010/0/-----------.; S W S M, Sen. RichardShelby of Alabama Holding Up Obama Nominees for Homestate Pork, Wash. Post, F. , 010, ://.

./-///010/0/05/AR0100050098..

48 SeeJ K, Sen. Bunning Agrees to Allow Vote on Unemployment Extension Bill, A.B.C. News, M., 010, ://..//010/03/----z--..

49 SeeR, supra 4.

50 U.S. S, N C (C), supra 37.

51 U.S. S, Ex C 3-14, ://..//LIS/x_/x.( N 9, 010).

5 U S C, J E, ://../JAJ/JV/JE.x ( N 9, 010).

53 U.S. Const. . II, .

54 SeeJ E. G, Te Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court Appointments, 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337,341 (1989) ( A C, F , S . . .); see also L Rz,Advice, Consent, andSenate Inaction Is Judicial Resolution Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1739, 175-5 (1998) (R F, , j S P. Id. 1753).

55

Seehe Federalist No. 7, 40 (Ax H) (B N ., 00) ( q - S I , , , , . I x P, S j, , , . I , .); he Federalist No. 77, 4 (Ax


32/36

27|Filibuster Abuse

H) (B N ., 00) (I x - S, , . T .).

5 E . U S, 50 U.S. 51, 59-0 (1997).

57J I A M, Held Up for 15 Months, Withdrawn FEC Nominee Laments Broken Process, heHill, O. 7, 010, ://.///13031--------.

58 See, e.g.,J E, N H F S P, WASH. POS., M. 3, 009, ://../-///009/03/0/AR009030045.; S M- K DY,Momentum Grows for Relaxing Cuba Policy,Wash. Post., M. 30, 009, ://

../-///009/03/9/AR009039040.; H C,Legislative Limbo Strands Many of Obamas Nominees, N.Y. imes, D. 7, 009, ://../009/1/8///8.; Rx , Webb Lifts Holds Over Nominees, he Hill,N. 18, 010, ://.///130019------. Seealso supra 47.

59 Koger, supra 40, 174.

0 SeeWawro & Schickler, supra 8, -87; Binder & Smith, supra 7, 11-197; M B. G D G, Te Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means toOvercome the Filibuster, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Poly 05, 17-0 (004); F C, supra 13, 09-13; see also J C. R,Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the Constitutionality of theSenate Cloture Rule, 0 J.L. & Pol. 505, 513-518 (004).

1 U.S. Const. . 1, 5, . .

SeeR, supra 0, 53; AA P. B, Burying the Continuing Body Teory of the Sen-ate, 95 Iowa L. R. 1401, 144 (010).

3 U.S. Const. . I, 1.

4 U.S. Const. . I, 7.

5 U S . B, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (189); accordU S . S, 8 U.S. , 33 (193).

B, 144 U.S. 5; S, 8 U.S. 48 (T C S ; C .).

7 B, 144 U.S. 5.

8

I.

9 Mz . F. E R C, 75 F. 18, 18-88 (D.C. C. 198). S, , . T C x C. T, C -


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. See also R, supra 0, 535.

70 R, supra 0, 53.

71 See, .., R, supra 0, 53-37 ( ); A-A P. B, Using

Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. POL. 345 (003) ( - ).

7 SeeB, supra 71, 3-71. A P B x:I , . T x C . F , C , .

Id. 3.

73W , . SeeM . M, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (

); see also J O. MG- M B. R, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Teory, 89 Va. L. Rev.385, 417-439 (003) ( C x ).

74 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *90.

75 F . P, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810).

7 L . U S, 54 U.S. 14, 147 (005) (S, J., ).

77 U S . W, 518 U.S. 839, 87 (199).

78 See, .., id.; R . Q, 87 U.S. 315, 319 (193) ([] C .); C M. L I. C. . S, 17 U.S. 0,1 (1899) ([E] q q j.); D .K, 18 U.S. 488, 497-98 (1897); B U C. . C C, 111 U.S. 74, 751 (1884);S . M, 101 U.S. 814 (1880); N . C, 100 U.S. 548, 554-55 (1880); B .

A, 94 U.S. 45, 50 (1877); O L I. C. . D, 57 U.S. 41, 431 (1854).

79 O L I., 57 U.S. 431.

80 F C, supra 13, 49 (q J N. E, emporal Limits on the Legislative Man-date: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 379, 384-45 (1987)).

80 See, e.g., C . G, 531 U.S. 510 (001); Pz . U S, 51 U.S. 898, 90 (1997) (T

C S z.); N Y . U S, 505 U.S. 144, 18 (199) ( F G S , ); M . J, 495 U.S. 33, 9 (1990) (I - . . . L .).


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29|Filibuster Abuse

8 C, 531 U.S. 58.

83 Id.

84 B, supra . T .

85 Seehe Federalist No. (J M) (B N E., 00); V D. A, Te Senate and theConstitution, 97 Yale L.J. 1111, 1118 (1988). A J M , [] , , ; , . he Federalist No. 62, 347.

8 T x q , j q. SeeB, supra , 1443 .145.

87 SeeB, supra , 1444-145 x .

88 Id. 1445 ( Martin B. Gold, Senate Procedure and Practice 15455 (004)).

89 Id. 1448-54.

90 Id. 1430 ( ).


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