Boehner-Ockham's Political Ideas

8/10/2019 Boehner-Ockham's Political Ideas

1/27

Ockham's Political IdeasAuthor(s): Philotheus BoehnerSource: The Review of Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Oct., 1943), pp. 462-487Published by: Cambridge University Pressfor the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf ofReview of PoliticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1404000.

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2/27

Ockham's

Political

Ideas

*

By

Philotheus

oehner,

O.F.M.

W

ILLIAM

OCKHAM,

the

Venerabilis

nceptor

nd

theDoctor

plus quam

subtilis,

tartedhis

academic

career

simply

as

a

theologian

nd

philosopher

who

did

not

have,

or at

least

did

not

evince,

he

slightest

nterestn

political uestions. y

1324

or

at

least

by 1327,he had composed ll his purely heological r philosophical

works

f

whichwe

have

any knowledge.'

In

all

these

writings

here s

no

trace

of

any

political

dea

worth

mentioning.

Even

the

struggle

about

the

Franciscan

deal

of

poverty

ad

left

no

impression

n

the

lineswritten

y

Ockham

prior

o

1327.

While

he was in

England

he

was either oo remote

rom

he theatre

f war

or

(and

this seems

to

be

more

ikely)

he

was too much

engrossed

n

the

construction

f

his

conceptualisticystem f philosophynd theology. In any case, we

know

rom isown

words

hat

he

did

not

take

part

n

the

truggle

bout

poverty--not

ven to the extent f

reading

he

pertinent

ocuments-

before

r

during

his

enforced

tay

at

Avignon

until

the

beginning

f

1328.

After

1328, however,

ckham

did

enter nto

the

field

f

polemical

and

politicalwriting,

nd

so

radical

was

this

change

that

henceforth

hewas

solely

polemical

nd

political

heologian.

So

completely

ere

his

energies

bsorbed

n

thisnew

task that

he

no

longer

ound

ime o

complete

ome

of his

more

philosophical

nd

theological

works.

This

sudden

change

n his

lifeoccurred

when,

t the

request

f

his

superior,

r.

Michael de

Cesena,

the

General

of the Franciscan

rder,

*

The

author

wishes

to

express

his indebtedness

to Fr. Sebastian

Day,

O.F.M.

for

his

assistance

in

preparing

the

manuscript

for

publication.

1

These are:

Reportatio

(quaestiones

in

2m-3m

librum

Sententiarum),

Ordinatio

(quaestiones

in Ini

I.

Sententiarum),

the

Commentaries

on

Porphyry's

Isagoge,

Aristotle's

Categories, Perihermenias,

De

Sophisticis

Elenchis

and on the

Physics,

Summulae

in

libros

Physicorum

and Summa

Logicae;

Ockham

had

composed

most

probably

at

this

time

Quodlibeta

VII,

Quaestiones

in libros

Physicorum,

his

two treatises on the

Holy

Eucharist

and

some

Quaestiones

disputatae.

Of these

works Exposito

in libros

Physi-

corum,Summulae

in

libros

Physicorum

and

Reportatio

are unfinished.Ockham

did

not

fulfill

his

promise

to write

on Aristotle's

Metaphysics

and other

works.

462

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3/27

OCKHAM'S POLITICAL

IDEAS

463

he

studied the

bitterly

ebated

problem

f the Franciscan deal

of

poverty.

Because of

this

question

Michael

was

held

under arrest t

thepapal court n AvignonfromDecember, 327 and Ockham,who

had

been

held at the same

court ince

1324

because

of an

impending

trial

oncerning

uspicious

octrines

n

theology,

ead

and studied

hen

for

the

first

ime

he

decretals

f

Pope

John

XXII. He soon became

convinced

hat there

were

contradictions

etween

hese

decretals nd

thoseof

former

opes,

especially

hoseof

Popes

Nicholas

III;

and

he

found

n

these contradictions

n excuse

to renounce bedience

o a

Pope whomhe considered eretical.2With hissuperiornd two other

friars,

ckham

escaped

from

Avignon

on

May

26,

1328.

He

took

refuge

with

he

Pope's enemy,

ouis

the Bavarian. This

event

marks

the

beginning

f

Ockham's

bitter

nd

relentless

ight

gainst

Pope

John

XXII and

his successors

nd,

at

the same

time,

marks

he

begin-

ning

of

his

career

s a

polemical

nd

political

writer.

At

first, owever,

he

purely

political questionsconcerning

he

relation etween he secularand ecclesiastical

ower

did not

occupy

Ockham's

nterest.

During

the

years

328-1335

is

pen

was,

s

it

seems,

mainly

evoted

o the

interests

f

his Order

in matters

f Franciscan

poverty.

In

this,

of

course,

he

gave

at

least

indirect

upport

o the

German

Emperor,

ouis

the

Bavarian,who,

for

his

own

cause

and

because

of his own

purely

olitical

truggle

gainst

he

Pope, exploited

the

opposition

f the

friars

gainst

he

Supreme

Pontiff.

However,

t

was

only

naturalthatOckham,

fighting

or the cause of Franciscan

poverty,

hould

favour

he

side

of the German

Emperor

gainst

the

common

nemy.

Nevertheless,

here

eems

o be a

deeper

reason

why

Ockham

finally ave

direct

upport

o the

Emperor's

ause. Louis

the

2

Noveritis

itaque

et

cuncti

noverint

Christiani, quod

fere

quatuor

annis

integris

n

Avinione

mansi,

antequam

cognoscerem

praesidentem

ibidem

pravitatem

haereticam

incurrisse,

quia

nolens

leviter

credere,

quod

persona

in tanto officio

constituta

haereses

definiretesse

tenendas,

constitutiones

haereticales

ipsius

nec

legere

nec habere

curavi.

Post

modum

vero,

ex occasione data,

superiore

mandante, tres constitutiones eu potius

destitutiones

haereticales....

legi

et

studui

diligenter

...

L.

Baudry,

La

Lettre

de

Cuillaume

d'Occam

au

Chapitre

d'Assise,

in

Revue

d'Histoire

Franciscaine

III

(1926)

p.

207.

Cf.

also

pp.

207

and 213

where

Ockham

states

that this

was

the reason

for

his

escape

from

Avignon.

It

does

not

seem

likely

that

Ockham

escaped

for

fear of

an

imminent ondemnation

in

his

trial;

for

this

assumption

meets

with

the

objection

that

Ockham

was

never

condemned

by

the

Pope

because

of

"suspicious

doctrines"

which

were

examined

by

the

Pope's

commission,

hough

t would

have

been

an effective

weapon

in

the

hands

of the

Pope.



4/27

464

THE REVIEW

OF

POLITICS

Bavarian

fought

or the

independence

f

secular

power

and

of the

Roman

Empire

n

particular)

gainst any

interference

by

the

Pope.3

He had been electedby a majority f Germanprinces; minority,

however,

isputed

heelection. In sucha

case,

the

Pope

(JohnXXII)

claimed

he

right

o

decidewho was to be the awful

Roman

Emperor.

The

struggle,

herefore,

f

the FranciscanOrder and

the

struggle

f

the

Emperor

gainst

the

Pope

was

one

struggle

or

nviolable

ights,

as Ockham

aw them.

The

Franciscans

fought

or

right uaranteed

by

Holy Scripture

nd

by

declarations

f

previousPopes,4

and the

Emperorfoughtfor a rightguaranteed y divineand natural aw.

Hence,

to

Ockham's

way

of

thinking,

oth cases

were

but one as to

theirfundamental

ssue;

for

both were

one in their

opposition

o an

unjust

laim

of

the

supreme

cclesiastical

ower,

which

was

prejudicial

to lawful

rights.

Thus,

the essential

problem

f the

entire

truggle

became

the

question

f the limits f

papal

authority,

nd

from bout

1335

Ockham focused

his main

interest n

this

problem.

This

is

evident rom ven very ursoryeading fhispoliticalwritings.hese

begin,

roughly

peaking,

with his monumental nd

unfinished

ork,

the

Dialogus,

on

which

Ockham

probably

orked

rom 334.

A

correct

nterpretation,

herefore,

f

these

so-called

political

writings,

here

the

problem

of

evangelical

nd

Franciscan

poverty

plays

only

subordinate

ole,

must

never ose

sight

f this

entral

dea.

The crucialproblem

was

not

simply

hat of the relation

between

Church

nd

State

or between

he

Pope

and

the

Emperor;

t

was

rather

this

ame

problem

ut with definite

ualification.

Ockham's

problem

was

the actual

extent

f the

Pope's

power;

still more

correctly

nd

precisely,

t was

the

actual

limits f

the

papal

power.

This was

the

problem

hich

nspired

ckham

o write

ll his

political

works,

nd

even

the

problem

f the

right

nd

extent

f

secular

power

nd

jurisdiction

3 It should be noted that wherever Ockham refers to the "Roman empire," he

understands

by

this

term

the

Ancient

Roman

empire

and

its

continuation,

the

so-called

"Holy

Roman

Empire."

4

Ockham

with

the friars-and

not

only

with the so-called

Spirituals--was

con-

vinced

that the

ideal

of Franciscan

poverty,

expressed

in the Franciscan

rule,

confirmed

by

the

Bull

of Honorius

III and

the decretal

of

Nicholas

III,

was revealed

by

the

life

of

Christ.

There

can be

no doubt

that

Pope

Nicholas

III believed

it,

too,

although

in

a

strict

heological

sense,

he had

not defined

t

ex

cathedra.

Since

Pope John

XXII

denied

it,

there

existed

for Ockham

a contradiction between

two definitions

f

Popes.



5/27

OCKHAM'S

POLITICAL DEAS

465

was

subordinated

o it.

For,

ontrary

o some

cholars,

ckham id

not

write

or

hebenefitf

the

Emperor,

r,

t

least,

hat

was

not

his

main oncern. hescholarso whom e refer ave ttachedoomuch

significance

o the much

uoted

words

which

werenever

poken y

Ockham t all:

"O

Emperor,

efend

me

with

he

word nd

I

shall

defend

ou

by

the

word".

Ockhamwas nota courtier hohad

sold

himself

o

a secular

rince

nd

who

now

arned

is

ife

nd

protection

by

such

ervility.

n

denying

he bsolute ulness

f the

papalpower

he

denied

he

bsolute

ulness

f the

Emperor'sower

s

well;

nd

he

alwaysmaintainedhe utonomyndhigherignityfthePope. For

Ockham

was

a

theologian

ho,

or

he

benefit

f

theChurch

nd

for

the

ove

of

peace

between hurch

nd

State,

ried

o definehe

proper

authority

f

the

Church nd ts

urisdiction

ide

by

sidewith hose

f

the

tate.

Though

xcommunicated

y

he

ope

and

expelled

rom

he

Order,

e did

not

renounce

heChurch r hisOrder. Neither id

he

deny

he

upremacy

f the

Pope

or

any

defined

ogma

f the

Church

-exceptthose efinedyPopeJohn XII andhissuccessor,ecause

he

thought

hem eretical.

Cf.

note 9 forOckham'sttitude

owards

the

nfallibility

f

the

Pope.)

It

is

apparent,

herefore,

hat he

only

ogical

nd

psychological

starting-point,

ven f a

short utline f

Ockham's

olitical

deas,

re

Ockham's otions

oncerning

he imits

f the

papal

power.

Conse-

quently,obaseOckham'soliticaldeas n,ortodevelophem rom,

his

so-called

Metaphysics,

s has

been

done

by

Al.

Dempf,5

ppears

to us more

s

an

adventure

nd

certainly

s

a

construction

f

the

writer.

We

do

not

deny

hat here re

nner

onnections.

hese

connections,

however,

an

be

seen

only

f the

philosophical

nd

theological

ystem

of

Ockham

s

correctly

nterpreted.

eldom

asthis

een

one

hitherto,

and

certainly

ot

by

Al.

Dempf,

ho

resents

rather

ague

nd

partly

veryncorrectnterpretation

fOckham's

etaphysics.ne should e

on his

guard

gainst

ll

suchconstructionsf

Hegelian

oinage

e-

cause

venBartholomaeus

e

Lucca,

he

onfessorf St.

Thomas nd

probable

ontinuator

f

his De

regimine rincipum,

nd

likewise

Aegidius

omanus,

nother

isciple

f

St. Thomas

nd

eading

homist

5

Cf.

Al.

Dempf,

acrum

mperium.

Miinchen

nd Berlin

1929),

esp. pp.

504-510.



6/27

466

THE

REVIEW

OF

POLITICS

of the 13th

entury,

rrivedt

a

very

nsound

olitical

heory

f an

unrestricted

bsolutism

f

the

Pope,

n

spite

f

their

homistic

eta-

physicalrinciples.ckham'soliticaldeas ntheirreatutlinesould

havebeen

developed,

o

far

s we

can

see,

from

ny

of

the

classical

metaphysics

f the 13th

entury;

or,

s

willbe

shown,

hey

oincide

with

sound

Catholic

olitical

heory.

Our

starting-point,

herefore,

illbe

Ockham's

tarting-point:

is

very ersonal roblem

f

the

imits

f the

Pope's

power.

His

dis-

obedience

o

the

Pope

cannot e

justified;t is,however,nderstand-

able

f

we take nto ccount

he onfusion

hich

revailed

t his

time

concerning

he

ctual

ower

f

the

Pope.

Ockham

uffered

rom his

confusion

o

which

he

riendsf

the

Pope

contributed

t least s

much

as

the

nemies

f

the

Pope.

Ockham,herefore,

aw

his

ask,

irstnd

above

ll,

s the

efinitionnd

determinationf

the

ight

nd

authority

of

the

uccessors

f

Peter.

In

natural

onsequence

f

and

in

depend-

ence

on this irst

ask,

e

had

to

deal

with

ecular

ower

nd also

its

rights

nd

limits.6

In

order

o find

ut

Ockham's

ersonal

iews,

ne must tart

with

works

n which he

Venerdbilis

nceptor xpresses

is

own

opinions

because

his

main

work,

he

Dialogus

composed

etween

334

and

1339)

and also the

Octo

quaestiones

e

potestate apae (probably

written

etween

340 nd

1342)

were oth

written

n the

tyle

f

mere

discussionsf theproblem ithoutevealinghepersonalpinion f

the author.

His

own

opinions

re

expressed

n less-knownorks

f

which

we

shall

use

the

Breviloquium

e

Potestate

apae

(composed

about

1340),

An

Princeps

composed

etween

338-1339),

nd

the

Consultatio

e

causa

matrimoniali

composed

bout

1341).

After

6

That the

imits

f the

papal

power

were Ockham's

chief

concern

inds

remark-

able

expression

n

Breviloquium

e

potestate

apae:

Porro,

i secundum

stos

tenendum

est, uod papa nonhabetpraedictamlenitudinemotestatis Christo, icatur rgoquam

potestatem

abet

Christo

t

quam

non

habet,

uod

tamen nullo

mpliantium

otestatem

papae

adhuc

est dictum.

t utinam

liquis

orum

oc

expressis

erbis icere

non

formidet

Ex

hoc

enim

xcogitata

or

exagitata?

Cf.

Consultatio

e

causa

matrimoniali,

d.

infra

cit.

p.

282,

lin.

18)

veritas

larius

lucescet.

ib.

1,

c.

13;

ed.

infra

it.

p.

42 f.

We

gladly

acknowledge

hat

N.

Abbagnano,

Cuglielmo

i

Ockham,

Lanziano

n.d.), p.

309

if

and

S.

Tornay,

Ockham,

tudies

and

Selections,

La

Salle,

Ill.

1938)

p.

79f

sub-

stantially

ome

to the

same

conclusion.

As to the

latter,

however,

is introduction

o

"Ockham's

political

philosophy,"

.

77,

contains

many

errors

oncerning iographical

data.



7/27

OCKHAM'S POLITICAL

DEAS

467

Ockham's

pinion

as

been

ufficiently

scertained

n thebasis

f

these

three

orks,

ne

may

e

permitted

o

dentify

is

opinions

s

expressed

in the ther ritings. s to theOctoquaestiones,generallyalid ule

would

eem

o

be

this:

That

opinion

which,

n

comparison

ith

he

others,

s

disproportionately

ore

developed

nd

provedrepresents

Ockham'swn

pinion.7

1.

The Nature

nd

Actual

Extent

f

Papal

Power.

In

order

o

give

faithfulistorical

ccount

f

Ockham's

olitical

ideas,

we

must ot

only

ee

the

problem

obe solved

s Ockham

aw

it,

but

we

must

lso

see with

ckham's

yes

he

historical

actswhich

stimulated

is

nquiry

nto

he

imits

f

papal power.

In

Pope

John

XXII's

claimof

the

right

o

interfere

n matters

ertaining

o

the

empire,

he

Venerabilis

nceptorertainly

aw

a

usurpation

funlawful

rights.

he

very

itle f

one

of Ockham's

main

works,

hich

xpresses

his own

personalpinions,

s

really ignificant

nd

speaks

or

tself:

Breviloquium

n the

tyrannical

ower

ver

hings

ivine nd

human,

especially,

owever,

ver

the

empire

nd

over

the

subjects

f

the

empire,

surped

y

certain

eople

alled

highest

ontiffs.8

ckham

was

convinced

f thehistoricalact

f

a

tyrannical

ower

surped y

certain

opes.

We,

however,

hall

dismiss

ere

he

quaestio

acti

s irrelevant

o

ourpurpose,ndshall implyakeOckham's

ontention

s our

tarting-

point.

Then,

we

must sk:

What s

meant

yusurped

nd

tyrannical

power

of

the

Pope?

Ockham

defined

his

in each one

of

his

political

ritings,

nd

never ired

f

coming

ack

o

it and

refuting

t

vehemently.

What

he

called

usurped

nd

tyrannical

ower

was

in

reality

n

absolutistic

nd

universal

upremacy

f

the

Pope

which,

n

its

fantastic

xaggerations,

ad

been

developed

by

the

so-called

7 We usedthefollowingditions:Dialogus (Lyons 1494); Breviloquium e poles-

tare

Papae,

ed.

L.

Baudry

(Etudes

de

Philosophie

M&dievale,

dir. Et. Gilson,

t.

24),

(Paris,

Vrin,

1937);

Octo

quaestiones

e

polestate

apae (ed.

J.

G.

Sikes),

An

Prin-

ceps

pro

suo

succursu,

cilicef

guerrae,possit

recipere

bona

ecclesiarum,

fiam

invito

Papa

(ed.

H.

S.

Offler

nd

R.

H.

Snape),

Consultatio

e causa

mairimoniali

ed.

H.

S.

Offler)

n

Guillelmi

de

Ockham

Opera

Politica accuravit

J.

G. Sikes

etc. Vol.

I

(Manchester

1940).

8

Baudry

has

changed

his

hallenging

itle

nto

the

very

nnocent

ne:

Breviloquium

de

potesiale

Papae,

for

typographical

easons.



8/27

468

THE

REVIEWOF POLITICS

Curialists,

uch s

Bartholomaeus

or Tolomaeus)

e

Lucca,

Aegidius

Romanus,

ugustinus

riumphus,

nd

others.9

This

development,

moreover,adnotcome boutwithoutt least heeffectivenfluence

of

Popes

nnocent

V

and

Boniface

III. Ockhams

well ware

hat

there ere

ifferences

nd nuances

n

their

ositions.

n

any

ase,

he

opinion

xisted

hat he

Pope

had full

that

s,

absolute)

ower

ver

all

things,

piritual

nd

temporal,

r

over

heChurch nd

the

State.

That

this

power

was

absolutemeant

hat

t was not

imited

y

any

human

aw

or

institution

r

treaty,

r

by

a

human

romise,

ow

or

oath. The only estrictionfthepowerf thePopewas mposedy

the

divine

aw

and

the

mmutablend

indispensable

aturalaw. In

other

words,

hings

which

were

directly

orbidden

y

God and

the

natural

aw

to

all human

eings

without

xception,

ecause

hey

re

illicit

n

themselves,

ouldnotbe

commanded

y

the

Pope,

but

outside

of this

ingle

estriction,

ll

human

eings

were

ubjects

f the

Pope

and he

may

ommand

hem

o

do

whatever

e

wills.

If he

commanded

withinhe imits f theaforesaidestriction,isorderswerebinding

in

conscience,

ven

hough

he

Pope

n so

commanding

hould

ommit

a sin.

0

Ockham

onsidered

uch

an idea

of

the

Pope's

absolute

ower

regarding

emporal

nd even

piritual

hings

s

false,

angerous

or

society,

nd

heretical.

n

thename

f

the

iberty

f

the

Holy

Gospel

heprotestedgainstuch usurpationfabsoluteower.Forhim he

new

aw

of

the

Holy

Gospel

s

a

lawof

freemen n

Christ,

nd

by

ts

very

ature

t

does

not

dmit

f

any

ervitude hich

ven

quals,

et

alone

surpasses,

he

yoke

mposed pon

the

Jews

y

the

Old Law.

It

is a

flagrant

ontradiction

f

the

Holy Gospel

to make

ll men

slaves

servi)

of

the

Popes

and

thus

reate

most

horrid tate

of

bondage.

Besides his

heologicaleasoning,

t

is

easy

o

imagine

ll

thedangerousonsequenceshich ould ollowfsuch powerwere

placed

n the

hands

f one

human

eing.

For

such

man

ould

urn

the

whole

f

society

pside

own;

he

could

take

way ustly-owned

9

For

introductory

nformationn this

regard

f. Al.

Dempf,

op.

cit.

p.

441-468.

0o

An

princeps,

.

I.;

p.

232. Cf.

Breviloquium,

ib.

2,

c.

I;

p.

17

and c.

13;

p.

42;

Octo

quaestiones,.

I,

c.

2;

p.

15;

Dialogus,

pars

III,

lib.

1,

c.

I tfs;

fol.

81va;

Consultatio,

.

284

f.



9/27

OCKHAM'S

POLITICAL

IDEAS

469

property

rom

everyone

nd

could

give

it

to

his

favorites;

e

could

depose

kings

nd

prelates

t

will

and could

appoint

riminalss

rulers,

without iolating nyright."

But in

advocating

he

divine

ight

f

the

liberty

f

the

Holy

Gospel,

Ockham

by

no

means makes

a

plea

for ibertinism.

He

cautionshis

readers hat

"liberty

f

the

Holy

Gospel"

can be

understood

n a

correct

nd

in a

false sense.

It

is

correctly

nderstood

f it

is taken

as the

denial

of an

absolute

ower

f the

Pope;

but

it

is

falsely

nder-

stood

f t

is taken

s the

denial

of

any

power

f the

Pope

whatsoever.

Consequently,

t must be rather

negatively

nderstood,

n the sense

that

the

evangelical

aw

does

not

admit

grave

yoke

or that

anybody

is

made

by

it

the

slave

of another.12 This

presupposes

hat

the

Pope

has

a

supreme

power,

although

Ockham

is

usually

not

too

much

concerned

with

he

actual content f the

supreme

cclesiastical

ower.

Yet,

since

to

limit

something

mplies

hat here s

something

hich an

be

limited,

he actual

content f the

Pope's power

s more

or

less

clearly

eeninOckham's riticismfthe

exaggerated

laims.

At

least

once he

expressed

is own

opinion

f the

actualextent

f

papal

authority,

n

his

treatise n

princeps.

owever,

ince he

ssential

elements

f

his

explanations

re

more

systematically

rranged

n

the

Dialogus,

we shall

follow

his

determinations

n the

latter

work,

with

references

o

the

former.

Ockham's

discussions

f

the

power

of

the

Pope

in

the

Dialogus,

are

likewise

overned y

the dea of a

limitation

of the

supreme

cclesiastical

power

to its

just

limits.

After

having

stated

that

the

Pope's

power

is not

absolute

(plenissima

potestas),

he nevertheless

dmits

that

t

is

grand,

ingular

nd

very

great.

He

then

xplains

he actual

extension

f

it

in the

following teps:

(1)

Christhas

constitutedeter

as

the

head,

the

prince,

nd

the

prelate

of the other

Apostles

and

of

all the

faithful. Hence

Peter

11 Breviloquium, lib. 2, c. 3; if. To the references to the other works on p.

20,

note

2,

add

also

Consultatio,

p.

234

ff.

12

Iterum,

quia

legem evangelicam

esse

legem

perfectae

libertatis

x

quo patet papam

non

habere

talem

plenitudinem

potestatis, potest

bene

et

male

intelligi,

est

advertendum

quod

legem evangelicam

esse

legem perfectae

libertatis

ncn

debet

intelligi,

ut

omnem

servitudinem

tollat

et

nullam

patiatur

etiam

christianis....,

sed

debet

magis intelligi

negative,

quia

scilicet

per

legem evangelicam

nullatenus

iugum grave

inducitur et nullus

per ipsam

fit servus

alterius,

nec

tantum

onus

quoad

exteriorem

cultum

divinum

per

ipsam

imponitur

hristianis

quanto Judaei passi

sunt.

Breviloquium,

lib.

2,

c.

4;

p.

21.



10/27

470

THE

REVIEW OF POLITICS

was not

elected

by

the

Apostles

or

by

others

nd

instituted

y

this

election n

his

right. Every

uccessor f Peter

possesses

he same

right

and privileges Peter.'"

(2)

The

Pope,

as

successor f

Peter,

has

the

regular

upreme

power

n

all

spiritual

matters,

hat

s,

in matterswhich

pertain

o the

evangelical

aw

and

which

re

proper

o

it,

and

which

do not

belong

to

another

aw,

at

least

not to anotherhuman aw. The

Pope

has,

therefore,

he

regular upreme ower

s

regards

he

dispensation

f the

Sacraments,

he

ordination

f

priests,

nd

the institutionf

clerics

r

the

promotion

f

those

who

have

to

govern

nd

teach

the

Christian

peoples.

In

brief,

he

Pope

has the

regular

upreme

ower

s

regards

faith

including

morals)

and

the

divine

ult

and

as

regards

ll those

things

without

which

he

Church

annot

conveniently

e

ruled.'14

(3)

Within

the frame f this

regular

upreme ower,

he

Pope

has,

however,

o absolute

power;

his

power

s

limited

o

those

things

which renecessaryo be doneoromitted.Hence hispowerdoes not

regard

works

f

supererogation.

or

instance,

he

Pope

has

no

right

to

oblige anybody

o

the observation

f

the

evangelical

ounsels

or

to works

without

which

neither

aith

nor

good

moralswould

be en-

dangered.

He

can,

however,

n case

of

necessity

r of

greatutility,

prescribe

uch

works.'5

(4)

Moreover,

he

Pope

has

regular

oercive

ower;

hat

s,

he

has

not

only

jurisdiction

s

regards

he onfessionalr theforumnternum

concerning

he

remission

f

sins,

but

he has

also the

right

o

enforce

13

Dialogus, pars

III,

tract.

I,

lib.

1,

c.

17;

fol.

88vb.

In

An

princeps

this truth

s

more

presupposed

as basis

than

formally expressed;

for instance:

Tertium

notabile,

quod

ex

praedictis

habetur

est,

quod

a Deo non solum instituta

st

potestas

papalis....

c.

4;

p.

243;

Amplius,

Christus

constituens

eatum

Petrum

caput

et

praelatum

cunctorum

fidelium....

I.c.c. 2;

p.

236

and elsewhere.

14

Dialogus,

I.c.

Cf.

An

princeps,

c.

4;

p.

244.

Cf.

also

p.

253

about the

Pope

as

delegate

of Christ

and

especially

p.

255:

Licet

potestas

papae,

quae spiritualia

respicit,

sit nobilior et dignior potestate saeculari, quemadmodum spiritualia sunt temporalibus

digniora,

et

papa

quoad

quaedam

spiritualia

habeat

etiam

potestatem

uper

illos

qui

sunt

in

sublimitate

aeculari

constituti,

amen

non habet

super

ipsos

talem

plenitudinem

potes-

tatis,

icet

sub

bono intellectu

posset

concedi,

quod,

quemadmodum

asserunt

sancti

patres,

papa

habet

plenitudinem

potestatis,

uia

quoad

omnia

spiritualia

quae

sunt

de

necessitate

facienda

et

super

quae

expedit

caput

fidelium

potestatem

habere,

ipse

regulariter

plenitudinem

obtinet

potestatis.

1,5

Dialogus,

I.c.

This restriction

s

contained

in the

liberty

of the

Holy Gospel.

Cf.

also

An

princeps,

c.

4;

p.

244,

and

Breviloquium,

lib.

2,

c.

17;

p.

52

f.



11/27

OCKHAM'S

POLITICAL

IDEAS

471

his

orders

by

punishment.

This coercive

power,

however,

must

be

(regularly,

t

least)

restricted

o

ecclesiasticalrimes

which re

directly

committedgainst heChristianaw as suchand which, herefore,re

not

considered

s

crimes

y

any

other aw.

As

regards

urely

ecular

crimes,

e

has no

regular

power

over

them,

nd has

to

leave

their

punishment

o the secular aw.

However,

n the

case

of

sinners

nd

criminals

who are

already udged by

a civil

court,

he

may

inflict n

them

dditional

unishments

n

order

o

bring

hem o

true

repentance.

In

any

case,

his

vindictive

ower

must

not

extend

o

a

violation

f the

lawfulrightsfothers, ormust t be exceedinglyevere nd incontra-

diction

o the

spirit

f the

Holy Gospel.16

(5)

Every

Pope

who

s

lawfully

lected s

ipso

facto

free

nd

not

subject

o

any

ecular

ower

r to

any

ecular

urisdiction.

f, therefore,

a

Pope

before

his

election

had been

a slave or

subject

o

any

secular

ruler,

y

the

fact

that

he is instituted

he

Supreme

Pontiff e

is

free

and notsubject o a secularurisdiction.This admits, owever,f

an

exception.

Though

the

Pope

is

regularly

ot

subject

to a

secular

power,

he

may

ose

his

liberty

nd

sovereignty

hrough

is own

fault,

because

of

heresy

r a crime hat

ndangers

ublic

ecurity."

(6)

The

Pope,

like

the

Church,

as the

right

o ask the

faithful

for all

necessary emporal

oods

without

which

fruitful

overnment

of

theChurch

annot e establishednd realized.

This,

of

course,

oes

not mean thatthePope can expropriatenyChristian, ut it means

that

he

has

the

right

o

get

the

necessary

upport

s to

temporal

hings

for

his divine

work.Is

16

Dialogus,

.c.

It

is

surprising

hat

Al

Dempf,

op.

cit.,

p.

518 denies

that,

ccord-

ing

to

Ockham,

the

Pope

has

coactive

power.

He

probably

failed

to

make

necessary

distinctions.

ckham

denies

the coactive

power

of

the

Pope

as

regards

urely

ecular

crimes

nd

"in

foro

contentioso,"

hich

pparently,

ere,

refers

nly

to

temporal

ontests

or

disputes.

f. An

princeps,

.

4;

p.

244

and

Octo

quaestiones,.

3,

c.

3;

p.

104 f.

17 Dialogus, .c. This privilegef thePope is not tated nAn princeps.t is,how-

ever,

xpressed

n Octo

quaestiones,

.

3,

c.

3;

p.

105,

where n

the

following

hapters,

which

certainly epresent

ckham's

opinion,

t is

proved

hat uch

an

exemption

s not

repugnant

o the

best

form

f

government.

18

Dialogus,

.c.

Cf.

An

princeps,

.

4;

p.

243.

Though

the Franciscan ormulation

of

this

privilege

s

striking,

evertheless

ckham

certainly

dmits

hat he

Pope

and

the

Churchown

those

temporal

oods

whichwere donated

by

the Christian

eople;

the

Pope

and

the

Churchown

them,

owever,

ot

by

divine,

but

by

human aw.

Cf.

An

princeps,

.

8;

p.

258

ff.



12/27

472

THE

REVIEW

OF

POLITICS

This

s,

according

o

Ockham,

he

regular

ower

f

the

Pope,

s

it

can

be established

y

the

eaching

f the

Holy

Gospel,

f theFathers

of theChurch,nd of saintlyheologians-especiallyt. Bernard,

whom

Ockham,

t

seems,

ollows

losely. Though

hisdemarcation

of

the

Pope's power

s

definite

n

its

general

utlines,

ckham

s,

nevertheless,

ware hat

not

every

ituations

covered

y

t.

Should

any

doubt risewhetherertain

hings elong

o

the

Pope'spower

r

not,

he

problem

as

to

be

decided

irst

y

going

ack o two nfallible

guides,namely,

oly

Scripture

nd

right

eason.

Everyone

ho

understandsolyScripturena soundway notmerelyn tsmystical

sense,

which

annot

e used

s a

strict

roof),

nd

whobaseshimself

on an infallible

eason,

as

the

right

nd

the

duty

o

explain

nd

to

declare

y

a true nd faithfultatement

hether

certain ase

falls

under

he

Pope'spower

r not.

For t s

obvious

hat

othing

hichs

against

oly

Scripture

r

right

eason an

belong

o

the

papal

uris-

diction.

Furthermore,

t s the ask f a General ouncil

nd also

of

thePope (if he is ableto understandhetruthorrectly)o make

authenticecisions

nd determinations

s

regards

he

Pope's power.

Such

determinations

ind

all

Christians

n conscience

nd

do

not

allow hem

o

teach,

xplain

r determinen

opinion

ontrary

o

the

definition

f the General

Council

or the

Pope.

If,

however,

he

Pope's

definition

s

against

ruth,

hen

obody

as to believe im

nder

any

circumstance.

n such

case,

nyone

who

by

Holy

Scripture

r

by necessaryeason nowshat hePope s in error as theduty ot

to

believe

he

Pope,

nd

he

has even he

duty

o refute

is errors

n

order

hathe

may

not

ppear

o assent o

them;

ut

uch one

must

observe

he

ppropriateness

nd

propriety

f

place,

ime,

nd all

other

circumstances.

By

these

eterminations

ckham

onstitutedhe

papalpower

n

its

own

i.e.,

n

ts

piritual)

ealm,

here

t

s

supreme

nd

a

full

ower,

19

An

princeps,

.

5;

p.

254.

This,

of

course,

s

Ockham's

Apologia pro

vita

sua,

also.

In

any

case,

Ockham

does not

believe n

the

nfallibility

f

the

Pope,

which,

t

this

ime,

was

not

yet

a

defined

ogma;

nor

does he seem

to

believe n the

nfallibility

of

a

general

ouncil,

but

only

of

the

Church,

hough

is discussions n this

opic

n

the

Dialogus

shouldbe more

autiously

sed

than

s

commonly

one.

In

any

case,

Ockham

did

not

make the

necessary

istinction

etween

definition

x

cathedra

nd other

tate-

ments f the

Popes.

Hence

the unfortunatenstances

f

erroneous tatementsf

Pope

John

XXII about

beatific

ision

prevented

im from

elieving

n

the

nfallibility

f the

Pope.



13/27

OCKHAM'S

POLITICAL

IDEAS 473

though

y

no

means

n

absolute

power.

Every

Christians

subject

o

the

Pope

as

to

his

lawful

piritual

uperior,

ccording

o

divine

nstitu-

tion-and the Emperor s no exception. But according o the same

divine

nstitution,

he

Pope

is not

a

lord

or

ruler

n the

secular

ense,

nor s

he

a

tyrant.

He

may

be

truly

alled

"Lord",

but

only

because

of his

dignity.

For,

n

truth,

he

Pope

is

the servant f all

Christians.

This

idea

of

the

ministeriumf

the

Pope,

and

not of

a

Dominium,

equally

emphasized

y

Dante,

probably

as

its

source n St.

Bernard's

De

Consideratione

d

Eugenium

Papam.

Impressed

by

this

idea,

OckhamremindshePope: "Let himknowthat,bythegeneral ega-

tion,

t

is not

conceded

o

him

by

any

meansto

command

imperare)

by austerity

nd

force;

et

him

know, herefore,

hat not the

Lordship

(dominium)

but the

ministry

ministerium)

s

given;

let

him know

that

he

is a

prelate

ver

ll

not for

himself

ut for

he

benefit

f

others,

because

it

was

not

provided

principally

or

him

but

for

the

others;

let

him know

that he received

he

power

n

the

Lord

for

edification,

not fordestructionnd perturbation,nd to diminish he rights f

others."

0

The

papal

power,

herefore,

s not

withoutimits

which re

imposed

upon

it

by

God.

These

limits

re

defined

y

the

actual

and

positive

content

of

the

ecclesiastical

uthority,

nd

also

by

the

God-given

rights

ossessed

y

others

which

s

only

the reverse f

it).

The

next

task

of

Ockham,

herefore,

as to

prove

the existence

f suchdivine

rights

utside

heecclesiastical

ealm,

nd

consequently

ot

dependent

on the

Pope.

In

fulfilling

his

task,

Ockham

had to

develop

what

could

be called

a

political

hilosophy.

2.

Man's Natural

Right

of

Property

nd

Dominion

Ockham

begins

withthe

premise

hat man has the natural

right,

granted o himbynatural nd divine aw, to acquirepropertynd to

set

up

a ruler

r a

government

ndowedwith

urisdiction.

This

right

is

independent

f

man's

belief

or

unbelief,

ince

God does not

cease

to

give

ife nd

health,

material

nd

spiritual oods

to all

men,

regard-

less

of

their

reed.

Hence,

they

re

capable

of

possessing

hem

nd

20

An

princeps,

.

6;

p.

254.



14/27

474

THE

REVIEW OF

POLITICS

of

ruling

ver

them;

r

in other

words,

hey

have the

right

f

acquiring

property

nd of

setting

p

a

government.Nobody,

therefore,

as the

right o deprive nyoneof these naturalprerogatives ithout just

reason.2

While

this

right

o

acquire

property

as

givenby

God

to man as

regards

emporal

hings,

his

property

s either

ommon

o

all

men.

or

is

private

roperty.

The common

property

f

temporal

hings

was

granted

o

Adam and his

wife,

not

only

for

themselves

ut

also

for

all their

escendants. This

ownershipdominium)gave

man the

right

to

dispose

of

temporal

hings

nd

to

use

them

or

his

personal

enefit.

It

did

not,

Ockham

continues,

nclude he

right

f

private roperty

n

any

form ecause

t

was the

will

of

God

that all

men shouldown

all

temporal

hings

n

common,

s

befitted

man in

his

original

nnocence.

Sin, however,

made

it

necessary

o

grant

to man the

right

f

private

property,

nd

for

his eason he

right

f

private

roperty

as

introduced

by

God

intothe

right

f common

property.

The

Franciscan nfluence n

this

dea

is worth

oting.22

Ockham

here follows

losely

nd

almost

iterally

uns Scotus.

The

right

o

acquire

private

roperty,

e

argues,

s

not

a

sign

of

perfection.

For

in

perfect

man,

uch s Adam

and

Eve

were

n their

riginal

nnocence,

there

s no avarice

nor

any greediness

o

acquire

r to use

any temporal

thing

against

the dictates

f

right

reason.

Consequently,

here

was

no necessityorevenutilityn possessingnytemporalhing o long

as

man remained

n

his

original

nnocence.

Sin,

however,

hanged

his

happy

tate.

After

man's sin there

rose

and

grew

n

him

varice nd

greediness

o

possess

nd

to use

temporal hings

n an

improper

anner.

In

order

o

restrain his

mmoderate

esire

o

possess

emporal hings,

and,

at

the ame

time,

o

prevent

man

from

eglecting

he

due

manage-

ment

nd

procurement

f

temporal hings

for

common

hings

which

belongto all men areusuallyneglected ybad men), it was necessary

21

Breviloquium,

lib.

3,

c.

6;

p.

84.

22

Cf.

the

same

(traditional)

idea

of

only

the

right

of

common

property

before sin

in

St.

Bonaventure,entent.,

I,

d.

44,

a

2,

q.

2,

ad

4;

ed.

Quaracchi

t.

2,

p.

1009.

The connection

with Franciscan

poverty

is

seen in

De

perfectione

evangelica,

II,

a.

1;

t.

V;

p.

129.

Cf.

Alexander

Halensis

(to

be exact William of

Melitona),

Summa

Theologica,

allae,

n. 521

f.;

(ed.

Quaracchi)

t.

3;

p.

777 ff.

cotus,

Oxoniense,

V,

d.

15,

q.

2,

n.

3-4;

ed.

Vives

.

18,

p.

256

f.



15/27

OCKHAM'S POLITICAL

IDEAS

475

that

ll

temporal hings

hould

not

be common

roperty

ut that

ome

of

them

hould

be

acquired

s

private

roperty.

This

is

thereason

why,

after hesin ofAdam and Eve, therightpotestas) to acquireprivate

property

as

introduced

y

divine aw. The

right

f

private roperty,

therefore,

s

a

restrictionf the ommon

ossession

f

all

temporal

hings,

a

restriction

n those

hings

which

re

necesssary

nd

useful or

good

and honest

ife

not

only

for

man as an

individual

ut

also

for

man

as

a citizen n

a

perfect

ociety.

Hence actual

society

annot

be

like the

Republic

f

Plato,

where ll

things

re

in

common,

nd

Aristotlewas

rightwhen he rejectedPlato's conception. Aristotle onsidered he

actual

tate

f

manand

knew hat

he

average

man s

inclined

o evil.23

But

ust

as

the

right

o

acquireprivate

roperty

as

given

o

man

as

an

adjustment

f

his actual

state,

so

for the

same

reason God

has

given

man the

right

o set

up

rulers ndowed

with

emporal

urisdiction.

This

implies

hat

temporalurisdiction

eserved

o

a

ruling

person

or

personswas foreigno theoriginal tateofman,butbecamenecessary

for

man's

actual

tate

n which

t is

necessary

nd

useful

o

set

up

rulers

for

a

good

social

life.

Furthermore,

e

says,

the

right

o institute

jurisdiction

as

immediately

iven

by

God,

and

not

by

any

human

intermediary

r

cooperation.24

These assertions

f

Ockham

do

not

mply

hat

emporalurisdiction

or

the state s

bad

in itself.

Though

the

need

of

forming

state

and

of

instituting

ruling

body

is one of the effectsf the first in,the

institution

f a

government

s

not n effect f

sin,

but s

only

occasioned

by

sin,

that

s,

as a

natural

remedy

or

the effectsf sin. From

this

it follows

hat

temporal

urisdiction

utside

the Churchand

outside

any

religious

uthorization

by

the

Pope,

for

instance)

is valid

and

good."5

23 Cf. Breviloquiium, ib. 3, c. 7; p. 85 ff.Cf. Scotus l.c. Ockham develops these

ideas

in

extenso

in his

Opus

nonaginta

dierum which

was

not used

here.

24

Potestas

ergo appropriandi

res

temporales

personae

et

personis

aut

collegio

data

est

a Deo

humano

generi.

Et.

propter

rationem

consimilem

data est

a

Deo,

absque

ministerio

et

cooperatione

humana,

potestas

instituendi

rectores

habentes

iurisdictionem

temporalem,

quia

iurisdictio

temporalis

est de

numero

illorum

quae

sunt

necessaria et

utilia

ad bene

et

politice

vivere....

Breviloquium,

lib.

3,

c.

7;

p.

87.

25

The other

view

found its

significant

xpression

in

the

formula: Extra

ecclesiam



16/27

476

THE

REVIEW OF

POLITICS

This

twofold

ight

o

acquireprivate

property

nd

to

institute

government

s

immediatelyranted

y

God

to

all

men,

believers

nd

unbelieverslike. It contains n affirmativerecept, nd, as such,

belongs

to

man's

moral and

natural

duties.

As

every

man,

believer

and

unbeliever,

s

obliged

by

a

precept

f

God

to honor his

parents

and

to

assisthis

neighbor,

o

every

man

s

obliged,

s soon as a

corres-

ponding

ituation s

given,

o

acquire

private

roperty

nd

to

set

up

a

ruler n

secular

matters.26

He is

obliged

o

do

so, however,

nly

f

a

corresponding

ituation

xists

because,

since this is an

affirmative

precept,t obliges lwaysbut not foreverymomentsemper ed non

pro semper).

The

corresponding

ituation

where

he

precept

bliges

s

the

case

of

necessity.

n other

words,

man s not

obliged

o

appropriate

property

r to

institute

government

o

long

as his

well-being

nd

a

sound

social

life are not

in

danger.

If

his

well-being

nd

a sound

social

ife

re

not

n

danger,

e can

use

his

right,

ut

he

is not

obliged

to

use

it.

Consequently

e can

renounce his

right,

s

he

does,

for

instance,ythevow ofpovertyr obedience.27

Fromthis

right

o

acquireprivate roperty

nd

to institute ruler

endowed

with

jurisdiction,

e must

distinguish

he

actual

appropria-

tionof

temporal hings

nd

the

actual

setting

p

of a

government.

he

right

omes

mmediately

rom

God

by

natural

aw;

the

ctual

appropria-

tion

and

setting

p

of

a

government

s

usually

he act

of man

and

of

human

law.

Man,

therefore,

sing

his

divine

right,

wns certain

temporal hings

s

private

property y

the act of

appropriation

n

a

lawful

way.

That means

hat

ccording

o

human

rdination

ertain

things

elong

to

one

and

others

o

another.

God

has

left he

division

of

temporal

hings

rdinarily

o

man,

though

n

exceptional

ases

He

has

given

certain

hings

o certain

ersons

r

nations.

In

this atter

case,

of

course,

he

person

or

persons

wn

temporal hings

by

divine

right

nd

not

by

human

right.28

omnia aedificant

ad

gehennam,

et

ideo

extra

ecclesiam

nulla est ordinata

potestas

sed

ibi

est solummodo

potestas

permissa

et

non concessa.

Breviloquium,

lib.

3,

c.

I

p.

68.

Ockham's

purpose

is to

refute

this

opinion

(based

on Rom. 14,

23),

which

implies

that

at least

the

Roman

Empire,

if

it does

not

"build

up

towards

hell,"

is from the

Pope.

26

Breviloquium,

lib.

3,

c.

8;

p.

87 f.

27

Breviloquium, I.c.

p.

88.

28

As to human

ordination

or

human

right,

cf.:

Ius

proprietatis

et

dominii

primo

introductum

uit

iure

humano

et

civili,

appellando

ius

civile omne

ius

quod

non est

ius



17/27

OCKHAM'S POLITICAL

IDEAS

477

The

ctual

ettingp

of

lawful

urisdiction

rof

rulerndowed

with

urisdiction

ccording

o

this

xplanation,

s at least

artlyy

humanrdinationndhumanaw. Theres,however,ne xception

to be

mentioned.

he

urisdiction

f the

husband

ver is

wife,

nd

likewise

he

urisdiction

f

he

atherver

is

hildren,

s not

y

human

institutionut

y

divinenstitution

nd

right,

r

by

natural

aw.

The

jurisdiction

f

rulers,

hats to

say,

f

udges

n

cities r

of

kings

n

their

ingdoms,

tc.,

s

not

ctually

et

up

by

naturalr

divine

aw,

at

east

ot

rdinarily;

t

s

ordinarily

et

up

by

humanctionnd

by

humanaws-fornstance,y lectionrheredityrthe ike.29

3.

TheDivine

ight

f

Secular

ower

It

is

clear

hat

ccording

o

Ockham

rue

ominion

ver

emporal

things

nd

rue

urisdiction

ver

ersons

as

nstituted

ot

nly

y

n

act

of

God,

but lso

and

mainlyy

acts f

human

eings.

f

we

leave side he

xceptional

aseswhere od has

given

ertainands

to ertain

eople

r

rulers,

r

where

od

has

nstituted

udges

r

Kings,

we have

o

ask:

By

what

ight

oes secular

ower

ossess

hat

s

given

o t

by

n

act

f he

eople?

n this

ase

oes

secular

ower

possess

ts

urisdiction

nd

ts

ominionver

ands

nd ther

roperties

by

human

ight

r

by

ivine

ight?

ckham

nswershat

uch

secular

power ossesses

ts

powery

divine

nd

not

y

human

ight,lthoughit s instituted

y

nactoracts f human

eings.

n other

ords,

such

secular

ower

as

ts

dominion

nd ts

urisdiction

ut

not

ts

institution

mmediately

rom

od.

What

does

"to

have

power

mmediately

rom

od" mean? It

can

be

understood

n three

ifferent

enses.

Thata

power

e

im-

mediately

rom

od

can

mean,

n

a first

ense,

hat

his

ower

s

immediatelyivenyGod ndwithouthehelpnd o-jurisdictionf

any

reature.

n

this

way,

Moses

had

his

uthority

s

leader

f

the

divinum

ec naturale.

ostea

autem

uaedam

dominia ntroducta

uerunture

divino,

uia

ex

speciali

consecratione

ivina;

quaedam

autem ntroducta uerunt

ure humano

uod

non

erat

us

regum

ed

populi

vel

aliorum

minoris

ignitatis

uam

sint

reges; quaedam

introducta

uerunt

ure

regum.

reviloquium,

ib.

3,

c.

15;

p.

98.

29

I.c.



18/27

478

THE

REVIEW

OF POLITICS

Israelites

mmediately

rom

God

and

in

no

way

from

he

people.30

In

a

second

ense,

power

an be

immediately

rom

od,

because

t

isgiven nly yGod,not,however,ithouthehelpof creatures.n

this

way,

or

nstance,

very

ope

after

eterhas

his

power

nd

his

pontificate

mmediately

rom

God,

not,

however,

ithout

uman

cooperation;

or

he

Pope

has

to be

elected.

But the

electors

f the

Pope

do

not

give

him

ny

power,

ust

s

the

performer

f

the

baptismal

ritedoes

not confer

race;

the

power,

ike

the

grace

n

Baptism,

s

immediately

onferred

y

God

alone.31

In a third ense

and

this s the most

mportant

ne forour

purpose)

power

an

be

understood

o

be

immediately

rom

od

or

from

God

alone,

f

somebody

ad

the

power

nd

the

dominion

irst

(i.e.,

when

he

was

instituted)

ecause

f

a concession

r

a

donation

or

the

resignation

f another

nd is

nevertheless

fter hese

cts

de-

pendent

nly

n

God

forhis

power

nd

dominion,

o

that

nly

God

is

his

superior

n these

matters.32

There

cannot

e

the

slightest

oubt

hat

Ockham

was

convinced

that

nly

n this

hird

ense id

every

ecular

ower

ome

mmediately

from

God

alone,

unless

n

a

particular

aseit couldbe

proved

y

a

special

ivine evelation

hat t was from

od

in thefirst

r

second

sense.

In

any

case,

the Roman

Empire,

ike almost

ll the

other

kingdoms

nd

empires,

eceived

ts

power

nd dominion

n

the

third

sensemmediatelyrom od alone.

It

is

important

ow

to

explain

what s

meant

y saying

hat

secular

ower

as

the

upremeower

y

divine

ight,

et

s

instituted

by

the

people.

It

means,

irst,

hat

supreme

ecular

nd

sovereign

power

as

ts

power y

the rdination

f

the

people,

o that

he

people

at

the

beginning

ave

transferred

r

given

he

supreme

ower

o the

ruler.

n

other

words,

he

people

id

not

simply

onsent

r acknowl-

edge

hat heruler adand

actually

xercisedhe

upremeower,

ut

the

people

really

nd

truly

onferred

his

power.

The

electors

r

30

Cf.

Octo

quaestiones,

.

2;

c.

3;

p.

74. The same

distinctions found

n

Brev-i-

loquium,

ib.

4,

c.

5;

p.

109,

though

ere n

specification

s to

jurisdiction.

31

Octo

quaestiones,

.c.

Cf.

Breviloquium,

.c.

The instance

f

the

Pope

is here

introduced

ith:

Isto

modo

videtur

liquibus....

32

Oclo

quaestiones,

.c.

Cf.

Breviloquium,

.c.;

p.

110.



19/27

OCKHAM'S POLITICAL IDEAS

479

those

who

perform

he coronation

ceremonymay

simply

ndicate

or

confirm

he

fact

that

somebody

as

the

supreme ower,

without

iving

himpower;thepeople'selection,however,onferredhepoweron a

ruler

nd transferred

t

to him

from hemselves.

This

power

ncludes

that over

temporal

oods

and

jurisdiction.

To

say

that secular

ower

has

the

supreme

ower,

et

s

instituted

by

the

people

means,

econdly,

hat

the

people

did

not transfer

his

power

o

a

private

erson

nd

for he

personal

enefit f an

individual,

but to a personor persons or the common enefit.Or, as Ockham

says,

they

onferred

t

not

on

a

person

but on

a

dignity.

Hence a

ruler

cannot use

his

power

for

personal

purposes,

ut

only

for the

common

ood.

If he

uses,

for

nstance,

emporal hings

which

belong

to his

dignity,

ot to his

person,

or

his

personal

enefit,

e is

obliged

to

restitution.

This

statement

means,

thirdly,

hat a

rulerto whom the

people

transferredhe

supreme ower

possesses

his

power

not as the

people's

power

but as a

divine

power,

r

not

by

the

right

f the

people

but

by

divine

right.

In one

word,

fter

he

transfer as been

accomplished

the rulerhas

no other

superior

ut

God,

and

is

regularly

ependent

on no one but

God.

In certain

ases,however,

hen

the

ruler

roves

to

be

unfit,

e

is

subject

to the

people

or to another

person-for

instance,

o

the

Pope-and

he can

be

deposed.33

From

this

t

follows hat sincethe

awfulruler

possesses

his

power

in

dependence

n

God

alone,

although

t

was

given

to him

by

the

people,

he

power

annotbe taken

away

from

im

without

just

cause.

Some

might

hink hat

he

cause of

the

constitutionf

a

lawful

overn-

ment s also

the

legitimate

ause of its

dissolution.

According

o

this

since

the

will

of the

governed

as

constitutedhe

government,

o the

willof thegovernedanlawfully, ithoutany ustcause sola voluntate

et

dissensu),

dissolve

the

government.

Ockham, however,

bjects

violentlygainst

his

reasoning:

ed

hoc habetminime

eritatem.

For

when

someone

ubmits imself

reely

o the dominion f

another,

e

33

Octo

quaesliones,

.

2,

c.

6;

p.

78

ff.

Breviloquium,

.c.;

p.

111.

As to the

deposition

f

an

emperor

f.

Breviloquium,

ib.

5,

c.

2;

p.

157 f.



20/27

480

THE

REVIEW

OF POLITICS

cannot,

ithout

he

other's

onsent,

etract

his ubmission

ithout

guilt.34

4. The

Just

onstitution

f

Commonwealth

Ockham's

nterests a

political

heoretician

as

focused

n the

relation

etween he

Roman

Empire

nd

the

Papacy.

After

having

established

he fact

that true ecular

power

n its

dominion

nd

juris-

diction

xists ithout

eing

uthorized

y

the

Pope

and

that

he

supreme ower, fterhavingbeen constituted,ossesses ts right n

immediate

ependence

n

God

alone,

he

goes

on

to show

how a

lawful

empire

an

be

constituted

ithout

cclesiastical

nterference.

e bases

his

discussions

n

the

pecial

ase of

theRoman

Empire.

He

enumerates

three

ways

n

which lawful

mpire

an

be

constituted.

The

third,

however,

may

be

disregarded

ere,

since

it

envisages

direct

divine

intervention.Of

the

remaining

wo

ways,

the

first

s

by

consent,

thesecondbyforce.

The

first

way

is

simply

y

consent.

All who

are

born

free

have

the

right

romGod

to

submit

hemselves

o a

higher

uthority,

o

long

as

they

re

not

subject

o another

uthority,35

s

was

already

xplained.

Hence

a

nation

an

submit

tselfn

toto

to

another

uthority

nd

thus

become

n

integral

art

of

a

larger

ommonwealth.

n

this

way,

all

the

people

who

belonged

o

the Roman

Empire

ould,

t thesame

time

or at

different

imes,

ave become

parts

f the Roman

Empire.

The

other

awful

way

is

by

force-that

s to

say,

by

a

just

war.

A

war

could

be

just

either

ecause

othernations

eclared

war

and

were

then

ubjected

n

Documents

Boehner-Ockham's Political Ideas