NB: THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS TYPED FROM A TRANSCRIPTION UNIT RECORDING AND NOT COPIED FROM AN ORIGINAL SCRIPT: BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF MISHEARING AND THE DIFFICULTY, IN SOME CASES OF IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS, THE BBC CANNOT VOUCH FOR ITS ACCURACY. ........................................................................ PANORAMA BRAVO TWO ZERO A Question of Betrayal RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1 DATE: 10:02:02 ........................................................................ PETER TAYLOR: Behind enemy lines in Iraq, the SAS, eight men go on patrol, call sign - 'bravo two zero'. Heroic deeds, blockbuster books, action packed movies - the Gulf War. But there's a darker side. The patrol abandoned the regiment's cardinal principle undermined. Court Proceedings This ethos was shattered when I realised our request for help was ignored. TAYLOR: Now for the first time, Mal, who wants the true story told, removes his mask and speaks openly for Panorama. MAL: I felt betrayed by the regimental hierarchy. This is 'bravo two zero' we're at ground call sign and we're in the shit! TAYLOR: Mal's outrage is shared. Fellow patrol member Mike has written a book. The government has tried to ban it. The cost to date - 2 million and rising. MIKE: I was disgusted. The hierarchy of the regiment during the Gulf War let a lot of the guys down. TAYLOR: The government warned Panorama about this programme. "Don't interview Mal. He's gagged by SAS order". We're showing it tonight because Panorama believes the full story should be heard. Tuesday 22nd January Late that night in 1991 the SAS patrol for the regiment's B Squadron was deployed behind enemy lines. MAL SAS Member of Bravo Two Zero There's no doubt it's regarded, and I still see it as such, as something of a privilege to be able to serve with that organisation on operations, let alone a classic desert operation. TAYLOR: But from the outset the patrol had problems. PILOT: Andy tell your crew we are now over the border.

MAL: We weren't well equipped for this mission, that's a fact. The through training in military organisations, they say well you know.. in training you haven't got the kit, but come the day of the war and the kit will be there. Funny enough it was just one of the things which went wrong here, and come the day of the war on this particular mission the kit not only wasn't there but we probably had less kit than we would have normally in training. TAYLOR: To illustrate the story we've used movie scenes and our own reconstruction. The patrol's leader, Andy McNab, said they didn't want vehicles. PETER RATCLIFFE SAS Regimental Sgt Major, Gulf War I went over to try and convince him to take a vehicle and he was adamant that they weren't taking a vehicle. I asked him the reasons why and he said the ground was too flat. TAYLOR: But why weren't McNab and the patrol ordered to take a vehicle, ordered by you as regimental sergeant major and by the commanding officer of the regiment? RATCLIFFE: Well in the SAS we work differently to the British Army. It is not tick tock, yes sir, no sir, three bags full sir. You know.. the guy on the ground is always right and that's the way we work. TAYLOR: When you're flying in behind enemy lines, does it occur to you that you might never get back again? MAL: That notion, I guess, crossed my mind. I can't speak for the others. But however it didn't play a significant part of my thought processes really. TAYLOR: You don't think 'I wish I wasn't here' ? MAL: Oh no, certainly not, because we would fight tooth and nail to get on such a mission. That is what we're in the regiment for. TAYLOR: The Gulf War was a showcase for American military technology, designed to inflict maximum damage on the enemy with minimum risk to its men. There seemed little room for the special skills of the SAS. Nevertheless the Regiment was itching to play its part. But first, General Norman Schwarzkopf, the coalition's US Commander, had to be persuaded over the SAS's value. He was sceptical. The Brigadier in charge of British Special Forces in the Gulf new what he was up against. TAYLOR: Brigadier ANDREW MASSEY

Gulf Commander, UK Special Forces Well a great line view of what General Schwarzkopf thought about Special Forces were that he thought they were a potential nuisance, a potential diversion for the main plan, an irritant in some respects. MAL SAS Member of Bravo Two Zero It was clear that Americans.. the American hierarchy was not keen on special forces involvement at the early stages of the Gulf War. TAYLOR: But all that changed when the Iraqis launched scud missiles against Israel from deep within the Iraqi desert. It was the opportunity the SAS had been waiting for. The British Commander in the Gulf, a former head of the SAS, lost no time in persuading Schwarzkopf that the SAS should be infiltrated deep behind enemy lines. Filmed in 1995 General Sir Peter de la BILLIERE Commander, British Forces, Gulf War When they got in there the scud war against Israel began in earnest, and it was quite clear that unless this was contained we were going to see Israel coming into the war with all the political dangers and effects that that was likely to bring with it, and so it was critical to stop this. You have one job, one job to do, and that is get those scuds out of the battle. TAYLOR: The scuds were being launched from around the road that leads from Baghdad to Jordan through the northern Iraqi Desert, it's known as 'the main supply route' the MSR . The mission was to make for the MSR, locate the scuds, cut their communications and put them out of action. De la Billiere: You can't beat a pair of eyes on the ground. We know that from using Special Forces in Europe. Filmed in 1995 General NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF Commander, Allied Forces, Gulf War The SAS gave the theatre, the capability to have some eyes and ears on the ground in the western part of Iraq and I felt would be particularly helpful in the anti-scud campaign. That was exactly the kind of mission that I felt was appropriate for them. So when Sir Peter de la Billiere came to me with the briefing and I asked him if he recommended that we do this, he was very strong in his recommendation that we did and so I bought their recommendation.

Wednesday 23rd January As dawn broke, the patrol realised they were in serious trouble. They'd been dropped too close to an enemy position. The mission was in jeopardy. They sent an urgent call for help on the radio but they'd been given the wrong frequency. Thursday 24th January On the second full day of the mission, things went from bad to worse. The enemy may not have seen them, but someone else did. MAL: They were compromised by a goat herder, a kid, who was wandering around the area, and there were many of them around the area with their herds. Lex got on satellite communication system and tried... it was really extraordinary that we could not communicate by that means either. The message went out 'Compromised, request immediate extraction' and we were not aware of that message being received either. Filmed 1995 Brigadier ANDREW MASSEY Gulf Commander, UK Special Forces We first heard that Bravo Two Zero was in trouble when we got a garbled radio message. We really didn't know what had gone wrong, we had to interpret it. PETER TAYOR However, we understand that SAS intelligence officers at UK headquarters near High Wickam did hear Bravo Two Zero calling for help on the satellite link several times. They also overheard a conversation between Brigadier Massey and the SAS Colonel who was the patrol's commanding officer in the Gulf. They were discussing possible air support for a rescue. Massey, we understand, described such military backup as "a bit premature" to the astonishment of some of those at High Wickham who had no doubt the patrol was in serious trouble. What they may not have known was that mounting a rescue was potentially embarrassing. MASSEY: We had to look after ourselves. General de la Billiere stressed this and General Schwarzkopf stressed that again, but he winked as he said it and I knew he'd give us help if we needed it. TAYLOR: The SAS hierarchy was confident that Bravo Two Zero could look after itself, and if they ran into trouble, there were clearly agreed procedures to get them out, they'd be rescued. This hallowed

contract was the lifeline between the men exposed in the field and their officers back at base. MAL: As we're moving off we started hearing vehicle sounds, there's a horrible groaning sort of sound to my left as I was heading off south following the others. They got louder and louder. Bad situation. We assumed that probably was the enemy - and it was. I reckon the whole contact lasted for something like 20 minutes. I remember looking at these guns and tracers sort of being fired, starting off very slowly, then appearing to accelerate towards us, and of course you think right, shall I stick that way, or that way, and where is the thing going to land. We were always fully exposed thinking gee, it's only a matter of time before one of us goes down and is going to be hit, and I think it was a miracle that anyone got out of that intense and incoming fire, anyone at all. TAYLOR: Besides radio and satellite communications the patrol had a handset known as a TACBE - a tactical beacon - it could send a distress signal to passing aircraft. MAL: I was aware of Andy.. Andy McNab actually on the TACBE calling the turbo, into a turbo, turbo call sign that was British Special Forces to anyone who's receiving that call sign, or allied aircraft, or so we hoped. He didn't get any response. TAYLOR: However, we can reveal that some messages were received back at base, and we know what they said because we've seen a copy of an SAS daily record or log written up in the Gulf, and we can further reveal from the log that the first message was received on Thursday 24th January , the second full day of the mission, and it was quite clear. B Squadron, northern MSR group - that's Bravo Two Zero - reported that they had been compromised and requested ex-filtration as soon as possible. There was no ambiguity about the message, the patrol was in deep trouble. Nevertheless no rescue was launched. Although the patrol had received no conformation of their messages, they hoped that one or two might have got through. Having survived the fire fight and evaded the enemy, they headed for a previously agreed rendezvous point expecting a rescue helicopter. MAL: We waited something like I think half an hour there so well past the time, there's no sign of this helicopter and then we have to move. TAYLOR: What goes through your mind, what do you say, what do you think, when the expected helicopter does not arrive? MAL: Well there's considerable hope amongst all of us really, and expectation rather, that this machine

should arrive because that is our safety net and really this whole operation, this dangerous operation so far behind enemy lines without any immediate support is based.. our plans are based on this kind of safety net actually being put into operation. It's as good a guarantee as you can get. TAYLOR: But the night was silent. The helicopter never came. The patrol now decided to head for Syria, a hundred miles north west, but they ran into another enemy, the weather. With conditions worsening they tried to make contact again. Hello A call sign, this is Bravo Two Zero, we're at ground call site and we're in the shit - over. TAYLOR: Their voices and the message seemed lost on the wind. McNab suddenly realised that in the appalling conditions, the patrol had split. MAL SAS Member of Bravo Two Zero Bear in mind it was a very, very dark night, as black as ink, there was very little ambient light. Some time during the night, when everyone was tired really, the separation occurred. It's not easy to have to admit that publicly but.. you know.. it's a fact that mistakes occur. That was a mistake in that we didn't intend to split. As a group of three of which I was part up front and then as a group of 5. TAYLOR: Once more the log we've seen indicates that a second message was received. It said "Bravo Two Zero made TACBE contact again, it was reasonable to assume that they were moving south. A Chinook 47 rescue crew were on standby." But the Chinook didn't fly. MAL: Why didn't that helicopter come in when it should have, not only in terms of their standard procedures because we had no effective communications, but secondly because they did actually receive some slightly corrupt versions of messages, even more so to the effect that imminent compromise, request extraction, and then compromised, request immediate extraction. TAYLOR: Why not send in the helicopter? PETER RATCLIFFE SAS Regimental Sgt Major, Gulf War It's going to be risking the lives of all these men and a helicopter. TAYLOR: But you've got the lives of eight men at stake at the other end. RATCLIFFE: This is the price you pay sometimes. MAL: Now if that kind of information has been coming in, we're in serious trouble, we need rescuing, that was the gist of the message and there's no doubt they would have understood that .

TAYLOR: That's why they feel betrayed. RATCLIFFE: They weren't betrayed. TAYLOR: They feel abandoned. RATCLIFFE: They weren't abandoned either. TAYLOR: The helicopter wasn't there. RATCLIFFE: The helicopter wasn't there because of these messages that was being received which were garbled. TAYLOR: Meanwhile, back at base, other members of the Squadron couldn't wait to get airborne to rescue the patrol. One told me there was absolute desperation and near mutiny. Their commanding officer came under intense pressure to respond. So why did nothing happen when at least two of the distress signals got through? The key may lie in the assurance that General de la Billiere gave General Schwarzkopf when he promised that if a patrol got into trouble, the SAS could look after itself. Perhaps the regimental hierarchy felt that they would have been losing face had they asked the Americans for help so early in the mission. It's possible that the garbled messages may have served as a convenient excuse. Filmed in 1995 General Sir PETER de la BILLIERE Commander, British Forces, Gulf War I'd promised Schwarzkopf that if the SAS went in, they wouldn't need rescuing. Now if the SAS - and I was confident they'd sought their own act out - if the SAS suddenly did start to need rescuing then what I'd said to Norman Schwarzkopf was inaccurate and I'd got to do something about it. Friday 25th January TAYLOR: By now the patrol had split into two groups, one was led by Andy McNab, author of "Bravo Two Zero", Mal was in the other with Chris Ryan, author of "The One That Got Away" and an SAS veteran called Vince. After resting up during Friday, Mal's group moved off again when night fell. MAL: Bitterly cold and it got worse. It got worse and worse and then started snowing. TAYLOR: Snowing?

MAL: Yes, it was snowing, and snowing throughout the day. TAYLOR: In the desert? MAL: On and off in the desert. Very difficult to navigate. There's Mac just holding his compass just looking into the blackness and into the wind and just walking along only a matter of ten paces, doing the same thing, making sure we're straight off the bearing and just going along like that. What became apparent is that Vince was getting worse and worse. Any kind of exercise that we were doing wasn't helping him at all which was very bad news really as far as Vince was concerned. JEFF Vince's brother Vince was a very professional soldier dedicated, especially to the SAS regiment, and to all his comrades. No doubt about it, it was his life. MAL: He kept on stopping, falling over, we lost him a couple of times, went back for him and went back for him again. This one time we went back for him and he really wasn't.. we couldn't find him there. What happened eventually, and this is as candid as I can be, and it's not something that has been easy, certainly for me, to live with and deal with, is that a decision was made, it was made by Chris and he admits that, that we should leave Vince and move on or there are going to be three of us dead. TAYLOR: Leave Vince to die. MAL: To die. VERONICA Vince's mother They had to go on to save themselves didn't they. I don't think it was anybody's fault really if they couldn't find Vince, they had to save themselves didn't they. TAYLOR: You don't blame them for not going back? VERONICA: I don't blame them. I don't personally, not personally, no. TAYLOR: What did Vince die for? JEFF: Vince died for his Queen and country. TAYLOR: Are you proud of him? JEFF: Very proud. TAYLOR: You're leaving for friend, your mate, your comrade behind to die alone and cold in the desert. MAL: Absolutely, yeah, he was abandoned by us and that is something we have to live with.

JEFF: It's not easy without Vince, my big brother. Saturday 26th January MAL SAS Member of Bravo Two Zero As luck would have it, there was better weather and blue skies, still bitterly cold and the ground was crunchy and icy cold, and I honestly thought, oh is this the first bit of good luck really that we perhaps have had. That was until a goat herder appeared and we heard this horrible sort of jingling of bells way in the distance. As this guy got closer and closer and closer, we thought surely this goat herder can go somewhere other than right on top of us. I mean there was everywhere else to go. Another fantastic bit of bad luck. He got closer and closer to us until we started having to make some plans as to what to do in case we're compromised because our cover wasn't great. Chris wanted to kill the guy, he had a knife so he would do it quietly. I thought no, no, no, hang on a moment. What if he's got valuable information which might in fact save us. Underlying all that it really does go against the grain for a regiment man to have to kill an innocent civilian. The goat herder got closer and closer - we were lying flat on the ground. - and literally he saw me when he was about one meter away, and his eyes were like saucers and he just stopped. Now of course the only word I knew in Arabic at the time was along he lines of mohaba, you know.. hello. He said nothing and just got him to sort of sit down, just carried on talking nonsense to him, trying to calm him down so that we could gain control of him and so somehow he'd have more confidence in us, as though this was no big deal. Now he did, that seemed to work. TAYLOR: Mal managed to overcome the language barrier and explained what he was looking for. The goat herder said "Follow me". After several hours Mal finally came across signs of habitation. MAL: He stopped in mid stride and he is clearly very surprised by my presence there. Again immediately I had to manage that situation and I brought up my trump card which was mohaba and he said nothing, and I carried on talking and he then made a dash for the vehicle. I shot him in the head. TAYLOR: Why did you shoot him in the head? He was not a threat to you. He's a civilian. MAL: No, no, precisely, you know.. and again, that goes totally against the

grain. In the situation I was I had to act at the time and act very, very quickly. It was an immediate situation. If he'd got away, or if he'd raised the alarm, if he'd just shouted perhaps, if there were other people there , my situation would have been perhaps further compromised. As I saw it, I didn't really hesitate on that, I didn't really have much of a choice, I just had to get control of a situation which could easy just run away from me very, very quickly. TAYLOR: A single shot. MAL: Yes. TAYLOR: To the head? MAL: Yes. Almost immediately out came the first Iraqi soldier. Now more soldiers came out. I aimed at the next one, fired, and there was a click, and I thought what on earth do I do now? Because I was totally out of control. I had no pistol, I was in dire straits here. I was hoping to be in a position to just magically come upon a key and to have some chance of hopefully of doing something about this, of getting away. But the firing stopped and I was just waiting there expecting to get hit any second. It seemed like an eternity and I was racing thinking what.. how do I handle the situation now? Another guy came up beside him and why didn't he fire? You know.. why didn't these guys fire right then? TAYLOR: You'd just killed several of their mates. MAL: True, true. I mean I don't know. I don't know. TAYLOR: According to the log a rescue helicopter finally took off on Saturday evening, 48 hours after the patrol had expected it. It flew after a third message had been received. Possible further communication from Bravo Two Zero using TACBE to a passing F15 aircraft. "Op mounted tonight to pull them out. Chinook returned to Alcohol Jouf without completing the mission due to bad weather." By then the snowstorm may have swept south in the direction the helicopters were coming from . Filmed in 1995 Brigadier ANDREW MASSEY Gulf Commander, UK Special Forces We launched our helicopters into the same conditions in which they were pretty horrific snowstorms. US helicopters helped us. We also committed some of their high tech assets into the search, and as it turned out wherever we looked, or wherever the beacons indicated the patrol was, they weren't.

TAYLOR: By this time it was too late. Mal had been captured and Vince was dead and Chris Ryan was heading for Syria. Meanwhile Mike and McNab's other section of the patrol were fighting for their lives. They'd been tied down in a gun fight with the Iraqis near the Syrian border. One of the patrol was killed, another died of hypothermia having tried to swim the Euphrates to safety. Mike was lucky to survive. 'MIKE COBURN' SAS Member of Bravo Two Zero It just ran.. hit my leg, it was quite strange actually because there wasn't really any pain initially, it was like this huge wave of nausea went over me. I mean really intense, well certainly more intense than I've ever felt before, and it was like somebody taking a sledge hammer to my ankle and just smashed it on me, but there wasn't any pain. I thought Christ, that was a bit strange, and the bullets are still going round and I sort of got into the old rugby position, I put my arms around my head to try and protect my head, not that it would have done anything, and another round when through my arm, and then the pain sort of game along, and I started to scream.. screaming my head off. TAYLOR: Mike and the others were captured and dragged off to join Mal. Mal tried to protect the patrol by inventing a cover story. MAL: I was shuffled up to the wall aggressively by these guards, one on each side, and a poker was actually put right against my eye and just pressed in against my eye there, and I was told I had been lying and I had been wasting their time, did I have anything more to say to actually save me. Now the first time this occurred this was an unnerving sort of situation to sort of be in, and I was thinking okay, you know.. I can probably lose.. I will probably lose an eye but I'll still be alive. I'll still had one eye at that stage. I don't know what will happen after that. I thought with that thing really pressing down on my eye, a horrible situation to be in, I thought no, if I admit at that stage, with all these threats having taken place, you know.. this is after the first day of interrogation, that in fact I had been lying, it would be too easy for that guy to just poke that eye out. I maintained my story straight down the line. MIKE: I was certainly beaten. I was beaten quite a bit actually in the first interrogation I was beaten a bit. And then what they did is they took you aside and left you alone with the guards , and I was left alone with them for a couple of hours and they really softened me up the whole time when I was by myself like that, just punching the head and kicking you and just keeping up the pressure as it were for when the next interrogators came.

Wednesday 27th February TAYLOR: The war ended a month later amidst scenes of appalling carnage as American planes strafed the Iraqi column fleeing along the road to Basra. 4th March 1991 Good evening, the headlines at 6 o'clock. Iraq has freed ten allied prisoners of war as a goodwill gesture. MAL: We captured really the spotlight of the world's media on the day, and the two of us were amongst ten allied prisoners of war who were released initially. TAYLOR: In the years that followed, Sir Peter de la Billiere led a parade of former SAS soldiers who immortalised the heroic exploits of Bravo Two Zero. But in 1996, fearing a tide of SAS memoirs, the MoD introduced a special contract that binds all members of Special Forces to a lifetime's duty of confidentiality. The contract is quoted in this letter from the Treasury solicitor which was sent to Panorama to warn us off this programme. The contract is draconian. This solemn undertaking binds members of the SAS for the rest of their lives. They're not allowed to disclose or say anything about the work of Special Forces without express authority from the MoD. They're even bound to notify the MoD immediately if anyone invites them to breach the contract. The contract isn't optional, it's compulsory. MAL SAS Member of Bravo Two Zero We were aware through the regimental grapevine that this confidentiality contract was about to come out and that we'd have to sign it, also that we had to sign the thing or we were out . It was as simple as that. It was a fait accompli. TAYLOR: Not much of a choice is it? Sign or get out. Sign or be sacked. RATCLIFFE: No, it's not being sacked from the army. TAYLOR: It's being sacked from the SAS. PETER RATCLIFFE SAS Regimental Sgt Major, Gulf War But the SAS is a volunteer force, and if you want to serve in the SAS, there are prices that people have to pay, and if this is one of them, then fine. TAYLOR: Effectively you were ordered to sign it, and if you don't sign it, if you disobey the order you'll return to unit, in other words you're kicked out of the SAS. That's what it comes down to, isn't it?

RATCLIFFE: Well it's a small price to pay if you don't sign i.e. you mean if you want to really serve that regiment, then you should sign without any question. MAL: We all thought at the time surely this could not stand up in a court of law, a civil court of law. TAYLOR: Were you allowed to consult a lawyer? MAL: There was simply no option for us at that the time to consult a lawyer or seek any independent Legal advice. TAYLOR: Did you sign the contract? RATCLIFFE: No. TAYLOR: You didn't? RATCLIFFE: I didn't, no. TAYLOR: But you should have signed it, shouldn't you? You were a serving member of the SAS, you had to sign the contract or be kicked out of the SAS, why didn't you sign it? RATCLIFFE: I was leaving the army five months later so.. TAYLOR: Doesn't make any difference, you were a serving member 1996, you should have signed the contract. RATCLIFFE: Who dares wins. TAYLOR: Did you win? RATCLIFFE: I won, yes. I didn't sign it. TAYLOR: What did you do with it when you got it? RATCLIFFE: I think I put it in the bin. TAYLOR: The contract did not go down well with the SAS's sister regiment ' The Special Boat Service' the SBS. A few weeks later its commanding officer wrote a letter to the Director of Special Forces. This is a copy. He said that his men viewed the contract as morally offensive and insulting to the SBS. Mike, like Mal, signed the contract because he too was still serving. But he insists that he did so only under duress. Nevertheless he was determined to write his own account of the patrol to set the record straight. Filmed 9n 2001 'MIKE COBURN' SAS Member of Bravo Two Zero I strove to keep anything that would have been remotely.. or what I consider

remotely confidential out of the book. TAYLOR: The MoD seemed to agree. In a memo to Colonel David Lyons, the SAS colonel commandant in charge of disclosure policy, the MoD wrote that there was nothing particularly sensitive in his book, and that it was unable to argue that damage to national security results from publication. Colonel Lyons then wrote to Tony Blair. He appears to have argued that though national security was not at risk, the principle of the contract had to be defended. Tony Blair took the Colonel's advice and gave the go ahead to fight Mike Coburn and soggier five on the other side of the world, thus beginning a costly, lengthy and bitter legal battle. Even the SAS was astonished by this turn of events as an internal SAS memo clearly shows. "We could hardly be on weaker ground for this first challenge to the authority of the contract. It is truly remarkable that we have secured political support for taking this issue into the New Zealand courts." Meanwhile, Peter Radcliffe, the regimental sergeant major during the Gulf War didn't sign the contract and got away with it. Why didn't you sign the contract? RATCLIFFE: In the back of my mind I had the thought of writing my own book and to put the record straight, and I was sick of reading about all this sensationalism that's been taking place in these other books, and in my mind it is wrong. It needs to be put right. TAYLOR: Peter Ratcliffe has submitted the manuscript of his book to the MoD and the green light was given for publication after a few miner changes had been made. Surprisingly, the fact that he didn't sign the contract, although he was serving at the time, was never made an issue. There was no court case, no pressure no problem. So why did Peter Ratcliffe dare and win, Mike Coburn not? Could there have been political reasons for stopping Mike's book. Given the failure to heed the call for help, which led to the death of Vince and two of his comrades, is the content simply too embarrassing? The war over, the troops return to England and the SAS to their headquarters in Hereford. Mal, Mike and other members of the patrol were invited to meet their commanding officer from the Gulf in his office. MAL SAS Member of Bravo Two Zero As you would have expected, the commanding officer was there, greeted us and we went into his room - his

study, sat down and he welcomed us back and seemed glad to see us and he broke open a bottle of champagne, again we'd expect that, that was nice - for a chat and a welcome back . But things changed at that moment, once we had the champagne in our hands and cheers 'welcome back' I remember this moment very clearly, and there was a pause. He was obviously picking his moment to actually hit us with this information and he said words to this effect, he said - and those of you who might be wondering, don't worry, we're not.. or I am not going to court-martial you for anything you might have done. Now all of us were in there and that simply rocked us back on our heels and we thought what on earth is this man talking about. He was not going to court-martial us, as though we'd done something horribly wrong. A very strange reaction. TAYLOR: A joke? MAL: Definitely not a joke, of that we need to absolutely clear.

TAYLOR: Mike appeared in the New Zealand High Court last year to fight the MoD's gag on his book. He and Mal tell the same story. MIKE COBURN Shocking among his revelations to us was a statement that he had decided not to court-martial the surviving members of the patrol, further that in effect were expendable. TAYLOR: Did you ask the commanding officer, when you met him back at Hereford why the rescue mission had not been launched. MAL: I didn't personally ask him that, but that question was asked. TAYLOR: And he said? MAL: This I remember clear as day as well and it is damming stuff really. He said, in effect, that he was prepared to risk a squadron of SAS for a scud missile and that we were in effect expendable. TAYLOR: Expendable? MAL: Expendable. TAYLOR: The commanding officer is alleged to have said the patrol was expendable. PETER RATCLIFFE SAS Regimental Sgt Major, Gulf War No. I've known the commanding officer for a number of years and he is not a man to expend anybody's

lives. He cared about his men and he still cares about men and he would have done everything in his power to make sure that those guys got out alive. But at the same time, he would not risk other people's lives when he was unclear of the situation that was taking place in Iraq. MAL: That information, if he had said that or admitted that should I say, to the regiment, if it had got out of that room, that would have changed the character of the regiment, people going straight up to him and poking him in the chest going what on earth are you talking about, because rather like the safety net which surrounded our patrol, or we thought did, we needed to know that that safety was in place. TAYLOR: Because that helicopter wasn't sent in soon, three men died, three members of Bravo Two Zero never returned. RATCLIFFE: Three men did die but you cannot send in a helicopter unless you have got absolute clarity from the guys on the ground. TAYLOR: Eleven years ago Mal and Mike were left stranded in the desert. To them, this was the real breach of contract. The injunction against Mike's book has been lifted in New Zealand but the proceeds, which he'd planned to share with Vince's family amongst others, now have to go to the MoD. To Mike, the issues are matters of principle, to be judged before the Privy Council in London this year. Filmed in 2001 MIKE COBURN SAS Member of Bravo Two Zero I think now that ten years on, and given that I fought for the ideals of freedom , that it's a shame the MoD have found this necessary and justifiable to try and take those freedoms away from me. TAYLOR: What angers Mal and Mike most is the breach of contract they believe left their patrol abandoned and three comrades dead. To them, those who dare only win if the system is there to support them. MAL: If we thought we were put in a patrol here, we'll be part of it, and in fact we could well be expendable, I for one would not be part of the regiment.

We asked the Ministry of Defence

To answer the questions raised By Panorama They declined. _________ www.bbc.co.uk/panorama

CREDITS

Reporter Peter Taylor Film Camera David Barker Pat Turley Alex Hansen Paul Handley Sound Recordists David Holmes Tim Day Greg Bailey VT Editors Nick Kampa Rod Hutson Dubbing Mixer Stewart Harper Colourist Glyn Palmer Music composed by David Ferguson With thanks to the makers of 'Bravo Two Zero' 'The Gulf War' Production Team Maria Ellis Martha Estcourt Rebecca Maidens Liz Mace Anita Rice Rosa Rudnicka Amanda Vaughan-Barratt

Graphic Design Julie Tritton Kaye Huddy Film Research Kate Redman Eamonn Walsh Film Editors Simon Thorne Andy Kemp Bob Hayward Assistant Producers Joanna Lee Julia Hannis Producer Sam Collyns Deputy Editor Andrew Bell Editor Mike Robinson

14 ________________________________________________________________________________ ______________________ Transcribed by 1-Stop Express Services, London W2 1JG Tel: 0171 724 79 53 E-mail 1-stop@msn.com