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Bottom-up constructions of top-down transformational change: Change leader
interventions and qualitative schema change in a spatially differentiated
technically-oriented public Professional Bureaucracy
A thesis presented to
QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
In fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
By
Robert McLeay Thompson
B.A. (Hons) Psych. (U. of Q.), MPsychApp (U. of Q.)
School of Management
Faculty of Business
Queensland University of Technology
2006
i
ABSTRACT
In the face of knowledge deficits in and poor outcome assessments of Organisation
Transformation (OT), there is a need for a better understanding of the relationship
between change leader interventions and qualitative organisational schema change,
the collective knowledge structures that must be replaced or significantly elaborated
if OT is to be realised.
Previous research on this relationship has (a) focused on imposed structural
interventions and given little attention to large-scale human process interventions,
(b) given little attention to the radical structural interventions frequently involved in
the transformation of public organisations, (c) given little scrutiny to how
organisational schema have been conceptualised, (d) given little scrutiny to recent
propositions on schema change dynamics that may be contentious, and (e) given
little consideration to the change management contexts in which leader influence
may be neutralised.
In the light of these gaps in the literature, this thesis investigates, from the
perspective of change recipients, the relationship between complex large-scale
change leader interventions and qualitative organisational schema change in change
management contexts thought to be inimical to leader influence. In particular, how
efficacious are change leader interventions in realising qualitative organisational
schema change in such contexts?
An interpretive longitudinal case study design was used to address this question.
The case organisation is a spatially differentiated technically-oriented public
Professional Bureaucracy located in Queensland. In this context, this thesis
investigates, over a three-year period, the creation and evolution of three schema
change contexts, or change trajectories, created by two temporally disconnected yet
functionally inter-related change leader interventions.
ii
Data collection techniques included focus group interviews, semi-structured
interviews, and secondary sources. Data were collected from several sites, including
Head Office functions and Regional and District offices, across Queensland. Data
were collected on four occasions across the three-year period from early 2000 to late
2002.
The results reveal that (a) while there are no panaceas, public managers need more
sophisticated intervention theories based on a knowledge of the relative efficacy of
different interventions rather than relying on, predominantly, structural interventions,
(b) viewing organisational schema in one-dimensional rather than multidimensional
terms masks both the complexity of organisational schema change and the possibility
of partial rather than configurational schema change, (c) while inter-schema conflict
or dialectical processes were apparent, successful schema change was better
explained by teleological processes than by dialectical processes, and (d) change
leaders can have a powerful influence on OT in change management contexts
thought to be inimical to change leader influence yet their influence is linked to high
investments of time and effort.
Keywords: Organisational Transformation; Leadership; Schema change; Public
Sector
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP ...............................................................................viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................. ix TABLE OF CONTENTS .....................................................................................................................iii LIST OF TABLES ...............................................................................................................................vi LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................vii ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................ i CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ........................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................... 1 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM ............................................................................................................ 6 THEORETICAL CONTEXT ............................................................................................................... 7 RATIONALE/JUSTIFICATION ....................................................................................................... 12 METHOD ......................................................................................................................................... 15 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS ......................................................................................................... 16 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 17
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................. 20 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................. 20 ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION (OT) ............................................................................. 20
OT IN PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS .......................................................................................... 23 Summary and critique ............................................................................................................... 30
ORGANISATIONAL SCHEMA AND OT ......................................................................................... 39 SCHEMA CHANGE THEORY ......................................................................................................... 42
Conflict Model of schema change ............................................................................................. 42 Paradox and contradiction ........................................................................................................ 46 Iterative Comparison theory of schema change ...................................................................... 50 Disengaged schema..................................................................................................................... 52
ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT....................................................................................................... 54 SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE ........................................................................................................... 57
CHAPTER 3: METHODS .................................................................................................................. 61 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................. 61 CRITERIA FOR SELECTING METHODS ...................................................................................... 61 RESEARCH STRATEGY .................................................................................................................. 63 RESEARCH DESIGN....................................................................................................................... 66
THE CASE STUDY DESIGN ................................................................................................... 66 SINGLE CASE DESIGN................................................................................................................... 69 LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH ........................................................................................................ 70 QUALITATIVE DATA ...................................................................................................................... 71 DATA COLLECTION STRATEGIES ............................................................................................... 73 INTERVIEWS ................................................................................................................................. 73
Focus group interviews .............................................................................................................. 74 Semi-structured interviews........................................................................................................ 75 OBSERVATION ........................................................................................................................ 75 DOCUMENTS............................................................................................................................ 76
RESEARCHER-RESPONDENT RELATIONSHIP........................................................................... 76 SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................... 77 RESEARCH PROCEDURE.............................................................................................................. 78
CASE SELECTION ................................................................................................................... 78 INTRA-CASE SITE SAMPLING ............................................................................................ 81 SAMPLING PARTICIPANTS WITHIN SITES..................................................................... 82
DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE .............................................................................................. 87 FOCUS GROUP PROCEDURE............................................................................................... 87 Focus group questions................................................................................................................ 87 Focus group procedure .............................................................................................................. 88
iv
Semi-structured interview procedure....................................................................................... 91 Observation procedure .............................................................................................................. 92 Documents................................................................................................................................... 93
ANALYTICAL STRATEGY ............................................................................................................... 94 Second-order analysis ................................................................................................................ 97
CREDIBILITY OF THE RESEARCH............................................................................................... 99 Credibility ...................................................................................................................................... 100 Transferability ................................................................................................................................ 102 Dependability ................................................................................................................................. 102 Confirmability ................................................................................................................................ 103 ETHICAL ISSUES .......................................................................................................................... 103 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 104
CHAPTER 4: PRE-EXISTING SCHEMA ...................................................................................... 105 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 105 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY ............................................................................................................. 105 RESULTS ....................................................................................................................................... 106
Organisational purpose............................................................................................................ 106 Relational environment............................................................................................................ 108 Managerial and leadership processes ..................................................................................... 110 Organisational design .............................................................................................................. 111 Change processes...................................................................................................................... 113
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 124 CHAPTER 5: LEADERSHIP CHANGE TRAJECTORY .............................................................. 126
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 126 THE INTERVENTIONS.................................................................................................................. 126 A NEW VISION ............................................................................................................................ 128 LEADING-MANAGING FRAMEWORK.................................................................................... 129 CREATING A SUPPORTIVE RELATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .............................................. 131 RESULTS ....................................................................................................................................... 133
FIRST ORDER ANALYSIS.................................................................................................... 133 Leader vision............................................................................................................................. 133 The Three Frames and the Five Signposts ............................................................................. 136 Relationship Frame .................................................................................................................. 139 Change process ......................................................................................................................... 148
SECOND-ORDER ANALYSIS .................................................................................................... 149 Change leader interventions.................................................................................................... 149
Schema change dynamics............................................................................................................... 157 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 161
CHAPTER 6: CORPORATE CHANGE TRAJECTORY................................................................ 164 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 164 THE INTERVENTIONS.................................................................................................................. 164 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY ............................................................................................................. 165 RESULTS ....................................................................................................................................... 166
CONTENT CHANGE.............................................................................................................. 166 Organisational purpose ................................................................................166 Relational environment ................................................................................169 Organisation redesign ..................................................................................173 Workloads ....................................................................................................177 Reduction in career and development opportunities....................................178
CHANGE MANAGEMENT PROCESS ................................................................................ 179 Regression....................................................................................................187
SECOND-ORDER ANALYSIS .................................................................................................... 189 From top-down techno-structural change to (remains unchanged)........................................ 200
Schema change dynamics............................................................................................................... 202 Change management context .................................................................................................. 205
EFFICACY OF CHANGE LEADER INTERVENTIONS................................................................ 206 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 208
v
CHAPTER 7: COMMERCIAL CHANGE TRAJECTORY ............................................................ 212 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 212 THE INTERVENTIONS.................................................................................................................. 212 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY ............................................................................................................. 214 RESULTS ....................................................................................................................................... 214
CONTENT CHANGE.............................................................................................................. 214 Organisational purpose ................................................................................214
Relational environment............................................................................................................ 226 Organisational redesign ........................................................................................................... 230 Workloads ................................................................................................................................. 234 Career and development opportunities .................................................................................. 234 CHANGE PROCESS ............................................................................................................... 235 Regression ................................................................................................................................. 239
SECOND-ORDER ANALYSIS........................................................................................................ 239 CHANGE LEADER INTERVENTIONS .............................................................................. 240 ORGANISATIONAL SCHEMA CHANGE.......................................................................... 243 From operations-driven road builder to profit-driven provider.......................................... 243 From decentralised & multiple businesses to centralised, integrated business................... 246 From top-down techno-structural change to continuous improvement .............................. 247 Emotional tone.......................................................................................................................... 247 SCHEMA CHANGE DYNAMICS ......................................................................................... 248
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 252 CHAPTER 8: ORGANISATIONAL SCHEMA CHANGE: AN INTEGRATIVE ANALYSIS ..... 255
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 255 CHANGE LEADER INTERVENTIONS ......................................................................................... 255
Visioning intervention ............................................................................................................... 259 Leading-managing process interventions................................................................................. 260
PATTERN OF SCHEMA CHANGE ACROSS CONTEXTS ........................................................... 264 SCHEMA CHANGE DYNAMICS................................................................................................... 265
SCHEMA CHANGE................................................................................................................ 267 Implicit vision ........................................................................................................................... 268 Facilitates achievement of critical tasks ................................................................................. 270 Feelings of confidence and competence .................................................................................. 272
POLARISATION........................................................................................................................... 273 Viability of the alternative schema ......................................................................................... 274 Threat to engineering excellence/professional identity ......................................................... 275 Increasing rather than decreasing ambiguity ........................................................................ 276
LACK OF CHANGE ..................................................................................................................... 276 Perceived paradox and contradiction ..................................................................................... 277 Perceived loss of performance................................................................................................. 278 Perceived loss of personal and professional development opportunities ............................. 278
UNREALISED CHANGE ............................................................................................................. 279 Complexity of alternative schema ............................................................................................. 280 Low perceived control ............................................................................................................... 280 Time pressure and workloads ................................................................................................... 281 Opportunities for interaction .................................................................................................... 281 Spatial differentiation................................................................................................................ 281 CHANGE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT.................................................................................. 283
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 286 CHAPTER 9: CONTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION ................................................................. 287
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 287 CONTRIBUTION ........................................................................................................................... 293 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH ............................................................................................ 296 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS ............................................................................................ 298 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS ....................................................................................................... 299 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 300
References
vi
LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1: Definitions of key concepts Table 3.1: The logic of four research strategies Table 3.1: Assumptions of the interpretive research strategy Table 3.2: Yin’s contingency theory of research design Table 3.3: Key events in the case organisation’s change history Table 3.4: Age of length of service of respondents Table 3.5: Respondent gender Table 3.6: Employment classification of respondents Table 3.7: Summary of focus groups and interviews conducted Table 3.8: Focus group questions by round Table 4.1: Pre-existing organisational schema Table 5.1: Qualitative schema change Leadership Change Trajectory Table 6.1: Qualitative schema change Corporate Change Trajectory Table 7.1: Qualitative schema change Commercial Change Trajectory
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1: Diagnostic categories Figure 2.2: A model of Organisational Transformation Figure 2.3: Bartunek’s Conflict Model of schema change Figure 2.4: Lewis’ (2000) Paradox Framework Figure 2.5: Labianca, Gray & Brass’ (2000) Iterative Comparison theory of schema
change Figure 2.6: Summary of the relationship between change leader interventions and
organisational schema change Figure 3.1: Spatial dispersion of the case organisation Figure 3.2: Overview of the research Figure 5.1: The Three Frames; Aligning for success Figure 5.2: The Five Signposts of Success
viii
STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP
The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet
requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the
best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously
published or written by another person except where due reference is made.
Signature:
Date:
ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge the support of and express my appreciation to the
managers and staff of the Queensland Department of Main Roads. Despite facing
high demands on their time, they generously agreed to attend interviews across the
period of the research. In particular, I would like to thank Christine Flynn, Jolanta
Szymczyk-Ellis, and Paul Connors who so ably facilitated contacts with Main
Roads. Your support was invaluable.
I would like to acknowledge the managers and staff of Main Roads on another count.
Change of the scale being undertaken is fraught, yet collective efforts to realise
organisational transformation were often inspirational. There was a degree of
commitment to transparency, openness and learning to “walk the talk” that sets the
organisation apart.
I would also like to express my thanks and gratitude to my supervisor, Professor
Neal Ryan. You helped in really important ways Neal, even if the results of your
help were not always obvious. And I would like to thank Adjunct Professor Dianne
Lewis. Thanks Di; I appreciated the time and support you gave me. Also thanks to
Leeanne Macbeth without whose help the process would have been even more
difficult.
My thanks also to the Main Roads Corporate Change project team, Professor Kerry
Brown, Dr. Jennifer Waterhouse, and Michele Little
And my love to Sarah and David; you supported me in ways that matter most.
For Jean and Alex
1
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Under the auspices of New Public Management (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994:543;
Hood, 1991), there has been a fundamental re-evaluation of traditional assumptions
about the role of public organisations and how these organisations should function
(Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). As a consequence, managers
of many traditional public organisations face imperatives to transform (Young,
2000), modernise (Maddock, 2002; Maddock & Morgan, 1998), reform (Pollitt &
Bouckaert, 2000), reinvent (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), or reshape (Queensland
Government, 2003a) themselves and their organisations to better fit new and
emerging environmental contingencies.
The transformation imperative confronting many public managers is complex in that
the level of personal and organisational discontinuity is high (new capabilities, new
organisational strategy and structures, and new belief systems are required)
(Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Nadler, Shaw, & Walton, 1995; Osborne & Gaebler,
1992; Schein, 1992), the existing knowledge base on how to achieve change of this
scale in public organisations is still relatively limited (Maddock, 2002) and the
prospects for success are still relatively low (Bate, Khan, & Pyle, 2000; Beer &
Nohria, 2000a).
While there are variations across public sectors (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000), the
transformational imperative may include; (a) the separation of the organisation’s
strategic and operational functions (Eggers, 1997; Glynn & Murphy, 1996; Osborne
& Gaebler, 1992), (b) the commercialisation, corporatisation, or privatisation of the
operational function (McKenna, 2000), (c) the parallel redesign of more organic
organisations that will serve these separate functions (strategic – commercialised
operations) and the management of their complex inter-organisational relationship
(Balogun & Johnson, 2004) , and (d) the transformation of managerial, leadership
and social processes in line with these new formal organisational arrangements
2
(Alimo-Metcalfe & Alban-Metcalfe, 2004; National Institute for Governance, 2003;
Valle, 1999).
Change of this order places significant demands on organisational members’
sensemaking capabilities; transformational change typically renders pre-existing
interpretive schemata, the knowledge structures that help make organisational
environments predictable, inadequate or obsolete (Bartunek, 1993; Bartunek &
Moch, 1987; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick, 1993). Change leader interventions
must, therefore, change the formal organisation and facilitate the development of
new, more appropriate schemata to reinforce change in that formal organisation
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1988; Kezar & Eckel, 2002; Mintzberg, 1989).
An example from this research will illustrate the scale and significance of the change
management problem involved (also see Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Change leaders
intervened in a longstanding operations-driven road building organisation by
truncating the organisation into a strategic owner organisation and a commercialised
provider organisation. Managers in each ‘sub-organisation’ are redesigning their
organisation consistent with each organisation’s new purpose, yet simultaneously
seeking to maintain organisational cohesion.
As a result, the members of the owner organisation no longer build roads; they
manage a complex strategic and policy context in which road system problems,
considered in a Whole-of-Government context, are identified through engagement
with stakeholders, prioritised, and contracted out to providers of road building
services. In this new conception of the organisation, road construction and
maintenance is one element of a complex socio-technical system that includes
concern for job creation, community development, cultural and environmental issues
and economic development.
The success of the transformational change management task in this example
requires more than change in formal organisational arrangements. Organisational
members also have to reframe their collective organisation schema (Bartunek &
Moch, 1987). Successful change in the strategic owner sub-organisation, for
example, is unlikely if organisational members remain wedded to the concept of the
3
organisation as a road builder and, for whatever reason, reject the concept of the
organisation as a strategic manager of a road system (though see D. S. Lewis, 1992
for a contrary view).
Schema change of this order typically requires the direct involvement of top-level
change leaders (Conger, 2000; Kotter, 1999; Poole, Gioia, & Gray, 1989). Change
leaders frame alternative schemata, select and sequence interventions that trigger
change in the pre-existing organisational schemata supporting traditional
organisational arrangements (Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Porras & Silvers, 1991).
These decision problems are encompassed by intervention theory (Dunphy, 1996).
Despite the growing body of literature on Organisation Transformation (OT) in
public organisations, relatively little attention has been given to the relationship
between change leader interventions and organisational schema change in public
organisations (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Labianca, Gray, & Brass, 2000) and
particularly in technically-oriented professional public organisations. If the
transformation of public organisations is to be achieved, this relationship needs to be
better understood.
In particular, four significant gaps in the literature on the relationship between
change leader interventions and organisational schema change deserve more
attention. These four gaps are introduced here and elaborated in a later section of
this chapter.
First, previous research has focused on the relationship between imposed, or power-
coercive (Chin & Benne, 1976) structural interventions and organisational schema
change (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Labianca et al., 2000). Little attention has been
given to the relationship between large-scale human process interventions (Waddell,
Cummings, & Worley, 2004) and organisational schema change, despite the fact that
such interventions are thought to play a significant role in organisational outcomes
(Schein, 1999).
Large-scale human process interventions seek to enhance the leadership and
managerial, interpersonal, problem solving and decision making capabilities of
4
organisational members (Waddell, Cummings, & Worley, 2000). These
interventions are of a different order to structural change (Harrison, 1970) and it is
not clear that propositions derived from the extant literature on structural
interventions and schema change will be supported.
Second, while pre-existing research on interventions and organisational schema
change has focused on structural interventions, these structural changes have tended
to be relatively less complex than those required in some public organisation
transformations (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Labianca et al., 2000).
Specifically, previous research has not investigated the relationship between a
restructure on strategic-owner and commercialised provider lines and organisational
schema change, an intervention that directly challenges professional and
organisational identities (Reger, Gustafson, Demarie, & Mullane, 1994). It is
unclear that propositions about the relationship between structural interventions and
organisational schema change derived from the existing research would be supported
in these circumstances.
Third, there is incomplete understanding of how organisational schemata change.
The extant research suggests, for example, that schema change is all or none, an
impression reinforced by the frequent conception of schema as a one-dimensional
bipolar construct (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Labianca et al., 2000). In most cases,
however, schemata are likely to be multidimensional. Considering schema in
multidimensional terms better reflects the complexity of change in that either
configurational change occurs or organisational members accommodate some
dimensions or sub-schema and not others.
Furthermore, the dynamics of schema change need to be better understood. Some
researchers argue that schema change is a function of managed conflict, or
dialectical processes (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995), between a pre-existing schema
and a juxtaposed new schema (Bartunek, 1993; Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Sillince,
1995). If successful, dialectical processes may result in the new schema replacing
the pre-existing one or the emergence of a synthesis of both.
5
More recently, two developments of schema change theory have been suggested.
First, it has been argued that schema change occurs as a result of an iterative inter-
schemata comparison process that does not necessarily involve conflict;
organisational members weigh up the relative advantages and disadvantages of new
versus pre-existing schema resulting in the reinforcement of one or the other schema
(Labianca et al., 2000).
Second, Balogun & Johnson (2004) argue that schema change occurs because
imposed change that forces a break from the past disengages organisational members
from their pre-existing schema forcing them to develop new schema based on
ongoing experience. There is no interplay, conflict or otherwise, between pre-
existing and alternative schema.
The more recent studies have not been subject to sufficient scrutiny, particularly as
their conclusions lend themselves to alternative interpretation. For example,
Labianca et al’s proposition that inter-schema conflict was not a dynamic appears
negated by their discussion of conflict, and resolution of this conflict, between
managers’ and non-managers’ decision-making schemata. Moreover, it is unclear
that Balogun & Johnson did establish that pre-existing schema of the managers
studied was disengaged by an imposed structural intervention. Given these
uncertainties, the propositions made in these studies warrant further investigation.
Finally, little explicit attention has been given to change leader interventions and
schema change in change management contexts that are inimical to change leader
influence (Cummings, 1999; Howell, Bowen, Dorfman, Kerr, & Podsakoff, 1990;
Mintzberg, 1989). Organisations in which organisational members are professionals
(Jermier & Kerr, 1997; Mintzberg, 1989) and where they are geographically distant
from change leaders (Kerr & Jermier, 1978) tend to be less responsive to leader
influence. In such contexts, change would be more difficult (Leitko & Szczerbacki,
1987) or impossible (Mintzberg, 1989).
Underpinning these gaps in the literature is a concern with the efficacy of change
leader interventions for achieving qualitative schema change. In particular, the
efficacy of change leader interventions can be explored in terms of four inter-related
6
criteria; change leader interventions are efficacious when (1) recipients view the
intervention as facilitative, (2) pre-existing schema are replaced or significantly
elaborated, (3) they reinforce dynamics thought to underpin schema change, and (4)
they overcome contextual constraints.
In summary, public sector managers face imperatives to transform themselves and
their organisations in line with contemporary conceptions of management,
leadership, organisation design and public policy. Change on this scale typically
places significant demands on organisational member sensemaking in that pre-
existing schema are likely to be rendered obsolete. Yet schemata tend to endure
whether they are obsolete or not (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Change leader
interventions must, therefore, not only change the formal organisational architecture
but also the individual and collective organisational schemata reinforcing this
architecture (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988).
This study is designed to address these significant gaps in the literature on the
relationship between change leader interventions and organisational schema change.
Specifically, the research investigates the evolution, over a three-year period, of
qualitative organisational schema change in three schema change contexts in
response to two large-scale interventions in a change management context thought to
be inimical to change leader influence, specifically a technically-oriented spatially
differentiated public Professional Bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1989; Zell, 2001).
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
Following the previous discussion, the research problem addressed in this thesis is:
How efficacious, from the perspective of change recipients, are change
leader transformational interventions in realising qualitative
organisational schema change in contexts thought to be inimical to leader
influence?
• How do organisational members construe change leader interventions?
• What is the pattern of qualitative schema change achieved?
• What dynamics explain the observed pattern of schema change?
7
It will be argued that (a) while there are no panaceas, public managers need more
sophisticated intervention theories based on a knowledge of the relative efficacy of
different interventions rather than relying on, predominantly, structural interventions,
(b) viewing organisational schema in one-dimensional rather than multidimensional
terms masks both the complexity of organisational schema change and the possibility
of partial rather than configurational schema change, (c) while inter-schema conflict
or dialectical processes are important, successful schema change was better
explained by teleological processes, and (d) change leaders can have a powerful
influence on OT in change management contexts thought to be inimical to change
leader influence yet their influence is linked to high investments of time and effort.
THEORETICAL CONTEXT
As indicated earlier, this research is conducted in the context of the literature on OT,
which has been defined in various ways. Levy & Merry’s (1986) definition captures
the main elements of the concept. For Levy & Merry, OT:
Is a multidimensional, multi-level, qualitative, discontinuous, radical
organisational change involving a paradigm shift.
Various theoretical perspectives have been used to investigate OT. The main
theoretical perspectives are organisational schema change (Bartunek, 1988),
individual and collective behaviour change (Burke, 2002; Porras & Robertson,
1992), and organisational culture change (Lurie & Riccucci, 2003). In this research,
OT is defined in terms of collective schema change, or paradigm change, though it is
acknowledged that collective behaviour change and organisational culture change
are also required.
The concept of schema has been variously defined. In essence, organisational
schemata are collective knowledge structures that enable organisational members to
interpret and make sense of organisational environments (Bartunek & Moch, 1987).
Schemata create cognitive order (McKinley & Scherer, 2000). Thus, schemata, once
established, tend to be stable and difficult to change, even when they conflict with
environmental conditions (Labianca et al., 2000).
8
The decision to focus on organisational schema change, rather than behaviour
change or culture change, was made on four grounds; (1) pre-existing theory
suggests that OT is contingent on individual and organisational schema change
(Bartunek & Moch, 1987), (2) top-down change messages first interact with
organisational interpretive schema (Porras & Silvers, 1991), (3) organisational
culture is a complex concept and its assessment has been the subject of some
controversy (Schein, 1992), (4) while OT also requires behaviour change, assessing
behaviour change in a spatially differentiated organisation across time was not
considered feasible without the investment of significant resources.
CHANGE LEADER INTERVENTIONS AND SCHEMA CHANGE
The focus of this thesis is the relationship between change leader interventions and
organisational schema change in a particular change management context. This
section briefly expands on the unresolved theoretical issues or gaps in knowledge of
the relationship between leader change strategies and organisational schema change
mentioned earlier. These unresolved issues provide a basis for the present research.
In the context of a need for OT, top level leaders frame new organisational schemata
to replace or significantly elaborate pre-existing schemata (Bartunek, 1993) and
change work settings in ways that reinforce these new schema (Porras & Robertson,
1992; Porras & Silvers, 1991). These issues fall within the scope of intervention
theory, which specifies when, where, and how to intervene to shift an organisation
toward a desired future state (Dunphy, 1996; Weick & Quinn, 1999).
Alternative schemata are designed to enable organisational members to make sense
or find meaning in new information processing contexts. For example, the
knowledge frameworks, or schemata, that allow organisational members to manage
information processing demands in traditional public organisational contexts will not
serve this purpose in radically changed contexts. Without schema change it is
unlikely that organisational members will be able to sustain the new behaviours
required (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
9
The first unresolved issue in the literature on the relationship between change leader
interventions and organisational schema change relates to the type of intervention
employed to influence schema change. Previous research on organisational schema
change has focused primarily on the relationship between imposed structural change
and organisational schemata change: specifically, the restructuring of a religious
order (Bartunek, 1984), a Quality of Working Life (QWL) intervention in a food
manufacturing plant (Bartunek & Moch, 1987), improving coordination in an
educational organisation (Bartunek & Reid, 1992).
More recent research has been of a similar order. Research has focused on
decentralising a U.S. University Health Centre (Labianca et al., 2000), the re-
engineering of a federal government agency in the U.S. (Geigle, 1998), large scale
restructure of a U.S. rural hospital and a U.S. state government department
(Sottolano, 2001), and the restructure of a recently privatised utility in the U.K.
(Balogun & Johnson, 2004).
Yet structural interventions are not the only options available to change leaders
(McKinley & Scherer, 2000). Five categories of intervention have been identified;
vision, organising arrangements (e.g. structure), social factors (e.g. interaction
processes), physical setting (e.g. space configuration) or technology (e.g. job design)
to effect schemata and behaviour change (Porras & Robertson, 1992; Porras &
Silvers, 1991).
Little attention has been given to the relationship between normative/re-educative
(Chin & Benne, 1976) large-scale human process interventions (Waddell et al.,
2000) designed to enhance organisational member process capabilities and
organisational schema change. This relationship is a key focus of this thesis.
The second unresolved issue in the literature on change leader interventions and
organisational schema change relates to the scale of structural intervention
employed. The truncation of an organisation on owner-provider lines, particularly in
professional organisations, has significant implications for organisational members’
organisational and professional identity (Reger et al., 1994).
10
When the alternative organisational identity schema created by change interventions
is discrepant from the pre-existing organisational identity schema, Reger et al argue
that organisational members are less likely to accept change: such changes fall
outside of the change acceptance zone (576) and, therefore, are less likely to be
accepted at the level of schema or behaviour. A key focus of the present research is
the relationship between a radical structural change and organisational schema
change.
The third unresolved issue in the literature relates to the dynamics of schema change.
Two sub-issues are important in understanding these dynamics. The first sub-issue
relates to how schemata are represented. Previous research typically represents
organisational schema as a one-dimensional bipolar construct (Labianca et al., 2000).
Conceiving of organisational schema in this way tends to mask the complexity of
organisational transformation.
For example, Labianca et al (2000) referred to a shift in decision-making schema
from participation as show schema to participative decision-making schema.
Balogun & Johnson (2004) referred to a shift from organisation as hierarchy –
common purpose schema to organisation as multidivisional – interdivisional
relationship schema. In both cases, the researchers reported that imposed structural
interventions influenced successful schema change.
As suggested in the earlier definition, OT is multidimensional, consequently
organisational members’ representation of the changing organisation will also be
multidimensional and configurational (Mintzberg, 1979). Focusing on one-
dimensional schema makes it easier to draw conclusions about the success or failure
of change though it is less likely to reflect the complexity of change. In this research
the focus is on capturing organisational members’ multidimensional schema, rather
than relying on one-dimensional schema labels.
The second sub-issue relates to the relationship between change leader interventions
and organisational schema change dynamics (Albert, 1992; Balogun & Johnson,
2004; Labianca et al., 2000). The literature suggests that change leader interventions
11
produce one of two schema change outcomes. In this thesis these outcomes are
referred to as the juxtaposition model and the disengagement model.
The juxtaposition model assumes that change leader interventions result in the
juxtaposition of a new organisational schema alongside a pre-existing schema. In
this situation, the change management task is to relocate organisational members
from their pre-existing to the new schema. Relocation typically involves dialectical
processes (Bartunek, 1993), or rational empirical processes (Labianca et al., 2000),
which can result in the replacement of old by new schema, or a synthesis of the two,
or adaptation to the simultaneous coexistence of two conflicting schemata (Bailey &
Neilsen, 1992; Palmer & Dunford, 2002).
The disengagement model assumes, on the other hand, that change leader
interventions disengage organisational members from their pre-existing schema. In
this case, there is no duality of schemata (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). Schema
change occurs because organisational members accept that the pre-existing schema is
obsolete or irrelevant and develop a new schema in the light of on-going experience
rather than as a result of the interplay between pre-existing schema and new schema
(Balogun & Johnson, 2004). Very little research has employed the disengagement
model.
Little is known about how normative/re-educative large-scale human process
interventions and power/coercive radical structural interventions will influence pre-
existing schema. This thesis addresses this issue.
The fourth unresolved issue relates to the context in which change leaders seek to
change organisational schemata. Previous literature suggests that change leaders
influence change by envisioning (e.g. new schema), enabling, and energising
(Conger, 1999, 2000; Kotter, 1999). Because leadership is contextually defined and
caused (Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2001) change management contexts may well vary in
terms of their responsiveness to leader influence.
Several factors have the potential to neutralise leader influence. For example,
professionalised employees (Leitko & Szczerbacki, 1987; Mintzberg, 1989; Zell,
12
2001, 2003), decentralisation (Mintzberg, 1989), spatial differentiation (Kerr &
Jermier, 1978) and organisations with high inertial properties, for example, old and
large organisations with strong cultures (Cummings, 1999). All these attributes are
characteristic of what has been referred to as a Professional Bureaucracy
configuration (Mintzberg, 1979). It is important, therefore, that there be a better
understanding of how change leader interventions influence organisational schema
change in such contexts.
In summary, at least four key unresolved issues in the literature on change leader
interventions and organisational schema change require additional research; (1) the
relationship between large-scale human process interventions and organisational
schema change, and (2) the relationship between complex structural interventions
and organisational schema change, and (3) schema change dynamics in the context
of these interventions, and (4) how change leaders intervene to achieve schema
change in contexts thought to be inimical to leader influence.
RATIONALE/JUSTIFICATION
This study is significant for three main reasons; the research (a) addresses significant
gaps in the literature on the relationship between change leadership interventions and
organisational schema change in organisational contexts inimical to leader influence,
(b) addresses a practical change management problem of direct relevance to public
managers, and (c) had access to a technically-oriented public Professional
Bureaucracy undertaking transformational change. Each of these justifications will
now be developed in more detail.
Addresses significant gaps in the literature
This research is justified on the grounds that it addresses significant gaps in the
literature on the relationship between change leader interventions and organisational
schema change. In particular, the extant literature has given insufficient attention to
the relationship between large-scale human process and complex structural
interventions and organisational schema change in organisational contexts thought to
be inimical to leader influence. Consequently, the thesis contributes to the literature
13
on intervention theory and on schema change theory, domains that have received
little attention in the literature on the transformation of public organisations.
The need for research on these gaps is given greater significance when OT outcome
studies are considered. Much of the public sector (Polidano, 2001; Schofield, 2001;
Stokes & Clegg, 2002) and private sector (Beer & Nohria, 2000a; Burke, 2002;
Gilmore, Shea, & Useem, 1997; Porras & Robertson, 1992) literature on OT is
pessimistic about the likelihood of success of these initiatives.
Several assessments suggest that about 70% of change efforts fail (M. Beer, R. A.
Eisenstat, & B. Spector, 1990; Beer & Nohria, 2000a). Porras and Robertson (1992)
reported, based on a meta-analysis of a large number of change studies, that 38% of
change efforts produced positive effects on key dependent variables, 52.5% show no
change and 9.5% showed a negative effect on change variables. Successful
transformations have been reported (Ashburner, Ferlie, & Fitzgerald, 1996; Young,
2000), yet by most accounts such reports are the exception rather than the rule.
Bate, Khan, & Pyle (2000:445) sum up the state of organisational change
management effectiveness:
As large-scale strategic change has become a major preoccupation in
contemporary management, so too has the sense of disappointment and
diminishing returns that all too often accompanies the change process.
During the 1990s, organizations in the commercial, public, and not-for-profit
sectors have experimented with and frequently failed to secure a sustainable
benefit from a variety of strategic change initiatives. They have been
restructuring, re-engineering, and refocusing but never quite realising the
gains they must have expected from their (sometimes huge) human and
financial investment in change.
In the face of such conclusions, research on unresolved gaps in the literature on OT
becomes more necessary as increasing numbers of public managers confront the task
of transforming their organisations.
14
Link to real world problem
The research is also justified on the grounds that it is directly linked to an explicit
concern of public managers. Managers of many public sectors across the world
confront the task of transforming organisations to better meet contemporary demands
(Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). For example, the Queensland Government has
indicated that one of its most significant challenges in reshaping the Queensland
public service:
Is how to manage the transition of the public service workforce through the
reshaping process (Queensland Government, 2003a).
This thesis has the potential to contribute to a better understanding of this process by
identifying factors that facilitate or hinder organisational schema change in the
context of the transformation of spatially differentiated technically-oriented public
Professional Bureaucracies.
Access opportunity
This research can also be justified on the grounds of access opportunity. Change
leaders seeking to transform their organisations often find it in their interests to be
more circumspect than open to external scrutiny; the risks and the potential for error
in Organisational Transformation are high. For example, Pollitt & Bouckaert (2000)
argued that:
It is usually harder for academics to obtain systematic information about
how reforms are being put into practice than about what the reforms are.
Governments are frequently keen to announce what they are going to do but
are understandably less energetic in offering a blow-by-blow account of how
things are going (90).
This researcher has had extremely good access to a technically-oriented public
Professional Bureaucracy over a period of three years. The organisation has been
undergoing transformational change for more than a decade. More recently, change
leaders have intervened in the organisation in ways that have had a significant and
ongoing impact on the organisation.
15
As a part of this process, organisational managers explicitly committed themselves to
demonstrating leadership, learning and transparency. The values driving change in
the case organisation facilitated data collection and analysis.
Summary
This research is justified, then, on the grounds that (a) there is a need to elucidate
theoretical issues and gaps in the organisational schema change literature,
particularly given poor outcome assessments of transformational change initiatives,
(b) the research is linked to a real world problem and there is an expectation that the
results of this research will contribute to better transformational change strategies,
and (c) there was an opportunity to access an organisation undergoing
transformational change
METHOD
To study the relationship between change leader interventions and organisational
schema change an interpretive, longitudinal single case study design was employed.
The case organisation is a spatially differentiated technically-oriented public
Professional Bureaucracy located in Queensland, an organisational form with
attributes that tend to make it inimical to change leader influence (Kerr & Jermier,
1978; Mintzberg, 1989).
Managers and staff at all levels agreed to participate in the study. Indeed, the
organisation was explicitly committed to providing leadership, being open and
transparent and developing its own transformational change capabilities. In
consequence, the organisation agreed to provide high levels of access for data
collection. The primary data collection methods used was focus group interviews
and semi-structured interviews.
16
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS
Chapter 2: Gaps in the existing literature: This chapter develops the arguments
outlined in summary form in Chapter 1 by analysing the literature on selected and
unresolved research issues in the relationship between change leader interventions
and organisational schema change in organisational contexts.
Chapter 3: Methods: This chapter proposes a method of investigating these
unresolved issues in the relationship between transformational interventions and
organisational schema change. In particular, the research employs a longitudinal
single case study design.
Chapter 4: Pre-existing schema: When transformational change interventions are
implemented, organisational members often seek to understand these changes using
pre-existing schemata. This chapter identifies this pre-existing schema as a
prerequisite to better understanding organisational members’ interpretations and
constructions of transformational interventions addressed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
Chapter 5: The Leadership Change Trajectory: This chapter investigates the
relationship between a large-scale human process intervention and qualitative
schema change. The change involved the development of a new concept of leading
and managing. This intervention is unique in the schema change literature: previous
research has focused on structural interventions.
Chapter 6: The Corporate Change Trajectory: This chapter explores the
relationship between change leader interventions and organisational schema change
in one of two schema change contexts created by an imposed radical structural
intervention. The shift involved the development of a strategy-driven organisation.
Chapter 7: The Commercial Change Trajectory: This chapter explores the
relationship between change leader interventions and organisational schema change
in the second schema change context created by an imposed structural intervention
which truncated the organisation. The change involved a shift to a profit-driven
provider organisation.
17
Chapter 8: Schema change: An integrative analysis of factors: This chapter
provides an integrative analysis of schema change in the three contexts addressed in
Chapters 5-7. The chapter explores the implications of change leaders’ intervention
theory and identifies those factors that explain the success or lack of success of
schema change in the case organisation and draws conclusions about the efficacy of
interventions designed to transform the case organisation.
Chapter 9: Conclusion and contribution: This chapter specifies the contribution
that this research has made to the literature on intervention theory and organisational
schema change. The chapter also outlines the limitations of the study, provides
directions for future research, and specifies implications for practice.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has argued that managers of many traditional public organisations face
a transformational change imperative; they are expected to transform themselves and
their organisations to achieve better alignment with contemporary and emerging
public policy contexts. Yet the knowledge base on OT is relatively limited, the
probability of success relatively low, and change management contexts vary in terms
of their openness to change leader influence. A significant focus of change leader
interventions is the replacement or significant elaboration of organisational
members’ pre-existing knowledge structures, or schemata. Little attention has been
given to this issue in the public management literature. Consequently, there is a need
to explicate the relationship between change leader interventions and qualitative
organisational schema change in contexts thought to be inimical to leader influence.
A better understanding of this relationship contributes to decision making based on
the efficacy of change leader interventions for qualitative schema change.
18
Table 1.1: Definition of key concepts
Intervention A set of structured activities in which selected
organisational units (target groups or individuals) engage in a task or a sequence of tasks with the goals of organisational improvement and individual development (French & Bell, 1999:145)
Large-scale human process interventions An intervention directed at improving such processes as organisational problem solving, leadership, visioning and task accomplishments between groups for a major subsystem, or for an entire organisation (Waddell et al., 2004:232)
Structural intervention or techno-structural interventions
Structural interventions include changes in how the overall of the organisation is divided into units, who reports to whom, methods of control, the spatial arrangements of equipment and people, work flow arrangements, and changes in communication and authority (French & Bell, 1999:220)
Large-group interventions Interventions for involving the whole system: they engage a critical mass of the people affected by change, both inside the organisation (employees and management) and outside it (suppliers and customers) (Bunker & Alban, 1997:xv)
Intervention theory Specifies when, where, and how to intervene so as to move the organisation closer to the ideal (Dunphy, 1996:543)
Efficacy of change leader interventions for achieving qualitative schema change
Derived from previous research and data: four inter-related elements were used to explore efficacy; (a) the intervention facilitates new schema development, (b) pre-existing schema has been replaced or significantly elaborated, and (c) interventions reinforce dynamics thought to underpin schema change, and (d) interventions are sensitive to change management context
Organisational schema A schema is the interpretive framework used by individuals to give meaning to observed objects, actions, and behaviours. Thus, a schema is used for processing information, and this includes scanning the environment, selecting stimuli (e.g., events, acts, and variables), measuring observed stimuli quantitatively (e.g., large or small) or qualitatively (e.g., good or bad), and either making decisions or storing information for later retrieval (Taylor and Crocker, 1981)
Organisational Transformation (OT) Multi-dimensional, multi-level, qualitative, qualitative, discontinuous, radical organisational change involving a paradigm shift (Levy & Merry, 1986:5)
Table 1.1 continues overleaf.
19
Table 1.1 continued Change leader substitute Characteristics of the individual subordinate, the
work task, or the organisation that prevent hierarchical leadership from affecting employee attitudes and/or behaviour and make such leadership unnecessary. Substitutes serve two functions: 1. They prevent a specific leadership behaviour from having an impact on employee attitudes and/or behaviour 2. They ‘replace’ the leader behaviour by having a direct impact of their own on these dependent variables (Kerr & Jermier, 1978:30)
Change Change is defined as a shift from a present state to a desired future state (Beckhard & Harris, 1987) (29). In this thesis, change involves a shift from a pre-existing organisational schema to a new organisational schema under the influence of change leader interventions
Teleological theory Assumes (1) an individual or group exists that acts as a singular, discrete entity, which engages in reflexively monitored action to socially construct and cognitively share a common end state or goal, (2) the entity may envision its end state of development before or after actions it may take, and the goal may be set explicitly or implicitly (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995:525).
Dialectical theory Assumes (1) at least two entities exist (each with its own discrete identity) that oppose or contradict one another, (2) the opposing entities must confront each other and engage in a conflict or struggle through some physical or social venue, in which the opposition plays itself out, (3) the outcome of the conflict must consist either of a new entity that is different from the previous two, or (in degenerate cases) the defeat of one entity by the other, or a stalemate among the entities (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995:525).
Juxtaposition-Relocation model Assumes that change leader interventions result in the juxtaposition of a new schema with a pre-existing schema. Subsequent interventions are designed to relocate organisational members from pre-existing to new schema (Labianca et al., 2000)
Disengagement-learning model Assumes that change leader interventions disengage organisational members from their pre-existing schema. Organisational members develop new schema on the basis of ongoing experience with changing conditions. There is no duality of schema (Balogun & Johnson, 2004)
Collective efficacy Collective efficacy is defined as a group’s shared belief in its conjoint capabilities to organise and execute the course of action required to produce given levels of attainment (Bandura, 1997:477)
20
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 1, it was argued that the investigation of four unresolved issues in the
literature on the relationship between change leader interventions and organisational
schema change will contribute to a better understanding of the efficacy of change
leader interventions in the context of OT. The core assumption of the research is that
transformation involves, at its core, the replacement or significant elaboration of
organisational member interpretive schema (Bartunek, 1993; Bartunek & Moch,
1987).
This chapter has two aims. First, the chapter analyses the existing literature on OT
in public organisations to establish the need for research on the relationship between
change leader interventions and organisational schema change. Second, the
literature on the relationship between change leader interventions and qualitative
schema change is reviewed as a basis for developing a framework to guide the
development of this thesis.
ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION (OT)
The concept of OT is problematic in that it has been defined in various and
sometimes contradictory ways (Camden-Anders, 2000; Tosey & Robinson, 2002).
While the debates reflected in this literature are important, they are outside the scope
of this thesis. For the purposes of this thesis, OT is defined as:
Multidimensional, multi-level, qualitative, discontinuous, radical
organisational change involving a paradigm shift (Levy & Merry, 1986).
Given the scale of change involved, OT is also referred to as whole-of-systems
change (Levine & Mohr, 1998) and configuration change (Mintzberg, 1989), or
archetype change (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988). The scale of change typically
means that the experience of OT is traumatic, it takes a long time to realise (Evans,
21
1992; Mintzberg, 1989) and success rates are relatively poor (Beer & Nohria,
2000c): it is, according to Mintzberg:
Prolonged and agonising, as the organisation sits suspended between its old
and new forms, with one group promoting change and another resisting it
(192).
OT is a multidisciplinary area of study. Research on OT has been informed by
concepts and theories from Organisational Theory, Organisational Behaviour,
Anthropology, and the physical sciences. Selected theoretical perspectives include
Institutional Theory (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996), Rational Choice Theory
(Clemens & Cook, 1999), Dissipative Structures (Gemmill & Smith, 1985),
Punctuated Equilibrium (Gersick, 1991; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994), Planned
Change Theory (Porras & Robertson, 1992), culture change (L.C. Harris &
Ogbonna, 1998), organisational learning (Argyris, 1993), and schema change
(Bartunek & Moch, 1987).
Each of these perspectives is linked to a growing body of knowledge on OT. As
important as these multiple perspectives on OT are, the theoretical perspective
adopted in this research is schema theory (Bartunek, 1993; Bartunek & Moch, 1987),
a theoretical perspective located within the field of managerial and organisational
cognition (Walsh, 1995).
This view of OT suggests that, when organisations transform, most if not all
elements of the organisation change, including organisational strategy (Baden-Fuller
& Volberda, 1997), organisational techno-structure (Galbraith, 2000), individual and
collective behaviour (Burke, 2002; Porras & Robertson, 1992), and, importantly, the
knowledge and belief systems underpinning and reinforcing the formal organisation
(Porras & Robertson, 1992; Walsh, 1995). If organisational environments change
radically then, to maintain some degree of congruence, the organisational members’
collective schema also has to change.
Not all organisational change is of this order. The need for schema change
distinguishes OT from incremental change. When organisations change
incrementally, organisational members can assimilate change messages within pre-
22
existing schema (Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Porras & Silvers, 1991). Assimilation is
not as likely when organisations transform, new schemata are required to make sense
of change demands and new organisational environments.
Yet, replacing or significantly elaborating pre-existing with new schema tends to be
very difficult (Labianca et al., 2000). Organisational members can maintain pre-
existing schemata in the face of disconfirming evidence (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and
they typically find it disconcerting to confront the inadequacy or obsolescence of
pre-existing schema (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993;
Mintzberg, 1979).
To facilitate schema change, change leaders frame alternative schema (Bartunek,
1993), select, sequence, pace interventions (Weick & Quinn, 1999), and select
appropriate implementation methods (Chin & Benne, 1976). These decision
problems fall within the bounds of intervention theory, which specifies when, where,
and how to intervene so as to move the organisation closer to the ideal (Dunphy,
1996:543). An intervention is defined as a planned sequence of actions or events
that purposely disrupt the status quo and create desired outcomes (Waddell et al.,
2004).
Change leaders may choose from multiple interventions, including structural
interventions and human process interventions (Porras & Robertson, 1992) and
different methods for implementing these interventions, including power-coercive
methods, normative/re-educative methods, and rational-empirical methods (Chin &
Benne, 1976; Stace & Dunphy, 2001). Such decisions are important: intervening at
the wrong point or introducing too much change too quickly will adversely affect
change outcomes (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1999; Stensaker, Meyer, Falkenberg, &
Haueng, 2001). As will be discussed later, despite optional interventions there has
been a tendency in public management reform to rely on structural interventions
(Maddock, 2002).
The focus on managerial and organisational cognition distinguishes this research
from that on change leader interventions and behaviour change (D. S. Lewis, 1992)
and change leader interventions and culture change (Schein, 1992). Both behaviour
23
change and organisational culture change are necessary components of successful
OT (Ashburner et al., 1996), however, behaviour change is unlikely to be sustained
without schema change and organisational culture change is a longer term outcome
of sustained behaviour change and schema change (Schein, 1992).
In summary, OT is complex, long term organisational change involving change,
through appropriate change leader interventions, in most, if not all, aspects of the
formal and informal organisation. While OT has been studied from various
perspectives, a critical prerequisite of OT is organisational schema change (Porras &
Robertson, 1992). Studying the relationship between change leader interventions
and organisational schema change is, therefore, an important avenue for developing
the OT knowledge base.
This section has provided an overview of OT. The next section analyses the
literature on OT in public organisations. This analysis establishes that research on
the relationship between change leader interventions and organisational schema
change will make a significant contribute to this literature.
OT IN PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS
One key issue in the extant literature on OT in public organisations is whether
change leaders interventions are more efficacious if they are imposed from the top
down or facilitated from the bottom up. Evidence for the efficacy of both top down
and bottom up change has been reported.
Lewis (1992) investigated, over a three-year period, the relationship between forced,
rapid culture change interventions and espoused and observed reactions of staff, their
actual behaviour, and organisational performance in the context of efforts to
transform an Australian College of Advanced Education into a university: a key
focus of change was staff role: staff were expected to shift from an exclusive focus
on teaching to one that involved teaching and research. It appears, then, that
structural interventions were used to produce culture change.
24
Lewis found that imposed change, despite widespread resistance from middle
managers and staff, did change patterned group behaviour consistent with
managerial expectations (staff obtaining PhD qualifications, seeking grants and so
on), though there was not a corresponding positive change in values or assumptions
(41). Moreover, she found that the incongruence between staff values or
assumptions and behaviour was unrelated to stakeholder evaluations of
organisational performance; stakeholders continued to provide positive evaluations
of the organisation despite the incongruence.
Lewis’ finding suggests that (a) in some circumstances patterned group behaviour
change will satisfice, that second-order change is not always necessary, and (b) that,
under some circumstances, power/coercive interventions can produce change of an
order sufficient to meet the expectations of change leaders (Dunphy & Stace, 1988;
Poole et al., 1989). Lewis’ findings are contrary to the assumptions of this thesis,
which assumes that for OT to occur changes in knowledge structures and beliefs are
essential.
Brunetto (2001) also investigated the relationship between techno-structural
intervention and organisational member reactions in a university setting.
Specifically, Brunetto explored senior academics’ reactions to a top-down university
teaching quality intervention designed to change the relative weighting of teaching
and research in decisions on junior academics’ promotion. That is, the intervention
supported teaching quality as a route to promotion, rather than an exclusive reliance
on research.
Brunetto found, contrary to Lewis, that values and assumptions did impact on senior
academics’ behaviour. Specifically, Brunetto found that, despite the reform
intervention, senior academics continued to rely on research as the main criterion to
promote academics. She concluded that senior academics undertaking management
tasks still have some power to mediate the way organisational changes are
implemented and that a well established organisational and professional culture
contributed to this (465). Brunetto’s results reinforce the view that top-down
interventions do not necessarily change behaviour, particularly when the required
behaviour conflicts with pre-existing and important professional cultural values.
25
Ashburner, Ferlie & Fitzgerald (1996) reported that top-down structural
interventions were successful in bringing about a transformation at Hospital Board
level of the U.K. National Health Service. Drawing on longitudinal qualitative
research, Ashburner et al conclude that change success is related to five factors: (1)
the initiation of multiple and interrelated changes across the system as a whole, (2)
the creation of new organisational forms at a collective level, (3) the creation of roles
at an individual level, (4) the reconfiguration of power relations (especially the
formation of new leadership groups) and (5) an emerging synthesis of traditional and
new cultures reflected in positive attitudes to change, the recruitment of private
sector managers, and the adoption of a new business-oriented language.
From the perspective of this research, the final criterion (point 5) is of particular
relevance. Ultimately, the success of criteria 1-4 depend on the success of criterion
5. Ashburner et al allude to change in cognition; they refer to, yet provide little
evidence of, what this means from the perspective of change recipients. At the very
least, the authors suggest the process is incomplete and conflicted.
Other researchers have expressed serious reservations about the efficacy of top down
structural interventions and argue that successful transformational change is more
likely when change is facilitated from the bottom up.
For example, Thompson (1999) was concerned with the influence of perspective, top
down or bottom up, on evaluations of reform interventions in the U.S. Federal
government. Specifically, Thompson argued that viewed from a top-down planned
change perspective, the reinvention of the U.S. federal government in line with the
National Performance Review rarely ‘works’ as intended by its sponsors (283).
However, Thompson argues that viewed from the perspective of local reinvention
initiatives, or reinvention labs, a different picture of the efficacy of reinvention
emerges.
Thompson found that a significant proportion of re-invention labs given some degree
of autonomy tended to produce positive outcomes. Thompson concludes, following
March (1981), that reform is best directed at amplifying naturally occurring change
26
processes by providing inducements and encouragement to those willing to challenge
old ways of doing business. This perspective represents, according to Thompson, a
more efficacious change strategy than the more traditional master blueprint concept
of reform.
Similarly, McHugh & O’Brien (1999) argue that those OT interventions driven from
the top and requiring the passive compliance of organisational members will rarely
be effective. McHugh & O’Brien’s conclusion was based on research of an Irish
Social Welfare Services organisation and they found that OT is more likely when
change:
Commences at the periphery and is led by relatively junior front line staff,
with senior management practitioners acting as facilitators of organisational
transformation (556).
Maddock (2002), in the context of the modernisation of the U.K. Health Service,
also suggests a greater role for lower level employees and, therefore, a shift toward
more participative, bottom-up change management. Maddock argues that the UK
government’s approach to modernisation via closed systems thinking and the belief
in the risk-free solution is doomed (15).
Maddock points out that there is a lack of leadership and know-how in the public
sector about how to achieve transformation and that policy makers need to focus on
managing the transformation process (15). More specifically, Maddock
acknowledges that public sector change agents are motivated to modernise but
suggests that their efforts will fail unless they adopt a more participatory process to
change and become less controlling (15).
Based on her analysis of public sector modernisation, Maddock (2002) identified six
barriers to successful transformation: (a) poor relationships with stakeholders, (b)
poor leadership by local politicians who have a vested interest in the continuation of
risk-free cultures and by executives who do not understand how to involve staff, (c)
structural top down change levers and narratives that obscure emergent practices (a
point reflected in Thompson’s work reviewed above), (d) transactional management,
a focus on outputs and targets, and inappropriate performance management, which
27
run counter to developing new relationships, (e) risk averse and gender cultures, and
(f) the lack of a transforming social philosophy to support those who are developing
new practices.
In summary, the existing literature on public sector OT reflects a concern with the
relative efficacy of power-coercive top-down structural change and emergent
bottom-up change. This debate, which has become somewhat polarised, is also
reflected in the broader OT literature (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; M. Beer, R. A.
Eisenstat, & B. A. Spector, 1990; Orlikowski, 1996). Given the scale of OT, it is
likely that both top-down and bottom-up change is required (Dunphy, 2000).
A further line of research on OT in public sector organisations has sought to identify
prescriptions for successful organisational transformation. Abramson & Lawrence
(2001) collected case studies of successful transformation in the U.S. and the U.K.
To illustrate, one of these studies will be examined. Young (2000) analysed, over a
period of five years, the successful top-down transformation of the U.S. Veterans’
Health Administration (VHA) and identified five factors to explain its success.
Unfortunately, few data are provided. However, Young argues that the success of
the VHA transformation is a function of (a) recruiting leaders with qualifications
consistent with the change agenda, (b) formulating a clear change plan, including a
clear vision, (c) perseverance in the face of setbacks, (d) matching external
environment changes with internal changes, (e) training and education, and (f)
balancing system-wide unity with operating unit flexibility.
Similarly, Kezar & Eckel (2002) sought to identify those factors that explain the
successful top-down transformation of six tertiary institutions in the U.S. Kezar &
Eckel attribute OT success to five common factors across the six research sites; (a)
senior administrative support, (b) collaborative leadership, (c) a robust change
management design, (d) staff development, and (e) visible action.
Kezar & Eckel argued that the critical effect of these strategies was their facilitative
effect on employee sensemaking, that is, they:
28
Provided opportunities for institutional participants to make new meaning –
to help members of the institution change the way they perceive their roles,
skills, and approaches/philosophies (303).
While Young and Kezar & Eckel were concerned with explaining successful
transformation, Polidano (2001) sought to explain why reform efforts fail. Polidano
concluded, based on research into public aid organisations that:
Most reforms in government fail. They do not fail because, once
implemented, they yield unsatisfactory outcomes. They fail because they
never get past the implementation stage at all; they are blocked outright or
put into effect only in tokenistic, half-hearted fashion (346).
Polidano suggests that successful reform in such organisations is more likely if
reformers (a) keep the scope of change narrow, (b) limit the role of aid donors, and
(c) give reform firm leadership while simultaneously allowing for line management
discretion (357).
The studies of Young, Kezar & Eckel, and Polidano focus on prescriptions for
successful OT. As useful as these prescriptions for change leaders deciding how to
intervene to effect OT might be, they provide little insight into why these
prescriptions work.
Another line of inquiry into OT in public sector organisations focuses on the
relationship between the reform interventions and pre-existing organisational beliefs
and behaviour, an issue reflected in the work of Brunetto cited earlier. This view
suggests that the reform process is so concerned with change and discontinuity that it
ignores the importance of continuity. In so doing the focus is on reform hopes rather
than the complex dialectical processes (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) that result from
change interventions.
Stokes & Clegg (2002) report evidence of a less than successful attempt to reform an
Australian public sector organisation. Instead of finding the managerial and
organisational changes anticipated in the reform literature, they found that:
29
Sedimented bureaucratic principles and innovative 'enterprising' freedom
produce new power games around contradictory and unresolved dualisms
(232).
The suggestion is that the effect of overlaying the reformed organisation on top of
the traditional organisation produced unanticipated and contradictory outcomes.
These authors conclude, then, that:
Neither reform hopes nor liberal anxieties are supported: instead, we identify
continuing points for pressure in the organizational politics of bureaucratic
reform (232).
In a similar vein, Schofield (2001) raises questions about the reform agenda by
arguing that it has tended to ignore implicit positive values that sustain traditional
bureaucracies. More specifically, Schofield asks:
The paradoxical question of why, given two decades of ideological and
structural reforms in the public sector, bureaucracy has survived both as a
concept and in practice. (77)
Schofield argues, on the basis of her research into the reform of the British National
Health Service, that bureaucracy is both useful and durable because it means that
governments can rely upon the obedience of bureaucrats (77). By implication,
Schofield argues that reform, or OT, of the type promoted by, for example, New
Public Management (NPM), is less likely when reform goals conflict with valued
traditions and the expectations of key stakeholders, a conclusion reminiscent of that
of Brunetto reported earlier.
The research of both Stokes & Clegg and Schofield raise questions about the wide-
spread enthusiasm for transformation of public organisations at the expense of what
is valuable in pre-existing public organisational designs and behaviour. At the very
least these authors argue that interventions designed to transform public
organisations have unanticipated effects; they intensify the perception of paradox
and contradiction thereby creating cognitive disorder (McKinley & Scherer, 2000) in
organisational participants. Nevertheless, as will be discussed later, dialectical
processes can also be a source of change (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) which
30
suggests that conflict between old and new might not necessarily be a negative
outcome.
A focus on paradox and contradiction is reflected in the broader OT literature. For
example, Evans (1992) argues that change and continuity is a duality: one without
the other leads to degeneration and pathology; continuity without change leads to
isolation and stagnation, and ultimately unwanted change in the shape of crisis and
change without continuity leads to devitalising stress, and the change itself turns out
to be illusory and shallow (253).
Summary and critique
Three lines of inquiry were identified in OT research in public organisations; (1) the
relative efficacy of top-down structural interventions and participative bottom-up
processes, (2) identifying interventions related to successful OT, and (3) explaining
how interventions create change-inhibiting dialectical tensions between reform hopes
and pre-existing and positive public sector values. What follows is an integrative
summary of the findings of this analysis.
Top-down power/coercive interventions can be viewed as efficacious if (a) change
targets change their behaviour in line with change leader expectations, even if
change targets’ values and assumptions are not congruent with the prescribed
behaviour (D. S. Lewis, 1994), (b) if large scale changes in the formal organisation
are achieved along with evidence of some level of synthesis of traditional and new
cultures (Ashburner et al., 1996), (c) interventions facilitate organisational members’
sensemaking (Kezar & Eckel, 2002), and (d) if change is both systematically planned
and involves power sharing with lower level managers (Polidano, 2001; Young,
2000).
On the other hand, top–down power/coercive structural interventions are less
efficacious if (a) expected behaviours conflict with core professional values
(Brunetto, 2001), (b) expected behaviours conflict with the values/interests of
political constituents to whom organisational members are accountable (Schofield,
2001), (c) they rely on structural change thereby masking emergent change
31
(Maddock, 2002) (d) the implementers of change are relegated a passive role
(McHugh & O'Brien, 1999), and (e) interventions create dualities or paradoxes that
remain unmanaged and unresolved (Stokes & Clegg, 2002).
Efforts to impose a new belief system or paradigm on a pre-existing paradigm are
not successful. The result is a set of unresolved tensions between pre-existing and
new paradigms, an outcome consistent with the view that change reveals and
intensifies paradox and contradiction (M. W. Lewis, 2000; Quinn & Cameron,
1988). Paradox and contradiction, consistent with dialectical theory (Van de Ven &
Poole, 1995), has the potential to trigger change (Cameron & Quinn, 1988) or hinder
it (Davis, Maranville, & Obloj, 1997), depending on how these dynamics are
managed (Clegg, da Cunha, & e Cunha, 2002; M. W. Lewis, 2000) and
organisational maturity (Bailey & Neilsen, 1992).
Some researchers have argued that top–down structural interventions will not
ultimately be successful. Instead, the change task is to facilitate change from below.
Interventions designed to facilitate bottom-up change are more likely to succeed
because (a) all organisational members are active agents rather than passive
recipients of change, (b) they amplify the pre-existing change aspirations of
organisational members rather than imposing change on them (J. R. Thompson,
1999), and (c) they involve change leaders in a new facilitative role that contributes
to collective learning and capacity building (Maddock, 2002; McHugh & O'Brien,
1999).
At least three clear gaps in the extant literature on the relationship between change
leader interventions and OT outcomes are apparent.
First, the discussion of intervention theory (Dunphy, 1996; Weick & Quinn, 1999)
tends to be implicit and narrowly focused on top-down structural interventions or
bottom-up participative processes. While intervention theory in public organisations
is in an early stage of development, there are a broader set of interventions and
intervention issues that have not yet been adequately addressed in this literature. For
example, little attention has been given to the efficacy of large-scale human process
32
interventions in public organisations (Friedlander & Brown, 1974; Waddell et al.,
2004).
Second, while the literature alludes to organisational cognition and its influence in
successful transformation (Kezar & Eckel, 2002; Stokes & Clegg, 2002), little
explicit attention has been given to the relationship between change leader
interventions and change in organisational cognition. Unless this relationship is
better understood, it is unlikely that insight into the efficacy of change leaders’
interventions or the contradictions pervading the process will be understood and
resolved.
The lack of attention given to organisational cognition change in public
organisations is surprising. Initial responses to imposed change are likely to be
mediated by individual and collective organisational cognition (Goodman & Dean,
1982). When change is announced organisational members have to make sense of
change messages, typically in terms of their pre-existing organisation schema. Yet
pre-existing organisational schemata are likely to be inadequate under conditions of
transformational change (Bartunek, 1993). A focus on the development of
organisational cognition under conditions of transformational change is, then, a
worthy focus of study.
Moreover, underlying extant studies of OT in public organisations is an apparent
intention to find either successful or unsuccessful transformational change outcomes.
Given the complexity of the task, it would seem more likely that OT efforts would
consist of both successful outcomes and unsuccessful outcomes. It should be
possible to get a more informed assessment of OT in public organisations by seeking
to identify and explain both types of outcome. This is the orientation adopted in this
research.
Third, little explicit attention is given to the underlying dynamics of collective
cognitive change in the transformation of public organisations. Dialectical processes
are discussed though usually inter-paradigm conflict is viewed negatively (Schofield,
2001; Stokes & Clegg, 2002). Yet other authors view conflict and dialectical
processes as a potential trigger for change (Bartunek, 1993; Bartunek & Moch, 1987;
33
Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). A closer examination of these underlying dynamics in
the context of OT in public organisations is necessary.
Fourth, little acknowledgement is given to change management context. Some
conceptual research suggests that organisational contexts vary in terms of their
responsiveness to leader influence (Cummings, 1999; Jermier & Kerr, 1997; Kerr &
Jermier, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979, 1989). In particular, little empirical research has
focused on change management contexts that are inimical to change leader influence.
One such set of contexts are technically-oriented, spatially differentiated
Professional Bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1989; Zell, 2001). Research on the
transformation of these contexts tends to be prescriptive rather than empirical (Van
Aken, Van Goubergen, & Letens, 2003).
Subsequent sections of this chapter identify and analyse the research issues related to
these gaps. In particular, these sections develop a framework for considering the
efficacy of change leader interventions. It will be argued that the efficacy of change
leader interventions for achieving qualitative schema change has four components;
change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious when (1) organisational
members perceive interventions as facilitative of change, (2) there is evidence of
replacement or significant elaboration of pre-existing organisational schema, (3)
interventions reinforce dynamics thought to underpin schema change, and (4)
interventions are sensitive to change management context.
INTERVENTION THEORY
Planned organisational transformation requires that change leaders select and
sequence interventions that shift organisations in the direction of the desired future
state (Conger, 2000; Porras & Silvers, 1991). These decisions are encompassed by
intervention theory which specifies when, where, and how to intervene so as to move
the organisation closer to the ideal (Dunphy, 1996:543).
Planned Change Theory (Porras & Robertson, 1992) provides a useful framework for
conceptualising the relationship between change leader interventions and
organisational schema change, the focus of this thesis. Porras & Robertson argue
34
that (a) organisational change is a function of change leader interventions in
workplace settings, (b) change in workplace settings produce change in
organisational member cognition and behaviour, (c) change in cognition and
behaviour influence organisation performance outcomes.
Porras & Robertson conceptualise the workplace setting in terms of five categories
of elements; vision, organising arrangements, physical setting, social factors, and
technology. The five categories and the main elements of each category are outlined
in Figure 2.1. Change leaders can intervene in one or more categories to effect
cognitive or schema change, which then influence behaviour and organisational
performance outcomes (see Figure 2.2).
OT involves not just deciding where to intervene but in what sequence. OT involves
multiple interventions (Ashburner et al., 1996) though typically these interventions
must be ordered to avoid the problems of excessive change (Evans, 1992; Stensaker
et al., 2001). However, change leader interventions, at least in the context of OT, are
also designed to unfreeze pre-existing belief systems to open people to new ways of
thinking and acting, a goal that often involves disconfirming the status quo (Weick
& Quinn, 1999) and creating the perception of crisis (Bartunek, 1993).
According to Porras & Robertson (1992) OT and schema change is a function of
change leaders intervening, first, at the level of vision, a view that resonates with
much of the practitioner literature (Miles, 1997). Framed appropriately, a vision is
essentially an alternative organisational schema. The vision, an ends schema, is
designed to focus motivation and effort in the direction of the new schema and away
from the pre-existing ends schema. Van de Ven & Poole’s (1995) teleological
theory of change underpins this intervention.
Research on the model has focused on Organisation Development (OD) rather than
OT and has provided some support for this aspect of the model (Porras & Robertson,
1992; Robertson, Roberts, & Porras, 1993; Robertson & Seneviratne, 1995).
However, there has been some debate in the literature about the appropriate entry
point for organisational transformation. Some researchers advocate intervention at
35
the level of organisational culture (Dent, 1992; Kilmann, 1984), which Porras &
Robertson include in the Social Factors category. Other researchers advocate
creating transformational change by intervening at the level of organisational
structure and procedural systems (Galbraith, 2000; Waterman, 1982). Ultimately, all
organisational elements will be changed; the issue is the order in which OT or
whole-of-system change is brought about.
Change leader choices may be critical for the success of transformational initiatives.
For example, a small but growing and potentially critical body of research is
beginning to examine the effect of the sequence of interventions chosen to bring
about transformational change (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1999; Bate, 2000; Kilmann,
1984; McKinley & Scherer, 2000), though for the most part, this work is conceptual
rather than empirical.
36
Figure 2.1: Diagnostic categories (Source Porras, J.I. & Robertson, P.J. (1992)).
Figure 2.2: A model of Organisational Transformation (Source: Porras, J.I. &
Silvers, R.C. (1991)).
The literature on organisational change interventions tends to focus on the
unanticipated and sometimes contradictory effects which adversely impact on
37
organisational members’ ability to make sense of change (Gilmore et al., 1997;
McKinley & Scherer, 2000; Molinsky, 1999; Tenner, 1996).
The earlier review of OT in public organisations highlighted some of these issues
about intervention. In particular, some authors argued that public change leaders
rely too heavily on structural change levers to effect public sector modernisation and
that these interventions mask emergent change (Maddock, 2002) and produce
dualities or contradictions that tend to remain unresolved thus contributing to greater
ambiguity and organisational politics (Schofield, 2001; Stokes & Clegg, 2002).
McKinley & Scherer (2000) found that structural interventions tend to have at least
two unanticipated consequences, only one of which will be addressed here. They
argue that structural interventions create cognitive order for top executives and
cognitive disorder for lower level employees.
Cognitive order reflects a less equivocal organisational environment: it results in
foreclosing alternative possibilities of meaning or action and embracing a single one
(738). Cognitive disorder reflects a more equivocal organisational environment:
lower level employees confront an array of alternative possibilities of meaning or
action, that is, they experience dualities (Stokes & Clegg, 2002) that make new
schema development more problematic. This outcome is reinforced by the tendency
of change to reveal and intensify paradox and contradiction (M. W. Lewis, 2000).
For top level managers, the experience of cognitive order is positive, for lower level
employees, the experience of cognitive disorder is aversive. For top level managers,
the positive experience produced by cognitive order is reinforcing, making it more
likely that top level managers will resort to structural interventions, an outcome that
resonates with the earlier discussion of a tendency for public managers to rely on
manipulating structural levers in their attempts at public sector reform (Maddock,
2002).
Along similar lines, culture change interventions (usually involving structure
change) can also contribute to cognitive disorder and perceived dualisms (Stokes &
Clegg, 2002). Gilmore, Shea & Useem (1997) (also see L. C. Harris & Ogbonna,
38
2002) identified four major side-effects of culture change interventions in a wide
range of organisations: (a) ambivalent authority, manifest in such directives as
‘ordering’ employees to become ‘empowered’; (b) polarized images, evident in
rhetoric that casts all that is new as progressive and all that is old as regressive; (c)
finger-pointing up and down the management hierarchy for the inevitable setbacks
that accompany change; and (d) behavioural inversion, displayed in empowerment
slogans that mask a reassertion of hierarchy. Again, these contradictions complicate
organisational members’ attempts at creating new, stablising organisational schema.
Beer & Nohria (2000c) also focus on intervention sequence and how sequence
increases or decreases the likelihood of successful change outcomes. Beer & Nohria
distinguish between two interdependent change strategies, economic value-focused
change (Theory E) and human capability-focused change (Theory O).
Each strategy has both strengths and weaknesses; relying on one or the other or
sequencing them leads to potential problems. Instead, Beer & Nohria suggest that
change leaders need to learn to accept the contradictions inherent in managing both
strategies simultaneously. For example, change leaders need to explicitly embrace
the paradox between economic value and organisational capability; they need to
simultaneously set direction from the top and engage the people from below, change
structures and build capabilities (137). Little previous research has addressed the
viability of this strategy in public sector organisation transformation.
Weick & Quinn (1999) used Lewin’s (1951) often cited three stage model of change
to differentiate the change process sequence in episodic (transformational change)
and continuous change. Weick & Quinn argue that transformational change
interventions require the usual unfreeze, transition, refreeze sequence, whereas
continuous change requires freeze, rebalance, unfreeze (366). The focus on
unfreezing is particularly relevant. Unfreezing is usually designed to disrupt
organisational equilibrium and inertial forces that can impede change. One way that
change leaders might unfreeze is to create a perceived crisis (Bartunek, 1993).
Under these circumstances, cognitive disorder might well be a desired outcome.
39
In summary, Porras & Silver’s planned change model has provided a convenient
framework for considering the broader relationship between change leader
interventions and organisational schema change. Within this context, the literature
on intervention theory relevant to OT in public organisations has been explored.
This literature reinforces some of the findings reported earlier in the review of OT in
public organisations. In particular, (a) the literature tends to be contradictory and
polarised, (b) the focus is typically on structural change, and (c) interventions
typically have unanticipated outcomes that create cognitive disorder for
organisational members. In this context, the next section explores the extant
literature on schema and schema change.
ORGANISATIONAL SCHEMA AND OT
In the context of transformational change, change leader interventions are designed
to not only change the formal organisational arrangements and facilitate the
replacement or significant elaboration of pre-existing organisational schema.
A schema is formally defined as:
The interpretive framework used by individuals (or groups) to give meaning
to observed objects, actions, and behaviours. Thus, a schema is used for
processing information, and this includes scanning the environment,
selecting stimuli (e.g. events, acts, and variables), measuring observed
stimuli quantitatively (e.g. large or small) or qualitatively (e.g. good or bad),
and either making decisions or storing information for later retrieval
(Armenakis & Feild, 1993:405).
The concept of schema has been equated with several other concepts. Schema is
equivalent or similar to the concepts of individual and organisational mental model
(Argyris, 1993; Schein, 1995; Senge, 1992), frame of reference (Westenholz, 1993),
implicit theory (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004), mindset (Weick, 1998), paradigm
(Clarke & Clegg, 1998), logic of action (Bacharach, Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl,
1996), mental template (Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Nielsen & Bartunek, 1996) and
40
personal construct system (Langan-Fox & Tan, 1997). The term schema will be
used in this thesis.
Schemata serve four main functions for individuals and organisations: (1) they are
mental maps enabling sensemaking in context (Markus & Zajonc, 1985); (2) they
guide the search for information, processing of information acquired, and subsequent
behaviour based on this information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991); (3) they are data
reduction devices that help individuals deal with an overwhelming amount of
information (Nielsen & Bartunek, 1996), and (4) they guide individual and collective
behaviour (Porras & Robertson, 1992; Porras & Silvers, 1991) and determine
attitudes to change (Lau & Woodman, 1995).
In addition, once schemata are established they tend to be stable, enduring, and
difficult to change (Bartunek, 1993). For example, Labianca et al (2000:236) argue
that organisational members may resist schema change even though this change is
potentially beneficial. This outcome occurs because organisational members have
difficulty changing the well-engrained pre-existing schema particularly when the
new schema is complex. Bartunek (1993) argues that schema change requires a
perception of crisis and a perception that the current schema is inadequate for
managing this crisis.
When organisations transform, relevant organisational schemata also need to change,
sometimes fundamentally (Bartunek & Moch, 1987:484). Whether schemata need to
change depends on the type of change involved (Bartunek, 1984, 1993; Bartunek &
Moch, 1987). For example, when organisations change incrementally,
organisational members are typically able to assimilate information about change
within pre-existing schemata (Bartunek & Moch, 1987).
However, when an organisation has to transform, pre-existing schema may not
permit ready assimilation of new information (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick,
1995). Under these circumstances, organisational schema needs to change. Change
of this order has been referred to as second order change (Bartunek & Moch, 1987),
double loop learning (Argyris, 1990), deep change (Quinn, 1996) or, as here,
transformational change (Porras & Silvers, 1991).
41
Organisational behaviour is likely to be guided by multiple schemata (Bartunek,
1993). For example, organisational members are likely to have schemata about
change (Lau & Woodman, 1995), organisational decision making (Labianca et al.,
2000), organisational structure (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Geigle, 1998),
individuals (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), and managing (Dijksterhuis, Van den Bosch, &
Volberda, 1999). This thesis is concerned with organisational members’ conception
of their organisation (their organisational schema) and how this conception changes
across the period of the research.
Research on schema in organisational contexts has tended to take three main paths.
First, some researchers have focused on determining the structure of organisational
schema. For example, Lau & Woodward (Lau & Woodman, 1995) have identified
six dimensions of change schema: they suggest that organisational members tend to
evaluate change in terms of (a) impact (how much impact the change has on current
practice), (b) significance (the intensity and significance of change process), (c)
meaning (the meaning of change), (d) salience: the salience of change (e) control
(personal control over change), and stress (how stressful the change is). Lau &
Woodward suggest that employee attitudes to change can be predicted from an
understanding of the way they construe change.
Second, researchers have sought to understand the content of organisational member
schema. For example, Thompson, Szymczyk-Ellis & Flynn (2002) used the
repertory grid technique to elicit managers’ leadership schemata. For one manager
involved in this study, effective (and less ineffective) leadership involved (a)
demonstrating a can-do attitude (rather than only doing what is necessary), (b)
maintaining personal control in difficult or emotional situations (rather than losing
control in certain circumstances), (c) avoiding procrastination on HR issues (rather
than hoping HR issues will resolve themselves), (d) introducing new and innovative
technology and systems (rather than waiting for others to introduce new ideas and
systems).
Third, a relatively small but growing body of empirical research is devoted to
understanding the dynamics of schema change in organisational contexts (Balogun &
42
Johnson, 2004; Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Labianca et al., 2000). This issue will be
taken up in the next section.
SCHEMA CHANGE THEORY
Three schema change theories have attracted most attention in the literature on the
relationship between change leader interventions and organisational schema change;
Bartunek & Moch’s (1987) Conflict Model and Labianca et al’s (2000) Iterative
Comparison theory, and Balogun & Johnson’s (2004) disengagement model.
Conflict Model of schema change
The conflict model of schema change (Bartunek, 1993) (see Figure 2.3) suggests that
inter-schema conflict is the essential dynamic of organisational schema change. The
conflict model of schema change is consistent with Van de Ven & Poole’s (1995)
dialectical theory of change.
Bartunek argues that top-level leaders (though also other organisational members)
sense shifts in the environment and (a) come to the realisation that the current
organisational schema are inadequate in the face of these environmental shifts, (b)
frame a more adequate schemata, (c) make a strong, clear presentation of the new
schema, (d) manage the inter-schema or inter-group conflict created by the
juxtaposition of a new and pre-existing schema by holding both sides of the conflict
simultaneously (see also Denison, Hooijberg, & Quinn, 1995; Quinn, 1988), and (e)
maintain a degree of continuity in some organisational dimensions which is likely to
help change in others.
Bartunek’s conflict model of schema change is a dialectical theory of change (Van
de Ven & Poole, 1995). Dialectical theory argues that (1) at least two entities (in this
case schema) exist that oppose or contradict one another, (2) the opposing schemata
must confront each other and engage in a conflict or struggle through some physical
or social venue, in which the opposition plays itself out, (3) the outcome of the
conflict, if successful, could result in (1) the imposition of the new schema, (2)
43
reversion to the original schema, and (3) creation of a synthesis of the pre-existing
and new schemata.
Research on the conflict theory of schema change is drawn from two sources, (a) a
series of studies undertaken by Bartunek and her colleagues (Bartunek, 1984, 1988,
1993; Bartunek & Moch, 1987) and (b) the growing literature on paradox and
contradiction (M. W. Lewis, 2000).
Taken as a whole, the literature reflects a somewhat contradictory picture of the role
of conflict in schema change. Specifically, conflict has been associated with schema
change (Bartunek, 1993), with hindering schema change (Westenholz, 1993), and
unrelated to schema change (Labianca et al., 2000).
Bartunek and her colleagues studied the relationship between structural interventions
and organisational schema change in a variety of organisational contexts. In
particular, they examined inter-schema conflict in the context of the restructure of a
religious order (education schema and a social justice schema) (Bartunek, 1984),
Quality of Work Life (QWL) intervention in a US food manufacturing plant
(productivity schema and high quality of working life schema) (Bartunek & Moch,
1987), and coordination in a school system (autonomy schema and collaboration
schema) (Bartunek & Reid, 1992).
44
Figure 2.3: Conflict model of schema change (Source: (Bartunek, 1993)).
In each case, the structural intervention resulted in a new schema being juxtaposed
with a pre-existing schema. Invariably, this juxtaposition resulted in inter-schema
conflict, which was often reflected in interpersonal and/or inter-group conflict as
individuals and groups sought to defend the traditional or the new representation of
reality. Schema change or lack of schema change was linked to how this conflict
was managed.
In the case of the restructure of the religious order, the intervention led to one group
aligning with the traditional educational role of the church and another group
aligning with a social justice role. Bartunek reported that:
Conflicts between these groups continued over several years. Eventually,
some members began to realise that education and justice were potentially
complementary (329).
45
On the other hand, Bartunek & Reid (1992) reported failed schema change in the
context of efforts to improve inter-departmental coordination in a private U.S.
school. The intervention, the creation of a new coordinator role, failed to produce
schema change because pre-existing conflict management scripts (passive resistance
and exclusion) were employed to deal with the interplay between a strongly held
view that each department should operate autonomously and the other view that
departmental autonomy should be reduced in the interests of greater inter-
departmental coordination and collaboration.
Poole et al (1989) found similar pre-existing conflict management scripts in the
context of a U.S. bank seeking to shift individual and organisational schema from a
pre-existing conservative, investment-oriented schema to an aggressive, marketing-
oriented schema (286). Poole et al found that coercion was more effective than
instruction and proclamation for resolving inter-schema conflict. Instruction failed
to influence schema change because the change targets often missed the message and
proclamations are easily ignored or dismissed by the target audience. They conclude
that:
A deeply rooted organisational culture may require the use of strong,
coercive, direct management actions to break down existing schemas and
introduce alternatives so as to produce change (287).
Dent (1992) investigated how a structural intervention and the resulting inter-schema
conflict led to the successful transformation of a European rail organisation. In the
context of declining budgets, structural change led to the appointment of private
sector business managers to staff (rather than line) positions. These managers
introduced a managerial-economic perspective to a railway culture described as
monopolistic, bureaucratic (rules and procedures were well defined, there were clear
chains of command, deference to authority, and formalised systems for planning
operations) and isolated from commercial pressures (28).
To effect change in this context, the new business managers had to create
opportunities in which interplay between the two perspectives, managerial-economic
and railway, could occur. Two main conflict strategies were reported. First, the
46
managers created forums in which they could reinterpret issues in terms of an
economic perspective and persuade organisational members to this perspective.
Second, the business managers staged contests (31) around strategically selected
issues that ultimately forced railway managers to concede to the new business
mindset. Over time, the organisation did make the transition. However, the shift
ultimately involved the departure from the organisation of technical managers who
found that the focus on business:
Reduced their autonomy and threatened their pride as railway operators and
engineers. They thought the emerging decisions unprofessional, and feared
for the quality of the railway (Dent, 1992:33).
The studies reviewed in this section suggest that (a) inter-schema conflict does not
necessarily produce schema change, (b) conflict management processes and norms
play a role in schema change outcomes, (c) coercion as a conflict resolution
mechanism may be necessary in strong cultures, and (d) in some contexts, change
leaders may need to create conflict to foster change.
Paradox and contradiction
The previous section suggested that juxtaposing a new schema alongside a pre-
existing schema leads to inter-schema conflict and change in the direction of the new
schema, regression to the old, or a synthesis of the two schemata. The literature on
paradox and contradiction (Clegg et al., 2002; M. W. Lewis, 2000) suggests another
possible outcome of inter-schema conflict.
When new schemata are introduced into an organisation, the new and the old schema
are often present at the same time (Isabella, 1990). Holding two competing
schemata at the same time is, typically, aversive (M. W. Lewis, 2000). It has been
described as a schizoid state (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988) or a schizophrenic frame
of reference (Westenholz, 1993).
In most circumstances, inter-schema conflict will result in a clear preference for one
or the other schema or a synthesis of the two. This choice of one schema is the basis
47
of cognitive order (McKinley & Scherer, 2000). However, the literature on paradox
suggests the possibility that organisational members accept the co-existence of both
competing schema.
A paradox denotes contradictory yet inter-related elements; elements that seem
logical in isolation but absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously (M. W.
Lewis, 2000:760). Lewis’ model of the dynamics of paradox and contradiction is
shown in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Lewis’ (2000) paradox framework (Source: (M. W. Lewis, 2000)).
Some researchers have shown that organisational members are capable of managing
paradoxical (apparently irreconcilable) schemata simultaneously and that this ability
is related to organisational effectiveness (Bailey & Neilsen, 1992; Murnighan &
Conlon, 1991; Palmer & Dunford, 2002).
48
Murnighan & Conlon (1991), in a study of the dynamics of British string quartets,
identified three paradoxes; the leader versus democracy paradox, the paradox of the
second fiddle, and the conflict paradox (confrontation versus compromise). They
found that the most successful British string quartets recognised and managed the
inherent paradoxes they faced (181). For example, in the successful groups first
violinists recognised the need, despite a strong belief in their own professional
autonomy, for directive leadership more than first violinists in the less successful
groups.
Palmer & Dunford (2002) drew a similar conclusion from their research into the
dynamics of conflicting discourses in Flight Centre, an Australian travel company.
They found two, differing discourses which appear to co-exist in creative tension
throughout the organisation (1045). One discourse is linked to competitive
individualism and the other to collaborative teamwork. They argue that the ability of
staff in Flight Centre to manage the differing discursive logics which confront them
on a day-to-day basis (1045) is linked to the competitive advantage this organisation
has achieved in the travel industry.
Similarly, Bailey & Neilsen (1992) found that educational professionals in a small
educational institution were ultimately able to tolerate conflicting schemata and that
this ability was a product of a developmental process. The professional organisation,
with a staff of 19 employees, was involved in the delivery of both standardised
educational programs and the development of innovative educational programs. The
schemata supporting these objectives were contradictory and created significant
conflict among the professionals involved.
Bailey & Neilsen identified two stages in the development of professionals’ ability
to deal with these contradictory demands; a naïve stage and a mature stage. The
naïve stage was characterised by significant inter-group and inter-schemata conflict;
professionals who worked on the delivery of standardised programs and those who
worked on the development of innovative programs tended to form into cliques.
However, at the mature stage, Bailey & Neilsen found that both groups of
professionals had learned to accept the co-existence of both standardised and
innovative educational programs.
49
However, paradox and contradiction can also inhibit schema change. Davis,
Maranville and Obloj (1997) studied schema change in the peak body of the Polish
fruit and vegetable industry. OT involved the shift in the organisation from
centralised regulator of the fruit and vegetable industry in Poland to one that
operated as a decentralised facilitator of long term planning and cooperative
problem solving among member organisations.
The transformation was deemed a failure. Davis et al explained the failure in terms
of the environment: framing paradox, namely that traditional frames (or schema)
were used to perceive and respond to information about the shift in role; rather than
reframing, organisation members chose to replace the Ministry Association with the
activities of the [former centralised regulator association]. This finding suggests that
if organisation members seek to interpret change messages using pre-existing
schema the change is likely to fail.
Similarly, Westenholz (1993) found that paradox and contradiction inhibited rather
than facilitated change in member frames of reference, or schema. Westenholz
conducted a ten-year study investigation of decision making about remuneration
arrangement in a cooperative. Westenholz identified three frames of reference
(schemata) toward the inherent ambiguity in three positions on the issue of
remuneration: logical frame of reference (take one position unambiguously and
reject the others), pluralist frame of reference (take one position but accept that other
positions exist), and schizophrenic frame of reference (positions coexist). Despite
the passage of ten years, organisational members were no closer to a resolution. The
same conflicting positions were being espoused.
In summary, the literature on paradox and contradiction (a) reinforces the role of
conflict in effecting schema change, (b) reinforces the difficulty of effecting schema
change, and (c) suggests an alternative outcome of successful schema change, the
simultaneous coexistence of two conflicting schema. More recent research has
sought to suggest that conflict is not always necessary for effecting schema change.
50
Iterative Comparison theory of schema change
Labianca et al (2000) question whether inter-schema, or inter-group, conflict is a
necessary outcome of juxtaposing new and alternative schema. Instead, they argue
that organisational schema change is a function of iterative inter-schema comparison
based on manager and employee expectations and behaviour at the individual level
followed by social negotiation at the collective level and that conflict is not
necessary.
Iterative Comparison theory was developed in the context of an investigation, over a
two-year period, of the relationship between a structural intervention, shifting the
organisation from a centralised structure to a team-based structure, flattening the
vertical structure, and involving staff in decision making, and schema change in a
U.S. University-based Health Care organisation of 112 employees.
In large part, the research was conducted in the context of a 13-person team
consisting of managers and non-managers. The team was set up to decide on a new
organisational structure for the organisation. The researchers wanted to explain why
organisational members resisted an intervention that would result in their
empowerment.
The pre-existing decision making schema was described as one in which a feared
and distrusted management resorted to participation as show; where input went into a
black hole; and decisions were predetermined (249). The new decision making
schema was framed in terms of asking organisational members for their suggestions
in joint management/employee committees, considering, and whenever possible,
implementing these suggestions.
Iterative Schema Comparison theory, represented in Figure 2.4, identified four
phases in the process of changing the decision making schema; (a) motivation to
change phase (environmental concerns, management proclamation), (b) new schema
generation phase (management’s expected new schema, employees’ expected new
schemata), (c) iterative inter-schemata comparison phase, and (d) stabilisation phase.
51
In the inter-schemata comparison phase, employees monitored the behaviour of
managerial members of the committee to determine whether the behaviour was more
consistent with the original unilateral decision making schema or was more
consistent with the new participative schema. In this case, fear and distrust of
management led non-managerial members of the committee to interpret management
actions in terms of the pre-existing rather than new schema, creating high levels of
tension between the two groups.
Labianca et al drew three conclusions from their results. First, they suggest that the
structural intervention resulted in the juxtaposition of a new schema with the pre-
existing schema rather than the disengagement of organisational members from their
pre-existing schema. Consequently, inter-schema dynamics would be the source of
change or lack of change.
The core problem hindering relocation from pre-existing to new schema was the
change recipients' failure to revise old decision making schemas and to enact new
schemas during a pivotal period in the empowerment effort (236). This failure to
revise old decision making schema was linked to (a) the degree of dissonance
between new and pre-existing schema and (b) scepticism that managers’ statements
on change were congruent with action.
Second, Labianca et al argue that interventions led to the successful relocation and
replacement of the pre-existing with the new schema rather than a synthesis of the
two. That is, change leader interventions, and particularly a workshop conducted by
the researchers led to non-managers’ adoption of and commitment to the new
schema as it was espoused by managers.
Third, Labianca et al suggest, somewhat controversially, that: our model does not
emphasise this conflict between groups championing different schemas. We instead
emphasise a schema comparison process that occurs at the individual level and in
the eventual social negotiation of a shared organisational schema (251).
This conclusion does not appear to be supported by their data. In the context of the
committee, there did appear to be inter-schema conflict; managers and non-managers
52
held conflicting schema (managers held the new schema, non-managers the pre-
existing schema). The OD intervention facilitated by members of the research team
helped resolve this conflict. The authors seem to be suggesting that resolved conflict
is not conflict. Labianca et al’s results, therefore, seem to reinforce the conflict
model of schema change rather than a new theory of schema change.
Figure 2.5: Iterative comparison model of schema change (Source: (Labianca et al.,
2000))
Disengaged schema
Balogun & Johnson (2004) suggest a new theory of schema change. They argue that
imposed structural change that forces a break from the past disengages
organisational members from their pre-existing schema, rendering it obsolete or
irrelevant. Hence there is no necessary juxtaposition of new and pre-existing
schemata and, therefore, no necessity for dialectical processes.
53
Balogun & Johnson (2004) investigated middle manager (26 out of a group of 90)
sensemaking and schema change in the context of the restructure of a privatised U.K.
utility across a period of approximately 12 months. The structural intervention
involved the replacement of a traditional integrated hierarchy with a more modular
and decentralised organisation of semiautonomous business units (523). Essentially,
one division was split into three divisions, a small core division, Engineering, and
Services.
Across the period of their research, Balogun & Johnson found that the structural
intervention influenced change in managers’ schema from organisation as hierarchy
- common purpose schema to organisational as multidivisional - interdivisional
relationships schema.
This shift, they argue, was a function of replacement sequence (Albert, 1992). The
imposed structural change rendered the pre-existing schema obsolete. Therefore,
there was no interplay of old and new schemata, no dialectical process to trigger
change. Instead, a new organisational schema evolved from ongoing experience:
Effectively rendered the old common purpose schema obsolete, leaving the
middle managers to adopt tentative interdivisional/business relationship
schemata that subsequently evolved through horizontal negotiation.
Balogun & Johnson’s core argument is that while multiple schema change dynamics,
including inter-schema conflict, are typically involved in complex organisational
change:
(1) when change is imposed, forcing a break from the past, a replacement
sequence of schema change may be more likely for change recipients than a
relocation sequence, (2) a replacement sequence affects subsequent schema
evolution; schemata evolve incrementally from comparison with experience,
with no duality and comparison of old and new (expected) schemata, and (3)
the conflict model may be more prevalent when there is no channel or
mechanism to facilitate the resolution of conflict caused by differences in
schemata (544).
54
This conclusion would appear to warrant further research on two grounds. First,
disengaging organisational members from their pre-existing schema would seem, in
the light of previous research, to be very difficult to achieve. It is not clear what
criteria Balogun & Johnson to establish this conclusion. Second, the separation of
the experience of conflict and its resolution would appear to be tenuous. They seem
to suggest that conflict is only salient if there is no means of resolving it.
Balogun & Johnson make another contribution to the schema change literature.
They distinguish between change content schema and change process schema and
suggest that the relationship between change content schema and change process
schema contributes to change outcomes (also see (Bartunek & Moch, 1991)).
In their study, Balogun & Johnson suggest that change leaders sought to impose a
business as usual change schema on the implementers of change. That is, the
managers involved were expected to operate in line with the current and the new
arrangements simultaneously and slowly shift to the new. This proved untenable and
was rejected in favour of a shift to the new schema. Balogun & Johnson argue that
content schema and process schema coevolved over the period of the research.
In this study, change leaders provided a more sophisticated change schema to
facilitate the development of new content schema. It will be possible then to clarify
the relationship between these two schema types.
ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT
Some researchers have focused on contexts and how they constrain leader
intervention and influence. Configuration theory (Mintzberg, 1979, 1989) argues
that top level leaders have less potential for influence in Professional Organisations
than in other organisational configurations, for example Machine or Administrative
Bureaucracies (Leitko & Szczerbacki, 1987; Mintzberg, 1989; Zell, 2001, 2003).
Specifically, Mintzberg argues that:
Change in professional organisations does not sweep in from new
administrators taking office to announce wide reforms, or from government
officials intent on bringing the professionals under technocratic control.
55
Rather, change seeps in through the slow process of changing the
professionals – changing who enters in the first place, what they learn in its
professional schools (norms as well as skills and knowledge), and thereafter
how they upgrade their skills. Where desired changes are resisted, society
may be best off to call on its professionals’ sense of public responsibility or,
failing that, to bring pressure on the professional associations rather than on
the professional bureaucracies.
Zell (2003) made a similar point, arguing that:
Bringing about fundamental change is difficult in any organisation, but
especially so in Professional Bureaucracies such as hospitals and
universities in which highly trained and autonomous professionals, rather
than administrators, largely control the core processes (73-74).
Several characteristics of professionals and Professional Bureaucracies have been
suggested as explanations to explain why they are difficult to transform. First,
professionals typically work relatively autonomously; their work is complex and
difficult to supervise directly; hence Professional Bureaucracies are typically
decentralised giving professionals significant discretion and autonomy in how they
work (Leitko & Szczerbacki, 1987).
However, successful top-down transformational change requires that authority be
invested in the top-level leader and that professional and other staff be receptive to
the exercise of this authority. Second, experienced professionals tend to work alone,
while transformational change tends to require high levels of cooperation and
teamwork (Mintzberg, 1989).
Third, professionals, particularly technical professionals (but also other professions
(Adams & Ingersoll, 1990; Schon, 1983)) are frequently socialised to think in terms
of technical rationality (Schon, 1983), reductionist thinking (Wood & Caldas, 2001),
convergent thinking (Mintzberg, 1989), pigeonholing (Mintzberg, 1989), and
engineering technology (Perrow, 1986) while transformational change requires the
ability to think systemically, paradoxically (Westenholz, 1993) and strategically
(Garratt, 2003; National Institute for Governance, 2003; Schon, 1983; Senge, 1990).
56
Finally, professionals are thought to be particularly resistant to change (Zell, 2001,
2003) while transformational change requires that people be open to influence.
Similar arguments have been developed in the leadership literature. Specifically,
Kerr & Jermier (1978) developed a Leadership Substitutes model which suggests
that characteristics of subordinates, characteristics of the task, and characteristics of
the organisation tend to neutralise leader influence.
For example, they argued that “a professional orientation” will neutralise both
relationship oriented leadership and task oriented leadership. They define
neutralisers as any characteristic of the task or the organisation that prevent the
leader from acting in a specified way or that counter the effects of his behaviour.
Specifically, they argue that:
Professional orientation is considered a potential substitute for leadership
because employees with such an orientation typically cultivate horizontal
rather than vertical relationships, give greater credence to peer review
processes, however informal, than to hierarchical evaluations, and tend to
develop important referents external to the employing organisation. Clearly,
such attitudes and behaviours can sharply reduce the influence of the
hierarchical superior (379).
More recently, Cummings (1999), in the context of efforts to understand the limits of
change leadership, has sought to (a) classify organisational contexts in terms of
whether leadership matters or does not, and (b) identify substitutes for change leader
behaviours; envisioning, enabling and energising. Specifically, Cummings suggests
that change leadership will matter least in organisations in which there are strong
inertial properties; that is, organisations that are old, large, have low resource
availability, high capital intensity, and strong cultures. Such an image reflects
traditional public sector organisations.
In summary, the study of leader interventions and schema change must take into
account organisational contexts. The attributes of such contexts can facilitate or
hinder top level leader influence, a critical aspect of OT. This research considers
57
leadership interventions and schema change in a particular context, one that is
inimical to leader influence. Few empirical studies have addressed this issue.
SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE
This section provides an integrative summary and critique of the literature on change
leader interventions and the transformation of public organisations. Consistent with
the Chapter 1, four key issues emerge from the analysis of this literature.
First, while OT outcomes have been considered in terms of culture change
(Ashburner et al., 1996) and behaviour change (Robertson & Seneviratne, 1995),
little explicit attention has been given to cognitive or schema change outcomes in
public organisations, though it has been alluded to (Kezar & Eckel, 2002; Stokes &
Clegg, 2002). This lack of attention is surprising given that schema change has been
equated with OT (Bartunek & Moch, 1987).
Second, the conceptual and empirical literature on OT in public organisations and on
schema change tends to focus on the efficacy of top-down, imposed structural
interventions for influencing change outcomes. Moreover, the conceptual literature
tends to question the efficacy of such interventions (Maddock, 2002; McKinley &
Scherer, 2000; Schofield, 2001; Stokes & Clegg, 2002). The schema change
literature does report positive relationships between structural interventions and
organisational schema change, yet achieving these outcomes is frequently
problematic (Labianca et al., 2000).
However, structural interventions are not the only interventions available to change
leaders (Porras & Robertson, 1992). The literature on OT in public organisations has
given little attention to the efficacy of large-scale human process interventions
(Waddell et al., 2004) for achieving qualitative schema change. Similarly, little
attention has been given to the efficacy of complex structural interventions
sometimes involved in OT in public organisations and organisational schema
change. Specifically, little attention has been given to the efficacy of truncating
organisations into strategic-owner and commercialised provider and organisational
schema change.
58
Third, the schema change literature typically relies on conceptualising organisational
schema as one-dimensional bipolar constructs (Labianca et al., 2000).
Conceptualising organisational schema in this way does make it easier to conclude
that change leader interventions are either successful or unsuccessful in influencing
schema change. An either/or conclusion does not do justice to the complexity of OT.
Organisational schemata are likely to consist of multiple inter-related bipolar
constructs. While change leaders design interventions that replace or significantly
elaborate organisational members’ pre-existing organisational schema. Interventions
that do change pre-existing schema will not produce transformational change.
Fourth, little attention has been given to how change leader interventions reinforce
dynamics thought to underpin schema change. The earlier review of OT in public
organisations alluded to change-inhibiting influence of dialectical processes as
reform interventions were overlaid on pre-existing public sector values (Schofield,
2001; Stokes & Clegg, 2002). However, the review of the schema change literature
suggests that dialectical processes are the key to the realisation of cognitive change
(Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Sillince, 1995; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995).
Moreover, existing theory suggests change leader interventions produce one of two
schema change outcomes on schema content (see Figure 2.6). The intervention
either places an alternative schema in juxtaposition with the pre-existing schema
(relocation sequence) or disengages organisational members from the pre-existing
schema (Albert, 1992; Balogun & Johnson, 2004).
However, (a) this issue has not been considered in the context of large-scale human
process interventions and radical structural interventions and (b) little scrutiny has
been given to the Balogun & Johnson’s proposition that change leader interventions
that force a break from the past disengage organisational members from their pre-
existing schema.
Fifth, more attention needs to be given to explanations of how schema change or do
not change. The dominant model of schema change explains change in terms of
inter-schema conflict (Bartunek, 1993) or dialectical processes (Van de Ven &
59
Poole, 1995). However, a recent theory of schema change suggests that inter-
schema conflict is not necessary for change (Labianca et al., 2000), however, this
view has been little scrutinised in the empirical literature.
Sixth, in some cases, change interventions must influence schema change outcomes
in change management contexts that are inimical to change leader influence, for
example, spatially differentiated technically oriented professional organisations.
Geographical distance from change leader and a professional workforce tend to be
neutralisers of leader influence (Cummings, 1999; Kerr & Jermier, 1978; Mintzberg,
1989).
Underpinning this summary and critique of the literature is a framework for
investigating the efficacy of change leader interventions in technically-oriented
spatially differentiated public Professional Organisations. Specifically, change
leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious when (a) organisational
members experience the interventions as facilitative of change, (b) pre-existing
organisational schema are replaced or significantly elaborated, (c) interventions
reinforce dynamics thought to underpin schema change, and (d) interventions are
sensitive to change management context. This framework will be used in subsequent
chapters to investigate the efficacy of change leader interventions for achieving
qualitative schema change.
CONCLUSION
The literature on the relationship between change leader interventions and
organisational schema change has given little attention to the efficacy of these
interventions for producing qualitative organisational schema change, particularly in
change management contexts thought to be inimical to change leader influence. This
research is designed to address this issue. The next chapter outlines a method by
which this issue can be addressed.
60
Figure 2.6: Summary of relationship between change leader interventions and
organisational schema change
Disengagement-Learning Juxtaposition-Relocation
Disengage pre-existing schema to render it obsolete using Power/coercive,
Normative/re-educative, or Rational-empirical means
Juxtapose pre-existing and alternative schema using Power/coercive, Normative/re-educative, or Rational-empirical means
Incremental development of new schema tested against ongoing experience rather
than pre-existing schema (data-based information processing)
(Balogun & Johnson, 2004)
Inter-schemata conflict (Bartunek, 1993) and/or Iterative inter-schemata comparison (Labianca et al, 2000) and/or
Simultaneous co-existence of competing schemata (Palmer & Dunford, 2002; Bailey & Neilsen, 1992)
CHANGE LEADER INTERVENTION
61
CHAPTER 3: METHODS
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter established that current research on the transformation of
public organisations has given insufficient attention to the relationship between
transformational change interventions, specifically large-scale human process and
radical structural interventions, and qualitative organisational schema change in
contexts thought to be inimical to leader influence.
This research addresses this gap in the literature. Consequently, this research will
address the following questions:
How efficacious, from the perspective of change recipients, are change
leader transformational interventions in realising qualitative
organisational schema change in contexts thought to be inimical to leader
influence?
• How do organisational members construe change leader interventions?
• What is the pattern of qualitative schema change achieved?
• What dynamics explain the observed pattern of schema change?
This chapter outlines and justifies the research design, data collection methods, and
analytical strategy used to investigate the relationship between leader interventions
and schema change in such a context.
CRITERIA FOR SELECTING METHODS
This section identifies the criteria used to select appropriate methods for this
research. These criteria have been derived from the research questions. Subsequent
sections of this chapter will specify and justify the decisions about methods taken on
each of these criteria. Four criteria are identified as being critical to successfully
addressing the above research question.
62
The first criterion requires that the research strategy and methods support the capture
of organisational members’ verbal reports of interpretations, evaluations and
preferences about transformational change events in their organisation. Furthermore,
the strategy should support the interpretation of these verbal reports in terms of
organised knowledge frameworks or schema. In particular, following Kelly (1955),
schema are assumed to be structured in terms of a finite set of bipolar constructs.
More information on this assumption is provided later in this chapter.
Second, and related to the previous point, the methods should provide respondents
with sufficient discretion, within the boundaries of the research framework, to decide
what is salient and what is not salient to report. This criterion is necessary because
little is known about how organisational members in this context interpret and
represent their transforming organisation. It is important, therefore, that respondents
have optimal levels of discretion to report their understandings of change without
unnecessary constraints imposed by the researcher.
Third, the data collection techniques should provide respondents with an opportunity
to test their interpretation of events with that of others. It is not always the case that
respondents can report what they know, at least without some stimulus. Interactions
with others provide the opportunity for conflicting points of view and for testing
points of view. The task of the researcher is, therefore, to provide an environment
within which respondents feel willing and able to express and challenge points of
view.
Fourth, the method should permit sensitivity to context. Organisation
Transformation and schema change occur in context. As discussed in Chapter 2,
change management contexts may not be equivalent in terms of responsiveness to
leader influence, indeed employee, task and organisational attributes may neutralise
leader influence. Consequently, while the research is not designed to compare
change in different change management contexts, the method adopted should
provide the potential for explanations based on context.
63
Finally, the method should be sensitive to the possibility of change in respondent
schema over time. Change leader interventions could have an influence on
respondents’ schemata, which is what the thesis seeks to investigate.
It will be argued that the most appropriate research design for satisfying the above
criteria is a longitudinal abductive-interpretive single case study design. Each
element of this argument will now be developed and justified.
RESEARCH STRATEGY
This section locates the research within a methodological framework (Blaikie,
2000:238; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Mason, 2002). Blaikie (2000:100) identified four
research strategies, which he described as heuristic tools rather than descriptions of
watertight categories. Each of these strategies is supported by particular theoretical
framework. The four strategies and their associated theoretical positions are (a)
inductive (Positivism), (b) deductive (Critical Rationalism), (c) retroductive
(Scientific Realism), and (d) abductive (Interpretivism).
It is argued that the abductive strategy based on Interpretivism best satisfies the first
criterion discussed above. The focus of the research is on organisational member
sensemaking about the relationship between change leader interventions and changes
in organisational schema. Blaikie (2000:114) defines the Abductive strategy as a
process used to generate social scientific accounts from social actors' accounts; for
deriving technical concepts and theories from lay concepts and interpretations of
social life.
The Abductive strategy has its theoretical roots in Interpretivism (Blaikie, 2000).
According to Blaikie (2000:115), Interpretivism focuses on the:
Meanings and interpretations, the motives and intentions, that people use in
their everyday lives and that direct their behaviour - and it elevates them to
the central place in social theory and research. For Interpretivism, the
social world is the world interpreted and experienced by its members, from
the 'inside'. Hence the task of the interpretive social scientist is to discover
and describe this 'insider' view, not to impose an 'outsider' view on it.
64
Mason (2002:56) reinforces the utility of an abductive – interpretive approach for the
purposes of this study:
What is distinctive about interpretive approaches is that they see people, and
their interpretations, perceptions, meanings and understandings, as the
primary data sources. Interpretivism does not have to rely on 'total
immersion in a setting' therefore, and can happily support a study which uses
interview methods for example, where the aim is to explore people's
individual and collective understandings, reasoning processes, social norms,
and so on.
A more formal outline of the abductive/interpretive strategy is provided in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Assumptions of the Interpretive approach (Source: (Blaikie, 2000))
According to Blaikie, abductive or interpretive studies involve a two-stage process.
First, the researcher describes the activities and meanings provided by organisational
members. In the second stage, the researcher derives categories and concepts that
can form the basis of an understanding of organisational member accounts. A
parallel process, first-order analysis and second-order analysis has been suggested by
van Maanen (1979). Van Maanen makes a distinction between respondents’ first-
65
order conception of what is going on in the setting (the ‘facts’) and the researcher's
second-order conceptions of what is going on (the theories used to organise and
explain these facts) (540).
In this research, the focus is on (a) capturing respondents’ verbal reports or accounts
of their interpretations, evaluations, constructions of transformational change in
response to change leader interventions in their organisation and (b) interpreting
these accounts in terms of sensemaking and the evolution of organised knowledge
frameworks or schemata. Weick (1995:6) suggests sensemaking, is about such
things as placement of items into frameworks, comprehending, redressing surprise,
constructing meaning, interacting in pursuit of mutual understanding, and
patterning.
For the purposes of this research, it will be assumed, following Kelly (1955), that
organisational member schema are organised in terms of bi-polar constructs. In this
context, sensemaking refers to deciding whether to prefer one pole, which typically
refers to pre-existing schema, or the other, which typically refers to the reframed
schema.
Porras & Robertson (1992) illustrate the bipolar nature of schema. They report the
case of organisational members’ reframing their perception of their organisation’s
purpose from production-oriented organisation to customer-service-oriented
organisation, a shift that, in practice, is likely to place significant cognitive and
emotional demands on organisational members.
Furthermore, particular schemata are likely to be supported by a set of constructs or
sub-schemata. For example, consistent with schema theory, the idea of organisation
as technical road builder will have a finite number of supporting constructs that will
tend to reinforce this as a meaningful construction of the organisation. For example,
being a technical road builder might be related to be managed by hard engineering
leadership and having a can-do culture.
Consistent with the abductive-interpretive research strategy, the research seeks, in
the first-order analysis, to grasp respondents’ collective constructions of their
66
organisation and, in the second-order analysis to interpret these constructions in the
light of schema theory.
The choice of Abductive – Interpretive strategy is not without disadvantages. One
potential difficulty is the assumption that respondents may have multiple and
changing social realities, not just one single reality, which is assumed by normal
science (Beer & Walton, 1987). One implication of this assumption is that there is
no independent or neutral way of establishing the truth of any of them; each social
reality may be real to its inhabitants (Blaikie, 2000:116). Typically, different criteria
for assessing and different strategies for enhancing the trustworthiness (Seale, 1999)
of the research are necessary. This issue is taken up later in this chapter.
RESEARCH DESIGN
This section outlines a research design consistent with the research strategy specified
in the previous section and satisfies the criteria identified earlier. It is argued in this
section that a qualitative longitudinal single case study design best serves the goals
of this research.
THE CASE STUDY DESIGN
This research is concerned with the relationship between change leader interventions
and evolving organisational member schema change in a particular organisational
change management context. The research design should, therefore, be sensitive to
context.
The decision to rely on case research can be justified on the grounds of a close
alignment between this research goal and the purpose of the case approach. Case
study research has been variously defined though the concern with phenomena in
context is a common theme in these definitions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen &
Rodgers, 2001; Yin, 1994).
Yin (1994:13) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that (a) investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the
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boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. Eisenhardt
(1989:534) reinforces this point. She suggests that the case study is a research
strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings.
A case study design can also be justified on the grounds of alignment with research
purpose, elaborating knowledge on the relationship between change leader
interventions and organisational schema change. Case studies have been used for
three main research purposes; description of some phenomena in context (Dubois &
Gadde, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989; Weick, 1979a), the generation of new theory
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990;
Weick, 1993), and the elaboration of existing theory (Dubois & Gadde, 2002).
The decision to rely on case research can also be justified on the grounds of Beer &
Walton’s (1987) critique of normal science as a means of investigating
organisational change. They identify four limitations of normal science for research
on change in organisational contexts. It will be argued that each limitation is
ameliorated by adopting a case study design.
First, Beer & Walton suggest that normal science seeks to isolate causation and
typically overlooks the systemic nature of organisations. Systemic interconnectivity
will always produce exogenous and intervening events [and] always prevent
powerful conclusions (343). They conclude that quantitative description may not be
the best method for understanding a multi-causal phenomenon (344). This research
acknowledges the systemic nature of organisations and of organisational change and
of the implications for research design. A reflection of the systemic nature of this
case research can be seen in Figure 3.1.
In addition, Beer & Walton (also see Bouchikhi, 1998) argue that traditional research
designs that assume the possibility of control of the research environment are not
feasible in a change management context. For example, independent control groups
or uninformed subjects are problematic in research on change in organisations.
Formal and informal communication in organisations makes control groups
problematic.
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Furthermore, normal science is based on the need for replication, an ideal that seems
impossible in the context of an organisation undergoing transformation. This
research, consistent with the sensemaking perspective (Weick, 1995), rejects
strategic rationality and instead focuses on what Weick (1995:6) describes as the
creation of reality as an ongoing accomplishment that takes form when people make
retrospective sense of the situations in which they find themselves.
Third, Beer and Walton argue that ‘normal’ science tends to be “flat”, that is, it tends
to be precise about methodology and instruments, [yet] it is often imprecise in depth
and description of the intervention and situation (343). Adopting an interpretive
case study approach provides opportunities for greater insight into organisational
members’ constructions of change interventions and their contribution to their
sensemaking.
Finally, Beer and Walton argue that the research on change often does not fit the
needs of the users (344). They suggest that the use of more complex statistical
techniques and more complex quasi-experimental designs, in attempts to achieve
more precision and tighter scientific 'proof', neglect the 'social construction' of
knowledge in the social sciences (344). A case study design developed for this
research addresses this concern by framing the analysis in ways that seek to add
value for the case organisation.
The decision to employ a case study research design can also be justified on the
grounds of Yin’s (1994) criteria for selecting an appropriate research design (see
Table 3.3). Yin suggests that case study research is appropriate when three criteria
are met. First, case research is appropriate when ‘how’ and ‘why’, rather than ‘who’,
‘what’, ‘where’, ‘how many’, and ‘how much’ questions are asked. This research is
concerned with how organisational members make sense of change over time and
seeks explanations of change (or the lack of it) over the period of the research.
Second, the case study approach is appropriate when the researcher has little or no
control over variables of interest to this research. This issue was addressed in the
earlier discussion of Beer & Walton’s critique of the utility of normal science for
research on organisational transformation and change. Third, Yin argues that case
69
study research is appropriate when context is relevant to the phenomena under study.
Again, this issue was addressed earlier in this section.
Table 3.2: Yin’s contingency model of research strategies (Source: (Yin, 1994))
In summary, case research is the appropriate design for this study in that it is aligned
with the intent of elaborating on the relationship between change leader interventions
and organisational schema change in context. As will be discussed later in this
chapter, this change management context is reflected in a technically-oriented
spatially differentiated public Professional Bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1989).
SINGLE CASE DESIGN
This research focuses on organisational schema change in a singe case organisation
undertaking transformational change. Single case research, and case study research
more generally, has been criticised on the grounds that it provides little basis for
scientific generalisation to the same or similar change management contexts (Jensen
& Rodgers, 2001; Lee, 1999; Yin, 1994).
The decision to focus on a single case organisation was made on three grounds.
First, as discussed in Chapter 1, gaining appropriate levels of access to public
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organisations undertaking transformational change can be problematic (Pollitt &
Bouckaert, 2000). There are relatively few technically-oriented spatially
differentiated Professional Organisations undertaking change of this scale.
Consequently, there was a pragmatic dimension to the decision to focus on a single
case.
Second and related to the first point, studying organisational transformation
longitudinally generates a large amount of data. Investigating multiple cases of
transformational change is beyond the capacity of one person and requires the
involvement of a significant number of people.
In addition, Jensen & Rodgers (2001) argue the dominant principle is knowledge
cumulation and show how meta-analyses can be used to cumulate knowledge using
case research. This research, therefore, is best viewed as an early step in a program
of research on organisational schema change in the context of technically-oriented
spatially differentiated Professional Organisations.
Third, within the single case organisation, three organisational schema change
contexts were investigated. Respondent data suggest that the three contexts were
created by two interventions differing in terms of the change target and the
implementation process employed. These variations were a focus of the research
and provided a basis for comparison across schema change contexts.
LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH Change research has been criticised on the grounds that it has tended to overlook the
temporal and longitudinal dimension of organisational change (Beer & Walton,
1987; Pettigrew, Woodman, & Cameron, 2001). Case studies of organisational
change conducted at one point in time provide fewer opportunities for gaining
insights into important change dynamics than do longitudinal studies (Beer &
Walton, 1987).
In order to better understand the relationship between change leader interventions
and organisational schema change, longitudinal research was employed. OT and
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schema change typically take many years to realise. To provide scope for finding
trends in the data, the research was conducted over a period of three years and
involved four data collection points.
Despite the longitudinal dimension of this research it is still appropriate to question
the adequacy of the period of the research. Evans (1992) reported that fundamental
change in Volvo took in the order of 15 years. In these circumstances most research
time frames will be inadequate.
However, it is argued that the three-year period of this research has been sufficient to
reveal useful trends in the progress of the transformation effort. It is acknowledged,
however, that these trends in the data may not be sustained or a new change of
direction may be initiated rendering observed change obsolete.
QUALITATIVE DATA
Case study research can involve the capture and analysis of either quantitative or
qualitative data or both (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). A reliance on qualitative data
in case research has been criticised (Lee, 1999). However, consistent with the focus
on organisational member constructions of their changing organisation, this research
relies on the capture and analysis of qualitative data.
Furthermore, there is little available prior evidence on how public servants of a
spatially differentiated technically-oriented public Professional Organisation would
construe organisation transformation. Under these circumstances it is appropriate to
rely on qualitative data.
Patton (1990:28) provides a good justification for the value of qualitative data in the
context of research on organisational member sensemaking in the context of
organisational transformation:
Quantitative measures are succinct, parsimonious, and easily aggregated for
analysis; quantitative data are systematic, standardized, and easily presented
in a short space. By contrast, the qualitative measures are longer, more
detailed, and variable in content; analysis is difficult because responses are
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neither systematic nor standardized. Yet the open-ended responses permit
one to understand the world as seen by the respondents. The purpose of
gathering responses to open-ended questions is to enable the researcher to
understand and capture the points of view of other people without
predetermining those points of view through prior selection of questionnaire
categories.
In a similar vein, Bartunek and Seo (2002:238) argue that a quantitative approach
typically assumes that:
Predefined variables have the same meaning across multiple settings. In
contrast, qualitative approaches attempt to increase understanding of local
perceptions, to explicate the ways people in particular settings come to
understand, account for, take action, and otherwise manage their day-to-day
situations.
Furthermore, Bartunek & Seo argue that questionnaire studies [the source of much
quantitative data] that explore variables leave out the dynamics of meaning-making,
both sense-making and sense-giving in a local context (239). It is this meaning-
making or interpretation of the transformational change experience which is the
focus of this study. Hence qualitative data is appropriate for the purposes of this
research.
However, it is acknowledged that some researchers have relied on quantitative
measurement of schema, particularly change schema (Lau, Kilbourne, & Woodman,
2003; Lau & Woodman, 1995). Lau & Woodman developed a measurement scale
designed to assess five dimensions of an individual’s change schema.
In particular, Lau & Woodman assess (a) the impact of change on current practice
(This change has important consequences for my future at this school), (b) the
intensity and significance of change (I am concerned with the issues behind this
change), (c) the meaning of change (This change is meaningful), (d) the salience of
change (I have a good understanding of the impact of this change on me), and (e)
personal control over change (I can be involved in the process of change).
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While such scales may be appropriate for particular purposes, they do not provide
insight into the meanings that organisational members assign to particular change
events. It is these meanings and constructions that this research is designed to
capture.
DATA COLLECTION STRATEGIES
Data collection was designed to capture organisational member accounts of
transformational change across time and to interpret these accounts in terms of
organisational schema. Assumptions about the nature of organisational schema will
be outlined in the later section titled Analytical Strategy. This section outlines the
methods used to capture organisational member accounts of change.
A number of qualitative data collection methods have been used to capture
organisational member sensemaking and schemata. These techniques include diaries
(Balogun & Johnson, 2004), interviews (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Geigle, 1998;
Labianca et al., 2000; Sottolano, 2001), focus groups (Balogun & Johnson, 2004;
Geigle, 1998; Labianca et al., 2000; Sottolano, 2001) observation (Weick & Quinn,
1999), and the analysis of documents (Geigle, 1998).
This research relies heavily on two types of interview, focus group interviews and
semi-structured interviews. In addition, some unstructured observation and analysis
of organisational documents was employed. The next section will outline the
research procedure used to operationalise these decisions.
INTERVIEWS
Interviews constitute one of the main qualitative data collection methods in
management and organisational studies (Mason, 2002). Two types of interview were
deemed appropriate for capturing data on organisational members’ sensemaking in
the context of transformational change; focus group interviews, in contrast to group
discussions and joint narratives (Flick, 2002) and semi-structured interviews, in
contrast to unstructured and structured interviews (Kvale, 1996).
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Focus group interviews
Focus groups have been found particularly useful for accessing respondent
interpretations and evaluations of events (Denzin & Lincoln, 2001; Hennink &
Diamond, 1999; Krueger, 1994; Merton, Fiske, & Kendall, 1990; D. L. Morgan,
1997; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990). Focus group interviews involve a moderator
who elicits information from (a) a number of interacting individuals having a
community of interest, (b) at a level that is more profound than is usually accessible
at the level of interpersonal relationships, (c) on a limited number of issues (Stewart
& Shamdasani, 1990).
There are two major advantages associated with the use of focus groups in this
research. First, it is possible to get a broader range of views from a much larger
number of respondents in shorter period of time than is possible from one-on-one
interviews (Wilkinson, 2003). Second, the interactions that occur between
organisational members at the focus group session make it possible to elaborate on
ideas and generate new ideas more readily than is possible in one-on-one interviews.
Morgan (1997:12) emphasises this aspect of the focus group interview
The hallmark of the focus group is the explicit use of the group interaction to
produce data and insights that would be less accessible without the
interaction found in a group.
The value of focus group interviews relies heavily on their moderation (Hennink &
Diamond, 1999). For example, if a key value of focus groups is in the interaction
among participants, the researcher must design questions and manage the group
process to optimise opportunities for and minimise constraints on discussion.
Several strategies support this goal including regularly summarising main points or
themes, paraphrasing, reflecting feeling and encouraging inter-member interaction
(Flick, 2002; D. L. Morgan, 1997; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990).
Nevertheless, there are several problems associated with focus group interviews.
First, monitoring intra-group interactions involving 8-12 people is complex,
particularly when the moderator is simultaneously seeking common themes and
contradictory points of view. In addition, there may be constraints on people’s
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willingness to contribute to group discussion. For example, status differences in the
group can reduce the potential for discussion.
Second, focus group interviews generate a huge amount of data, particularly when
multiple focus groups are conducted across time. Consequently, data reduction
strategies form an important part of data management. The strategies employed to
facilitate this task in this research are outlined later in this chapter.
Semi-structured interviews
Semi-structured interviews are appropriate for capturing the perspective of an
individual on the research topic by guiding, but not determining, the content of that
perspective. (Flick, 2002; Mason, 2002).
Rubin & Rubin (1995:51) suggest three reasons for choosing semi-structured or
qualitative interviews. First, they argue that semi-structured interviews are
appropriate when in-depth understanding is required and this is best communicated
through detailed examples and rich narratives (51). Second, semi-structured
interviews are appropriate when you need to bring some new light on puzzling
questions (51). Finally, these interviews are appropriate when the researcher is
trying to unravel complicated relationships and slowly evolving events (51).
Another consideration is the target group where possible managers participated in
focus group discussions. However, in some research sites this was not possible
given that only one manager may have been available.
OBSERVATION
Mason (2002:84) suggests that observation refers to methods of generating data
which entail the researcher immersing herself or himself in a research ‘setting’ so
that they can experience and observe at first hand a range of dimensions in and of
that setting. Observation may be structured or unstructured (Patton, 1990).
Structured observation suggests that the researcher has been able to pre-plan an
76
approach for determining the salient dimensions of the setting and has determined a
means of data generation in that setting.
In some cases, and as is the case in this research, structured observation is not
possible and nor is immersion. In these situations, a setting is presented with little
opportunity for detailed planning. When opportunities for observation were
provided the research agenda drove the observation strategy. In particular, the
observation focused on organisational member discussions of change events and
reactions to these events. In addition, the spatially differentiated nature of the
organisation precluded immersion.
DOCUMENTS
When organisations undertake transformational change much of the agenda is
reflected in written form. During this research, several documents were made
available for analysis, including memoranda that outlined organisational directions,
annual reports, portfolio and departmental strategic plans, and a departmental
magazine.
Given that the focus of the research is on the relationship between change leader
interventions and organisational schema change (reflected in verbal and written
accounts) available documents were studied for reports and descriptions of planned
change interventions and organisational member responses to these interventions.
The procedure applied to this analysis is outlined in a subsequent section.
RESEARCHER-RESPONDENT RELATIONSHIP
Abductive – Interpretive research hinges on the nature of the relationship between
the researcher and respondents. In this research, the relationship tended to facilitate
the collection of valid data.
The task of the researcher is to get ‘inside’ the constructions of the respondents
(Blaikie, 2000). The collection of valid data in the context of focus group interviews
and semi-structured interviews requires the development of some level of rapport
77
between researcher and respondents. Respondents will not be open with their
constructions of events if they feel the researcher is not concerned with their
interests.
At the same time, however, this does not necessarily mean that the researcher has to
be rely on total immersion in a setting to access respondent constructions of events
(Mason, 2002). In the context of the dispersion of research sites and the number of
people participating in the study, immersion was not a realistic option.
Despite having only irregular contact with respondents; that is, only during data
collection rounds, respondents in all research sites were always friendly and
welcoming and, overall, participated well in focus group discussions. There was no
evidence that as a group, respondents felt reticent about sharing information, both
positive and negative, about the change program. Indeed, on occasion respondents
indicated that they enjoyed focus group discussions in that they provided a forum in
which their own reactions could be tested against those of others.
Certainly this openness was facilitated by the psychological contracting that occurred
at the beginning of each interview, and by the dynamics of the focus group session
itself. Yet, it also appeared that respondents had a high level of commitment to the
organisation (many respondents were long term employees of the organisation) and
offered their insights on the basis of potential value to organisational learning.
Even data that might be interpreted as criticism of the change content or process was,
on closer inspection, more consistent with sensemaking complex and sometimes
little understood processes rather than outright resistance to change.
SUMMARY
The preceding discussion has established that an interpretive longitudinal qualitative
case study design is most appropriate for research (a) on the relationship between
change leader interventions and organisational schema change (b) from the
perspective of organisational members responsible for implementation (c) in a
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particular context. The next section outlines the procedure used to operationalise
this design.
RESEARCH PROCEDURE
CASE SELECTION
The research is concerned with organisational members’ evolving sensemaking and
schema change in a particular organisational context. The context is one that
previous theory suggests is inimical to change leader influence. This context is of
concern to this research in that OT, defined in terms of organisational schema
change, is thought to require the direct influence of top-level change leaders. This
raises the question of how change leaders seek to effect change in this context.
The case organisation, the Queensland Department of Main Roads, is a spatially
differentiated, technically-oriented public Professional Bureaucracy (Mintzberg,
1989). Most research studies mask the identity of the case organisation. However,
in this research the organisation’s identity is provided on the grounds that (a) it
would be extremely difficult to mask the organisation’s identity given the research
content and (b) the organisation expressed its willingness to be identified.
The Queensland Department of Main Roads provides an appropriate organisational
context for the purpose and goals of this research on four grounds. First, the case
organisation possesses characteristics that some researchers suggest make it inimical
to leader influence (Jermier & Kerr, 1997; Leitko & Szczerbacki, 1987; Mintzberg,
1989; Zell, 2001, 2003), an issue of concern in this research. Specifically, the
organisation’s operating core consists of professionals who have a high degree of
autonomy over their work and the organisation is spatially differentiated.
Professionalised employees and physical distance from the change leader is likely to
neutralise change leader influence (Kerr & Jermier, 1978; Mintzberg, 1999).
Second, the organisation is technically oriented in that the dominant professional
group has been socialised into a science-based discipline, specifically engineering.
The technical rationality associated with science-based disciplines tends to be
79
discrepant from those required for managing transformational change (Gowdy, 1994;
Schon, 1983). Little research has been conducted on technically-oriented
organisations and the little that has been done has been prescriptive rather than
empirical (Van Aken et al., 2003).
Third, the case organisation is currently undergoing a major program of planned
transformational change linked to Government policy changes and to the case
organisation’s own strategic plans. The organisation is in the process of
repositioning itself within a new policy framework. Moreover, the transformational
change agenda of concern to organisational members includes large-scale radical
structural interventions and large-scale human process interventions, which are of
particular concern to this study. The changes are consistent with the broader New
Public Management (NPM) paradigm outlined in Chapter 1. Significant change
events in the organisation’s recent history are provided in Table 3.3.
Fourth, senior management of the case organisation has made an explicit
commitment to transparency, openness and organisational learning (Golding, 2001).
Such a commitment provided the levels of access to organisational sites necessary
for capturing organisational member accounts of the significant changes they were
seeking to implement.
The implication of these characteristics is, however, that the organisation may not be
representative of Professional Organisations more generally. Indeed, there is
evidence that the case organisation is not representative of such organisations. The
organisation has a reputation for early adoption of new technologies and policy
initiatives and a reputation, among other departments, for being different.
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Table 3.3: Key events in the case organisation’s change history
Change
intervention Year Comments
Amalgamation into
a Transport mega-
Department
1991 Explicit efforts to destroy the culture of Main
Roads in the interests of creating a new
Transport culture
Road Reform 1992 Change the nature of organisation-stakeholder
relationships
Administrative
Systems change
1992 - current Involved large scale change of the
organisation’s administrative systems
De-amalgamation
from the Transport
mega-Department
1996 Despite de-amalgamation, the case organisation
was expected to operate in partnership with
Transport Department; a Transport portfolio
Leadership change 1996 Professional engineer appointed to Director
General
Owner-provider
split
1996 - current The organisation was truncated into Corporate
Main Roads and Commercial Main Roads.
Leadership change 1998 First non-engineer appointed to Director-
General
Transformational
Change initiative
1998 - current New mission and vision and a new managerial
process schema, the Three Frames
Leadership change 2000 Professional engineer and experienced public
manager appointed Director-General
Continuation of
transformational
change initiative
2001 - current Focus on greater inclusiveness; “One-
Department” policy and “Main Roads family”
values. Strong focus on relational orientation;
Five Signposts, a process model
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Figure 3.1: Spatial dispersion of the case organisation (Regional and District
boundaries are indicated) (http://www.mainroads.qld.gov.au August, 2002)
INTRA-CASE SITE SAMPLING
The case organisation is spatially differentiated across a geographical area of
1,727,200 square kilometres (see Figure 3.2). The organisation is divided into four
regions and fourteen districts. In addition, as indicated in Table 3.2, the organisation
is divided on owner–provider lines. Furthermore, the case organisation consists of
several head office or metropolitan functions.
Patton (1990) identified two main sampling strategies, Random sampling and
Purposive sampling. Random sampling was not an option in this research in that
ultimately site selection would be based on negotiation with the organisation.
Purposeful sampling strategies include sampling extreme or deviant cases, sampling
typical cases, maximum variation sampling, sampling critical cases, sampling
politically important or sensitive cases, convenience sampling.
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In terms of intra-case site selection a maximum variation sampling strategy was
employed. This strategy increases confidence in common patterns that cut across
different [locations], document unique program variations that have emerged in
adapting to different conditions (Patton, 1990:105). Consequently, given that
geographical dispersion may affect organisational member experience of change and
their susceptibility to change leader influence, it was decided to sample from
metropolitan, regional, and district sites.
Site selection was a joint decision between the researcher and organisational
managers. In the final analysis, nine research sites from the Corporate (owner) sub-
organisation, five Regional-District sites and four Head Office sites, and five
research sites from the Commercial (provider) arm were included in the research.
Sites were selected to ensure maximum variation on three dimensions. First, sites
were selected to reflect the degree of geographical separation from Head Office. As
discussed in Chapter 2, distance from change leader tends to neutralise leader
influence (Jermier & Kerr, 1997). The change leader interventions were initiated
from Head Office and it was important to not only capture accounts of organisational
members located close to Head Office but also those distant from Head Office. As a
result four regions were represented in the study. Within each region one district
office was included.
Second, sites were selected on the basis of perceived level of adaptation to the
change agenda. The pool included sites that were thought to be changing
successfully and sites where the change agenda was posing more difficulty. Third,
sites were also selected to ensure that a wide range of occupational groups were
represented. It was important to capture accounts of technical professionals,
technical support, staff professionals, and administrative staff.
SAMPLING PARTICIPANTS WITHIN SITES
Convenience sampling (Patton, 1990) was used for within-site sampling. Given the
spatially differentiated nature of the organisation and the scale of the research, an
organisational representative arranged site visits and provided the names and
83
designations of organisational members who could be available for interview. Such
a strategy was necessary as many organisational members are engaged in field work
and could not commit to be available at the time of the researcher’s visit. In
addition, sites, particularly those outside head office, tended to be small.
The potential loss of perspectives as a result of absence on fieldwork was not
considered detrimental to the validity of the data captured. In the final analysis, a
diverse sample of organisational members from various geographical, functional,
and hierarchical sites was obtained (see Table 3.7).
However, criteria for selecting participants into focus groups were provided to the
organisation. For example, the researcher asked that (a) supervisors and their
immediate staff not attend the same focus group interview, and (b) the group be
representative of the occupational groups available. In practice this criteria was
sometimes impossible to meet. This issue will be taken up in the discussion of focus
group procedure outlined in the next section.
The final sample, across the period of the research, consisted of a total of 522
organisational members; 468 were involved in focus group interviews and 54 took
part in semi-structured interviews. Participants ranged in age from 18 years to 64
years (Mean 40) and had an average tenure of 13.9 years (see Table 3.4). In
addition, 309 males and 159 females participated across the period of the research
(see Table 3.5).
The sample included organisational members from various occupational groups,
levels in the organisation, and organisational sites. The distribution of participants
by classification is provided in Table 3.6
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Table 3.4: Age and Length of Service of interview participants (in years)
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Age 18 64 40.16 10.70
Length of service in DMR
.01 45.1 13.9 11.5
Table 3.5: Gender of interview participants
Round of Focus Groups
1st Round 2nd Round 3rd Round 4th Round Gender Male Female
104 46
79 41
65 29
61 43
Table 3.6: Employment Classification of interview participants
Round of Focus Groups
Classification 1st Round 2nd Round 3rd Round 4th Round Total 3 13 1 4 21 AO1-03 26 25 23 28 102 AO4-06 41 25 22 27 115 AO7-08 18 14 10 13 55 CW 4 2 1 2 9 Mech 1 1 OO4-OO7 5 3 3 2 13 PO2 8 5 3 3 19 PO3 3 1 3 2 9 PO4 5 4 4 2 15 PO5 1 1 2 2 6 PO6 1 1 2 SES 10 10 5 6 31 SO 9 1 10 TO1 2 1 1 4 TO2 4 4 TO3 1 5 7 5 18 TO4 6 4 4 4 18 TO5 3 4 4 3 14 TO6 1 1 2 Total 150 120 94 104 468
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Table 3.7: Summary of focus groups and interviews conducted
Round Date Number of Focus Groups
Number of Interviews
Total number of Focus Group Participants
1 August-September 2000
18 12 150
2 March-June 2001 16 13 120
3 October-December 2001
14 17 94
4 April-May 2002 15 12 104
Total 63 54 468
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Figure 3.2: Overview of the Research
Pre-existing organisational schema
Chapter 4
1996 Structural intervention
Owner Provider Corporate Change Trajectory Chapter 6
Commercial Change Trajectory Chapter 7
1998 Process intervention Vision & Three Frames 2001 Five Signposts &
“One Department” Chapter 5
Reframed Process Schema
2003
Reframed Organizational
Schema 2003
Reframed Organizational
Schema 2003
Integrative analysis Chapter 8
Contribution Chapter 9
Evolution of change content
schema & change process schema
Evolution of change content
schema & change process schema
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DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE
This section specifies the design of data collection techniques used to generate valid
data used for subsequent interpretation in terms of organisational schema and
organisational schema change.
While the aim was to conduct rounds of focus groups six months apart, this was not
always possible and focus groups were scheduled when most convenient for
participants. Focus groups were generally conducted over a 1.5 to 2 hour time frame
and interviews over approximately one hour. At least two researchers were always
present. It has been suggested that the optimum number of participants in focus
groups is between 6 and 12 (D. L. Morgan, 1997). The total number of focus
groups, focus group participants and interviews are summarised in Table 3.7.
FOCUS GROUP PROCEDURE
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the purpose of focus group interviews in this
research was to capture organisational member evolving interpretations,
constructions, evaluations, and perceptions of the transformational change process,
their sensemaking.
Focus group questions
The research questions posed to focus groups are provided in Table 3.8. As
discussed earlier in this chapter, question design provided respondents with
discretion, within the framework of the research, to decide what was salient from
their perspective. Consequently, questions were not asked, in the first instance,
about particular transformational change interventions. Where necessary, probe
questions were used for this purpose.
Consistent with the abductive-interpretive strategy outlined earlier in the chapter, the
questions were designed to access organisational members’ accounts of the
transformation of the case organisation. The questions gave respondents the
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opportunity to reflect on the history of change in the organisation, current changes,
and predictions about where the changes were taking the organisation.
Questions in round 2 and 3 sought to capture similar insights into respondents’
accounts of change. However, these rounds differed from round 1 in that
respondents’ accounts of change communication were sought. It had become
apparent from round 1 data that change communication was an issue however it was
unclear what messages respondents were getting about change. This question was
designed to address this issue.
Round 4 questions provided respondents with an opportunity to identify current
changes and their impact but also for a more general reflection across the three years
of the change in Main Roads.
Focus group procedure
At the outset, the moderator introduced himself and explained the purpose of the
research. The purpose of the research was explained in terms of mapping
organisational member qualitative experience of change over a three-year period.
This information would be widely disseminated in report form across the
organisation and would also be available for the purposes of academic research.
Participants were advised that senior managers supported and were committed to the
research.
Participants had an opportunity to ask questions for clarification about any aspect of
the research. In the event that participants had questions following the interview, a
telephone contact number was provided. This contact opportunity was deemed
important in that interviews were conducted in various centres across the state where
ready access to the researcher was not possible.
Participants completed a questionnaire seeking demographic data. These data were
reported in Tables 3.4 – 3.6 in the previous section of this chapter.
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Table 3.8: Focus group questions by round
ROUND 1 1. What has been the most significant change in Main Roads over the past
five years? 2. What is the most important change affecting Main Roads now? 3. We would like to discuss how change has affected, (1) your region, (2)
your work, and (3) you? 4. How will these changes position Main Roads for the future? 5. If you had one comment to make on change in Main Roads, what would
it be?
ROUND 2 1. How has the organisation changed in the past nine months? What have
been the successes and failures? 2. What messages are you currently getting about change in Main Roads?
How consistent are these messages with the changes that are actually occurring?
3. What sort of organisation would you hope to see in six months time? What does the organisation need to do over the next six months to achieve this?
4. If there is one story that characterises the culture of Main Roads now what would it be?
ROUND 3 1. How has the organisation changed since our last visit in May 2001? What
have been the successes and failures? 2. What messages are you currently receiving about change in Main Roads?
How consistent are these messages with the changes that are actually occurring?
3. What sort of organisation do you expect to see in five years time? What sort of organisation do you expect to see in two years time? What needs to be done to achieve or avoid this?
4. Who do you see as important or responsible for achieving change and why? What do you see as your role in the future of the organisation?
ROUND 4 1. What have been the changes over the past six months in Main Roads? 2. Reflecting on the changes over the past three years, what are the main
messages you have received about culture change in Main Roads? How consistent have these messages been with the changes that are actually occurring?
3. Describe the culture of Main Roads now. How does the culture differ from three years ago? If there is one story that characterises the culture of Main Roads now what would it be?
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The participants were informed that participation in the focus group was voluntary.
No participant left a focus group interview. Furthermore, while there would be
encouragement to respond to focus group questions, the decision about whether to
respond to particular questions rested with the participants.
The moderator asked permission to audio-tape the interview on the grounds that
audio-tapes would facilitate the accurate identification and clarification of issues
raised by participants. The process for managing audio-tapes was explained.
Specifically, the tapes would be kept in a locked cabinet at the researcher’s office.
The case organisation would not have access to these tapes. The moderator informed
the group that individual anonymity and group anonymity would be protected. No
focus group refused to permit audio-taping of the interview.
To facilitate introductions between participants and researchers and on occasion
among participants, a brief icebreaker activity was conducted. The activity ensured
that participants and researchers were on first name basis and also sanctioned
disclosure of information about their constructions of organisational transformation.
Focus group questions were presented on overhead transparencies, these questions
are provided in Table 3.9. Each transparency showed one question. The moderator
read the question. This enabled participants to both see and hear the question. The
moderator checked to see if participants had questions for clarification. Participants
were encouraged to discuss the questions among themselves and not feel that they
had to address their responses to the moderator. The value of focus group interviews
resides in this interaction among participants.
When necessary, the moderator intervened to ensure equity of air time for each
participant. In addition, the moderator summarised issues raised in the discussion,
acknowledging both agreements and disagreements. The second researcher took
notes of the discussion and monitored the tape recorder.
At the conclusion of the focus group interview, the participants were thanked for
their involvement and the main elements of our contract with them, confidentiality,
and the researchers’ availability after the meeting, were reiterated.
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As soon after the interview as possible, the moderator prepared a summary of the
main themes and any verbatim comments that could be recalled to support the
identified themes. On return to Brisbane, the audio-taped interviews were either
summarised or transcribed verbatim or both. Discussion of this process is outlined
in a subsequent section, Analytical strategy.
In addition, a summary of the interview themes was forwarded to each focus group
participant. This summary provided a basis for respondent validation of the data. At
the beginning of the next round participants were asked to validate the summary.
A respondent contested an interview summary on only one occasion. In this
particular case, the respondent felt that the summary had not captured the intensity of
feeling that he had expressed about a particular issue. As a result he indicated that
he had chosen not to attend the next two focus group rounds. A commitment was
made to change the summary so it did reflect group sentiment.
Discussion about how these data were managed will be discussed in a later section,
Analytical strategy.
Semi-structured interview procedure
A similar process was used to administer the semi-structured interviews. Two
researchers were involved in each interview. The presence of two people facilitated
managing interview content and process. One researcher managed the interaction
while the other took notes and intervened if necessary to clarify issues raised by the
respondent.
The interviews began with the researchers introducing themselves and outlining the
purpose of the interview. Permission was obtained to audio-tape the interview.
Respondents were advised that the tapes would not be made available to the
organisation. They would be kept in a locked cabinet at the researcher’s office.
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Respondents were also advised that their anonymity would be protected. The data
would be aggregated and individual respondents would not be identified. However,
respondents were informed that verbatim comments might be used and if there was
any doubt that a person could be identified then respondents would be asked for
permission to use the quote.
Interviewees were told that a summary of the interview would be returned to the
interviewee for validation. Respondent validation of the accuracy of the summary
was checked at the next interview.
Following the interview, the researcher wrote a summary of the interview and
recalled verbatim quotes to support themes identified. These notes were later used as
a basis for discussion with other researchers who had intimate knowledge of the
organisation. The strategy used to manage and analyse the data is reported in a later
section of this chapter.
Observation procedure As indicated earlier, unstructured observation was used in selected contexts. During
the course of the research, opportunities were provided to attend two departmental
conferences. In addition, focus group interviews are important contexts for gaining
an appreciation of organisational members’ emotional reactions to the change
agenda, reactions which are frequently reflected in the emotional tone of the
discussion rather than verbal reports.
One conference was a Diversity Conference held in a regional location held in 2000.
This conference was important in that the new Director General was the keynote
speaker and outlined his vision for the organisation and selected achievements and
challenges facing the organisation. The second conference was a Senior Officers’
Conference held in Brisbane in 2001. This conference provided an opportunity to
observe a meeting of the senior management group and their focus on personal and
interpersonal processes. This conference also provided an opportunity to observe a
small group of senior managers who were seeking to link their current operational
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projects to the new long-term strategic plan and its accompanying reporting
framework.
As discussed earlier, transformational change is likely to have implications for
emotions (Eriksson, 2004). As well as attending to the content of focus group
discussions, the researcher also attended to what might be referred to as the
emotional tone of the group as they discussed the transformation of their
organisation. Hence the concern was not so much with individual expression of
emotion (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987) but with an assessment of group feeling about the
change, something that was not necessarily reflected in what participants said but
how they said it. It was possible to determine whether organisational members were
positive about change, neutral, or negative.
Following the observation opportunities, field notes were typed and included in the
analysis. This was achieved by sharing and discussing field notes with other
researchers intimately involved in the case organisation to test interpretations.
Documents
During the period of the research the researcher was provided with access to several
documents relevant to the research. The documents included memoranda from the
Director-General on the transformation of the organisation, reports (eg, strategic
planning documents, annual reports, and websites), hard copies of departmental
conference presentation notes and slides.
In addition, the organisation publishes a staff magazine, Interface. This magazine is
one of the ways in which organisational members are kept informed of
organisational transformation initiatives, among others, and their progress. These
magazines were searched for references to organisational transformation and the data
in these sources were coded and incorporated in the analysis.
By way of illustration, the departmental magazine provided accounts of interviews
with senior managers and of initiatives taken by organisational members to advance
the change agenda. In particular, the magazine reported an interview with the
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Director-General who generated the 1998 transformational change agenda on his
departure to another department.
These magazine articles served two purposes consistent with the aims of this study.
First, selected articles clarified the change interventions and change leader intentions
with respect to these interventions. For example, the Director-General reported his
assessment of change in the case organisation after his two year tenure. An insight
into the change process not mentioned in interview was the Director-General’s view
that he was only two-years into what he saw as a four-year change program.
Second, the magazine also reported occasional reactions to the change agenda. For
example, on the departure of Director-General Varghese in 2000, one manager had a
poem about the Director-General published in the magazine. This poem is
reproduced in Chapter 5.
ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
The previous section specified the data collection procedures. This section details
the strategies employed to manage, analyse and interpret the data generated by these
data collection procedures. Consistent with the abductive-interpretive strategy
outlined earlier in this chapter, the aim of the analysis is (1) conduct a first-order
analysis of respondents’ evolving accounts of transformational change, and (2) to
conduct a second-order analysis to explore the first-order data in terms of the
relationship between change leader interventions and organisational schema change.
Sixty-three focus group interviews, fifty-four semi-structured interviews,
observation, and analysis of secondary sources over three years generated a large
amount of data. The analytical strategy was designed to increase the probability that
valid conclusions were drawn from these data.
As indicated above, the data generated by focus groups and semi-structured
interviews were in the form of audio-taped records and researcher notes. A thematic
analysis of these data was considered the most appropriate approach for gaining
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insight into organisational members’ constructions or sensemaking about
organisational transformation.
The data were analysed thematically. Strauss & Corbin (1990:61) define open
coding as the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualising,
and categorising data. This thematic analysis of the data entailed the use of written
research notes, audio tape summaries or verbatim transcripts, and a review of the
audio tapes themselves.
Initial coding of the data occurred in the interview itself in that the moderator
paraphrased the main themes at the end of the interview and checked for accuracy.
Following the interview the researcher noted the themes and any illustrative data
recollected from the interview. This was necessary in that interviews were
frequently conducted at various sites across Queensland.
A written transcript of themes was prepared and mailed to each participant. At the
next interview, participants had an opportunity to respond to these summaries and
report inaccuracies or misinterpretations.
Following return from the research site, each audio taped record was either
summarised or transcribed verbatim. The number of focus groups and interviews
prohibited verbatim transcriptions of all tapes. However, those interviews
transcribed verbatim were strategically selected to (a) validate the summaries and
recorded notes of the attending researchers, and (b) provide deeper insight into the
dynamics at particular sites to provide input into decisions about probe questions in
subsequent research rounds. Furthermore, selected interview tapes were both
transcribed verbatim and summarised. This provided an opportunity to determine
that key themes in the verbatim transcripts were reflected in the summaries.
Other researchers who were intimately familiar with the case organisation and the
focus group and interview data met regularly to discuss data coding and to reach
consensus about data codes. These meetings focused not only on agreed data codes
but also focused on contradictory and disconfirming evidence. Such evidence was
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reflected in conflicting points of view within focus groups and across focus groups
and semi-structured interviews.
A representative of the case organisation was a part of this process and this person
was able to provide respondent validation of the data codes identified by the
researchers and to provide contextual information that explicated the data.
Respondents identified two seminal transformational change interventions, the 1996
truncation of the organisation into owner organisation and provider organisation and
the 1998/2001 large-scale human process intervention. Other transformational
change events were mentioned; for example, the amalgamation into and de-
amalgamation from a Transport mega-department (see Table 3.3).
As would be expected, respondents framed their responses to the open-ended
questions in terms of those aspects of the organisation that were being targeted by
change leader interventions. Consequently, initial codes for accounts related to
restructuring, or content changes, were organisational direction, relational
environment, which encompassed organisational – environment relationships and
internal relationships, organisation redesign (including workload implications and
implications for career and personal development), and change process.
Note, however, that the codes used to frame respondent accounts of structural change
differed from those used to frame respondent accounts of human process change. An
illustration from both change contexts is now provided.
As would be expected, given truncation of the organisation and its purpose,
respondents, in this case in Corporate Main Roads, were concerned with
organisational direction. A consistent account of organisational direction across
focus groups related to a managerial, administrative, financial focus. References to
shifts from a technical viewpoint to an economist’s viewpoint; it’s an emphasis away
from our core business of design and engineering to a management style of
operation; we are expected to be more like business managers. In addition, there
were frequent references to management reporting of financial information.
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Responses to the human process intervention had to be treated quite differently.
First, there was much less data to draw upon in that collectively the change agenda
was unrealised. For this reason, the first-order analysis of these data reflected the
aims of the change agenda itself. For example, one element of the intervention was a
new vision and mission.
While there were few references to the change leaders’ vision in the data, there was a
great deal of discussion about the need for clearer direction, more leadership, more
linking of change to a broader strategic direction.
In addition, there were frequent references to a lack of clarity about the future of the
organisation and potential threats to this future. Similarly, the data related to the
Three Frames and Five Signposts (leading-managing schema explained in Chapter
5), and to the relational environment were used to explain on the one hand a lack of
incorporation of the ends-means schema and on the other an acceptance of the
relational schema.
Second-order analysis
To this point the analysis has focused on coding the raw data. The researcher was
also concerned with a second order analysis of these data (Poole et al., 1989). This
second order analysis was concerned with identifying interpretive schemes or the
lenses through which organisational members interpreted the transformational
change agenda being undertaken by the case organisation.
The second-order analysis involved the researcher interpreting these accounts in
terms of organisational schema. As indicated earlier in this chapter, organisational
member schema are assumed to consist of a finite set of bi-polar constructs (Isabella,
1990; Kelly, 1955). One pole of the construct, in this case the left-hand pole, reflects
organisational members’ pre-existing organisational schema. The right-hand pole
reflects the reframed schema, how organisational members interpret the situation
post intervention.
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This interpretation of schema is consistent with, though more detailed than, in other
research. For example, Isabella (1990) used a photographic metaphor to describe a
tendency for organisational members to conceive of change situations in terms of
double exposures, they would see images of both the previous organisation and the
new.
For example, in the first round of interviews, organisational members were asked the
question, “what has been the most significant change in Main Roads over the past
five years?” One consistent response to this question was before we just built roads,
more and more efficient roads and we didn’t think much about why we build roads.
Now we act more like business managers/administrative financial managers and we
have to consult our various stakeholders much more and we try to work out why we
build roads. In this case, two bipolar constructs were abstracted, (1) road builder
focus (left-hand pole) and managerial/financial focus (right-hand pole), and (2)
operations-driven (left-hand pole) and strategy-driven (right-hand pole).
The decision to split statements into different constructs was based on other criteria.
In this example, respondents reacted to the two bipolar dimensions differently. In
the case of the road builder-managerial/financial focus organisational members
tended to be polarised, some preferred the left-hand pole and others preferred the
right-hand pole. In the case of operations-driven-strategy-driven respondents tended
to prefer the right-hand pole over the left-hand pole in that being strategy-driven the
organisation would be likely to address looming problems that adversely impacted
on the organisation. Note that this does not mean that respondents thought the
organisation was as strategic as it needed to be, just that being strategic was
preferable to being totally operational.
Kelly suggests that people tend to prefer one pole over the other. This is an
important consideration in change research in that change leaders typically expect
organisational members to prefer the pole that exactly or approximates as closely as
possible the desired organisational schema. An example of preference was provided
in the previous paragraph. Preference as determined by the degree of consistently
positive reference to one pole or the other.
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However, change is rarely a simple preference for one thing or another.
Respondents may also be split on preference for one pole or the other. Furthermore,
even if respondents prefer the reframed schema it does not mean that cognitive order
is achieved. For example, respondents preferred a concept of the organisation as
open to external influence from stakeholders who have interests in the road system
over the pre-existing concept of being closed to external influence.
However, being open to external influence raised several contradictions. Being open
was positive but it also meant longer project timelines, increased cost, and greater
capability and workload demands on people. These contradictions were considered
important in terms of getting greater insight into organisational member schema.
The outcome of the second-order analysis then was (1) a set of bipolar constructs
that reflected the main themes derived from the first-order analysis, (2) preference
(positive when respondents tended to prefer the reframed pole, negative when they
preferred the pre-existing pole, polarised when respondents were split on one pole or
the other, and unrealised when respondents had not developed, collectively, a sense
of what the change meant), and tensions or constructs suggesting issues concerning
successfully reframing the change. Note that respondents can prefer a new schema
yet find difficulty in reconciling the inevitable contradictions involved in framing
that complex schema.
Framing respondents’ schema in terms of bipolar constructs facilitated discussion of
change and lack of change in the context of pre-existing theory and research on
schema change.
CREDIBILITY OF THE RESEARCH
The place of the usual standards of research quality, validity and reliability, has been
the subject of some controversy in discussions of qualitative research (Mason, 2002;
Seale, 1999; Silverman, 2001). It is frequently acknowledged that qualitative
research cannot meet the same standards of trustworthiness as quantitative research
yet the ideals associated with producing trustworthy research remain. Qualitative
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researchers have sought to focus on developing convincing (Mason, 2002) or
plausible (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1993) arguments.
Maxwell (1996:87) defines validity as the correctness or credibility of a description,
conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other sort of account. This section is
designed to outline the strategies used to enhance the trustworthiness of the research
or, in Maxwell’s terms, manage validity threats.
For the purposes of this discussion, the criteria identified by Lincoln & Guba (1985)
will be used to identify strategies for enhancing the trustworthiness of this research.
The four criteria are credibility, applicability, consistency, and neutrality.
Credibility
Credibility refers to the process of establishing confidence in the 'truth' of the
findings of a particular inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) (290). To enhance the
credibility of the research four strategies were employed; respondent validation
(Seale, 1999), triangulation (Denzin, 1978), and comprehensive data treatment
(Silverman, 2000).
Respondent validation involves engaging respondents in sanctioning data and data
interpretation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Respondent interpretation was used in two
ways in this research. First, following each focus group, a summary of the main
themes generated in the discussion was forwarded to each focus group participant.
At the beginning of the next focus group interview participants were asked to
comment on the faithfulness of the summary.
The second way in which respondent validation was incorporated into the research
was to validate data and interpretations with an organisational liaison person. The
liaison person, who had excellent knowledge of the organisation, was a member of a
unit in the organisation which was responsible for managing organisational change
and development. This person participated in coding the data and was able to
provide contextual or background information
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Triangulation has been the subject of some criticism in the qualitative literature
(Seale, 1999; Silverman, 2000). However, it can be viewed as one of several
strategies for enhancing the trustworthiness of research. Two main types of
triangulation (Denzin, 1978) were used in the research. First, investigator
triangulation which involves team research with multiple observers in the field,
engaging in continuing discussion of their points of difference and similarity,
personal biases can be reduced, was used.
Fortunately, other researchers had intimate knowledge of the case organisation and
the data generated. It was possible, therefore, to discuss data and data interpretation
and to explore different coding or indexing options and the interpretation of these
data.
Second, data triangulation, which involves using diverse sources of data, so that one
seeks out instances of a phenomenon in several different settings, at different points
in time or space was used. In this research a total of 14 research sites were involved
across a two-year period. It was possible, therefore, to examine conclusions made in
the context of data analysis in one site with those in other sites and to do so across
the four data collection points.
At those times where triangulation was not possible efforts were made to find an
alternative explanation for the data: Silverman (2000:180) referred to this as
comprehensive data treatment, which refers to checking conclusions across all
relevant data collected, that is, seeking to account for the whole data set rather than
part of it. Adopting this approach led to the realisation that different organisations
(or sub-organisations) were involved in the case organisation, different interventions,
not just the transformational change intervention that prompted the research.
In addition, this approach made it possible to see that in some areas organisational
respondents might prefer a new schema over the traditional schema, yet, at the same
time, they might experience tensions or contradictions as they seek to make sense of
the new schema. Without careful analysis of all the available data this distinction
might well have been lost.
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Transferability
Transferability refers to the process of determining the extent to which the findings of
a particular inquiry have applicability in other contexts or with other respondents
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985:290). As discussed earlier in this chapter, extrapolating from
a single case to other cases is problematic. Nevertheless, within the constraints of
the scale of the research, a detailed description of the respondent accounts and of
organisational interventions is provided. The level of description, that is, the first-
order analysis, should be sufficient to allow other researchers conducting research on
the relationship between change leader interventions and organisational schema
change in similar contexts to make comparisons.
This approach is consistent with Jensen & Rodgers (2001), who argue that the
critical issue in case research is knowledge cumulation (235) and that ultimately
more attention needs to be given to meta-analyses of case research in public
management rather than criticising the single case approach.
In addition, this research has sought to incorporate the analyses conducted in
previous case research on the relationship between change leader interventions and
organisational schema change, particularly the work of Balogun & Johnson (2004)
and Labianca et al (2000). While the contexts investigated in those studies were
different, it was possible to consider parallels in the dynamics of the relationship
between change leader interventions and organisational schema change.
Dependability
Dependability refers to how to determine whether the findings of an inquiry would
be repeated if the inquiry were replicated with the same (or similar) respondents in
the same or similar contexts (Lincoln & Guba, 1985:290). In the case of this
research, this question is hypothetical in that, given change interventions, replication
is highly unlikely. Nevertheless, it seems best to assume that replication could be
possible and specify what strategies have been used in this research to allow others
the possibility of replication.
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The strategies used in this research have been mentioned in the above discussion. In
particular, a detailed description of methods used to generate and interpret data has
been provided in this chapter. In addition, because other researchers had intimate
knowledge of the case organisation and the data, regular meetings were held to
achieve investigator triangulation or inter-coder agreement were used. Furthermore,
and as discussed above, respondent validation was also used.
Confirmability
Confirmability refers to the process of establishing the degree to which the findings
of an inquiry are determined by the respondents and conditions of the inquiry and
not by the biases, motivations, interests, or perspectives of the inquirer (Lincoln &
Guba, 1985:290). This criterion was addressed using previously discussed
strategies, specifically, by being as explicit as possible about how the second order
interpretation of the data was conducted. In addition, as discussed above, respondent
validation was also used.
ETHICAL ISSUES
The nature of the data collected in this research raises the prospect of a range of
ethical issues. Some of these issues have been canvassed in the earlier discussion.
This section acknowledges the ethical issues that arose in conducting this research
and specifies strategies for managing them.
First, the identity of the case organisation is apparent from information provided in
this thesis. The organisation has been a model of openness and transparency and has
granted permission for the organisation to be identified.
Second, as stated earlier, a commitment was made to respondents that audio-tapes
and other forms of data would be protected.
Third, when longitudinal research involves the preparation of feedback reports at
particular phases in the data collection, there is a potential that the distinction
between research and intervention becomes blurred. This is also the case when
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organisational members’ expectations are raised in the course of focus group
discussion of organisational change issues, particularly when the researcher is
viewed as a conduit to senior management; a conduit that may not be otherwise
available.
There is no easy remedy. As much care as possible was taken to explain to
respondents that while the aggregated data would be available to the organisation
there could be no guarantee that management would act on it.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has outlined and justified a research design consistent with the aims of
this research. Specifically, it was argued that the most appropriate design for
capturing organisational member interpretations of organisational transformation in a
context thought to be inimical to change leader influence is an interpretive
longitudinal single case study design. The chapter has identified both the strengths
and weaknesses of this design and has identified strategies for minimising its
weaknesses. In addition, procedures used to capture and analyse the data were
specified.
The next four chapters, Chapters 4 - 7, report data on each of the schema change
contexts specified in the research overview provided in Figure 3.1. Specifically,
Chapter 4, the next chapter, reports on organisational members’ constructions of the
pre-existing organisational schema. Chapter 5 reports organisational member
constructions of the managerial/leadership and social process interventions, Chapter
6 on the evolution of constructions of Corporate, and Chapter 7, on the evolution of
constructions of Commercial. Chapter 8 provides an integrative analysis of results
reported across the four chapters.
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CHAPTER 4: PRE-EXISTING SCHEMA
INTRODUCTION
As indicated in Chapter 1, change is viewed as a shift from a pre-existing
organisational schema to a qualitatively new organisational schema (Bartunek, 1993;
Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Bartunek & Reid, 1992). Investigating change requires,
then, an appreciation of both the pre-existing and the new or reconstructed
organisational schema (Beckhard & Harris, 1987).
This chapter identifies respondents’ pre-existing organisational schema. Chapters 5-
7 investigate the efficacy of change leader interventions designed to replace or
significantly elaborate this pre-existing schema in the light of changes in public
policy.
ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
This section provides a brief restatement of the analytical strategy outlined in
Chapter 3. This same analytical strategy is applied in each of the subsequent data
chapters (Chapters 5-7). Analysis is conducted in two stages: the first stage analyses
respondents’ first-order conceptions (Blaikie, 2000; Van Maanen, 1979) of the
traditional organisation, the second stage applies theoretical concepts to explain
first–order concepts.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the pre-existing organisational schema was determined by
asking organisational members to identify the major changes in the organisation over
the previous five years. In their responses, respondents drew contrasts between the
traditional organisation and the emerging organisation. For example, respondents
frequently indicated (in one part of the organisation at least) that we used to just
build roads now we spend most of our time micro-managing budgets.
This contrast reflects a bipolar construct; the left-hand pole reflects the traditional
organisation (road building), the right-hand pole represents a construction of the new
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or emerging organisation (managing budgets). This chapter is concerned only with
identifying the left-hand pole of the bipolar construct. The right-hand pole will
emerge in subsequent chapters as respondent accounts of change of the
contemporary organisation are discussed. In these later discussions, it will be
possible to consider organisational members’ preferences for one pole or the other,
the basis of schema change or lack of change.
This separation of the discussion of pre-existing (left-hand pole) and new or
reframed (right-hand pole) was necessary because the two seminal interventions
identified by respondents created three schema change contexts, though each is
underpinned by the same pre-existing schema. Consequently, the data reported in
this chapter will also be used to facilitate analysis in the subsequent three chapters.
RESULTS
FIRST-ORDER ANALYSIS
Organisational purpose
Respondents commented on what they saw as the core purpose of the traditional
organisation: the organisation was driven by a single purpose: road building; or in
more colloquial terms, laying black stuff. It was a department that builds and
maintains roads, full stop (Focus Group R1C).
Moreover, respondents suggested that the organisation was operations-driven rather
than strategy-driven: the organisation:
Existed because it existed; engineers who were totally focused on the aim to
provide more roads and more efficient roads regardless of any social or
environmental costs ran Main Roads (Focus group R1A).
One implication of this operations focus was limited concern for the future or how
emerging strategic issues would impact on the organisation. This operational
orientation existed at all levels of the organisation:
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I remember walking into the [former Director-General’s] office and he’d be
looking over a bunch of maps and that was his thing, like, a very strong
engineering focus (Focus Group R1HH).
The focus on proficient and operations-driven road building was, however, at the
expense of concern with other critical organisational processes. In particular, the
perception was that longer term issues confronting the organisation were not
addressed. For example, the organisation faced losing a large number of its
experienced technical professionals to retirement, yet there was a perception that
little had been done address this problem.
Respondents described the organisation as being motivated by a strong commitment
to high level proficiency; a commitment to and pride in technical excellence. Some
technical professional staff had developed international reputations based on
publication of their work in various technical disciplines:
The feeling of pride of workmanship, everyone used to have in the
Department, there’s still that pride and hard work but there’s so much more
to do now (Focus Group R1A).
The organisation was described as a can-do organisation not only in terms of the
technical function but also the administrative function; organisational members had
the ability to get the job done whatever the obstacles. Indeed, the level of collective
confidence was such that the organisation was perceived as arrogant by members of
other public sector organisations (Senior Manager interview), a perception
acknowledged at all levels of the organisation.
This conception of the organisation as a can-do organisation was reinforced by
organisational story-telling. Stories detailing risks and challenges overcome in the
face of diverse geographical and technical problems associated with the construction
and maintenance of the State’s road network were heavily reflected in respondents’
accounts.
Respondents see the organisation as a leader in terms of its readiness for early
adoption of new technologies and new government policy initiatives. It was an
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organisation at the cutting edge (Focus Group R1A), able to solve any problem
confronting it.
As will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, the subsequent truncation of the
organisation into strategic-owner and commercialised-provider directly affected core
organisational purpose: the owner sub-organisation was required to develop a
strategic and systemic orientation to the development of the road network, a function
for the most part lacking in the traditional organisation. The commercialised
provider sub-organisation was expected to be a profit-driven provider of
infrastructure delivery services.
Relational environment
Respondents described the organisation’s traditional relationship with its stakeholder
environment as limited: relatively little consultation with external stakeholders
occurred; decisions were made internally on technical grounds:
A: Oh, I think probably the biggest change I’ve noticed is the change in what we do, like um when I first joined the department we just built roads we never consulted anyone General laughter B: Doesn’t matter if anyone wants it or not A: We never considered pedestrians General laughter C: Much noise, or rubbish in the water streams. I noticed the biggest change is the scope of the work, there’s so much more thought for other people, consultation, it’s actually probably made a remarkable difference in the amount of black stuff we put down but we are certainly doing it more considerately now.
Researcher: So that’s a very positive thing? C: Well yes, I think so. We never even used to worry about giving anyone refuge when they were crossing the road, we used to have medians with slopes like that (steep slope indicated), now we don’t do anything like that, and we never considered any room on the pavement for bikes, cyclists they just weren’t even considered I guess. They didn’t pay registration, so they had no right to be there!
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Laughter Researcher: Would that be right? A: Yea, pretty well C: There were certainly a smaller number of them back in those days J: And we never consulted anyone about our plans. We kept all our plans secret and we never mentioned a word about any projects we had coming up, did we? A: No, no that was all C: First thing you would have known was when the trucks arrived B: Or a resumption notice A: Yea, in the mail. Yea, so we’re becoming more caring and considerate. It hasn’t necessarily translated into more roads C: No, less actually I think
Moreover, the organisation operated relatively autonomously of regulatory agencies
due to unique Federal and State funding arrangements. This autonomy allowed
organisational members to become very good at what they did, build roads: however,
at the same time it reduced the organisation’s capacity to coordinate policy
development and operations with the wider state public sector.
The internal relational environment of the traditional organisation was portrayed as
very hierarchical, which in turn was reinforced by a rigid status structure: it tended to
be paternalistic and authoritarian; engineers were god. Yet, at the same time, a large
proportion of employees had long tenure in the organisation, liked being part of
Main Roads, and took pride in organisational membership; there was a Main Roads
family, even thought one interviewee was later to describe it as a dysfunctional
family.
The traditional relational environment also placed little value on and little sensitivity
to gender, cultural or disciplinary diversity. The traditional organisation was
dominated by white male engineers. Women tended to report the traditional
organisation as paternalistic. Input from women received a pat on the head with
little evidence that their input was being taken seriously.
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As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, change leader interventions sought to
fundamentally transform the internal and external relational environment as the
organisation positioned itself within a Whole-of-Government policy context.
Organisational members had to engage with external stakeholders and with internal
stakeholders in a fundamentally different way. Thus subsequent change
interventions would result in significant discontinuity in organisation-environment
relationships.
Managerial and leadership processes
Respondents described the organisation’s traditional management style as hard
engineering leadership and an I say – you obey, big stick management style.
However, respondents also reported that managers cared for and took an interest in
staff. Traditional managers:
Came through the engineering stream and they were very strong willed
people shall we say …. The department was driven from that engineering
focus. We seem to have lost that really hard leadership we had back in those
days with the very senior engineers who were technical leaders (Focus Group
R1A)
The top down hierarchical management style was reinforced by the organisation’s
limited governance structure. The top four managers were responsible for
organisational decision making. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the Leadership
Change Trajectory, this governance structure was elaborated to include the top 25
managers.
Respondents frequently referred to authority and discipline as key characteristics of
the traditional organisation. Respondents tended to view organisational discipline as
a positive characteristic, it reduced ambiguity:
If you were late they drew a red line across the attendance book and you
were answerable. It honestly didn’t do me that much harm because I’m still
working here and you knew exactly where you stood. You knew what was
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right, and you knew what was wrong, and if you did the crime well, then,
basically you had to do the time
Organisational members also reported a high obedience orientation, a characteristic
that would seem paradoxical in a professional organisation. Organisational members
reported we are an obedient lot … we do what we are told (Interview Senior
Manager R2). An implication of being obedient is a tendency to look to the top for
direction in non-routine situations and to limit questioning of top-down decisions.
As will be seen in subsequent chapters, requests for clear unequivocal direction from
the top and problematic bottom-up communication tended to be thematic.
In addition, respondents reported the existence of a blame culture in the organisation.
Managers viewed the expression of conflicting points of view as pockets of
resistance (Focus Group R1D), thereby censoring organisational communication.
The organisation was conflict averse, at least in terms of the open expression of
dissenting points of view. Conflict tended to find expression in organisational
politics. Respondents reported examples of people looking after their own turf and a
silo mentality (Focus Group R1C).
Respondents reported that the traditional organisation was characterised by a belief
that there is a right way to do everything. The large-scale human process
intervention discussed in the next chapter was designed to develop managerial and
leadership processes. The intended shift was away from authority/obedience
management to one that engaged and inspired people to contribute to organisational
outcomes.
Organisational design
Respondents also gave significant discussion time to the organisation’s design.
Structurally, the organisation was highly decentralised and spatially differentiated, a
trend that began in the early 1960s. The organisation consists of a Head Office, four
regions and fourteen districts nested within the four regions. Respondents described
the organisation as having fourteen different cultures, one for each district. These
local cultures were so strong that each culture had difficulty talking to the others:
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The culture of the organisation is split and it’s split around the regions,
they’ve got their own culture because it’s the way we do it round here but we
want to do it our own way, and the trouble is you can’t interact with them
because they have different terms right across the whole state, and we really
need to get corporate standards, corporate policies to bring the
Organisational culture back into it when everybody starts to talk the same
language (Focus Group R1A).
Respondents reported that one significant outcome of high level decentralisation was
a strong tendency to develop customised systems and procedures to fit local
circumstances. This customisation was to later become a significant issue as
transformational change required greater connectivity to enable better management
control and better management reporting.
In addition, traditionally, professionals tended to operate autonomously of
regulation, guidelines or policy. Local decisions were made on the basis of
professional judgement; there was little codification of professional or administrative
knowledge; organisational knowledge was, for the most part, tacit (Lam, 2000).
Moreover, performance reporting was limited; local staff did what was required and
did it well and that was all that was required:
Before we could just manage our own technical assessments and the way we
were going to work out on the road … before it was sort of black and white,
yes or no answer (Focus Group R1A)
The development of local autonomy and the customisation of processes and services
were facilitated by spatial differentiation. Distance from Head Office, a neutraliser
of change leader influence (Howell, 1997), served to buffer regions and districts
against change imposed from Head Office. For example, respondents attributed the
organisation’s ability to resist Queensland Transport’s attempts to destroy the culture
of Main Roads during the period of amalgamation in the early to mid-1990s to
strong and autonomous local regions and districts.
In this highly decentralised organisational environment, organisational systems,
technical and administrative, had evolved to satisfy local requirements with little
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consideration of whole-of-organisation or Whole-of-Government considerations.
There was, therefore, very little consistency in systems across the organisation,
contributing to the earlier view that each district had its own culture and had limited
capacity for lateral coordination.
This lack of consistency of systems would pose significant problems for the
transformation of the organisation’s design in the face of the need to standardise
systems to facilitate inter-connectivity and coordination in a Whole-of-Government
environment.
The traditional organisation staff structure was dominated by engineers with
relatively few professionals from non-technical disciplines. The organisation was:
A: Being run by engineers who were totally focused on the aim to provide
more roads
B: So the staffing was different too. It used to be 90% technical people.
C: 99% probably (Focus Group R1A).
The traditional organisational structure also provided career and professional
development opportunities; indeed the evidence suggests the organisation took pride
in its approach to developing and mentoring (providing a training environment)
junior technical professionals. Decentralisation and local autonomy provided
technical and other professionals with a range of on-the-job experiences that
contributed to a highly skilled and proficient work force.
As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, large scale structural change led to a
radical organisation redesign; the organisation was split into owner sub-organisation
and provider sub-organisation, new structures were created within each sub-
organisation aligned with purpose, and technical and administrative systems were
standardised.
Change processes
In addition to conceptions of the traditional formal organisation, respondents also
provided accounts of the organisation’s traditional change management capability.
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Organisational members’ constructions of the organisation’s change management
capability were based on their experience with multiple changes during the 1990s
(Queensland Criminal Justice Commission, 1993; Queensland Government, 1988,
1992a, 1995).
First, there was a growing concern with a Whole-of-Government orientation, greater
levels of policy coordination, and the level of departmentalisation in the public
service; 27 departments were to be reduced to 18. This decision resulted in the case
organisation’s amalgamation, along with three other departments, within a Transport
mega-department. Respondents reported that this period was particularly difficult
for managers and staff. For example, in seeking to build an integrated Transport
culture, the organisation’s CEO sought to destroy individual department cultures
(Stevenson, 1990).
Second, the pursuit of effectiveness and efficiency resulted in public sector wide
development of administrative systems. Along with other major changes occurring
during this time the implementation of these administrative systems placed
significant demands on managers’ change management skills.
Third, the organisation initiated a major change initiative, the Road Reform Program,
which was designed to change the nature of the organisation’s relationships with
providers of road maintenance services, for example Local Government Councils,
and with peak road user organisations. This initiative was viewed as particularly
successful in that it created significant efficiencies and at the same time developed
improved partnerships with providers of road maintenance services and road users
(Queensland Government, 1992b, 1995).
Finally, consistent with national competition policy and state government policy,
there was a clear focus on separating the public sector as strategist and public sector
as provider of services. There was a clear trend toward the corporatisation and
commercialisation of service provision functions. For the case organisation this
policy meant, in 1996, the restructure of the organisation on owner-provider lines.
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This restructure, which constitutes one of the two transformational change
interventions of concern in this research, was particularly difficult and its
implications were still unfolding throughout and beyond the period of this research.
The evolution of new organisational schemata in each arm, labelled Corporate and
Commercial in this thesis, will be analysed in some detail in Chapters 6 and 7
respectively.
Each of these techno-structural changes involved large-scale organisational change.
The appointment of a person with a strong technical/engineering background was a
source of concern in some quarters given the significant change management task
facing the organisation. For example:
When [name deleted] finally got back in, they all threw their hands up and
thought this was great but I personally believe it wasn’t great because I
think, and I come from a technical background, I think [name deleted] sat
back and really didn’t do anything to change the organization. He just
resurrected the old way and ‘we’ll keep building roads’ and to me that
wasn’t the way for the organisation to go ahead (Focus Group R1HG).
Managers were ready to acknowledge that they did not manage these changes
particularly well and reported that we lost our people during this period:
Since 89, the last 11 years has just been [a very busy time in terms of
organisational change]. 89-94 was just flat out. Everything changed all the
time, you never knew where you were coming from or where you were going
to (Focus Group R1A).
The data suggest that, collectively, organisational members evaluated the
organisation’s change management capability negatively; Main Roads is not good at
implementing change (though usually qualified by an observation that they do it
better than other agencies). There was a perception of a siege mentality among
managers in the face of change imposed from outside the organisation. Internally,
change led to fragmentation and the development of a silo mentality.
In summary, respondents reported that the 1990s was a period of fundamental
techno-structural change (see Table 3.3 for a list of key change events in the
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organisation’s history). Problems with the implementation of these changes left
organisational members with the view that the organisation does not manage change
well (thought does it better than other departments).
SECOND-ORDER ANALYSIS
Consistent with the analytical strategy discussed in Chapter 3, this section develops a
second-order analysis of respondents’ first-order concepts (Van Maanen, 1979). As
indicated in Chapter 2, this second-order analysis draws on the concept of schema to
interpret respondents’ accounts of change. This analysis establishes (a)
organisational members’ pre-existing schema and their level of commitment to it,
and (b) the rationale for change from the perspective of change leaders. In
subsequent chapters, this analysis will contribute to insights into the tensions
between pre-existing and new organisational schema.
The pre-existing organisational schema reflects a concern with five organisational
elements; (1) organisational purpose, (2) the organisation’s relational environment,
(3) organisation design, (4) management and leadership processes, closely linked to
change management processes, and (5) how it felt to be a part of the organisation,
the organisation’s climate. It is not surprising that respondents should be concerned
with these issues. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, change leader
interventions sought to effect fundamental change in each of these organisational
elements.
The pre-existing organisational schema can be determined by reading down the right
hand column of Table 4.1. It is noteworthy that this organisational schema was
highly coherent for respondents; it had a configurational quality, not surprising given
the long history of this organisation. Respondents could justify elements of the
schema that might be viewed, from an outsider’s perspective, as somewhat negative.
For example, the traditional command and control management style, while it could
be harsh, was a source of order; there was little ambiguity, everything was black and
white, a positive attribute at that point in time but much less so in a complex
environment created by Whole-of-Government policies and priorities.
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Respondent accounts suggest that Main Roads was a successful, relatively
autonomous, closed, narrowly focused, technically proficient operations-driven road
building organisation. While it was successful at road building relatively little
attention was given to locating the organisation within its longer term strategic
context or with negotiating through conflicts of interest with external stakeholders.
Parallel conclusions have been drawn about traditional public organisations in other
contexts (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).
Paradoxically, organisational success had adverse consequences for the organisation.
When organisations have been successful, there is a tendency for organisational
schema to narrow (Mintzberg, 1979, 1989) as organisations learn to leverage those
capabilities that contributed to this success. Yet the narrowing of focus on a single
goal can be detrimental to long term organisational effectiveness, particularly as
policy environments change.
Mintzberg (1991) refers to this dynamic as contamination. Mintzberg argued that
while organisational effectiveness is a function of narrowing focus on one
organisational “force,” in this case proficiency, if this narrowing occurs at the
expense of other organisational forces, for example, direction or efficiency, then the
organisation faces the prospect of decline as prevailing conditions change.
Miller (1993:117) also referred to the tendency in successful organisations to narrow
their focus in line with those capabilities that had contributed to their success. Miller
agued that this dynamic explains organisational success and organisational failure; a
dynamic he described as the:
Architecture of simplicity: an overwhelming preoccupation with a single
goal, strategic activity, department, or world view – one that increasingly
precludes consideration of any others.
Consequently, the capabilities that made the organisation a successful road builder
were not necessarily those that would serve the organisation’s purposes in a context
defined by declining budgets, increasingly sophisticated and politically aware
stakeholders, increasing frequency and intensity of conflicts of interest, and Whole-
of-Government policy context (Queensland Government, 1995, 2002a).
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In addition, economic development was linked to the enhancement of the private
sector and competition rather than the public sector (Queensland Government,
1992a). Consequently, as discussed in Chapter 1, there has been a tendency to split
the strategic management of a policy context from the operational provision of
services, which are increasingly commercialised, corporatised, or privatised
(McKenna, 2000).
Yet organisational members were highly committed to the concept of the
organisation as an operations-driven road builder. There was a high degree of
professional and organisational identification associated with laying black stuff; it
provided technical professionals with work experiences and careers directly related
to their chosen profession. For non-technical staff, there was a strong vicarious
identification with road building, attested to by the strong commitment of non-
technical staff to the organisation.
Chapters 6 and 7 report an analysis of change leader interventions designed to
separate the underdeveloped strategic and the operational purposes of the
organisation. One implication of this truncation of the organisation was a need to
reframe professional identity, particularly for technical professionals in the strategic-
owner sub-organisation. Seeking to change professional identities is fraught and has
been linked to change failure (Reger et al., 1994).
Organisation-environment relations
Traditional bureaucracies tend to be closed to external influence (Osborne &
Gaebler, 1992); in the case organisation decisions affecting the community tend to
be made on impersonal and technical criteria; experts know what is best for road
users. Respondent accounts suggest that the traditional case organisation was in
large part closed to external influence.
Yet road design and construction has the potential to adversely affect external
stakeholders. The case organisation was the subject of some criticism, indeed
personal attacks (Queensland Government, Undated), in response to its handling of
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some particularly sensitive roads projects. In an increasingly interconnected world
(Bryson, 2004), public managers find openness to external influence is necessary if
outcomes are to serve multiple and frequently competing interests in the context of
declining budgets.
Openness to external influence has implications for intra-organisational
relationships. To manage the greater emphasis on external relationships, the
organisation needs to invest in developing its internal information processing
capabilities (Child & McGrath, 2001). For the case organisation, this required
addressing restrictive traditional vertical and lateral relationships, relationships based
on status, obedience and a low tolerance of ambiguity.
Managerial processes
Respondent accounts of managerial processes were consistent with a command and
control orientation underpinned by technical rationality assumptions (Adams &
Ingersoll, 1990; Perrow, 1986; Schein, 1996). Technical rationality supports
convergent thinking or reductionist thinking, rather than systems thinking (Adams &
Ingersoll, 1990; Schon, 1983; Senge, 1990). Moreover, there was little concern with
what Schein (1988) referred to as a process orientation or how problems were solved
and decisions made.
The demands facing the organisation made command and control and technical
rationality less viable. Organisational managers were faced with the framing and
prioritisation of complex systemic problems both in terms of development of the
state’s road system as well as the management of the organisation’s transformation.
Such problems are typically not amenable to technical rationality and command and
control (Schon, 1983).
Contemporary management perspectives, particularly those drawn from the private
sector, have tended to espouse a greater focus on leadership, on strategic thinking, on
systems thinking, and the importance of relationships (Australian Public Service
Commission, 2004; DiVanna & Austin, 2004; Senge, 1990). Such approaches tend
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to rely more on the capabilities of the organisational members than on organisational
member compliance with managerial commands.
Yet modern management practices impose significant demands on managers.
Issuing commands as the dominant managerial approach is qualitatively different
from managers engaging organisational members in important organisational
decision making, particularly in a technically oriented and spatially differentiated
organisation. The potential for threat and embarrassment increases as leaders engage
with employees in new ways. The experience of threat and embarrassment makes
defensive behaviour more likely and second order or transformational change less
likely (Argyris, 1985).
Consistent with command and control and technical rationality, traditional change
management processes tended to be top-down power/coercive techno-structural
change. The concept of change process schema is reflected in the extant literature on
schema change (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Bartunek, 1993), though in this case
respondents gave much more attention to their constructions of change processes
than was the case in prior research.
Change processes reinforced a strong obedience orientation and low tolerance of
ambiguity at all organisational levels. The black and white way of working relied
less on personal initiative and questioning and more on compliance. Yet
contemporary change management relies on both personal initiative and a propensity
to challenge instructions (Frese & Fay, 2001; Frohman, 1997). However, it is worth
noting that there was also a caring and friendly organisational work climate with a
high level of organisational member commitment to and pride in the organisation.
This obedience orientation may be characteristic of public sector organisations
generally. For example, Schofield (2001) argued that obedience is a key value
inherent in bureaucracy:
Bureaucracy is both useful and durable because it means that governments
can rely upon the obedience of bureaucrats … this obedience is a function of
bureaucratic vocation, the protection of professional reputation and a form
of instrumental motivation.
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Traditionally, change management processes in the Queensland public sector were
not well aligned with espoused Government policy. A former State Government
change agency (Queensland Government, 1990) suggested that change
implementation in Queensland was:
Slow, uneven or incomplete. Recent inquiries into Queensland public
administration are a case in point. The record of implementation was poor
because there was no unit within government with sufficient powers and
inclination to ensure the adoption of their recommendations. Too often the
results of inquiries languish on a shelf … (4).
While no particular reference was made to the case organisation in this report, the
record suggests the organisation’s change management processes ill-prepared the
organisation for the change management problems confronting it during the 1990s.
Managers themselves acknowledged the problem as they addressed the major
techno-structural changes confronting the organisation during this period.
In summary, respondents’ accounts suggest that traditional management-leadership
was authority-obedience oriented. Furthermore, this orientation had value for
organisational members in that ambiguity and uncertainty were minimised.
Nevertheless, this management orientation was less viable as the organisation faced
public policy and large-scale structural change. Successful implementation of
transformational change requires much greater personal initiative across the
organisation and a greater willingness to challenge authority. Chapter 5, Leadership
Change Trajectory, investigates responses to interventions designed to
fundamentally change organisational members’ orientation to leading-managing
processes.
Organisational design
Paradoxically, the organisation already possessed some elements of an organic
design (Child & McGrath, 2001). Indeed, it may have been too organic. The
organisation was highly decentralised and districts and regions had a high level of
autonomy in the way that local demands were met; the organisation consisted of
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fourteen distinct cultures with restricted capacity for lateral communication or
coordination.
The mutual reinforcement of professional autonomy and spatial differentiation is
characteristic of Professional Bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1979) and it is this
characteristic that has been used to explain the difficulty of applying traditional
change approaches to these organisational forms (Leitko & Szczerbacki, 1987).
The dominant professional group was professional engineers. As is the case in many
professional organisations, the design was based on the individual professional
(Mintzberg, 1979). Individual professionals had high levels of autonomy and relied
on on-site professional judgement for decision making; there was little attention
given to codifying knowledge (Mintzberg, 1989). More contemporary conceptions
of organic organisational forms rely more on team working and collective decision
making as organisations pursue greater flexibility and the capacity to enhance their
information processing capabilities (McHugh & Bennett, 1999a, 1999b).
The governance structure consisted of the top four managers, limiting the capacity of
a large number of lower level managers to contribute to or gain an appreciation of
the strategic issues and direction of the organisation. More recent conceptions of
organisational governance tend to highlight the importance of wider representation in
the governance structure, particularly as organisational networks have to cope with
much higher information processing demands (Galbraith & Lawler III, 1993b;
Holmes & Shand, 1995).
The traditional organisation design was evaluated positively, particularly in the
regions and districts (Head Office accounts acknowledged the problems associated
with little inter-district standardisation). Local autonomy and the capacity to decide
how best to meet local contingencies was evaluated positively. Moreover, distance
buffered local organisations from any perceived excesses emanating from Head
Office.
In summary, NPM (see Chapter 1) has placed greater weight on the simultaneous
demands of both organisational flexibility and responsiveness and management
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control and performance measurement than was the case in traditional public
organisations, an approach reinforced by a Whole-of-Government orientation
(Holmes & Shand, 1995; Thurley, 2003). From this perspective the organisation was
under-organised. While the traditional organisation was highly decentralised, less
attention was given to reporting performance against government policies and
priorities. Subsequent interventions were designed to fundamentally change
organisation design in the direction of more standardisation, more centralisation, and
more performance reporting. These interventions are addressed in Chapters 6 and 7.
Emotional tone
Respondents’ accounts reflected an emotional tone or organisational climate
associated with the traditional organisation; organisational members had a strong
sense of their own competence to the point where others perceived the organisation
as arrogant. It was a can-do organisation.
The idea of collective confidence in ability to achieve some particular outcome is
consistent with Bandura’s (1997) conception of perceived collective efficacy beliefs,
potentially a key determinant of group or organisational performance. Bandura
(1997) defines perceived collective efficacy as a group's shared belief in its conjoint
capabilities to organise and execute the courses of action required to produce given
levels of attainment (477).
Pre-empting later discussion, the concept of perceived collective efficacy is raised
here for three reasons. First, the having of it, the loss of it and the regaining of it,
play an important role in the case organisation’s experience of change. Second, the
role of perceived collective efficacy in terms of change management capabilities has
been rarely examined in the literature, despite its likely importance in determining
the outcomes of effective change. Third, perceived collective efficacy would appear
to be a candidate as a dimension of change schema, though it has not been
considered in this light (Lau et al., 2003).
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided a synthesis of organisational members’ representation of
the organisation before transformation. The image reflected in respondents’
accounts suggest the organisation was operations-rather than strategy-driven, closed
rather than open to external influence, focused more on command and control and
technical rationality than on leadership and systems thinking, highly decentralised
with limited lateral coordination and performance reporting, relied on top-down
techno-structural change with less emphasis on organisational capability
development.
It is this collective representation of the organisation that leader change interventions
were designed to replace or significantly elaborate. Subsequent chapters report
organisational member responses to leader-driven interventions designed to
fundamentally change organisational pre-existing schema.
In particular, Chapter 5, the Leadership Change Trajectory, investigates respondents’
constructions of efforts to change the way organisational members construe leading-
managing processes. Chapter 6, the Corporate Change Trajectory, and Chapter 7,
the Commercial Change Trajectory, investigate leader-driven efforts to change
organisational members’ constructions of the fundamental purpose and design of the
organisation. The inter-relationship between these interventions was outlined in
Figure 3.2.
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Table 4.1: Pre-existing organisational schema
Organisational Purpose
• Operations-driven road builder: laying black stuff • Engineering focus • High concern with technical excellence and quality, less
concern with efficiency and the strategic purposes served by road construction
Relational Environment
• Externally, little engagement with stakeholders; secretive with respect to plans
• Internally, authority/obedience style, though with caring and friendly work climate; strong status structure; low tolerance of ambiguity
• Conflict averse upward, tended toward obedience. Horizontal conflict reflected in organisational politics, silo mentality.
Leading-managing Processes
• Hard engineering leadership; technical rationality • Limited governance structure • Ambiguity intolerant: black and white, one-right-way
orientation • Authority-obedience orientation
Organisation Design
• Highly decentralised & customised systems and service delivery: fourteen different cultures
• Individual-based structure relying on professional judgement: little codification of knowledge
• Lateral coordination limited • Single dominant discipline • Predictable and controllable career & development
opportunities • Autonomous and in-house capacity for organisational
tasks Change process • Techno-structural change often implemented using
power/coercive means; Main Roads doesn’t manage change well but does it better than other departments
Emotional tone • Can-do organisation; high levels of collective confidence in ability to get the job done despite obstacles
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CHAPTER 5: LEADERSHIP CHANGE TRAJECTORY
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter identified respondents’ pre-existing organisational schema. It
is this schema, in large part inadequate in the context of a radically changing
organisational environment, that change leader interventions are designed to replace
or significantly elaborate(Bartunek, 1993; Bartunek & Moch, 1987).
This chapter investigates the efficacy of large-scale human process interventions
(French & Bell, 1995; Waddell et al., 2004) for achieving qualitative change in
organisational members’ construction of what it means to lead and manage in the
context of a performance-driven Whole-of-Government policy environment.
RESEARCH GOALS
Previous research on the relationship between change leader interventions and
organisational schema change has focused on structural interventions. This chapter
explores the efficacy of large-scale human process interventions and organisational
leading-managing process schema change. As discussed in Chapter 2, efficacy from
the perspective of this thesis has four elements (a) whether organisational members
view the intervention as facilitative, (b) whether there is evidence of change in
schema content, (c) whether the interventions reinforce dynamics thought to
underpin schema change, and (d) whether the interventions are sensitive to change
management context.
THE INTERVENTIONS
Figure 3.2 (Chapter 3) shows how the research reported in this chapter is located
within the transformation of the case organisation. The large-scale human process
intervention post-dates the structural intervention that truncated the organisation into
strategic-owner and commercialised-provider by two years. Temporal order has not
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been followed in this analysis because the large-scale human process intervention
overarches both sub-organisations created by the structural intervention.
Large-scale human process interventions seek to transform human process
capabilities. Waddell, Cummings & Worley (2004:219) define an organisational
human process intervention as:
A change program directed at improving such processes as organisational
problem solving, leadership, visioning and task accomplishment between
groups for a major subsystem, or for an entire organisation.
In this case organisation, the large-scale human process interventions included; (a) an
organisational vision and mission that would locate the organisation within a broader
Whole-of-Government context, (b) the inculcation of two complementary leading –
managing frameworks that would enable organisational members to address the
complex problems facing them as they sought to realise the vision, and (c) the
creation of an interpersonal and social climate in which organisational members felt
safe enough to share information irrespective of status and hierarchical differences.
Each element of the intervention is outlined in more detail in subsequent sub-
sections.
The themes underpinning the large-scale human process intervention are consistent
with those reflected in the contemporary management literature. Modern
management espouses the need to think strategically (DiVanna & Austin, 2004;
Garratt, 2003; Heracleous, 1998), to think systemically (Gharajedaghi, 1999;
Maddock, 2002; Senge, 1990), and to think relationally (National Institute for
Governance, 2003).
The new framework was designed to replace or significantly elaborate organisational
members’ traditional conception of leading and managing. As discussed in Chapter
4, the pre-existing leading-managing schema was characterised by (a) a command
and control orientation underpinned by technical rationality assumptions, (b) though
the working environment was described as caring and friendly, internal
communication was constrained by a rigid status system and a narrow governance
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structure, and (c) the focus was on operations management with little apparent
attention given to the long term strategic issues facing the organisation.
While pre-existing capabilities had contributed to a very successful road building
organisation, they were less appropriate in the context of the significant strategic,
operational, and change management problems facing the organisation operating in a
Whole-of-Government environment (Queensland Government, 2001). Each element
of the large-scale human process intervention will now be outlined in more detail.
A NEW VISION
In 1998, a new stretch vision and mission for the organisation was framed. The
vision was to:
Position the organisation as the premier roads infrastructure delivery agency
in Australia and Asia-Pacific. More specifically, to achieve a road network
that Queenslanders value – improving the liveability of communities,
affording safe travel conditions, supporting economic development, reducing
transport costs, promoting environmental care and we will do this in
partnership with Queensland Transport; we will do this as an active,
innovative, creative partner in the Transport portfolio (Queensland
Government, Undated).
In 2000, a new Director-General framed a new vision that was congruent with that of
his predecessor:
Main Roads aspires to be valued by Government, the community and industry
for its technical strength and its culture of “getting on with the job.” We are
working towards being a leading service delivery agency in the Australian
and Asia-Pacific public sector – an agency which attracts increasing
investment by State and Commonwealth Governments because we are
reliable, skilled, well-managed and exceed expectations in supporting key
policy agendas, such as job creation, regional development, diversity, equity
and social justice (Golding, 2000).
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The new visions were designed to position Main Roads within a wider Whole-of-
Government context and to provide staff with a clear sense of direction and focus for
their activities.
LEADING-MANAGING FRAMEWORK
The Three Frames, which is shown in Figure 5.1, is an abstract, open systems, and
content-free model of leading and managing that provides managers and staff at all
levels and in all functions with a process for realising the objectives of their sub-
units, technical or administrative projects, or of change management initiatives.
The model is based on the idea that managers realise vision and mission by (a)
creating alignment of both the organisation’s psycho-social subsystem and its
technical subsystem, (b) creating and sustaining alignment through open two-way
communication and a willingness to get the best possible outcomes for all
stakeholders involved, and (c) evaluating their performance in terms of the strategy,
their financial and delivery performance, stakeholder relationships, operations, and
people and learning.
The new mission and vision and the Three Frames were widely promulgated via
video (Queensland Government, Undated), wall posters, and face to face
communication by the Director-General and by designated staff. In addition, senior
and middle level managers were encouraged to participate in leadership development
programs that addressed, if not the model, the skills prerequisite to implementing the
model.
In 2001, a second leading-managing model designed to complement the Three
Frames (see Figure 5.2) by providing an alternative conception of the Balanced
Scorecard Frame was introduced. This framework consisted of five change themes,
the Five Signposts of Success, that would guide:
The operation of the department as a whole, and guide us in our individual
roles (Golding, 2001).
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Figure 5.1: The Three Frames; Aligning for Success (Source: (Varghese, 1998)).
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Figure 5.2: The Five Signposts of Success (Source: (Golding, 2001)).
In both models, leadership and learning played key roles, though they were more
explicit in the Five Signposts:
Leadership development and the calibre of our leaders are vital for our
success. I expect our leaders to be capable of communicating our vision and
objectives to all staff and inspiring their commitment to work across
functional areas, engage with peers, staff and the community in a relational
and inclusive manner (Golding, 2000).
CREATING A SUPPORTIVE RELATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Both leaders took the view that the application of the Three Frames and the Five
Signposts could only occur in a supportive social environment, which in turn
involves breaking down the restricted communication characteristic of the traditional
organisation. Both models require the open exchange of information independently
of the status and organisational level of those involved. Managing complex
problems and organisational learning requires a social environment in which
information can be shared without fear of retribution.
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Both change leaders sought to create a safe environment in which organisational
members could feel free to exchange relevant information independently of level and
status. At senior levels of the organisation, this was facilitated by introducing what
were referred to as check-ins and check-outs at meetings, and a process of calling
behaviours to confront behaviour that was inconsistent with, for example, open two-
way interpersonal communication.
In 2001, the concept of a safe environment was elaborated to include an inclusive
environment. The One-department and Main Roads family policies were an
acknowledgement of and response to the social and structural divisions in the
organisation. These divisions were inhibiting the management of complex strategic
and operational problems. An inclusive social environment was intended to repair
fractured organisational relationships and increase organisational cohesion.
In summary, the large-scale human process interventions were designed to enhance
collective leadership and management capabilities. The intervention consisted of (a)
a new stretch vision, (b) two leading-managing frameworks designed to facilitate
realisation of the vision, and (c) the creation of a safe, inclusive social environment
to replace the adversarial climate created, in part, by radical structural change (see
Chapters 6 and 7).
ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the analysis is conducted in two stages. The first
stage involves a first-order analysis of respondents’ accounts (Van Maanen, 1979) of
the large-scale human process interventions. Consistent with this approach, as rich
an account as possible is provided of these accounts (Seale, 1999).
However, respondent accounts of the large-scale human process interventions were
more limited than expected. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, the data
across the four data collection rounds have been amalgamated. However, note that,
given the relationship between the large-scale human process intervention and the
radical structural intervention, these data are discussed again in subsequent chapters.
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The second-order analysis of organisational members’ accounts (Van Maanen, 1979)
interprets the first-order analysis in the light of extant schema change theory
discussed in Chapter 2.
RESULTS
FIRST ORDER ANALYSIS
Respondent accounts of the transformation of the case organisation suggest that the
new vision and Three Frames/Five Signposts were not well incorporated, as an
integrated framework, into organisational discourse. However, one element of the
integrated framework, the relationship frame or being relational, was.
In the light of these results, this analysis will examine respondents’ accounts of each
element of the intervention, vision, Three Frames/Five Signposts, and relationship
frame.
Leader vision
Top level leaders’ vision had limited explicit impact on organisational members’
attention or focus. Indeed, a consistent theme in the data across the period of the
research was that organisational members experienced high levels of uncertainty
about the future of Main Roads and wanted more clarity about this future:
It was anyone’s guess where the organisation will be in five years time
(Focus Group R3-1).
It is difficult to know where the future of the organisation lies as higher
management has not communicated its overall plan: and staff is unsure and
concerned about job security and future direction (Focus Group R3-5).
There is still some uneasiness about which path the organisation will take
with commercialisation; there was a perceived risk that commercial
operations will be privatised or corporatised, which would then split Main
Roads entirely (Focus Group R3C).
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Respondents felt that what happens in the organisation’s future is outside their
control. It is:
Dependent on the political climate of the time (Focus Group R3-3); and
People have little control over what happens in the future; it’s all up to
management. We just do the work (Focus Group R3C); and
Rumours about organisational restructuring abound. Filtered messages
have created concerns and confusion (Focus Group R3-3).
The future was also unclear because respondents felt that managers were:
Not linking systems, people, and policy issues to the bigger picture (Focus
Group R3F); and there is:
Fragmentation and disunity throughout the state related to how Main Roads
should be and where it is going and people are very comfortable within their
silos (Focus Group R2B).
The data suggest that organisational members were not attending to the future as it
was defined by organisational leaders but were attending to that future controlled by
forces outside the organisation. The concept of vision assumes that those involved
believe that their actions influence the realisation of the vision. In this organisation,
organisational members felt they were pawns in a much larger game.
Organisational members had some evidence to support this conclusion. The
organisation had been amalgamated (and explicit efforts made to destroy its culture
(Stevenson, 1990), de-amalgamated (along with the perceived threat of being re-
amalgamated), and split on owner-provider lines; all of these changes were imposed,
all were controversial, and all caused dislocation. Several focus groups reported the
existence of a siege mentality in the organisation in the face of these experiences.
Respondents also suggested there were pre-existing beliefs that resulted in a
discounting of the future:
You’re talking about planning, the scenario planning which was the future
planning stuff with some of our people, it was actually mainly engineers. It
was actually very hard to get some of them to focus on something that was
right out there instead of something that was actually going on. That’s some
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of our very senior people because they didn’t really see the value, and some
of them still don’t, don’t see the value in actually looking out and seeing
what’s coming up in the future and that’s been one of the real challenges
with the policy review, I guess, that we’ve undertaken in that we are starting
to say, well how, you know, this is how we can start to remain relevant in the
future and there are some that are saying, well, let’s just get the job done;
it’s a mentality of well why am I bothered sitting here talking about this
stuff when there’s actually roads to be built and things to be done out there
and I’m too busy to be involved in that. Thankfully that group is shrinking;
there is a realization that, yes OK, well future planning is really important
and we do have to start looking at some pretty major uncertainties. (Focus
group R1HG)
Discounting the future resulted in a culture clash between the pre-existing
engineering culture and the strategic-managerial culture:
Yeah, I think it’s about, um, different, um, I think when I came it was very
much about the engineering focus. Jim came in; he wasn’t an engineer. He
had a strategic focus; he had an interest in longer term things, um, and I
think it was a change. I guess it was a bit of a clash of the engineering
culture and the strategic culture and it’s like you’re talking about: you’ve got
the difference between planners and engineers; they never work well
together, and the strategists and doers never...you know, there’s always that
merging thing (Focus group R1A)
Despite the widespread uncertainty about the organisation’s future direction, some
respondents did see a perceptual shift as a result of the new vision:
I saw us as being very arrogant in our view of how we saw external things we
existed just because we existed. [Jim] put us more back in focus of how we
actually fit into the Whole-of-Government agenda and the whole of society in
the community and where we really fit and I think there’s still a lot of more
work to come but I think that has been a really big shift in the last few years
that everybody sort of takes a look back and being slapped on the knuckles
for not being externally relational and not considering how we fit and how
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we look. So that’s how I see it. So that’s how I see the really big changes
that Jim Varghese brought in (Focus Group R1A).
The evidence reported here suggests the new vision did not capture organisational
members’ attention or focus. Contributing factors were perceptions of lack of
control over the future, a focus on perceived threats, and a discounting of the future.
The Three Frames and the Five Signposts
Respondent accounts suggest that neither the Three Frames nor the Five Signposts
were well integrated conceptually or practically. Nevertheless, there were excellent
examples of their application. Application of the Three Frames is evident in the
planning of change in both Corporate Main Roads and Commercial Main Roads.
For example, the development of Project 21 discussed in Chapter 7 appears to have
been influenced by the Three Frames (among other change management models).
Consistent with recent thinking on leadership (Brien, 2002; Cenek, 1995;
Golembiewski & Sun, 1991; Nutt, 1992; Nyhan, 2000; Vallas, 2003), the change
leader expanded the organisation’s governance structure to encompass the top 25
managers. Participation would seem to be a critical issue in a spatially differentiated
Professional Organisation. If significant change is to be implemented successfully
then it requires that all those who would have a responsibility for implementation
would need a clear understanding of what was involved.
One manager commented that:
When Jim Varghese came he instituted the concept of the EMG [Executive
Management Group] and that was something we hadn’t done before –
getting a shared understanding at that level has probably been the single
biggest thing Jim did (Corporate Manager, Round 1).
Respondent reports suggest that the pre-existing organisation provided few
opportunities for participation in organisational decision making at the top of the
organisation or elsewhere. For example, the organisational governance structure
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consisted of the top four managers. This orientation to organisational management is
consistent with the traditional view of engineering (Beder, 1998):
In Main Roads it was very much we do the work and we do what we’re told
(Focus group R1).
Yet there is little evidence that the models had the desired pervasive influence across
the organisation. For some organisational members, the Three Frames is:
Just a poster on the wall with little impact on day to day work (Focus Group
R14).
Respondents found the Three Frames complex. Organisational members charged
with explaining the model to the organisation found it difficult to do so:
You can hear Jim explain it (Three Frames) and it made perfect sense and
someone else would try to explain it and it would be a bit of a muddle. So
Jim made an effort to get around and explain it personally but it wasn’t
always possible. I believe that where he was able to successfully do that, it
was embedded …
When Jim identified that it wasn’t filtering down he put together a Road
Show. Where he had a video and slide and he made them all go out and
deliver this to their region and what a lot of feedback we were getting is that
they would sort of get up there and go ‘Oh. You’ve heard about this Three
Frames stuff, I’ve got to tell you about it because Jim told me to, and that is
just not selling it. A lot of them had trouble understanding it themselves
(Focus Group R1HG).
Focus groups often reported that the relationship between the Three Frames and the
Five Signposts was a source of confusion. While the Five Signposts was an
alternative to the Balanced Scorecard Frame of the Three Frames, this was not clear
to organisational members nor does it appear to have been explained. Consequently,
the Five Signposts, instead of contributing to greater understanding of the leading
and managing processes, contributed to greater complexity and confusion.
In addition, technical professional managers who tried to manage using a process
orientation were not always well received:
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I don’t think it’s been all that successful and I tend to call them content-free
managers. I find it very strange for technical people to leave their
technology behind even though they are still managing a technology group.
And what’s happened of course with these managers, in my view, they’ve lost
direction, there’s no vision; the fact that they tend to stand aloof in the
organisation, if you like. People with technology will say where are we
going with this stuff? That’s one of the other changes I see as being a great
detriment to this department (Focus Group R1A).
However, respondents also attributed the model (and its author) with stimulating
transformational change. For example, one focus group reported that:
Quite clearly Jim Varghese has been the biggest influence for change in this
department. I think that Three Frames philosophy as he drove it certainly
has got departmental support. He achieved that from being an outsider in a
very short period of time and I think that’s starting to pay a lot of dividends.
It’s the non-rational things that we weren’t good at before … A long way to
go but we’re in the right direction (Focus Group R1B).
Respondents recognised the role of the Three Frames model in changing the
department, yet believed that it did not go far enough in that technical issues facing
the organisation were not addressed by the model (despite the fact that the model
was abstract enough to cover this situation):
Well, with the Three Frames he actually started to change the whole
organisation, he was one of the few people who have been able to do that. If
he had taken a few more steps and said we are now going to operate under
corporate procedures, corporate standards if they had have been brought out
stronger more change would have taken place. That’s the silent bit. But I
think that’s because the culture of the organisation is split and it’s split
around the regions, they’ve got their own culture because it’s the way we do
it round here but we want to do it our own way, and the trouble is you can’t
interact with them because they have different terms right across the whole
state, and we really need to get corporate standards, corporate policies to
bring the organisational culture back into it when everybody starts to talk the
same language (Focus Group R1A).
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Furthermore, while there is no explicit evidence, the non-linear nature of the model
may have posed difficulties for professionals socialised to think in linear sequential
ways. It is interesting to consider the Three Frames and the Five Signposts as
cultural artefacts. The author of the Five Signposts found it necessary to reinterpret
the circular relationship among the Three Frames into a linear sequential form,
despite the fact that he was clearly seeing the model in systemic terms.
In summary, the Three Frames did have influence; however, it has not had the
pervasive and transforming influence intended. There is no evidence that managers
or staff, at the collective level, use the models explicitly to guide the management of
organisational subunits, manage projects, or manage change, a conclusion that will
be reinforced in the next two chapters.
Relationship Frame
While the Three Frames and the Five Signposts were not well integrated in the
organisation, one important element of these frameworks was. Organisational
members accepted the need for a relational orientation and this was widely reflected
in organisational discourse:
Through the leadership agenda and relationship frame, the biggest key
change has been the recognition that it doesn’t matter how good any of the
systems, processes and products are, if Main Roads doesn’t learn to play in
the sand pit well, everyone is going to get into trouble (Focus group R1HH).
Furthermore, there was significant evidence that this orientation prompted a number
of efforts to improve intra- and inter-organisational relationships (Queensland
Government, Undated). The Relationship Frame promoted open two-way
communication among all organisational members; status differences were de-
emphasised in the interests of the exchange of relevant and accurate task
information, a necessary outcome in the light of increased information flows
resulting from greater organisational openness.
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By walking the talk and challenging senior managers and making them accountable,
the change leader has had a major influence on the organisation and there have been
significant change in 60-year-old engineers in the way they deal with people:
The SMG [Senior Management Group] has turned the corner; they
understand better the value of working relational and have become more
sympathetic to the needs of workers in the lower levels of the organisation
(Focus Group R1HI).
Furthermore, there was a perception that the intervention has:
Pushed the relational envelope and although it has caused some angst in
parts of the organisation, there is a growing recognition that being relational
is inevitable if the Department is to survive and be a viable competitive
business in the future. It has been a subtle change but one that has had far-
reaching ramifications for the department (Focus Group R1C).
However, some respondents expressed reservations about how well embedded being
relational was. For example, some respondents said there has not been enough time
to embed any cultural change and the process is very affected by change in the
Director-General and the government (Focus Group R1HI). Furthermore, Head
Office is:
A very volatile environment, as you have to live the politics and people have
to realise that there will not be any instant gratification; it’s going to take
many years to introduce change and have it filter down through the
organisation (Focus Group R1HI).
While most respondents reported that that the level of consultation both internally
and externally has improved in the Department, respondents felt that the relational
frame had not been translated into what was happening operationally. There were
concerns that organisational members were not able to communicate their concerns
about career paths, training, resourcing, and workloads more effectively and openly
with management:
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Management needs to start listening to and accepting feedback from staff at
the workplace level rather than relating to staff as if they were a line on a
graph (Focus Group R1A).
The evidence also suggests that pre-existing relationships across the organisation
tended to be dysfunctional. In 1996, the organisation was split on strategic-owner
and commercialised-provider lines (a change developed in Chapters 6 and 7). The
strategic-owner – commercialised-provider split was described as a messy divorce
rather than a planned separation (Focus Group R3A). Former colleagues refused to
talk to each other, resources were hidden to minimise claims by the other sub-
organisation. The perception was that one side was involved in empire building
while the other struggled to make ends meet.
In addition, there were dysfunctional conflicts within each arm of the organisation.
Focus groups reported that, in the absence of a strategy for business success,
business units in the Provider arm adopted individualistic and competitive behaviour
in their relationships with other business units (Queensland Government, Undated).
Similar problems occurred in the owner sub-organisation; focus groups reported an
increase in fragmentation and a tendency toward a silo mentality in various parts of
the organisation.
The embedding of the relationship frame was also reinforced because the new
Director-General was also strongly committed to promoting a relational orientation
in the organisation (Golding, 2000). Indeed, he indicated his desire to be known as:
The Director-General of the era of relationships
A manager made a similar point:
Under Jim, the department became forward looking, modern practices, and
leadership – where common sense prevails and this approach has continued
under Steve. Steve has conveyed strong and decisive leadership and positive
messages (Manager Interview, Round 1).
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A relational orientation was also reinforced by a greater use of participative decision
making techniques such as the Fish Bowl technique, Accountability Mapping and
achievement planning:
Meetings (of 25 managers) are done in a circle. Managers concerned go
into the inner circle with two empty seats and anyone who wanted to could
come into the vacant seats. Someone took on purchaser/provider
relationships; we are no longer doing internal purchaser provider except
[organisational sub-unit] (Director-General Interview)
I took all my capabilities and linked them to everyone else in the department
so everyone’s capabilities and functions are linked to the D-G’s. Two people
maintained no linked capabilities with the D-G. These positions were
removed. Accountability Mapping is useful because it shows where
duplication lies and what work you are doing. It mapped out the empires.
This was used to focus every position and then got an achievement plan and
disaggregated this against the Balanced Scorecard [one of the Three
Frames]. People thought this was ambitious; I just wanted an 80/20 plan
(Director-General Interview).
To facilitate vertical communication, organisational members were invited to
communicate directly with the Director-General through a direct phone link; the D-
G’s Hotline, though the Hotline was not always well received:
By setting up a Hotline I believed it would be good to get a feeling how
people felt about the system. Outcomes exceeded this. Some managers were
very hostile to it. A lot of managers would say they agreed but would do
something different. When a problem occurred they had learning stages …
they would have meetings and ask why things went wrong, how it would be
fixed next time and what to do if it happens again? When it happened a third
time, delegations were taken from them and double-loop learning
implemented. They sat an exam. This was circulated around the department
to lead to better financial plans which lead to culture change (Interview
Director-General).
Moreover, there was some risk associated with being too open:
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Just recently, quite a senior member of staff had actually put a message on
the D-G’s Hotline and it’s questioning portfolio roles and we’ve been told
it’s OK to put things on the D-G’s hotline, but I think a very strong message
has gone back to that person that the Main Roads culture says you don’t
question – and the gentleman put his name to it as well – so you don’t
question at that sort of level how the portfolio is working, and a bit of a wrap
over the knuckles over that one, so again you say one thing: please be open
and question and so forth, and when it is done, it’s well no, look, I know that
it says that but it’s really not appropriate to do that because you are
questioning some fundamental stuff between the portfolio, and leave that up
to the D-G’s initiative to question (Focus group R1HG).
Developing a relational orientation was also reinforced by a greater emphasis on
interpersonal process (Schein, 1988, 1999). The concern with interpersonal process
was demonstrated at senior management levels of the organisation. Focus groups
and interviews reported that prior to change, the interpersonal dynamics in the top
team were characterised by dysfunctional conflict and territorial behaviour.
A process intervention in top team meetings, check-ins and check-outs, were
designed to contribute to the development of more open confrontation of conflict. A
check-in involved senior managers reporting publicly on thoughts and feelings that
might impact on their orientation to or behaviour in the meeting. A check-out
enabled a similar sharing at the end of the meeting to achieve closure. One senior
manager instituted this approach in his own team meetings:
Ever since Jim came I start all meetings with a check-in and finish them with
a check-out. I find this very good. This is one thing that Jim brought here
which is a tangible thing that you can notice and works very well. I don't
know if it's changed the productivity of the department, I don't know
(Interview Corporate Manager).
Another manager commented on the efficacy of Varghese’s preference for face-to-
face communication and the effect this had on operational staff:
When Jim first joined that was a real revelation as well. He came out and
actually spoke to a lot of the guys on our projects on Logan Road not once
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but twice and that went over really well with the blokes. Here’s someone
who’s interested enough to come out and talk to them and listen to what their
problems are, their fears, and act on them (Queensland Government,
Undated).
For another manager the efficacy of the process approach resided in valuing people:
Role of D-G in promoting a different kind of culture was vital; Jim believed
in people and gave [organisational members] permission to take care of
people (Manager Interview).
The concern with interpersonal process was also reflected in Varghese’s approach to
conflict resolution. There was a clear attempt to create new conflict management
norms at senior levels in the organisation:
Every manager would shaft the other ones. I made it clear this was a safe
environment. When it happened again I invited them in and told them what
each had said about the other. This gave the impression that I was happy to
hear about each problem as long as the other person was present (Director-
General Interview).
A relational orientation was also reinforced by initiating a process of identifying and
resolving blockages to organisational transformation. A participative process was
employed to facilitate the identification of significant problems constraining
organisational change. Each major problem was then delegated to a committee for
clarification and resolution.
A relational orientation was also reinforced by the publication of cases of successful
negotiations with external stakeholders. A number of success stories documenting
how technical project leaders were able to negotiate mutually satisfactory outcomes
with the community were published and widely disseminated (Department of Main
Roads, Undated).
Another manager reported relational problems with contractors and the community
on a particularly sensitive roads project, to the point where departmental officers
were subject to personal attacks. The manager reported that by using a relational
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approach, relationships with these stakeholders on the project were significantly
improved (Queensland Government, Undated). As a result of the organisational
stories about these experiences, the idea that Main Roads is good at building
external relationships is widely acknowledged in organisational discourse across the
organisation.
The Relationship Frame also seemed to be accepted in the organisation because the
notion of relationships, particularly professional-client relationships, resonated with
pre-existing professional values. As a part of their socialisation, professionals
assume that what they do is directed toward helping a client solve a problem (Beder,
1998). Focus group reports suggest that some, even if limited, consultation occurred
in the traditional organisation. The much increased demand for, say, community
consultation, already had roots within the existing organisation.
The commitment to a relational orientation continued following the change in
Director-General in 2000. For example, one group reported:
I’m sure there’s parts of the organisation that would have thought, ‘you
beauty, a bloody engineer again’ [a few words unclear]. Steve’s not like
that. He’s been through a lot of personal change himself and I think he will
keep flowing with the direction that Main Roads has been travelling over the
last two years (Focus Group R1HG).
For technical professionals the change of leader presented opportunities for the
development of both technical excellence and relationships:
I think just answering that question, what is the most important change
affecting Main Roads now – clearly I think in my mind Steve Golding is the
new [Director-General], he’s got the engineering background, he’s had heaps
of experience in Main Roads, he’s been there, done that and he’s seen where
we’ve come from and I see a lot of positives coming up because of the
situation, not that I want to run down Jim, I think he’s done a great job in his
area, more from the relationship side, but I think Steve now has the oomph or
the ability to get something back into the system that is more balanced and
focused in our key area of operation – which is basically engineering – we
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are road builders – and I think it’s promising at this stage that Steve’s there
(Focus Group R1HG).
The concern with promoting a relational orientation was linked to two inter-related
issues. First, there was a clear recognition that departmental managers were facing a
more complex and dynamic environment, one that required relationship building as
an organisational capability. Main Roads faced a:
More challenging and demanding environment, including managing
stakeholder and community expectations, integrating planning, and
managing perceptions both internally and externally (McCaffery, 2001:9).
In this context, there was an acknowledgement that the relational frame had not
penetrated sufficiently and that there was much more to do to institutionalise
appropriate relational behaviour in the organisation:
Not a deep penetration of that throughout the department … this is a big
challenge for us to get this coverage and understanding to an appropriate
level. The guy who drives a bulldozer does not need to know a lot but he
needs to know how the other guy feels about things, and that is enough.
Getting people to identify where there are opportunities to use this stuff.
Many of the districts have not caught on …. There are ten core
competencies: listening, technical things, asset management etc. helps people
to understand there is more to DMR than the construction and maintenance
of roads. This is where some of the learning things would come in (Director-
General Interview).
A Director-General sums up this section best. He said that:
Main Roads is based on the development of sound relationships, leadership
and the integration of our values with those of our customers and
stakeholders (Director-General Interview).
The organisation’s growing commitment to developing a relational capability is also
reflected in more inclusive attitudes towards professionals from other disciplines,
women, and minority groups. The traditional Main Roads was dominated by
engineers and males:
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The engineering old boys club has started to be squeezed out. There is
recognition of other skills, economics, and accounting. There is a real focus
on modern leadership and an external focus. Main Roads is engaging with
the general public and politicians much better. Open communication, cards
on the table approach (Interview round 1).
A similar point was made by a focus group:
And also start to value different skill sets and which we are trying to
enhance, like the things that do mean, as [person’s name] says, moving
beyond the economic to incorporate the social and the environmental, and
actually putting some focus around capabilities of, you know, environmental
scientists and anthropologists, and everyone just about dropped dead when
they hired an anthropologist [all laugh]; fancy having an anthropologist in
Main Roads. And you know, the cultural heritage stuff and the great work
that’s been done there, and it’s actually openly celebrated and … I came
from a welfare background so, I mean, I was just horrified that it’s a hard-
line engineering couldn’t-care-less-about-anybody type organization and
that was the reputation it had (Focus Group R1HH).
The acknowledgement of the value of diversity was also reflected in changes in
attitude to women:
I really think that one of the strongest reflections of this cultural change has
been a change of attitude towards women. I’ve never experienced terrible
things as a female in the workforce anyhow, so I have to say I’ve either been
very lucky or I’m just very obtuse and haven’t noticed it, but I have certainly
noticed that it’s improved so that’s obviously something, and I really believe
that Jim’s model provided an environment where it was OK to stand up for
what you actually thought was, you know, right, which sounds like a very
[next word only partially said]… it’s not meant to sound that way, but it was
OK to pay attention to those things that perhaps we’d never really paid
attention to before, and that created an environment where people could be
themselves in an easier way, and I think that’s very important to the cultural
change process (Focus Group R1HG).
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Another focus group participant, reflecting on positive changes in the organisation,
reported that, traditionally:
Particularly as a female, it was very much a pat on the head and sends you
on your way, and very much so that was the case (Focus group R1A).
In summary, the relationship frame was well accepted across the organisation.
However, this discussion of acceptance of the importance of the relational
orientation is not intended to suggest that the process is non-problematic. Accepting
the value of a relational orientation cognitively is not the same as incorporating the
relationship frame into behaviour. The organisation faces a number of challenges as
they seek to embed the relational orientation into behaviour.
Change process
Reflected in organisational members’ constructions of the large-scale human process
intervention and its influence was the perception that both Directors-General had a
reputation for walking the talk. There was a high level of congruence between what
was espoused and what was practiced. Indeed, it will be argued in the second-order
analysis that leader behaviour played a significant role in the acceptance of the
Relationship Frame.
A member of the case organisation will provide the conclusion to this section. This
person wrote a poem that gives some indication of the influence of one of the top-
level leaders pursuing change in this organisation (Jones, 2000). The poem is titled
Farewell Jim:
We really didn’t want him Because we all got used to Dick* But in the end we had to take him Because we didn’t get to pick
He arrived all bright and bouncy And he wore a cute bow tie “What have we done to merit this?” They’ll give anyone a try!
But he grabbed the old Department And he turned it upside down He made good people into better ones
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Oh how easy sat the crown.
So when we all got used to being The leading roads department in the nation The premier up and scratched him And made him head up Education So Jim we all say “Thank you” For all the good things you have done And to the folk at Education Believe us, you haven’t yet begun.
* A former Director-General
SECOND-ORDER ANALYSIS
This section, consistent with the abductive-interpretive method outlined in Chapter
3, provides a second-order analysis of the respondent accounts of organisational
transformation. The second-order analysis seeks to interpret the first-order data in
terms of intervention theory and schema change theory.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the efficacy of change leader interventions is considered
in terms of (a) whether organisational members see the interventions as facilitative,
(b) the pattern of schema content change achieved across the period of the research,
(c) their contribution to schema change dynamics, and (d) their sensitivity to change
management context.
Change leader interventions
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious when organisational
members experience them as facilitative of change. As discussed in Chapter 2, when
faced with the need to bring about organisational transformation, change leaders
have choices about when, where, and how to intervene to transform the organisation
in the desired direction: these decision problems are addressed by intervention theory
(Dunphy, 1996:543; Porras & Robertson, 1992).
Previous research on interventions and schema change suggest that change leaders
frequently choose top-down structural interventions (Balogun & Johnson, 2004;
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Labianca et al., 2000). There have been similar reports in the practitioner literature,
despite growing criticism that organisational members do not experience them as
facilitative of change (Bartunek, 1993; Conger, Spreitzer, & Lawler III, 1999;
Cummings, 1999; Howell et al., 1990; see Labianca et al., 2000 for a similar finding;
Maddock, 2002; McHugh & O'Brien, 1999; Porras & Silvers, 1991; Queensland
Government, Undated; Robbins & Barnwell, 1998; Rowe, 2001). The issue of the
efficacy of structural interventions will be addressed in the next two chapters.
In the case organisation, the top-level change leader chose to intervene at the level of
large-scale human process capabilities. In terms of schema theory (2001), the new
vision and Three Frames/Five Signposts framework is an ends-means schema. The
change leader framed an alternative schema to that pre-existing in the organisation
and then sought to convince organisational members to adopt this new schema. The
ends-means schema is configurational or systemic, the elements form an integrated
whole. Ideally then, incorporation of the ends-means schema would also be
configurational.
The ends-means schema can also be viewed as a substitute for direct change
leadership (Levin, 2000). Spatially differentiated organisations are more complex
and difficult to transform than are single site organisations (Adams & Ingersoll,
1990). In such organisations, change leaders do not always have the capacity to
directly influence change implementers. The inculcation of the ends-means schema
would reduce the need for direct change leader influence.
The choice of a large-scale human process intervention appeared to require an
outsider change leader (see Brunetto, 2001 in Chapter 2) with high levels of
awareness of and capabilities in human and task processes. Based on respondent
accounts of the pre-existing organisation, there is little indication that the
organisation had a pre-existing capability to produce such an intervention, despite
the adverse consequences of the radical restructure of the organisation two years
earlier.
The first-order analysis suggests that some organisational members were
transformed by the intervention. Taken together, the intervention served, at least
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partially, to unfetter organisational members from a restrictive pre-existing leading -
managing schema that was inadequate for meeting the systemic problems
confronting the organisation. For these organisational members the experience was
similar to that reported in other efforts to transform public organisations:
Many employees in bureaucratic governments feel trapped. Tied down by
rules and regulations, numbed by monotonous tasks, assigned jobs they know
could be accomplished in half the time if they were only allowed to use their
minds, they live lives of quiet desperation. When they have the opportunity to
work for an organisation with a clear mission and minimal red tape - they
are often reborn (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) (38).
This experience was not organisation-wide however. For others it was complex,
confusing, and not linked to day-to-day operations, just a poster on the wall.
Frequently, those reporting this experience also said that nobody had explained it to
them. It is worthy of note that the initiating change leader left the organisation two
years into what he saw as a three-year transformational change program. It would
have been interesting to have seen its influence after four years.
Functionally, the intervention contributed to (a) the transformation of the dynamics
of the top management team, which had important symbolic value for the
organisation, (b) facilitated the development of key managers (he made good people
into better ones), (c) change management planning, including the identification and
resolution of change blockages, in each sub-organisation to advance their redesign
(Labianca et al., 2000; Reger et al., 1994), (d) the realignment of the governance
structure with business needs, (e) action to enhance intra-organisational and extra-
organisational relationships which had been adversely affected by prior interventions
(Labianca et al., 2000), and (f) a regeneration of the collective, can-do confidence
that had been somewhat depleted by radical structural changes during the previous
decade.
On the other hand, the intervention had disadvantages. In particular, the large-scale
human process intervention (a) would take a very long time to embed in collective
cognition and collective behaviour, even those elements that were well accepted
(addressed in the next section), (b) raised expectations, particularly about task-
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oriented relationships that were not as well supported following the initiating change
leader’s departure two years into what he saw as a four-year change program, (c)
was incompletely inculcated by important change managers whose behaviour was
being closely monitored by organisational members for evidence of consistency or
inconsistency between espoused and practiced change behaviour (organisational
members were using this evidence to determine what was safe for them to say and do
(French & Bell, 1995)). More often than not they saw inconsistency between the
espoused and actual behaviour.
In summary, structural interventions, for the most part, were not seen to facilitate
change. Instead, they tended to be associated with greater cynicism which adversely
affected commitment to change. The large-scale human process intervention did
have a profound influence on organisational members, at least on those who were
directly influenced by the change leader. However, the experience was not
organisation-wide and it did not attract a critical mass of support to embed the ends-
means schema into organisational cognition. This evidence suggests the need for
more attention on large-scale human process interventions and better synergy
between these interventions and structural interventions.
Schema change
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious when existing schema
content has been replaced or significantly elaborated during the change process.
Note that there are time scale issues involved. By the end of the research period the
large-scale human process intervention had been in place for five years, a limited
period of time in transformational change terms, particularly as the organisation was
managing multiple change trajectories.
Table 5.1 encapsulates the pre-existing and reframed schemata constructed from
organisational member accounts reported in Chapter 4 and in the earlier first-order
analysis reported earlier in this chapter. Taken as a whole, the first-order analysis
suggests there was not a holistic shift or quantum change in the collective leading-
managing process schema. There were sites in which organisational members had
reframed their view of leading-managing. However, this was not the case at a
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collective level. Each element of the new leading-managing schema will now be
discussed.
From operations-driven to vision-led
As discussed in Chapter 2, it would be difficult to find a discussion of Organisational
Transformation that did not give central place to the development of a new
organisational vision and mission (2000). Indeed, Planned Change Theory (Lau et
al., 2003; Lau & Woodman, 1995) argues that re-visioning is the cornerstone of OT
(see Chapter 2).
The first-order analysis suggests that the new organisational vision did not focus
collective organisational members’ attention and motivation. Several factors
contributed to this outcome. First, there was a strong and pervasive belief across the
organisation that the organisation was necessarily reactive to external control.
Vision interventions rely on organisational members believing they have control
over organisational outcomes. Schofield’s (1997) conclusion that politicians rely on
the implicit obedience of public servants reinforces this view.
Second, a focus on vision competed with other demands on organisational members’
attention. In particular, organisational members appeared to be in a constant state of
anticipation of more radical change. There were concerns about issues that may
have been beyond the organisation’s control, for example, whether Commercial
Main Roads would be privatised. In addition, the here-and-now problems associated
with contentious top-down techno-structural change, and resulting workload
problems and job/career insecurity were a source of distraction. Visions suggest
some consistency of direction (McKinley & Scherer, 2000); there was little
expectation of this in respondents’ accounts.
Third, the first-order analysis suggests a pre-existing organisational tendency toward
technical rationality (Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) and
discounting the future. The here-and-now operational concerns were preferred over
the longer term and systemic concerns, though there was also evidence of change.
There was some evidence of this in managers’ attempts to link projects and vision.
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There was a tendency to try to link current operational projects to the vision, rather
than assimilate the vision and consider projects in the light of this vision.
In summary, the efficacy of a visioning intervention is contingent on a pre-existing
belief that (a) the organisation’s future can be influenced by the actions of
organisational members, (b) that some degree of consistency of direction can be
expected, and (c) that organisational future is at least as important as the present. In
the case organisation, pre-existing beliefs were, collectively, incompatible with these
beliefs. Other researchers have drawn parallel conclusions about the role of pre-
existing beliefs (Labianca et al., 2000; Reger et al., 1994).
From authority-obedience to Three Frames/Five Signposts management
The Three Frames/Five Signposts were designed to provide organisational members
with the means of realising the organisation’s vision. The pre-existing leading –
managing schema characterised by command and control management underpinned
by technical rationality assumptions was inadequate for the task of managing the
complex systemic problems facing the organisation.
The Three Frames and Five Signposts were not well integrated into organisational
cognition. Several factors militated against the successful implementation of these
models. First, the Three Frames model was abstract, complex and difficult to
communicate (particularly across a spatially differentiated organisation),
characteristics that tend to decrease the possibility of schema change (Davis et al.,
1997; Labianca et al., 2000). Those charged with communicating the model across
the organisation found it difficult to explain; more success was achieved when
Director-General Varghese was able to communicate the model face-to-face.
Second, the relationship between the Three Frames and the Five Signposts was
unclear; it caused more confusion than clarity. Third, there were reported
perceptions of regression to earlier leading – managing approaches; organisational
members quickly pick inconsistency in managers’ behaviour, which reduces their
commitment to change (Reger et al., 1994). Fourth, there were few models of the
application of the process communicated across the organisation; given that the
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application process would make significant demands on managers’ facilitation
capabilities, models of the process would be essential. Finally, the departure of the
initiating leader reduced the likelihood of successful implementation.
This is not to suggest that no change occurred in organisational members’ sensitivity
to managerial and organisational processes. Managers typically acknowledged that
change management was an increasingly critical element of their role and that their
change management capabilities had improved over the previous several years and
they now saw change management as integral to their role. Nevertheless, despite
outstanding examples of use, the Three Frames and Five Signposts were not well
integrated into organisational cognition.
Table 5.1 distinguishes between Three Frames/Five Signposts management and
change management, yet the two are closely related and will be integrated in this
discussion. The change leader’s normative/re-educative implementation process
(Bartunek & Reid, 1992) had a significant influence on organisational schema
change. The experience of interpersonal and problem solving behaviours, for
example, check-ins/check-outs, and finding that those behaviours produced positive
outcomes appeared to explain the ready acceptance of being relational.
In summary, organisationally the shift from command and control management to
Three Frames/Five Signposts management was unrealised. This is not to suggest,
however, that there were no changes. There were accounts of excellent applications,
yet reports of these applications had not travelled to other parts of the organisation.
From status-driven hierarchical relationship to ‘being relational’
The relationship frame, one of the Three Frames, did, however, have a profound
influence on respondents. Collectively, the concept of being relational was well
integrated into organisational discourse: building relationships characterised by two-
way communication and a commitment to achieving win-win outcomes. This does
not mean it was necessarily translated, collectively, into behaviour.
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Emotional tone
The large-scale human process interventions also had a profound influence on
collective organisational confidence, particularly in Head Office. After a period
during which collective confidence appeared to be very low, the organisation’s
traditional can-do mindset seems to have been reasserted. Instead of creating
cognitive disorder as McKinley & Scherer (2000) found in the case of structural
interventions, the large-scale human process intervention tended to produce
cognitive order; it facilitated sensemaking.
The issue of collective confidence or collective efficacy contributes to an
understanding of the dimensionality of organisational change schema. Previous
research (Lau et al., 2003; Lau & Woodman, 1995) has identified five dimensions of
organisational change schema; (a) impact (how much impact change has on current
practice), (b) significance (the intensity and significance of the change process), (c)
meaning, (d) salience, (e) control (personal control over change), and (f) stress (how
stressful the change is).
This research suggests another dimension of organisational change schema;
collective change management efficacy (how confident organisational members are
in their collective ability to effect change). The concept of collective change
management efficacy for understanding organisational change effectiveness has
received little attention in the OT literature.
The data from the case analysis suggests variation in collective efficacy over time.
Traditionally, organisational members saw themselves as having a can-do culture, at
least with respect to its then core business of designing and constructing roads;
stories of successful exploits pervade the organisation. However, during the 1990s
the organisation faced major structural changes that had an adverse impact on
collective efficacy. Government reform agenda undermined the organisation’s
traditional autonomy and control over its own operations and future.
In summary, configurational ends-means schema change was unrealised. However,
the concept of being relational was readily embraced by organisational members.
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Moreover, for some organisational members the ends-means schema was
transforming. In addition, there was little evidence of the cognitive disorder reported
to be associated with structural interventions (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). Instead,
the large-scale human process intervention tended to contribute to greater cognitive
order. Respondents tended to see these interventions as (a) addressing a lack in the
organisation, particularly in the area of relationships, (b) consistent with modern
management approaches, and (c) fitting the organisation within a broader Whole-of-
Government framework.
Schema change dynamics
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious when they reinforce
dynamics thought to underpin schema change. Two issues are relevant to this
discussion; (a) how interventions influence schema and (b) the schema change
dynamics flowing from this influence.
Two models of the influence of interventions on schema were identified (see Figure
2.6), the juxtaposition-relocation model (Bartunek, 1993) and the disengagement-
learning model (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). The results of the present study suggest
that the large-scale human process intervention was juxtaposed alongside the pre-
existing ends-means schema. Subsequent interventions were designed to relocate
organisational members through normative/re-educative means from the pre-existing
to the new schema. There is no evidence that the change leader intended or achieved
disengagement from the pre-existing organisational schema.
From the perspective of the juxtapose-relocate model, the degree of success or lack
of success is linked to how the interplay between pre-existing and new schemata is
managed. In the present case, schema change dynamics need to explain (a) why the
pre-existing schema did not accommodate the new ends-means schema and (2) why
the concept of being relational was so readily embraced. It will be argued that Inter-
schema conflict or dialectical processes did play a role in explaining why the ends-
means schema was not incorporated yet it does not explain why being relational was.
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Extant research suggests that the dialectics of relocation are hindered by new schema
complexity (Reger et al., 1994), interpreting new information in terms of pre-existing
schema (Zell, 2001, 2003), challenges to organisational identity (Mintzberg, 1989),
by inappropriate conflict management norms (Cummings, 1999), by change leader
behaviour inconsistent with new schema (Reger et al., 1994), fear and distrust of
change leaders (Mintzberg, 1989), paradox and contradiction (McHugh & O'Brien,
1999; Orlikowski, 1996; J. R. Thompson, 1999; Weick, 2000), and by choice of
change processes that conflict with the needs of content changes (Queensland
Government, 2003b).
The present analysis reinforces and elaborates these previous findings. In the present
case, unrealised ends-means schema change was linked to (1) the inherent
complexity and abstractness of the new schema, (2) spatial differentiation and the
difficulty of communicating complex new schema across large distances, (3) time
pressure/workloads that consumed attention to the detriment of reflection and
discussion, (4) managerial/content-free focus and its perceived lack of attention to
technical issues, (5) the significant demands the new schema makes on managerial
capabilities, (6) a conflict-averse environment, despite efforts by the change leader to
change conflict management norms, and (7) incomplete implementation in that the
initiating change leader left two years into what he saw as a four-year program.
Schema change, on the other hand, could not be explained by dialectical processes
and inter-schema conflict, even though there was evidence of such conflict. Instead,
the evidence suggests that schema change was linked to teleological and behavioural
processes. In particular, (a) organisational members had an implicit vision of how
organisational relationships should be, (b) organisational members engaged in new
behaviour, for example relational behaviour, consistent with the new schema (b)
under the influence of a change leader who had position power and who ‘held’ the
new schema, (c) in the context of a safe psycho-social environment, and (d) the
experience of positive outcomes contingent on the behaviour.
The interpretation is best made by creating a scenario. Imagine a team meeting. The
change leader indicates some ground rules governing the conduct of the meeting
including open and frank discussion, conflict would be openly confronted, it is a safe
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environment. The meeting would start with a check-in. There would be a round-
robin activity, starting with the change leader, in which each person would share
their current thoughts and feelings as they confront the meeting. Behaviour
inconsistent with norms of openness would be called, that is, a person engaging in
such behaviour would be challenged directly.
In this view schema change occurs when (a) a new schema is complex and
discrepant from the pre-existing schema, (b) a change leader with position power and
who holds the new schema and behaves in accord with it, (c) requests congruent
behaviour change from others in a safe psycho-social environment, (d) that
behaviour is successful in that it has a positive outcome on the psycho-social
environment and/or on task achievement, and (e) this new behaviour is transferred to
other contexts.
This interpretation is similar to yet different from Weick’s (Bartunek, 1993)
conception of successful sensemaking. Weick argued that successful sensemaking
involves organisational members (1) staying in motion, (2) having a direction, (3)
looking closely and updating often, and (4) conversing candidly (232).
In summary, the large-scale human process intervention resulted in efforts to
juxtapose and relocate organisational members from pre-existing to new ends-means
schema. Relocation was unrealised. Several factors adversely affected dialectical
processes and hindered relocation. The success of the shift to being relational was
explained by alternative dynamics. In particular, teleological theory (Van de Ven &
Poole, 1995) provides a better explanation.
Change management context
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious when they are sensitive
to change management context. Previous conceptual frameworks suggest that top-
down change in spatially differentiated Professional Organisations will be
problematic on the grounds that professionals typically enjoy a high level of
autonomy (Blaikie, 2000; Van Maanen, 1979), a dynamic that is exacerbated when
professionals are distant from the direct influence of a change leader (Department of
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Main Roads, Undated), when the organisation has high inertial properties (Burke,
2002), and when the new schema is discrepant from the professionals’ pre-existing
identity schema (Robinson & Griffiths, 2005).
Nevertheless, top level leadership did play a significant role in transforming the
organisation; a new leader did sweep in and announce wide reforms and to a degree
that would probably be unexpected in a relatively narrowly focused, technically-
oriented spatially differentiated Professional Bureaucracy achieved significant if
incomplete change.
In many respects the large-scale human process intervention clashed with pre-
existing professional values; it was managerial rather than technical, it was
concerned with relationships and structures, not just structures, it was strategy-
oriented rather than operations-oriented, it required systems thinking rather than
‘scientific’ thinking, and it required facilitation skills rather than directing skills.
Yet there were people across the organisation who saw its value. Professionals tend
to value ideas that contribute to their professional problem solving task and if they
can see how it would add value, then they will incorporate it (Porras & Robertson,
1992).
Spatial differentiation, in concert with the complexity of the schema, did have an
adverse impact on the communication of the new schema across the organisation,
Organisational members delegated the task of communicating the new schema found
it difficult to communicate and consequently created more confusion than clarity.
The Road Show devised by the change leader did contribute to greater acceptance.
To some degree this process was facilitated by key regional managers who did have
a good understanding of the model and how it might be applied.
However, when viewed as a substitute for direct change leadership, the intervention
could have negated the influence of spatial differentiation. Had organisational
members across the organisation inculcated the schema, there would have been a
greater likelihood of less reliance on the top for direct change leadership. The large-
scale human process intervention would have facilitated the sort of bottom-up or
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emergent change that some authors espouse as essential for successful Organisation
Transformation (Orlikowski, 1996).
EFFICACY OF LARGE-SCALE HUMAN PROCESS INTERVENTIONS
The analysis does not permit simple conclusions about the efficacy or inefficacy of
large-scale human process interventions for achieving qualitative schema change.
The evidence suggests that large-scale human process interventions are efficacious in
that they have the potential to (a) engage organisational members and sometimes
provide a transforming experience, and (b) facilitate schema change when the new
schema is consistent with implicit ideals.
On the other hand, large-scale human process interventions tend to be less
efficacious when respondents (a) find them complex and difficult to understand, and
(b) do not believe they have outcome-control.
By 2004-2005, the Three Frames and the Five Signposts had been dropped from the
organisation’s lexicon. Nevertheless, the influence of the intervention should not be
underestimated. At the very least the results suggest more research needs to address
the relationship between large-scale human process interventions and organisational
schema change.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has investigated the efficacy of a large scale human process intervention
for achieving qualitative schema change in a change management context thought to
be inimical to change leader influence. While the results of this analysis of their
potential for contributing to transformational change outcomes are not altogether
conclusive, there is enough evidence to suggest that relevant large-scale human
process interventions can play a significant and positive role in engaging
organisational members in the change process.
Chapters 6 and 7 each address one of two different schema change contexts created
by the radical truncation of the organisation along strategic and operational lines. In
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each of these contexts the large-scale human process intervention reported in this
chapter reappears. However, the main focus of these chapters is on the efficacy of
structural interventions for achieving qualitative schema change in the case
organisation.
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Table 5.1: Organisational schema change Leadership change trajectory
Pre-existing organisational schema Reframed organisational schema
Operations-driven Aspiration and vision-driven; Whole-of-Government focus
Reaction: Unrealised or in progress Tensions: Potential imposed government changes; pervasive belief organisation reactive; reporting demands; here-and-now change management problems and distractions (eg top down imposed change); some discounting of the future; technical rationality; abstractness; complexity; linking current operations to vision (rather than the reverse)
Authority/obedience management with caring & friendly work climate
Three Frames/Five Signposts Leadership/Management
Reaction: Unrealised, though also examples of excellent application in both Corporate and Commercial and more general development of change management capabilities Tensions: Complexity; communicability; abstractness; relationship between Three Frames & Five Signposts; demands on managerial capabilities; perception of regression; departure of initiating leader; no clear application process; spatial differentiation
Relational environment: ordered, status-driven
Relational environment Inclusive, value diversity
Reaction: Highly positive, One Department policy; Main Roads family policy; better place to work in Tension: Regression; sub-cultural boundaries Top down techno-structural change process: frequently power/coercive; being told what to do
Change process: Normative/re-educative; modelling, persuasion; participation with limits
Reaction: Highly positive (particularly at top); check-ins, check-outs Tension: Required heavy involvement of DG Emotional tone: Adversarial relationships following truncation of the organisation into owner-provider
Emotional tone: Greater collective confidence; significant progress made in advancing content change goals
Reaction: Highly positive; started to head in the right direction Tension: Perceived regression
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CHAPTER 6: CORPORATE CHANGE TRAJECTORY
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter explored the efficacy of large-scale human process
interventions for achieving qualitative schema change in the context of
developing leadership and management processes linked to the realisation of
organisational vision. No prior research on this relationship could be located.
The key findings were (a) the interventions were, for those exposed to them,
experienced as highly facilitative of change, (b) configurational schema change
was unrealised, though a critical sub-schema was, (c) juxtaposition-relocation
rather than disengagement-learning and, with exceptions, teleological rather than
dialectical processes better explained schema change, and (d) contextual
attributes, professionalism and distance affected intervention influence.
This chapter investigates the first of two schema change contexts created by the
1996 truncation of the case organisation into strategic-owner and
commercialised-provider (the second context is addressed in the next chapter).
In particular, the chapter investigates interventions and schema change in the
context of the development of realising the transition from operations-driven
road builder to strategic-owner of a road system.
THE INTERVENTIONS
Consistent with broader trends in the NPM literature (Glynn & Murphy, 1996;
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), the case organisation was truncated into strategic-
owner sub-organisation and commercialised provider sub-organisation in 1996.
Accounts of the change suggest it was implemented using power-coercive
means.
The successful creation of a strategic-owner organisation required that
organisational members’ concept of the organisation change from Main Roads as
operations-driven road builder (see Chapter 4) to Main Roads as strategic
manager of a road system within a Whole-of-Government policy environment
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(paraphrased from information on the organisation’s website,
http://www.mainroads.qld.gov.au accessed August 2002), and the case
organisation’s strategic plan, second-order or transformational change.
Much later key capabilities were identified. Organisational members were
required to become (a) systems thinkers, (b) informed decision makers and
effective policy developers, (c) technically and professionally excellent, (d)
engaging, collaborative and consultative, (e) leaders and influencers, (f) positive
and active contributors to ecologically sustainable development, (g) innovative
and creative, (h) balanced and adaptive managers, (i) reliable performers, and (j)
good fiscal managers. (http://www.mainroads.qld.gov.au accessed August 2002).
After 1998, the transformation of the strategic-owner organisation was to be
facilitated by the large-scale human process intervention discussed in Chapter 5
(also see Figure 3.1). As discussed in Chapter 5, the large-scale human process
intervention was designed to provide organisational members with the means of
realising organisational aspirations.
ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
Consistent with the abductive-interpretive strategy outlined in Chapters 3, 4 and
5, the analysis is divided into first-order analysis and a second-order analysis .
The first-order analysis analyses organisational members’ accounts of change at
four points in time. The second-order analysis analyses first-order concepts in
terms of intervention and schema theory consistent with the unresolved issues
outlined in the previous section.
The first-order data are presented by data collection round. However, given the
high degree of consistency in respondents’ accounts in rounds 2 and 3 (and
across the four rounds generally), these rounds have been substantially
amalgamated. To maintain coherence of data in each round, analysis of the data
is provided at the end of the round rather than at the end of each subsection.
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The framework for exploring the efficacy of change leader interventions for
achieving qualitative schema change consists of four elements, (a) the
interventions are experienced as facilitative of change, (b) the pre-existing
organisational schema is replaced or significantly elaborated, (c) interventions
reinforce dynamics thought to underpin schema change, and (d) interventions are
sensitive to change management context.
RESULTS
This section reports and analyses data collected during the four rounds of the
research. Table 6.1, included at the end of the chapter, outlines the results of this
analysis.
CONTENT CHANGE
Organisational purpose
In round 1, respondents were polarised on the change in core organisational
purpose. There was a perception that the expertise of the organisation had been
split and there had been a significant loss of organisational expertise. For many
the change was framed in terms of a shift from a technical viewpoint to an
economist’s viewpoint, the core organisational task was managing budgets
(Focus Group R1D). For some technical respondents the split had triggered
feelings of great loss:
I think the most significant change in Main Roads I think clearly one
word covers it very adequately and that is the word ‘de-engineering.’
I’ve been in the Main Roads 45 years now and come from a technical
background on [discipline name deleted] and I’ve been very disappointed
to see (I’m getting a bit emotional here) – the way the Department has
lost a lot of expert experience through the focus new direction of
commercialisation that [person’s name deleted] has brought up. So just
that one word ‘de-engineering’; it’s an emphasis away from our core
business of design and engineering to a management style of operation
with a lot of skilled people in that area. It’s a shame to me that the
Department has lost a significant slice of its long involvement of
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operation in the last 5-6 years since QT and Main Roads joined and
commercialisation came in. So I guess there you go – ‘de-engineering’ is
what comes to mind (Focus Group R1A).
Another group of respondents acknowledged that a fundamental change had
occurred as a result of the restructure of the organisation on owner-provider
lines:
The organisation’s whole way of doing business had fundamentally
changed in line with government policies and with the orientation of
particular Directors-General; there had been a philosophical shift (Focus
group R1C).
Specifically, the organisation had shifted from being a technically-based
organisation to one that was about more than building roads (Interview);
embraced contemporary management practices (Focus Group R1C) and from a
focus almost exclusively on technical excellence to one of market leader in a
diversity of fields (Focus Group R1D).
Furthermore, respondents felt a mind-shift involving a greater focus on long term
strategic planning and development had occurred, though much more was
needed, particularly in the area of succession planning (Focus Group R1A).
Respondents saw being strategic as addressing looming problems facing the
organisation, for example, the loss of a large number of senior engineers to
retirement.
Rounds 2 and 3 reaffirmed respondents’ polarised perceptions of the
fundamental shift in organisational direction reported in Round 1. There was an
acknowledgement that Main Roads has shifted from a road builder to Main
Roads building roads that serve the community in its various forms (Focus Group
R2C) and from a technical and engineering focus to an administrative, political
focus (Focus Group R2B).
Respondents saw Main Roads’ reputation being enhanced in the process of
making this shift:
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Main Roads has become recognised as the leading agency in cultural heritage
issues and increasing emphasis is placed on effective communication and
consultation with a range of organisational stakeholders (Focus Group R2D).
Nevertheless, and as discussed in Chapter 5, respondent accounts suggest wide-
spread uncertainty about where changes were taking the organisation. There is a
need for:
Overt leadership, decision-making and steady direction from
management; the department is hungry for consistency and visibility in
leadership and direction (Focus Group R2B); and
A more personalised delivery from the Director-General so that we have
a better sense of why the direction has been chosen, more ownership of
the future direction and higher levels of motivation (Group R3HI).
Uncertainty about future direction was reflected in reports of some uneasiness
about the future of commercialisation (Focus Group R3HI). Respondents were
concerned about the risk that Commercial will be privatised or corporatised,
which would then split Main Roads entirely. Respondents felt that Commercial
is seeking to differentiate itself from Corporate and they are more like cousins
now than brothers and sisters (Focus Group R3C).
In round 4, respondents reinforced earlier polarised perceptions:
The goal of technical excellence has become subordinate to an ongoing
importance being placed on financial and administrative aspects (Focus
Group R4B). The technical engineering focus has been supplanted by a
requirement for more people to act like business managers (Focus Group
R4HG).
As in previous rounds (also see Chapter 5) respondents reported high levels of
uncertainty about the future direction of the organisation. There was a feeling
that the department lacked specific direction and focused more on budgets than
on long term strategy.
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In summary, these data reflect respondent acknowledgement of a fundamental
shift in organisational purpose, yet were polarised on the value of this shift. In
addition, respondents were not clear about organisational direction and saw
potential threats to the organisation. In this context, there was a wish for more
direction from the top.
Relational environment
Change in organisational purpose had significant implications for the
organisation’s relationship with external and internal stakeholders (also see
Chapter 5).
In round 1, respondents reported much greater openness to the influence of
external stakeholders, including industry groups, communities, local government,
and other government departments, particularly its portfolio partner, than was the
case in the past. There has been a shift from:
We know what is best for the public to now asking the public what they
think is best for them (Focus Group R1E).
In concept, this greater openness and a Whole-of-Government orientation was
evaluated positively; the organisation could no longer ignore the realities of the
real world (Focus Group R1A). There was a ready acceptance of the need to
incorporate the quality of external relationships and Whole-of-Government
outcomes into organisational effectiveness measures (Focus Group R1B).
Moreover, the organisation had achieved significant successes in its management
of complex external relationships. Some of these successes were published
(Department of Main Roads, Undated), which had helped create a widely held
view that the Main Roads is good at building external relationships (Focus
Group R1C).
Nevertheless, greater openness was not without significant cost. The life-spans
of most projects were substantially extended, more capital was needed to fund
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compliance with a plethora of legislation while budgets have been reducing and
harder to shift between different projects (Focus Group R1A), insufficient
resources were available to ensure quality assurance practices were met on
construction worksites where cost efficiencies are crucial, increasing time and
resources were being spent on community consultation, cultural heritage,
environmental issues exceeding that spent on what they saw as their core
business of building roads, particularly given an assessment that the overall
quality of road construction has declined, and greater ambiguity and uncertainty.
Assessments of intra-organisational relationships between Corporate Main Roads
and Commercial Main Roads (addressed in the next chapter) were mixed. At
some research sites, there was a perception that improvements in this relationship
were necessary if local knowledge was to be enhanced (Focus Group R1D).
Other sites reported that productive relationships had been negotiated with
Commercial.
Internal relationships were an important success of the change program;
particularly relationships among senior executives. Improved relationships have
provided the organisation with a new approach to negotiation among senior
managers. The personalities of senior managers were perceived to be less of an
impediment to reaching an agreement than was previously the case, the silo
mentality was reduced, and staff had greater involvement in organisational
decision making (Focus Group R1HG).
Moreover, respondents acknowledged a more inclusive organisation in that the
traditional rigid organisational status structure was changing; engineers are no
longer treated like Gods (Focus Group R1HI) and attitudes to diversity are
changing; Main Roads values diversity (Focus Group R1HG) and interactions
across disciplinary and gender boundaries had significantly improved.
In rounds 2 and 3, respondents’ accounts reaffirmed accounts reported in round
1. Respondents evaluated the greater openness and growing sophistication of
both the community and Main Roads positively yet acknowledged the
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problematic implications of greater openness for organisational capabilities and
resources.
Local communities, industry-based forums, environmental management and
cultural heritage groups and the public at large are now much more informed and
participating more fully in the consultation and decision making processes
(Focus Group R2C). In the context of declining budgets and a need to
demonstrate value-adding, consultation is an important means of enhancing
public and peak industry forums’ understanding of the constraints involved in
medium to long term road implementation planning and in the project delivery of
infrastructure. Moreover, respondents felt that Main Roads now demonstrates
greater maturity in the way it consults with external stakeholders (Focus Group
R3D).
As in round 1, greater openness to influence imposes significant demands on
respondent knowledge; requiring on-going training across many broad aspects
including the legal implications and for more communication and sharing of
expertise (Focus Group R2C). Moreover, the consultation process slows up the
delivery of projects as there are so many new requirements and hurdles to
overcome compared to what it used to be (Focus Group R2C). In addition:
Full consultation has to be undertaken even on very small jobs and many
external clients have decided that consultation means they can make all
the decisions regardless of whether scarce monies could be better spent
on improving other aspects like road safety (Focus Group R3A).
The nature of the relational environment is best summed up by a comment made
in one focus group; gone are the days when we can say we are Main Roads and
we know what is best for you (Focus Group R2E). This shift has been positive,
yet it has imposed significant demands on people and resources.
In round 4, as in earlier rounds, respondents reported on the positive and not so
positive aspects of the organisation’s greater openness to influence by external
stakeholders. The thrust of community consultation was viewed positively by
respondents. The importance of building alliances with local government
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councils and shires, joint venture partnerships, and community engagement was
unquestioned. Indeed there was a feeling that Main Roads would need to be
more proactive in engaging the community in decision making.
A three-fold rationale was offered by respondents for external stakeholder
relationships. First, there was a clear feeling that the community was
increasingly knowledgeable and expected to be involved in departmental
decision making. Second, stakeholder relationships were the means by which the
organisation was able to help these stakeholders put their expectations into
perspective (Focus Group R4E); that is, it was a way for the organisation to
manage external expectations. Third, engagement with external stakeholders
was the means of prioritisation due to an ever-diminishing budget (Focus Group
R4E).
However, engagement with external stakeholders also presented respondents
with contradictory demands. For example, the legal and moral obligations
encapsulated within the legislation have caused delays and uncertainty in the
preplanning stages of many construction projects. The need for mediation with
claimants often arises when disputes occur over boundaries or perceived
demarcations (Focus Group R4D). These constraints put further pressure on
already strained financial budgets, as work is being held up while mediators,
crown lawyers and the courts decide what the appropriate outcomes should be.
In addition, respondents reported that people are finding it increasingly difficult
to keep up with community expectations with the current level of resources
allocation. Public inquiries and complaints keep increasing, so there is little
time available for training (Focus Group R4A).
The relational environment is also characterised by greater social inclusiveness.
While Main Roads is still viewed as an engineering-driven organisation, there is
now greater inclusiveness and recognition of different disciplines than there was
three years ago (Focus group R4HH).
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In summary, compared to the traditional organisation, largely closed to external
influence (see Chapter 4), the transforming organisation is much more open to
influence from external and internal stakeholders. Moreover, respondents readily
embraced this shift to greater openness as it provided the means of better serving
their various stakeholders in the context of declining budgets. Furthermore, the
organisation had demonstrated its ability to develop and manage these
relationships though the organisation has yet to develop a sophisticated
consultation schema that provided a collective guide to practice.
Organisation redesign
The framing of a new organisational purpose is also reflected in ongoing
development of organisational design. Roles of people in several job categories
were fundamentally changed; program managers; technical staff and engineers
who had previously made decisions on technical and construction criteria now
have to consider community preferences, environmental, and cultural issues, that
is, Whole of Government criteria.
However, there is a downside. Corporate Main Roads engineers are no longer
exposed to the full range of engineering experience. Where previously engineers
had engaged in all aspects of transport planning, construction and contract
administration, they now tended to be allocated to one specialised field. To help
deal with this situation, a rotation scheme had been set up so that Corporate Main
Roads engineers can gain operational experience in Commercial Main Roads.
As a result, respondents reported increasing job dissatisfaction among junior
technical and professional officers; much of the work performed by this group is
construed as paper chasing, acting as liaison with community interest groups and
shire councils, the maintenance and widening of roads, and managing
relationships with consultants (Focus Group R1D). There are few avenues for
this group to gain in-house experience in either construction or design and they
see this as detrimental to their future career progression.
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Organisation design has also shifted toward a multi-disciplinary team-based
structure. Respondents were polarised on the value of teams. Teams were
positive in that they provided greater opportunities for collaboration and
coordination. Yet, at the same time, there were reports of role ambiguity, more
politics, higher workloads and a shifting of the burden of responsibility from
management to the team.
From a regional/district perspective, respondents also reported that organisational
decision making is more centralised; previously decision-making was highly
decentralised and they could customise their responses to local requirements.
They have now become extremely accountable to Head Office with regard to
performance and local responsibilities. Greater centralisation has had adverse
consequences for regions in that Head Office has lost focus on what happens in
the regions that run the core business for the Department (Focus Group R1C).
Organisational redesign also incorporated outsourcing of organisational tasks, a
contentious issue for respondents (though recent policy changes had ameliorated
this concern). Outsourcing leads to a loss of organisational knowledge;
consultants … tend to dissipate their membership from projects so any necessary
design amendments are difficult and they are unable to link their designs back
into the general knowledge built up in the Department (Focus Group R1E).
In rounds 2 and 3, respondent accounts of organisation redesign reaffirmed
those in round 1. A positive outcome of restructuring has been the much-needed
clarification of roles and positions thereby reducing high levels of duplication
which had been adding to unnecessary workload pressures (Focus Group R3A).
Furthermore, the organisation appears to have entered a period of stability and
consolidation. This achievement was attributed to the decisive and stabilising
influence of the new Director-General (Focus Group R3B).
Respondents reaffirmed their perception of growing centralisation of decision
making: the organisation was more authoritarian which, in their view, was
reducing organisational effectiveness. In this context, two issues were raised, the
push for consistency of systems and management reporting. While the potential
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benefits of standardisation were acknowledged, the drive for state-wide
standardisation has to be offset by tangible benefits for the districts and regions.
Currently, people often grapple with inappropriate systems that do not meet local
requirements and needs.
Management reporting was a particular concern: these demands demonstrate a
general lack of appreciation of the already heavy demands put on staff trying to
meet District, Regional and Corporate requirements. What intensified
respondent concerns was their uncertainty about the value of their reports:
regions and districts received little feedback.
The multidisciplinary team structure was reaffirmed, yet, at the same time, there
were concerns about the diffusion of the budget on non-core functions.
Respondents were again polarised on the value of teams; frequently they
involved shifting the burden for managing workloads from managers to teams
with little appreciation of the implications for employees.
In this round, there was a perception that structural change has re-accentuated the
focus on technical excellence at the expense of the corporate change program
(Group R3E), a regression. Yet, there was also a concern about the perceived
loss of technical excellence. Being at the cutting edge was necessary, not only to
attract high calibre people but also to improve and update Main Roads
specifications and to raise the status of the organisation to where it used to be,
on the cutting edge (Focus Group R3B).
In round 4, as in previous rounds, redesign interventions were generally
problematic. Respondents reported that the constant organisational restructures
and realignments have compounded the problems people face every day in
having to do more with less and trying to keep up with community expectations.
The concept of teamwork was of particular concern to respondents. Respondents
felt that a team structure was intended to replace the concept of family and to
enable people to deal more effectively with change but it has not succeeded
(Focus Group R4E). Working in teams has contributed to greater levels of
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ambiguity; there is no longer a black and white way of working (Focus Group
R4A). Some people see the team concept as a means of increasing and
intensifying work demands. Furthermore, in the teams there is:
Often a lack of direction and clarity about roles and responsibilities,
decision-making is too far removed from the workplace and operational
systems are still largely imposed upon people regardless of whether they
are appropriate to particular requirements or not (Focus Group R4B).
On the other hand, the team structure has also made a positive contribution; there
is more of a team culture now with improved sharing of information and
interaction between units. Jobs are no longer strictly divided according to work
sections (Focus Group R4E).
Organisation decision making structure was again of concern to respondents.
Greater centralisation created greater dependence on the top yet the overriding
concern for staff is not being able to obtain important decisions from
management and to get straight answers to their questions. People are
struggling to get their jobs done due to the lack of full information (Focus Group
R4E).
In this round, respondents acknowledged that regionalisation/spatial
differentiation served to protect or buffer them to some degree from the effects of
corporate change; districts and regions have been relatively resilient to these
corporate changes due to the autonomy in decision-making afforded by the
decentralised nature of Main Roads (Group R4E).
As in earlier rounds, reduced outsourcing was viewed positively by respondents:
there has been a shift towards valuing internal organisational capabilities and
skills rather than simply hiring external consultants to run projects (Focus Group
R4HH).
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Workloads
Respondents, while acknowledging management efforts to deal with the
problem, reported that change in organisational purpose and organisation design
created a dramatic increase in workload, reducing opportunities to consolidate
learning and reducing morale. The increase in workload was attributed primarily
to (a) techno-structural interventions, (b) meeting the contradictory demands,
within a project management context, of budget limitations and delivering
quality work, (c) continually changing legislative requirements, and (d) a lack of
organisational support, insufficient staff and:
The continuous constant change (Focus Group R1B).
Districts have become more short-term in their orientation as people are
continually ‘fire-fighting’ rather than regaining the organisation’s lost
technical cutting edge (Focus Group R1A).
Everyone’s trying to do three jobs at once; everyone’s acting in someone
else’s position and no one knows exactly what their jobs entail (Focus
group R1A).
In rounds 2 and 3, as in round 1, the problem of excessive workloads and stress
was again a key theme. Respondents felt they were in a high pressure
environment (Focus Group R3A) and were faced with the task of trying to put a
round peg in a square hole (Focus Group R2C).
Rather than swamping people with high-level strategic changes and
distracting them from being smart and technically excellent, the department
needs to align resources and workloads to enable people the time and ability
for refinement and innovation (Focus Group R3A).
In round 4, concerns about excessive workloads as a result of strategic and
techno-structural change were reiterated. Efforts to resolve the issue had little
effect:
Rather than the department taking steps to identify job areas or tasks that
could be redesigned to alleviate workload pressures, the emphasis is still
placed on the individual to manage their own workloads and to take
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responsibility to talk to local management about concerns (Focus Group
R4E).
Workload increases are inevitable in organisations undergoing transformation.
Yet the intensity of feeling in respondents (at all organisational levels) accounts
of horrendous workloads warrants greater research attention being given to their
effects.
Reduction in career and development opportunities
In round 1, respondents reported that change in organisation purpose/strategy
and organisation redesign has had an adverse effect on career and development
opportunities and was leaving the organisation devoid of essential capabilities:
The overwhelming changes in technical guidelines and policies, the lack
of training and the increasing use of external consultants, have adversely
affected career prospects (Focus Group R1A).
‘Outside’ people are getting the available positions because their own people are
not getting the breadth of experience and training to allow them to compete with
external applicants on merit (Focus Group R1C). Performance reviews and the
development of individual training programs are often neglected. Valuable
employees last only three to four years before moving to more challenging
positions in other public sector organisations and the private sector. There is a
feeling of:
Deep frustration and despair over the lack of managerial attention to these
matters. Massive stress associated with the excessive workloads and long
working hours is unrecognised by the hierarchy and calls for help go
unheeded (Focus Group R1F).
In round 2 and 3, respondents, while acknowledging career working groups,
reiterated concerns about reduced opportunities for professional and career
development. Informal mentoring arrangements largely serve the purpose of
transferring technical knowledge; there is little emphasis on career and personal
mentoring or on addressing the growing age gap in levels of expertise and their
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profound detrimental effects on the department’s future workforce capabilities
(Focus Group R2C). Respondents feet that management often does not recognise
the capabilities, skills and specialties that staff has developed.
In round 4, the themes reflected in earlier rounds emerged. There are fewer
career opportunities and those that do exist are linked to greater mobility,
insufficient attention given to succession planning, inadequate mentoring, and
insufficient training: budgetary constraints reduce:
The amount spent on the availability of training as this is seen as expendable in
the short term (Focus Group R4E); and the
Aspirations for advancement have been and are still being frustrated by a lack of
any career path through the organisation at the district level (Focus Group R4F).
In summary, respondent accounts of organisational redesign highlight many of
the issues underlying respondent polarisation on change of organisational
purpose. Changes linked to Whole-of-Government decision criteria and the
development of a multidisciplinary organisation were viewed positively as were
greater clarification of roles and reduced duplication of effort.
However, several aspects of organisation redesign were contentious. The split
(owner-provider) in professional role meant that professionals do not get the full
range of professional experience. The shift to a team-based organisation
polarised respondents. The greater centralisation of decision making and the
consequent loss of local autonomy and the greater demands for management
reporting were an overwhelming concern of regional/district respondents. The
issue of workloads and loss of career and development opportunities were critical
issues, particularly for junior technical professionals.
CHANGE MANAGEMENT PROCESS
Respondents gave considerable discussion time to accounts of how change was
being implemented. For the most part, particularly in regions/districts,
respondents’ accounts tended to reinforce a pre-existing negative evaluation of
the organisation’s change management capabilities.
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In round 1 most respondents were critical of change implementation. However,
one research site was extremely positive about the change process. This group
believed that the Main Roads change process was the most successful they had
experienced in the Public Service. The group cited the strong endorsement of
other agencies as testimony of their success (Focus Group R1HG).
Outside this research site, several concerns were raised about implementation.
Inadequate diagnosis prior to implementation adversely affected implementation.
Respondents raised concerns about the level of head office assessment of local
circumstances before trying to implement change, not consulting sufficiently,
driving the change from the top with little opportunities for input, inadequate
resources resulting in horrendous workloads and inadequate training. The sense
of the problem is reflected in a comment from one focus group
Main Roads has the culture of there’s only one way to do something and
can turn Rolls Royce technology and systems into running like a Holden
(Focus Group R1HH).
High organisational aspirations adversely impacted implementation.
Respondents reported that Main Roads had an ambition to be a change leader in
the public sector, a view consistent with its can-do culture. However, this
ambition was thought to create problems in that there is a tendency to try to take
on too much:
It is a huge ask for operational and district or regional field staff whose
main priority is in the key area of building roads (Focus Group R1A).
Low perceived control of change and, consequently, a reactive rather than
proactive orientation to change adversely affected change implementation.
Respondents believe the organisation has no control over the pace, planning and
implementation of change. Consequently, Head Office specialists decide on
structures and systems for implementation at the regional level without liaising
or consulting with the regions about its local applicability or viability.
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Consequently, implementation is managed by the chaos method with the majority
of managers not knowing how to lead or encourage teamwork (Focus Group
R1HI), it is reactive and ad hoc rather than planned: there is frequently little time
to consult, little time to develop effective implementation plans, and little time to
absorb the amount of information that accompanies change:
The rate of change is the hardest thing to control. They really can’t
control the rate of change …. It’s just doubling and tripling and just
happening all the time. You don’t get that breathing space to actually do
something or learn something or put something in place so you can teach
the new people coming in … (Focus Group R1A).
People at the coal face who are good at their jobs have not got the
particular skills to absorb the continuously changing knowledge being
put out in specs and manuals (Focus Group R1B).
Middle-level change leadership adversely affects change implementation.
While top-level leaders were viewed as positive drivers of change, middle
level managers in head office and in regions and districts (with important
exceptions) were thought to be unsupportive of change in that new behaviours
were not always modelled (particularly the Three Frames), they tended to
diffuse change, and they tended to equate conflicting points of view with
resistance:
Working relational has not been embraced and incorporated into
business units and not modelled by middle management (Focus Group
R1B).
Change starts at the top, hits middle management where the funding and
momentum dissipates, leaving the junior staff feeling as if they have
missed out on opportunities (Focus Group R1E).
Management is still influenced by a blame culture that inhibits coherent
decision-making and commitment to strategic outcomes (Focus Group
R1C).
Middle managers often reported the same issues associated with implementation
reported by operational level staff. Some managers reported that they filtered
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information from head office to protect lower level staff from information
overload. A metaphor provided by one manager sums up their experience of
change: he felt as though he was at the bottom end of a funnel and head office
were pouring changes in at the top (Interview R1A4).
Themes in rounds 2 and 3 were consistent with those reported in round 1.
Change was being driven from the top down with few opportunities for bottom-
up change, usually involved too little prior diagnosis to identify what was
required to implement the change successfully and usually involved too much
information and too short a time period in which to absorb it. Furthermore, the
pace and frequency of change, primarily techno-structural change, often meant
that a new change was begun before the previous change had been completed;
there was insufficient time to consolidate changes.
Organisational change management practices tended to reinforce a negative
stereotype or change management schema of the organisation’s change
management capability: Main Roads doesn’t manage change well. The outcome
of this assessment was less willingness to cooperate in the implementation of
changes (Focus Group R2B).
Furthermore, change usually involved a much higher workload with little
perceived benefit or relevance, resulting in people becoming somewhat
disillusioned and cynical (Focus Group R2C) and a tendency for change
managers to hide behind labels such as ‘leading road authority in the Asia-
Pacific region, (the mission statement outlined by Director-General Varghese)
(Focus Group R2C).
However, experience of excessive change demands resulted in defensive cross-
district lateral networks. District staff tended to begin to share their experience
of change with staff from other district offices. This outcome could well have
been beneficial in an organisation that had a less well developed lateral
communication but organisational members were sharing negative experiences.
Pre-existing negative evaluations of the organisation’s change management
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capabilities would have been reinforced as would the gulf between
regions/districts and head office.
Respondents felt they still had no clear picture or message about what the
organisation was trying to achieve and no real coordination or determination of a
course of action. The vision has not been clearly articulated and not linked back
to the strategic plan (Focus Group R3HG) or to what people do on a daily basis
(Focus group R3A). Consequently, people have been reeling from one
management ism to another; the incorporation of new systems and processes has
become unruly with no time available for training (Focus group R3A).
Furthermore, as the rapid pace of change impacts, there is little recognition by
senior management of how long it takes for change to permeate throughout the
department and when a new vision is being espoused the old vision may be just
starting to take hold in some parts of the organisation.
People at the workplace level are essentially not seeing any real change while
the rhetoric continues to be presented in different formats and keeps going
around in circles (Focus Group R3C).
As discussed in Chapter 5, the Three Frames and the Five Signposts were
designed to facilitate change management. However, respondents felt that the
relevance of the Three Frames and Five Signposts (Chapter 5) was not always
understood at the workplace level and does not guide day-to-day operations
(Focus Group R3C). Where it has been applied, the Three Frames and Five
Signposts have been used retrospectively to promote ideas and projects rather
than focusing on strategic future directions.
Consequently, respondents felt that fundamental issues were still not being
addressed and changes not embedded before the organisation moves on to the
latest cutting edge management fad (Focus Group R3HG). Respondents want
more facilitators to lead people through the change processes and encourage
them to be content owners (Focus Group R3F).
There is now a thin veneer covering fragmentation and diffusion of
different approaches. It is a shame that when something is seen as being
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worthwhile it is embedded in the old culture rather than given the
credibility to be developed in a new frame (Focus group R1HH).
There was a general feeling that Director-General Golding made a good start
with his vision and direction for the department. However, there was a sense that
all had gone quiet and for someone with such an important role there has been
insufficient follow up. Respondents believed that the Director-General should be
more visible and lend support and leadership. Respondents also commented on
change leadership at lower levels. Focus group members felt that senior
managers were focusing upward and externally and, as a result, they lacked the
time to communicate downwards to lower levels of managers.
Open communication, particularly upward communication, was a significant
issue. Respondents feel their ideas and initiatives are still not being valued by
the organisation. There is a need to:
Be able to speak boldly yet cautiously about where the organisation is
headed and the ability to do so comes back to your sphere of influence.
Some management still have a tendency to make sweeping changes to old
regimes for the purpose of control before really understanding the
process and acknowledging the positives (Focus Group R3HH).
A particular problem was consultation on systems changes; consultation was
frequently 11th hour, when no meaningful input can really be given (Focus Group
R2C). The department suffers from a ‘seniority complex’ where consultation
occurs but advice is always taken from senior levels rather than from the staff
that technological change impacts directly on (Focus Group R2C).
Issues associated with electronic forms of communication were also frequently
mentioned. The consensus was that although email does inform more readily
and response times are lessened, this technology has adversely affected
workloads and efficiency. There is a need for greater prioritisation of messages;
determine what is really necessary to communicate and not overwhelm people
with a lot of useless, mindless and ill-informed information and requests (Focus
Group R2F).
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However, in one site there have been some positive steps taken by local
management to promote staff involvement in decision making and input into the
management of projects and to recognise and reward achievements.
Open forums allow people to share information and the knowledge of
more experienced people is now more readily transferred (Focus Group
R3C).
In round 4, there was a perception that change had slowed and this had given
regional and district offices the opportunity for stabilisation and consolidation.
After several years of frequent change, respondents reported that this period of
slowed change was welcome.
However, implementation of ongoing change was still problematic. First, change
is still being driven, for the most part, from the top down and organisational
members at lower levels had few opportunities to initiate change. People at
middle and lower levels then feel disenfranchised from the corporate change
process. Second, several groups commented on an incongruence between what
is espoused at the top and what is happening in reality.
The philosophical position espoused by senior management is not being
translated in a meaningful way throughout the organisation (Focus
Group R4A).
This inconsistency between espoused and actual has adversely affected vertical
relationships and respondents felt it would take:
Some time to win back the trust and confidence of people to believe in the
organisational values espoused by senior management (Focus Group
R4A).
Third, respondents had concerns about the translation of abstract change agendas
into practical implications for people in their jobs. Respondents acknowledged
the value of many of the new initiatives yet translating them into practice was
difficult without more support from the top:
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The concepts are not expressed in practical terms so it becomes arduous
to implement the changes and to communicate their meaning to the public
(Focus Group R4A).
In this context, respondents acknowledged the ongoing relevance of the Three
Frames, however they were having difficulty seeing how the Five Signposts
related to the Three Frames (see Chapter 5); senior managers need to be seen as
having a stronger commitment to the Five Signposts and to demonstrate how the
framework works in practice (Focus Group R4).
Fourth, respondents reported a perception of cultural inertia. Change agents are
burning out and there has been a slowing down of the creativity, the passion and
the willingness to take risks that is necessary to advance the organisation and
corporate change has fragmented the organisation to the extent that it lacked a
defining culture (Focus Group R4A).
Respondents felt that not a lot of information was being passed down the
organisation; communication channels have gone very quiet and they are not
hearing any of the change rhetoric that had been so pervading in the past (Focus
Group R4A). The districts and regions are not getting regular visits from Head
Office any more and the transfer of information and feedback is only taking
place over phone lines (Focus Group R4E).
As a result, Head Office is not receiving a true reflection of what is really
happening in the districts and regions. In addition, respondents expressed a
concern that feedback from lower levels in the organisation was not heard or
taken into consideration by top-level managers; this input was falling upon
barren ground (Focus Group R4C).
Furthermore, the level of consultation had decreased, resulting in people feeling
disengaged from the change process and wanting more direction from senior
management:
The people driving the continual changes have become much more
anonymous, the rationale behind change less considered and defined and
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it is less likely for individuals to claim responsibility for, be decisive
about or to take action to rectify any inherent problems (Focus Group
R4B).
Respondents did, however, acknowledge that the relational model has
encouraged people to question change more openly than in the past and to be
proactive in taking up learning opportunities (Focus Group R4F).
Regression
Perceived regression was a key issue across the period of the research. This
issue has been separated from change implementation because it is directly
relevant to a proposition in the extant research which suggests that imposed
structural change disengages organisational members from pre-existing
organisational schema. Regression disconfirms this view.
A particularly critical issue was a perception that the organisation was not
committed to commercialisation or the truncation of the organisation on owner-
provider lines:
The organisation is trying to back-pedal on commercialisation and put
operational expertise back into the organisation (Focus Group R1B).
If this is the case, respondents felt that someone should address those who
suffered the pain of commercialisation and those who see the benefits of it, as
there will be a lot of anger if there’s any great shift to move back to the
traditional status quo:
It is watershed time now; incredible leadership will be required to stop
the pendulum from swinging back to the status quo and to move the
organisation forward (Focus Group R1B).
Respondents also reported evidence of regression in that some senior managers
were censoring open communication:
Communication, despite improvement efforts, has diminished slightly in
recent times (Focus Group R1HG).
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Similar sentiments were expressed in rounds 2 and 3. Openness to confront and
challenge was reduced:
Where previously people were encouraged to question, to scrutinize and to
openly challenge, some elements of the department are slipping back into the
old Main Roads comfort zone. There is the issue of self-censorship again, of
not being able to express issues and concerns in an open problem-solving
environment (Focus Group R2HG).
Furthermore, respondents noted that organisational language again revolves
around technical excellence. In addition, senior management appears to be
creating coalitions again and regional managers are not always communicating
information back to the local workplaces in the districts and regions.
Furthermore, turf wars are still apparent over core business and the connection
between core business and Whole-of-Government directives.
Respondents also reported that the Three Frames, and in particular the
Relationship Frame, which would support better consultation, had been de-
emphasised in the face of what they saw as a strong resurgence of a technical
agenda since the change of Director-General. Moreover, it was felt that at the
lower levels of the organisation the Three Frames had not made a great deal of
difference. Although the Three Frames act as a guiding framework for day-to-
day operations, there is a good deal of confusion about how the Three Frames,
the Five Signposts and the vision fit together.
On the other hand, respondents also acknowledged that the Director-General has
been building on the Three Frames, the Five Signposts, and the Leadership and
Learning portfolio, to encourage organisational learning. There is now a strong
focus on aligning learning with organisational capabilities, values, strategic
ideals, structures and systems.
In round 4, consistent with earlier rounds, respondents reported evidence of
regression; Main Roads seems to be returning to the way things were done
twenty years before (Focus Group R4F). Managers were less responsive and
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open to valuing different people’s contributions and perspectives. Respondents
felt the change process was being impeded by:
A renewed hierarchical structure which is creating barriers to open
channels of communication (Focus Group R4HG).
Perceived regression has resulted in a malaise about the change process as a
whole; people are only giving lip service to the implementation of change (Focus
Group R4HI). Reports from one focus group best sum up change
implementation:
Main Roads stands at a crossroad with lots of choices to make. If the
organisation falters, the changes that have occurred may be seen as
superficial and will undermine its credibility as a leader in its field.
There is a threat that the organisation could be splintered by the impact
of commercialisation and the corporate services review. At present there
is more emphasis being placed on how to rationalise costs rather than the
value being generated by pockets of loyal, innovative employees. Main
Roads needs to support its people and build on the enormous
competencies that already exist rather than trying to solve problems
through another restructure or realignment (Focus Group R4HG).
In summary, there was a consistent negative view of change implementation
across the period of the research. From the perspective of respondents, change
implementation reinforced a pre-existing change process schema that suggested
that Main Roads does not manage change well. Change process was top down,
allowed limited opportunity for input or for initiating change from the bottom up,
involved inadequate diagnosis, usually involved techno-structural interventions
with little development of organisational member capabilities.
SECOND-ORDER ANALYSIS
The previous section provided an analysis of organisational members’ first-order
accounts of change. This section provides a second-order analysis of these first-
order accounts. In particular, the chapter interprets first-order data in terms of
the efficacy of change leader interventions for achieving qualitative
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organisational schema change in a context thought to be inimical to change
leaders’ influence.
Consistent with this purpose, the efficacy of change leader interventions is
considered in terms of (a) whether organisational members experience the
interventions as facilitative of change, (b) whether there is evidence of
replacement or significant elaboration of pre-existing organisational schema, (c)
whether interventions reinforce dynamics thought to underpin schema change,
and (d) whether the interventions are sensitive to change management context.
Change leader interventions
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious when
organisational members experience the interventions as facilitative of change. In
the strategic-owner sub-organisation, the focus of this chapter, change planning
subsequent to the large-scale human process intervention resulted in the
implementation of a series of techno-structural interventions.
The extant research on change in public organisations suggests that the
experience of structural interventions is not facilitative of change. For example,
structural interventions tend to create cognitive order for top-level leaders and
cognitive disorder for those lower in the organisation (McKinley & Scherer,
2000), tend to mask emergent change (Maddock, 2002), and tend to assume
organisational members will be passive recipients of change (McHugh &
O'Brien, 1999). However, structural interventions have been found to influence
schema change even if the process has been somewhat problematic (Bartunek,
1993).
In the present case, respondents’ accounts suggest the initial structural
intervention created deep divisions, adversely affected organisational and
professional identities, and created confusion and stress in the organisation as
organisational members tried to make sense of the changes. There were frequent
reports of conflict between Corporate and Commercial Main Roads; it was a
messy divorce rather than a planned separation. Furthermore, there were reports
191
of conflict between Corporate Main Roads sub-units; there was increased
fragmentation and a silo mentality.
Several inter-related factors contributed to these outcomes. First, from the
perspective of respondents, the structural intervention did not provide sufficient
direction; the perception was that change leaders had not framed an alternative
schema that would guide new schema development. Indeed, there is nothing in
structural change that necessarily provides organisational members with an
alternative schema to facilitate sensemaking (Bartunek, 1993). In the absence of
clear direction there was a tendency toward individualistic and competitive
behaviour (Johnson & Johnson, 1994).
Change leaders appeared to assume that organisational members had the
collective capability to develop new schema consistent with changes in formal
organisational arrangements. Historically, senior managers appear to have
depended on the can-do capabilities of their staff. Given the discontinuities
involved, it was not clear that the assumption was valid.
Second, the data suggest that change leaders and change implementers have a
differential perception of the pace of top-down structural change. Respondents
reported that senior managers seemed to be unaware of how long it takes to
implement structural change at lower levels in the organisation. The perception
was that a new structural change was communicated before the previous change
had been successfully implemented. The funnel metaphor used by one manager
illustrates this dynamic.
Third, for lower level respondents the interminable structural changes were a
reflection of top management’s unwillingness to put trust in the talents and
capabilities of their own staff. Top-down structural change reduced the potential
for local initiative. The focus on top down structural change, as indicated in the
OT change literature masked emergent change (McHugh & O'Brien, 1999; J. R.
Thompson, 1999) and rendered change implementers as passive recipients of
change (Mintzberg, 1979).
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Fourth, the evidence suggests the structural intervention was tectonic (radical)
rather than synoptic or midrange (Reger et al., 1994), in that the intervention
required new organisational and professional identities (see Chapter 4). In
particular, technical professionals changed from being operations-oriented road
builders to strategic road system managers. Interventions of this order are more
likely to fall outside a zone of change acceptance, and are, therefore, less likely
to be successfully implemented (Reger et al., 1994).
However, this discussion is not intended to suggest that structural change was not
necessary. The restructure on owner – provider lines did create an environment
in which schema change was necessary (Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Schein, 2004),
did create behaviour change, and did serve an unfreezing function, a necessary
prerequisite of transformational change (Weick & Quinn, 1999). The issue is
that the intervention created an environment that was not conducive to the
development of new and more appropriate organisational schema. Indeed, the
outcome was much greater change cynicism (Abraham, 2000) and less
willingness to implement change.
As discussed in Chapter 5, large-scale human process intervention (see Chapter
5) did have a profound influence; it tended to ameliorate some of the negative
effects of the structural interventions particularly in terms of organisational
relationships, thus contributing to the potential for dialectical processes (Sillince,
1995; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) and schema change. However, respondents’
accounts of change processes reinforce the conclusions drawn in Chapter 5; there
was little evidence of the Three Frames/Five Signposts being applied.
These results suggest that large-scale human process interventions and structural
interventions have differential effects on organisational members’ constructions
of change. Each has advantages and disadvantages.
Some authors argue that organisational structural design and organisational
capability interventions should be implemented simultaneously; that change is
fundamentally about managing the paradoxical tensions between both (Beer &
Nohria, 2000b). However, as desirable as this might be, it depends on very
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sophisticated change management capabilities that do not seem to have co-
existed in the organisation at the same time.
In summary, the intervention theory implicit in respondents’ accounts suggest
that the organisation relied heavily on techno-structural interventions to produce
OT. Reactions to these interventions reinforce and elaborate the existing
literature. With exceptions they were not experienced as facilitative of change.
Moreover, other authors argue that top-down interventions in any form are
unlikely to have the desired effects (McHugh & O'Brien, 1999; J. R. Thompson,
1999). Both techno-structural and large-scale human process interventions are
necessary. However, it seems unlikely that change leaders had the experience or
capabilities to frame and manage both structural interventions and human process
intervention simultaneously (Beer & Nohria, 2000b).
Schema change
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious when there is
evidence of replacement or significant elaboration of pre-existing organisational
schema. The intended schema change is configurational (Mintzberg, 1989);
organisational members shift from one schema configuration to another,
preferably one more in line with change leaders’ schema. This outcome is
consistent with schema-based definitions of OT (Bartunek & Moch, 1987).
The data suggest that, collectively, configurational schema change has not yet
been realised. Organisational members are still trying to resolve the
contradictions (McKinley & Scherer, 2000) that transformational change will
typically reveal and intensify (M. W. Lewis, 2000).
The pattern of schema change reflected in respondents’ first-order accounts is
shown in Table 6.1. Respondents’ constructions revealed four main elements;
their construction of (1) the organisation’s core purpose, (2) the relational
environment (organisation-environment relations), (3) the organisation design,
and (4) change (implementation) processes. Table 6.1 also reveals collective
reactions to and contradictions in efforts to make sense of the shift.
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Rather than configurational schema change, the evidence suggests that
organisational members readily accepted change in some sub-schema, were
polarised on some, and preferred the traditional schema on others. Each sub-
schema dimension will now be considered.
From operations-driven road building to strategy-driven managerial focus
A critical goal of the transformational change agenda was a fundamental shift in
core organisational purpose from a traditional operations-driven road builder to a
strategic manager of a road system.
The data indicate that respondents were polarised on the shift of core
organisational purpose. One group of respondents conceived of the shift as one
from a technical/engineering focus to a managerial and financial focus. Their
core purpose is to operate as business managers, monitor finances, report
financial performance, paper chasing, and giving stakeholders what they want.
They believed the organisation’s expertise had been split, the organisation had
been de-engineered, the technical edge had been lost and road quality had
deteriorated, and professional development opportunities and career progression
had been adversely affected.
The second group saw Main Roads as being about more than building roads.
There was a big picture view that had been missing from the traditional
organisation; in a future of declining budgets and changing community
expectations, there is a need for a more strategic and more systemic approach to
managing the development of the roads network.
Professional and organisational identity issues (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Reger et
al., 1994) contributed to polarization. The technical professional role was split
into managerial (Corporate) and operational (Commercial). This division of the
professional role adversely affected opportunities for career and personal
development and led to the creation of a rotation scheme that allowed technical
professionals and administrative staff to transfer between both sub-organisations.
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Both organisational and professional identities, particular forms of schema, tend
to be highly resistant to change (Reger et al., 1994).
The complexity of the new schema also contributed to polarization. It is unclear
that organisational members had yet, collectively, developed a coherent
representation of the organisation’s new purpose. There was little evidence of a
collective sense of how the transforming Corporate Main Roads now contributes
to the development of the road system. It seems unlikely that organisational
members will accept or be able to implement what they do not understand
(Labianca et al., 2000). However, there were pockets of sophisticated
understanding of the systemic nature of the task facing the organisation.
It is difficult to imagine greater discontinuity than that involved in this change.
The task of conceptualising road network problems in the context of Whole-of-
Government priorities requires a significantly higher-order problem solving
capabilities than those dominant in the traditional organisation. It is akin to a
shift from an engineering technology to a non-routine technology, requiring
organisational members to operate from fundamentally different decision
premises (also see Mintzberg, 1989; Perrow, 1986).
As will be discussed later in this chapter, polarisation (and its implications) is
inconsistent with Balogun & Johnson’s (2004) proposition that imposed
structural change which forces a break from the past disengages organisational
members from their pre-existing schema thereby forcing the evolution of new
schema without reference to pre-existing schema.
From closed to external influence to open to external influence
The shift in core organisational purpose had implications for organisation-
environment relations. To fulfil this purpose the organisation needed to (a)
engage much more actively in consultation with its external stakeholders on
decisions, and (b) engage internal stakeholders in organisational decision
making. Greater openness to external and internal stakeholder influence is
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characteristics of trends in the design of organic organisations (Child &
McGrath, 2001; Galbraith & Lawler III, 1993a).
Traditionally (see Chapter 4), the organisation operated relatively independently
of external influence, decisions on road construction and maintenance were made
unilaterally and on technical grounds. External stakeholders were less willing to
accept this approach and on some particularly sensitive roads projects, technical
professionals were subject to personal attacks from members of the community.
Internal relationships and communication were constrained by a rigid status
structure and a dominant management style characterised by authority/obedience
(see Chapter 4). Given increasing information processing demands, this
approach was not going to serve the organisation’s capacity to manage the
increasingly complex and systemic problems created by transformational change.
Respondent accounts suggest that organisational members readily accepted
greater openness to external influence from external stakeholders; the
organisation can no longer ignore the realities of the real world. External
involvement in decision making and prioritisation of road projects was viewed
positively, particularly as both the department and stakeholders developed a
mature approach to consultation.
Moreover, and in large part related to the large-scale human process intervention
(Chapter 5), there was a pervasive acceptance of the idea that Corporate Main
Roads is good at building external relationships. This view was reinforced by
the publication of success stories of difficult negotiations with external
stakeholders (Department of Main Roads, Undated).
Accepting greater openness does not mean, however, that the shift from being
relatively closed to being relatively open was unproblematic. Increasing
openness to external influence resulted in significant and difficult to resolve
tensions, or cognitive disorder (McKinley & Scherer, 2000). For example,
greater openness to influence meant developing a consultation schema that was
appropriate to the complex nature of managing relationships with external
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stakeholders. In developing this consultation schema, respondents experienced
tensions about whose interests were to hold sway, the problem of over-consulting
(consulting on even small projects), and the relative time spent on consultation as
opposed to necessary work on road design.
Nevertheless, organisational members saw greater openness as inherently better
than the traditional closed organisation. As will be discussed later in this
chapter, the existing literature on schema change rarely considers the possibility
of schema change that is readily embraced. Schema change is thought to be
inevitably difficult even when the change benefits change recipients (Labianca et
al., 2000) or the organisational client (Bartunek & Reid, 1992).
From decentralised and customised to more centralised and standardised
Inevitably change in organisational purpose/strategy involves organisation
redesign: the organisation has to be realigned to the new purpose (Balogun &
Johnson, 2004; Stace & Dunphy, 2001) and these designs are typically in the
direction of more organic forms (Stace & Dunphy, 2001). Five structural or
redesign dimensions were reflected in respondents’ accounts of change and, for
the most part, respondents tended to evaluate structural changes negatively.
First, respondents evaluated negatively the perceived shift from the highly
decentralised traditional organisation in which regional and district staff
customised service delivery to fit the requirements of local circumstances to a
view of the organisation as increasingly centralised and standardised.
This shift seems paradoxical given change goals (see Putnam, 1986 for a
discussion of systems paradoxes). However, from the perspective of change
leaders, greater centralisation and standardisation appeared necessary. The
traditional organisation was viewed from a managerial perspective as under-
organised. There were fourteen different cultures and each culture had
developed its own way of doing business. Such an environment made
performance management and measurement and connectivity within a Whole-of-
Government environment more difficult.
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Nevertheless, from the perspective of change recipients, the shift toward greater
centralisation and standardisation contributed to a perceived reduction rather than
enhancement of service provision. Respondents’ accounts suggest they wanted
to regain lost authority and the capacity to align service provision with local
needs.
Second, respondents were polarised on the shift from the former individual-based
structure to a team-based structure. The introduction of a team-based structure is
consistent with trends in public sector transformation though their
implementation can be problematic (McHugh & Bennett, 1999a).
In the present case, team structures tended to (a) reduce discretion to make
professional judgements on the circumstances as they found them with fewer
interdependencies to manage, (b) increase intra-team role ambiguity, team
politics and complicate decision making, and (c) shift the burden of
responsibility from managers to the team, increasing intra-team tensions and
workloads. On the other hand, some respondents evaluated the shift to a team
structure more positively. The team environment provided opportunities for
collaboration, innovativeness and managing workloads.
The shift from an engineering dominated organisation to a multidisciplinary
organisation, an implication of a Whole-of-Government policy context, was
readily accepted. Success in diverse fields such as cultural heritage and
environmental protection meant that Corporate Main Roads’ capabilities and
reputation as a leader in multiple fields was enhanced. Nevertheless, there were
contradictory tensions as organisational members faced the inevitable tradeoffs
between investment in these new capabilities and investment in road system
development.
Fourth, respondents evaluated negatively the shift from relying on in-house
capabilities to meet task requirements to a greater reliance on outsourcing of core
tasks. Outsourcing adversely affected career and development opportunities and
adversely affected perceived organisational expertise and quality of the road
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network. Consultants did not necessarily share their expertise with the
organisation and they did not necessarily feel any ownership of the road system.
There was evidence, however, of a reducing dependence on outsourcing across
the period of the research, an outcome welcomed by respondents.
Fifth, respondents saw the transformation of the organisation as adversely
affecting career and personal development opportunities, though there was also
an acknowledgement of change leaders’ efforts to deal with this issue. The
relatively predictable and controllable career paths in the traditional organisation
were no longer available. Reduced career opportunities tend to be characteristic
of shifts towards more organic organisation designs (Melnarik, 1999; Robinson
& Griffiths, 2005).
The truncation of the organisation on owner-provider lines had split the
technical-professional role so that professionals no longer had the range of
technical experience provided in the traditional organisation. Some technical
professional commented on their work as consisting of paper chasing and liaising
with stakeholders rather than engineering work.
In addition, change interventions had increased workloads of the experienced
managers to such a degree that they no longer had time to effectively mentor or
provide career and personal development counselling. Outsourcing was a
particular source of concern, even though recent policy changes had ameliorated
this concern somewhat. The appointment of consultants and the failure of
consultants to pass on their experience to internal staff meant loss of
development opportunities.
The net effect of these changes was that respondents found they could not
compete successfully, even for internal jobs, they were losing these jobs to
external candidates. Respondents reported job dissatisfaction, loss of
organisational expertise, higher turnover, and an inability to attract new
graduates.
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The issue of workloads was a significant issue across organisational levels and
across the period of the research. The issue of workloads, and organisational
member responses to workloads, warrants much more research (Robinson &
Griffiths, 2005). The evidence from this case suggests that workloads had a
detrimental effect on organisational information processing, change management
and change implementation, and levels of organisational member satisfaction.
Furthermore, respondents reported that efforts to manage the problem were
ineffectual, a reflection of its paradoxical nature; change increases workloads and
increased workloads decrease change capability.
In summary, respondents were conflicted about organisation redesign (aligning
organisation with new purpose). The redesign was perceived to reduce local
discretion and reduce opportunities for personal and career development.
Moreover, the shift to a team-based organisation polarised respondents in that it
both increased ambiguity and enhanced collaboration. However, respondents
saw the shift toward a multidisciplinary organisation as contributing to Main
Roads capabilities and reputation.
Top-down techno-structural change
As predicted in previous research, not only did respondents evaluate content
changes but also change process (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Bartunek & Moch,
1991). Balogun & Johnson reported that in restructuring their case organisation,
senior managers dictated a business as usual change process; managers were
expected to effect structural change and simultaneously maintain current
operations. Balogun & Johnson reported that content change and change process
coevolved over the period of their research.
Despite the large-scale human process intervention (Chapter 5), coevolution of
content change and change process was not the experience of respondents in this
sub-case. In the present case, change management processes tended to reinforce
a pre-existing view that the organisation does not manage change well (though
there was also a belief that Corporate does it better than other departments).
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Furthermore, respondents’ conceptions of the organisational change process did
not change across the period of the research, the Three Frames and Five
Signposts had little influence on perceptions of change process. In this case
change processes tended to subvert the goals of the content change agenda.
Based on respondents’ accounts reported earlier in this chapter, the change
process schema-in-use can be paraphrased in the following terms: in this
organisation change is driven from the top-down with little opportunity for input
into change decisions and too little opportunity for bottom-up change. Too much
emphasis is placed on techno-structural change and too little on the talents and
capabilities of organisational members; they don’t listen to or trust us.
In addition, there is little prior diagnosis to determine the fit between
interventions and local circumstances, there is inadequate resourcing of change
and there is too much information and too little time to absorb it. Furthermore,
change interventions are not linked to an overarching vision; organisational
members find it difficult to see the link between change and pressing local task
demands. There was also a perception that middle managers tended to view
conflicting points of view as resistance, there was still a blame culture.
This change process adversely affected organisational members’ confidence in
organisational change management capabilities, to the point where change
processes were having an adverse influence on their commitment to content
change, increasing cynicism about the likely success of change efforts, and
greater passivity and feelings of powerlessness.
In addition, there was greater dependence on top-level leadership for solutions; a
tendency to attribute responsibility for change management to the top.
Furthermore, change was fast, frequent and overwhelming to the point where
perceived demands came close to exceeding perceived resources. There were
frequent calls for a period of stabilisation and consolidation. The situation is
summed up by one manager who reported that he felt like he was at the bottom
end of a funnel and head office were pouring changes in at the top.
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Consequently, the change imposed significant cognitive and behavioural
demands on the system. Taken as a whole, the data suggest that the
transformation of the case organisation is still very much a work in progress, not
unexpected given the scale of change involved. This outcome suggests, contrary
to much of the previous research, that a simple assessment of success or failure is
inappropriate. Attention needs to be given to explaining both success and failure.
It would be easy to view organisational members as simply resisting change. Yet
again there is a fundamental cross-level contradiction operating that underpins
respondent reactions. At the level of the system, performance is enhanced by
standardisation and centralisation and reduced by local customisation and
decentralisation. From the local perspective, organisational performance is
enhanced by customisation to local conditions and reduced by standardisation
and centralisation.
From can-do to overwhelmed and disempowered
The emotional tone reflected in respondents’ accounts of change suggest that for
the most part the organisation was overwhelmed by change; change was
experienced as excessive (Stensaker et al., 2001). There were frequent calls for a
period of consolidation and stabilisation. Moreover, the experience of change
increased cynicism about change and decreased commitment to its
implementation (Abraham, 2000).
Schema change dynamics
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious if they reinforce the
dynamics thought to underpin content schema change. Schema change is more
likely to fail if these dynamics are not addressed (Bartunek & Reid, 1992). Two
issues are relevant to this discussion, (a) how interventions influence
organisational schema, and (b) the underlying dynamics flowing from this
influence.
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As discussed in Chapter 2, two models of change leader interventions on schema
have been identified. These models were labelled the juxtaposition-relocation
model and the disengagement-learning model (see Figure 2.6). In the former
model, schema change is thought to involve dialectical processes as
organisational members struggle to reconcile new and pre-existing schema
(Bartunek, 1993). In the latter model, new schema develops on the basis of
ongoing experience with the demands of the change management task; dialectical
processes play no role (Balogun & Johnson, 2004).
Given the scale of change involved in truncating the organisation into strategic-
owner and commercialised-provider, it would be expected that the
disengagement-learning model would be more likely (Balogun & Johnson,
2004). However, this thesis does not support the disengagement-learning model.
There is more evidence to support the juxtaposition-relocation model.
This conclusion is based on two key findings in this research. First, the evidence
of polarisation and the rejection of some sub-schema suggest that disengagement
had not occurred. If disengagement had occurred there would be no duality of
schema: the pre-existing schema is rendered obsolete (Balogun & Johnson,
2004:544). Second, there were frequent references in the data to perceived
regression. Respondents’ accounts tell of perceived regression on
commercialisation and on being relational. There was a sense that the
organisation was returning to the organisation of twenty years ago. Perceived
regression is not consistent with disengagement.
The dominant dynamic underpinning the juxtaposition-relocation model is
conflict (Bartunek, 1993), dialectical processes (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995), or
argumentation (Sillince, 1995). Conflict between groups and/or individuals who
hold one schema or the other is the basis for this conflict. Given the top-down
nature of the change agenda in this case study, it would be expected that conflict
would entail vertical groups (Labianca et al., 2000), though lateral inter-group
relations was also involved as one group or another supports or rejects the new
schema espoused by the top. Resolution of inter-schema conflict would then
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depend heavily on the openness of the organisation to upward expressions of
conflict, as middle and lower groups work through tensions with the top.
The evidence suggests, however, that, vertically, the organisation is conflict
averse. Respondents acknowledged a strong obedience orientation; we do what
they are told. Moreover, there was a perception that, at least from the
perspective of lower levels, middle managers found it difficult to challenge the
top; there was a blame culture and conflict tended to be viewed as resistance.
Under such circumstances, critical issues would not be resolved, making
regression and unresolved latent conflict (Westenholz, 1993) and the
reinforcement of the pre-existing schema more likely (Labianca et al., 2000).
Moreover, there was evidence that respondents were monitoring organisational
leaders for signs of incongruence between espoused behaviour and actual
behaviour and, in their perception, often finding it. This inconsistency was
readily seized on, leading to private reservations about the top’s commitment to
change. Organisational members often thought the risk of calling behaviour (a
concept introduced as part of the large-scale human process intervention) too
great.
Consequently, collective conflict management norms were not supportive of the
successful resolution of inter-schema conflict and in particular the tensions that
underpinned the relationship between pre-existing and new organisational
schema. Under these circumstances inter-schema conflict was more likely to
reinforce pre-existing organisational schema rather than new schema.
However, conflict, either functional or dysfunctional was not the dynamic that
explained the finding of sub-schema change related to being more strategic,
being more open to influence by external and internal stakeholders in a Whole-
of-Government context and, related to this, being more multidisciplinary.
Organisational members readily embraced these shifts; there was little evidence
of inter-schema conflict.
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Instead, organisational members appeared to hold an implicit vision of how the
organisation should operate. When interventions created outcomes consistent
with this implicit vision organisational members readily embraced the change.
This dynamic is more consistent with teleological process theory (Van de Ven &
Poole, 1995). The influence of teleological processes was reinforced by change
leader facilitated behaviour change consistent with the new vision or schema.
The new behaviour, for example negotiating with external clients, was itself
reinforced by the creation of a safe psycho-social environment and its success in
achieving valued outcomes.
In summary, organisational schema change in the Corporate/strategic owner arm
is still very much a work in progress. There is little evidence, despite the radical
truncation of the organisation, of disengagement from pre-existing schema and
little evidence of configurational schema change. Instead, the evidence suggests
a pattern of change characterised by polarisation, rejection, and positive change.
Significantly, schema change was associated more with teleological and
supportive behavioural processes than with dialectical processes. Dialectical
processes tended to be hindered by pre-existing conflict management norms and
behaviour.
Change management context
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious if they are sensitive
to change management context. The literature suggests that the change
management context attributes (professionalism and distance from change
leader) will tend to neutralise change leader influence and interventions (Howell
& Dorfman, 1986; Jermier & Kerr, 1997).
The structural intervention was not particularly sensitive to change management
context. Structural interventions typically change organisational environments
and there is nothing in structural interventions to provide an alternative schema.
The assumption is that in this new environment organisational members can
develop new schema. For incremental structural change (Bartunek & Moch,
1987), this may not be an issue. However, in this case, the intervention required
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the replacement or significant elaboration of pre-existing schema, which has
been shown in the present analysis to impose significant cognitive and emotional
demands on organisational members.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the large-scale human process intervention had the
potential to be more sensitive to change management context. It was framed as
an ends-means schema and gave more local control to professionals and non-
professionals as they managed the demands of change implementation.
However, its successful adoption relied heavily on the direct involvement of the
top-level leader.
In this case, spatial differentiation did make it more difficult to communicate
complex schema across the organisation and did make it more difficult for those
on the receiving end of efforts to explain the new schema to test or contest it.
Respondents in regions and districts also acknowledged that their distance from
head office buffered them from the effects of change.
EFFICACY OF CHANGE LEADER INTERVENTIONS
This section draws together the conclusions outlined in the previous sections of
the second-order analysis. The transformation problem facing the organisation
was to shift from an operations-driven road builder to a strategic manager of the
road system within a Whole-of-Government policy context. There is a high
degree of discontinuity involved in realising this shift.
First, while the radical structural change did produce behaviour change and
collective unfreezing of the status quo, it also contributed to greater
organisational fragmentation, high levels of organisational stress, and a more
adversarial relational climate. Adverse outcomes were linked to (a) the
perceived lack of clear vision (alternative schema) to facilitate sensemaking, (b)
challenges to professional and organisational identity, and (c) an assumption that
the organisational had the pre-existing capabilities to develop a new schema.
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The large-scale human process intervention (Chapter 5) ameliorated some of the
adverse effects of the radical structural change, particularly in terms of
contributing to the development of a relational environment within which
organisational members, particularly those in close contact with the initiator of
this intervention, found renewed confidence in the organisation’s capability to
advance the change agenda and change planning. The outcome of this planning
was a series of techno-structural interventions, which, while necessary, had
adverse consequences on organisational member engagement with the change
agenda.
From the perspective of change implementers, top-down techno-structural
interventions (a) were not linked to clear vision so appeared unrelated to local
task priorities thereby creating cynicism, (b) dampened opportunities for
initiating bottom-up change, (c) resulted in a differential tempo of change
between the top and bottom of the organisation, (d) reflected a perceived lack of
trust by management in organisational members’ capabilities, (e) created
horrendous workloads and restricted career and personal development
opportunities, (f) were linked to inadequate implementation processes, and (g)
created a work environment that was disempowering and overwhelming.
This organisational member experience was reflected in the pattern of reported
schema change. There was little evidence of the realisation of a coherent new
organisational schema. Instead, on some critical schematic dimensions
organisational members were polarised and on several others they preferred the
pre-existing schema to what they saw as the emerging schema. Nevertheless,
there were clear shifts on some schematic dimensions. In particular,
organisational members embraced those shifts that contributed to public service
values and the facilitation of critical organisational tasks.
This result suggests two outcomes. First, the imposed structural intervention did
force a break from the past but it did not disengage organisational members from
their pre-existing organisational schema (Bartunek, 1993). The assumption that
it did would certainly make change management actions easier, at least from the
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change leaders’ perspective. Having to manage the relocation from the pre-
existing schema to the new complicates change management significantly.
Second, the dynamics underpinning schema change had less to do with inter-
schema conflict, or dialectical processes, but were more driven by teleological
processes (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). However, the vision driving change
tended to be implicit rather than linked to the formal organisational vision. The
potential of dialectical processes was constrained by non-facilitative conflict
management norms.
Change management context did have an adverse influence on change leader
interventions and influence. In particular, discontinuity intensified problems
associated with both professional acceptance of change and distance. Distance
from change leaders did tend to neutralise change leader influence.
Organisational members acknowledged that the decentralised nature of the
organisation buffered them against some aspects of change.
Greater change leader influence ensued from direct face-to-face contact; more
problems arose when change leaders were perceived to be anonymous.
Moreover, distance made the communication of complex meanings much more
difficult, particularly given the discontinuous nature of the change.
The complexity of the pattern of organisational members’ constructions of the
transforming organisation defies simple statements of success or failure; despite
change of organisational design and prescribed behaviour, schema change is still
a work in progress.
CONCLUSION
This chapter explored the efficacy of interventions for achieving qualitative
schema change; a shift from a concept of the organisation as an operations-driven
road builder to a concept of the organisation as a strategic management of the
road system within the context of a Whole-of-Government policy environment.
As the previous analysis indicates, simple conclusions about the efficacy or
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otherwise of change leader interventions are not possible yet the analysis does
contribute to an understanding of what makes the relationship between change
leader interventions and organisational schema change so complex.
The next chapter investigates change leader interventions and schema change
designed to reinforce the transformation of the operations-driven road builder
into a commercialised-provider organisation. This is the second schema change
context created by the truncation of the organisation on strategic-owner and
commercialised provider lines.
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Table 6.1: Qualitative schema change Corporate Change Trajectory
Pre-existing organisational schema* Reconstructed organisational schema
Road building focus Managerial/financial focus Reaction: Polarised; about more than building roads; philosophical shift – de-engineered Tensions: Loss of technical expertise; loss of technical excellence; core versus consultation tasks; management reporting with unknown or uncertain value; career and development implications, particularly range of experience available
Operations-driven Strategy-driven Reaction: Positive, contemporary management practice; establish why organisation does what it does; potentially deals with looming problems particularly related to loss, to retirement, of large number of experienced engineers (succession planning) Tensions: Complex problems not confronted; strategy unclear; complexity of shift; perception of regression
Departmental autonomy & closed to external influence
Whole-of-Government & open to external influence
Reaction: Positive; can no longer ignore the realities of the real world; success experiences (Success Stories); social responsibility; greater maturity organisationally and in community; knowledge for decision making Tensions: Inter-departmental relationships; budget diffusion; knowledge, skill, time & resource demands; balancing core tasks and community consultation tasks
Highly decentralised and customised systems & service delivery
Greater centralisation and standardised systems & service delivery
Reaction: Negative (thought traditional organisation under-organised in terms of demonstrating performance against Whole-of-Government objectives and priorities) Tensions: Perception of reduced level of service; loss of customisation; round peg, square hole; paradoxical given that aim organisationally is flexible, responsive, decentralised learning organisation
Single dominant discipline Multidisciplinary
Reaction: Positive: enhances Main Roads capabilities in multiple fields; enhanced reputation as leader in multiple fields; reflects Whole-of-Government orientation Tensions: Diffusion of budget, non-core activities reduces investment in roads
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Table 6.1 continued
Individual-based structure Team-based structure Reaction: Polarised: individual judgement and autonomy versus greater collaboration in meeting demands Tensions: Role ambiguity, increased ‘politics’; shifting burden of responsibility to team; team decision making; increased workload
In-house capabilities Outsourcing Reaction: Negative, though ameliorated by policy change in the direction of creating more permanent positions and rebuilding in-house capability Tensions: Loss of ownership of road network; lack of consultant commitment to road network; limited transfer of knowledge from consultants; loss of expertise, loss of career competitiveness; loss of professional work experience
Predictable/controllable career & development opportunities
Restricted & less controllable career and development opportunities
Reaction: Negative and much stronger in Corporate than in Commercial Tensions: Inadequate mentoring; outsourcing; workloads; external appointments; changed nature of work means less experience; loss of organisational knowledge and expertise
Top-down techno-structural change processes
Top-down techno-structural change processes (no change)
Reaction: Negative; change management practices reaffirmed pre-existing change management schema: Main Roads doesn’t manage change well, though we do it better than other departments; want period of consolidation and stabilisation; slowed by round 4; spatial differentiation buffers to some degree Tensions: Unclear direction; incomplete diagnosis before implementation; limited or token opportunities for input; inadequate resourcing of change; excessive pace and frequency of change; regression; horrendous workloads; perception of limited trust in organisational member capabilities; change not clearly linked to strategy
Emotional tone: Can-do; like Main Roads, pride; ordered social system, absence of ambiguity
Emotional tone: Disempowered, overwhelmed; need for consolidation and stabilisation; increased cynicism; remain committed, though tested: much ambiguity and uncertainty
Reaction: Negative, though some variation across sites Tensions: Lack of control; feeling over-whelmed – demands exceed capacity; need for consolidation and stabilisation; horrendous workloads; pace and frequency of change
*Left-hand pole anchors were drawn from Chapter 4, that is, organisational
members’ constructions of the traditional organisation
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CHAPTER 7: COMMERCIAL CHANGE TRAJECTORY
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter explored the efficacy of change leader interventions for
achieving qualitative schema change in the context of shifting Corporate Main Roads
from operations-driven road builder to strategic-owner of the road system. The
chapter found that (a) with exceptions, the techno-structural interventions were not
experienced as facilitative of change, (b) configurational schema change was not
achieved though critical sub-schema change was, (c) contrary to expectation,
juxtaposition-relocation rather than disengagement-learning and teleological rather
than dialectical processes better explained schema change dynamics, and (c)
contextual attributes, professionalism and distance, did hinder intervention influence.
This chapter investigates the relationship between change leader interventions and
organisational schema change in the second schema change context created by the
1996 truncation of the organisation. In particular, the chapter investigates the
efficacy of change leader interventions designed to facilitate the development of the
commercialised-provider organisation, a second-order or transformational change
(Bartunek & Moch, 1987).
THE INTERVENTIONS
From the perspective of Commercial Main Roads, the goal of the truncation of the
organisation was to shift the organisation from an operations-driven road builder to a
profit-driven provider of infrastructure delivery services within a Whole-of
Government policy environment (paraphrased from reported and internal
documents). Specifically, Commercial Main Roads is (a) becoming a commercial
profit-driven organisation while providing Whole-of-Government outcomes, (b)
adopting a highly accountable and performance-driven organisation for the future,
and (c) developing a continuous improvement mindset and organisational change
capability (Queensland Government, 2002b).
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A key element of this shift is a fundamental change in core business. Specifically,
the change was designed:
To change the culture of the place and to move away from that strong
technical excellence of an engineering culture to a paradigm that runs on a
parallel set of railway tracks, which is the Project Management concept. The
core business that we’re in is not engineering, but project management,
which is the core business of our future (Commercial manager 2001).
A second critical intervention was the large-scale human process intervention
discussed in Chapter 5. The environment created by the large-scale human process
intervention triggered a series of subsequent interventions designed to progress the
development of new formal organisational arrangements and new organisational
schemata.
Change leaders in this sub-organisation choose, consistent with the Three Frames, a
large-group intervention (Bunker & Alban, 1997) designed to determine the
organisational design and capabilities required to create a successful profit-driven
infrastructure delivery organisation. Large-group interventions are methods for
involving the whole system, internal and external, to the change process. They
involve a critical mass of the people affected by change, both inside the organisation
(employees and management) and outside it (suppliers and customers) (Bunker &
Alban, 1997)(xv).
A key goal of the intervention was to gain the commitment and ownership of the
change process by all employees. The outcome of the large-group intervention was a
change management plan, Project 21, which focused on whole-of-organisation
change including culture change (the creation of a project management culture),
techno-structural change, and the development of new organisational capabilities.
In summary, this chapter investigates the relationship between change leader
interventions and organisational schema change in the context of efforts to
substantially replace the traditional organisation with a viable commercialised
organisation.
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ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
As in previous chapters the analysis is divided into a first-order analysis and a
second-order analyses. The first order analysis explores organisational members’
accounts to establish their constructions of the changing organisation at four points
in time. The second-order analysis, provided at the end of the chapter, interprets
first-order concepts in terms of the relationship between change leader interventions
and organisational schema change.
The data are presented by data collection round. However, given the high degree of
consistency in respondents’ accounts in rounds 2 and 3 (and across the four rounds
generally), these rounds have been amalgamated. To maintain coherence of data in
each round, analysis of the data is provided at the end of the round rather than at the
end of each subsection.
RESULTS
CONTENT CHANGE
Organisational purpose
The dominant theme in Round 1 was the adverse effect of the restructure of the
organisation into owner-provider on Commercial Main Roads and on its
relationships with Corporate Main Roads. Respondents felt the restructure was not
well conceptualised or managed. They felt they were put into an impossible
situation in that they had to compete and make a profit or face the prospect of
downsizing yet faced significant restrictions on their ability to compete.
Respondents reported that high levels of organisational stress existed at this time.
Respondents typically experienced the restructure on owner-provider lines as sudden
and involving little preparation of people or the organisation for the new role
demands that would be imposed on them:
One Friday you are working for the State, the next Monday you are no longer
serving the public, and are having to worry about the bottom line (Focus
Group R1-1).
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Furthermore, there was a perceived absence of a clear strategy for realising the
objectives of the owner-provider split:
With the transition from public sector operations to competing in a market
environment tendering for work against contractors, there was initially no
real direction given on how to get the job done (Focus Group R1-5).
In some cases, technical professional managers were ill-prepared for their new role
as managers of a competitive business:
We had managers who were thrown into being accountable for funds and
had to manage it in a very different way than they were used to. The
managers we used to have say eight plus years ago were engineers or people
who were at a very high level in their profession who were very good at what
they did and that was engineering, and I’m only speaking from the technical
side, so engineers or senior draftsmen, and all of a sudden these people were
then told you have to manage in a commercial business and had absolutely
no idea what to do. So some grasped it and some didn’t. I was caught
watching the ones who did succeed and I was watching the ones who were
drowning (Focus Group R1-2).
Respondents’ reactions to the large-scale human process intervention of Director-
General Varghese were viewed much more positively than the structural
intervention. Varghese was viewed as a respected and strong leader (Focus group
R1-2). Varghese’s influence was attributed to the Three Frames and its associated
“unblocking” strategies. Unblocking referred to the collective identification of
significant blockages to organisational transformation, and the creation of
committees to address those blockages. The Relationship Frame, in particular, was
reported to have had a positive impact on coordination across Commercial Main
Roads.
Furthermore, Varghese initiated structural realignment in a way that was not
altogether characteristic of public sector restructuring: he realigned Main Roads
structure to business needs rather than align business to structure (Focus Group R1-
2).
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In addition, Varghese expanded the organisation’s governance structure from the top
four managers to top twenty-five managers. As a consequence, Commercial
managers had direct access to a member of the Senior Management Group; a person
with a relevant portfolio and through whom they could report procedures and
progress. Finally, Varghese was thought to have provided an environment in which
planning and development of the new Commercial Main Roads could be advanced.
This planning resulted in a formal change management plan, Project 21.
In summary, respondents reacted differently to the two interventions, radical
restructure and large-scale human process intervention. The radical restructure
created an environment in which change was required yet there was little evidence of
facilitation of organisational member sensemaking. Indeed, the environment created
tended to trigger dysfunctional conflict both between Commercial Main Roads and
Corporate Main Roads and within each sub-organisation. The large-scale process
intervention was viewed much more positively. This intervention triggered changes
that provided key organisational members with the means and an environment in
which needed change could be planned and implemented.
Respondents’ reactions to the change in organisational core purpose created by the
restructure were polarised. Some respondents were highly supportive of the split and
others felt that Commercial Main Roads should be reintegrated with Corporate Main
Roads. This is a critical finding in that it is contrary to the findings of Balogun &
Johnson. This issue will be taken up in the second-order analysis.
Some respondents believed that the concept of commercialisation was fundamentally
flawed; it was seen as pseudo-commercial; still having to serve the people of
Queensland and trying to act like a hardened contractor (Focus Group R1-1).
Others questioned the need for the owner – provider split; there was a feeling that
Main Roads could have commercialised without creating a division in the
department. The problem the group felt was that senior management of the day were
too easily influenced by politicians.
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Respondents reported that the restructure on owner-provider lines had an adverse
impact on people in Commercial because, apart from the isolation of being
physically separated from Corporate Main Roads, the Commercial workforce was
constantly being downsized, leaving them with a feeling of being doomed (Focus
Group R1-4) and in a half way land (Focus Group R1-1).
In addition, respondents believed the commercialisation was detrimental to the
quality of the road system; an indication that some organisational members were
evaluating the change in terms of traditional technical excellence values. For
example, the conflict between the former concern with technical excellence and
quality of work and the need to be efficient and competitive was problematic:
Quality tends to go out the window when budgetary constraints leave you
with little or no option but to use cheaper materials and the most cost
efficient work practices; everything revolves around the dollar (Focus Group
R1-1).
This proficiency-efficiency conflict is further exacerbated, respondents reported, by
being governed by Corporate Main Roads’ policies and specifications. Respondents
also reported that they had to meet these expectations but they were not financed or
resourced to compete with private contractors who could cut corners and compete
with lower costs (Focus Group R1-1).
Respondents also mentioned the restrictions placed on them and the effect this had
on their competitiveness. For example, the organisation was not permitted to tender
for some jobs as Government policy dictated that a large percentage of State funding
allocated to road construction go to the private sector nor were they able to advertise
in the open market. They felt they were treading a fine line; any shift in the balance
will result in downsizing (Focus Group R1-4). Consequently, respondents felt like
they were trying to run a business with one hand tied behind our backs (Focus
Group R1-4).
Respondents felt that the success of the transformation of Commercial hinges on
changing culture:
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Turning a traditional long standing public sector organisation into a
commercial business and overcoming the established territorial culture of
Commercial units in districts and regions to enhance improved cooperation,
communication, and creativity and innovation with every unit having access
to one State-wide pool of resources (Focus Group R1-2).
Despite the constraints imposed, there was polarisation in respondents’ views about
the future viability of commercialisation in Main Roads. Some respondents reported
that if Commercial was fully commercialised we would not be able to compete in the
open market due to systems and process overheads imposed by Corporate (Focus
group R1-1). Furthermore, there was a feeling that Commercial should go back to
Corporate so that we can focus on doing a decent job building roads that we know is
going to last its design life (Focus Group R1-1).
However, other respondents, despite having to juggle competing in the external
market to make a profit, maintaining existing workforce size and not being able to
increase market share, expressed much greater levels of confidence in their ability to
succeed and believed they were well positioned to accept the challenge of
privatisation (Focus Group R1-2). Respondents attributed their rapid adaptation to a
commercial focus to becoming more goals-orientated, more conscious of stringent
time deadlines, working smarter, being flexible and providing value added services:
I tend to think that the government split us all up so we’re competitive and
we’re a lot more goal-orientated and we’re a lot more competitive within
ourselves, within our groups and that sort of thing as well.
So, that’s been a good thing?
Yes, at the end of the day it’s a little more meaningful.
I suppose if you are able to get a better value for money and ….. just like it
had in our area. We’ve certainly done that. Improvements and everything
that’s taken place (Focus Group R1-2).
A greater focus on being entrepreneurial was a key shift for respondents across
research sites. For example, respondents reported that entrepreneurial activity had
increased and, consequently, their capabilities and their confidence.
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Being in [Commercial], I think has made us a lot more skilled in different
areas like we’re doing a lot of things out of the ordinary that we were
probably doing in the last three years when I started, now we’re competing
for a lot of small jobs like schools and car parks, boat ramps. We’re just
about to start a job out at [site name deleted] doing all roads and that sort of
thing. It’s broadened our wings. To do different things and compete in the
open market (Focus group R1-5).
Having to become more accountable was another key strategic shift identified by
respondents. In this context there was a tendency to contrast the levels of
accountability required of them and that required in Corporate Main Roads.
Commercial Main Roads had to justify every dollar spent while simultaneously
having to operate under Corporate standards and purchasing policies; they were
expected to be extremely flexible in work practices, particularly in terms of their
willingness to be mobile, then required to give all the profit back to regional office
leaving nothing to reinvest back into the business (Focus Group R1-4).
If we do this, we can save ourselves a bit of time because, I still think the
Public Service hasn’t changed that much that we don’t say a deadline, yeah
maybe we can let it slip until tomorrow, sort of thing. We’re not as bad as
what we were when I first started, but at the same time, they’re kind of
thinking ohhh. You’re always conscious of it – you’re commercial focus and
so you do try and put in a little bit of effort, extra effort in to get things done
on time or to a cost or whatever it is that you’re asked (Focus group R1-5).
Experience of uncertainty about the future was a key theme in the round 1 data. In
this context, respondents had no real vision of the future; the future remains very
much an unknown (Focus Group R1-4). People are still coming to terms with
commercialisation and have little concept of what management is trying to achieve.
Moreover, respondents reported that there are small pockets of resistance at all levels
of the organisation and that it is difficult to get the message down to the coalface.
Respondents felt their future was controlled by Corporate Main Roads, not by them
(Focus Group R1-2) and it was unclear whether they would be sold off or rejoin
Corporate. As discussed above, for some research sites there was ongoing and deep
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concern about the prospect of privatisation; the existing structure and systems would
never allow the group to successfully compete in the private sector; no private sector
organisation would carry the overheads that Commercial does (Focus Group R1-4).
Rounds 2 and 3 were characterized by a growing collective confidence in
organisational members’ ability to compete in the marketplace. While respondents
reported that they were still operating within very tight budgetary constraints, they
had had some success in tendering for open market work and the expectation is that
more work will be tendered for outside the region and with external customers and
this financial year Commercial has made a profit for the first time in five years and,
consequently, morale has improved (Focus group R3-4).
In the context of declining budgets, and a downward trend in traditional work, it is
finding ways of diversifying into non-traditional infrastructure delivery markets to
broaden its customer base.
Successful competitiveness was attributed to; (1) a perception that up-skilling, for
example, project management skills, has created higher capability levels, (2)
organisational members had more experience working in the commercial
environment, and (3) the organisation had been benchmarked by the private sector
on how to produce quality work with limited amounts of money.
Respondents have been successful in overcoming an adversarial contracting
environment and are creating an alliance environment with local governments, utility
providers, other inter-state road authorities, and private contractors. As a result there
has been greater integration of road strategies, the sharing of resources and keeping
employment within local communities Moreover, Commercial Main Roads has
been able to continually reframe and restructure the way it provides services and
generates revenue with increasing emphasis on making sure clients are getting value
for money and are getting what they want.
Building alliances was a key element of the organisation’s perceived strategy. In the
context of declining budgets and internal and external pressure to demonstrate value-
adding, Commercial will need to create more alliances with Local Governments and
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build cooperative relationships with private contractors and other land use and road
network stakeholders to maintain the levels of budgets needed to stay in business
(Focus Group R3-2). Alliances provide a better chance of winning tenders on
bigger projects (Focus Group R3-3), encourage resource sharing, create job
opportunities (Focus Group R3-1) and provide valuable experience and ... a better
perspective of how outside contractors operate (Focus Group R3-3).
Despite the development of these alliances, however, there has been concern in some
areas about a projected downturn in available work over the next three to four years.
Coupled with a dramatic drop in the allocation of corporate funding for road
construction, it is expected that the organisation will be much smaller in the future or
possibly parts sold off.
Change will also impact on the nature of work undertaken. Commercial will become
more involved in the rehabilitation and maintenance of the network asset rather than
in the construction of roads and bridges. As a consequence, over the next couple of
years internal alignments between Corporate and Commercial will have to become
tighter to facilitate growth and continuous learning (Focus Group R3-2).
Respondents reported that Commercial is still struggling with not being able to
compete on a level playing field with private contractors and others; Commercial
should have a preferred supplier arrangement with Main Roads. The main issue is
that while Commercial Main Roads:
Is being pushed to embrace commercial principles, there are continual
impediments with the rules and regulations and associated overhead costs of
being part of government (Focus Group R2-5).
Consequently, (a) Commercial is still treading a fine line between winning tenders
on price whilst trying to maximise the quality of the work produced (b) Commercial
does not have the funding to put on new staff or trainees, age profiles of workers in
the field are rising and it is recognised that business performance will begin to suffer
as lost injury time indicators are on the increase and (c) that the quality of the
regional road network had deteriorated and that, consequently, there has been a trend
toward road maintenance work rather than major construction work.
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As a result of these impediments, there have been fewer opportunities for younger
staff to engage in big projects (Focus Group R2-1). It is also difficult to train staff in
the context of continual shortages and excessive workloads; this is viewed as
detrimental to career progression, both professionally and organisationally. The
group felt there should be a greater focus on workforce planning, having staff and
resources in the right areas, and increasing the level of training for road workers.
As in earlier rounds, a continuing theme was the contradictions inherent in operating
simultaneously in both public and private spheres; they:
Continue to grapple with a competing agenda of having to win open market
tenders based on the lowest price, deliver a quality product, while making a
three percent profit and operating within an accountability framework that
creates excessive overheads (Focus Group R3-1).
The experience of public-private contradictions is intensified by three factors. First,
respondents perceived a tendency for Corporate to be more concerned with being
proficient than with being efficient, which significantly increased duplication.
Second, Commercial has to maintain a permanent workforce increasing their
dependence on Corporate to ensure future contracts. Third, there are still marked
differences between Commercial and the private sector in the way they can compete
and operate in the same market: private contractors have a more flexible orientation
to quality, safety and workforce flexibility, whereas Commercial is bound by less
flexible public sector rules and regulations.
As discussed in Chapter 5, respondents find Commercial’s strategic direction
difficult to interpret and, therefore, it is not always clear what is required or needs to
be implemented at the grassroots level. Consequently, there is some confusion and
uneasiness over the possible directions that Main Roads may take to future
commercialisation and privatisation. Yet, there is also an acknowledgement that
there is no going back:
Although [Commercial] has insufficient resourcing and funding with
workloads increasing and deals continually with the threat of downsizing in
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the organisation, it is in a position where it cannot turn back (Focus Group
R2-1).
Despite business successes and greater levels of collective confidence, respondents
still reported high levels of uncertainty about their collective future. The consensus
was that it was anyone’s guess where the organisation will be in five years time
(Focus Group R3-1). Commercial’s future was governed by forces outside their
control. In particular, Commercial is influenced to a significant degree by the
political climate of the time (Focus Group R3-3). Consequently, they expect
Commercial will remain relatively dependent on Corporate Main Roads for work
over the next few years regardless of advances made in alliance contracting and
diversification.
In addition, concern was expressed about the fuzzy picture reflected in messages
from the higher echelons of Corporate Main Roads regarding their commitment to
the concept of commercialization (Focus Group R3-5). Some conflict has been
developing at the regional level over the department’s obligations to support local
employment and the recent orientation towards becoming a flexible State-wide
business. Whether cooperation exists or not between Commercial and Corporate
Main Roads at the regional level depends largely upon the persuasion and influence
exerted by the particular District Director. Staff is unsure and concerned about their
job security and future direction (Focus Group R3-5).
In the face of high level uncertainty, respondents suggested that strong leadership
and a consistent strategic vision that leaders link back to belief systems is vital for
workers to feel empowered and secure in their employment. Management:
Should take on greater responsibility to translate the strategic direction of
the organisation to the workers to cultivate a better understanding and sense
of stability in employment (Focus Group R3-2).
In round 4, respondents again acknowledged the organisation’s shift from a
technical-engineering focus to a new operating philosophy [project management]
and the development of external and internal relationships (Focus Group R4-3).
Respondents also continued to see their competitive success (and continuity of work)
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in terms of actively engaging in alliances with external stakeholders, diversification,
and increasing their skills and expertise though exposure to other contractors.
At the same time, there was a view that the organisation has a focus on extreme
accountability and appeasing the public rather than ensuring that quality work is
achieved safely. Commercial has to be accountable for every cent spent and to
maintain a permanent local work force, private contractors do not. This conclusion
they felt was supported by evidence from the organisation’s reward system;
Excellence Awards are focused on community engagement rather than on the core
business of doing a quality job (Focus Group R4-1).
For the most part their efforts had been successful; they reported a lessening of their
dependence on Corporate for work from the initial 90%. This shift was a function of
Commercial’s growing reputation for providing quality work and not cutting corners
to win tenders has spread across local government and the private sector. The
building of these external relationships has been promoted by decreasing funds
available from Main Roads to sustain future commercial development and the
unrealistic expectations across the department of what can be achieved within
worsening budgetary constraints.
Respondents were also concerned not just with profit generation but also with the
social impact of their operations. For example, respondents reported the need to
establish closer relationships with local government to ensure that Commercial
doesn’t take bread and butter work away from local people (Focus Group R4-2).
Respondents felt this was particularly important in remote areas were partnerships
create employment and business opportunities for local people. Hence, dealing with
cultural heritage issues is at the forefront of many of these initiatives.
In addition, Corporate Main Roads was not addressing the uncertainty in
Commercial about its future. Indeed, there was a high degree of experienced
uncertainty about the future of Commercial. In particular, there was a perception
that Corporate was more concerned with short-term revenue gain than on how
Commercial’s long-term viability could contribute to Main Roads’ future.
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This short term orientation has created significant levels of competition between
business units across the state. Business units need to be able to work cooperatively
and support each other, in order to quell the under-utilisation of resources in some
areas and scarcity in others. Overall, respondents had a sense that this had yet to be
worked out:
They need to work out what they want the organisation to look like in the
future and communicate that vision to employees in such a way that it is not
so open to different interpretations (Focus Group R4-1).
The constraints that bureaucratic controls and Corporate’s perceived internal focus
(Focus Group R4-3) placed on Commercial’s scope for innovation and viability was
a continuing issue; internal conflict and tension continue to rise from the
contradiction of trying to work within a commercial orientation and autonomous
work ethic while being constrained by bureaucratic controls (Focus Group R4-2)
and feeling frustrated and shackled by the amount of corporate overheads it has to
carry (Focus Group R4-4). Respondents felt they were trying to be commercial but
they felt they have still got the big rope on. Yet, in terms of the future, they see that
Commercial is actively positioning itself for future viability in the industry. They
believed that Main Roads still has a long way to go.
Consequently, respondents argued that Commercial should not be judged solely in
dollar terms but also on its contribution to Whole-of-Government outcomes.
Another point of contention in the relationship was the perception that while
Commercial’s employment numbers are decreasing to maintain commercial
viability, the numbers of corporate employees appear to be increasing; a point of
contention for this group.
On a more positive note, respondents acknowledged that under Steve (Director-
General) there is a better balance between above the green line and below the green
line issues (Focus Group R4-3). This group also believed that the 25-year plan,
Roads Connecting Queenslanders, was a positive intervention in that it provides a
framework for people to work towards and for implementing business plans.
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Relational environment
Change in core organisational purpose created a need for a new relational
environment: the organisation needed to develop new types of relationship with
external clients and stakeholders, with Corporate Main Roads, and between business
units within Commercial.
The truncation of the organisation into owner and provider was problematic for
Commercial – Corporate relationships; it was described as a messy divorce rather
than a planned separation (Focus Group R1-2) and it caused a split in the expertise
of the department; a lot of senior experienced people opted to work in Commercial
to the detriment of the skills base in Corporate (Focus Group R1-3).
As a result, there were:
Real divisions between the corporate and commercial workforces with a
them-and-us mentality emerging; the sharing of ideas stopped, resources
were claimed and hidden and working relationships suffered (Focus Group
R1-1).
The issues in this relationship were intensified by Commercial Main Roads
dependence on Corporate Main Roads for projects to sustain its workforce. Indeed,
the relationship was frequently described in power-dependency terms; District Office
issued the instructions and Commercial had to comply; the owners and the doers
(Focus Group R1-1). The risks in this dependency relationship posed significant
concern for respondents.
Not only did the restructure have an adverse impact on the relationship between
Corporate and Commercial, it also adversely impacted on inter-unit relationships
within Commercial. An ‘us-and-them’ mentality [developed] within Commercial
itself (Focus Group R1-2). This internal conflict was attributed to inter-unit
differences over how quickly they were able to develop a business identity. Rather
than a collective approach to developing the organisation, units tended to operate
individualistically and sometimes competitively.
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Efforts were made to build the relationship between Commercial Main Roads and
Corporate Main Roads. In particular, a scheme in which staff members rotate
through both areas was established; this scheme facilitates the transfer of skills and
experience and has produced more opportunities for staff in both organisations to
gain perspective, engineering, technical, and administrative experience.
Respondents viewed this intervention very positively.
Another positive initiative has been Commercial’s greater willingness to question
departmental changes and strategies in delivering core business. This has been a
significant shift from the traditional tendency to passively accept changes initiated in
Head Office. As a consequence, Commercial has started to develop a new way of
thinking about how Main Roads delivers services. This reframing of the business
has led to improved inter-unit relationships; they were not bashing each other up
(Focus Group R1-2).
Finally, respondents acknowledged that the Corporate-Commercial relationship had
improved following Director-General Golding’s One- Department and the Main
Roads family policy. However, despite the Director-General’s intervention,
respondents also felt there was still little interface between Commercial and
Corporate.
In rounds 2 and 3, despite improvements, the relationship between Commercial and
Corporate was an ongoing source of concern for Commercial respondents.
Commercial sees itself as different from Corporate; each has a totally different
driving force and focus (Focus Group R2-1). Main Roads consists of two different
cultures (Focus Group R2-4).
Respondents felt that Corporate did not always recognise the implication of these
differences. Different sets of urgency exist, with Commercial having to focus on
greater flexibility and faster decision making to optimise business outcomes.
Corporate needs to be more commercially focused:
Letting go of a lot of the checks and balances to allow Commercial to
become a streamlined, flexible, hybrid organisation that can market its
products effectively (Focus Group R3-5).
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In particular, the two cultures are different in terms of attitude to accountability;
commercialisation provides for and requires greater accountability in all areas of
operation than is required in Corporate (Focus Group R2-1). In addition, the
group perceived inequity between the two groups; for example, the obvious
anomalies between Corporate and Commercial staff ratios and budgets.
Moreover, their relationship with certain parts of Main Roads is still tense over
territorial issues (Focus Group R2-2). Respondents felt that there are still
significant issues that need to be addressed regarding the business charter and
competition between Commercial and Corporate. The perception was that
Corporate Main Roads’ commercial focus was to be wound back but in reality
things are still very competitive on the ground (Focus Group R2-2).
In some districts, on the other hand, efforts had been made to ensure a good
working relationship between Commercial and Corporate. Respondents reported
that Commercial managers meet regularly with the District Director and staff is
then notified of outcomes. In this way agreement had been reached on how to
deal with issues of concern to Commercial. However, the group felt that when
new changes are initiated at Head Office level, consultation and communication
with branch managers is, at times, overlooked; the trend is to hear the rumours
first then actions follow.
Overall, more progress is necessary to develop cooperation among different
groups within Main Roads, fostering the One-Department philosophy and
encouraging the shift from the adversarial type of relationship based on
protecting one’s own patch (Focus Group R2-2). They recognised that this is
particularly difficult given that there are fourteen Corporate districts across the
state and they have no consistent approach for dealing with Commercial. In
consequence, Commercial is often distinctly disadvantaged when competing
against private contractors in terms of quality of work and time requirements.
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Nevertheless, respondents also felt that although Commercial is relatively
independent of Corporate, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the
organisation is a part of the department (Focus Group R3-3).
As in previous rounds, the relationship between Commercial and Corporate was a
key theme in Round 3. Respondents reported some improvement in establishing
relationships with Corporate business units and an increasing interest in project
management, innovative work practices and workforce capabilities from within
Corporate. Yet, Commercial staff operates primarily under hearsay and rumour
(Focus Group R3-5).
Respondents also commented on dysfunctional relationships within Commercial
itself. They believed that State-wide problem solving and decision making is
made difficult because of the inherent competition between the Commercial
branches where success at the project level is assessed on financial performance.
This has implications for the sharing of resources and whether any learning from
post project outcomes is shared across the department. In this context, the group
felt that the overall lack of cooperation and teamwork in some pockets of the
organisation also created inefficiencies.
In round 4, as in earlier rounds, a significant issue was the differing evolutionary
paths of the two organisations. Commercial was standardising its business
practices yet each Corporate Region and District had its own way of doing
business, a leftover from the traditional organisation. The lack of standardisation
in Corporate is limiting Commercial’s competitiveness.
Yet, as was the case in earlier rounds, respondents acknowledged the
interventions designed to improve the Commercial-Corporate relationship. At the
same time, there was some scepticism that this would be successful, however
given the difficulty Corporate has in understanding Commercial’s business and
customer focus.
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Organisational redesign
The change in core organisational purpose also had implications for organisational
design. In order to be competitive, change leaders embarked on a program of
organisational redesign.
In round 1, respondents acknowledged the structural integration of the four
Commercial groups into a Commercial operations group; now they see themselves as
one organisation from a State and regional perspective. As a part of this integration,
organisational flexibility and inter-unit working relationships improved:
People are making an effort to open up lines of communication and are
willing to share resources and expertise (Focus Group R1-1).
In addition, all research sites commented on their positive experience of structural
change at the micro-level; the current work organisation allows them greater
challenge, requires them to think, and be more accountable:
You used to get paid from the neck down, now you have to think as well.
Although overworked, stressed and under-resourced, working for
[Commercial] offers more autonomy, challenges, and responsibilities than
working for the Corporate side (Focus Group R1-3).
Specifically, respondents felt that both responsibility and authority had been
devolved. For example, respondents felt that they had been given the tools,
authority, and support by the General Manager to achieve business outcomes and
make vital business decisions; and that the organisation does empower people by
allowing more individual autonomy and lateral thinking and does foster open
external and internal communication channels (Focus Group R1-2). Indeed their
experience of empowerment was so positive that some respondents would find it
difficult to work in a public sector context again.
Greater organisational flexibility was also an outcome of organisation redesign.
Work crews and administrative employees are now required to perform construction
and maintenance work around all parts of the region and consequently have to spend
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more time in the field away from their families. This situation is causing stress as
they try to balance work and family commitments.
The development of a team structure is also contributing to greater organisational
flexibility and innovativeness; there is a continual forming and reforming of teams
to accommodate workload peaks and troughs (Focus Group R1-5). Furthermore:
Specialised people are moving around the region transferring their skills to
those areas where they are needed. Work is dispersed to where it can be
handled most efficiently and effectively (Focus Group R1-5).
I personally think that, in the Commercial side, people have tended to
gravitate to the Commercial side that are warned to give things a go or
warned to not be afraid of the change or having to work a bit harder or a bit
smarter of something like that because I find in our design area, we kind of
get our heads together and say well blah, blah, blah. You know, we can do
this and achieve that or something. (Focus Group R1-5)
Across all research sites, respondents expressed concerns about the viability of
public sector HR, financial and administrative systems and procedures. Corporate
accounting are dragging us down from providing a reasonable return on investment
(Focus group R1-3). HR recruitment and selection and reward systems make it
difficult to attract and retain talented people:
Traditional bureaucratic public sector positions with their duties and
selection criteria no longer fit this organisation (Focus Group R1-2).
In rounds 2 and 3, as in round 1, respondents acknowledged the evolving horizontal
integration of Commercial into a state-wide business. Respondents saw emerging
benefits associated with the redesign including improved lateral communication and
cooperation, resource and experience sharing, greater flexibility in staffing and
reduced fragmentation of skills and resources.
There has been a shift from being concerned primarily with local ‘backyard’ issues
to working under a State-wide product, whole-of-business model:
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Learning is now being exchanged more freely and people are being
encouraged to be innovative in their approach so as to gain the greatest
benefits for the organisation (Focus Group R3-2).
However, reservations about the restructure were emerging. The restructure created
more financial cost centres which re-ignited internal competition:
Creating conflict among work groups to make the almighty dollar and,
thereby, splitting Main Roads even further apart (Focus Group R2-4).
Moreover, the drive for consistency in business systems through Project 21 is also a
source of concern. Standardisation makes it less likely that districts will be able to
meet local customer needs. They believe that every area of the state is a totally
different market. The issue is to make sure that Main Roads districts are more
closely aligned in their operations and increase levels of trust.
The restructure to a State-wide business based on product lines also raised concerns
that major projects would be managed by specialists from Brisbane rather than by
the regions and districts. For this group, this change would mean a loss of individual
identity and sense of local direction (Focus Group R3-3). Furthermore, managing
projects from Brisbane may cause some tension between project managers coming
into the district and the local workforce. The perception may be that the work could
not be handled locally.
The restructure will result in the need for fewer construction workers and the
remaining workers will be required to be very mobile and travel to major projects.
The perception is that the districts’ skill sets, expertise and aging workforce restricts
the high level of mobility that will be required for major projects, and some level of
external subcontracting will occur.
Project management methodology, and the training associated with it, has had
positive outcomes. Project management is producing a better-educated management
team who are more accountable and aware of what the business requires so they can
effectively exchange information across the organisation.
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In round 4, respondents again acknowledged the emerging integration of the
business and its significance for the continued viability of Commercial Main Roads:
Work boundaries have changed and responsibilities have broadened and
there is a greater focus on State-wide business (Focus Group R4-4).
Overall, the general feeling was that redesigning the business would unite the
different commercial units, improve financial accountability, enhance the public’s
awareness of what the organisation does and facilitate the marketing of new and
existing products. In addition, the transition has encouraged networking and greater
transfer of knowledge and expertise between regions and districts; organisational
members are now being able to talk about concerns and successes with a wider circle
of people. In addition, there are greater opportunities for relieving in different
positions across the State.
As in earlier rounds, several reservations about the restructure were raised. There
was a concern that the new State-wide structure would result in a loss of local
identity, impede communication and would increase staff mobility requirements.
Under these circumstances, balancing work and family issues would be increasingly
difficult (Focus Group R4-1).
In addition, respondents raised concerns about the implications of devolving
administrative paperwork responsibilities to fieldworkers; devolution has increased
complexity; has dramatically complicated the process of accountability and financial
control, increased workload without extra resources and increased stress levels.
As in earlier rounds, respondents were very positive about the value of the project
management intervention:
Project management has increased accountability and improved risk
management and has encouraged people to plan and work a lot smarter
(Focus Group R4-3).
The standardisation of systems and processes and the formal training that has gone
with these interventions is starting to produce greater consistency across the state;
the training, which is linked to nationally-endorsed competencies, is a positive
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intervention. However, some respondents also felt that more importance should be
placed on maintaining engineering and technical expertise in the organisation
(Focus Group R4-1).
Workloads
Change in core organisational purpose and in organisational design imposed
significant workload demands. Respondents in Commercial Main Roads reported
significant concerns about much higher workloads across all levels of the
organisation and across all data collection rounds:
Staff at grass roots level suffer information overload as they had to know how
to comply with legislative requirements, including cultural heritage,
environmental protection, and occupational health and safety (Focus Group
R1-3).
In addition, respondents felt that the department is consistently pushing for tighter
project deadlines with expectations, particularly relating to financial reporting, being
far too high. These expectations can affect the quality of work output and whether
the needs of the wider public are being met. So respondents experience conflict
about which master [they] are really serving (Focus Group R2-4).
Career and development opportunities
The ongoing transformation of the organisation was adversely affecting career and
development opportunities. There was a perception that professionals no longer had
the opportunity to work on big projects and that this was impacting on their
professional development.
This, along with the design of a much flatter organisational structure, has resulted in
blocked internal career paths, less sharing of departmental knowledge and expertise,
and has reduced staff morale:
[Staff] don’t know what the big picture is, have nothing to aspire to and do
not know what Main Roads is after in its people (Focus Group R4-5).
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CHANGE PROCESS
Change implementation processes were frequently referred to in respondents’
accounts of change.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the process of splitting the organisation into
Corporate Main Roads and Commercial Main Roads was viewed negatively.
However, without suggesting that no efforts were made to develop the organisation
in the interim, a major process initiative in the 1998/1999 resulted in the
collaborative development of a formal change management plan for the organisation,
Project 21.
The process involved a large-scale participative planning process designed to
determine organisational design parameters and get organisational member
ownership of the process and the outcome. Forums and state conferences were
conducted to facilitate organisation-wide implementation of the change agenda.
In round 1, respondents were very positive about Project 21. Respondents expected
the project to bring benefits (networking, communication, financial management).
Over an 18-month planning stage:
The core project team, specialised business consultants, organisational
change management consultants, and a coalition of executive officers have
identified and evaluated the skills, processes and systems necessary to deliver
the core components of the project and facilitate the development of new
business (Focus Group R1-2).
Respondents also reported that continuous incremental change is embedded in their
organisation; every work practice is continually reviewed for quality control and to
streamline the practices further (Focus group R1-5). In this context, respondents
expect to have to become more adaptable to flexible working arrangements. With
this, comes a more hands-on approach; a role for individual leadership and
involvement and a customer service focus.
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However, concerns were raised about change implementation in the wider Main
Roads. Respondents suggested there was a need for continuity of specific change
programs, for example, the Three Frames and stabilisation of technology, not just a
continual turnover of new ideas. Furthermore, change messages are:
Not reaching everyone outside Brisbane as well as those in Brisbane; change
has to be handled sensitively as blame for problems is attributed to Brisbane
(Focus Group R1-2).
Respondents were also concerned about the constant changes to processes and
systems; changes that cause confusion for managers and staff alike and diminish a
sense of achievement (Focus group R1-4); people need to be consulted, trained and
outcomes assessed before implementation starts. In this context, there was a general
perception that Corporate had limited understanding of what it is like operating in a
commercial environment and did not appreciate that their decisions can have an
adverse impact on Commercial’s long term viability:
Corporate is slower to react and slower to understand that there are broader
issues at stake (Focus group R1-5).
In rounds 2 and 3, the issue of the implementation of new technology and systems
remained a significant issue, particularly the issue of determining change needs
before implementation.
While its full impact had not yet been felt, respondents acknowledged that Project 21
with its focus on the standardisation of quality systems, organisational integration
and project management will generate improvements for the organisation. In
addition, Project 21 has a strong focus on soft skills and providing a clear rationale
for change. However, it has been a difficult process communicating the same
message across a geographically spread, task-oriented, tactile workforce from
diverse backgrounds and educational levels (Focus Group R2-2).
Respondents also suggested that, despite the time and effort devoted to developing
strategies for improving relationships, people issues continue to be a major problem
and are often avoided (Focus Group R2-4). So people are still struggling against the
same opposition in the workplace environment, as some people are not practising
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what they have learned on this program: respondents want more leadership, more
direction and more commitment from senior management.
Respondents felt there was a need for more leadership, direction and commitment
from senior management. Problems are not being addressed or resolved and to
obtain some middle ground or compromise over issues requires a long drawn out
process often not resulting in win- win outcomes (Focus Group R2-4). They should
have a better appreciation of current successes before making changes for the sake of
change or to merely follow some private sector management technique:
People are not fighting the change but implementation has been very poor
and a lot more attention needs to be given to the way change initiatives are
implemented and explained (Focus Group R3-1).
Moreover, there was some concern about how whatever changes were decided would
be implemented; high-level decisions are generally made with unrealistic time
frames for change to be implemented. Furthermore, these decisions have a far
greater impact on lower levels of the organisation than those making these decisions
would expect (Focus Group R3-2).
Decisions about strategic direction are already made at the top with little cross
sectional input from different groups across the state about what happens on the
ground (Focus Group R3-1). It appears as if people are being consulted but in reality
there are few opportunities given to provide input into future organisational
direction; there is frustration that local knowledge is not trusted by Head Office and
that responsibility is not devolved further down the line (Focus Group R3-1).
On the other hand, other respondents reported that Commercial has taken proactive
steps to reduce inconsistent or mixed messages being communicated throughout the
organisation (Focus Group R3-2). Consistency is difficult to achieve as different
interpretations occur when information is being filtered down several levels.
Another group reported that the work unit operates with open lines of
communication with messages being related to all staff by the individual managers
(Focus Group R3-3).
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Nevertheless, respondents are aware of the need to seek continuous improvement in
work practices, to attract new business opportunities, to improve customer focus, and
to work harder in the field to ensure that, at the end of the day, they make a profit.
In round 4, Respondent reports of the implementation of change in Commercial
were polarised. One group of respondents said they were encouraged by
Commercial management to be forerunners in implementing new ideas and
embracing and implementing significant change. Their success in this is
demonstrated leadership in all four quadrants of the Balanced Scorecard (one of the
Three Frames). They report a genuine commitment to continuous improvement by
changing organisational culture from a builder of roads to a service provider
responsive to public’s needs (Focus Group R4-2).
At the other pole, respondents reported that change was so rapid and continuous that
there is a great deal of uncertainty about where the organisation is heading; we can
only make assumptions about what the rationale is behind the changes and where
the organisation is heading (Focus Group R4-1). The group felt that the short time
frame between changes destabilises and fragments the organisation.
In addition, these respondents acknowledge the scope of the structural change
(reducing four regions to two) but suggest that details of how the different regions
will make the transition have not yet been communicated and are concerned about
how people will adapt to this restructure; they see that some still protect their patch
and will not readily accept change. At the same time, they see no incentive for
people to look beyond their local responsibilities as they are measured on how their
local unit performs.
Continual change can waste resources; it can send out the wrong message to both
internal and external clients. These respondents reported that by phasing in different
change strategies competently, the organisation would gain a great deal more
enthusiasm and commitment from its staff and credibility with the wider community.
A similar polarisation is apparent in respondent perceptions of change leadership and
communication. One group of respondents remains confident in the openness of
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vertical communication channels; senior management encourages staff to challenge
decision and asks for feedback on how operations can be improved, for example, at a
recent state-wide conference ideas from staff were voted on and enabled changes to
happen.
On the other hand, some respondents felt their opinions were not having much
impact or were largely ignored. This group felt that their relationship with Head
Office has become more difficult because of increasing number of layers within the
organisation made consultation with lower levels more difficult (Focus Group R4-4).
The implication is that staff will have to meet set parameters and work within a new
framework regardless of whether resources, existing systems and structures at the
regional level will support the changes driven from the top.
Regression
Few explicit concerns were raised about regression in Commercial: pockets of
resistance were acknowledged rather than broad-based resistance. The focus was
very much on a continual change mindset in which respondents were focused on
finding ways of improving the viability of the business.
The first-order analysis has provided a rich description of organisational members’
accounts of the transformation of their organisation. A summary of the main
conclusions from this analysis will be incorporated in the second-order analysis.
SECOND-ORDER ANALYSIS
Consistent with the strategy employed in previous chapters, this section explores the
efficacy of change leader interventions in schematic terms. In particular, consistent
with the framework outlined in previous chapters, change leader interventions are
thought to be more likely when (a) organisational members experience the
interventions as facilitative of change, (b) there is evidence of the replacement or
significant elaboration of pre-existing schema, (c) interventions reinforce dynamics
thought to underpin schema change, and (d) interventions are sensitive to change
management context.
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Change leader interventions
Change leader interventions are likely to be more efficacious when organisational
members perceive the interventions as facilitative of change. While the Corporate
and Commercial Change Trajectories emerged from the same intervention, a
different intervention theory is reflected in each trajectory. Attention will be given
to clarifying these differences in Chapter 8.
The implicit intervention theory reflected in Commercial suggests the following
intervention sequence. The transformation of Commercial began with the radical
restructure of the organisation. Two years later, a new Director-General initiated a
large-scale human process intervention (Chapter 5) intended to provide
organisational members with the means of advancing OT.
Respondents’ accounts suggest that the radical restructure was traumatic, indeed this
effect seemed more intense than in Corporate in that the perceived costs of failure
were likely to be higher. It was described as a messy divorce rather than a planned
separation. In addition, respondents felt they were inadequately prepared to meet
the demands that the new structure imposed on them. From the perspective of
respondents, and in the absence of an alternative organisational schema, the
intervention created confusion and stress and a tendency for either individualistic or
adversarial behaviour rather than cooperative behaviour (Johnson & Johnson, 1994);
there were reports of fragmentation, a silo and an ‘us-and-them mentality’.
Moreover, the restructure created intense contradictory demands; they were relegated
to a half-way land between profit-driven provider organisation and a public
organisation. In this half-way land they had to satisfy profit expectations and, at the
same time, meet the standards of public policies and regulations. Moreover, the
organisation relied on Corporate for a large proportion of its revenue and while this
dependence declined over the period of the research as organisational members
developed their entrepreneurial capabilities, significant risks were associated with
commercialisation (and the prospect of privatisation).
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However, as will be discussed in the next section, respondents were polarised on the
potential shift toward privatisation. Some research sites were very confident in their
ability to meet the demands of privatisation should it occur and other sites preferred
a re-integration with Corporate Main Roads. While this polarisation persisted
through the period of the research, there was an general increase in collective
confidence in their capabilities.
The large-scale human process interventions were designed to improve relationships
and provide an environment within which change planning could be advanced. The
outcome was a large-group intervention (Bunker & Alban, 1997) designed to
identify the structures, processes and capabilities required to create a successful
profit-driven provider organisation, and gain organisational members ownership of
and commitment to the process of developing the organisation.
Project 21, a detailed change management plan was the outcome of the large-group
intervention. Project 21 encompassed the development of a project management
culture, organisation structure and systems change. The plan reflected a belief that
strong collective initiative and engagement by organisational members was required
if the organisation was to succeed; the organisation could not succeed by relegating
organisational members to the role of passive recipients of change driven from the
top, the pre-existing orientation to change (see Chapter 4).
An initial focus of the implementation of Project 21 was the development of a
project management culture intended to embed project management capabilities in
the organisation to improve relationships, coordination, knowledge sharing, and
creativity within and among business units. Structural interventions were secondary
to the development of project management capabilities. Indeed, by the end of the
research period, some respondents were complaining about the slowness of
implementation of some aspects of the organisational restructure.
Respondents responded very positively to project management; the intervention did
create an alternative organisational schema and an optimal level of local autonomy to
realise change goals. Moreover, project management capabilities and processes were
directly linked to critical task demands, stimulated creativity and lateral
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relationships, and contributed to organisational flexibility and staff mobility, in that
the organisation now had a common language that staff could carry with them across
the organisation.
Responses to subsequent techno-structural interventions depended on whether they
emanated from Commercial or Corporate. Responses to top-down systems changes
emanating from Corporate Main Roads were as adverse as those reported by
respondents in Corporate (Chapter 6).
Techno-structural interventions initiated by Commercial were better accepted.
Organisational members could see a clear link between these interventions and
organisational competitiveness, on which the ongoing viability of the organisation
depended. The restructure of the organisation from a highly decentralised, region-
and district-based organisation to a centralised and integrated business is particularly
noteworthy. While respondents expressed reservations about the loss of local
identity and the potential problems related to the relationship between Head Office
based project managers and local staff, there was a clear acceptance of the
restructure. The link between the intervention and organisational competitiveness
and viability was apparent to them.
In summary, while the Corporate and Commercial Trajectories arose from the radical
restructure of the organisation, there were differences in the subsequent intervention
theory that drove choices about where, when and how to intervene to produce OT
(Dunphy, 1996). In Commercial there was evidence of discontinuity in thinking
about change management. Much more weight was put, initially at least, on
developing organisational members’ project management capabilities, capabilities
essential to organisational competitiveness. For the most part, organisational
members evaluated change interventions, at least those initiated within Commercial
itself, positively. These interventions contributed to an increasing sense of order and
direction and, organisationally, to greater competitiveness.
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Organisational schema change
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious if there is evidence of
the replacement or significant elaboration of pre-existing organisational schema, that
is, configurational schema change. Schema content outcomes are shown in Table
7.1. This section examines evidence for organisational schema change across the
period of the research.
From operations-driven road builder to profit-driven provider
The shift from operations- and engineering-driven road builder to profit-driven
provider organisation was captured in three bipolar constructs (see Table 7.1); (a) the
shift from operations-driven road builder to a profit-driven infrastructure delivery
provider operating within a Whole-of-Government policy context, (2) the shift from
an engineering focus to a project management focus, and (3) the shift from a public
organisation to one that was expected to operate within a public sector policy
environment and simultaneously in a competitive market place.
Taken together, the data suggest that organisational members were polarised on the
shift from the traditional proficient road builder to a profit-driven infrastructure
delivery provider. Some respondents enthusiastically embraced the concept of a
profit-driven, commercialised organisation and their positive experience in this
context would make it difficult for them to work in a public sector context again.
For this group, their work environment provided them with challenges and
opportunities not available in the public sector.
On the other hand, some respondents were concerned about the viability of
Commercial and believed the best strategy was to return to Corporate and get back to
the task of building quality roads again. The shift from a focus on proficiency to
efficiency was problematic for this group. Traditionally, safety is a dominant
concern of engineers (Schein, 1996), believing that commercialisation would
compromise this value did not sit comfortably.
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The shift from an engineering-focus to a project management focus was well
accepted by respondents. Respondents saw project management as contributing to
their ability to deliver work on time and on budget, thereby enhancing their
reputation with customers. In addition, project management had the potential to
facilitate lateral coordination and knowledge generating and sharing.
Managing the shift from public organisation to public-private organisation appeared
to be the most problematic issue for both those who supported commercialisation
and those who preferred a return to Corporate. This issue was a strong ongoing
theme across the period of the research. Organisational members were trying to
operate within the constraints of public sector policies and systems yet compete with
dollar-driven contractors. In particular, respondents felt that constraints imposed by
marketing and tendering policies together with non-business oriented administrative,
financial, and Human Resource Management systems made meeting profit targets
more difficult. The experience of these contradictory demands was intensified by
the perceived threat of downsizing if profit targets were not met.
The other side of this dilemma, however, was the acknowledgement of the
organisation’s dependence on Corporate for work. While this dependence declined
across the period of the research as entrepreneurial activity and diversification
created new profit-generating business opportunities, some level of dependence
remained (accounts suggest dependence on Corporate reduced from 90% to 30%
across the period of the research).
Previous research has highlighted the consequences of the perception of
contradiction and paradox (Davis et al., 1997). The perception of contradiction tends
to create high levels of anxiety and dysfunctional behaviour (M. W. Lewis, 2000).
The literature suggests that there is a tendency to resolve contradiction by choosing
one option or the other (Clegg et al., 2002; McKinley & Scherer, 2000). However,
under current policy, the choice of public or private was not available.
Yet there is also research that suggests that the ability to adapt to contradictory
demands is a source of organisational effectiveness (Bailey & Neilsen, 1992; Palmer
& Dunford, 2002). As will be discussed later, in Commercial, there was evidence of
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an emerging synthesis of public and private demands in some sites. This synthesis
was based on a rejection of the worst and an incorporation of the best of both public
and private sectors.
Moreover, the evidence suggests site variations in confidence in ability to adapt to
the demands of privatisation, should it occur. Three research sites were more
confident, two were less confident. What underpinned this variation is not
immediately obvious. However, two factors appearing to contribute to this variation
were the nature of the relationship between the Commercial site and the local
Corporate office and the perception of work availability in the area. The latter issue
was to some degree to be addressed by centralisation of the business.
In summary, respondents were polarised on the critical shift in core organisational
purpose; one group was highly supportive of commercialisation and another
preferred reintegration with Corporate. However, both groups readily embraced
project management capabilities and were equally challenged by the contradictions
involved in spanning both public and private domains.
From closed to external influence to open to external influence
As discussed in Chapter 1, contemporary public organisations are opening up to
influence from external stakeholders (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). The shift from an
organisation closed to external influence to one that actively engaged with customers
and other stakeholders was readily accepted by organisational members. The new
focus allowed the organisation to engage in collaborative alliance-based contracting
that allowed both profit generation as well as meeting its obligations under the
Whole-of-Government policy context.
The new openness also contributed to significant improvements in internal
relationships. There was a greater sense of shared fate; in order to succeed as a
profit-driven provider they had to collaborate in knowledge generation and transfer
internally as well as externally.
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From decentralised and multiple businesses to a centralised, integrated business
Change in core purpose required change in organisational design. Respondents used
three structural dimensions to evaluate the redesign of Commercial; (1) the shift
from a decentralised organisation with multiple businesses to a centralised,
integrated business with some local autonomy, (2) the shift from an individual-based
structure to a team-based structure, and (3) predictable career and development
opportunities to fewer career and development opportunities.
First, respondents reported that the organisation was shifting to a centralised and
integrated business and away from the decentralised, district-based structure of the
traditional Main Roads. While reservations were reported, respondents generally
accepted the need to shift to a centralised organisation. Such a design provided
greater flexibility in resource management. There were reservations, however. The
loss of a local input and identity and the difficulties associated with project managers
from other parts of the state quickly adapting to local workforces were concerns.
Respondents readily embraced the shift from an individual-based structure to a team-
based structure. Team work provided opportunities for participation and
collaboration. Respondents typically experienced high levels of ownership of their
work processes.
Workload and reduced career opportunities were a concern. The traditional Main
Roads provided technical professionals with the opportunities to work on major road
projects. The restructure meant that younger engineers no longer had the
opportunity to work on big projects.
For the most part respondents reacted positively to the structural changes.
Organisational members saw the logic of these interventions in terms of contributing
to the organisation’s competitiveness on which the ongoing viability of the
organisation depended.
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From top-down techno-structural change to continuous improvement
Organisational members’ reactions to change implementation processes were
contingent on the source of change. Reactions to organisational change imposed by
Corporate were similar to those of people in Corporate. Change was viewed as top
down, with little diagnosis of business needs. Change emanating from Commercial
itself, however, was viewed more positively. Respondents typically had greater
opportunities and responsibility for generating bottom up continuous change.
A critical feature of the local change process was the sanction given by Commercial
management to take a local initiative to contribute to the development of the
business. Organisational members were not to be passive recipients of change: they
were encouraged and given support to build the organisation from the bottom up.
Emotional tone
Efforts to create schema change, particularly fundamental schema change as is the
case here, are not achieved without triggering an emotional response (Bartunek,
1993; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). As indicated earlier, the assimilation of the new
organisational schema was tempered by the contradictory demands of achieving
profits in a highly competitive market yet, at the same time, operating within public
sector constraints. The perception of paradox and contradiction tends to elicit
anxiety and defensive reactions (M. W. Lewis, 2000) and this was the case here.
Nevertheless, in some groups there were high levels of collective confidence in the
group’s ability to be competitive. In these groups, respondents tended to be upbeat
about the prospects for Commercial and report examples of innovative strategies
designed to enhance their ability to compete successfully.
The emotional tone in other groups reflected much less confidence in the group’s
ability to meet the contradictory demands. The emotional tone in these groups was
more downbeat. There was a tendency to focus on external and internal constraints
that hindered rather than enhanced prospects for success.
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The source of differences in emotional tone among groups was not clear from the
data and given the geographical distances and timescales involved it was not possible
to clarify this issue. Nevertheless, two factors did seem to have an influence, the
nature of the relationship between Commercial and Corporate at the research site and
the nature of and availability of work in the District/Region. Both issues are being
addressed in the redesign of the organisation
Schema change dynamics
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious when the interventions
reinforce schema change dynamics thought to underpin schema change. As
discussed in Chapter 2, two models have been suggested to explain the influence of
change leader interventions on organisational schema, the juxtaposition-relocation
model and the disengagement-learning model.
Recent research (e.g., Balogun & Johnson, 2004) suggests that, given the scale of
change involved, that the disengagement-learning model would better reflect the
observed influence of radical structural interventions. However, contrary to Balogun
& Johnson, the evidence of this case suggests that the juxtaposition-relocation
sequence better explains intervention outcome. Change leaders facilitated the
creation of a new organisational schema (in the context of the large-group
intervention mentioned earlier) and collectively there was a commitment to working
out how to relocate from the traditional view of the organisation as road builder to a
profit-driven provider of infrastructure delivery services.
The evidence suggests that organisational members were evaluating changes in terms
of the pre-existing schema. In particular, juxtaposition-relocation can be seen in the
context of polarisation of opinion about the Corporate-Commercial split. This
polarisation would not occur if organisational members had been disengaged from
their pre-existing schema.
Moreover, as in earlier chapters, both dialectical and teleological processes
contributed to schema change and lack of change. Dialectical processes contributed
more to change in Commercial than it did in Corporate. Under the influence of a
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profit imperative, organisational members reported that they were more willing to
question and dispute decisions made at the top. Conflicts associated with clashes,
between the ‘Corporate schema’ and the ‘Commercial schema’, were also more
readily addressed. The evidence suggests that conflict management norms were
changing to meet the demands facing the organisation and that these norms were
contributing to the functional resolution of inter-schema conflict.
As in Corporate, teleological processes provide a good explanation of those changes
that were readily embraced by respondents. The evidence suggests that
organisational members held an implicit vision of the effective organisation.
Changes aligned with this vision were well accepted. For example, the new working
environment was well accepted: organisational members responded well to the
greater participation in decision making and the discretion to act locally. The
experience was so positive that respondents felt it would be difficult for them to
return to a public sector environment.
This result is reminiscent of Osborne & Gaebler’s (1992:38) proposition about
public sector work design. They reported that:
Many employees in bureaucratic governments feel trapped. Tied down by
rules and regulations, numbed by monotonous tasks, assigned jobs they know
could be accomplished in half the time if they were only allowed to use their
minds, they live lives of quiet desperation. When they have the opportunity to
work for an organisation with a clear mission and minimal red tape ….. they
are often reborn. When they are moved into the private sector, they often
experience the same sense of liberation.
In summary, contrary to Balogun & Johnson (2004), change leader interventions in
Commercial resulted in a juxtaposition-relocation rather than a disengagement-
learning outcome. While there was clear evidence that change leader interventions
did reinforce the development of more appropriate conflict management norms and
that these norms were contributing to relocation outcomes, implicit teleological
processes (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) better explained those changes that were
readily accepted by organisational members.
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Change management context
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious if they are sensitive to
change management context. As indicated in Chapter 2, the change management
context is thought to be inimical to change leader influence. In some measure,
change leaders overcame potential problems associated with professionalism and
distance.
The large-group intervention facilitated schema development by providing
organisational members with the opportunity to participate in determining what
content changes were required and also to gain a sense of ownership of the change
process. For the most part, the intervention appears to have succeeded. Respondents
were positive about the Project 21, the change management plan that arose out of the
large-group intervention.
In particular, the project management culture provided organisational members with
a common language that was contributing to the breaking down of internal
boundaries. The new language facilitated lateral coordination and identity
construction and staff mobility. In addition, the discretion given to local business
units allowed them to contribute to the development of the business: they did not
need to wait for top down direction to act on local initiatives.
EFFICACY OF CHANGE LEADER INTERVENTIONS
This section provides a summary of the conclusions drawn in the discussion above.
Interventions developed by Commercial were generally positively evaluated; for the
most part organisational members could see the relationship between the intervention
and the task of creating a viable and profit-driven provider organisation.
This does not mean there were not perceived tensions. The creation of a project
management culture, which is essentially a large-scale human process intervention,
was evaluated positively. These capabilities were directly related to developing a
viable and flexible profit-driven organisation.
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Again configurational schema change was not achieved. Respondents were
polarised on the key issue of commercialisation, however, the qualitative evidence
suggests that more respondents were supportive than not supportive. Moreover,
there was little evidence that organisational members, collectively, were disengaged
from their pre-existing schema. Organisational members were evaluating change in
terms of their pre-existing schema.
The juxtaposition-relocation model better explained the influence of change leader
interventions. In addition, both dialectical and teleological processes underpinned
efforts to relocate organisational members from pre-existing to new schema.
Increasingly, inter-schema conflicts were resolved by lateral collaboration; sites were
able to share knowledge and resolve problems through engaging with peers. The
greater focus on lateral coordination constituted a significant shift from that in the
traditional conception of Main Roads.
Inter-schema conflict reflected in the contradictory demands of simultaneous
involvement in both public and private spheres was particularly acute. This
contradiction was an ongoing source of concern. However, in some sites there was
evidence of an emerging synthesis. Teleological dynamics also contributed to
schema change; organisational members had an implicit vision of how the
organisation should operate. When there was alignment between this vision and new
schema, new schema tended to be readily embraced.
Again, unequivocal assessments of the efficacy of change leader interventions are
not feasible. Yet, the evidence suggests that significant change has occurred in this
trajectory. Three factors that underpin this success are change leaders’ intervention
theory, which departed from that traditionally employed in the transformation of
public sector organisations, the existence of some degree of continuity in the
operational focus of the organisation, and the perceived imperative to transform or
downsize.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has explored efforts by members of the Commercial Change Trajectory
to reframe their conception of the organisation from an operations-driven road
builder to profit-driven provider of infrastructure delivery services in a Whole-of -
Government policy context. While there was some polarisation on the critical
dimension of organisational purpose, it appeared that there had been a significant
schema shift. Yet, as in the case of Corporate, schema change in Commercial
remains a work in progress.
The next chapter provides a summary and integrative analysis of the three schema
change contexts investigated in this thesis.
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Table 7.1: Qualitative schema change Commercial Change Trajectory
Pre-existing organisational schema Reframed organisational schema
Engineering focus Project management focus
Reaction: Positive: task aligned; improved lateral coordination and knowledge sharing; organisational flexibility; change leaders more managerial and less wedded to a professional identity based on engineering Tensions: Loss of technical/engineering expertise; concern with some aspects of implementation
Operations-driven road builder Profit-driven infrastructure delivery provider in Whole-of-Government
Reaction: Polarised: Viability concerns; social responsibility Tensions: Dependence on Corporate; relationship with Corporate; uncertainty about the future of Commercial; imposed constraints on business practice, including public sector administrative systems; collective confidence, loss of quality/technical excellence; perceived deterioration of the roads network
Public sector Spans Public and Private
Reaction: Negative: tempered by dependence on Corporate; evidence of emerging synthesis based on acceptance of best of public and private and rejection of worst Tensions: Paradox; a half-way land; public business and HR systems; potential for downsizing; lack of Corporate empathy; prospect of privatisation under present constraints
Relational environment: Departmental autonomy and closed to external influence
Relational environment: Whole-of-Government and open to external influence; creation of partnerships and alliances
Reaction: Positive: has been successful at building partnerships and alliances Tensions: Job and capability creation in partner workforces
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Table 7.1 continued
Decentralised and multiple businesses Centralised, integrated business with local autonomy
Reaction: Positive: increased flexibility and competitiveness; improved coordination and sharing of knowledge Tensions: Loss of local perspective and expertise; mobility and flexibility expectations; with concerns for work-family balance; relationship between central project managers and local work teams
Individual-based structure Team-based structure
Reaction: Positive: higher levels of collaboration and participation; increased knowledge-sharing, enhanced coordination, manage workload ‘troughs’; have to think, not just obey; greater organisational flexibility Tensions: none reported
Career and development opportunities Fewer career and development opportunities
Reaction: Negative: no big projects Tensions: External appointments; fewer opportunities as a result of flatter structure; knowledge transfer; nature of work in that there is less scope for big projects
Top-down techno-structural change Top down-bottom-up Continuous improvement
Reaction: Positive with some polarisation: positive when linked to enhanced competitiveness; Project 21; flexibility; adaptability; ownership though concerns about top-down techno-structural change imposed by Corporate Tensions: Imposed Corporate systems change not aligned with business needs
Emotional tone: Can-do; like Main Roads; ordered social system; absence of ambiguity
Polarised from high enthusiasm and confidence to low levels of confidence; tolerance of ambiguity Empowered
Reaction: Polarised: High enthusiasm for Commercial to stress related to meeting demands in the context of uncertain future and work availability Tensions: Prospect of privatisation under current constraints
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CHAPTER 8: ORGANISATIONAL SCHEMA CHANGE: AN
INTEGRATIVE ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The previous four chapters, Chapters 4-7, investigated the efficacy of change leader
interventions for achieving qualitative schema change in a change management
context thought to be inimical to change leader influence. The interventions were
designed to produce second-order or transformational change (Bartunek & Moch,
1987).
This chapter provides a summary and integrative analysis of the results of these
investigations. Consistent with the research question, the discussion of the efficacy
of change leaders’ interventions focuses on whether (a) the interventions are
experienced by organisational members as facilitative of change, (b) there is
evidence of qualitative schema content change, (c) the interventions reinforce
dynamics assumed to underpin content schema change, and (d) the sensitivity of the
intervention to change management context.
CHANGE LEADER INTERVENTIONS
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious if organisational
members experience the interventions as facilitative of change. Previous conceptual
research on top-down structural interventions, for example, reveals a tendency for
these interventions to mask bottom-up change (Maddock, 2002), create cognitive
disorder in those below top-level leader level (McKinley & Scherer, 2000), and
assign a passive, rather than active role to change recipients (McHugh & O'Brien,
1999).
However, the issue is not clear-cut. Some authors support structural interventions.
Galbraith (2000) argues that structural change can produce behaviour change
relatively quickly. In addition, radical structural change has the potential to create a
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perception of crisis and unfreezing (Bartunek, 1993) in that radical structural change
disconfirms the status quo.
Within the timescale of this study, two different types of intervention were reflected
in respondent accounts, large-scale structural interventions and large-scale human
process interventions. The sequence of interventions implemented in the case
organisation was as follows (see Figure 3.2 for a graphical overview).
First, in 1996, consistent with State Government strategy (Queensland Government,
1995), the organisation was truncated into strategic-owner organisation (Corporate
Change Trajectory) and commercialised-provider organisation (Commercial Change
Trajectory). Two years later, a new ‘outsider’ Director-General initiated a top-down
large-scale human process intervention (Leadership Change Trajectory), which
provided a new ends-means leading-managing schema to facilitate the realisation of
change in the earlier trajectories.
The large-scale human process intervention (a) triggered change planning in both the
strategic-owner organisation and commercialised-provider sub-organisations, (b)
was directly related to addressing process problems created by the 1996 radical
structural intervention, and (c) was unique in the experience of the case organisation
in that it focused on developing large-scale leading-managing capabilities rather than
technical capabilities.
Change planning triggered by the large-scale human process intervention took a
different course in each sub-organisation. In Corporate, techno-structural
interventions began the transformation change program (Beer & Nohria, 2000a).
The organisation chose to re-align structure with its new core strategic-manager
purpose and to achieve greater consistency in systems and procedures. Accounts
reported in Chapter 6 suggest that techno-structural interventions were an ongoing
feature of the Corporate Change Trajectory.
A different course of action was adopted in the Commercial Change Trajectory
(Chapter 7). In the Commercial Change Trajectory change leaders initiated a large-
group intervention (Bunker & Alban, 1997; Mirvis, 2005). This intervention
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brought various stakeholders together to (a) create a vision of a successful profit-
driven provider of infrastructure delivery services, (b) identify the capabilities and
resources necessary to realise this vision, and (c) obtain organisational member
ownership of the change process. The outcome was a change management plan,
Project 21, which incorporated multiple interventions, including the development of
a project management culture and large-scale techno-structural change.
Implementation focused first on the development of a project management culture, a
large-scale management process intervention.
Organisational members’ experience of change leader interventions varied by
intervention and by Trajectory. The initial truncation of the organisation produced
behavioural change (though not integrated schema change, which is addressed in
next section), was divisive despite ongoing interdependence between the sub-
organisations, created high levels of organisational stress, and dysfunctional
organisational behaviour. It was a messy divorce rather than a planned separation,
an ‘us-and-them mentality’ developed, there was no strategy, and there were
frequent references to organisational fragmentation, a silo mentality and a siege
mentality.
Moreover, the truncation of the organisation created significant discontinuities in
both sub-organisations and particularly in Corporate. Organisational members in
each sub-organisation were expected to develop a new schema, yet the discontinuity
was so great, it is likely that the capacity to develop this new schema did not pre-
exist in the organisation. Consequently, the learning-development task was
extremely complex and stressful, particularly as there was a perception that failure
could lead to adverse outcomes.
The heavy reliance on structural interventions in the development of the Corporate
Change Trajectory was also contentious. Organisational members were left feeling
overwhelmed by structural change: they felt as though they were at the bottom end
of a funnel and changes were being poured in at the top.
Beyond these findings, however, structural interventions tended to affect the
relationship between top and lower organisational levels in that there was a
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perception at lower levels that the focus on structural change reflected a lack of trust
by the top. Rather than relying on organisational members’ capabilities, change
leaders tended to rely on imposing interminable structural changes. In addition,
frequent structural change intensified the differential perception of change tempo at
top and bottom of the organisation.
Structural interventions were not always evaluated negatively; some structural
change made sense. Respondents reacted positively to structural changes that
increased role clarity and reduced duplication of function. Moreover, significantly,
the major shift from a decentralised organisation to a more centralised organisation
in Commercial was accepted. Even though there were reservations about the loss of
local identity, the shift made sense in the context of the need for organisational
competitiveness.
Large-scale human process intervention
The focus on large-scale human process interventions in this thesis is unique in the
schema change literature. Across the three schema change contexts, two main
human process interventions were employed. The first was the leading –managing
schema (vision, Three Frames, and Five Signposts) introduced in 1998 to contribute
to organisational transformation. The second was the focus on what Commercial
Main Roads referred to as implementing a project management culture.
The large-scale human process intervention ameliorated the dysfunctional outcomes
of the 1996 radical restructure by (a) sanctioning the development of new
capabilities, (b) challenging traditional and now, inappropriate, organisational norms,
(c) addressing extra- and intra-organisational relationship processes, (d) engendering
greater collective confidence in the organisation’s capacity to progress the change
agenda, (e) facilitated change at the level of the top management team (Porras &
Robertson, 1992), and (f) appealing to organisational members’ commitment to the
organisation.
The results of the leading-managing interventions on organisational process schema
evolution are paradoxical: it had a profound and positive influence on organisational
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members while, at the same time, its role in transforming organisational leading-
managing processes, at least at the time of the completion of the research, was
unrealised (a point taken up later in this chapter). Taken together, the large-scale
human process intervention served to unfetter the organisation from some change-
inhibiting aspects of the pre-existing organisational schema.
Given that so little attention has been given to large-scale human process
interventions in the empirical literature, organisational members’ experience of each
element of the intervention will be discussed in more detail.
Visioning intervention
The literature on transformational change assigns a central place to visioning
interventions for achieving OT (Kotter, 1995; Porras & Silvers, 1991). Visions are
assumed to provide organisational members with an alternative ends schema to guide
decision making and action. Moreover, visioning interventions are designed to
engage organisational members in the process of change.
Taken together, the new vision had little influence on organisational members’
experience of change. The key impediment was a strong pre-existing belief that the
organisation had no control over its own destiny: the organisation is reactive and
obedient to influences over which it had no control (see Schofield, 2001 for a similar
argument). Consequently, organisational members paid little explicit attention to the
new vision. Instead, organisation members were focused on, and wanted resolution
of, the uncertainty of and perceived threats in the future (e.g., commercialisation,
loss to retirement of a large number of experienced engineers); threats that may well
have been outside the organisation’s control.
Ironically, however, vision did play a role in facilitating change. However, the
vision was implicit to organisational members. Organisational members appeared to
possess a concept of the ideal organisation and when change interventions were
congruent with this implicit vision, change was readily embraced. This issue will be
discussed in the context of schema change dynamics.
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Leading-managing process interventions
Models of leading and managing are not new: the academic and practitioner
literature is replete with such models (Beer & Nohria, 2000c). Moreover, many
leadership development programs espouse such frameworks. However, these
models are often not integrated with the transformational change agenda of top-level
managers.
In the case organisation, the Three Frames/Five Signposts were a cornerstone of the
transformational change agenda. These models or schema had the potential to serve
two purposes; provide an integrated leading-managing framework to guide practice
and facilitate development and change and to provide a substitute for direct change
leadership.
The results suggest that the Three Frames/Five Signposts were not well integrated
conceptually or practically, across the organisation; for some proportion of staff, the
Three Frames was just a poster on the wall. In particular, their use was not well
reflected in respondents’ constructions of change implementation processes,
particularly in the Corporate Change Trajectory. There was more evidence of their
application in the Commercial Change Trajectory. Nevertheless, by 2003, there
were few references to the Three Frames or the Five Signposts.
The data suggest that these interventions required a significant investment of time
and energy by the change leader. Where there was sufficient evidence to suggest
that they may have made a difference in their twin functions – providing
organisational members with a means of managing organisational development and
change in the direction of the vision and as a substitute for direct change leader
influence – it was in the context of face-to-face involvement of the Director General;
he was able to explain the model and its implications for practice.
Creation of a relational environment
The third element of the large-scale human process intervention was the effort to
create a relational environment in which organisational information processing and
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decision making could be facilitated with less regard for organisational rank and
status.
The results suggest that this element was highly successful in influencing the way
organisational members construed their organisation. The concept of being
relational was well embedded in organisational discourse and the change has been
sustained over time. This is not to suggest that being relational is embedded in
behaviour. One Director-General estimated that it had about ten percent coverage.
Yet the fact that it was readily embraced at the level of schema suggests a significant
cognitive shift.
Several factors contributed to the success of relationship enhancement interventions
in the organisation: (a) some important relationships with external stakeholders were
adversarial and dysfunctional, (b) intra-organisational relationships had become
adversarial following the truncation of the organisation on strategic-owner and
commercialised provider lines, (c) they proved to be successful in enhancing
relationships, and (d) they had a positive influence on organisational climate, it is a
better place to work in.
Project management culture
A critical feature of Project 21, the change management plan developed by
Commercial Main Roads, was the creation of a project management culture. The
project management culture was intended, as a critical part, to provide organisational
members with a set of management and problem solving capabilities that would
enable them to successfully manage the planning and control of infrastructure
projects to meet customer expectations and timelines.
Organisational members valued these capabilities; they were capabilities directly
related to getting and keeping customers. Moreover, the inculcation of project
management capabilities had important flow-on effects in that project management
processes facilitated knowledge sharing, innovativeness horizontally. It improved
relationships and coordination. Furthermore, project management contributed to the
development of a common organisational language that contributed to organisational
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flexibility. Staff could be transferred to different parts of the state and not face
having to learn site-specific procedures for managing a critical work function.
In addition, depending on how they are framed and who frames them, large-scale
human process interventions have the potential to serve as change leader substitutes
(Jermier & Kerr, 1997), a necessary function in a complex spatially differentiated
professional organisation (this issue that will be taken up in a later section of this
chapter).
In summary, the evidence suggests that large-scale human process interventions
were efficacious in achieving qualitative organisational schema change in that they
(a) influenced the way senior managers conceived of their own team dynamics, (b)
provided an environment in which planning new schema could be framed and
incorporated, (c) challenged pre-existing norms related to relationships and conflict
resolution, (d) had symbolic value in that they signalled a shift toward more
contemporary management practices, (e) recharged collective efficacy, the
organisation’s can-do orientation, in the face of severe challenges over the preceding
decade, (f) redressed some of the negative outcomes of the radical structural
intervention, and (g) enhanced organisational member engagement with the change
process.
However, large-scale human process interventions were less efficacious in that they
(a) be much slower to implement than structural interventions (Beer & Nohria,
2000a) and therefore will be more adversely affected by leadership change, (b) are
complex and difficult to communicate, (c) rely on the high level skills and direct
involvement of the change leader, (d) make discontinuous demands on
organisational members’ capabilities, (e) are abstract, making the connection to
practice less clear, (f) are subject to regression, and (g) are less likely to contribute to
a sense of urgency and crisis that would trigger unfreezing and change.
These differences highlight the advantages and disadvantages of each intervention
focus and raise the issue of intervention sequence. Sequence of change intervention
is a contentious issue in both the practitioner literature (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1999)
and the academic literature (Porras & Robertson, 1992). While several intervention
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targets have been identified (Porras & Silvers, 1991), sequence choice is likely to be
a function of change leader style and knowledge.
This discussion of intervention theory suggests that change leader decisions about
where and when to intervene can either facilitate or hinder schema development and
change. The issues are complex and unanticipated outcomes are likely whatever
course of action is chosen (McKinley & Scherer, 2000). The extant literature
suggests that structural interventions are frequently employed as an entry point in
leader-driven OT (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Labianca et al., 2000).
More recently, authors have argued, as a part of a larger change model, that both
structural interventions and capability building interventions are required
simultaneously (Beer & Nohria, 2000b) However, it is yet to be established
empirically that this strategy is feasible in the context of technically-oriented public
organisations. For example, it is unlikely that senior technical professional managers
would have had sufficient exposure to intervention processes that would realise this
strategy. Technical professional change leaders’ choice of structural interventions
appeared to be the product of a change management script (Geigle, 1998). It
required an ‘outsider’ Director-General to frame and implement a large-scale human
process intervention.
In conclusion, organisational members’ experience of top-down structural
interventions reinforced extant conceptual research (e.g., McKinley & Scherer,
2000). Structural interventions tended to increase organisational change cynicism
(Abraham, 2000) and decrease commitment to change. Structural interventions that
were experienced positively, tended to be associated with reducing ambiguity.
Large-scale human process interventions tended to be experienced very positively, at
least for those aware of them. Indeed, for some, these interventions provided a
transformational experience. However, there are no simple solutions. Public
managers need capabilities in both types of intervention and the knowledge of when
to use each and in what sequence.
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PATTERN OF SCHEMA CHANGE ACROSS CONTEXTS
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious if they are associated
with the replacement or significant elaboration of organisational schema content.
The concept of schema in previous research tended to be characterised by one-
dimensional bipolar constructs. However, useful schemata tend to be organised
(Weick, 1979b) and multidimensional, that is configurational (Mintzberg, 1989).
Successful organisational schema change is, then, configurational, rather than one-
dimensional.
The case included three schema change contexts (a) the development of a new
leading-managing ends-means schema, (b) the development of a strategic manager
schema, and (c) the development of a commercialised provider organisation schema.
The results of this research suggest that, by the end of the research period
organisational members, collectively, had not achieved configuration change in any
of the three schema change contexts.
Instead, there was a complex pattern of schema change in which respondents readily
accepted some sub-schema changes, were polarised about others, rejected others,
and, in others, intended changes were unrealised (these results are reflected in Tables
5.1, 6.1, and 7.1).
This result is not altogether surprising given elapsed time since initiation of
interventions. Consequently, conclusions about the efficacy of change leader
interventions for achieving qualitative schema may be premature. As a whole, the
results suggest that schema change in each context remains a work in progress.
The shift in realising configuration schema change in the Corporate Change
Trajectory is particularly problematic. The new schema is highly discontinuous with
pre-existing schema and is associated with a high level of cognitive and behavioural
complexity. The requirements of shifts in professional identity, the capacity to
conceptualise complex socio-technical systems, the capacity to assimilate the
conflicting interests of diverse stakeholders, the capacity to strategically intervene in
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such systems, and the capacity to create supportive organisational information
processes imposes significant demands on organisational members.
Organisational members involved in the Commercial Change Trajectory also face
discontinuous change. However, in important respects there was also more
continuity between past and future. This continuity together with innovative change
management (large-group intervention and the sequencing of interventions) have
resulted in significant shifts in the desired direction.
The Leadership Change Trajectory, incorporating large-scale human process
interventions, also involved a discontinuous relationship between the pre-existing
leading-managing schema and that espoused in the intervention. Again, there was
little evidence of a configurational schema shift. However, one element of the new
schema, being relational, was well incorporated in organisational discourse. While
much needs to be done to embed this change behaviourally, the schema shift is an
important and successful outcome.
The large-scale human process intervention had the potential to play a critical role in
facilitating the realisation of the content change agenda in both Corporate and
Commercial Change Trajectories. Had it been implemented as intended there would
have been greater congruence between schema content change and change process
schema. As it was, respondents’ accounts suggest incongruence between content
change goals and processes, particularly in the Corporate Change Trajectory, and
that this incongruence adversely influenced schema change outcomes.
SCHEMA CHANGE DYNAMICS
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious for achieving
qualitative schema change when they reinforce dynamics thought to underpin shifts
in schema content. This section draws together the conclusions on this issue from
the investigation of each of the three schema change contexts.
As discussed in Chapter 2, two issues underpin this discussion. The first issue is
related to the relationship between change leader intervention and organisational
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schema. Two models of this relationship were drawn from the extant literature. In
this thesis, the two models were labelled juxtaposition-relocation model and the
disengagement-learning model.
The two models predict different schema change dynamics (see Figure 2.6).
Juxtaposition-relocation, the dominant model in the literature, suggests that change
leader interventions result in the juxtaposition of new schema alongside pre-existing
schema: schema change is a function of dialectical processes. The disengagement-
learning model, on the other hand, suggests that change leader interventions
disengage organisational members from pre-existing schema and force learning from
experience. In the latter case, there is no interplay between pre-existing and new
schema.
The data reported in this case provide little evidence for the disengagement-learning
model. Even though change leader interventions, particularly radical structure
changes, forced a break from the past, there is no indication that organisational
members were disengaged from pre-existing schemata. Instead, the evidence
suggests that, across the three schema change contexts addressed in this thesis,
change leader interventions juxtaposed new schema, which then required the
relocation of organisational members from pre-existing to new schema.
As will become clear in the discussion in the next section, organisational members
were evaluating change messages in terms of pre-existing schema and, in some
cases, there were strong regressive tendencies as organisational members sought to
re-establish some elements to the traditional organisation. Consequently, inter-
schema conflict dialectical processes were salient dynamics.
However, pre-existing conflict management norms were not supportive of a good
dialectical process. Lateral conflict resolution tended to rely on the creation of silos.
Vertical conflict, despite significant initial progress resulting from the Three Frames
and Five Signposts (Chapter 5), tended to be suppressed. Consequently, inter-
schema conflict was characterised by ongoing polarisation, rejection, and unrealised
change.
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It is important to note, however, that timescale may be a contributing factor. Given
the discontinuities involved, the resolution of inter-schema conflicts may take a
significant amount of time, though it is also the case that conflict norms need further
intervention by change leaders. Moreover, there is evidence of change of conflict
norms in the Commercial Change Trajectory. In this trajectory, the risks associated
with not being successful appeared to trigger challenges to the traditional authority-
obedience orientation. There was evidence of a greater tendency to question and to
challenge directives thought to be contrary to the successful creation of a
competitive, profit-driven provider organisation.
Nevertheless, on important schema dimensions, change was realised. This schema
change tended to be unrelated to dialectical processes and more to implicit
teleological processes (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995), a process not addressed in the
organisational schema change literature. The following sub-sections provide a more
fine-grained analysis of the dynamics of change, polarisation, rejection of change,
the lack of realisation of change.
SCHEMA CHANGE
Contrary to the existing literature on organisational schema change, there was
evidence of organisational members readily embracing some sub-schema, which
suggests a different schema change dynamic than the dominant conflict or dialectical
process of schema change. Schema change is thought to be problematic even when
change has potential benefits (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Labianca et al., 2000). For
example, Labianca et al (2000:239) argued that even potentially beneficial changes
may be rejected because a well established schema is not easily disconfirmed,
schema change takes a considerable time … the process is long and iterative.
The acceptance of new schema did not mean change was unproblematic. There were
frequently unresolved tensions even though the new sub-schema was preferred. As
some authors argue, change tends to reveal and intensify the perception of paradox
and contradiction and that the management of paradox and contradiction is an
inevitable consequence (Clegg et al., 2002; M. W. Lewis, 2000).
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Schema change occurred in all three trajectories. In the Commercial Change
Trajectory, organisational members preferred (a) a project management approach,
(b) a centralised and integrated business with local autonomy, and a team based
structure. In Corporate Change Trajectory, organisational members preferred (a) a
more strategy-driven organisation, (b) the concept of an organisation open to
external experience in a Whole-of-Government context, and (c) the concept of a
multidisciplinary organisation. Across all three Trajectories organisational members
preferred the concept of being relational.
Specifically, new schema content is more likely to be preferred when the alternative
schema is consistent with an implicit vision held by organisational members. The
data suggest that organisational members’ implicit vision is characterised by an
alignment with (1) implicit ideals, (2) critical organisational task achievement where
non-performance may result in adverse consequences, and (3) contributes to higher
collective confidence.
Implicit vision
Schema change was facilitated when the new schema was evaluated as implicitly
good, that is, it was aligned with an implicit ideal or value. The new schema may
have instrumental value yet there was also something beyond instrumentality. At
least three ideals were reflected in respondent preferences for new schema; positive
relationships, public service, and enriched work.
First, respondents preferred the concept of ‘being open and relational’ over the
traditional closed and restricted relationships. Being relational was one of the non-
rational things the traditional organisation was not good at. Consequently, the
organisation was viewed as a better place to work in, yet respondents were less clear
about the extent that being relational improved performance.
Second, organisational members were more likely to accept new schema when the
new schema reflected public service values. Being open to external influence and
engaging with the community in the context of a Whole-of-Government orientation
was viewed as socially responsible. There was a sense that the organisation could no
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longer ignore the realities of the real world and that being concerned with job
creation, cultural heritage and environmental protection was implicitly worthwhile.
Seeing themselves as developing a multidisciplinary capability enabled them to
realise this idea in a Whole-of-Government environment.
A third ideal linked to enriched work was also reflected in respondent preferences
for new schema. Some Commercial respondents felt that, given their experience of
work in Commercial, it would be difficult to go back to a public sector work
environment again (though as will be discussed later, there was polarisation about
this issue, though there was agreement about the value of the work environment).
The shift from an individual-based structure to a team-based structure, and
teamwork, was viewed as intrinsically good in Commercial (though this was less
true in Corporate where there tended to be greater polarisation about a team-based
structure).
Commercial teams allowed organisational members, whatever their organisational
position, to participate in organisational decision making. A respondent provides a
good indication of a broad sentiment in Commercial; I have been working with Main
Roads for 25 years, and this is the first time I have been asked to think. In addition,
respondents felt that the traditional public sector position descriptions were
inappropriate in Commercial; jobs were much less specialised.
Work design theories have long advocated designing work environments to provide
organisational members with discretion, with opportunities to participate, and with
skill variety (Reger et al., 1994). More recently, Osborne & Gaebler (2000:38)
reflect a similar dynamic in their discussion of the need for reinventing government:
Many employees in bureaucratic governments feel trapped. Tied down by
rules and regulations, numbed by monotonous tasks, assigned jobs they know
could be accomplished in half the time if they were only allowed to use their
minds, they live lives of quiet desperation.
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Facilitates achievement of critical tasks
The data also suggest (Table 8.1) that organisational members will readily embrace
new schemata when these new schemata facilitate task accomplishment, particularly
if non-performance has significant and adverse consequences. They are less inclined
to shift toward the new schema when the relationship between schema and task
demands is not clear.
A project management culture was readily embraced in Commercial Main Roads.
Indeed, respondent reactions to this intervention were strong and positive across the
period of the research. The shift to a project management culture had at least three
instrumental benefits for organisational members; (a) it facilitated planning and
control of projects where both effectiveness and efficiency were crucial, (b) it
facilitated the development of lateral relationships across business units, and (c)
facilitated the development of a more flexible organisation.
First, a project management culture facilitated the management of projects where
success was an imperative. In a competitive environment the planning and control of
infrastructure delivery projects had much greater significance. Meeting client
expectations, time lines and budgets was crucial for maintaining their reputation as
service providers, for increasing the likelihood of winning future contracts, and for
profit generation.
Second, a project management culture facilitated communication and coordination
laterally across business units. It provided a common language and framework that
facilitated knowledge transfer. Indeed, respondents reported that the system
triggered the sharing of innovations and learning across business units. The greater
level of coordination across Commercial was viewed as one of the successes of the
change program.
Finally, a standardised project management model contributed to greater
organisational flexibility in that staff could be more easily transferred across
business units. Once organisational members were socialised into the standardised
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project management system, the organisation had greater capability to shift people to
meet task demands across the state.
Commercial respondents expressed a preference for the creation of an integrated and
centralised business (rather than a decentralised multiple business organisation).
Centralisation, particularly on high-value projects, enabled greater flexibility in
managing people and resources across the state. Centralisation, then, contributed to
organisational competitiveness, a critical concern for organisational members
concerned about the ongoing viability of their organisation. It reduced threats to
organisational viability.
Schema change that supported task facilitation was also reflected in respondents’
conceptions of a team-based structure (as opposed to an individual-based structure).
These teams were providing organisational members with opportunities to engage in
collaborative problem solving, and so improving coordination.
Task facilitation was also reflected in Corporate respondents’ preference for a
strategy-driven organisation (as opposed to operations-driven). Being strategy-
driven was linked to addressing anticipated and critical medium- and longer-term
organisational problems. Not addressing these problems would have adverse
consequences for the organisation. The most frequently identified problem was the
imminent loss, to retirement, of a large number of experienced engineers. Being
strategy-driven meant addressing such problems with, for example, succession
planning.
Greater openness to external influence, while linked to a public service ideal, also
had an instrumental value for respondents. Indeed, this was viewed as one of the key
successes of the transformational change program; Main Roads is good at building
external relationships was a common evaluation. The success was captured in a
publication, Main Roads Success Stories (Department of Main Roads, Undated), in
which roads project members had achieved win-win outcomes in the context of
difficult negotiations with the community.
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Greater openness within a Whole-of-Government context had also resulted in a need
for a growing multidisciplinary dimension to the organisation and this shift had
instrumental value. Professionals with backgrounds in archaeology, strategic
planning, and communication were being employed. Respondents saw this change
as being positive in that, within a whole of government context, Main Roads was
developing capabilities and a positive reputation in multiple fields, not just in
engineering (and related fields). Main Roads reputation as a lead agency in the
public sector was, thereby, enhanced.
Feelings of confidence and competence
Schema change was facilitated when new schema contributed to a sense of
confidence and competence. This conclusion is less tangible than those discussed
above, yet underpins them all. The conclusion is best illustrated by an analogy
drawn by respondents; some respondents reported that Main Roads is more like
Ansett Airlines (a failed airline which at the time of the interviews was focused on
internal problems as it declined). Instead, Main Roads should be more like Virgin
Blue (another airline which, at the time, was engaged in aggressive marketing).
The concept of perceived collective efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1997; Zaccaro, Blair,
Peterson, & Zazanis, 1995) provides a useful analytical concept. Bandura
(1997:477) defines perceived collective efficacy as a group's shared belief in its
conjoint capabilities to organise and execute the courses of action required to
produce given levels of attainment.
Bandura suggests that perceived collective efficacy is an emergent group property
that centres on a group's operational capabilities; groups or organisations with high
perceived collective efficacy are more likely to persist with a course of action in the
face of obstacles. Low perceived collective efficacy implies that group or
organisational members will give up in the face of obstacles.
Surprisingly, little attention has been given to perceived collective efficacy beliefs in
the context of change management. Collective efficacy beliefs would appear to be
usefully considered a dimension of organisational change schema in addition to
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those identified by Lau, Kibourne & Woodman (2003) (intensity and significance,
judgement, meaning, salience, personal control, and stress).
In summary, the fact that organisational members readily embraced some sub-
schema suggests that the dominant schema change dynamic was not a prolonged
dialectical process as suggested by the conflict model of schema change (Bartunek &
Moch, 1987). A better explanation can be found in teleological change theory (Van
de Ven & Poole, 1995).
Formally, change as a result of teleological processes occurs when:
(1) An individual or group exists that acts as a singular, discrete entity,
which engages in reflexively monitored action to socially construct and
cognitively share a common end state or goal (2) the entity may envision its
end state of development before or after actions it may take, and the goal
may be set explicitly or implicitly. However, the process of social
construction or sense making, decision making, and goal setting must be
identifiable (3) a set of requirements and constraints exists to attain the goal,
and the activities and developmental transitions undertaken by the entity
contribute to meeting these requirements and constraints (Van de Ven &
Poole, 1995:516).
In the case organisation, teleological processes tended to be implicit rather than
explicit. As indicated earlier, the formal vision and mission framed by top-level
change leaders did not contribute to this dynamic. However, the evidence suggests
that organisational members had an implicit vision of how they believed the
organisation should operate. The evidence suggests that this vision incorporated a
concern with public service, with task facilitation, and with positive relationships.
When new schemata were aligned with this implicit vision, schema change was
readily embraced.
POLARISATION
On some schematic dimensions organisational members were polarised. Some
organisational members preferred the pre-existing schema and others preferred a new
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schema. Polarisation is predicted by the conflict model of schema change (Snell,
2002). Despite the potential of conflict and dialectical processes to trigger change,
there is as much evidence that these dynamics hinder change (see Chapter 2).
In particular, organisational members in Commercial were polarised on the issue of
profit-driven operations as opposed to the traditional public road building
orientation. In Corporate, organisational members were polarised on two core issues
(a) Main Roads as a technically proficient road builder versus Main Roads as a
managerial and financial organisation involved in more than building roads, and (b)
Main Roads as a team-based organisation versus Main Roads as an individual-based
organisation.
The data suggest that polarisation was related to (a) doubts about the viability of the
alternative schema, (b) perception of threats to professional and organisational
identity, and (c) levels of ambiguity. Underpinning the organisation’s capacity to
resolve these issues is a tendency for it to be conflict averse.
Viability of the alternative schema
In Commercial, respondents were polarised about the viability of the alternative
schema; a profit-driven infrastructure delivery provider operating within the
constraints of public sector policies and procedures. For some respondents
commercialisation was a flawed concept. Moreover, there were concerns about the
prospect of declining quality of the road system in an environment driven by the
almighty dollar.
There were also concerns about their capacity to compete given the overheads
imposed by Corporate, the restrictions placed on its business practices (marketing
and tendering), the need for efficiency and its influence on the quality of work, and
its dependence on Corporate for ongoing work to support its workforce. They were
managing with one hand tied behind their backs.
For one group of respondents, then, there was a view that Commercial should be
reintegrated with Corporate so that they could get back to building quality roads.
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This view was exacerbated by the perception that the organisation was back
pedalling on commercialisation; there were doubts about senior managers’
commitment to commercialisation. Nevertheless, another group of respondents were
highly positive about shifting toward a conception of the organisation as a profit-
driven, entrepreneurial and competitive organisation.
Threat to engineering excellence/professional identity
Perceived threats to engineering excellence and professional identity were evident in
polarisation about shifts in organisational purpose in both Corporate and
Commercial, particularly in Corporate where the shift was most pronounced.
Previous research has identified organisational and professional identity as a
powerful schematic lens through which organisational members evaluate change
interventions (Labianca et al., 2000; Reger et al., 1994).
From the perspective of respondents (rather than change leaders) Corporate Main
Roads’ purpose had shifted from a road building and engineering focus to what was
described as a managerial and financial focus. The implications of this shift were
linked to respondent perceptions of their professional and organisational identity.
For some respondents this shift represented a de-engineering of the organisation.
The shift to a more managerial focus had adverse implications for organisational
capability, how close the organisation was to the technological edge, the quality of
the road system (which was thought to be declining), and opportunities for personal
and professional development.
For other respondents, Main Roads was about more than building roads. There was
a sense that being strategic and managerial was essential if the road system was to
meet the future demands of communities and road users. One manager described it
as a need for big picture thinking. This strategic perspective was not well served by
the traditional operational road building focus of the organisation.
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Increasing rather than decreasing ambiguity
Polarisation also occurred in the context of the shift, in Corporate, from individual-
based structure to a team-based structure. Recall that team-based structure in
Commercial was readily accepted by respondents. In Corporate some respondents
reported that team work reflected a positive shift. Teams provided an opportunity
for managing troughs and peaks in workload and supported collaboration.
However another group of respondents reported that team work created problems.
Specifically, the shift from hierarchical decision making to team-based decision
making posed difficulties. The shift created greater ambiguity about roles in the
team and increased levels of political behaviour. Furthermore, there was a
perception that the burden of responsibility for managing team problems was being
shifted to the team. The effect was much greater workloads and fewer resources.
Aversion to ambiguity was a key theme in the data. In the face of an uncertain
organisational direction and future, there was a consistent call for more direction,
strong leadership as a means of resolving ambiguities.
LACK OF CHANGE
On six schematic dimensions respondents preferred the traditional schema over their
reframed schema. In particular, Commercial staff evaluated negatively the shift to a
state that required them to operate in both public and private sectors simultaneously.
Corporate staff did not prefer the shift to (a) an organisation design that involved
greater centralisation and standardisation of systems and service delivery, (b) greater
reliance on outsourcing, though this shift was ameliorated over the course of the
research, (c) an emotional environment characterised by the experience of being
disempowered.
The reframed schema is not necessarily intended by change leaders. Respondents
perceive it that way. Three factors explain the negative evaluation of the new pole;
perceived paradox and contradiction, perceived loss of performance, and perceived
loss of personal and professional development opportunities.
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Perceived paradox and contradiction
Lewis (2000) argued that change reveals and intensifies paradox and contradiction
and the experience of contradiction is aversive, triggering anxiety and defence
mechanisms. Contradiction and paradox underpinned almost all concerns raised by
respondents.
Reconciling the simultaneous demands of both public and private sector, that is,
attain profit targets yet as the same time adhere to public sector procedures, rules and
regulations, posed significant problems for Commercial respondents across the
period of the research; the public-private space they occupied was construed as a half
way land. Commercial was expected to adhere to public sector policies and
regulations yet at the same time be profitable in a competitive environment.
Recent work on the perception of paradox and contradiction in organisational
settings reinforces this point; it frequently results in high anxiety and defensive
responses (Reger et al., 1994), yet, at the same time, has the potential to increase
effectiveness (Palmer & Dunford, 2002). In schematic terms, human beings tend to
prefer one pole or another but not both simultaneously.
For Commercial, being public meant being constrained by policies that imposed
restrictions on their capacity to market services and to tender for certain projects. In
addition, public sector human resource management and financial systems were
perceived as limiting their capacity to be competitive. At the same time they had to
make a profit within a private sector driven by the almighty dollar and could cut
corners not permitted to them. The experience of this paradox was intensified by the
prospect of downsizing of their workforce.
The efforts by Commercial to manage paradox and contradiction were the most
obvious, yet paradox and contradiction pervaded organisational experience.
Tensions and contradictions contributed to high levels of ambiguity; there was a loss
of the certainty that had been a positive characteristic of the traditional organisation.
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Perceived loss of performance
Change leader interventions are typically targeted at improving performance. In this
case, change implementers experienced change as reducing rather than improving
performance. From the perspective of implementers of change greater centralisation
and standardisation adversely affected their perceived ability to provide locally
relevant services. However, from the perspective of top management, centralisation
and standardisation improved their capacity to monitor and report on organisational
performance within a Whole-of-Government policy environment. Putnam (1986)
described this situation as a system paradox.
Perceived loss of personal and professional development opportunities
The data suggest that schema change is less likely when the alternative schema
conflict with organisational members’ conception of the organisation as a provider of
opportunities for personal and professional development. Organisations are political
systems in which three sets of interests interact; task interests, career interests, and
extramural (personal values and lifestyle) interests (G. A. Morgan, 1997).
Maintaining some degree of balance among these interests is critical if organisational
members’ engagement with the organisation is to be maintained.
Under the best of circumstances, the relationship among these three sets of interest is
uneasy and fluid, creating tensions that underpin organisational politics and
organisational cynicism (Abraham, 2000). Under conditions of transformational
change, this uneasy balance is put under more pressure, often linked to perceived
violations of the organisation’s psychological contract, the implicit beliefs about
reciprocal obligations held by employees and employers (Rousseau, 2001).
Violations of the psychological contract have been linked to increases in change
cynicism (Abraham, 2000) and threats to change implementation (Novelli, Kirkman,
& Shapiro, 1995).
In the present case, organisational members consistently construed the new
organisation as providing fewer career opportunities and fewer opportunities for
development, a source of significant levels of frustration. The source of this lack
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was frequently attributed to techno-structural change, restructuring the organisation
into owner and provider changed the nature of the work, the range and/or scope of
work activities were no longer available and new tasks were often viewed as paper
chasing and liaising. Outsourcing provided work for external consultants yet there
was little transfer of expertise back to the organisation.
In addition, the high workloads of more experienced professionals meant that these
people had less time to devote to mentoring and providing career information to less
experienced staff. Perceived outcomes included reports of higher turnover among
junior staff, difficulty of attracting new graduates, and high levels of job
dissatisfaction.
UNREALISED CHANGE
On two organisational schema change dimensions, the shift from pre-existing to new
schemata was unrealised or in an early stage of development. Specifically, the
following intended shifts were not realised (a) to a vision-driven organisation, and
(b) to Three Frames/Five Signposts management.
It should be noted that the fact that the collective incorporation of the Three Frames
and Five Signposts were not realised does not mean there was no change in
managerial capabilities. Managers were ready to admit that they had been on a steep
learning curve since the 1990s in terms of their change management capabilities.
The issue here is not so much that no change has occurred but that the notion of the
Three Frames that the change leader saw as critical to the realisation of
organisational vision was not well integrated across the organisation.
The data suggest that four inter-related factors contributed to unrealised
organisational schema change; (a) complexity of the new schema, (b) low perceived
control, (c) time pressure and workloads, and (d) organisational context, in particular
spatial differentiation and opportunities for interaction. The first three factors will be
considered in this section. Organisational context will be considered in a later
section.
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Complexity of alternative schema
As discussed in Chapter 5, the evidence suggests that unrealised schema change is
linked to the abstractness and complexity of the new schema. New schemata are
experienced as complex if they are significantly discrepant from organisational
members’ pre-existing schema. Under these circumstances, organisational members,
collectively, found it difficult to interpret and in particular see the implications for
practice.
Greater complexity of alternative schemata impeded schema change, a finding
consistent with earlier research on schema change (McKinley & Scherer, 2000;
Reger et al., 1994). Complexity of new schema has been linked with higher levels of
resistance to change, indeed previous researchers have suggested it may be a better
explanation of resistance than personal interests (Labianca et al., 2000) and reduced
likelihood of implementation (Reger et al., 1994).
Low perceived control
Schema change would seem less likely if organisational members do not believe they
have control over the realisation of the schema. Collectively, organisational
members experienced low perceived control over the future of the organisation,
despite a well publicised organisational vision and mission. For respondents the
future lay in the hands of external stakeholders. The organisation was believed to be
reactive to those stakeholders. Uncertainty about this future was a source of concern
for respondents and contributed to the lack of acceptance of the vision element of the
large-scale human process intervention.
Low perceived control was also characteristic in the Corporate Change Trajectory.
Collectively, organisational members were overwhelmed by change. The comment
by one manager summed up the reactions of many: reported that he felt as though he
was at the bottom end of a funnel and Head Office was pouring changes in at the
top. In Corporate Main Roads, there were frequent calls for a period of stability and
consolidation in order that previous changes could be implemented and people could
learn from their change experiences.
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Time pressure and workloads
Low perceived control was linked to time pressure and workloads perceived to be
excessive. Constructing new complex and abstract schema is, in part, a reflective
rather than a rational linear sequential learning task (Schon, 1983). Such learning is
adversely affected by time pressure and workloads.
Opportunities for interaction
There appeared to be relatively few opportunities for lateral interaction about change
experience. In part, this was contributed to by the pre-existing organisation which
consisted of fourteen different cultures. Both the conflict model and the iterative
comparison models of schema change suggest that constructing new schemata is, in
part, a social phenomena; it is an outcome of interaction among organisational
members. From this perspective, it is this interaction, conflicted or otherwise, that
contributes to the development of new schema.
For managers the key forum in which sensemaking about change could occur were
Senior Officers’ Conferences. While respondents reported the development of
defensive networks in the face of change, it is likely that these networks reinforced
negative evaluations of the change rather than contributed to the development of new
schema.
Spatial differentiation
The preceding factors were compounded by the distance between change leaders and
those organisational members expected to interpret the change. Communicating the
meaning of abstract and complex information across distance poses significant
problems for change leaders. From the perspective of organisational members there
seemed to be a reliance on electronic forms of communication. Respondents
reported that they found it difficult to navigate their way through the electronic
communication system and found it difficult to separate out less important from
important messages.
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Face-to-face communication appeared to be most efficacious yet its success seemed
to depend on the direct involvement of the Director-General. Others had difficulty
communicating the change agenda to the organisation.
More generally, change leaders must be able to hold both sides of the conflict at the
same time (Bartunek, 1993), and change interventions must be directed at the
organisation’s pre-existing conflict management norms (Bartunek & Reid, 1992).
Labianca et al’s (2000) study of decision making schema change, for example,
involved an intervention by two members of the research team (both were also OD
consultants) which resulted in the facilitation of conflict between managers and non-
managers.
In the case organisation, there was some evidence that the organisation was conflict
averse. This is not to say that conflict did not exist. As discussed in Chapters 6 and
7, the restructure of the organisation on owner-provider lines created an environment
in which there were levels of dysfunction conflict. There was less evidence that
functional conflict over conceptions of change were well tolerated. Frequently,
lower level employees took the view that middle management were not
communicating the problems experienced in implementing change to top
management.
The top-level leader who initiated transformational change (Leadership Change
Trajectory) seemed to create opportunities for people to deal with conflict openly.
For example, he reported that if one person complained about another he would get
them together and have them address the conflict openly. In addition, he introduced
the idea of calling behaviour where one person could confront another’s behaviour if
that behaviour was inconsistent with the new norms of the relational environment.
In circumstances where functional conflict in a safe environment is not supported
and where spatial differentiation reduces opportunities for face to face interaction the
potential for inter-schema conflict resolution or synthesis is reduced. There seems
little support for Balogun & Johnson’s (2004:544) proposition that the conflict
model may be more prevalent when there is no channel or mechanism to facilitate
the resolution of conflict caused by differences in schemata.
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In summary, a complex set of dynamics underpinned the pattern of schema change
context addressed earlier. In particular, while inter-schema conflict was apparent, it
had, by the end of the research period, contributed little to schema change outcomes.
Where schema change, or rather sub-schema change, had occurred it could be better
explained by implicit teleological processes. In addition, new schema complexity
and abstractness contributed to unrealised schema change.
CHANGE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT
Change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious when they are sensitive
to change management context. As discussed in Chapter 2, change management
contexts are thought to vary in terms of their responsiveness to change leader
influence. This thesis focuses on change leader interventions and schema change in
a context thought to be inimical to change leader influence. In particular, prior
conceptual research has suggested that professional organisations are much less
responsive to change leader interventions than other organisational forms
(Mintzberg, 1979, 1989), a tendency intensified by spatial differentiation.
The focus is on interventions and the attributes of professionalism and distance from
change leader. The analysis does not compare the efficacy of change leader
interventions in different contexts, though this would be worth investigating, but
seeks to examine the results through the lens of change management context.
Professionals, including technical professionals, tend to be strongly committed to
their own sense of autonomy and professional identity (Zell, 2001) and, by
implication, their professional and career development. Moreover, professionals
tend to find collaboration and innovation problematic (Mintzberg, 1989).
Collaboration can threaten autonomy, consequently professionals often prefer to
work independently.
In addition, professional training tends to reinforce technical rationality (Schon,
1983) and pigeonholing (Mintzberg, 1989) while OT typically requires strategic and
systems thinking. Moreover, technical professional training does not always prepare
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professionals for the problem of designing with people in mind. The engineering
culture attends more to the design of structures that exclude the potential for human
vagaries (Schein, 1996).
In the case organisation each of these attributes of professionals was challenged by
change leader interventions. OT in the case organisation involved; challenges and
changes to professional identity, reduced scope for professional development, a
greater focus on collaboration and team work, a requirement for more strategic and
systems thinking, and the design and development of a road system that incorporated
the preferences of stakeholders with divergent interests.
This discussion is not intended to suggest that these OT interventions are
inappropriate. It does mean, however, that the change management task is more
complex in that greater investment of resources may be required to effect the
intended changes.
Challenges to professional identity and professional development were frequent
concerns of professional staff. Moreover, many respondents felt their concerns
about these issues, and their consequent effect on organisational capabilities, were
not registering with top-level leaders. This issue was particularly acute in Corporate
where the professional role underwent most change. In Corporate, there were more
concerns with de-engineering and greater attention to paper chasing and liaising
rather than design and road building. In Commercial, concern about the loss of an
engineering focus was an issue yet despite the project management rather than
engineering orientation, the business remained operational. Across both trajectories
there was a concern with not getting experience with the big projects.
The Leadership Change Trajectory resulted, as mentioned earlier, in contradictory
outcomes. Some technical professionals were ‘transformed’ by the new leading-
managing schema; good people were made into better ones. Yet, collectively, it has
not been well incorporated. There is a significant discontinuity between the pre-
existing and the new leading-managing styles and the new style challenged
professional identity (strategic managers rather than professional engineers). There
was an underestimation of the degree of capability development required to embed
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schema change, successful incorporation required the more intensive involvement of
change leaders and more people who were able to communicate it successfully.
Nevertheless, the significant successes achieved suggest that contextual constraints
can be overcome. The framing and promotion of new schema, such as the Three
Frames and Five Signposts, did have a profound influence on a proportion of
organisational members. The task is to find ways of extrapolating this influence
across a critical mass of organisational members.
Distance between change leaders and change implementers, in interaction with new
schema complexity and professionalism, also adversely affect interaction and
sensemaking. Successful schema change requires that organisational members can
accurately conceptualise the espoused alternative schema. Distance from change
leader adversely affected this outcome in all three schema change contexts, but
particularly in the Leadership Change Trajectory and the Corporate Change
Trajectory.
Moreover, distance (in interaction with other organisational attributes) adversely
affected dynamics thought to underpin schema change. In particular, the dominant
model of schema change, juxtaposition-relocation through dialectical processes
(Bartunek, 1993; Sillince, 1995; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Working through
inter-schema/inter-group conflicts requires an environment in which organisational
members can interact and create new meaning in a safe environment. Distance
hinders opportunities to interact and feel safe. The D-Gs Hotline did seek to provide
organisational members with a safe medium for expressing conflicting (and
supportive) points of view. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, the medium was not
totally trusted.
In summary, change management context, professionalism and distance, did
adversely influence the efficacy of change leader interventions. Change context and
the degree of discontinuity created by change leader interventions required a much
greater involvement of change leaders or substitutes for direct change leader
influence.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has summarised and integrated the key findings of Chapters 4-7. This
analysis suggests that structural interventions and large scale human process
interventions have a differential influence on organisational members’ experience of
change. Consistent with prior research, structural interventions tended, with
exceptions, to adversely affect organisational members’ experience of change while
large-scale human process interventions tended to engage organisational members
and contribute to greater collective confidence in the organisation’s ability to
advance the change program. Considered in terms of multidimensional constructs,
organisational schema change was incomplete, though there was evidence of sub-
schema change, (c) where sub-schema change did occur it was linked to teleological
processes rather than dialectical processes, and (d) change context did adversely
influence the efficacy of change leader interventions, requiring much greater
investment by top-level change leaders.
The final chapter, Chapter 9, draws conclusions from this analysis and their
implications and specifies the contribution this research has made to the literature on
the relationship between change leader interventions and OT, or organisational
schema change, in public organisations.
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CHAPTER 9: CONTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
The core purpose of this thesis is to investigate, from the perspective of change
recipients, the efficacy of change leader interventions for achieving qualitative
organisational schema change (OT) in change management contexts thought to
be inimical to change leader influence (Jermier & Kerr, 1997). It is argued that a
better understanding of this relationship will make a significant contribution to
both the theory and practice of OT.
This chapter has four objectives; it (a) draws out the implications of this research
for the relationship between change leader interventions and organisational
schema change, (b) establishes the contribution that this thesis has made to the
literature on this issue, (c) outlines avenues of future research, and (d) identifies
practical implications for public managers responsible for organisational
transformation.
CONCLUSIONS
Fundamentally, OT requires the replacement or significant elaboration of pre-
existing organisational schema (Bartunek & Moch, 1987). Without schema
change, organisational members will not be able to interpret and implement
change as intended by change leaders.
Three schema change trajectories were explored in the context of efforts to
transform a technically-oriented, spatially differentiated, public professional
organisation. These three trajectories were the result of two seminal
interventions and subsequent interventions triggered by these. While the
trajectories were inter-related (see Figure 3.2), each focused on different schema
change outcomes, each involved different pattern of interventions, and each
placed different demands on those responsible for implementation. The
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investigation of the three trajectories provides new insights into the relationship
between change leader interventions and organisational schema change.
As discussed in Chapter 2, intervention theory addresses the complex decisions
of when, where and how to intervene in an organisation to achieve change goals
(Balogun & Johnson, 2004). Decision making complexity is exacerbated
because the intervention theory literature is (a) frequently contradictory (see
Chapter 2), (b) frequently conceptual rather than empirical (McKinley & Scherer,
2000), and (c) often driven by practitioners rather than academics (Dunphy,
1996). Moreover, the knowledge base on intervention theory in the context of
Organisation Transformation is still limited (Maddock, 2002) and the chance of
successful OT outcomes is low (Bate et al., 2000).
Four main conclusions can be drawn from this research.
First, structural interventions and large-scale human process interventions have a
differential influence on organisational members’ experience of change. It was
argued that change leader interventions are more likely to be efficacious if
organisational members experience them as facilitative of change. The research
reinforces the concerns raised by some authors about the efficacy of structural
interventions on organisational members’ engagement with change (Maddock,
2002).
Beyond those factors already identified in the literature, a reliance on structural
interventions adversely affects levels of perceived trust. Moreover, the tempo of
structural change is experienced differently at the top and lower levels of the
organisation. Techno-structural change can be initiated more quickly at the top
than can be absorbed at lower levels. This differential tempo can result in those
at lower levels experiencing change as overwhelming and disempowering. In
addition, problems arise when new structures create cognitive demands that are
outside the experience of the recipients of change: replacing pre-existing schema
without an alternative new schema as a guide is difficult.
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Nevertheless, there were instances where structural changes were viewed
positively: organisational members’ experienced structural interventions
positively when they could see a direct relationship between the intervention and
outcomes, for example, role clarity, less duplication of function, performance
goals. Consequently, the results do not suggest that structural change should be
rejected as an OT option. The issue has more to do with the relationship between
large-scale structural interventions and large-scale human process interventions,
an issue that will be addressed next.
Very little attention has been given to large-scale human process interventions in
the context of the transformation of public sector organisations. In this case, the
large-scale human process interventions tended to be experienced as facilitative
of change, at least for those who were influenced by them. In some cases the
experience was transformational; organisational members who had little prior
exposure to such interventions underwent significant personal change.
These interventions, particularly relationship enhancement interventions and the
development of project management capabilities provided organisational
members with the means of managing the complex systems problems facing the
organisation and tended to instil greater levels of collective confidence that
organisational outcomes could be achieved. Collectively, organisational
members valued task achievement very highly. Interventions that supported task
achievement were readily embraced.
However, large-scale human process interventions are not a panacea. They
require that change leaders have cognitive, emotional, and behavioural
capabilities consistent with the complex demands imposed by these
interventions. It may be more difficult to find such capabilities in a traditional
technical organisation where senior technical professionals have not necessarily
been exposed to such capabilities. In the present case, an ‘outsider’ Director-
General was needed.
Moreover, not all large-scale interventions had the intended influence. The
formal vision and the Three Frames/Five Signposts were not as influential across
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the organisation as change leaders had hoped. The relationship enhancement
interventions may have worked as well as they did because they provided
organisational members with the means of addressing highly adversarial
relationships both internal and external to the organisation; they created a better
working environment and they facilitated task achievement.
However, at the very least, the analysis suggests that, to achieve organisational
schema change (OT), public change leaders need (a) exposure to a wider range of
interventions and their potential positive and adverse effects, (b) the diagnostic
ability to align intervention and change purpose, and (c) the capacity to integrate
multiple interventions in ways that facilitate organisational members’
sensemaking. The tendency to rely on large-scale structural interventions alone
is not conducive to successful OT. In short, public change leaders need to
develop much more sophisticated intervention theories.
Second, organisational schemata are multidimensional and configurational.
Researchers need to find ways of representing multidimensional schema and find
ways of exploring how multidimensional schema change and do not change. The
advantage of representing schemata as multidimensional configurations of
bipolar constructs is that it provides better insight into the complexity of schema
change. In the present case, there was no evidence that configurational schema
change occurred in any of the three schema change contexts studied. The
transformation of the organisation is a work in progress. As one focus group
reported, Main Roads stands at the crossroads.
Previous research has tended to view organisational schema as one-dimensional.
Representing schema as one-dimensional does facilitate drawing conclusions
about success or failure of the replacement or significant elaboration of pre-
existing schema (Labianca et al., 2000) yet such results do not sit well with prior
evidence on the difficulty of achieving schema change. If schemata are viewed
as multidimensional it provides an opportunity to track development of change to
see what influences the shift to new schema or the regression to pre-existing
schema.
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Moreover, there is little evidence that change leader interventions disengaged
organisational members from pre-existing schema, as might be expected from
some previous research (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). However, it did appear as
though, at least with respect to structural changes, that change leaders were
acting as if disengagement had occurred. Acting as if disengagement had
occurred lessened the need for change leaders to work through the complex
process of relocating organisational members from pre-existing to new schema.
Third, change leaders need to find ways of reinforcing dynamics that underpin
schema change. Two dominant schema change dynamics were reflected in
organisational members’ accounts; dialectical processes and teleological
processes. The dominant dynamic was conflict, or dialectical processes. Change
driven from the top sets the scene for inter-level inter-schema conflict and lateral
inter-schema conflict. However, if these dialectical processes are to facilitate
change, the conflict management norms must be in place to support resolution.
In the present case, conflict management norms were not supportive of working
through inter-schema conflict, increasing the likelihood of unsatisfactory
outcomes for all internal stakeholders. Organisationally, conflict tended to find
less functional forms of expression. Less functional forms included retreating to
silos, organisational politics, a blame culture, and organisational fragmentation.
However, the Leadership Change Trajectory did involve efforts to create new
conflict management norms (confronting conflict directly, creating opportunities
for conflict, creating a safe environment in which conflicts could be addressed)
and to some degree these efforts had an influence. For example, there was
evidence of new conflict norms taking effect in the Commercial Change
Trajectory. Organisational members reported a much greater propensity to
challenge and question directives from the top than was the case in the traditional
organisation.
Moreover, Commercial’s need to manage the ongoing and conflicting demands
of both public and private sectors contributed to the development of new conflict
management norms. Being in a halfway land increased levels of frustration with
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what were perceived to be bad decisions: there was a greater propensity to
challenge these decisions. Yet the extrapolation of new conflict norms across the
organisation was incomplete.
The literature on organisational schema change has given little attention to the
second schema change dynamic, teleological processes (Van de Ven & Poole,
1995). When sub-schema change did occur in the case organisation it was
typically related to alignment between the new schema and an implicit vision
(incorporating a concern with public service and task facilitation) held by
organisational members.
Much more attention needs to be given to research on teleological processes and
schema change. Presumably, the formal organisational vision is designed to
contribute to these processes. However, as discussed earlier, the formal vision
tended not to have much influence in this case. Organisational members’
implicit vision did, however.
Fourth, it seems doubtful that all change management contexts in public
organisations are the same. The present change management context is
characterised by professionalism and distance between change leader and those
implementing change. Both of these characteristics tend to neutralise change
leader influence (Howell & Dorfman, 1986; Mintzberg, 1989). The key
constraints in the situation involved clashes with pre-existing professional
identity (technical rather than managerial) and values (such as autonomy and
opportunities for professional development).
Moreover, distance, in interaction with complexity of new schema intensified
these clashes. Communicating what interventions and their implications mean
across large distances proved particularly challenging. The elaborate Road Show
established to inform and convince the organisation of the value of the new
leading-managing schema (Chapter 5) is a reflection of this. There were some
reported successes related to this intervention, yet there was little evidence of its
wider and sustained application.
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Yet, despite the constraints there was more evidence of schema change in the
case organisation than the prior conceptual literature on this issue would suggest
possible. Where change was most successful, the change leader invested a great
deal of time and effort to effect understanding and change.
This result seems to be a key conclusion on the change management context
issue: achieving change in change management contexts inimical to change
leader influence is very labour intensive from the change leaders’ perspective.
Change leaders cannot assume that because a change has been announced and
‘implemented’ that cognitive change has occurred.
CONTRIBUTION
This section identifies the significant and original contribution that this research
has made to the literature on the efficacy of change leader interventions for
achieving qualitative schema change. In particular, the thesis makes an original
and significant contribution to intervention theory in contexts thought to be
inimical to change leader influence.
First, the research has made a significant contribution to the literature by
investigating the efficacy of large-scale human process interventions in the
context of efforts to transform a technically-oriented spatially differentiated
public professional organisation. Little previous research has focused on either
of these issues. Previous research has focused on structural interventions and
organisational schema change, a focus that is attracting some criticism
(Maddock, 2002).
While incomplete and unrealised, the evidence on the efficacy of large-scale
human process interventions suggests that they have the potential to make a
major contribution to the transformation of these change management contexts.
Much more research needs to address this intervention type and its inter-
relationship with the structural interventions, which the literature suggests are the
interventions of choice for public change leaders.
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Second, the research has made a significant contribution to the literature on
schema change by conceptualising organisational schema in multidimensional
terms. Analysis of first-order accounts suggests that respondents conceptualised
the changing organisation in terms of core organisational purpose, organisation-
environment relations, organisation design, and organisational change
management processes. Conceptualising organisational schema in these terms
provided a better reflection of the complexity of schema change and allowed a
more fine-grained analysis of change and lack of change.
Previous research on organisational schema change has tended to conceptualise
organisational schema in terms of a one-dimensional bipolar construct.
Conceptualising organisational schema in this way does facilitate conclusions
about success or failure of schema change. However, such an approach also
masks the complexity of OT.
In the present research, it was much more difficult to establish unequivocal
success or failure of schema change. Configurational schema change did not
occur in any of the three schema change contexts investigated. However, sub-
schema change did occur and these occurrences had a profound influence on
organisational members. However, sub-schema change rather than
configurational schema change indicates that change gains are likely to be more
susceptible to regression.
However, partial rather than configurational schema change raises interesting
possibilities for further longitudinal research. In particular, it would be
interesting to determine how the pattern of sub-schema change evolves over
time: how does the relationship between sub-schema change and configurational
schema change evolve over time? At what point does configurational change
occur and how does sub-schema change contribute to this outcome?
Third, this research has made a significant contribution to understanding of
schema change dynamics in public change management contexts. Two findings
contribute to this outcome. Contrary to expectation, the disengagement-learning
model (Balogun & Johnson, 2004) was not supported, despite the radical break
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from the past imposed by structural change. The evidence of polarisation and
regression supports this conclusion; organisational members were evaluating
change in terms of pre-existing schema and, clearly, in some cases preferred the
pre-existing schema over the new.
The juxtaposition-relocation model had more support. Moreover, there was
support for the conflict model in that organisational members’ accounts suggest
high levels of vertical and lateral conflict over the course of change. However,
organisational conflict management norms for the most part did not support
effective dialectical processes and schema change outcomes.
An important and new finding of this thesis is the role of implicit teleological
processes in organisational sub-schema change, a process not explicitly
considered in the extant schema change literature. When sub-schema change did
occur it did so relatively quickly. The best explanation of these shifts was that,
consistent with teleological theory (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995), organisational
members held an implicit vision of how the organisation should operate. Change
leader interventions juxtaposing schemata that were consistent with this vision
were readily embraced. Behavioural interventions involving organisational
members engaging in new behaviours in a safe environment appeared to
reinforce these teleological processes.
Fourth, the thesis has made an original contribution to understanding schema
change interventions in change management contexts thought to be inimical to
change leader influence. In many respects there was a clash between the new
schema and the pre-existing professional schema.
Nevertheless, contrary to previous conceptual research on this issue (Mintzberg,
1989), important changes did occur. Certainly, implicit teleological process did
contribute to this outcome, yet the investment of significant amounts of personal
time and energy into the realisation of change by the change leader also was a
contributing factor. An important finding of this research, then, is that in change
contexts inimical to change leader influence, change leaders must assume that
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they will make a significant and direct investment in relocating organisational
members from pre-existing to new schema.
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
This section identifies limitations of the research that may suggest more
tentativeness in accepting its conclusions.
First, despite the fact that three schema change episodes were considered in this
research, it could be argued that the data on which conclusions about top level
leader schema change interventions change were based on a single case and that
this raises issues about generalisation. However, a central argument of this thesis
is that more research on particular contexts is necessary. It is more appropriate
to view single cases in the context of a program of research in which validation
occurs across studies.
The problem of access to technically-oriented spatially differentiated public
professional organisations is also a consideration. It is not clear how many such
organisations are undertaking the scale of change involved in the case
organisation. Moreover, even if multiple case organisations were available, the
demands would exceed the resources of a single researcher.
Second, it could be argued that the focus on organisational cognition is limiting
on the grounds that it is ultimately behaviour that will provide a more adequate
measure of change. However, focusing on organisational member schema
change is an essential element of sustained behaviour change. It seems unlikely
that behaviour change can be sustained if these behaviours are not reinforced by
cognitive change.
Third, the research relies on retrospective data about the organisation’s pre-
existing schemata and history and about the first two years of the
transformational change intervention. Specifically, data collection began in
2000, two years after the initiation of the transformational change agenda and
297
four years after the structural intervention that truncated the organisation into
what have been referred to in this thesis as Corporate and Commercial.
While there are inevitable problems relying on retrospective data, the researcher
is confident in the conclusions reported in this thesis on the grounds that there
was a high degree of consistency across focus groups in terms of their memory
for past events. This was facilitated by a good proportion of long-standing
employees involved in the focus group discussions.
Fourth, focus group research raises several significant problems. For example,
focus group interviews generate large amounts of data, necessitating the use of
data reduction strategies. However, every effort was made to ensure key themes
were identified. For example, while some audio tapes were summarised rather
than transcribed verbatim, several measures were in place to ensure key themes
were captured in this process. For example, selected tapes were both transcribed
verbatim and summarised. It was then possible to compare summaries and
transcriptions. In addition, themes were discussed with and validated by others
who had intimate knowledge of the organisation, including a member of the case
organisation.
Another potential problem with focus groups relates to the member participation.
Some focus group members find it difficult to contribute, particularly if they
have to compete for air time with more extroverted members. Every effort was
made to encourage participation, for example, by going around the table to allow
each focus group member the opportunity to contribute.
Finally, while the research took place over a three year period, this is still a
relatively short period of time in OT terms. OT may take in the order of 10-15
years (Evans, 1992) depending on the scale and depth of change involved. These
circumstances suggest caution in drawing conclusions about the efficacy of
change interventions.
298
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The research presented here offers several avenues for future research on schema
change in organisational settings.
First, more research on the implicit intervention theory employed by public
sector change leaders and the influence that this implicit intervention theory has
on organisational schema change is necessary. The tendency to rely on structural
change with less attention to large-scale human process interventions warrants
further attention. In particular, how can change leaders develop better synergy
between large-scale structural and large-scale human process interventions, when
the requisite capabilities for managing this synergy are not necessarily resident in
the organisation?
Second, more research on schemata as substitutes for direct change leader
influence in inimical change management contexts is necessary. While the
human process intervention in this case was incomplete and unrealised, there was
sufficient evidence of its potential to warrant further investigation. In particular,
there is a need for more research on strategies for embedding such schema in
spatially differentiated organisations.
Third, the shift from an operations-driven to a strategy-driven organisation
appears to have received little attention in the public management change
literature, at least for professional organisations. In such cases, the degree of
discontinuity in terms of capabilities and organisation design is high. More
research is needed to address those factors that contribute to the success or
otherwise of such changes.
Fourth, more research on schema change dynamics is necessary. The dominant
schema change dynamic discussed in the literature is conflict or dialectical
processes. This study suggested that when change did occur, teleological (and
behavioural) processes were better explanations of this change. More research
should address this issue to determine how such processes can support
configurational schema change.
299
Fifth, more research is necessary to elucidate the antecedents and consequences
of collective change management efficacy, a concept that has not received
attention in the literature, despite its potential value for successful OT.
Finally, more research is necessary to explicate the role and dynamics of top-
level change leader behaviour in context. While the idea that top level leaders
envision, enable and energise is intuitively appealing, it frequently ignores the
role of context. More research needs to focus on the relationship between change
leader schema and dominant pre-existing schema and change acceptance.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The research suggests at least six important implications for public managers
responsible for transforming technically oriented, spatially differentiated
Professional Bureaucracies. The object is not to oversimplify a very complex
change management process, but to provide guidelines.
First, public managers need to give more attention to (a) identifying pre-existing
organisational schema, (b) framing alternative and more adequate schemata, and
(c) identifying ideals that facilitate the process of organisational member
sensemaking. If change leaders conceptualise both pre-existing and new schema,
they are in a better position to help relocate organisational members from the
pre-existing to the new schema (or find a satisfactory synthesis). Note, however,
that framing new schema may require capabilities not available in the
organisation.
Second, more attention needs to developing an appropriate intervention theory.
On the basis of the data reported in this thesis, managers are more likely to
achieve outcomes if the early interventions are experienced by organisational
members as being helpful or value-adding. Structural change would appear to
create particular problems in that the experience of the pace of change at the top
of the organisation is faster than at the bottom of the organisation.
300
Visioning interventions may also be problematic if pre-existing beliefs do not
support individual and collective initiative. Change leaders may have to consider
prerequisite interventions to address such beliefs before the goals of visioning
interventions can be realised. The uncritical acceptance of the value of visioning
interventions is unwarranted.
Third, public managers need to find a way of integrating or coordinating the
multiple change interventions necessary to produce organisational change.
Several organisational units were involved in aspects of transforming the case
organisation. Many of these changes appeared to intersect at the level of district
offices, producing significant concerns about overload.
Fourth, change leaders should seek to identify organisational members’ ideal
organisation schema. This means much more attention has to be given to
diagnosis and dialogue among organisational stakeholders affected by change
than is usually undertaken.
Fourth, change leaders need to monitor the relationship between change schema
and change process schema. Communicating a change message and then trying
to implement it with processes that contradict those reflected in the change
message will be problematic.
Finally, change leaders need to monitor the level of perceived collective change
efficacy. If organisational members have high collective confidence in the
organisation’s ability to implement change successfully then it is more likely that
the organisation will do so. Low levels of collective confidence in the
organisation’s ability to implement change will adversely affect change
outcomes.
CONCLUSION
This research investigated the efficacy of change leader interventions for
achieving qualitative schema change in the context of the transformation of a
technically-oriented spatially differentiated public professional organisation. The
301
research highlights the complexity of Organisation Transformation: it is not
sensible to reach an unequivocal conclusion about the efficacy of change leader
interventions and organisational schema change in such contexts.
Nevertheless, the findings of this study do provide a basis for ongoing research
on this relationship. In particular, there is a need for more research on (a) the
potential synergies between large-scale structural interventions and large-scale
human process interventions for transforming public organisations, (b) finding
new more sophisticated ways of conceptualising and exploring change in
organisational schema, (c) the role of teleological process in organisational
schema change and how those dynamics can be better managed, and (d) the
change management demands created by contexts that are inimical to change
leader influence.
302
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