Book Reviews

Donald Barry, Bob Applebaum, and EarlWiseman. Fishing for a Solution. Canada’sFisheries Relations with the EuropeanUnion, 1977-2013. Calgary, AB: Universityof Calgary Press, www .uofcpress.com,2014. xvi+178 pp., maps, tables, notes,appendices, bibliography, index. CDN$34.95, paper: ISBN 978-1-55238-778-8.(Co-published with the Centre for Militaryand Strategic Studies)

Fishing for a Solution by Donald Barry,Bob Applebaum and Earl Wiseman shedslight on one of the twentieth century’s mostinteresting chapters in international fisherieshistory, the development of the fisheriesrelationship between Canada and theEuropean Union (EU) following theextension of the Canadian fisheries limit to200 nautical miles (nm).

Co-authors Bob Applebaum and EarlWiseman are former high-ranking officialsof the Canadian Department of Fisheriesand Oceans (DFO) and Donald Barry isProfessor Emeritus of Political Science atthe University of Calgary. Their bookshould be understood as an historical re-flection on the development of Canada-EUfisheries relations by former actors andstakeholders, rather than a traditional pieceof scholarly historical analysis. Theseparticular authors are both the main strengthof the book and also its main weakness. They are, without any doubt, well qualifiedto discuss the topic, but, having beenactively involved in the issues described,

lack the critical distance from the subjectnormally required for an analytical historicalapproach. Furthermore, while the bookbenefits from the authors’ in-depthknowledge of the subject, it is characterizedby a clearly Canadian perspective ratherthan a neutral historical approach.

The book follows a chronological line,describing the main stages of EU-Canadianrelations post-1977along with relatedinternational or bilateral agreements, includ-ing access to fish stocks, tariffs and EUimport regulations for Canadian fisheriesproducts. Worth noting is how Canada wastaken by surprise when, after declaring the200nm fisheries limit, EU trawlers firstfished for their quotas inside the Canadianlimit, and then continued fishing for thesame stocks outside the Canadian limitinstead of returning to their homeports. While this was legal according to the lettersof agreement of the time, it was definitelyneither expected nor welcomed by Canada. This is a key example of the problems ofmodern international fisheries agreements. Unfortunately, the book mainly addressesnational fisheries policy rather thandiscussing developments on the companylevel; for example, the idea of building upEuropean (German)–Canadian jointventures. Integrating the history of theseworking-level developments into the storywould have provided a more nuancedpicture. Despite this, the book is a morethan welcome starting point and willhopefully help to initiate future historical

The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord, XXV (October 2015), 413-465

414 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

research on topics like the proposed EU-Canada joint ventures.

Statistical data, an index and abibliography make the book an importantresearch tool for any historian interested inthe subject, even if the book itself containsmore historical reflection than historicalanalysis. The bibliography is somewhatlimited, as sources in languages other thanEnglish are rare, despite the relevance ofSpanish, Portuguese and German sources tothe topic.

Perhaps this reviewer’s sense of thebook’s incompleteness is simply the resultof an historian mainly interested in theEuropean (German) side of the develop-ments under discussion reviewing a bookwritten by Canadian authors for a largelyCanadian audience. That being said, theauthors’ efforts to draw attention to a periodthat has, so far, rarely caught the interest ofhistorians is much appreciated. The bookclearly explains that the extension of fishinglimits in the North Atlantic to 200nm didnot resolve all fishing conflicts but served asa turning point that resulted in new conflictsand regulatory challenges that will generatea rich catch for future generations offisheries historians.

Fishing for a Solution is a mostwelcome addition to the existing literatureon the history of the international fisheriesof the Northwest Atlantic, even though afinal historical analysis still needs to bewritten. Taking into account that the periodunder review is less than 50 years in thepast, footnotes referring to ‘confidentialinformation’ might have been unavoidable,but from an historian’s point of view, it isunsatisfactory, if not even unacceptable. Nevertheless, the book is recommended toany researcher interested in the fisheries

history of the North Atlantic and/or thedevelopment of Canadian fisheries policy. The questions it raises should be answeredby future generations of historians once theyhave access to the related sources that willno longer be ‘confidential information’.

Ingo HeidbrinkNorfolk, Virginia

Thomas McKelvey Cleaver. OspreyAircraft of the Aces # 125: F4F Wildcat andF6F Hellcat Aces of VF-2. Botley, Oxford:Osprey Publishing, Inc. , www.ospreypublishing.com, 2015, 96 pp. illus-trations, colour plates, appendix, index. UK£13.99, US $22.95, CDN $26.95; paper;ISBN 978-1-4728-0562-1.

U.S. Navy Fighter Squadron VF-2 was thefirst USN unit to receive fighter aircraft. InOsprey Aircraft of the Aces # 125: F4FWildcat and F6F Hellcat Aces of VF-2, theauthor tells the story of this historic aircraftunit between 1921 and 1944.

In reading this book, one thing must bekept in mind: the USN often dis-establishesunits and later reforms them with differentpersonnel. The new unit bearing the oldnumeric designation has no direct lineagewith the prior unit beyond the same number,though the new unit may (and frequentlydoes) choose to adopt the insignia,nickname, and traditions of the prior unit. From 1921 to 1945, VF-2 was formed, dis-established, reformed, dis-established again,reformed again, and dis-established after itslast combat tour in late 1944. Therefore,this book relates the story of three distinctsquadrons, each bearing the same number.

Book Reviews 415

The first VF-2 squadron was formed in1921 in San Diego, California, and wasoriginally named Combat Squadron Four. It gained the VF-2 designation the nextyear. For the next twenty years, VF-2 wouldbe in the forefront of USN carrier operationdevelopment. Flying biplanes for years, andthen upgrading to the Brewster F2A Buffalomonoplane, the first VF-2 flew off theUSN’s first aircraft carrier, U.S.S. Langley,and then U.S.S. Lexington. During thistime, VF-2 laid the groundwork for USNcarrier operations. When the Japaneseattacked the USN base at Pearl Harbor,Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, VF-2 was atsea aboard the Lexington. For the nextseveral weeks, VF-2’s pilots and airplanescarried out patrols with little combat. Experience with the F2A Buffalo indicatedthat the aircraft was not as good as itscontemporary, the Grumman F4F Wildcat. Therefore, in January, 1942, the first VF-2was dis-established. Many of its pilotsnever saw combat as the USN neededexperienced pilots to train the many pilotcadets that would see future combat in thePacific.

The second VF-2 was formed inJanuary 1942 and its pilots and aircraft wereonce again assigned to U.S.S. Lexington. This time, VF-2 saw combat: the USNcarried out several little-known combatoperations against Japanese installations inthe South Pacific and VF-2 and Lexingtonwere part of those operations. But thesecond VF-2 had a short lifespan: Lexingtonwas sunk during the Coral Sea battle in May1942. (It should be noted that many of thesecond VF-2’s pilots went on to distinguishthemselves during the remainder of theSecond World War and thereafter.)

The third VF-2 was formed a year later,

in June 1943, and it is this “version” of VF-2 that made combat history. The squadronwas originally equipped with the FM-2Wildcat (a variant of the F4F Wildcat) butwas soon re-equipped with the GrummanF6F hellcat—a larger, faster and morepowerful aircraft than the earlier Wildcat. By common consent, the Hellcat was thebest carrier fighter aircraft of the SecondWorld War.

After a period of training on the Hellcat,the third VF-2 went into combat inNovember 1943. From then until its returnto the USA in September 1944, the pilots ofVF-2 destroyed 506 Japanese aircraft—261aircraft in aerial combat and 245 Japaneseaircraft on the ground. When the one aerialvictory of the second VF-2 is added to thetotal, the two versions of VF-2 destroyed262 Japanese aircraft. This is all the moreremarkable when it is noted that VF-2 lostonly three Hellcats and nine pilots during itssecond combat tour—a victory-to-loss ratioof almost nine-to-one. In addition, 28 VF-2pilots shot down five or more enemyaircraft, which still stands as a USN recordfor the most aces in one squadron.

Cleaver’s history of this great squadronfollows the standard Osprey format of thisseries: a well-written narrative that includespilots’ accounts of their times with VF-2,even going back to the first VF-2 in the1930s. The book is heavily illustrated andthe personal accounts add much to thenarrative. As well, the colour sectioncontains plates of aircraft from all three VF-2s. The very colourful prewar schemes ofUSN biplanes are well-represented as is aF2A Buffalo in the bright pre-war colourscheme. The following plates of Buffalos,Wildcats, and Hellcats show the transitionto camouflage and the consequent wartime

416 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

USN colour schemes. These are valuablefor the modeller and historian. The authorindicates in the Introduction that VF-2 wasreformed a third time; its fourth versionwhich has seen action in recent years. Asidebar with a brief description of this latestVF-2 would have been helpful.

It would be tempting to dismiss thiswork as “just another Osprey book,” but theaccounts of the first and second versions ofVF-2 lift this above that trite designation. The chapter dealing with the first VF-2gives a wealth of information as to thedevelopment of USN carrier operations. The chapters dealing with the first andsecond versions of VF-2 contain detail onlittle-known post-Pearl Harbor USNoperations and a close look at the Coral Seabattle. The chapters on the third VF-2 havemuch information on Pacific War aerialcombat. For those reasons, this book isrecommended.

Robert L. ShoopColorado Springs, Colorado

D’Maris Coffman, Adrian Leonard, WilliamO’Reilly (eds.) The Atlantic World. London:Routledge, www.routledge .com, 2014. 726pp., illustrations, maps, notes, index. US$205.00, hard-back; ISBN 978-0-415-46704-9.

Few volumes can address the complexscope of the areas and peoples living alongthe Atlantic Ocean between the mid-fifteenth and the early twenty-first centuries. In The Atlantic World, D’Maris Coffman,Adrian Leonard, and William O’Reilly, allfaculty of the University of Cambridge,bring Atlantic world history to life in a

series of 35 articles. This hardcoveranthology consists of 726 pages divided intoeight parts, each of which is centred on animportant theme in Atlantic world history. Topics covered include exploration,immigration and emigration, culturalencounters, warfare and governance,finance and trade, commerce andconsumption, and the circulation of ideas. The notes and references after each articleare useful for those who wish to read moreon a particular topic. The volume issupplemented by two maps and 49 black-and-white images.

Coffman and Leonard begin chapterone by framing the debate over thedefinition of “Atlantic World” and thedifferent methodological approaches tounderstanding the past. The goal of thisbook is to avoid reductionism and Euro-centrism by including articles on overlookedtopics. To address relevant issues in thefield and avoid limiting explanations, theeditors chose an ecumenical approach whendeciding which articles to include, so thatthe book encompasses methodological,theoretical, thematic, and geographicdiversity. Even with the large number oftopics covered, the editors do not claim tohave produced a comprehensive guide toAtlantic history, but rather a volume thatsheds new light on topics that have beenpreviously ignored. Because there were nospecific criteria on the types of articlesincluded, however, there is little coherencyto the publication as a whole. A broadspectrum of interesting and uncommontopics is covered, but there is a lack of depthwithin each subject, unavoidable given theapproach of tackling each topic in a singlearticle. The Atlantic World is a pedagogicbook, and is most appropriate for advanced

Book Reviews 417

scholars. Longstanding debates in historyare touched upon and many chapters includejargon that may overwhelm those who arenovices in Atlantic history. This volumewould be most helpful for those who arealready interested in one of the books’topics and want an additional source. As advertised, the editors includearticles on unconventional subjects notpreviously covered. For example, SouthAfrica, Austria, and Morocco, which are notnormally included in Atlantic history, arediscussed in depth. Racism, or “colourprejudice”, during the French colonizationof Guadeloupe is explored from both theviews of both the French and the indigenouspeoples. And, while the more commonlycovered experiences of Catholics andProtestants are present, the editors alsoinclude articles on the rarely-mentionedexperiences of Jews and Muslims in theAtlantic world.

Familiar concepts are also re-exploredfrom new points of view. For example,slavery is discussed from several uniqueangles, such as the enslavement of Britonsby Barbary pirates. There are differentperspectives on the role of paper money inchanging the Atlantic world, maritimeinsurance, the effects of public taste on freetrade policies, fish and fisheries in the NewWorld, and endemic flora and fauna inNorth America. In addition, new methodsfor studying the Atlantic world are explored. For example, chapter twelve re-examinesAtlantic history by applying the knowledgeand methods used in Pacific world history. The book covers diverse and rare topics,adding new literature to the field, but thetopics covered seem to lack coherence. Thisbook is excellent for those looking forspecific articles on Barbary pirates or

fisheries in the New World for example, butis not recommended for those looking forcomprehensive coverage of life along theAtlantic coast.

Lastly, I find that reductionism andEurocentricity would have been betteravoided by ensuring more diversity withinthe contributors themselves. According tochapter one, “one can give greater weight toevents in one’s own Atlantic world thanthey merit in a broader context” (2). Yet,the majority of contributors appear to beWestern-educated, and all except for twoare affiliated with universities in the UnitedKingdom or a former British colony (e.g.United States, Australia, Canada, and SouthAfrica).

The editors’ joint efforts have yielded awealth of detail that will delight bothacademics and anyone with a scholasticinterest in the Atlantic world. Readers willbe able to enjoy the diverse approaches,methodological pluralism, and uniqueperspectives presented in this volume.

Grace TsaiThousand Oaks, California

David J. Freeman. Designs of Distinction:Unofficial Insignia of the RCN 1910-1948.Privately printed, 2015. 615 pp.,illustrations, charts, appendices,bibliography, indices. CDN $125.00, paper;ISBN 978-0-9940717-0-5. (Orders toinclude postage, via D.J. Freeman, 992Karen Crescent, Victoria, B.C., V8X 3C6,djfreemen@shaw.ca)

In 1984, Nimbus Publishing produced YogiJensen and Thomas Lynch’s small bookGun-shield Graffiti, an admirable selection

418 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

of the artwork that had appeared on aselection of RCN ships’ gunshields duringthe Second World War. Occasionally, otherunofficial badges have appeared inphotographs in various RCN histories, oftenjust in the background. In his new volume,Dave Freeman has once again produced aheavily-researched identification book thathas taken over 15 years to compile, acompanion for his earlier, very valuable,Canadian Warship Names (VanwellPublishing, 2000). This is a major leapforward from the introduction to unofficialRCN ships’ emblems in that GunshieldGraffiti. It also will serve as a supplementto the official DND publication Badges ofthe Canadian Forces (1965) and othersmaller booklets that depicted the officialbadges produced post-1948.

The list of the book’s sections alonewill indicate its scope. The notes onheraldry include the artists’ original designmodifications and Freeman’s efforts tomake the descriptions clearer for thoseunfamiliar with heraldic terms. TheWartime Designs section starts withgunshield artwork and front-of-the-bridgebadges, but expands to include blazer crests,boats’ badges, stationery, plaques, groupinsignia—whatever turned up or could befound. Next come notes on honours,unidentified designs, unsuccessful searchesfor reported badges and more. Non-shipbadges include those for NSHQ, schools,stations, WRCNS, DEMS, rugby teams, apay office—and other material generated bythe author’s appeals for submissions. Heidentifies the difference in crowns used,funnel markings used during the war forship groups, and in some cases, byindividual ships, missing badges, post-1948insignia derivations and changes. The

author concludes the 353 pages of badgeswith 9 appendices with such useful guidesas The Crow’s Nest Club in St. John’s; U-boat insignia (a descriptive table—flotillas,and a few boats with similar badges);insignia known but not found; painters anddesigners. There are three valuable indices: by people, by ships and a general index. This book is not only fascinating to leafthrough, but highly valuable for identifyingbadges.

Not all ships developed an insignia (myown Armed Yacht, HMCS Vison, forinstance!), but Freeman has not missedmany. He has even located insignia forsome of the later British-built Castle Classcorvettes, and has confirmed that he isalready accumulating an addendum forfuture use. Despite the high cost ofproducing a volume with so much colour, itwill undoubtedly produce more hiddengems as time goes on. The standard ofcolour reproduction is mostly excellent,except where Freeman had to rely on apoorer quality illustration, such as a distantphotograph, although he has manipulatedthese to the best of his considerableabilities.

The book’s value will be in identifyingcrew photographs otherwise not identified,by means of some fanciful depiction on acartoon figure, a Kisbie ring or ship’s badgein the background. Many ships, particularlythe destroyers and earlier vessels, have asm a n y a s f i v e d i f f e r e n tinsignia/badges/cartoons illustrated, oftenwildly different, ranging from gunshield artto blazer crests and other sources. HMCSCalgary has four, Iroquois has six, forexample. Freeman provides a descriptionfor each illustration, detailing source, material, a semi-heraldic description if it is

Book Reviews 419

in the form of a badge, date (if known) andoften a brief commentary as to location onthe ship, and the artist where known. Somebadges adhered closely to proper heraldicformat, while others, such as a cowboyriding stylized corvettes biting U-boats,were the subject of a painter’s or badge-maker’s imagination. Some are handsomeand evocative and were even carried over,in part, into the official post-war badges. Others are dull or simply anal, depicting thetraditional fouled anchor with a nameadded. Dawson and Wentworth, forinstance, simply carry that “normal” navalbadge within the oval of leaves with a nameunder it. All that surfaced from Freeman’sappeals for information.

The period covered ranges from HMCSNiobe and Rainbow of 1910 and other pre-First World War vessels, such as Vancouverand Thiepval, to post-Second World War;such as, the ships from Uganda (her RNbadge) to Armed Yachts in a couple ofcases; almost every early corvette; a fewMTBs and LCTs, 13 out of the 80 Fairmilescommissioned; Reserve Divisions (Hunterand Unicorn, even for one of the pre-warHalf Companies). HMCS Trentonian’sexample, a cloth blazer badge, was notproduced until 1990 for a reunioncommemorating the ship’s loss off the U.K.in February 1945—no wartime badge wasfound.

One example will give an ideas of howcomplete (and complex) a reference thiscompendium of insignia is. The 1944Castle Class corvette, Arnprior, has twobadges; one a suspected gunshield (fromYogi Jensen), and the other, a painted jacketpatch, described as:

“Within a diamond frame proper on ared field, a raised golden heraldic arm,

holding an arrow. At the bottom of the arm,the word PRIMUS in red letters on analternating blue and white striped pennant. On each side of the arm and below, threeblue maple leaves highlighted andfimbriated in gold. In the tally plate, theship’s name in black on a gold field. At thebottom of the naval crown, the ship’s title{HMCS} in black letters on a gold field.”The four designs for the next ship entry,HMCS Arrowhead, all contain variations onthe Indian chief’s headdress, on a gunshield,a sweatshirt and two jacket patches, andinclude their sources and a note on thecareer of one of the donors.

This is a fascinating collection insignia,but also, a wartime naval mini-history ofevents and memories. It will, likeFreeman’s earlier volume on ships’ names,be an essential reference for anyone tryingto source or date photos or other items withthe help of the appended notes. It is wellworth the cost to any researcher or seriousstudent of the RCN’s record.

F.M. McKeeToronto, Ontario

Norman Friedman. Fighting the Great Warat Sea. Strategy, Tactics and Technology.Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,www.nip.org, 2014, 416 pp., illustrations,maps, notes, bibliography, index. US$85.00, cloth; ISBN 978-1-59114-188-4.

The secondary title of Norman Friedman’sscholarly study succinctly expresses thebook’s themes, the Strategy, Tactics andTechnology of World War I at sea. Hedescribes the way each of the protagonistsattempted to use the sea to their advantage

420 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

and thereby, deny it to their adversariesduring a time of advanced industrial andtechnical sophistication, coupled withinventive naval warfare strategies.

The book opens with an overview of thestrategic objectives and resources of thegreatest European maritime powers at thebeginning of the war; those of Great Britain,Germany and, to a lesser degree, France. Areview of the participating fleets’ operationsand outcomes of their combat engagementsfollows. Although Friedman recountsdetails of many battles including DoggerBank, Jutland, Heligoland, and Gallipoli,his literary purpose is more an evaluationand analysis rather than a narrative of thehistorical events. The heart of the book is adetailed examination of the maritimecharacter or technological advancementwithin many classes of vessels involved inthis conflict. These include dreadnoughts(capital ships), cruisers, destroyers, crudeaircraft carriers, minelayers, mine sweepers,specialized logistical craft, submarines,submarine chasers, transports, and moreclose-in littoral vessels, such as torpedoboats. Friedman also provides an academicappraisal of weapons and weapon-systemsthat were developed and deployed alongwith their effectiveness, flaws andevolution, their protective armour, andfinally, their swiftness and agility.

Of particular note is a substantialdiscussion about vessels designed to delivertorpedoes and mine warfare; topics that arerarely covered in other texts concerned withthe First World War. As the author pointsout, torpedoes had deficient targetingsystems making it difficult to accurately plota target’s course and distance. Combinedwith the inability of most submarines to firemore than a single salvo at a target, thismade a potentially deadly weapon much less

potent. The author devotes considerableattention to variations in types of mines,their strategic placement and the safeclearing of underwater minefields. Indescribing the problems of mine removalfrom the Narrows in preparation for theDardanelle campaign Friedman noted,“Because of shore batteries, all sweepingattempts [for mines] were made at night. . ..the strong current flow in the Narrowscaused the mines to dip, bringing thembelow the trawler draught. Sweeping wiresoften could not cut mooring cables, so thatsweepers dragged mines out of the straits,where special dumping areas were set up;”details that have received scant attention inmost accounts of the historic assault onTurkey.

The author also addresses the questionof logistical support. Albeit unglamorous,supplies of munitions, spare parts, medicalsupport, food and clothing are critical to thesuccessful conduct of any militaryengagement. As the technology of complexnaval systems evolved, it became vital torecruit educated men rather than the brawnneeded during the age of sail—and provideadvanced training to the sailors. Oneobvious example is the intelligent use ofradio communications to acquire situationalawareness particularly at sea where precisenavigation was wanting.

Fighting the Great War at Sea is notjust another book about a war that has beenextensively covered. Friedman revisits theconflict armed with declassified documentsopened some seventy-five years after thewar’s end. This new material casts somelight upon what was going through theminds of the maritime hierarchies just priorto the start of the conflict.

Friedman, a renowned naval historian,expresses his opinions seen through the lens

Book Reviews 421

of his accomplished “retrospectoscope.” Henotes that both sides knew that a war in theearly part of the twentieth century wouldseriously disrupt the British economybecause Germany was a major tradingpartner and their respective monarchs werecousins. The two nations were fiscallyinterdependent, but Germany’s failure tostockpile spare parts and munitions meant itwas ill prepared for war. Thus, both sidesthought that if war were declared, it wouldlikely end quickly. “The British war aimwas the defeat of Germany, not thepreservation of France. [But in an untowardscenario] if the Germans did overrunFrance, but lost the war, they would havehad to disgorge what they had seized. Thatis just what happened in the Second WorldWar . . .” (355)

Friedman’s book is a supplement andupdate of the readily available works ofmany other scholars of the naval history ofthe First World War including themonumental multi-volume works of ArthurJacob Marder. Fighting the Great War atSea is a physically large volume. Onemight classify it as a coffee table book, butFriedman’s authoritative work should not besuperficially perused. Although its quasi-encyclopedic treatment of the subject makesit a bit less accessible than it deserves to be,it makes an important contribution to themaritime history of this conflict. The well-organized data are well documented withregard to its various sources. The book’smany illustrations augment the writtendescriptions and new information addsimportant insights about the war’sbeginnings and its conduct at sea.

Louis Arthur Norton West Simsbury, Connecticut

Howard J. Fuller. Empire, Technology andSeapower: Royal Navy crisis in the age ofPalmerston. Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge,Cass Series: Naval Policy and History, www.routledge.com, 2013. xv+297 pp.,notes, bibliography, index. US $140.00,hardback; ISBN 978-0-415-37004-2.

For a full century the perception that theRoyal Navy of the 1870s and 1880s wasinadequate to meet the demands that wouldhave been made of it in the event of warwent virtually unchallenged. This vieworiginated in the mid-1880s and gatheredsteam the following decade courtesy ofalarmist screeds by journalists such asWilliam T. Stead and Spenser Wilkinson. Itwas in turn adopted, lock, stock and barrel,by later writers such as Arthur J. Marderand Oscar Parkes, the latter of whom coinedthe resonant phrase “the dark ages of theVictorian navy” to describe the decade1874-84.

Since the 1980s, this interpretation hasbeen largely upended by the work ofAndrew Lambert, myself, Robert Mullins,Richard Dunley, and others, who haveargued that the “dark ages” school drewalmost exclusively on the views ofdisgruntled naval officers such as LordCharles Beresford, Geoffrey PhippsHornby, and John A. Fisher, whoseprofessional antipathy towards politicians’alleged parsimony should be taken forgranted and whose doom-mongering oughtto be taken with several grains of salt, ratherthan accepted at face value, as did Marder,Parkes, and others.

Once one cuts through the navalisthyperbole and assesses the mid-Victorianbattlefleet against its rivals—such as theywere—First Lord G.J. Goschen’spronouncement to the House of Commons

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in 1873 that Britain possessed twelveironclads so powerful that they had no peersin other navies appears not whistling in thedark, but the confident utterance of a manwho knew the country held a winninghand.(Hansard, 3rd Ser., vol. 215, col. 44-45) Moreover, so far from failing todevelop an alternative operational strategyto the blockade—its efficacy thrown open todoubt by the arrival of steam power—theRoyal Navy adopted coastal assault as ameans of destroying enemy forces beforethey could sally forth.

In this, his latest volume, Howard J.Fuller would have us return to the “darkages” paradigm. Indeed, he goes further,arguing that Britain’s decline as a worldpower—hitherto dated variously to the1890s, the Edwardian era, post-World WarOne, or even post-1945, depending onwhich book one consults—was in factunderway by the 1850s. Why, especiallygiven that, as Paul Kennedy stressed in TheRise and Fall of the Great Powers, the1860s marked the apogee of Britain’seconomic and industrial dominance?(Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 151) Fuller takesas evidence for his claim Lord Palmerston’sfailure to back up his bellicose utteranceswith action in the Schleswig-Holstein crisis(1864), the narrow margin of superioritythat the British settled for in the ironcladshipbuilding race with France 1858-62, andabove all Britain’s refusal to intervene in theAmerican Civil War.

Moreover, he maintains that the RoyalNavy lacked the offensive capacity as aserious threat to France, Russia, and theUnited States, and that whatever strength itpossessed was therefore defensive. Indeed,he bluntly denies the existence of whatAndrew Lambert has described as the“Cherbourg strategy” for destroying enemy

forces and arsenals with mortar- andgunboats, working in conjunction heavily-armoured and armed breastwork monitorssuch as HMS Devastation.(48) Were thatnot enough, he misses few opportunities todenigrate HMS Warrior’s battle worthiness,while lauding not only the Americanmonitor design’s fighting qualities, but itsseaworthiness as well.

In his eagerness to make his case,however, Fuller has misrepresented thearguments of his scholarly opponents to thepoint of caricature. Contra his allegations,nobody of whom I am aware has claimedthat “[n]othing could prevent British navalpower from destroying at will even the mostheavily defended fortresses in the world,” orthat “that British foreign policy—backed byan all-powerful Royal Navy—all butdictated world peace in the nineteenthcentury.”(3, 7-8) Still less defensibly, hetakes pot shots at Dr. Rebecca Matzke’s fineDeterrence Through Strength: British NavalPower and Foreign Policy Under PaxBritannica (2011) despite the fact that theperiod it surveys (the 1830s and early 40s)falls well outside the chronological scope ofhis own study. Why? A clue is found infootnote 4 on page 63, where it is stated thatDr. Matzke “gratefully acknowledges the‘particular help on the nineteenth-centuryRoyal Navy’ given her by Andrew Lambertand John Beeler.”(7, 63)

Fuller’s argument is grounded on thepresumption that Britain would haveintervened in many of the era’s numerouscrises had it possessed the means to do so,and interprets its failure to act in any ofthem, especially the American Civil War, asevidence that it could not, owing chiefly tothe Royal Navy’s weakness, not to mentionits want of a viable offensive operationalstrategy. That there might have been more

Book Reviews 423

cogent reasons for Britain’s remaining aloofthan fear of American monitors—startingwith the fundamental fact that no corenational interests were at stake—is notcountenanced.

The same is true of his treatment ofBritain’s aloofness during the Italian crisisof 1859-60 and the Schleswig-Holstein Warof 1864, which he attributes in part to “thegrowing realization that the Royal Navy wasnot quite supreme with the advent of theironclad....”(4) Missing is any considerationof the bases on which British foreign policyrested. Intervention on the continent was inthe offing only if national security wasthreatened, and if a continental ally wasforthcoming. Tellingly, when Belgianneutrality appeared to be in jeopardy in thesummer of 1870 even the unwarlikeGladstone sought guarantees from Franceand the North German Confederation andwas prepared to commit Britain to the frayshould either of the combatants occupy thecountry, by cooperating with the party didnot.

Fuller’s derisive dismissal of coastalassault rests on his claim that no “plans” forits employment have surfaced, charging atone point that “no one has published anymeasured proof of its existence” and atanother that “in the absence of any realplans which were formulated at the time...animaginary reality is substituted” for realityitself.(179, 48) Yet he repeatedly quotescontemporaries who evidently took theconcept seriously, starting with RobertSpencer Robinson, Controller of the Navy1861-71, who in 1866 pressed for theconstruction of several small vessels of “theMonitor type being intended either for coastdefences or for the attack of shipping in anenemy’s harbour.” (42, emphasis added) Nine years later, First Naval Lord

Alexander Milne deprecated using suchships for high seas service: “however greatand important the power of their guns andhow admirable [sic] they may be adaptedfor the attack of an Enemy’s fleet, forts, orharbours, yet their sphere of action islimited by the means of obtaining coal nora r e t h e y a d a p t e d f o r o c e a ncruising….”(Quoted in Beeler, Birth of theBattleship. 91, emphasis added) Numerousother examples could be adduced.

What, then, are readers to make ofFuller’s claim that no “plans” for preciselythat employment exist? Are they toconclude that Robinson and Milne (andmany others) did not mean what they wroteor said? To be sure, no bound volumeconveniently labeled “plans for theemployment of coastal assault vessels” is tobe found among the Admiralty Papers, butFuller’s own research should have madehim aware of why: war planning in thenineteenth-century Royal Navy was not acentralized undertaking. Rather, theAdmiralty devolved that function tocommanders on the spot. When hostilitiesthreatened with the U.S. over the Trentaffair in late 1861, First Lord the Duke ofSomerset informed Milne, then in commandof the North America and West IndiaStation, that “[i]n the event of war I do notsend from here any plan of operations asyou have probably better means of judgingwhat it may be advisable to do,” onlysuggesting the advisability of raising theUnion blockade of the South’sports.(Beeler, ed., The Milne Papers, vol. 2,559)

Was this ad hoc approach the mostefficient way of proceeding? Perhaps not,but there was much to be said for the viewSomerset expressed: that those on the spotwere better placed to judge what was

424 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

possible and what measures were needed toachieve British aims, especially prior toinstantaneous global communications, thanwere those at the Admiralty. Moreover, thisdevolved approach persisted long after thePalmerston era, even after the creation of aNaval Intelligence Department in 1887.

Was the Royal Navy “all-powerful” inthe 1860s, 70s, and 80s? No. It generallymaintained a modest level of superiorityover France and Russia, not becausepoliticians were unmindful of possiblethreats—although with the exception of1858-62 there were no such worthmentioning—but because they were mindfulof the taxpaying electorate that had to footthe bill. By the standards of 1900-1914 the£10-13 million expended annually on thesenior service appears paltry, but comparedto the £7-8 million per year typically spentduring the 1840s and early 50s it appearedenormous, and was regarded so by many, ifnot most, contemporaries save the usualsuspects: naval officers and their hawkishallies in Parliament and the press.

Moreover, sensible statesmen such asGladstone, Disraeli, Goschen, and otherswere mindful that Britain held virtually allthe trumps should any rival be so foolhardyas to provoke a naval arms race, inparticular unmatched financial resources,the most advanced steam engineeringindustry in the world, and a shipbuildingsector that was still producing almost 60percent of the world’s tonnage as of 1914. Early in the book Fuller paraphrases BryanRanft’s assessment of Britain’s behaviourduring the period 1889-1914: “Ranftdecided that the driving force behindBritain’s naval expansion at the turn of thecentury was a sense of vulnerability.”(22)

Unfortunately, he then fails to followthis line of thought to its logical outcome

and conclude that perhaps the reason forBritain’s comparatively modest navalexpansion from the late 1850s to 1889 wasbecause it largely lacked that sense ofvulnerability.

In justice to Fuller, a case can be madethat, in countering the “dark ages”interpretation, those he labels “revisionists”may have pushed their arguments too far. His approach, however, does not strike meas the most persuasive way to make it.

John BeelerTuscaloosa, Alabama

James Goldrick. Before Jutland. The NavalWar in Northern European Waters, August1914-February 1915. Annapolis, MD:Naval Institute Press, www.nip.org, 2015.xvi+382 pp., illustrations, maps, table,notes, bibliography, index. US $44.95, UK£36.50, paper; ISBN 978-1-59114-349-9.(E-book available.)

The outbreak of war in August 1914followed a decade of unprecedented changein warships and naval technologies. Withinthe Royal Navy it was recognized that thiswas the first major war in a century butthere were many “unknowns” about whatwas to come. In fact, the initialmobilization and deployments to warstations—initiated even before hostilitiesformally began—were well handled. Butswitching to a war fighting mode had itsodd features. On the night Britain declaredwar, the battleship Dreadnought was part ofa darkened formation heading through theStrait of Dover. Lionel Dawson had beensurprised that part of his turnover whentaking over the Middle Watch was an order,soon rescinded, that all officers on duty

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were to wear revolvers. (Captain LionelDawson, Flotillas: A Hard-Lying Story,London 1933, 152).

Before Jutland is a very competentoperational history, from a Britishperspective, of the first six months of thewar at sea in the North Sea and Baltic. It isan updated and slightly longer version of thesame author’s The King’s Ships Were atSea, also published by the Naval InstitutePress in 1984, which became generallyrecognized as an authoritative modern battlehistory. Between publishing the twoversions of this history, James Goldrick hashad a distinguished career as an officer inthe Royal Australian Navy, retiring as aRear Admiral, and as the author of severalpublications about British and Australiandefence policies and modern naval history. In his introduction, Goldrick writesengagingly that since the first edition, he“grew up”. His experiences at sea,including command of several ships andserving at more senior operational levels,have better informed his understanding ofhow the opposing forces functioned and ofthe challenges which affected theirperformance.

The author writes “... that the sixmonths described here can be called the truebeginning of modern naval warfare.”(299) Almost all of the new technologiesprofoundly influenced operations:submarines, aircraft both in reconnaissanceand attack, open sea minelaying, surfaceengagements fought at long range and highspeed in adverse weather, and radiocommunications. Then there was theexploitation of an enemy’s use of radiothrough signals intelligence. At the sametime, detection of enemy forces was stilllimited to visual ranges. Goldrick observesthat both the Battles of Doggerbank in

January 1915, described in this book, andJutland, in May 1916, started in conditionsof exceptional visibility. Inevitablenavigational errors bedevilled reports fromunits out of sight of each other. It wouldtake decades to introduce mechanizedplotting tables to record the track of amanoeuvring warship and to developtechniques to coordinate the understoodpositions of widely dispersed units. Goldrick also notes how Britishcommanders at sea failed to grasp theirresponsibilities beyond an individual ship,or formation- level as part of a fightingorganization. One result was lamentablypoor reporting of contact with the enemy. Reporting problems and a lack ofunderstanding of the importance of feedingvital information upwards surfaced early butcontinued and would have seriousconsequences at Jutland more than a yearafter the period covered in this narrative.

The book covers events inchronological order after establishing acontext in six succinct introductory chapterson the individual navies, war plans, andoperational challenges. This second editionalso includes coverage of Russian andGerman operations in the Baltic. Theauthor explains that what he describes as “afundamental source” for both editions wasthe Royal Navy’s Great War “internalhistory” the Naval Staff Monographs(Historical) which had been producedbetween 1919 and 1939. Perhaps becausethe Monographs were his jumping off point,Goldrick’s narrative focus is, as he says,“primarily on the British”. Thus, eventhough the events examined happened acentury ago, this new book—possibly thebest in this genre—joins a long list of workswhich concentrate largely on presenting theRoyal Navy side of operations.

426 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

Goldrick’s narrative is buttressed byfrequent allusions to writings and studies byothers. The bibliography of Englishlanguage references is almost intimidating. For example, it lists 68 personalmanuscripts in various British archives. This new edition reflects scholarly workover the 30 years since the first edition,including Andrew Gordon’s dissection ofthe RN’s cult of command in The Rules ofthe Game (1996) and studies such asNicholas Lambert’s Planning forArmageddon (2012) which have clarifiedthe British war plan to wage economicwarfare on Germany by imposing a distantblockade. Stephen Roskill had alreadypublished criticisms of Churchill’s actionsas First Sea Lord by 1984 and there havebeen further searching appraisals since. Goldrick writes: “The Admiralty wouldhave been a different place withoutChurchill, but the question is open as towhether it benefitted from his energy morethan it suffered from his ignorance”. (301) The difficulties the Germans had because ofinferior coal had already been written aboutin English back in 1984, but Goldrick hadpublished an article on this topic in 2014and weaves it into the story. The difficultiesboth the British and the Germansexperienced when wartime demanded moresustained steaming and at higher speeds arewell brought out.

Chapter 5, “Operational Challenges”, isparticularly rewarding. Goldrick brings hisown professional background and seaexperience to bear by outlining issues suchas environmental conditions, contemporarynavigation techniques, endurance and fuel,the gaps between prewar expectations ofnew technologies and actual performance inoperational conditions, problems in radiocommunications and the embryonic nature

of both signals intelligence and the Ad-miralty’s organization control forces at sea.

More could have been done to help thereader grasp North Sea geography and theengagements described so fluidly. The textcarries a litany of evocative place nameswhose location is not clarified: SwarteBank, Smith’s Knoll, Norderney Gat, “theGabbards” and most exotic of all “TheBroad Fourteens” (a large area to the westof the Dutch coast with fairly uniformdepths around 14 fathoms). There is a mapas frontispiece but these points are notshown, nor are they defined as in otherbooks about the North Sea encounters. Thetrack charts show times and sinkings butnothing else (the one showing U-9’s famoussinkings of three cruisers on 22 Septemberdoes indicate where Weddingen fired historpedoes). Track charts in other worksabout these actions have annotations abouthow many ships were in formation, whenthe enemy was first sighted, when theyopened fire etc.—some even very usefullyindicate areas of restricted visibility. Thephotographs are disappointing — the samestodgy small images of individual ships andmostly stodgy images of individuals as inthe first edition. Pictures showingcontemporary warships belching smoke andthe torpedo beats with their low freeboardplunging into seas would have underlinedpoints made in the text about how heavysmoke inhibited gunnery and poorperformance in heavy weather hamperedsmall warships. The index is useful becauseit cites page numbers for specific aspects ofa particular heading. There has been an oddchange, however, since the first editionbecause the new index curiously does notlist individual submarines or include thenames of commanding officers other thanMax Horton.

Book Reviews 427

Thanks to the author’s combination ofa naval operational background andmeticulous research, Before Jutland cantruly be described as an authoritative battlehistory of the opening months of the war atsea in Northern Europe in 1914-15. Thisstudy reads easily and incorporates currentscholarship about how new technologieswere influencing naval warfare and aboutBritish plans to use seapower against theGerman economy. While German andRussian intentions and operations arecovered the emphasis is on how the RoyalNavy—not only at sea but as anorganization—planned and conducted theopening phases in home waters of its firstmajor war in a century.

Jan Drent Victoria, British Columbia

David Greentree. Q-Ship versus U-Boat1914-18. Oxford: Osprey Publishing,www.ospreypublishing.com, 2014. 80 pp.,illustrations, tables, map, bibliography,index. US $18.95, UK £12.99, CDN$19.95, paper; ISBN 978-1-78200-284-0. At the outbreak of the First World War in1914, Great Britain was unprepared totackle Imperial Germany’s so-called ‘U-boats’ and its fast torpedo boats that preyedupon Allied merchant vessels in the AtlanticOcean. The Admiralty faced a steeplearning curve in supporting Britain’s wareffort in the Atlantic and, as early as May1915, Britain’s situation was being openlydescribed as desperate

After obtaining an MA in War Studiesfrom King’s College London, the authorserved in the Royal Air Force in a variety oflocations, including Afghanistan and Oman.

His fifth book for Osprey Publishing isillustrated by Peter Dennis and Ian Palmerwho contribute a wide range of fascinatingphotographs, ship’s profiles and illustrationsof weaponry to the book.

This illustrated account of the FirstWorld War at sea shows how these earlymachines of naval warfare—the British ‘Q-ship’ and German ‘U-boat’, as well as thecombatants who operated them—werepitted against each other. The authorexplains how, from the summer of 1915 on,the German Navy was sinking up to sixtyAllied merchant vessels per week. TheAdmiralty was initially at a loss as to how torespond to the threat to their main fleets inthe North Sea while French Jeune Ecolestrategists had suggested building a barrageacross the North Sea to block Germanaccess to the Atlantic. Britain promptlydismissed this notion as unworkable, despitehaving lost over 328,000 tons of shipping tosubmarines by April 1917.

Greentree describes in some detail howthe Admiralty, backed by WinstonChurchill, developed the novel solution of‘decoy vessels’. Constructed to appear tothe enemy as innocent merchant ships, theywere, in fact, fully armed with cannonsconcealed behind camouflage screens andwere crewed by Royal Navy personnel infishermen’s clothes. Allied freighters andocean-going fishing boats stalked theiradversary unrecognized and, when attacked,the crew would theatrically appear to beundisciplined landlubbers or panic-strickencivilians. They also launched lifeboats tofurther tempt the so-called wolf packs ofGerman U-boats to surface (Morris 1995),at which point the hidden guns of the Q-ships would open fire. (Massie 1991)

Greentree carefully explains much ofthe technology involved in creating

428 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

Britain’s Q-ships while analyzing Admiraltytactics during the pioneering years of anti-submarine warfare. The evidence clearlyshows that naval service at that time washighly dangerous for the participants andrequired training in the new art of marinedeception. The author has also detailed thevessels, technology and tactics of the twomain sides. He explains how, as the warprogressed, U-boats in the Atlantic becamemore wary, taking fewer risks as Germanyevolved new tactics in the battle forsuperiority to match those of the RoyalNavy.

Although parts of this story have beentold elsewhere, this new book gives afascinating account of how these ships facedoff against each other. It also details thedangers which the Q-ships faced andhighlights how the crews acquired uniquetraining in the black arts of deception. TheFirst World War saw many unexpectedmaritime innovations, such as seaplanes andcommunication at sea, which are outlinedhere. Fortunately, this book is just one partof an illustrated series which highlights notonly Q-ships and U-Boats, but the DestroyerEscorts, British Cruisers, GermanCommerce Raiders, E-Boats and MTBs.

Greentree has made good use of manyof the less conventional maritime sources inwriting this book. The result is achronology that skilfully analyses how thethreat to Allied merchant shippingdeveloped during the First World War andhow Britain effectively dealt withGermany’s novel U-boats.

Officially backed by Winston Churchillat the Admiralty and the dynamic senior SeaLord, Admiral Jacky Fisher, a new dawn ofcontesting submarine warfare was heraldedin. Yet, within two decades, the Treaty ofVersailles had disappeared in a fog of

misunderstanding, missed opportunities andevents, and the seven great navies of theworld had rebuilt their fleets. This slimbook ‘punches above its weight’ and, assuch, it deserves a prominent place on theshelves of any reader with an interest in thecentenary of the First World War and theRoyal Navy.

Michael ClarkLondon, England

John R. Grodzinski. Defender of Canada.Sir George Prevost and the War of 1812.Norman, OK: University of OklahomaPress, www.oupress.com, 2014. xxi+375pp., illustrations, maps, tables, appendices,notes, bibliography, index. US $34.95,cloth; ISBN 978-0-80614387-3.

Most historians of the War of 1812 have notbeen kind to Governor-in-Chief LieutenantGeneral Sir George Prevost, the man incommand of British North America duringthe war. Portrayed in the past as a goodcivil administrator, his military leadershiphas been viewed as timid, interfering, andoutright incompetent. A fracturedrelationship with Royal Navy commanderCommodore Sir James Lucas Yeo, plusPrevost’s own failed attack on Plattsburgh,New York, in September 1814, led toPrevost’s recall to London and the demandfor his court martial. Prevost’s death beforethe court could sit left a permanent bad odoraround his time as military leader inCanada.

John Grodzinski’s Defender of Canada:Sir George Prevost and the War of 1812 isa complete revision of the former narrativesurrounding Prevost’s military leadership inBritish North America. With strong and

Book Reviews 429

clear prose, Grodzinski elevates Prevost outof the dustbin and into the position ofinsightful leader, strategist, tactician andinnocent victim of a self-protective politicalassault by his critics. It is a persuasiveargument.

The first chapter takes us from his birthin 1767 in the New Jersey colony throughhis arrival in Nova Scotia as governor in1808. Prevost’s military credentials areestablished with his involvement in thedefense of St Vincent. Time as governor ofSt Lucia and Dominica led to hisappointment as the governor and militaryleader for Nova Scotia in 1808. With theChesapeake-Leopard Affair in 1807 souringrelationships between Britain and theUnited States, Prevost’s posting to NovaScotia’s was important.

The second chapter focuses onPrevost’s time in Nova Scotia and theexpedition to capture Martinique in 1809. His reorganization of the local militia, theraising of a regiment of fencible infantry forNova Scotia, and repairs and additionalworks for the defense of Halifax preparedthe colony for the coming war. Grodzinskidescribes Prevost’s active part in the captureof Martinique, leading his troops in pursuitof the French, and setting the British siegeguns.

Chapter Three covers his arrival inQuebec to assume the position of Governor-in-Chief through to the beginning of theWar of 1812. The problems in defendingthe colonies, with too few regular troops, asmall logistics staff, limited food supplies, ashaky militia, an incompetent provincialmarine and a supply line over 1,700 miles inlength are sketched out for the reader. TheBritish Government ordered Prevost toadopt a defensive stand. Grodzinski pointsto this directive as critical in understanding

how Prevost approached the war. Passingthis defensive strategy along, he did,however, tell Generals Brock andSherbrooke to attack the enemy ifopportunity allowed. This rather minimalinstruction is used by Grodzinski to supportlater critiques of Brock and his successors. Meanwhile, by accommodating the Frenchpopulation of Lower Canada, Prevost turnedseveral of the English ruling class in thecolony into his worst enemies.

The opening of the war is the subject ofthe next chapter. Continued disadvantagesfor Prevost play across this chapter, but itsmain target is Isaac Brock and his perceivedheroic defense of Upper Canada. Grodzinski notes that Brock’s movesagainst Fort Mackinac and Detroit weresuggested by Francis Gore, the previousGovernor-in-Chief, and that both actionswere completely in line with Prevost’s plan. Brock’s rash behaviour at the Battle ofQueenston Heights is turned into anignorant blunder and Sir Isaac is toppledfrom his mythic pedestal.

Chapters Five and Six address the warduring 1813, including various Americaninvasion efforts, although the central focusis the arrival of Sir James Yeo and theBritish Navy on the Great Lakes. Yeo wasto report to the Admiralty and AdmiralWarren in Halifax, and consult andcooperate with Prevost. Grodzinski seesthis as giving Yeo room to ignorewhomever he liked. The attack on SackettsHarbor at the end of May 1813 is the firstbreak in the relationship between Prevostand Yeo. Prevost suggested the attack, asure sign of his aggressiveness. The assaultdid not go well, but in Grodzinski’s telling,Prevost was the one who pushed the attackto its breaking point before ordering awithdrawal. Yeo is noted as wanting an

430 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

attack but abandoned his ships to fightashore. The failure of naval support and anenemy ensconced in fortified positionsdefeated the mission. The second break intheir relationship involved how to use theLake Ontario squadron. During 1813, theBritish and American squadrons met threetimes. These indecisive engagements revealYeo’s hesitation to fight AmericanCommodore Chauncey and win control ofthe lake. At the same time, Prevost hadrequested Yeo cooperate with the army bymoving troops and supplies. Theengagements interrupted such cooperation. On both counts Grodzinski scores hitsagainst Yeo and points for Prevost. At theend of Chapter Six, Grodzinski addressesthe criticism that Prevost’s failure to supportMajor General Henry Proctor atAmherstburg led to the defeats of theBritish squadron on Lake Erie in Septemberand Proctor’s at Moraviantown in October1813. Barclay’s defeat is easily turned intoYeo’s failure to send seamen to Lake Erie. Proctor’s defeat is racked up toincompetence and failing to obey Prevost’sorders.

The assault on Yeo continues inChapter Seven. Prevost’s desire for Yeo’scooperation with the army on the NiagaraPeninsula in 1814 went largely unfulfilled,causing the former great stress. Grodzinskialso claims that Prevost influenced (at leastin part) the attack against Washington. Hewrites that the destructive raids on Dover inMay 1814 and St David’s and Queenston inJuly 1814 moved Prevost to suggest asimilar raid to Cochrane (commanding theBritish Naval forces on the Station). Cochrane decided on Washington.

The central reason for the book lies inChapters Eight and Nine dealing with theSeptember 1814 Plattsburgh campaign, in

which Prevost led an army of 10,000 Britishtroops. They were sent from Europe tocapture the forts and town of Plattsburgh, onthe shore of Lake Champlain. Cooperationwith a squadron of four ships and elevengunboats that would engage the Americansquadron anchored off the town was acritical feature of the assault. The failure ofthis effort is the main military strike againstPrevost; its reassessment by Grodzinski iscritical to his argument.

Prevost is clearly in charge, but he useshis aides to communicate with the generalscommanding the troops and for logistics. Logistical problems slow the transportationof supplies with the army as it moves south. Yeo would later claim that an agreementwas made between Prevost and CaptainDowney (in command of the squadron) thata coordinated assault on the forts atPlattsburgh would occur as the Britishsquadron attacked the American ships. Thiswas to distract the cannons of the forts fromfiring on the British vessels. Grodzinskishows that the ships were too far away fromthe forts for this to be necessary. Hequestions the need for a coordinated attackand the possibility that captured Americanordnance could be used to bombard theAmerican squadron into submission, evenafter it had captured the British ships. Whatis clear is that as the British ships sailed intofight their American counterparts, there wasno corresponding attack by British landforces, with the exception of a minimalcannonade. The uncoordinated preparationsand the loss of the squadron caused Prevostto call off the attack and head for LowerCanada. Fear of a counter attack byAmerican forces in the area also played intoPrevost’s decisions. Mutterings ofdisapproval from the British officers withEuropean experience emerged as the troops

Book Reviews 431

re-entered Lower Canada. Their mainconcern was Prevost’s failure “to issue ascheme of operations” (164) before theforce left to attack Plattsburgh.

As Grodzinski points out, the Britishtroops were not an elite force and there wasan absence of siege engineers andappropriate artillery. The naval situation onLake Champlain was a desperate one, withthe new ship only partially finished, thougharmed, and with the bulk of new recruitsarriving within days of the battle. Oneconcern is Yeo’s sending Captain PeterFisher to replace Commander Daniel Pringas commander of the squadron and thenquickly replacing Fisher with CaptainRobert Downey, who only arrived 1September. Yeo is also rightfully blamedfor ignoring Pring’s requests for moresailors, as he had ignored Barclay’s.Reviewing the exchange of letters betweenDownie and Prevost, Grodzinski is clearthat Prevost did not order, nor goad Downieinto sailing before he was ready, as put forthby Yeo and other critics. When the navysailed into the bay off Plattsburgh it wastheir choice. Yet the letters indicate thatPrevost wanted action to happen soon andthat two days of delay did not please him.They also indicate some form ofcoordinated attack by the British army andnavy against the American forces, but thatcoordination did not occur. Grodzinskistates that, “Prevost may have misemployedthe division, but he had preserved it” (191).

Preparations for Prevost’s court martialon charges stemming from surviving RoyalNavy officers complaining about his urgingof Downey to engage and then failing tosupport him as promised are the focus ofChapter Ten. At the end of the war, Prevostwas recalled to explain the loss atPlattsburgh to the Admiralty. Yeo returned

home to respond to similar questions, butthese concerns disappeared as Yeo pressedto have the former Governor-in-Chief ofBritish North America tried for the defeat atPlattsburgh. As this court martial was beingprepared, with Yeo serving as a prosecutor,Sir George Prevost, already in declininghealth, died. The questions over his militaryand civil conduct in North America werenever fully investigated leaving the cloudthat, Grodzinski holds, unfairly marredPrevost’s reputation. In a final comment onPrevost’s career, Grodzinski states thatPrevost led the war effort, dealt withincredibly demanding logistical concerns forboth the army and the navy and had fewertroops than he needed for most of the war. Instead of criticism, Prevost deserves praisefor his efforts and ultimate success inpreserving the colonies.

Grodzinski’s argument is convincing,but the rendering of Prevost we are left withis that of the saviour of Canada (almostsingle-handedly). While Gore and Prevostrealized their importance, it was Brock whodecided (albeit with a bit of a waffle) toorder the attack on Fort Mackinac before theAmericans there heard about the declarationof war. It was Brock who went after theAmericans at Detroit, delivering a cripplingblow. Both of these events ensured theAboriginal tribes, including those underTecumseh stayed with the British, analliance that was never assured, even withearlier agreements. Grodzinski’s criticismof Proctor’s performance fails to note hissuccess at the Battle of Frenchtown inJanuary 1813, and underplays the pressurefrom Tecumseh to fight. The author’ssuggestion that Prevost had something to dowith the raid on Washington is a stretch. The British had been raiding ChesapeakeBay for over a year, getting more daring and

432 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

destructive. Washington was a naturalprogression in these raids, especially withthe arrival of reinforcements in earlyAugust. The overall narrative is that few,other than Prevost, succeeded, and if theydid, it was because of him, which is simplynot reflective of the historic record. Prevosthad some talented officers and steadyregulars, seamen and militia who made theirboss look good.

Black and white illustrations include aportrait of Prevost, maps of St Lucia,Martinique, Dominica, the Great Lakesregion and Prevost’s family coat of armsand grave-site. Two maps appear in thechapter on Plattsburgh. The most dynamicof the six appendices is the last, a copy ofYeo’s incomplete preparatory notes for thecourt martial (a great find, produced herefor the first time) that reveal Sir James’ planto demonstrate Prevost’s forcing Downie toengage the enemy before his squadron wasready, and then Prevost’s failure to deliverthe support he had vowed to give. Grodzinski suggests it is a bizarre “pretend”trial written up by Sir James Yeo himself. Endnotes are thorough, numerous anduseful, as is the bibliography. The index ismore then adequate and easy to work with.

As a revision to the old story of SirGeorge Prevost’s command of British NorthAmerica during the War of 1812, this bookhelps to set a bent record straight, but indoing so, makes it shine just a little toobrightly.

Thomas MalcomsonToronto, Ontario

Morten Hahn-Pedersen (ed.). Årbog forFiskeri-og Søfartsmuseet SaltvandsakvarietEsbjerg 2014. Esbjerg, Denmark: Fiskeri-

og Søfartsmuseet, www.fimus.dk, 2015.191 pp., illustrations, notes, Englishsummaries. 198, Dkk, hardback; ISBN 978-87-90982-75-1.

Reviewing yearbooks published byacademic institutions, and in particular,yearbooks from research-focused museums,are always a challenge because they serve anumber of different functions, and not all ofthese functions are directly related to atraditional academic publication. A reviewof the 2014 yearbook of the fisheries andmaritime museum in Esbjerg, however, is acomparably easy task as the volumecombines a number of scholarly articles thatwould have been easily accepted byvirtually any academic journal within thefield.

The volume combines nine articlescovering various museum research areasranging in time from Early Modern to thepresent. Mette Guldberg provides a historyof the northernmost North Sea port,Hjerting, in the Early Modern period andIda Christine Jørgensen discusses the ideasof life and the world of Danish seafarers inthe same period. Both articles are wellresearched and highlight topics oftenoverlooked, but definitely important for abetter understanding of the past. Contributions by Holger Munchaus Petersenand Benny Boysen deal with the transitionperiod from sail to steam and from timber toiron-built ships.

Søren Byskov and Knud Jakobsen focuson fisheries history and in particular, Danishplaice fisheries and Danish fisheries duringthe Second World War. Probably the mostinteresting article in this edition of theyearbook is Morten Hahn-Pedersen’sdiscussion of the development of the DanishNorth Sea tourist industry over the last 200

Book Reviews 433

years. It reads like a blueprint for not onlyDanish seaside-resorts, but also for resortson the German or Dutch North Sea coast. Readers from these areas will not onlyappreciate the detailed historical analysis,but will definitely enjoy the numerousparallels with their own childhoodmemories at the beach. With tourism one oftoday’s most important industries for coastalareas all around the globe, such an analysisseems to be especially relevant forunderstanding the changing coastal cultureof the last two centuries.

The final two articles by Carl ChristianKinze and Bie Thøstesen are dedicated tothe wider field of natural history and focuson humpback whales in the Baltic andbeached whales in Denmark; in otherwords, whales that left their traditionalhabitat. While both articles are primarilynatural history articles, they are at the sametime important contributions to maritimeenvironmental history.

Altogether the nine articles successfullydemonstrate that it is no longer enough fora maritime (and fisheries) museum to focusexclusively on traditional maritime historytopics, but that new fields like coastalculture and/or maritime environmentalhistory can contribute to the future ofinstitutions like the museum in Esbjerg andmaritime history at large. While somemight regard these fields as outside thefocus of an institution dedicated to maritimeand fisheries history, it should be stated thatthis research is critical for keeping andwidening the societal relevance of suchinstitutions and the discipline. With thepublication of their 2014 yearbook, thefisheries and maritime museum in Esbjerghas demonstrated once again that it is notonly one of the foremost Danish institutionsin the field of maritime history, but that it

provides intellectual leadership for thediscipline at large. It serves as an examplefor many other institutions regardless ofwhether they are on the North Sea or on anyother coast around the globe.

I would recommend Esbjerg’s 2014yearbook to any historian interested in thehistory of the North Sea region, whetherpursuing traditional maritime historyresearch or a broader cultural history ofcoastal regions. Although published inDanish for a primarily Danish audience(which might limit international readershipsomewhat), there are English summariesavailable for all articles. This makes thebook more accessible while ensuring theessential clarity of the original article, whichcan sometimes be lost in translation. Theyearbook’s scholarly content is a welcomeaddition to the existing literature. Moreover, the museum should becommended for its decision to continue tocommunicate its research at a time whenmany museums are drifting towards the ideaof ‘edutainment’ or focusing on exhibitionsdesigned to drag a maximum number ofvisitors into the museum regardless of theirscholarly quality or importance.

The high quality of the publication andthe large number of previously unpublishedillustrations, in combination with areasonable price, make it easy recommendthis book, even to readers with limited skillsin Danish.

Ingo HeidbrinkNorfolk, Virginia

Jon K. Hendrickson. Crisis in theMediterranean: Naval Competition andGreat Power Politics, 1904-1914.Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,

434 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

www.nip.org, 2014. 234 pp., illustrations,notes, bibliography, index. US $54.95, UK£41.50, hardback; ISBN 978-1-61251-475-8. (E-book available.)

Hendrickson has written an interesting bookabout a little-known side of the naval rivalryin the years prior to the Great War. Inevitably, focus is on the two mainprotagonists—Great Bri tain andGermany—with the navies of other powerseither completely invisible, or skipped overin passing. Consequently, Hendrickson’svolume fulfills a useful service in raising theprofile of the navies of France, Italy andAustria-Hungary. Remaining obscure is thenaval force of the Ottoman Empire.

The author’s basic theme is theexistence of a naval rivalry in theMediterranean that was every bit asimportant as that of the far better knowncontest in the North Sea. In particular,Great Britain’s weakness threw open thedomination of the ancient crucible ofRome’s Mare Nostrum to new powers aftera century of Pax Britannica. It is anintriguing story. Is it true?

It must be noted that the war’s openingdays absolutely witnessed drama ofenormous consequences. The pursuit ofSMS Goeben and SMS Breslau by ana r gu ab l y ou t gu n n ed , c e r t a i n l youtmanoeuvred, British squadron led to theOttoman’s Empire’s entry into the war onthe side of the Central Powers. In turn, thisled to the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign,and then ultimately, to the more successfulcampaigns up the Tigris and EuphratesRiver valleys and the littoral struggle up theMediterranean coast from Egypt, all leadingto the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in theautumn of 1918. No need to enter into adigression as to the malign consequences of

the Treaty of Versailles on the Middle East. Agreement as to the criticality of the regionin the Great War’s progress itself as well asfor the subsequent decades of the twentiethcentury and into today seems axiomatic anduncontroversial.

Once these opening scenes were over,however, the naval war in the Mediter-ranean fled off the front pages of thenewspapers and it became a secondarytheatre. Essentially, the Central Powerscould not effectively challenge thedominance of the Entente navies and controlof the Mediterranean was essentially, but byno means entirely, uncontested. HasHendrickson set the scene for this outcomewith his review of naval developments inthe decade before the Great War’s outbreakin 1914?

In my view, the premise of Hend-rickson’s thesis is ill-founded. Great Britaindid not abandon its Pax Britannicadominance of the Mediterranean in favourof an unsupervised struggle of minnows,and hence, risk loss of prestige and power ina critical theatre. Britain’s reduced presencewas entirely due to the arrangements madewith France and the modernization andcentralization of its fleet in home waters toconfront its main rival, Germany. Possession of bases at Gibraltar, Malta,Cyprus and Egypt would permit a rapiddeployment of naval forces to upholdBritish interests very swiftly as circum-stances dictated. The power of the Frenchfleet was assessed as more than adequate todeal with the presumed rivals Italy andAustria-Hungary. If the French neededassistance, the surfeit of naval power in theNorth Sea would certainly allow theredeployment of sufficient forces to dealwith whatever issue arose. In the event, ofcourse, the Italians never supported their

Book Reviews 435

Central Power allies and so the potentialproblem evaporated in 1915, after consid-erable tensions in 1914.

Indeed, the struggle between the‘minnows’ was intense at that level, butnever a ‘First Division’ struggle representedby the North Sea protagonists. Describingthis as a crisis seems to be overstating thematter. It was certainly important, and thedifficulties faced by authorities principallyin Paris, Rome and Vienna were significant(London seems to have been much lesstroubled). But the scale of the matter wasvery much a second-order struggle. Hendrickson relates with some relish themanoeuvrings for financing that affected theAustria-Hungary fleet, which rather makesthe case for a second-string issue. Thesleight of hand involved for the Austro-Hungarian naval authorities to secure thefunds needed to build their fleet makes foran interesting story, but it illustrates howmarginal the navy was for that government. As was the case with the other powers, thekey branch of the military wasunambiguously the army. Funds spent onthe navy were funds that were not availablefor the far more important army. Given theperformance of the Austro-Hungarian armyduring the war, it can be argued that thenavy funds might have been more profitablyspent elsewhere. (Indeed, this theme is wellknown with regard to Germany. It is nonew thesis to suggest that the resourcespoured into the Kaiser’s fleet were a geo-political disaster of the first order. HadGermany maintained a small, cruiser-basedfleet designed to maintain colonial interests,and not challenged Great Britain for navalsupremacy, we would be living in anentirely different world today.)

I don’t think Hendrickson has made thecase for his ‘crisis’, but that does not mean

the book is not worthwhile. He relates hisstory with some verve and he sheds light onan aspect of the naval rivalries prior to theGreat War that is ignored or glossed over bymost. True, this “Mediterranean” rivalry isminor in big picture terms, but it is notwithout interest. In particular, the role ofthe Italo-Turkish War over Libya (1911-1912) is well covered, and provides asignificant new interpretation on a muchignored aspect of great power rivalry in thepre-war years. Hendrickson has, therefore,provided useful insights that will round outany reader’s knowledge of both the era andthe area involved. He has also made use ofthe primary sources of the four main nationsinvolved and so has shed light on a topicthat is essentially deeply obscure. Hendrickson writes well.

The book is bare bones. There are noillustrations, or maps, or photographs of thevessels involved, or of the naval facilitiesthat were the backbone of the region’snavies. This is a pity as the familiarity ofmost readers with the subject of the bookwill be limited and hence, illustrations allthe more valued. There is also minimaldiscussion as to the material quality of thenavies so painfully built or of theiroperational performance in the war to come. Admittedly the book ends with the outbreakof war in 1914, but a short concludingchapter touching on such matters wouldhave been a useful addition to the book. Irecommend Hendrickson’s book but notethe caveats raised.

Ian YeatesRegina, Saskatchewan

David Hobbs. Warships of the Great WarYear: A History in Ship Models. Barnsley,S. Yorks: Seaforth Publishing,

436 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

www.seaforthpublishing.com, 2014. 128pp., illustrations. UK £25.00, cloth; ISBN978-1-84832-212-7.

In his introduction, Hobbs provides thereader with a brief overview of the state ofthe Royal Navy in 1914 as it entered theFirst World War, mentioning the growthand addition of thousands of new ships andvessels under its command, along with theircapabilities relating to communications,armament and machinery. He then goes onto discuss the importance scale ship modelscan play today in the study of these ships

The second chapter/section starts outwith a discussion on battleships and howstandardization of the battleship came withSir William White’s Royal Sovereign classof ship. Using pictures of a highly detailed,1/48 scale model of the Royal Sovereignclass ship Ramillies that was made for thebuilder, the reader is able to view variousconstructional details of the ship as Hobbsdescribes them in his narrative. He thendiscusses the King Edward VII and LordNelson pre-dreadnought classes of ships andtheir armaments, the Dreadnoughtrevolution and the Super-dreadnought. Thissection ends with a look at some of theunderwater threats and protection of theseships.

In Chapter/Section 3, Hobbs coversbattlecruisers, the capitol ship and itsdevelopment 1914-1918. In this section, hemakes use of various highly detailed modelsto highlight various construction details ofthe ships.

The next chapter/section discusses thecruiser, beginning with a general overviewof the cruiser and its beginnings and alsocovers scout cruisers, light cruisers andarmoured cruisers. Included is a briefdiscussion of how Britain dominated the

world market for iron-hulled warships andhow it also built ships for other nations

Next comes a chapter on the torpedo-boat destroyer, later simply shortened todestroyer. This section starts with anoverview on the early River, Tribal andBeagle (or ‘G’) class torpedo-boatdestroyers. The Acorn (‘H’) and Acheron(‘I’) class ships based on Admiralty designsare then looked at. Next is a discussion onstandardization and refinement of featuresof the destroyer covering the ‘M’ through‘U’ classes. The Royal Navy’s ultimateFirst World War destroyer classes, the ‘V &W’, are covered and the section ends withsome examples of comparable Germantorpedo boats.

Chapter/Section 6 is dedicated tosubmarines, while Chapter/Section 7 isdedicated to a variety of other types ofwarships used, including aircraft-carryingships, anti-submarine escorts and coastalmotor boats to name a few. This chapterprovides the reader with some fineexamples (models) that show the diversityof the ships used by the Royal Navy duringthe First Great War. The last chaptercompletes the book with some examples ofmerchant ships armed for war.

With almost all of the ships of this eranow gone, this book will be of interest to awide audience of warship enthusiasts fromscale model ship builders to researchers. Hobbs’ narrative carries the reader througha logical progression of ship development,using highly detailed models to illustratesome of the construction details, in somecases, the configuration of the same ship atdifferent times. I highly recommend thisbook to any warship enthusiasts.

Winston E. ScovilleClinton, Ontario

Book Reviews 437

Harald Hückstädt, Erik Larsen, ReinhardSchmelzkopf, Hans-Günther Wentzel. VonRostock nach See. Die Geschichte derRostocker Dampfschifffahrt, 1850 bis 1945.(Schriften des Deutschen Schiffahrts-museums, Vol. 74) Bremerhaven:Deutsches Schiffahrtsmuseum andOceanum Verlag, www.dsm.museum, 2011.247 pp., illustrations, maps, bibliography,notes, index German with English andFrench summaries. Euro € 34,90, hardcover; ISBN 978-3-86927-074-6.

With the downfall of the mighty SovietUnion and its stranglehold over EasternEurope, scholars from all walks of academiahave gained access to a myriad of archivalrepositories in which to conduct theirrespective research. German maritimehistorians have often focused on the wellestablished, world-wide trading port citiesof Hamburg and Bremen, as well as smallerGerman cities, such as Lübeck and Kiel,because of their reputations as centrallylocated "gateways" between east and west. Historians Hückstädt, Larsen, Schmelzkopf,and Wentzel shifted their focus from suchinternationally rich harbours to the oldMecklenburgian city of Rostock, located inthe former East German DemocraticRepublic. In Von Rostock nach See: DieGeschichte der Rostocker Dampfschifffahrt,1850 bis 1945 (From Rostock to the Sea:The History of Rostock Steam Shipping,1850 to 1945), the authors chronicle thehistory of steam-powered shipping—theships and ship owners, their development,and daily operation—in a port city that has,for years, stubbornly depended upon theperpetual employment of sailing ships andtheir manpower.

At the beginning of Von Rostock nachSee, the authors supply a history behind the

city’s established practices of maritimetransport and trade, transitioning to theirfocus on the use of steam-powered shipswithin the region. In nineteenth-centuryGermany, Rostock was the third largestharbour city, next to Bremen and Hamburg,the maritime giant. As the authors note,Rostock maintained a stubborn bravadowhen it came to modernizing towards steampower. One of the early practices amongR o s t o c k m e r c h a n t s w a s t h e"Partenreederei", the concept of shippingentrepreneurs seeking financial backingfrom other participants—be they captains,ship builders, agents, or brokers—topromote their enterprise. Each partnerbought a share into the ship hoping theproductivity of its respective trade routewould pay off; yet by the mid-nineteenthcentury, the lack of capital generatedrendered this practice futile, whichultimately left shippers in the same positionof maintaining their already-establishedfleet.

By 1866, Rostock coal and sugar traderMartin Petersen commissioned a shipyard inInverkeithing, Scotland to build the WilhelmTell, a small steamer of 225 BRT(Bruttoregistertonne or gross registeredtonnage). He ran the steamer until 1881,navigating its usual trade route from St.Petersburg to the United Kingdom carryingsugar and wood out and bringing backBritish coal to Mecklenburg. With the warsof German unification, first between Prussiaand Denmark and then with Austria, theadvancement of steam-powered shippinghalted slightly until 1869, when shippingentrepreneur N. H. Witte assumedownership of the Concurrent from the localRostock shipyard. During the latter half ofthe nineteenth century, shippers such asPetersen built his fleet up to five steam-

438 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

powered ships, setting the precedent forfuture shipping tycoons such as AugustCords, the Fischer family, Erik Larsen, andOtto Zelck to amass steam-powered fleets atextraordinary strength. Lesser ship owners,such as Witte, partnered with tradesmen likeengineer Carl Abendroth, to establish theRostocker Actien-Gesellschaft für Schiffs-und Maschinenbau—the RostockCorporation for Ship and EngineBuilding—which ultimately becameGermany's famous shipyard, Neptunwerft,located in Rostock.

Just before the onset of the First WorldWar, rail lines were established betweenBerlin and Neusterlitz by the Deutsch-Nordischer Lloyd that stretched all the wayto Rostock's seaside area of Warnemünde. This linked Berlin directly to areas in thenorth and outside of Germany, as well asestablishing Rostock as a ferry port. In1914, the First World War erupted, as theauthors say, "with no warning system." Rostock merchants were hit hard as theytried to maintain their everyday business ofsending ships to all parts of Europe; 18 ofthe 54 total ships in Rostock were lost toenemy harbours, either seized by Alliedpowers, or else attacked and sunk. Towardswar's end, the German government providedsome assistance through the "Gesetz überdie Wiederherstellung der deutschenHandelsflotte", allowing some companies,such as F. W. Fischer, to recover eightsteam-powered ships. Allied powers alsooffered to sell confiscated ships back at alower price, through which about six shipswere resold to Germany. During theinterwar rebuilding period, shipping nameslike Cords and Zelck flourished, whileothers, such as Fischer, were either boughtup or simply went out of business, sellingoff any remaining ships. Life in National

Socialist Germany, according to the authors,seemed surprisingly less stressful than thelosses suffered in the First World War, savefor the typical bureaucratic red tape, whereby 1941, all ships essentially took ordersfrom the Reichskommissar für dieSeeschiffahrt (ReiKoSee). With the war'send in sight, the Baltic became a death trapas Soviet submarines and Allied bomberspreyed on Rostock ships. In the end, thecity was in ruins as Rostock's businessmenfled in fear of the onslaught of Sovietoccupation.

Von Rostock nach See provides a well-researched chronicle of steam-poweredshipping as well as a user-friendly registryof all the Rostock shippers and theirrespective ships, a list which encompassesnearly half the book. Unfortunately, theauthors occasionally fail to provide enoughdetails; for example, a chapter devoted toshipyards like the Neptunwerft, or moreinformation behind the day-to-dayoperations these ships experienced inEuropean waters would have been helpful.Nevertheless, enthusiasts and scholars ofmaritime history in Germany will find VonRostock nach See an insightful addition. Christopher PearcyVirginia Beach, Virginia

Richard Johnstone-Bryden. HMS BelfastCruiser 1939. Barnsley, S. Yorks.: SeaforthPublishing, www.seaforthpublishing.com,2013. (Published and distributed in the USand Canada by Naval Institute Press,http://www.nip.org"www.nip.org). 129 pp.,illustrations, bibliography. US $29.95,paper; ISBN 978-1-59114-385-7.

HMS Belfast Cruiser 1939 was written as

Book Reviews 439

both a visual and historic guide, and is partof a series that focuses on specific historicvessels. The book brings to life the story ofHMS Belfast, a ship which played a vitalpart in the Royal Navy from the early- tomid-twentieth century. The author set outto present a colourful and interestingnarrative, supported by numerous imagesand drawings, on the history of this class ofwarship. But this was not his only aim. From a broader perspective, he describesand illustrates the Belfast’s rescue from ascrapyard in the early 1970s, itspreservation and conservation, and itscontinuing service to the public andmaritime community as a floating museum.

Cruiser development, in general, startedin the late-eighteenth century whenindividual warships would undertakeindependent operations well away fromtheir home fleets and go “cruising” forpirates, privateers, enemy ships, andintelligence gathering. The word “cruiser”did not yet designate a specific type ofvessel; instead, it described a method ofnaval warfare. The definition of cruiserchanged, however, with the advent of steampropulsion and iron hull amour in the mid-nineteenth century. By the end of thatcentury, the term “cruiser” signified aspecific type of medium-sized, well-armed,long-range warship capable of undertakingthe traditional cruising role. After themaritime arms race, the dreadnought era,the First World War and the naval-limitation treaties of the 1920s and 1930s,governments developed various types ofcruisers. Many of them were characterizedby unique combinations since, dependingupon the needs of the country that orderedthem, the developers could customize thefollowing: tonnage, speed, amour, and guncalibre. Great Britain, because of its

scattered colonies and potential maritimeenemies, such as Japan, became extremelyinterested in d enveloping various classes ofcruisers. The initial result of thisdevelopment was a line of English cruisers,the Southampton-class cruiser, whichincluded HMS Belfast, commissioned inAugust of 1939, just one month before theoutbreak of the Second World War

Directly after her timely commissionand acceptance into the Royal Navy, HMSBelfast proved to be an excellent ship,crewed by first-rate officers and men. Whatfoll