BOOK TWO Cases

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BOOK TWO: HUMAN

RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT(APPRENTICES)


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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 114337. September 29, 1995.]

NITTO ENTERPRISES, Petitioner , v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and ROBERTOCAPILI, Respondents.

Sinfroso R. Pagunsan for Petitioner .

Ma. Elena Enly B. Nazareta for Private Respondent .

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the decision 1 rendered by publicrespondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired Roberto Capilisometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeshipagreement 2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate ofP66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.

At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working on,accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital.

Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office premises which was

not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the processinjured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private Respondent .

The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letters 3 which reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

August 2, 1990

Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung papaano gamitin and "TOOL" sapagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at nadamay pa ang isangsekretarya ng kompanya.

Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minuto ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon siya ay pumasok sa shop na hindinaman sakop ng kanyang trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang kanyang sarilingkamay.

Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Emergency and doctor fee P715.00

Medicines (sic) and others 317.04

Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang matanggal ang tahi ng kanyang kamay.

Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.

Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng kanyang kamay, pagkatapos ng siyam naaraw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.


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You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called for in the dispositive portion,and turn over such amount to this Office for proper disposition.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Hence, the instant petition-for certiorari .

The issues raised before us are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THATPRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THATPETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OFPRIVATE RESPONDENT.

We find no merit in the petition

Petitioner assails the NLRC’s finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be considered an

apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the agreement wasexecuted.

Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already established an employer-apprentice relationship.

Petitioner’s argument is erroneous.

The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Contents of apprenticeship agreement. — Apprenticeship agreements, including the main rates of apprentices, shallconform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceedsix months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no caseshall start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance withapprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard

model programs of apprenticeship. (Emphasis supplied )

In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder.." On the same date, anapprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment.However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval bythe Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.

Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated thatapprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with theapprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.

Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, acondition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.

The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminarystep towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.

Article 57 of t he Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish national apprenticeship program through theparticipation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeshipstandards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLEto any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeshipagreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot bedebased.

Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in theabsence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent’s assertion that he washired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserve credence. He should rightly beconsidered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library


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ARTICLE 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrarynotwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regularwhere the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usualbusiness or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertakingthe completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee orwhere the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of theseason.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided That, anyemployee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be

considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shallcontinue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied )

and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare." 9

Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private Respondent .

There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due process, substantive andprocedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists. 10 Without which, the dismissal becomes void.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. This simply meansthat the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance ofhis representative, if he so desires.

Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him toprepare adequately for his defense including legal representation. 11

As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC : 12

The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2) written noticesbefore termination of employee can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular actsor omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of theemployer’s decision to dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130, Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and RegulationsImplementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to comply with the requirements taints the dismissal withillegality. This procedure is mandatory; in the absence of which, any judgment reached by management is void andinexistent (Tingson, Jr. v. NLRC, 185 SCRA 498 [1990]; National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122, Ruffy v.NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 L [1990]).

The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three days after he was

made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not voluntary and deliberate.Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante").

He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned resignation letter andquitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it clear to him that anyway, he did nothave a choice. 13

Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the latter’s allegedresignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious examination of both events belies anyspontaneity on private respondent’s part.

WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission,the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 152894 : August 17, 2007]

CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, Petitioner , v. COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA C. PALAD,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.

The Case

This is a Petition for Review 1 of the Decision2 dated 12 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 5 April 2002 of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.

The Facts

On 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad) as "fish cleaner" atpetitioner's tuna and sardines factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997 an apprenticeship agreement 3with petitioner.Palad received an apprentice allowance of P138.75 daily. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeshipprogram for approval to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) of the Department ofLabor and Employment (DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved petitioner's apprenticeship program. 4

According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted on 15 November 1997, where petitioner gave Palada rating of N.I. or "needs improvement" since she scored only 27.75% based on a 100% performance indicator.Furthermore, according to the performance evaluation, Palad incurred numerous tardiness and absences. As aconsequence, petitioner issued a termination notice5 dated 22 November 1997 to Palad, informing her of hertermination effective at the close of business hours of 28 November 1997.

Palad then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-payment of pro-rated 13th monthpay for the year 1997.

On 25 February 1999, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but ordered petitioner to pay Paladher last salary and her pro-rated 13th month pay. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the complaint for illegal dismissalfiled by the complainant against the respondents in the above-entitled case should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED forlack of merit. However, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant the amount of ONE THOUSANDSIX HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P1,632.00), representing her last salary and the amount of SEVEN THOUSANDTWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (P7,228.00) PESOS representing her prorated 13th month pay.

All other issues are likewise dismissed.

SO ORDERED.6

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter's decision,thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Arbiter dated 25 February 1999 is hereby MODIFIED in that,in addition, respondents are ordered to pay complainant's backwages for two (2) months in the amount of P7,176.00(P138.75 x 26 x 2 mos.). All other dispositions of the Arbiter as appearing in the dispositive portion of his decisionare AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.7


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Upon denial of Palad's motion for reconsideration, Palad filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court ofAppeals. On 12 November 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned decision of the NLRC is hereby SET ASIDE and a new oneentered, to wit:

(a) finding the dismissal of petitioner to be illegal;

(b) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner her underpayment in wages;

(c) ordering private respondent to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority rights and topay her full backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld from her up to the time of herreinstatement;

(d) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) per cent of the monetaryaward herein; and cralawlibrary

(e) ordering private respondent to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.8

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was not valid and binding becauseit was executed more than two months before the TESDA approved petitioner's apprenticeship program. The Court ofAppeals cited Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission,9 where it was held that prior approval by theDOLE of the proposed apprenticeship program is a condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement canbe validly entered into.

The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner illegally dismissed Palad. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitionerfailed to show that Palad was properly apprised of the required standard of performance. The Court of Appealslikewise held that Palad was not afforded due process because petitioner did not comply with the twin requirementsof notice and hearing.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTWAS NOT AN APPRENTICE; and cralawlibrary

2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOTADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATERESPONDENT.10

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is without merit.

Registration and Approval by the TESDA of Apprenticeship Program Required Before Hiring of Apprentices

The Labor Code defines an apprentice as a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with anemployer.11 One of the objectives of Title II (Training and Employment of Special Workers) of the Labor Code is toestablish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices.12In line with this objective, Articles 60 and 61 ofthe Labor Code provide:

ART. 60. Employment of apprentices. - Only employers in the highly technical industries may employapprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.(Emphasis supplied )cralawlibrary


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ART. 61. Contents of apprenticeship agreements. - Apprenticeship agreements, including the wage rates ofapprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeshipshall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimumwage, which in no case shall start below 75 percent of the applicable minimum wage, may be enteredinto only in accordance with apprenticeship programs duly approved by the Minister of Labor andEmployment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship. (Emphasis supplied )cralawlibrary

In Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission,13 the Court cited Article 61 of the Labor Code and heldthat an apprenticeship program should first be approved by the DOLE before an apprentice may be hired, otherwisethe person hired will be considered a regular employee. The Court held:

In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, anapprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment.However, the apprenticeship agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval bythe Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.

Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated thatapprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only inaccordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.

Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, acondition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.

The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminarystep towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.

Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program through theparticipation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeshipstandards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLEto any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeshipagreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot bedebased.

Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in theabsence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he washired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly beconsidered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code x x x. (Emphasissupplied )14

Republic Act No. 779615 (RA 7796), which created the TESDA, has transferred the authority over apprenticeshipprograms from the Bureau of Local Employment of the DOLE to the TESDA.16 RA 7796 emphasizes TESDA's approvalof the apprenticeship program as a pre-requisite for the hiring of apprentices. Such intent is clear under Section 4 ofRA 7796:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:

x x x

j) "Apprenticeship" training within employment with compulsory related theoretical instructions involvinga contract between an apprentice and an employer on an approved apprenticeable occupation;

k) "Apprentice" is a person undergoing training for an approved apprenticeable occupation during anestablished period assured by an apprenticeship agreement;

l) "Apprentice Agreement" is a contract wherein a prospective employer binds himself to train the apprentice whoin turn accepts the terms of training for a recognized apprenticeable occupation emphasizing the rights,duties and responsibilities of each party;

m) "Apprenticeable Occupation" is an occupation officially endorsed by a tripartite body and approved forapprenticeship by the Authority [TESDA]; (Emphasis supplied )cralawlibrary

In this case, the apprenticeship agreement was entered into between the parties before petitioner filed itsapprenticeship program with the TESDA for approval. Petitioner and Palad executed the apprenticeship agreement on


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17 July 1997 wherein it was stated that the training would start on 17 July 1997 and would end approximately inDecember 1997.17 On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted for approval its apprenticeship program, which the TESDAsubsequently approved on 26 September 1997.18Clearly, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced even before theTESDA approved petitioner's apprenticeship program. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement is void because it lackedprior approval from the TESDA.

The TESDA's approval of the employer's apprenticeship program is required before the employer is allowed to hireapprentices. Prior approval from the TESDA is necessary to ensure that only employers in the highly technicalindustries may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations.19Thus, under RA 7796, employers canonly hire apprentices for apprenticeable occupations which must be officially endorsed by a tripartite body and

approved for apprenticeship by the TESDA.Ï‚Î!Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎ"Å¡ Î #Î$râ% Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰ lÎ$brÎ±rÃ¿

This is to ensure the protection of apprentices and to obviate possible abuses by prospective employers who maywant to take advantage of the lower wage rates for apprentices and circumvent the right of the employees to besecure in their employment.

The requisite TESDA approval of the apprenticeship program prior to the hiring of apprentices was furtheremphasized by the DOLE with the issuance of Department Order No. 68-04 on 18 August 2004. Department OrderNo. 68-04, which provides the guidelines in the implementation of the Apprenticeship and Employment Program ofthe government, specifically states that no enterprise shall be allowed to hire apprentices unless itsapprenticeship program is registered and approved by TESDA.20

Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement was enforced before the TESDA'sapproval of petitioner's apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed a regular employee performing the job of a "fish

cleaner." Clearly, the job of a "fish cleaner" is necessary in petitioner's business as a tuna and sardines factory.Under Article 28021 of the Labor Code, an employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged toperform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.

Illegal Termination of Palad

We shall now resolve whether petitioner illegally dismissed Palad.

Under Article 27922 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee for just causes 23 orfor authorized causes.24 Furthermore, under Article 277(b)25 of the Labor Code, the employer must send theemployee who is about to be terminated, a written notice stating the causes for termination and must give theemployee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Thus, to constitute valid dismissal from employment,two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must beafforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. 26

In this case, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner terminated Palad for habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency ofperformance. Under Section 25, Rule VI, Book II of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, habitual absenteeismand poor efficiency of performance are among the valid causes for which the employer may terminate theapprenticeship agreement after the probationary period.

However, the NLRC reversed the finding of the Labor Arbiter on the issue of the legality of Palad's termination:

As to the validity of complainant's dismissal in her status as an apprentice, suffice to state that the findings of theArbiter that complainant was dismissed due to failure to meet the standards is nebulous. What clearly appears is thatcomplainant already passed the probationary status of the apprenticeship agreement of 200 hours at the time shewas terminated on 28 November 1997 which was already the fourth month of the apprenticeship period of 1000hours. As such, under the Code, she can only be dismissed for cause, in this case, for poor efficiency of performanceon the job or in the classroom for a prolonged period despite warnings duly given to the apprentice.

We noted that no clear and sufficient evidence exist to warrant her dismissal as an apprentice during the

agreed period. Besides the absence of any written warnings given to complainant reminding her of "poorperformance," respondents' evidence in this respect consisted of an indecipherable or unauthenticatedxerox of the performance evaluation allegedly conducted on complainant. This is of doubtful authenticityand/or credibility, being not only incomplete in the sense that appearing thereon is a signature (not thatof complainant) side by side with a date indicated as "1/16/98". From the looks of it, this signature isclose to and appertains to the typewritten position of "Division/Department Head", which is below thesignature of complainant's immediate superior who made the evaluation indicated as "11-15-97."

The only conclusion We can infer is that this evaluation was made belatedly, specifically, after the filingof the case and during the progress thereof in the Arbitral level, as shown that nothing thereon indicatethat complainant was notified of the results. Its authenticity therefor, is a big question mark, and hence


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BOOK TWO: HUMANRESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

(HANDICAPPED WORKERS)


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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122917. July 12, 1999]

MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID, DAVID P. PASCUAL, RAQUELESTILLER, ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND M. CORTEZ, JOSELITO O. AGDON GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR.,CELSO M. YAZAR, ALEX G. CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN, ROWENA M. TABAQUERO, CORAZON C.

DELOS REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA, MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI, IKECABANDUCOS, COCOY NOBELLO, DORENDA CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT MARCELO, LILIBETH Q.

MARMOLEJO, JOSE E. SALES, ISABEL MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO TECSON, MELODY V.GRUELA, BERNADETH D. AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R. CORTEZ, MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION,

DINDO VALERIO, ZENAIDA MATA, ARIEL DEL PILAR, MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA, THELMA

SEBASTIAN, MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY BALOLOA,ELIZABETH VENTURA, GRACE S. PARDO & RICO TIMOSA, Petitioners v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION & FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.

The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the same terms andconditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Once they have attained the status of regularworkers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to thecontrary. This treatment is rooted not merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice for all.

The Case

Challenged in the Petition for Certiorari 1 before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision

2 of the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC),3 which affirmed the August, 22 1994 ruling of Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan. The labor

arbiters Decision disposed as follows:4cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-mentioned complaint for lack of merit.

Also assailed is the August 4, 1995 Resolution5 of the NLRC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise: 6

Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly wordedagreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. (pp. 68 & 69, Records) The full text of said

agreement is quoted below:

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR HANDICAPPED WORKERS

This Contract, entered into by and between:


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FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking corporation duly organized and existing underand by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with business address at FEBTC Building, Muralla, Intramuros,Manila, represented herein by its Assistant Vice President, MR. FLORENDO G. MARANAN, (hereinafter referredto as the BANK);

- and -

________________, ________________ years old, of legal age, _____________, and residing at

__________________ (hereinafter referred to as the (EMPLOYEE).

WITNESSETH: That

WHEREAS, the BANK, cognizant of its social responsibility, realizes that there is a need to provide disabled andhandicapped persons gainful employment and opportunities to realize their potentials, uplift their socio-economicwell being and welfare and make them productive, self-reliant and useful citizens to enable them to fully integrate

in the mainstream of society;

WHEREAS, there are certain positions in the BANK which may be filled-up by disabled and handicapped personsparticularly deaf-mutes, and the BANK ha[s] been approached by some civic-minded citizens and authorizedgovernment agencies [regarding] the possibility of hiring handicapped workers for these positions;

WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE is one of those handicapped workers who [were] recommended for possible

employment with the BANK;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and in compliance with Article 80 of theLabor Code of the Philippines as amended, the BANK and the EMPLOYEE have entered into this EmploymentContract as follows:

1. The BANK agrees to employ and train the EMPLOYEE, and the EMPLOYEE agrees to diligently and faithfully

work with the BANK, as Money Sorter and Counter.

2. The EMPLOYEE shall perform among others, the following duties and responsibilities:

i Sort out bills according to color;

ii. Count each denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine;

iii. Wrap and label bills per hundred;

iv. Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and

v. Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.

3. The EMPLOYEE shall undergo a training period of one (1) month, after which the BANK shall determinewhether or not he/she should be allowed to finish the remaining term of this Contract.

4. The EMPLOYEE shall be entitled to an initial compensation of P118.00 per day, subject to adjustment in thesole judgment of the BANK, payable every 15

th and end of the month.

5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5) days per week, from Mondays thru Fridays, ateight (8) hours a day. The EMPLOYEE may be required to perform overtime work as circumstance may warrant,for which overtime work he/she [shall] be paid an additional compensation of 125% of his daily rate if performed

during ordinary days and 130% if performed during Saturday or [a] rest day.

6. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following benefits:

i. Proportionate 13th month pay based on his basic daily wage.


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ii. Five (5) days incentive leave.

iii. SSS premium payment.

7. The EMPLOYEE binds himself/herself to abide [by] and comply with all the BANK Rules and Regulations andPolicies, and to conduct himself/herself in a manner expected of all employees of the BANK.

8. The EMPLOYEE acknowledges the fact that he/she had been employed under a special employment programof the BANK, for which reason the standard hiring requirements of the BANK were not applied in his/her case.

Consequently, the EMPLOYEE acknowledges and accepts the fact that the terms and conditions of theemployment generally observed by the BANK with respect to the BANKs regular employee are not applicable tothe EMPLOYEE, and that therefore, the terms and conditions of the EMPLOYEEs employment with the BANKshall be governed solely and exclusively by this Contract and by the applicable rules and regulations that theDepartment of Labor and Employment may issue in connection with the employment of disabled and handicappedworkers. More specifically, the EMPLOYEE hereby acknowledges that the provisions of Book Six of the LaborCode of the Philippines as amended, particularly on regulation of employment and separation pay are not

applicable to him/her.

9. The Employment Contract shall be for a period of six (6) months or from ____ to ____ unless earlier terminatedby the BANK for any just or reasonable cause. Any continuation or extension of this Contract shall be in writing

and therefore this Contract will automatically expire at the end of its terms unless renewed in writing by the BANK.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, have hereunto affixed their signature[s] this ____ day of _________________, ____________ at Intramuros, Manila, Philippines.

In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in 1990, nineteen (19); in1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were renewed every six monthssuch that by the time this case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were employed by respondentunder the said employment agreement. The last one was Thelma Malindoy who was employed in 1992 and

whose contract expired on July 1993.

x x x

Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company

maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers the hearing impaired employees were hiredtemporarily under [a] special employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic andpolitical personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to pakiusap which must beconsidered in the light of the context of the respondent Banks corporate philosophy as well as its career andworking environment which is to maintain and strengthen a corps of professionals trained and qualified officersand regular employees who are baccalaureate degree holders from excellent schools which is an unbendingpolicy in the hiring of regular employees; that in addition to this, training continues so that the regular employeegrows in the corporate ladder; that the idea of hiring handicapped workers was acceptable to them only on aspecial arrangement basis; that it adopted the special program to help tide over a group of handicapped workerssuch as deaf-mutes like the complainants who could do manual work for the respondent Bank; that the task ofcounting and sorting of bills which was being performed by tellers could be assigned to deaf-mutes; that thecounting and sorting of money are tellering works which were always logically and naturally part and parcel of thetellers normal functions; that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent Bankplantilla for sorters or counters; that the tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a regular

feature and integral part of their duties (p. 97, Records); that through the pakiusap of Arturo Borjal, the tellers wererelieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without creating new positions as there isno position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the Philippines which deals with purely counting and

sorting of bills in banking operations.

Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dismissed, viz:7cräläwvirtualibräry

NAME OF PETITIONER WORKPLACE Date Hired Date Dismissed

1. MARITES BERNARDO Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93

2. ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE Intramuros 24 JAN 90 11 JAN 94


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3. REBECCA E. DAVID Intramuros 16 APR 90 23 OCT 93

4. DAVID P. PASCUAL Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 21 NOV 94

5. RAQUEL ESTILLER Intramuros 2 JUL 92 4 JAN 94

6. ALBERT HALLARE West 4 JAN 91 9 JAN 94

7. EDMUND M. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 JAN 91 3 DEC 93

8. JOSELITO O. AGDON Intramuros 5 NOV 90 17 NOV 93

9. GEORGE P. LIGUTAN, JR. Intramuros 6 SEPT 89 19 JAN 94

10. CELSO M. YAZAR Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93

11. ALEX G. CORPUZ Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93

12. RONALD M. DELFIN Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93

13. ROWENA M. TABAQUERO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93

14. CORAZON C. DELOS REYES Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93

15. ROBERT G. NOORA Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93

16. MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN Intramuros 1 FEB 93 1 AUG 93

17. ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI Intramuros 22 JAN 93 22 JUL 93

18. IKE CABANDUCOS Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93

19. COCOY NOBELLO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93

20. DORENDA CATIMBUHAN Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93

21. ROBERT MARCELO West 31 JUL 938 1 AUG 93

22. LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO West 15 JUN 90 21 NOV 93

23. JOSE E. SALES West 6 AUG 92 12 OCT 93

24. ISABEL MAMAUAG West 8 MAY 92 10 NOV 93

25. VIOLETA G. MONTES Intramuros 2 FEB 90 15 JAN 94

26. ALBINO TECSON Intramuros 7 NOV 91 10 NOV 93

27. MELODY V. GRUELA West 28 OCT 91 3 NOV 93

28. BERNADETH D. AGERO West 19 DEC 90 27 DEC 93

29. CYNTHIA DE VERA Bel-Air 26 JUN 90 3 DEC 93

30. LANI R. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 10 DEC 93


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31. MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION West 6 SEPT 90 6 FEB 94

32. DINDO VALERIO Intramuros 30 MAY 93 30 NOV 93

33. ZENAIDA MATA Intramuros 10 FEB 93 10 AUG 93

34. ARIEL DEL PILAR Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93

35. MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA Intramuros 27 JUL 90 4 FEB 94

36. THELMA SEBASTIAN Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93

37. MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES West 6 JUN 92 7 DEC 93

38. JEANNIE RAMIL Intramuros 23 APR 90 12 OCT 93

39. ROZAIDA PASCUAL Bel-Air 20 APR 89 29 OCT 93

40. PINKY BALOLOA West 3 JUN 91 2 DEC 93

41. ELIZABETH VENTURA West 12 MAR 90 FEB 94 [SIC]

42. GRACE S. PARDO West 4 APR 90 13 MAR 94

43. RICO TIMOSA Intramuros 28 APR 93 28 OCT 93

As earlier noted, the labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein petitioners. Hence, this recourse

to this Court.9

The Ruling of the NLRC

In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission ratiocinated as follows:

We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the conclusion that complainants werehired as an accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employment[s] werecovered by xxx Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80.Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbiter a quo, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the

parties.10

The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable, considering the

prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case.

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause:

I. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petitioners - money sortersand counters working in a bank - were not regular employees.

II. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the employment contracts

signed and renewed by the petitioners - which provide for a period of six (6) months - were valid.

III. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying the provisions of the Magna

Carta for the Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription against discrimination against disabled persons.11

In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular employees.


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This Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose

contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal.

Preliminary Matter: Propriety of Certiorari

Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of facts of the NLRC is notallowed in a petition for certiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the Court cannot pass upon the findings of public

respondents that petitioners were not regular employees.

True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in acertiorari proceeding. Inresolving whether the petitioners have become regular employees, we shall not change the facts found by thepublic respondent. Our task is merely to determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion inapplying the law to the established facts, as above-quoted from the assailed Decision.

Main Issue: Are Petitioners Regular Employees?

Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters andcounters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contractsserved merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as special workers and should notin any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.

12 Rather, they were special workers

under Article 80 of the Labor Code. Private respondent contends that it never solicited the services of petitioners,whose employment was merely an accommodation in response to the requests of government officials and civic-minded citizens. They were told from the start, with the assistance of government representatives, that they couldnot become regular employees because there were no plantilla positions for money sorters, whose task used tobe performed by tellers. Their contracts were renewed several times, not because of need but merely forhumanitarian reasons. Respondent submits that as of the present, the special position that was created for thepetitioners no longer exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their

special employment contracts.

At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private respondents effort to provide

employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive members of society. However,we cannot allow it to elude the legal consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their employmentirrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitablyshow that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees. As such, they haveacquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a

consequence of law and justice.

The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of onemonth, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month termof the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable

cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.

According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with Article 80 of the

Labor Code, which provides:

ART. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an

employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include:

(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed;

(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five (75%) per cent of theapplicable legal minimum wage;

(c) The duration of employment period; and


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(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.

The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized

representatives.

The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited provision. Succeeding eventsand the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons),

13 however, justify the application of

Article 280 of the Labor Code.

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed thecontracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of thehandicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessaryto the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of theirpositions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be giventhe same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Cartaprovides:

Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment .No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities forsuitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions ofemployment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a

qualified able bodied person.

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts fromthe ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are

thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:

ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. -- The provisions of written agreement to the contrarynotwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to beregular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable inthe usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project orundertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of theemployee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the

duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, anyemployee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall beconsidered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall

continue while such activity exists.

The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC ,14

in which this Court held:

The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between theparticular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test iswhether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Theconnection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of

the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least oneyear, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuingneed for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to thebusiness. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such

activity exists.

Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondentbank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Thus, thefollowing twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular employees: Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante,Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon,George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson,Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret


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Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa,Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo.

As held by the Court, Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of makingpermanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them probationaryappointments, ad infinitum.

15 The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during

which the bank determined the employees fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapseof the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees.

16 No employer is

allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.

As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may beterminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such cause,

17 these twenty-

seven petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement withoutloss of seniority rights and other privileges.

18 Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of money

sorting is no longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originallybelonged,

19 petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

20cräläwvirtualibräry

Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and hence not

entitled to the same benefits.

Applicability of the Brent Ruling

Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora21 in which the Court upheld the validity of an employmentcontract with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the contract on equal footing. It adds that thepetitioners had in fact an advantage, because they were backed by then DSWD Secretary Mita Pardo de Taveraand Representative Arturo Borjal.

We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the petitioners were disabled,and that the bank had to determine their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of theLabor Code. But as noted earlier, petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under theMagna Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment enjoyed byqualified able-bodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners arequalified for their positions. Thevalidation of the limit imposed on their contracts, imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring instance of

the very mischief sought to be addressed by the new law.

Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest.22 Provisions ofapplicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselvesand their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with eachother.

23 Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the

provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualifiedable-bodied employees.

Respondents reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because the Bangko Sentral ngPilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned over to the BSP during business hours from 8:00 a.m. to5:00 p.m., respondent resorted to nighttime sorting and counting of money. Thus, it reasons that this task couldnot be done by deaf mutes because of their physical limitations as it is very risky for them to travel at night.

24We

find no basis for this argument. Travelling at night involves risks to handicapped and able-bodied persons alike.This excuse cannot justify the termination of their employment.

Other Grounds Cited by Respondent

Respondent argues that petitioners were merely accommodated employees. This fact does not change the natureof their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of

service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them.

Equally unavailing are private respondents arguments that it did not go out of its way to recruit petitioners, andthat its plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T. Datu v. NLRC ,

25 the Court held that the determination of

whether employment is casual or regular does not depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedureof hiring x x x but on the nature of the activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length ofperformance and its continued existence.


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Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they could not become regularemployees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the stipulation in the contract regarding this point. Still, we arenot persuaded. The well-settled rule is that the character of employment is determined not by stipulations in thecontract, but by the nature of the work performed.

26 Otherwise, no employee can become regular by the simple

expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of employment.

In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC :27

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Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the employees right to be secure in

his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with theconcept of regular employment defined therein. Where an employee has been engaged to perform activities whichare usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, such employee is deemed a regularemployee and is entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the contrary provisions of his contract ofemployment.

x x x

At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves instructive. As reaffirmed in subsequentcases, this Court has upheld the legality of fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive determinant in termemployment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreedupon the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship. But this Court went onto say that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to preclude

acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to publicpolicy and morals.

In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor of the working class, butalso the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for DisabledPersons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatmentof qualified persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not ahindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employmentcontracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired? The Court believes,that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them, they should be treated and granted the same rights

like any other regular employees.

In this light, we note the Office of the Solicitor Generals prayer joining the petitioners cause.28

cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20, 1995 Decision and the August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC are REVERSEDand SETASIDE . Respondent Far East Bank and TrustCompany is hereby ORDEREDto pay back wages and separation pay to each of the following twenty-seven (27)petitioners, namely, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. SalesIsabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera,Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes,Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. The NLRC is herebydirected to compute the exact amount due each of said employees, pursuant to existing laws and regulations,

within fifteen days from the finality of this Decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Documents

BOOK TWO Cases